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Oh it was in my playlist. Somehow I don't think intellectual NY alt-hip-hop is going to be played in an airport.
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Nov 8, 2018 04:39
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Nov 8, 2018 05:39
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wesleywillis posted:The legend lives on from the Chippewa on down Few days too early to be posting that, isn't it?
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Nov 8, 2018 05:40
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Jerry Cotton posted:The guy who lives in the house next to my home is a train driver and he went to his boss one morning and told them to send his rear end to rehab because he was afraid he'd die of drinking. He told me this one night over a pint at the local pub where he had been celebrating getting out of rehab that morning. This is still a highly unionised industry with some decent protection for staff, thank goodness. So the other side of the coin of the zero tolerance policies has generally been that companies are required to commit to helping people who come forward. I've heard lots of stories like yours.
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Nov 8, 2018 08:04
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Holy poo poo
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Nov 8, 2018 08:29
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DG-7e943srs
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Nov 8, 2018 08:33
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Even Dahir Insaat is laughing at this
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Nov 8, 2018 08:34
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I thought that scene in battleship was implausible but now I'm convinced.
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Nov 8, 2018 09:48
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GotLag posted:Even Dahir Insaat is laughing at this Dahir Insaat would have the whole top thrid of the building convert into a drone.
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Nov 8, 2018 10:22
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Like all videos of things too-large-to-be-moving-safely-that-fast, the video's been sped up. See the waves and the little people dashing about.
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Nov 8, 2018 10:42
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Serephina posted:Like all videos of things too-large-to-be-moving-safely-that-fast, the video's been sped up. See the waves and the little people dashing about. Needs more Benny Hill
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Nov 8, 2018 11:05
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Local school. Apparently they used regular nails instead of screws. It happened during weekend so no one was hurt.
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Nov 8, 2018 11:12
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OrthoTrot posted:Thanks! And jesus that's some rainfall. As yet there aren't any systems I'm aware of to detect weather related obstacles so if the track circuits are still functioning no one would know what was going on. Although if the ground has physically gone I would assume the track circuit has long since tripped. This isn't the same time and place, and the flooding here is more extensive, but the situation wrt the hanging track is the same.  I am very relieved they knew the track was out before the train got there.
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Nov 8, 2018 11:13
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OrthoTrot posted:This is still a highly unionised industry with some decent protection for staff, thank goodness. So the other side of the coin of the zero tolerance policies has generally been that companies are required to commit to helping people who come forward. I've heard lots of stories like yours. Oh I just remembered another guy who went into seizure due to alcohol withdrawal during a job interview. I was there - at the local pub again - when he came back from three weeks in rehab and after a few cups of coffee he decided it would be a smart idea to "just try" a mint schnapps or two. He didn't work with trains or anything dangerous like that, however. He was a crane operator at the harbour.
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Nov 8, 2018 11:34
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Kennel posted:Local school. Man, things have gotten crazy since cannabis laws were relaxed.
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Nov 8, 2018 11:51
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Jerry Cotton posted:He didn't work with trains or anything dangerous like that, however. He was a crane operator at the harbour. Oh, no danger at all then
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Nov 8, 2018 11:58
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spog posted:Dahir Insaat would have the whole top thrid of the building convert into a drone. At least the Dahir Insaat version would be theoretically possible (in a perfect world with infinite money)
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Nov 8, 2018 12:00
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Lord Zedd-Repulsa posted:Few days too early to be posting that, isn't it? Yeah, someone mentioned the E a few posts before mine, so I figured what the hell.
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Nov 8, 2018 12:03
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OrthoTrot posted:The drivers safety device is a pedal that has to be continuously depressed or the train will stop. same
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Nov 8, 2018 14:39
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Serephina posted:Like all videos of things too-large-to-be-moving-safely-that-fast, the video's been sped up. See the waves and the little people dashing about. lol and the pitch of the horn
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Nov 8, 2018 14:43
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There was a specific request for this one earlier. Hatfield – the accident that broke the entire railway network. Warning – long. This was an engineering accident rather than an immediate human failing in railway operating, like most of the stuff I know more about. What is very interesting though is the decaying management structure that had allowed the situation as a whole to come about. It lead to a complete reorganisation of the rail industry and was a big political scandal. Combined with Ladbroke Grove and the earlier Potters Bar derailment railway safety seemed at crisis point. 17 October 2000. The 12:10 from London Kings Cross to Leeds was travelling at 115mph down the East Coast Main Line on what was known as the Down Fast line. At Welham Green curve, just south of Hatfield the left hand rail cracked under the driving locomotive, sending fragments of rail into the wheels and undercarriage. As the train passed over the cracks at speed the rail completely came apart, causing the subsequent coaches to derail. The buffet car turned over and was thrown into one of the masts that supported the overhead wires. Four people in that carriage were killed and several, including the two buffet car staff, were seriously injured. Derailments occur for lots of reasons – train speed, improperly set points, track “spread”, track geometry, and the physical conditions of the rails themselves. In this case everything was fine except the actual rails. They had come apart due to what is known as “gauge corner cracking”. The gauge corner is the corner of the rail head where the main flat of the wheel and the flange both contact the rail – the top edge on the inside of the tracks. It is the bit that receives most contact from the wheels so it is vulnerable to rolling contact fatigue. Here’s a diagram of what different bits of rail are apparently called: http://imgur.com/a/xnneKJv And here’s a cross section of what gauge corner cracking looks like on the insde: http://imgur.com/gallery/bVQCqUO As to how that had come about we have to go to a policy making level. In 1994 the UK’s railways were privatised. To run the actual trains the Department for Transport would draw up a series of long term franchises for each set of routes and then bids would be submitted for them. Successful bids would then be given the franchise as a Train Operating Company (TOC) or Freight Operating Company (FOC), e.g. Thames Trains from the Ladbroke Grove crash, or Great Western Railway from the Southall crash. They pay a fee for the privilege of running that route, have to submit to various obligations about what services they will run, and their incentive is they get to keep the revenue remaining. It’s incredibly complicated and bureaucratically wasteful, but that’s the basics. Running trains is only one part of the work of keeping the railway going though, and John Major’s Conservative government was committed to putting the whole industry in the private sector. So they created Railtrack, a private company that had responsibility for the infrastructure. This company had to ensure the track was maintained and where appropriate improved and updated. It also employed the signallers. Railtrack in turn contracted out most of the maintenance work via a tendering process. So the actual work of ensuring the track on the East Coast Main Line was safe to run trains on was being done by Balfour Beatty. Industry standards, and the contract with Railtrack, required Balfour Beatty to patrol the track regularly. This was not done. Where it was done they walked from the side of the tracks, although the standard was that the patrol should be done from the area between the tracks, the “four foot”. Patrol report sheets indicated their patrols from one side of the tracks were supposed to cover all four lines – the Up and Down Fast, and the Up and Down Slow. Here is what they were supposed to be looking for, at a potential distance of 20-30 meters: http://imgur.com/a/dmpVHg0 Ultrasound examination was also required, and carried out. However the staff weren’t really trained in what their responsibilities were when doing it. They found defects, wrote them in reports, then took no further action. No comprehensive record of defects found, level of seriousness, and action taken, was kept. Balfour Beatty managers knew of the defects, and in particular knew the Welham Green Curve was a top priority area, but didn’t have the resources to fulfil their contractual obligations. They wrote up a recovery plan to deal with the increasingly out of control situation, but it was not comprehensively risk assessed for priority. They twice delayed replacing the rails at Welham Green curve in the months before the derailment. Railtrack, meanwhile, had the ultimate responsibility to ensure this work was being done. Balfour Beatty was merely their instrument for doing it. They knew Balfour Beatty hadn’t done the work, and wrote to them continuously to ask what they were doing, but took no concrete action. They did not know Balfour Beatty hadn’t trained their staff appropriately as they had no oversight of the actual day to day functioning of the work. They undertook audits but the write ups of those indicated a marked lack of probity. Where recommendations were made no one chased them up. When the dust settled after the accident it was found that recommendations and plans for recovey had stacked up over time, but in almost no cases had any action been taken on any of them. The whole point of contracting out was so Railtrack would not have to be concerned by the technical work. This meant there was a complete de-skilling process whereby the managers responsible for ensuring Balfour Beatty were doing their job generally lacked the competence to know either way. In addition there was a significant lack of political will within Railtrack to challenge their contractors in a meaningful sense with enforcement action. Privatisation had to be a success. Contracts were set up in such a way as to encourage bid submissions so as to make the whole thing seem competitive. It had to be the flourishing of now unfettered private sector innovation. The best way to do that was draw up the contracts in such a way that they were very attractive to bid for. Railtrack also had the responsibility to impose speed restrictions where track defects were uncovered and not yet fixed. Obviously they hadn’t done that here. They had responsibility to keep records of the condition of the track across the country. As they had no control over their contractors actually doing the work their records were in an appalling state. Immediately after the crash the question was asked loudly, at a government level, where else this might be happening. Railtrack had no answer and so they took the incredible step of imposing 1800 speed restrictions of 20mph around the country at places where they weren’t able to conclusively demonstrate the track had been maintained to the right levels. Part of this was a necessary safety response to the out of control situation. Part of it was political game playing as they felt they had been put in an impossible situation. From the second point of view it was a catastrophically bad idea. The chaos on the rail network was immense. It was estimated to be costing the UK economy as a whole £6 million a day. Disruption continued for over a year. I’m not sure a better example of the incompetence of the infrastructure management was possible. They had been stewards of the infrastructure for just over six years and it took nearly a year to resolve the damage done in that time. In 2002 the Department for Transport forced Railtrack into administration and replaced them with Network Rail, which took the maintenance contracts back in house. Railtrack and Balfour Beatty were charged with corporate manslaughter, along with five individually named managers. These charges were later dropped. Both companies were found guilty of Health and Safety legislation breaches though. Railtrack was fined £3.5 million and Balfour Beatty was fined £10 million, which was then reduced on appeal to £7.5 million. The previous highest railway related fine was the £2 million Thames Trains had been fined after Ladbroke Grove. The high court judge awarding the fines described it as the worst case of corporate negligence they had ever seen. Ladbroke Grove probably had a bigger impact on day to day operations. It brought us TPWS, systematised route learning, and clear procedures for assessing route risks and mitigating them at a design and planning stage. Hatfield was the bigger organisational overhaul. The infrastructure manager was scrapped and replaced wholesale. The rail regulator was moved from the Health and Safety Executive to its own independent organisation – the Office of the Rail Regulator. The Railway Safety Standards Board was established. The Rail Accident Investigation Board was established. In terms of regulation and management those arrangements look roughly similar still today.
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Nov 8, 2018 15:28
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A small postscript. One of the things that came out of the Hatfield debacle was the need to conduct track patrols and ultrasound testing regularly and document the results. Balfour Beatty had been doing that from the side of the tracks as they said it was the safest way to do it. Standards were strengthened to make it clear that this did not count as a sufficient examination. The infrastructure manager has the responsibility to ensure thorough examinations are conducted from positions on the actual line itself, and a safe system of work designed to allow that to happen. It is acceptable for that work to be carried out on lines open to traffic, whilst protected by a lookout, although all other methods have to be considered and ruled out as impractical. It was this chain of logic that led to John Wright acting as lookout for a colleague doing ultrasound testing outside Newark station in January 2014, as I wrote about previously, resulting in him being struck and killed. Two steps forward, one step back.
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Nov 8, 2018 15:40
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Serephina posted:Like all videos of things too-large-to-be-moving-safely-that-fast, the video's been sped up. See the waves and the little people dashing about. Even at normal speed, that's an impressive bit of ship-handling.
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Nov 8, 2018 15:54
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There was a collision between a Norwegian frigate Hilge and an oil tanker. The frigate was beached and there were hopes that'd keep it from sinking but...   Phone posting from the app. Those images are cobbled from two seperate posters. I tried image preview but the preview didn't load. I assume they aren't leached and won't break tables.
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Nov 8, 2018 16:05
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RandomPauI posted:There was a collision between a Norwegian frigate Hilge and an oil tanker. The frigate was beached and there were hopes that'd keep it from sinking but...
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Nov 8, 2018 16:09
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Oh that's not supposed to be riding that way.
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Nov 8, 2018 16:09
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I made this crack in the other thread, may as well make it in this one. If they can just counterflood it enough they could always dock it in pd-50.
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Nov 8, 2018 16:14
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I've been following the frigate thing all day. They're currently drilling anchors into the rock to try to tie it down and prevent it from slipping off the shoal it's sitting on into 30m-ish depths.
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Nov 8, 2018 16:32
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spog posted:Dahir Insaat would have the whole top thrid of the building convert into a drone. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yICU1pQ8fkM That except drone
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Nov 8, 2018 16:40
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no actual crash thankfully, but alarming all the same: "The plane climbed to 1,500ft, but then pitched and "descended rapidly" because the autopilot was set with a target altitude of 0ft." https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-46137445
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Nov 8, 2018 18:31
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spiny posted:no actual crash thankfully, but alarming all the same: Is there ever, under any circumstances, a valid reason to set an autopilot course for under 1000 ft? It seems like something that should never be possible.
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Nov 8, 2018 18:45
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Blorange posted:Is there ever, under any circumstances, a valid reason to set an autopilot course for under 1000 ft? It seems like something that should never be possible. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_WQfZYacEAw
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Nov 8, 2018 18:50
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Blorange posted:Is there ever, under any circumstances, a valid reason to set an autopilot course for under 1000 ft? It seems like something that should never be possible. When you wanna visit Amsterdam?
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Nov 8, 2018 18:51
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Rad-daddio posted:Deckels aren't cheap milling machine. pls post pics either way. It went fine, pretty undramatic really, down and indoors pretty quickly. Worst part was it did not fit through the doorway into the room I wanted it. But whatever. I might have to rethink my shop layout entirely anyway.  Detailed pics here https://forums.somethingawful.com/showthread.php?noseen=0&threadid=2905844&perpage=40&pagenumber=312#post489662699
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Nov 8, 2018 20:54
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RandomPauI posted:There was a collision between a Norwegian frigate Hilge and an oil tanker. The frigate was beached and there were hopes that'd keep it from sinking but... "Oh man I'm a really sleepy ship guys. Can I just crash here on these rocks for a while?"
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Nov 8, 2018 21:40
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Nov 8, 2018 22:08
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His Divine Shadow posted:It went fine, pretty undramatic really, down and indoors pretty quickly. Worst part was it did not fit through the doorway into the room I wanted it. But whatever. I might have to rethink my shop layout entirely anyway. Cool pics! I almost bought a cam-driven Browne and Sharpe screw machine for 200.00 at a local equipment auction. I decided against it when I found out that it come with none of the cams or tooling, and I'd have to source all that myself.
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Nov 8, 2018 23:28
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RandomPauI posted:There was a collision between a Norwegian frigate Hilge and an oil tanker. The frigate was beached and there were hopes that'd keep it from sinking but... Incidents like this should just automatically purge not just the people directly at fault but the entire chain of command above them.
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Nov 8, 2018 23:48
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https://i.imgur.com/jlSwB0z.mp4
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Nov 8, 2018 23:55
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RandomPauI posted:There was a collision between a Norwegian frigate Hilge and an oil tanker. The frigate was beached and there were hopes that'd keep it from sinking but... The fjord it is said never gives up her dead when the skies of November turn gloomy.
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Nov 9, 2018 00:05
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