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HEY GUNS
Oct 11, 2012

FOPTIMUS PRIME

zoux posted:

The article makes the case that this movie specifically shifted public perception and political stances toward global nuclear war, which , you know, good that that happened, but also unsettling that people didn't realize what nuclear war meant before they saw a made-for-TV movie about it.
This is how many things happened, like the influence The Jungle had on food safety laws, or the claim that Bill Clinton started to think seriously about biowarfare after reading Hot Zone. Human beings think in terms of concrete things--images, scenes, sounds.

A made-in-America TV series on the Holocaust showed in West Germany in 1979 and that started a whole public discussion about the Holocaust. They showed each episode back-to-back with a panel show of historians. It's not that West Germany hadn't known the Holocaust was a thing before that, it's seeing images, hearing sounds, following a plot.

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EvilMerlin
Apr 10, 2018

Meh.

Give it a try...

Taerkar posted:

Most E2s were built with 75mm guns as they were intended to attack fortified positions, places where the superior HE shell of the 75 would be better than the 76.

The E8, despite popular belief, does not necessarily mean 76, but rather is a designation for the HVSS (and I think a few other things). There are at the very least a number of M4A3E8 (105) tanks still around.



Uh, thats what I just said...

Cessna
Feb 20, 2013

KHABAHBLOOOM

zoux posted:

I was 4 in 1983 so I didn't really have my finger on the pulse of the Zeitgeist, was anyone old enough to remember watching this movie and then the roundtable as it happened? The article says that polling showed that 50% of Americans thought they would die in a nuclear war, which is so nihilistic it must have affected the national character tremendously. The article makes the case that this movie specifically shifted public perception and political stances toward global nuclear war, which , you know, good that that happened, but also unsettling that people didn't realize what nuclear war meant before they saw a made-for-TV movie about it.

I was 13. I distinctly remember watching the movie on TV with my parents, then talking about it in school the next day. It had enough of an impact that the discussion wasn't confined to Social Studies or History classes, pretty much the whole day was spend on it in one form or another.

I don't think the movie did that much to alter my personal perspective. I was interested in military history at that point and had read more than a few books on nuclear war at that point. I lived in New Jersey, right across the river from NYC. I was under no illusions - if there was a war, if I was lucky I was going to die quickly. (If I was unlucky I'd die slowly.) The only real question was whether there was going to be a war or not.

Most of the teachers were savvy enough that they understood this as well. They had grown up in the "duck and cover" era and some of them brought up the fact that they'd lived through the Cuban Missile Crisis as kids. They knew that we were doomed if the balloon went up.

As for my peers? Well, I don't think I said it out loud, but I felt a bit of an "I told you so" sort of vindication after they saw the movie; they seemed to understand what was at stake more than they did beforehand.

Cessna
Feb 20, 2013

KHABAHBLOOOM

zoux posted:

What was the US's biggest boondoggle or mistake during WW2

Tank Destroyers.

:smuggo:

EvilMerlin
Apr 10, 2018

Meh.

Give it a try...

Cyrano4747 posted:

Those 41 numbers are a bit iffy if were taking t34s for a bunch of reasons. First off the 34 was no where near the dominant tank in service. You have a ton of BT tanks etc in there that German armor could deal with just fine. You also have issues with the chaos of the early months. Armor formations being destroyed due to dumb unsupported counterattacks and the like.

There are also famously issues with how the Germans and Soviets counted armor kills. They don’t add up in any way that allows a good comparison. Generally the soviets would write off a vehicle for record keeping purposes even if it was later repaired and returned to service, while the Germans counted things as destroyed only when they were truly beyond salvage. There’s an old thread joke about the panther burning 20 miles behind Soviet lines not being a write off because tomorrow’s counterattack might retake it. It’s a joke, but it has a kernel of truth.

Numbers were pulled from Russian war documents via the book The Red Army Handbook 1939-1945.

Nope the T34 wasn't close to the dominant tank in service in 1941.

There was the T-28 that was still being built in 1941. Almost all of them were lost in that same year. The T26 was still in service in 1941 and much like the 28, was nearly completely wiped out in the same year but mostly to air attacks and arty, and then to just lack of parts.

The 35's were gone mostly by 1940.

There were too few T50's to be anything but a tiny blip.

The T60's didn't enter service until the middle of 1941 but were rather easy fodder for any level of German armor fielded. 6292 of these little fuckers were built in a two year period.

zoux
Apr 28, 2006

Cessna posted:

Tank Destroyers.

:smuggo:

N-no....

HEY GUNS posted:

This is how many things happened, like the influence The Jungle had on food safety laws, or the claim that Bill Clinton started to think seriously about biowarfare after reading Hot Zone. Human beings think in terms of concrete things--images, scenes, sounds.

A made-in-America TV series on the Holocaust showed in West Germany in 1979 and that started a whole public discussion about the Holocaust. They showed each episode back-to-back with a panel show of historians. It's not that West Germany hadn't known the Holocaust was a thing before that, it's seeing images, hearing sounds, following a plot.

That's a good point.

Nothingtoseehere
Nov 11, 2010


For a more recent example of TV shaping public perception, look at Blue planet 2 and ocean plastics.

Acebuckeye13
Nov 2, 2010

Against All Tyrants

Ultra Carp

chitoryu12 posted:

And then dealing with the gunner not having an unmagnified sight, which according to the French tests meant an average of 20 seconds of back-and-forth between the gunner and commander to lay the gun on a new target. Or the turret rotating down when on an incline because of the weak rotation system (which on some models was tied to the engine RPM for speed). And hoping you don't get shot in the side, which is so thin that a 14.5mm anti-tank rifle could penetrate it at 100 yards.

Basically, it worked best when placed in a fixed position firing at a pre-determined area and driving it as little as possible to avoid an inopportune breakdown.

Sure, I'm not trying to argue that the Panther was some unkillable supertank. It had issues, significant issues, that we could spent all day discussing and laughing about. But at the same time, in the right hands and in the right situations* (Many of which weren't that uncommon, especially in the defensive war Germany was fighting in the West) it was an exceptionally dangerous vehicle, one that the Americans were unprepared to face in the numbers they did—hence the desperate call for more M36s and the acceleration of the T26 program (And of course, let's not forget the Sherman had some problems as well—the 76, for instance, had been cut too short to facilitate shipping, and had a tendency to kick up a shitton of dust every time it fired, preventing the crew from seeing anything for up to a minute after firing. And the ammo stowage in the early models was... problematic).

We both know that the Sherman was ultimately the better tank for the war that was fought. Getting tanks to the battlefield before the enemy can and bringing more of them is the single best way to win an armor engagement, and in spite of the logistical challenges the American army could almost count on having more Shermans in a fight than the Germans ever could Panthers. I just think it's important to remember that the Panther was still very dangerous in spite of its flaws, in ways that influenced American strategic thinking and their production priorities.

*Of course in the wrong hands and in the wrong situations it could be dunked on hilariously, such as at Arracourt.

EvilMerlin
Apr 10, 2018

Meh.

Give it a try...

Acebuckeye13 posted:


We both know that the Sherman was ultimately the better tank for the war that was fought. Getting tanks to the battlefield before the enemy can and bringing more of them is the single best way to win an armor engagement, and in spite of the logistical challenges the American army could almost count on having more Shermans in a fight than the Germans ever could Panthers. I just think it's important to remember that the Panther was still very dangerous in spite of its flaws, in ways that influenced American strategic thinking and their production priorities.


This was more, or less, WW2 in a nutshell.

The Germans had crazy tech. Sure that tech was often not fully vetted, broke down often or just wasn't ready for prime time. And thankfully a loving nut job was in charge.

The Panther was much like the Me-262. If the higher ups didn't gently caress around with it to do something it wasn't supposed to do, it would have been a lot worse for the allies.

Cessna
Feb 20, 2013

KHABAHBLOOOM

zoux posted:

N-no....

(I was joking, based on the thread title and memory of past arguments.)

zoux
Apr 28, 2006

Cessna posted:

(I was joking, based on the thread title and memory of past arguments.)

I was playing along, also thanks for being old as poo poo for your perspective on The Day After.

HEY GUNS
Oct 11, 2012

FOPTIMUS PRIME

zoux posted:

That's a good point.
i once taught a class on german history where the novel "the reader" was on the syllabus, and the same students who were checked out whenever we discussed history woke up and began discussing characters' motivations and interactions in a relatively sophisticated way when it was about individual people

also i don't know if the bill clinton story is true, but it is what i heard when i read hot zone

HEY GUNS fucked around with this message at 17:26 on Dec 13, 2018

Valtonen
May 13, 2014

Tanks still suck but you don't gotta hand it to the Axis either.

Randarkman posted:

Artillery. The Americans did artillery smarter and more efficient (well perhaps not efficient, there was a prodigious amount of shell expenditure involved) than basically everyone else. Though the incredible wealth and resources of the US lay behind why they were able to do artillery so much better than others.

With their proliferation of radios, and the relatively easy to use firing tables that the US Army had compiled, the Americans could request and call down accurate and devastating artillery strikes ridiculously quickly compared to other armies. Also having motor vehicles flowing out of every orifice also meant that US artillery could be moved much more quickly and easily than in other armies, especially compared to German and Soviet armies.

bewbies posted:

I'd argue that both of these advantages were made possible only by the bottomless pit of raw materials and colossal untouched manufacturing capacity that was midcentury America but there probably isn't any real way to quantify that statement.

This exactly. When it came to EFFICIENT artillery use US couldnt hold a candle on some small countries that had to count every shell individually. Not that it matters, If you have ten Times the resources using them at 2/3rds as efficient you still end up with 70% better end result due to volume alone.

Cessna
Feb 20, 2013

KHABAHBLOOOM

zoux posted:

I was playing along, also thanks for being old as poo poo for your perspective on The Day After.

Happy to help!

(Looks at grey hairs reflected in monitor, weeps.)

Nenonen
Oct 22, 2009

Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

zoux posted:

What was the US's biggest boondoggle or mistake during WW2

Lend Lease! :hitler:

EvilMerlin
Apr 10, 2018

Meh.

Give it a try...

Valtonen posted:

This exactly. When it came to EFFICIENT artillery use US couldnt hold a candle on some small countries that had to count every shell individually. Not that it matters, If you have ten Times the resources using them at 2/3rds as efficient you still end up with 70% better end result due to volume alone.

Its funny how it changed when nukes entered the picture how the US's "role" reversed.

The US was allowed far fewer warheads, because the accuracy of those warheads was, at the time, leaps and bounds ahead of the Russians, not to mention the overall reliability (or the supposed reliability) of the launch vehicles.

EvilMerlin
Apr 10, 2018

Meh.

Give it a try...
I think the refusal to use the ocean convoy system for so long... we lost a lot of ships, material and men before we started using the convoy.

Comrade Gorbash
Jul 12, 2011

My paper soldiers form a wall, five paces thick and twice as tall.
What the US military got really good at in WW2 and continues to be good at and scares the poo poo out of military planners everywhere else is moving things from A to a very far away B. All kinds of stuff and lots of it, consistently and on time. Land, sea, air. Troops, equipment, support services, supplies. By the end of WW2, there was no place on Earth the US couldn't throw a credible combat force and then give it what it needed to operate, even if it was a terrible idea to do it.

Basically the US military turned into Amazon with guns.

Acebuckeye13
Nov 2, 2010

Against All Tyrants

Ultra Carp

zoux posted:

What was the US's biggest boondoggle or mistake during WW2

The US could afford boondoggles like no one else (The bat bomb being an always fun and exciting example) though the mistake that cost them the most was probably Replacement Depots. For most countries, when a unit was sent into combat, that unit would be expected to be ground down over time, then pulled back to the rear, built up with replacements, and then eventually sent back to the front. The US, however, utalized a system of Replacement Depots, or the 'Repple-Depple' system. Instead of units being replenished when they were pulled off the line, units would be continually provided with fresh troops from the states or troops that had been previously wounded in combat but had recovered. I think the intention was that it would allow for combat units to remain on the front lines for longer, but it ended up being a corrosive mess for multiple reasons:

  • Fresh troops would effectively be thrown directly into combat without any chance to integrate into their units or to receive additional training or advice from veteran soldiers, and the vets themselves would try not to get attached to new soldiers since they would so often be killed quickly.
  • In addition, wounded veterans wouldn't be sent back to their original units, but to whoever needed replacements—meaning that instead of fighting with the men they'd trained with, fought with, and new well, they'd be surrounded by a bunch of guys who didn't know or care about them. Some soldiers actually went AWOL just to go back to their original units instead of having to fight with people they didn't know.
  • In areas with heavy, static fighting, such as in and around the Hürtgen Forest on the border of Germany, many units took horrendous and awful casualties that wore them to the bone. But instead of being pulled off the line to rest and refit, those units would stay on the line so long as there was a steady stream of replacements. This torpedoed morale for the veteran troops and lead to extremely heavy casualties for the replacements.
  • As the war went on, the number of casualties outstripped the rate the US was shipping soldiers to Europe, and as a result many replacements began to be taken from non-combat units, with typists, clerks, and cooks being handed rifles and sent to the frontlines. This only exacerbated the problem, as these replacements had no combat experience and little training and would get killed even faster.

Ultimately, the repple-depple system got a lot of people killed and only got worse as the war went on. It really wasn't a sustainable system, and the US is lucky in many respects that the war ended when it did.

Fangz
Jul 5, 2007

Oh I see! This must be the Bad Opinion Zone!

EvilMerlin posted:

Numbers were pulled from Russian war documents via the book The Red Army Handbook 1939-1945.

Nope the T34 wasn't close to the dominant tank in service in 1941.

There was the T-28 that was still being built in 1941. Almost all of them were lost in that same year. The T26 was still in service in 1941 and much like the 28, was nearly completely wiped out in the same year but mostly to air attacks and arty, and then to just lack of parts.

The 35's were gone mostly by 1940.

There were too few T50's to be anything but a tiny blip.

The T60's didn't enter service until the middle of 1941 but were rather easy fodder for any level of German armor fielded. 6292 of these little fuckers were built in a two year period.

The point being made is that you are trying to use kill ratios to prove the T34 is bad and that's just silly

Randarkman
Jul 18, 2011

Valtonen posted:

This exactly. When it came to EFFICIENT artillery use US couldnt hold a candle on some small countries that had to count every shell individually. Not that it matters, If you have ten Times the resources using them at 2/3rds as efficient you still end up with 70% better end result due to volume alone.

Well the US lack of efficiency is mostly that if it was at all possible to request artillery against a target, you would do so and the shells would begin landing not long after. For the Germans for an example this wasn't quite the case, they weren't quite as eager to expend shells to do a job that infantrymen with light equipment could accomplish, also not quite as willing to risk revealing their guns and being exposed to counter-battery fire. That's the US being "less efficient" in their use of artillery, perhaps it is more appropriate to say that they were "less frugal" with their shell expenditure. When it comes to being able to quickly and accurately lay shells at a target I don't think any other army really came close.

zoux
Apr 28, 2006

Acebuckeye13 posted:

The US could afford boondoggles like no one else (The bat bomb being an always fun and exciting example) though the mistake that cost them the most was probably Replacement Depots. For most countries, when a unit was sent into combat, that unit would be expected to be ground down over time, then pulled back to the rear, built up with replacements, and then eventually sent back to the front. The US, however, utalized a system of Replacement Depots, or the 'Repple-Depple' system. Instead of units being replenished when they were pulled off the line, units would be continually provided with fresh troops from the states or troops that had been previously wounded in combat but had recovered. I think the intention was that it would allow for combat units to remain on the front lines for longer, but it ended up being a corrosive mess for multiple reasons:

  • Fresh troops would effectively be thrown directly into combat without any chance to integrate into their units or to receive additional training or advice from veteran soldiers, and the vets themselves would try not to get attached to new soldiers since they would so often be killed quickly.
  • In addition, wounded veterans wouldn't be sent back to their original units, but to whoever needed replacements—meaning that instead of fighting with the men they'd trained with, fought with, and new well, they'd be surrounded by a bunch of guys who didn't know or care about them. Some soldiers actually went AWOL just to go back to their original units instead of having to fight with people they didn't know.
  • In areas with heavy, static fighting, such as in and around the Hürtgen Forest on the border of Germany, many units took horrendous and awful casualties that wore them to the bone. But instead of being pulled off the line to rest and refit, those units would stay on the line so long as there was a steady stream of replacements. This torpedoed morale for the veteran troops and lead to extremely heavy casualties for the replacements.
  • As the war went on, the number of casualties outstripped the rate the US was shipping soldiers to Europe, and as a result many replacements began to be taken from non-combat units, with typists, clerks, and cooks being handed rifles and sent to the frontlines. This only exacerbated the problem, as these replacements had no combat experience and little training and would get killed even faster.

Ultimately, the repple-depple system got a lot of people killed and only got worse as the war went on. It really wasn't a sustainable system, and the US is lucky in many respects that the war ended when it did.

Did this practice extend into Vietnam? I just know from movies and books about FNGs getting assigned to veteran units and dudes not even learning guys names, was that just dramatic license or was it different from the RD system?

KYOON GRIFFEY JR
Apr 12, 2010



Runner-up, TRP Sack Race 2021/22

Acebuckeye13 posted:

We both know that the Sherman was ultimately the better tank for the war that was fought. Getting tanks to the battlefield before the enemy can and bringing more of them is the single best way to win an armor engagement, and in spite of the logistical challenges the American army could almost count on having more Shermans in a fight than the Germans ever could Panthers.

Is there a war that could have been fought where the Panther's tactical advantages outweighed the Sherman's strategic and operational advantages? You make it sound like such a situation really exists, and I am not convinced.

Randarkman
Jul 18, 2011

Acebuckeye13 posted:

The US could afford boondoggles like no one else (The bat bomb being an always fun and exciting example) though the mistake that cost them the most was probably Replacement Depots. For most countries, when a unit was sent into combat, that unit would be expected to be ground down over time, then pulled back to the rear, built up with replacements, and then eventually sent back to the front. The US, however, utalized a system of Replacement Depots, or the 'Repple-Depple' system. Instead of units being replenished when they were pulled off the line, units would be continually provided with fresh troops from the states or troops that had been previously wounded in combat but had recovered. I think the intention was that it would allow for combat units to remain on the front lines for longer, but it ended up being a corrosive mess for multiple reasons:

  • Fresh troops would effectively be thrown directly into combat without any chance to integrate into their units or to receive additional training or advice from veteran soldiers, and the vets themselves would try not to get attached to new soldiers since they would so often be killed quickly.
  • In addition, wounded veterans wouldn't be sent back to their original units, but to whoever needed replacements—meaning that instead of fighting with the men they'd trained with, fought with, and new well, they'd be surrounded by a bunch of guys who didn't know or care about them. Some soldiers actually went AWOL just to go back to their original units instead of having to fight with people they didn't know.
  • In areas with heavy, static fighting, such as in and around the Hürtgen Forest on the border of Germany, many units took horrendous and awful casualties that wore them to the bone. But instead of being pulled off the line to rest and refit, those units would stay on the line so long as there was a steady stream of replacements. This torpedoed morale for the veteran troops and lead to extremely heavy casualties for the replacements.
  • As the war went on, the number of casualties outstripped the rate the US was shipping soldiers to Europe, and as a result many replacements began to be taken from non-combat units, with typists, clerks, and cooks being handed rifles and sent to the frontlines. This only exacerbated the problem, as these replacements had no combat experience and little training and would get killed even faster.

Ultimately, the repple-depple system got a lot of people killed and only got worse as the war went on. It really wasn't a sustainable system, and the US is lucky in many respects that the war ended when it did.

I believe the Soviets also handled casualties and replacements in a matter pretty similar to this. I'll have to look it up.

EvilMerlin
Apr 10, 2018

Meh.

Give it a try...

Fangz posted:

The point being made is that you are trying to use kill ratios to prove the T34 is bad and that's just silly

No that wasn't the point I was trying to make.

I never said the T34 was bad, not once.

Comrade Gorbash
Jul 12, 2011

My paper soldiers form a wall, five paces thick and twice as tall.

KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:

Is there a war that could have been fought where the Panther's tactical advantages outweighed the Sherman's strategic and operational advantages? You make it sound like such a situation really exists, and I am not convinced.
I think you could make a case that it was the perfect tank for attacking France in 1939. If you knock the enemy out within one maintenance cycle, it doesn't matter as much that you've made your maintenance process a gigantic pain in the rear end.

bewbies
Sep 23, 2003

Fun Shoe

KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:

Is there a war that could have been fought where the Panther's tactical advantages outweighed the Sherman's strategic and operational advantages? You make it sound like such a situation really exists, and I am not convinced.

If I'm fighting a defensive campaign on my own ground in 1943 I absolutely pick the Panther. If I have to fight an offensive campaign across an ocean I pick the Sherman and wait impatiently for it to be upgunned.

mllaneza
Apr 28, 2007

Veteran, Bermuda Triangle Expeditionary Force, 1993-1952




I saw They Shall Not Grow Old last night. It's a really good narrative with lots of actual veterans talking, probably from the BBC oral history archives. The footage is great and well chosen to support the theme of "this is what it was like for the poor SOBs on the front line".

The restoration job they did to fix the frame rate, colorize, and make it 3D was amazing. Just as the story gets to the trenches for the first time it switches from scratchy, sepia-toned footage to full color 3D and the transition is breathtaking. It's a nice bit of history, but an impressive technical achievement.

Mark my words, this will win awards.

EvilMerlin
Apr 10, 2018

Meh.

Give it a try...

mllaneza posted:

I saw They Shall Not Grow Old last night. It's a really good narrative with lots of actual veterans talking, probably from the BBC oral history archives. The footage is great and well chosen to support the theme of "this is what it was like for the poor SOBs on the front line".

The restoration job they did to fix the frame rate, colorize, and make it 3D was amazing. Just as the story gets to the trenches for the first time it switches from scratchy, sepia-toned footage to full color 3D and the transition is breathtaking. It's a nice bit of history, but an impressive technical achievement.

Mark my words, this will win awards.

Is this the one by Peter Jackson?

Acebuckeye13
Nov 2, 2010

Against All Tyrants

Ultra Carp

KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:

Is there a war that could have been fought where the Panther's tactical advantages outweighed the Sherman's strategic and operational advantages? You make it sound like such a situation really exists, and I am not convinced.

That's not what I meant. The war was already well underway when both the Sherman and the Panther was designed, and those tanks were designed to meet the needs of their respective armored forces in that war. As it turned out, the Americans had a better perspective not only on the kind of vehicle that they would need, but the kind of vehicle that could succeed in the war as a whole. It doesn't matter if there was a war that the Panther could have succeeded in, because that's not the war that was being fought.

FMguru
Sep 10, 2003

peed on;
sexually

Acebuckeye13 posted:

The US could afford boondoggles like no one else (The bat bomb being an always fun and exciting example) though the mistake that cost them the most was probably Replacement Depots. For most countries, when a unit was sent into combat, that unit would be expected to be ground down over time, then pulled back to the rear, built up with replacements, and then eventually sent back to the front. The US, however, utalized a system of Replacement Depots, or the 'Repple-Depple' system. Instead of units being replenished when they were pulled off the line, units would be continually provided with fresh troops from the states or troops that had been previously wounded in combat but had recovered. I think the intention was that it would allow for combat units to remain on the front lines for longer, but it ended up being a corrosive mess for multiple reasons:

  • Fresh troops would effectively be thrown directly into combat without any chance to integrate into their units or to receive additional training or advice from veteran soldiers, and the vets themselves would try not to get attached to new soldiers since they would so often be killed quickly.
  • In addition, wounded veterans wouldn't be sent back to their original units, but to whoever needed replacements—meaning that instead of fighting with the men they'd trained with, fought with, and new well, they'd be surrounded by a bunch of guys who didn't know or care about them. Some soldiers actually went AWOL just to go back to their original units instead of having to fight with people they didn't know.
  • In areas with heavy, static fighting, such as in and around the Hürtgen Forest on the border of Germany, many units took horrendous and awful casualties that wore them to the bone. But instead of being pulled off the line to rest and refit, those units would stay on the line so long as there was a steady stream of replacements. This torpedoed morale for the veteran troops and lead to extremely heavy casualties for the replacements.
  • As the war went on, the number of casualties outstripped the rate the US was shipping soldiers to Europe, and as a result many replacements began to be taken from non-combat units, with typists, clerks, and cooks being handed rifles and sent to the frontlines. This only exacerbated the problem, as these replacements had no combat experience and little training and would get killed even faster.

Ultimately, the repple-depple system got a lot of people killed and only got worse as the war went on. It really wasn't a sustainable system, and the US is lucky in many respects that the war ended when it did.
Building on this, the US had an amazingly backwards approach to training and supplying infantry, starting with the assumption that any idiot can hold a rifle and march. So when troops were inducted, they ran bushels of tests on them, and all the high scorers got picked up by the technical-minded specialties - armor, artillery, aircraft, maintenance, intelligence, signals, OCS, engineering, etc - and of the ones that were left, the cream of the crop were skimmed off and put into elite formations (rangers, airborne, etc), so the pool of soldiers that became riflemen were literally the people too mentally or physically deficient to do anything else. Which was a real problem, because the actual business of being a combat rifleman is actually skilled work that requires a lot of training and talent to do well. So the people making up the tip of the spear, the people most in contact with the enemy, the people doing the real heavy lifting, were disproportionately made up of people who would have been rejected for induction if the standards had been a little higher.

They also way underestimated the casualty rates that riflemen would rack up, so by 1944 there were shortages, which meant accelerating the pipeline (lowing standards even further, shortening the already inadequate training), which meant even lower-quality troops (and higher casualties, and the cycle continued).

Zorak of Michigan
Jun 10, 2006


Randarkman posted:

Well the US lack of efficiency is mostly that if it was at all possible to request artillery against a target, you would do so and the shells would begin landing not long after. For the Germans for an example this wasn't quite the case, they weren't quite as eager to expend shells to do a job that infantrymen with light equipment could accomplish, also not quite as willing to risk revealing their guns and being exposed to counter-battery fire. That's the US being "less efficient" in their use of artillery, perhaps it is more appropriate to say that they were "less frugal" with their shell expenditure. When it comes to being able to quickly and accurately lay shells at a target I don't think any other army really came close.

People often talk about "efficiency" as though it means one specific thing. You need to be precise about which resource you are trying to use efficiently. For the most part, the US fought like a rich country, and tried to be efficient about its expenditure of troops. Our doctrine was to use and if necessary expend equipment. If you are accustomed to thinking of shells / trucks / radios as being scarce resources, the US approach looks extremely wasteful, but it could certainly be made to work.

Nenonen
Oct 22, 2009

Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:

Is there a war that could have been fought where the Panther's tactical advantages outweighed the Sherman's strategic and operational advantages? You make it sound like such a situation really exists, and I am not convinced.

Are you telling that you can't come up with a counterfactual situation involving tanks in a thread where the most common counterfactual situation involves the skin melanin and sexual preference of the head of state of Germany?

Here's another one to ponder: if Germany had built tank models which Allies had and Allies built what Germans had (at historic times, so no Shermans vs Panthers in 1939), would anything have really changed? (IMO not, overall the differences between individual tanks of the same category are not that relevant compared to overall combined arms strategy, national resources and strategic plans. There can't be a timeline where Germany builds 50k Shermans and fields them.)

Nenonen fucked around with this message at 18:02 on Dec 13, 2018

ChubbyChecker
Mar 25, 2018

HEY GUNS posted:

i once taught a class on german history where the novel "the reader" was on the syllabus, and the same students who were checked out whenever we discussed history woke up and began discussing characters' motivations and interactions in a relatively sophisticated way when it was about individual people

maybe it was because there was an older woman loving a teen boy

Cessna
Feb 20, 2013

KHABAHBLOOOM

zoux posted:

Did this practice extend into Vietnam? I just know from movies and books about FNGs getting assigned to veteran units and dudes not even learning guys names, was that just dramatic license or was it different from the RD system?

No.

The problem in Vietnam was that soldiers rotated in- and out- of country as individuals. They'd go through boot camp and MOS/infantry training, then get on a plane and fly to Vietnam. Once there they'd be assigned to a unit and spend a year (13 months for the USMC) with that unit. Then they'd leave and go home. If they were wounded and medivac-ed they'd go back to the same unit they were "in country" with.

In contrast today the practice it to rotate UNITS, not individuals. So you'll go to boot camp, infantry training, and an MOS school. Then you'll be sent to a unit that is starting it's work-up/training for a deployment, or is early on in the process. Then you'll train with the unit. THEN you'll deploy overseas with the people you trained with. You do your tour, then return to the states for a break, then start the process over again.

This only really works because when you join the military now you're doing it for a 4 year enlistment, so you can rotate through a couple of these cycles. In Vietnam it was join/get drafted, get trained, do a single tour, get out. Soldiers didn't really have time to build competence/experience then effectively pass it along to their replacements.

Officers were in an even worse spot - there was huge pressure to get every officer a "ticket punch" (get combat experience, important if you're planning on a career), so they were rotated in and out on six month cycles. Junior officer competence plummeted because they just weren't able to get the experience they needed.

(No, I am not old enough to have been in Vietnam.)

EvilMerlin
Apr 10, 2018

Meh.

Give it a try...

Nenonen posted:

Here's another one to ponder: if Germany had built tank models which Allies had and Allies built what Germans had (at historic times, so no Shermans vs Panthers in 1939), would anything have really changed?

I don't think that ever would have happened.

Remember the original design of the Panther topped the scales 20 and later 30 tons. Not the nearly 45 tons it was released as.

Cessna
Feb 20, 2013

KHABAHBLOOOM

FMguru posted:

Building on this, the US had an amazingly backwards approach to training and supplying infantry, starting with the assumption that any idiot can hold a rifle and march.

A WWI era cartoon:

ChubbyChecker
Mar 25, 2018

Acebuckeye13 posted:

The US could afford boondoggles like no one else (The bat bomb being an always fun and exciting example) though the mistake that cost them the most was probably Replacement Depots. For most countries, when a unit was sent into combat, that unit would be expected to be ground down over time, then pulled back to the rear, built up with replacements, and then eventually sent back to the front. The US, however, utalized a system of Replacement Depots, or the 'Repple-Depple' system. Instead of units being replenished when they were pulled off the line, units would be continually provided with fresh troops from the states or troops that had been previously wounded in combat but had recovered. I think the intention was that it would allow for combat units to remain on the front lines for longer, but it ended up being a corrosive mess for multiple reasons:

  • Fresh troops would effectively be thrown directly into combat without any chance to integrate into their units or to receive additional training or advice from veteran soldiers, and the vets themselves would try not to get attached to new soldiers since they would so often be killed quickly.
  • In addition, wounded veterans wouldn't be sent back to their original units, but to whoever needed replacements—meaning that instead of fighting with the men they'd trained with, fought with, and new well, they'd be surrounded by a bunch of guys who didn't know or care about them. Some soldiers actually went AWOL just to go back to their original units instead of having to fight with people they didn't know.
  • In areas with heavy, static fighting, such as in and around the Hürtgen Forest on the border of Germany, many units took horrendous and awful casualties that wore them to the bone. But instead of being pulled off the line to rest and refit, those units would stay on the line so long as there was a steady stream of replacements. This torpedoed morale for the veteran troops and lead to extremely heavy casualties for the replacements.
  • As the war went on, the number of casualties outstripped the rate the US was shipping soldiers to Europe, and as a result many replacements began to be taken from non-combat units, with typists, clerks, and cooks being handed rifles and sent to the frontlines. This only exacerbated the problem, as these replacements had no combat experience and little training and would get killed even faster.

Ultimately, the repple-depple system got a lot of people killed and only got worse as the war went on. It really wasn't a sustainable system, and the US is lucky in many respects that the war ended when it did.

Did the typists, clerks, cooks etc. have the same basic training as riflemen had, or were they trained only for their job?

sullat
Jan 9, 2012

zoux posted:

What was the US's biggest boondoggle or mistake during WW2

Probably the Chronosphere.

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ChubbyChecker
Mar 25, 2018

KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:

Is there a war that could have been fought where the Panther's tactical advantages outweighed the Sherman's strategic and operational advantages? You make it sound like such a situation really exists, and I am not convinced.

The Western Europe had a good rail network, so the Panthers were quite efficient there. Less so in the Eastern Europe.

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