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And no mention of the fact that Lambert was originally suing over dick pills that didn't work?https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1094 posted:Troy Lambert purchased an alleged aphrodisiac dietary supplement that was manufactured by Nutraceutical, but that had not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Based on the product’s labels, Lambert believed that the supplement would enhance his sexual performance, and had he known these claims were false, he would not have purchased the product.
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Feb 27, 2019 05:06
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 Opinions! MADISON v. ALABAMA Holding / Majority Opinion: The Eighth Amendment, this Court has held, prohibits the execution of a prisoner whose mental illness prevents him from “rational[ly] understanding” why the State seeks to impose that punishment. In this case, Vernon Madison argued that his memory loss and dementia entitled him to a stay of execution, but an Alabama court denied the relief. We now address two questions relating to the Eighth Amendment’s bar, disputed below but not in this Court. First, does the Eighth Amendment forbid execution whenever a prisoner shows that a mental disorder has left him without any memory of committing his crime? We (and, now, the parties) think not, because a person lacking such a memory may still be able to form a rational understanding of the reasons for his death sentence. Second, does the Eighth Amendment apply similarly to a prisoner suffering from dementia as to one experiencing psychotic delusions? We (and, now, the parties) think so, because either condition may—or, then again, may not—impede the requisite comprehension of his punishment. The only issue left, on which the parties still disagree, is what those rulings mean for Madison’s own execution. We direct that issue to the state court for further consideration in light of this opinion. This Court decided in Ford v. Wainwright that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments precludes executing a prisoner who has “lost his sanity” after sentencing. While on death row, Alvin Ford was beset by “pervasive delusion[s]” associated with “[p]aranoid [s]chizophrenia.” Surveying both the common law and state statutes, the Court found a uniform practice against taking the life of such a prisoner. … The Court clarified the scope of that category in Panetti v. Quarterman by focusing on whether a prisoner can “reach a rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution.” Like Alvin Ford, Scott Panetti suffered from “gross delusions” stemming from “extreme psychosis.” In reversing a ruling that he could still be executed, the Panetti Court set out the appropriate “standard for competency.”...The critical question is whether a “prisoner’s mental state is so distorted by a mental illness” that he lacks a “rational understanding” of “the State’s rationale for [his] execution.” … Vernon Madison killed a police officer in 1985 during a domestic dispute. An Alabama jury found him guilty of capital murder, and the trial court sentenced him to death. He has spent most of the ensuing decades on the State’s death row. In recent years, Madison’s mental condition has sharply deteriorated. Madison suffered a series of strokes, including major ones in 2015 and 2016. He was diagnosed as having vascular dementia, with attendant disorientation and confusion, cognitive impairment, and memory loss. In particular, Madison claims that he can no longer recollect committing the crime for which he has been sentenced to die. … Two issues relating to Panetti’s application are before us. Recall that our decision there held the Eighth Amendment to forbid executing a prisoner whose mental illness makes him unable to “reach a rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution.” The first question presented is whether Panetti prohibits executing Madison merely because he cannot remember committing his crime. The second question raised is whether Panetti permits executing Madison merely because he suffers from dementia, rather than psychotic delusions. In prior stages of this case, as we have described, the parties disagreed about those matters. But at this Court, Madison accepted Alabama’s position on the first issue and Alabama accepted Madison’s on the second. And rightly so. As the parties now recognize, the standard set out in Panetti supplies the answers to both questions. First, a person lacking memory of his crime may yet rationally understand why the State seeks to execute him; if so, the Eighth Amendment poses no bar to his execution. Second, a person suffering from dementia may be unable to rationally understand the reasons for his sentence; if so, the Eighth Amendment does not allow his execution. What matters is whether a person has the “rational understanding” Panetti requires—not whether he has any particular memory or any particular mental illness. … Do you have an independent recollection of the Civil War? Obviously not. But you may still be able to reach a rational—indeed, a sophisticated—understanding of that conflict and its consequences. Do you recall your first day of school? Probably not. But if your mother told you years later that you were sent home for hitting a classmate, you would have no trouble grasping the story. And similarly, if you somehow blacked out a crime you committed, but later learned what you had done, you could well appreciate the State’s desire to impose a penalty. Assuming, that is, no other cognitive impairment, loss of memory of a crime does not prevent rational understanding of the State’s reasons for resorting to punishment. And that kind of comprehension is the Panetti standard’s singular focus. … But such memory loss still may factor into the “rational understanding” analysis that Panetti demands. If that loss combines and interacts with other mental shortfalls to deprive a person of the capacity to comprehend why the State is exacting death as punishment, then the Panetti standard will be satisfied. That may be so when a person has difficulty preserving any memories, so that even newly gained knowledge (about, say, the crime and punishment) will be quickly forgotten...But the sole inquiry for the court remains whether the prisoner can rationally understand the reasons for his death sentence. … Next consider a prisoner who suffers from dementia or a similar disorder, rather than psychotic delusions. The dementia, as is typical, has compromised this prisoner’s cognitive functions. But it has not resulted in the kind of delusional beliefs that Alvin Ford and Scott Panetti held. May the prisoner nonetheless receive a stay of execution under Ford and Panetti?...Psychosis or dementia, delusions or overall cognitive decline are all the same under Panetti, so long as they produce the requisite lack of comprehension….Panetti framed its test, as just described, in a way utterly indifferent to a prisoner’s specific mental illness. The Panetti standard concerns, once again, not the diagnosis of such illness, but a consequence—to wit, the prisoner’s inability to rationally understand his punishment. … The only question left—and the only one on which the parties now disagree—is whether Madison’s execution may go forward based on the state court’s decision below. Madison’s counsel says it cannot because that ruling was tainted by legal error—specifically, the idea that only delusions, and not dementia, can support a finding of mental incompetency. Alabama counters that the state court did not rely on that (concededly) incorrect view of the law. But we come away at the least unsure whether that is so—especially given Alabama’s evidence and arguments in the state court. … For those reasons, we must return this case to the state court for renewed consideration of Madison’s competency (assuming Alabama sets a new execution date)...The sole question on which Madison’s competency depends is whether he can reach a “rational understanding” of why the State wants to execute him. ... We accordingly vacate the judgment of the state court and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Footnote 3, responding to the dissent directly: The dissent is in high dudgeon over our taking up the second question, arguing that it was not presented in Madison’s petition for certiorari. See post, at 1–6. But that is incorrect. The petition presented two questions—the same two we address here. The first question asked whether the Eighth Amendment bars executing Madison because he has no “memory of his commission of the capital offense.” The second question asked whether that Amendment bars his execution because his “vascular dementia” and “severe cognitive dysfunction” prevent him from either remembering his crime “or understanding the circumstances of his scheduled execution.” Ibid. So the first question concerned whether memory loss alone could form the basis of a Panetti claim and the second whether the varied consequences of dementia could do so. The body of the petition, to be sure, devoted more space to the first question. But it clearly referenced the second. (“[T]his Court has never sought to constrain the world of maladies that can give rise to a finding that a prisoner is incompetent to be executed”); (“[C]ourts have recognized dementia and attendant cognitive decline and memory impairment as a basis for a finding of incompetency to be executed”). And in any event, the number of words spent on each is not what matters. Our Rule states that the Court will consider “[o]nly the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein.” Here, we consider, in order, the two questions set out in Madison’s petition. Lineup: Kagan, joined by Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Dissent by Alito, joined by Thomas and Gorsuch. Kavanaugh did not participate. Other Opinions: Dissent (Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch): What the Court has done in this case makes a mockery of our Rules. Petitioner’s counsel convinced the Court to stay his client’s execution and to grant his petition for a writ of certiorari for the purpose of deciding a clear-cut constitutional question: Does the Eighth Amendment prohibit the execution of a murderer who cannot recall committing the murder for which the death sentence was imposed? The petition strenuously argued that executing such a person is unconstitutional. After persuading the Court to grant review of this question, counsel abruptly changed course. Perhaps because he concluded (correctly) that petitioner was unlikely to prevail on the question raised in the petition, he conceded that the argument advanced in his petition was wrong, and he switched to an entirely different argument, namely, that the state court had rejected petitioner’s claim that he is incompetent to be executed because the court erroneously thought that dementia, as opposed to other mental conditions, cannot provide a basis for such a claim. This was not a question that the Court agreed to hear; indeed, there is no mention whatsoever of this argument in the petition—not even a hint. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-7505_new_6kg7.pdf GARZA v. IDAHO Holding / Majority Opinion: In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, this Court held that when an attorney’s deficient performance costs a defendant an appeal that the defendant would have otherwise pursued, prejudice to the defendant should be presumed “with no further showing from the defendant of the merits of his underlying claims.” This case asks whether that rule applies even when the defendant has, in the course of pleading guilty, signed what is often called an “appeal waiver”—that is, an agreement forgoing certain, but not all, possible appellate claims. We hold that the presumption of prejudice recognized in Flores-Ortega applies regardless of whether the defendant has signed an appeal waiver. … In early 2015, petitioner Gilberto Garza, Jr., signed two plea agreements, each arising from criminal charges brought by the State of Idaho. Each agreement included a clause stating that Garza “waive[d] his right to appeal.” The Idaho trial court accepted the agreements and sentenced Garza to terms of prison in accordance with the agreements. Shortly after sentencing, Garza told his trial counsel that he wished to appeal. In the days that followed, he would later attest, Garza “continuously reminded” his attorney of this directive “via phone calls and letters,” Record 210, and Garza’s trial counsel acknowledged in his own affidavit that Garza had “told me he wanted to appeal the sentence(s) of the court,” Garza’s trial counsel, however, did not file a notice of appeal. Instead, counsel “informed Mr. Garza that an appeal was problematic because he waived his right to appeal.” … The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that Garza, given the appeal waivers, needed to show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice; it concluded that he could not. In ruling that Garza needed to show prejudice, the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged that it was aligning itself with the minority position among courts. For example, 8 of the 10 Federal Courts of Appeals to have considered the question have applied Flores-Ortega’s presumption of prejudice even when a defendant has signed an appeal waiver. We granted certiorari to resolve the split of authority. We now reverse. … The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants “the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for [their] defence.” The right to counsel includes “‘the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’” Under Strickland, a defendant who claims ineffective assistance of counsel must prove (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) that any such deficiency was “prejudicial to the defense,” “In certain Sixth Amendment contexts,” however, “prejudice is presumed.” Ibid. For example, no showing of prejudice is necessary “if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial,” or left “entirely without the assistance of counsel on appeal,” Similarly, prejudice is presumed “if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” And, most relevant here, prejudice is presumed “when counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken.” We hold today that this final presumption applies even when the defendant has signed an appeal waiver. … As with any type of contract, the language of appeal waivers can vary widely, with some waiver clauses leaving many types of claims unwaived. Additionally, even a waived appellate claim can still go forward if the prosecution forfeits or waives the waiver. Accordingly, a defendant who has signed an appeal waiver does not, in directing counsel to file a notice of appeal, necessarily undertake a quixotic or frivolous quest. Separately, all jurisdictions appear to treat at least some claims as unwaiveable. Most fundamentally, courts agree that defendants retain the right to challenge whether the waiver itself is valid and enforceable—for example, on the grounds that it was unknowing or involuntary. Consequently, while signing an appeal waiver means giving up some, many, or even most appellate claims, some claims nevertheless remain. It is also important to consider what it means—and does not mean—for trial counsel to file a notice of appeal. “Filing such a notice is a purely ministerial task that imposes no great burden on counsel.” In the federal system, for example, a notice of appeal need only identify who is appealing; what “judgment, order, or part thereof” is being appealed; and “the court to which the appeal is taken.” Generally speaking, state requirements are similarly nonsubstantive. … With regard to prejudice, Flores-Ortega held that, to succeed in an ineffective-assistance claim in this context, a defendant need make only one showing: “that, but for counsel’s deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would have timely appealed.” So long as a defendant can show that “counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance deprive[d him] of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken,” courts are to “presum[e] prejudice with no further showing from the defendant of the merits of his underlying claims.” Ibid. Because there is no dispute here that Garza wished to appeal, see supra, at 2, a direct application of Flores-Ortega’s language resolves this case. … We hold today that the presumption of prejudice recognized in Flores-Ortega applies regardless of whether a defendant has signed an appeal waiver. This ruling follows squarely from Flores-Ortega and from the fact that even the broadest appeal waiver does not deprive a defendant of all appellate claims. Accordingly where, as here, an attorney performed deficiently in failing to file a notice of appeal despite the defendant’s express instructions, prejudice is presumed “with no further showing from the defendant of the merits of his underlying claims.” See Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S., at 484. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Idaho is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Lineup: Sotomayor, joined by Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Dissent by Thomas, joined by Gorsuch and Alito (as to Parts I and II). Other Opinions: Dissent (Thomas, Gorsuch, and Alito as to Parts I and II): Petitioner Gilberto Garza avoided a potential life sentence by negotiating with the State of Idaho for reduced charges and a 10-year sentence. In exchange, Garza waived several constitutional and statutory rights, including “his right to appeal.” Despite this express waiver, Garza asked his attorney to challenge on appeal the very sentence for which he had bargained. Garza’s counsel quite reasonably declined to file an appeal for that purpose, recognizing that his client had waived this right and that filing an appeal would potentially jeopardize his plea bargain. Yet, the majority finds Garza’s counsel constitutionally ineffective, holding that an attorney’s performance is per se deficient and per se prejudicial any time the attorney declines a criminal defendant’s request to appeal an issue that the defendant has waived. In effect, this results in a “defendant-always-wins” rule that has no basis in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, or our other ineffective-assistance precedents, and certainly no basis in the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment. I respectfully dissent. … The Court purports to follow Flores-Ortega, but glosses over the important factual and legal differences between that case and this one. The most obvious difference is also the most crucial: There was no appellate waiver in FloresOrtega. The proximate cause of the defendant’s failure to appeal in that case was his counsel’s failure to file one. Not so here. Garza knowingly waived his appeal rights and never expressed a desire to withdraw his plea. It was thus Garza’s agreement to waive his appeal rights, not his attorney’s actions, that caused the forfeiture of his appeal. Thus, Flores-Ortega is inapposite. Because Flores-Ortega does not control cases involving defendants who voluntarily waive their appeal rights, this case should be resolved based on a straightforward application of Strickland. Under that framework, Garza has failed to demonstrate either (1) that his counsel was deficient or (2) that he was prejudiced in any way by that alleged deficiency. … [Here’s the part Alito isn’t joining] In addition to breaking from this Court’s precedent, today’s decision moves the Court another step further from the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” That provision “as originally understood and ratified meant only that a defendant had a right to employ counsel, or to use volunteered services of counsel.” Yet, the Court has read the Constitution to require not only a right to counsel at taxpayers’ expense, but a right to effective counsel. The result is that convicted criminals can relitigate their trial and appellate claims through collateral challenges couched as ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Because little available evidence suggests that this reading is correct as an original matter, the Court should tread carefully before extending our precedents in this area. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-1026_2c83.pdf JAM ET AL. v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP. Holding / Majority Opinion: The International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 grants international organizations such as the World Bank and the World Health Organization the “same immunity from suit . . . as is enjoyed by foreign governments.” 22 U. S. C. §288a(b). At the time the IOIA was enacted, foreign governments enjoyed virtually absolute immunity from suit. Today that immunity is more limited. Most significantly, foreign governments are not immune from actions based upon certain kinds of commercial activity in which they engage. This case requires us to determine whether the IOIA grants international organizations the virtually absolute immunity foreign governments enjoyed when the IOIA was enacted, or the more limited immunity they enjoy today. … Petitioners are local farmers and fishermen and a small village. They allege that the power plant has polluted the air, land, and water in the surrounding area. Petitioners sued the [International Finance Corporation, an international organization headquartered in the United States] for damages and injunctive relief in Federal District Court, but the IFC claimed absolute immunity from suit. Petitioners argued that the IFC was entitled under the IOIA only to the limited or “restrictive” immunity that foreign governments currently enjoy. We agree. … When the IOIA was enacted in 1945, courts looked to the views of the Department of State in deciding whether a given foreign government should be granted immunity from a particular suit. If the Department submitted a recommendation on immunity, courts deferred to the recommendation. If the Department did not make a recommendation, courts decided for themselves whether to grant immunity, although they did so by reference to State Department policy. Until 1952, the State Department adhered to the classical theory of foreign sovereign immunity. According to that theory, foreign governments are entitled to “virtually absolute” immunity as a matter of international grace and comity. At the time the IOIA was enacted, therefore, the Department ordinarily requested, and courts ordinarily granted, immunity in suits against foreign governments. In 1952, however, the State Department announced that it would adopt the newer “restrictive” theory of foreign sovereign immunity. Under that theory, foreign governments are entitled to immunity only with respect to their sovereign acts, not with respect to commercial acts. The State Department explained that it was adopting the restrictive theory because the “widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial activities” made it “necessary” to “enable persons doing business with them to have their rights determined in the courts.” … In 1976, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The FSIA codified the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity but transferred “primary responsibility for immunity determinations from the Executive to the Judicial Branch.” Under the FSIA, foreign governments are presumptively immune from suit. But a foreign government may be subject to suit under one of several statutory exceptions. Most pertinent here, a foreign government may be subject to suit in connection with its commercial activity that has a sufficient nexus with the United States. … In 2008, the IFC loaned $450 million to Coastal Gujarat Power Limited, a company located in India. The loan helped finance the construction of a coal-fired power plant in the state of Gujarat. Under the terms of the loan agreement, Coastal Gujarat was required to comply with an environmental and social action plan designed to protect areas around the plant from damage. The agreement allowed the IFC to revoke financial support for the project if Coastal Gujarat failed to abide by the terms of the agreement. The project did not go smoothly. According to the IFC’s internal audit, Coastal Gujarat did not comply with the environmental and social action plan in constructing and operating the plant. The audit report criticized the IFC for inadequately supervising the project. In 2015, a group of farmers and fishermen who live near the plant, as well as a local village, sued the IFC in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They claimed that pollution from the plant, such as coal dust, ash, and water from the plant’s cooling system, had destroyed or contaminated much of the surrounding air, land, and water. Relying on the audit report, they asserted several causes of action against the IFC, including negligence, nuisance, trespass, and breach of contract. The IFC maintained that it was immune from suit under the IOIA and moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ... The IFC contends that the IOIA grants international organizations the “same immunity” from suit that foreign governments enjoyed in 1945. Petitioners argue that it instead grants international organizations the “same immunity” from suit that foreign governments enjoy today. We think petitioners have the better reading of the statute. The language of the IOIA more naturally lends itself to petitioners’ reading. In granting international organizations the “same immunity” from suit “as is enjoyed by foreign governments,” the Act seems to continuously link the immunity of international organizations to that of foreign governments, so as to ensure ongoing parity between the two. The statute could otherwise have simply stated that international organizations “shall enjoy absolute immunity from suit,” or specified some other fixed level of immunity. Other provisions of the IOIA, such as the one making the property and assets of international organizations “immune from search,” use such noncomparative language to define immunities in a static way. Or the statute could have specified that it was incorporating the law of foreign sovereign immunity as it existed on a particular date. See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 1992, 30 U. S. C. §242(c)(1) (certain land patents “shall provide for surface use to the same extent as is provided under applicable law prior to October 24, 1992”). Because the IOIA does neither of those things, we think the “same as” formulation is best understood to make international organization immunity and foreign sovereign immunity continuously equivalent. That reading finds support in other statutes that use similar or identical language to place two groups on equal footing. In the Civil Rights Act of 1866, for instance, Congress established a rule of equal treatment for newly freed slaves by giving them the “same right” to make and enforce contracts and to buy and sell property “as is enjoyed by white citizens.” That provision is of course understood to guarantee continuous equality between white and nonwhite citizens with respect to the rights in question. Similarly, the Federal Tort Claims Act states that the “United States shall be liable” in tort “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” That provision is most naturally understood to make the United States liable in the same way as a private individual at any given time. … The more natural reading of the IOIA is confirmed by a canon of statutory interpretation that was well established when the IOIA was drafted. According to the “reference” canon, when a statute refers to a general subject, the statute adopts the law on that subject as it exists whenever a question under the statute arises….In contrast, a statute that refers to another statute by specific title or section number in effect cuts and pastes the referenced statute as it existed when the referring statute was enacted, without any subsequent amendments. … [E]ven if an international development bank’s lending activity does qualify as commercial, that does not mean the organization is automatically subject to suit. The FSIA includes other requirements that must also be met. For one thing, the commercial activity must have a sufficient nexus to the United States. For another, a lawsuit must be “based upon” either the commercial activity itself or acts performed in connection with the commercial activity. Thus, if the “gravamen” of a lawsuit is tortious activity abroad, the suit is not “based upon” commercial activity within the meaning of the FSIA’s commercial activity exception. At oral argument in this case, the Government stated that it has “serious doubts” whether petitioners’ suit, which largely concerns allegedly tortious conduct in India, would satisfy the “based upon” requirement. In short, restrictive immunity hardly means unlimited exposure to suit for international organizations. The International Organizations Immunities Act grants international organizations the “same immunity” from suit “as is enjoyed by foreign governments” at any given time. Today, that means that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act governs the immunity of international organizations. The International Finance Corporation is therefore not absolutely immune from suit. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lineup: Roberts, joined by Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Dissent by Breyer. Kavanaugh did not participate. Other Opinions: Dissent (Breyer): The International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 extends to international organizations “the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments.” The majority, resting primarily upon the statute’s language and canons of interpretation, holds that the statute’s reference to “immunity” moves with the times. As a consequence, the statute no longer allows international organizations immunity from lawsuits arising from their commercial activities. In my view, the statute grants international organizations that immunity—just as foreign governments possessed that immunity when Congress enacted the statute in 1945. In reaching this conclusion, I rest more heavily than does the majority upon the statute’s history, its context, its purposes, and its consequences. And I write in part to show that, in difficult cases like this one, purpose-based methods of interpretation can often shine a useful light upon opaque statutory language, leading to a result that reflects greater legal coherence and is, as a practical matter, more sound. The general question before us is familiar: Do the words of a statute refer to their subject matter “statically,” as it was when the statute was written? Or is their reference to that subject matter “dynamic,” changing in scope as the subject matter changes over time? It is hardly surprising, given the thousands of different statutes containing an untold number of different words, that there is no single, universally applicable answer to this question. Fairly recent cases from this Court make that clear. Compare New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 7) (adopting the interpretation of “‘contracts of employment’” that prevailed at the time of the statute’s adoption in 1925); Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 2) (adopting the meaning of “‘money’” that prevailed at the time of the statute’s enactment in 1937); Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U. S. 379, 388 (2009) (interpreting the statutory phrase “‘now under Federal jurisdiction’” to cover only those tribes that were under federal jurisdiction at the time of the statute’s adoption in 1934); and Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U. S. 607, 612–613 (1992) (adopting the meaning of “‘commercial’” that was “attached to that term under the restrictive theory” when the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was enacted in 1976), with Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 14) (noting that the words “‘restraint of trade’” in the Sherman Act have been interpreted dynamically); West v. Gibson, 527 U. S. 212, 218 (1999) (interpreting the term “‘appropriate’” in Title VII’s remedies provision dynamically); and Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 275–276 (1995) (interpreting the term “‘involving commerce’” in the Federal Arbitration Act dynamically). The Court, like petitioners, believes that the language of the statute itself helps significantly to answer the static/dynamic question. See ante, at 7–9. I doubt that the language itself helps in this case... the words “as is enjoyed” do not conclusively tell us when enjoyed. Do they mean “as is enjoyed” at the time of the statute’s enactment? Or “as is enjoyed” at the time a plaintiff brings a lawsuit? … Linguistics does not answer the temporal question. Nor do our cases, which are not perfectly consistent on the matter. Compare McNeill v. United States, 563 U. S. 816, 821 (2011) (present-tense verb in the Armed Career Criminal Act requires applying the law at the time of previous conviction, not the later time when the Act is applied), with Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U. S. 468, 478 (2003) (present-tense verb requires applying the law “at the time suit is filed”). The problem is simple: “Without knowing the point in time at which the law speaks, it is impossible to tell what is past and what is present or future.” It is purpose, not linguistics, that can help us here. … The majority finds support for its dynamic interpretation in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which gives all citizens the “same right” to make and enforce contracts and to buy and sell property “as is enjoyed by white citizens.” But it is purpose, not words, that readily resolves any temporal linguistic ambiguity in that statute. The Act’s objective, like that of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, was a Nation that treated its citizens equally. Its purpose—revealed by its title, historical context, and other language in the statute—was “to guarantee the then newly freed slaves the same legal rights that other citizens enjoy.” Given this purpose, its dynamic nature is obvious. Similarly, judges interpreting the words “same . . . as” have long resolved ambiguity not by looking at the words alone, but by examining the statute’s purpose as well. … Thus, all interpretive roads here lead us to the same place, namely, to context, to history, to purpose, and to consequences. Language alone cannot resolve the statute’s linguistic ambiguity. “Statutory interpretation,” however, “is not a game of blind man’s bluff.” We are “free to consider statutory language in light of a statute’s basic purposes,” ibid., as well as “‘the history of the times when it was passed,’” In this case, historical context, purpose, and related consequences tell us a great deal about the proper interpretation of the Immunities Act. Congressional reports explain that Congress, acting in the immediate aftermath of World War II, intended the Immunities Act to serve two related purposes. First, it would “enabl[e] this country to fulfill its commitments in connection with its membership in international organizations.” S. Rep. No. 861, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1945); see also id., at 2–3 (explaining that the Immunities Act was “basic legislation” expected to “satisfy in full the requirements of . . . international organizations conducting activities in the United States”); H. R. Rep. No. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1945) (similar). And second, it would “facilitate fully the functioning of international organizations in this country.” S. Rep. No. 861, at 3. I first examine the international commitments that Congress sought to fulfill. By 1945, the United States had entered into agreements creating several important multilateral organizations, including the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The founding agreements for several of these organizations required member states to grant them broad immunity from suit. … These international organizations expected the United States to provide them with essentially full immunity. And at the time the treaties were written, Congress understood that foreign governments normally enjoyed immunity with respect to their commercial, as well as their noncommercial, activities. Thus, by granting international organizations “the same immunity from suit” that foreign governments enjoyed, Congress expected that international organizations would similarly have immunity in both commercial and noncommercial suits. More than that, Congress likely recognized that immunity in the commercial area was even more important for many international organizations than it was for most foreign governments. … In light of this history, how likely is it that Congress, seeking to “satisfy in full the requirements of . . . international organizations conducting activities in the United States,” S. Rep. No. 861, at 2–3 (emphasis added), would have understood the statute to take from many international organizations with one hand the immunity it had given them with the other? If Congress wished the Act to carry out one of its core purposes—fulfilling the country’s international commitments—Congress would not have wanted the statute to change over time, taking on a meaning that would fail to grant not only full, but even partial, immunity to many of those organizations. Congress also intended to facilitate international organizations’ ability to pursue their missions in the United States. To illustrate why that purpose is better served by a static interpretation, consider in greater detail the work of the organizations to which Congress wished to provide broad immunity. Consider, for example, the mission of UNRRA. The United States and other nations created that organization in 1943, as the end of World War II seemed in sight. Its objective was, in the words of President Roosevelt, to “‘assure a fair distribution of available supplies among’” those liberated in World War II, and “‘to ward off death by starvation or exposure among these peoples.’” 1 G. Woodbridge, UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 3 (1950). By the time Congress passed the Immunities Act in 1945, UNRRA had obtained and shipped billions of pounds of food, clothing, and other relief supplies to children freed from Nazi concentration camps and to others in serious need. These activities involved contracts, often made in the United States, for transportation and for numerous commercial goods. Indeed, the United States conditioned its participation on UNRRA’s spending what amounted to 67% of its budget on purchases of goods and services in the United States. (describing UNRRA training programs for foreign doctors within the United States, which presumably required entering into contracts); (describing successor organization’s transportation of displaced persons, presumably also under contract). Would Congress, believing that it had provided the absolute immunity that UNRRA sought and expected, also have intended that the statute be interpreted “dynamically,” thereby removing most of the immunity that it had then provided—not only potentially from UNRRA itself but also from other future international organizations with UNRRA-like objectives and tasks? This history makes clear that Congress enacted the Immunities Act as part of an effort to encourage international organizations to locate their headquarters and carry on their missions in the United States. It also makes clear that Congress intended to enact “basic legislation” that would fulfill its broad immunity-based commitments to the UN, UNRRA, and other nascent organizations. S. Rep. No. 861, at 2. And those commitments, of necessity, included immunity from suit in commercial areas, since organizations were buying goods and making contracts in the United States. To achieve these purposes, Congress enacted legislation that granted necessarily broad immunity. And that fact strongly suggests that Congress would not have wanted the statute to reduce significantly the scope of immunity that international organizations enjoyed, particularly organizations engaged in development finance, refugee assistance, or other tasks that U. S. law could well decide were “commercial” in nature. See infra, at 12. … Now consider the consequences that the majority’s reading of the statute will likely produce—consequences that run counter to the statute’s basic purposes. Although the UN itself is no longer dependent upon the Immunities Act, many other organizations, such as the FAO and several multilateral development banks, continue to rely upon that Act to secure immunity, for the United States has never ratified treaties nor enacted statutes that might extend the necessary immunity, commercial and noncommercial alike. … As a result of the majority’s interpretation, many of the international organizations to which the United States belongs will discover that they are now exposed to civil lawsuits based on their (U. S.-law-defined) commercial activity. And because “commercial activity” may well have a broad definition, today’s holding will at the very least create uncertainty for organizations involved in finance, such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. The core functions of these organizations are at least arguably “commercial” in nature; the organizations exist to promote international development by investing in foreign companies and projects across the world. … The majority’s opinion will have a further important consequence—one that more clearly contradicts the statute’s objectives and overall scheme. It concerns the important goal of weeding out lawsuits that are likely bad or harmful—those likely to produce rules of law that interfere with an international organization’s public interest tasks. … At the end of World War II, many in this Nation saw international cooperation through international organization as one way both to diminish the risk of conflict and to promote economic development and commercial prosperity. Congress at that time and at the request of many of those organizations enacted the Immunities Act. Given the differences between international organizations and nation states, along with the Act’s purposes and the risk of untoward consequences, I would leave the Immunities Act where we found it—as providing for immunity in both commercial and noncommercial suits. My decision rests primarily not upon linguistic analysis, but upon basic statutory purposes. Linguistic methods alone, however artfully employed, too often can be used to justify opposite conclusions. Purposes, derived from context, informed by history, and tested by recognition of related consequences, will more often lead us to legally sound, workable interpretations—as they have consistently done in the past. These methods of interpretation can help voters hold officials accountable for their decisions and permit citizens of our diverse democracy to live together productively and in peace—basic objectives in America of the rule of law itself. With respect, I dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-1011_mkhn.pdf [internal citations inconsistently omitted throughout]
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Feb 27, 2019 23:23
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In "why the gently caress do we even have arbitration at all" news, Fox was accused of fraudulent accounting, blatant enough that the binding arbitrator hit them with a 5x punitive on top of $50m in damages. Of course: "The ruling by this private arbitrator is categorically wrong on the merits and exceeded his arbitration powers," reads a statement from 21st Century Fox. "Fox will not allow this flagrant injustice, riddled with errors and gratuitous character attacks, to stand and will vigorously challenge the ruling in a court of law." which roughly translates to "we only meant YOU had to be bound by rulings in our favor". https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/fox-rocked-by-179-million-bones-ruling-lying-cheating-reprehensible-studio-fraud-1190346 The whole thing is a wild trip down the hollywood accounting rabbit hole as well, including such fun things as selling the streaming rights for nothing, in a contract with both sides signed by the same person in his roles at both fox & hulu, obviously buying off a key witness before their testimony, and lying to people that the show would be cancelled if they didn't sign a release while not revealing it had already been renewed and the key stars already contracted.
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Feb 27, 2019 23:31
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Harik posted:In "why the gently caress do we even have arbitration at all" news, Fox was accused of fraudulent accounting, blatant enough that the binding arbitrator hit them with a 5x punitive on top of $50m in damages. Arbitration replaces a trial court, you can always appeal for the same reasons you'd appeal a trial court's ruling?
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Feb 27, 2019 23:51
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hobbesmaster posted:Arbitration replaces a trial court, you can always appeal for the same reasons you'd appeal a trial court's ruling? This is emphatically not the law. The FAA provides more limited reasons to set aside an arbitrators ruling than to appeal a court judgment.
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Feb 28, 2019 00:18
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my eyes glazed over about halfway through the breyer dissent but it sounds interesting in principle so I'll probably try again later
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Feb 28, 2019 00:23
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GreyjoyBastard posted:my eyes glazed over about halfway through the breyer dissent but it sounds interesting in principle so I'll probably try again later In summary: “if you fuckers would only look at legislative history and congressional intent you wouldn’t keep loving up your statutory interpretation.”
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Feb 28, 2019 00:39
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Holy poo poo, at least Alito didn't join on to Thomas and Gorsuch's "gently caress poor people" Sixth Amendment view. Just a monstrous viewpoint.
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Feb 28, 2019 00:53
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The trial transcript clearly showed the defendant answered "what?" to the question "guilty man says what?"
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Feb 28, 2019 03:20
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Zeeman posted:Holy poo poo, at least Alito didn't join on to Thomas and Gorsuch's "gently caress poor people" Sixth Amendment view. Just a monstrous viewpoint. Dead Reckoning fucked around with this message at 05:00 on Feb 28, 2019 |
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Feb 28, 2019 04:53
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Dead Reckoning posted:I mean, it's internally consistent: the first amendment doesn't require the government to buy you a Bible or build you a mosque, and the 2nd doesn't mandate that the government buy you arms to keep and bear, but interpreting the sixth in that way would put legal representation completely beyond the reach of the average citizen. twodot fucked around with this message at 04:59 on Feb 28, 2019 |
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Feb 28, 2019 04:56
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twodot posted:Except that it's literally the government and no one else that creates any sort of demand for criminal lawyers. I'd also guess that, at the time of the founding, criminal codes were less complex, and someone had a better chance proceeding pro se than they do today.
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Feb 28, 2019 06:21
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Or they just didn’t give a gently caress if the peasants could not defend themselves.
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Feb 28, 2019 10:46
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Dead Reckoning posted:That's a really good point. You’d think that, but you’d be wrong. Criminal codes might be more extensive than they were a in past centuries, but they’re much simpler to read and understand thanks to the MPC. Also “criminal codes are complex” is far from the most important reason why going pro se in a criminal trial is a bad idea. More important reasons include: the fact that trial advocacy (think like, actually being able to pick and persuade a jury) is kind of a niche skill that most lawyers and almost all lay people are incompetent at, evidence law (which is also much simpler today than it was a hundred years ago thanks to codification), and criminal procedure (admittedly more complicated now, but much more defendant friendly thanks to the exclusionary rule).
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Feb 28, 2019 11:48
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My guess is that it was an attempt to make sure they didn't have to deal with some of the nonsense the ancient democracies had where legal representation at trials was illegal and instead there was a dumb legal fiction about having a "friend" show up to defend you, for free, and that you'd have to maintain that you are totally not paying this guy under the table, he's just strangely a friend to all well off people who end up at trial. I'd also guess it'd tie into a bit of the intent behind the fifth amendment, that its making it perfectly clear that its alright for an innocent person to have a lawyer to safeguard their rights, since apparently there was a line of thought in the UK that no amount of oration skill or eloquence could possibly defeat the words of a truly innocent person speaking the truth and thus no defense counsel should be needed at all. There's a lot of historical angst about how the rich and powerful could evade punishment via professional orators / lawyers (tho it was not so much a humanist "oh no people are getting loving screwed" angst so much as a kind of "oh no reality is getting in the way of our philosophical ideal" angst), and an understanding that the law was often way too complex for random people, or sometimes even the judges themselves, to fully understand, but the solutions were often just "ban lawyers / limit pay of lawyers and then point to said ban when people complain about the problem"; if the rich and powerful are just dodging the bans via legal fictions then thats just a problem with outcomes and nobody has time for that poo poo. If you got judged guilty because you didn't have a lawyer you were probably just whining that you couldn't bend the law to evade punishment, you sophist. Tiler Kiwi fucked around with this message at 16:28 on Feb 28, 2019 |
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Feb 28, 2019 12:26
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did Madison vs Alabama attempt to address the Ricky Ray Rector scenario at all? i.e.e loss mental capacity not through natural degeneration, but through artificial means?
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Feb 28, 2019 13:56
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exploded mummy posted:did Madison vs Alabama attempt to address the Ricky Ray Rector scenario at all? i.e.e loss mental capacity not through natural degeneration, but through artificial means? No. However, the logic of the opinion (summarized above) would suggest that the means are irrelevant; the only relevant question is current capacity to understand why the state is going to kill you. quote:Panetti framed its test, as just described, in a way utterly indifferent to a prisoner’s specific mental illness. The Panetti standard concerns, once again, not the diagnosis of such illness, but a consequence—to wit, the prisoner’s inability to rationally understand his punishment. ulmont fucked around with this message at 16:42 on Feb 28, 2019 |
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Feb 28, 2019 15:17
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Tiler Kiwi posted:My guess is that it was an attempt to make sure they didn't have to deal with some of the nonsense the ancient democracies had where legal representation at trials was illegal and instead there was a dumb legal fiction about having a "friend" show up to defend you, for free, and that you'd have to maintain that you are totally not paying this guy under the table, he's just strangely a friend to all well off people who end up at trial. I'd also guess it'd tie into a bit of the intent behind the fifth amendment, that its making it perfectly clear that its alright for an innocent person to have a lawyer to safeguard their rights, since apparently there was a line of thought in the UK that no amount of oration skill or eloquence could possibly defeat the words of a truly innocent person speaking the truth and thus no defense counsel should be needed at all. It was also part of English common law. quote:As advocates seek recognition of a civil right to counsel, it is worth noting the extraordinarily ancient roots of the concept. Clause 40 of the Magna Carta guarantees that "[t]o none will we sell, to none deny or delay, right or justice." A Tudor statute, 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 (1494) established a right to counsel for indigent civil plaintiffs with meritorious causes of action, requiring a court to "assign to the same poor person or persons, Counsel learned by their discretions which shall give their Counsels nothing taking for the same …." The right later expanded to include civil defendants as well as plaintiffs. http://civilrighttocounsel.org/about/history
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Feb 28, 2019 16:59
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Hieronymous Alloy posted:It was also part of English common law. Sort of. Not for treason and felonies. Thomas, dissenting posted:The Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel grew out of the Founders’ reaction to the English common-law rule that denied counsel for treason and felony offenses with respect to issues of fact, while allowing counsel for misdemeanors. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 349–350 (1769); 1 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 341 (1883); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 60 (1932) (“Originally, in England, a person charged with treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel, except in respect of legal questions which the accused himself might suggest”). It was not until 1696 that England created a narrow exception to this rule for individuals accused of treason or misprision of treason—by statute, Parliament provided both that the accused may retain counsel and that the court must appoint counsel if requested. 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch.3, §1. Only in 1836 did England permit all criminally accused to appear and defend with counsel, and even then it did not require court-appointed counsel at government expense. 6 & 7 Will. 4, ch. 114, §1. It would be another 67 years—112 years after the ratification of the Sixth Amendment, and 35 years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment—before England provided court-appointed counsel for all felonies. Poor Prisoners’ Defence Act, 1903, 3 Edw. 7, ch. 38, §1.
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Feb 28, 2019 17:39
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Wow, Thomas's dissent seems explicitly just wrong there once you realize the context is that english common law provided for actual provision of counsel to civil defendants. Which we should have today, btw. A rigorous reading of the 6th (edit: and the 14th, I forgot the 6th specified criminal) would require not only appointment of civil defenders but equal pay for prosecutorial and defense attorneys (imho). Hieronymous Alloy fucked around with this message at 19:55 on Feb 28, 2019 |
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Feb 28, 2019 17:50
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Hieronymous Alloy posted:Wow, Thomas's dissent seems explicitly just wrong there once you realize the context is that english common law provided for actual provision of counsel to civil defendants. I think Thomas' reading is the more accurate one especially to the intent of a group of lawyers writing a document to entrench their power over a country and just another example of why the constitution is bad and scotus not only can but must ignore or misinterpret it in the pursuit of justice
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Feb 28, 2019 19:18
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Constitution: accused has the right to an attorney. Thomas: doesn't say they you get a free pass if they gently caress up. That about summarize it?
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Feb 28, 2019 19:21
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ilkhan posted:Constitution: accused has the right to an attorney. Thomas' argument is that the constitution provides a right to hire and employ an attorney in your defense, not a right to be provided with one for free.
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Feb 28, 2019 19:23
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atelier morgan posted:Thomas' argument is that the constitution provides a right to hire and employ an attorney in your defense, not a right to be provided with one for free.
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Feb 28, 2019 19:43
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atelier morgan posted:I think Thomas' reading is the more accurate one especially to the intent of a group of lawyers writing a document to entrench their power over a country and just another example of why the constitution is bad and scotus not only can but must ignore or misinterpret it in the pursuit of justice this is a dangerous principle to enshrine unless and until the faultless Communist Party of America (as opposed to the splitter trots in the American Communist Party) runs a one-party state
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Feb 28, 2019 19:45
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ilkhan posted:"The result is that convicted criminals can relitigate their trial and appellate claims through collateral challenges couched as ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims." Yes, he brings up right to public provided attorney, but the focus there is on effectiveness of their effort. You have to put it in context though. quote:In addition to breaking from this Court’s precedent, today’s decision moves the Court another step further from the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment provides that, “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” That provision “as originally understood and ratified meant only that a defendant had a right to employ counsel, or to use volunteered services of counsel.” Yet, the Court has read the Constitution to require not only a right to counsel at taxpayers’ expense, but a right to effective counsel. The result is that convicted criminals can relitigate their trial and appellate claims through collateral challenges couched as ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Because little available evidence suggests that this reading is correct as an original matter, the Court should tread carefully before extending our precedents in this area. Thomas is framing this as a negative right, i.e. the government doesn't have the right to deny you counsel if you've hired an attorney. But the understood meaning by people who aren't madmen is that you have the right to counsel no matter what your circumstances, even if you can't afford to hire your own attorney. But this places a burden on the state to provide counsel, which costs money. And the state isn't actually that interested in providing good public defenders because all the voters just assume anyone accused of a crime is guilty anyway, so they tend to severely underfund public defender offices which leads to them hiring less effective lawyers, overworking them, and providing substandard legal defence to their clients, which may ultimately result in people being found guilty of crimes that they are not guilty of, and of which they would have been acquitted with effective counsel. So the Court has a more expansive definition of counsel, which is that the state has to provide actually effective defence counsel, or it's a violation of this right. This is essentially to prevent the absurd possibility where the state employs one public defender who got their degree from Liberty University Law School, and they pay them $3 a year, and they're best friends with the prosecutors and their brother is a police officer and they spend one minute on each case, and they never, ever get a client found not guilty. So the right is actually to effective counsel, which the state has to provide. Once you establish that as a positive constitutional right, any further argument is just about details: how effective is effective enough? Thomas, on the other hand, wants to tear down this entire system and go back to public defenders not existing and only wealthy people having defence lawyers, because he reads the right in a completely different way from the rest of the Court and the rest of the legal system.
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Feb 28, 2019 19:52
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atelier morgan posted:I think Thomas' reading is the more accurate one especially to the intent of a group of lawyers writing a document to entrench their power over a country and just another example of why the constitution is bad and scotus not only can but must ignore or misinterpret it in the pursuit of justice Bill of Rights wasn't written in the Constitutional Convention. It was the result of popular pressure and became necessary to secure the democratic passage of the whole package.
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Feb 28, 2019 19:53
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vyelkin posted:
which is to say, it's Thursday
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Feb 28, 2019 19:55
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It's doubly ridiculous for an originalist to interpret the right to council as a negative right when other amendments are specifically negatively structured and the 6th very clearly isn't.
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Feb 28, 2019 20:22
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GreyjoyBastard posted:this is a dangerous principle to enshrine unless and until the faultless Communist Party of America (as opposed to the splitter trots in the American Communist Party) runs a one-party state It's only philosophically different from the idea of a living constitution, not actually any different in terms of result. I just happen to agree with Thomas that the majority often just makes poo poo up, while believing that's its a good thing they do so to prefer sanity and justice over any consideration for the constitution as something valuable in and of itself. I just also think the comprehensive failure that is our justice system, legislature and executive would be best served by writing a new constition, rather than looking at it as some evolving ideal to reach for. Hieronymous Alloy posted:Bill of Rights wasn't written in the Constitutional Convention. It was the result of popular pressure and became necessary to secure the democratic passage of the whole package. I'm well aware and its laughable to treat anything as democratic considering the state of the franchise at the time. At the time of ratification the franchise still had a property requirement (in addition to excluding slaves, free blacks (except in four states) and women), it was a document by and for landowners, merchants and lawyers just like the constitution. atelier morgan fucked around with this message at 01:20 on Mar 1, 2019 |
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Mar 1, 2019 01:12
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atelier morgan posted:I just happen to agree with Thomas that the majority often just makes poo poo up This is only true if you, like Thomas, pretend that precedent doesn't inform future court decisions.
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Mar 1, 2019 02:20
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fool_of_sound posted:This is only true if you, like Thomas, pretend that precedent doesn't inform future court decisions. It doesn't. Dred Scott, Korematsu, Bush v. Gore and Hobby Lobby just off the top of my head. SCOTUS rules however it wants to and comes up with a nice legal excuse whenever they feel like their idea of justice would be better served that way. The idea that the judiciary is any less political than the other branches of our political system is a pernicious lie.
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Mar 1, 2019 03:48
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atelier morgan posted:It doesn't. Dred Scott, Korematsu, Bush v. Gore and Hobby Lobby just off the top of my head. Thomas getting his way would absolutely devastate the current legal system and how laws have worked for more than a century.
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Mar 1, 2019 03:51
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Piell posted:Thomas getting his way would absolutely devastate the current legal system and how laws have worked for more than a century. I really don't see how you got the crazy idea that I think Thomas should ever get his way. As long as our current system exists the court should and must ignore precedent and the constitution when it stands in the way of justice. I just get there without feeling the need for thousands of pages of conlaw texts to justify pretending like actually that's what the holy and infallible constitution wanted all along. Our present system relies on the court being an important element of our political system, now more than ever before as the idea of actually passing legislation is vanishing into the mists of laughability where amending the constitution already lives. atelier morgan fucked around with this message at 03:58 on Mar 1, 2019 |
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Mar 1, 2019 03:55
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atelier morgan posted:I really don't see how you got the crazy idea that I think Thomas should ever get his way. Thomas and Gorsuch aren't "ignoring precedent when it stands in the way of justice", they're ignoring precedent because it stands in the way of their personal political goals. Thomas just literally argued that poor people shouldn't be provided lawyers, and even if they are then their lawyer can completely and factually be absolutely incompetently and they would have no recourse. Piell fucked around with this message at 04:05 on Mar 1, 2019 |
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Mar 1, 2019 04:01
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Piell posted:Thomas and Gorsuch aren't "ignoring precedent when it stands in the way of justice", they're ignoring precedent because it stands in the way of their personal political goals. Yes, because they're vile fuckers and what they want is terrible and makes a mockery of the idea of justice. Not because there's a fundamental difference of type between those two ideas. I loathe Thomas and have made it clear (albeit many, many pages and months/years ago) in this thread. atelier morgan fucked around with this message at 04:07 on Mar 1, 2019 |
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Mar 1, 2019 04:04
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Piell posted:Thomas and Gorsuch aren't "ignoring precedent when it stands in the way of justice", they're ignoring precedent because it stands in the way of their personal political goals. Thomas ignores precedent. Full stop, always. His political goals have nothing to do with it. Even when he agrees with the liberals on the court, its often through a crazy reason.
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Mar 1, 2019 04:09
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Yeah Thomas genuinely just has an insane interpretation of how US jurisprudence works, that virtually no other judges agree with. He also happens to be a conservative piece of poo poo, but he don't pretend that his interpretations are somehow more valid; that's not how the law works in the US.
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Mar 1, 2019 04:20
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fool_of_sound posted:Yeah Thomas genuinely just has an insane interpretation of how US jurisprudence works, that virtually no other judges agree with. He also happens to be a conservative piece of poo poo, but he don't pretend that his interpretations are somehow more valid; that's not how the law works in the US. Yeah, don't get me wrong. Thomas is right that the majority makes poo poo up to fit what they want to rule. He also makes poo poo up himself to fit how he wants to rule and pretends he doesn't, just like the other justices he complains about. He's a hypocrite AND a complete piece of poo poo.
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Mar 1, 2019 04:25
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atelier morgan posted:Yeah, don't get me wrong. Thomas is right that the majority makes poo poo up to fit what they want to rule. He also makes poo poo up himself to fit how he wants to rule and pretends he doesn't, just like the other justices he complains about. He's a hypocrite AND a complete piece of poo poo. He's not really pretending or hiding anything, he's pretty clear about what he's doing and he is probably the most legally and logically consistent members on the right. (As opposed to say, Alito who is just a political hack who will ignore what he said last term if its inconvenient) Every day he pretends that its the early 1800's, he is the very first judge to have ever examined the issue, and his only source is the constitution. He only talks about prior decisions to mock other members of the court and point out that they aren't really doing what they claim they are, but he's always only looking at the original text, and doesn't give a drat what even a conservative prior court may have said..
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Mar 1, 2019 04:36
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