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Rigel posted:Every day he pretends that its the early 1800's, he is the very first judge to have ever examined the issue, and his only source is the constitution. This really isn’t true. Thomas is willing to look at Blackstone’s, the Magna Carta, and a whole host of other sources for what the founders thought they were writing into the Constitution.
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Mar 1, 2019 04:44
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Rigel posted:He's not really pretending or hiding anything, he's pretty clear about what he's doing and he is probably the most legally and logically consistent members on the right. (As opposed to say, Alito who is just a political hack who will ignore what he said last term if its inconvenient) Every day he pretends that its the early 1800's, he is the very first judge to have ever examined the issue, and his only source is the constitution. He only talks about prior decisions to mock other members of the court and point out that they aren't really doing what they claim they are, but he's always only looking at the original text, and doesn't give a drat what even a conservative prior court may have said.. Thomas' supposed consistency is massively overrated, though it's an equally massive pain to explain exactly how because normal media loves to present him that way and most conlaw critics are behind paywalls His opinion in Lawrence was at odds with his supposed philosophy, Adarand v. Pena is a good example of him having no interest in any sort of originalism, you can watch him literally change entire schools of jurisprudence between Morse v. Frederick and Parents Involved v. Seattle Schools and, ofc, signing off on Roberts' concurrence in Bush v. Gore. That's just stuff i remembered off the top of my head or could easily google, but there's an entire galaxy of examples bush v. gore might has saved me from the dismal fate of going to law school just in time to graduate during the recession by providing an example even my idiot teenager brain could understand of why scotus was fundamentally broken atelier morgan fucked around with this message at 04:56 on Mar 1, 2019 |
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Mar 1, 2019 04:52
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born to dissent thomas is a gently caress overturn em all 1989 537,623,954 dead precedents
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Mar 1, 2019 08:11
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Clarence Thomas is the most principled man in America.
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Mar 1, 2019 15:02
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Rigel posted:He's not really pretending or hiding anything, he's pretty clear about what he's doing and he is probably the most legally and logically consistent members on the right. So what part of the Constitution says that appointing George W Bush was the Supreme Court's job E: Also are we asserting that Mr Most Legally And Logically Consistent would have voted the same way if Gore had led at first and was suing to stop a Bush-requested recount
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Mar 1, 2019 15:28
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Conservative legal folks coming in hard against the Establishment Clause. School Prayer coming back y'all.
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Mar 1, 2019 15:54
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VitalSigns posted:So what part of the Constitution says that appointing George W Bush was the Supreme Court's job That decision would be quite easy for someone like Thomas, and yes I believe he would have voted the same way for Gore. The dissent's main point was that the safe harbor (for their electors to not be easily challenged) was really not a big deal, so why shouldn't we allow more time for another full statewide recount. Thomas has always been unmoved by these general fairness and "it just wouldn't be right" type of arguments. A partial recount was not allowed (in his view) by the 14th, Florida passed a law demanding that they stay within the safe harbor deadline, and there was nothing obviously wrong with the first recount other than the closeness of the election, so that was that for him.
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Mar 1, 2019 17:22
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The Florida Supreme Court ruled that deadline was unconstitutional under their state constitution. Thomas also disregarded the part of that Florida statute that required the recount if there is an error in vote tabulation. That was kind of the whole case, Thomas just picked the part of the law he liked and ignored the rest, he didn't just "follow the law" and "reject appeals to fairness" VitalSigns fucked around with this message at 17:47 on Mar 1, 2019 |
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Mar 1, 2019 17:39
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atelier morgan posted:It doesn't. Dred Scott, Korematsu, Bush v. Gore and Hobby Lobby just off the top of my head. Roberts says Korematsu was overruled in the court of public opinion, which is apparently superior to the Supreme Court.
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Mar 2, 2019 14:08
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FronzelNeekburm posted:Roberts says Korematsu was overruled in the court of public opinion, which is apparently superior to the Supreme Court. That's a good way to overturn the Roberts' court.
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Mar 2, 2019 21:37
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FronzelNeekburm posted:Roberts says Korematsu was overruled in the court of public opinion, which is apparently superior to the Supreme Court. Moral or practical infeasibility is grounds for overturning res judicata. That blade cuts both ways though, and conservatives like to abuse it.
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Mar 2, 2019 21:44
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FronzelNeekburm posted:Roberts says Korematsu was overruled in the court of public opinion, which is apparently superior to the Supreme Court. Was this before, during, or after he started to defend Trump's refugee prison camps?
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Mar 2, 2019 21:55
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Evil Fluffy posted:Was this before, during, or after he started to defend Trump's refugee prison camps? before, when he was defending the muslim ban
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Mar 2, 2019 22:02
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Specifically:Trump v. Hawaii posted:Finally, the dissent invokes Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944). Whatever rhetorical advantage the dissent may see in doing so, Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible relocation of U. S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential authority. But it is wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission. See post, at 26–28. The entry suspension is an act that is well within executive authority and could have been taken by any other President—the only question is evaluating the actions of this particular President in promulgating an otherwise valid Proclamation. "That ban was racism, but this ban is good." Sotomayor posted:Today’s holding is all the more troubling given the stark parallels between the reasoning of this case and that of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944). See Brief for Japanese American Citizens League as Amicus Curiae. In Korematsu, the Court gave “a pass [to] an odious, gravely injurious racial classification” authorized by an executive order. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 275 (1995) (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). As here, the Government invoked an ill-defined national security threat to justify an exclusionary policy of sweeping proportion. See Brief for Japanese American Citizens League as Amicus Curiae 12–14. As here, the exclusion order was rooted in dangerous stereotypes about, inter alia, a particular group’s supposed inability to assimilate and desire to harm the United States. See Korematsu, 323 U. S., at 236–240 (Murphy, J., dissenting). As here, the Government was unwilling to reveal its own intelligence agencies’ views of the alleged security concerns to the very citizens it purported to protect. Compare Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1418–1419 (ND Cal. 1984) (discussing information the Government knowingly omitted from report presented to the courts justifying the executive order); Brief for Japanese American Citizens League as Amicus Curiae 17–19, with IRAP II, 883 F. 3d, at 268; Brief for Karen Korematsu et al. as Amici Curiae 35–36, and n. 5 (noting that the Government “has gone to great lengths to shield [the Secretary of Homeland Security’s] report from view”). And as here, there was strong evidence that impermissible hostility and animus motivated the Government’s policy. FronzelNeekburm fucked around with this message at 08:30 on Mar 3, 2019 |
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Mar 3, 2019 08:28
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Asking from ignorance: practically, what does imprisoning US citizens based on their ancestry have to do with banning the travel of non-citizens from certain countries to the US? To be clear, the travel ban is plainly meant as a racist action to keep Muslims out of the country and send a message of 'we don't want you here' but I don't really understand how the one can directly influence the other, to me it seems like they are wildly different ideas/actions even if the motivations behind them are similar.
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Mar 3, 2019 09:25
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Corsair Pool Boy posted:Asking from ignorance: practically, what does imprisoning US citizens based on their ancestry have to do with banning the travel of non-citizens from certain countries to the US? They're not strictly the same, but both have the same intent: Those people are the baddies, so we're going to use an emergency declaration to strip away their rights, ignoring Congress and existing law. The travel ban went through three different revisions before it was cautious enough that the Supreme Court could say, "Well, it doesn't specifically say 'ban all Muslims' in here..." But as Sotomayor points out, both cases raise scary questions about the limits of the President's powers and how encouraging their use will hurt people in the future. Plus, a week before that decision, the Supreme Court said in the gay cake baker case that an equal rights commissioner chiding a Christian man for his obvious, proud bigotry was trampling his religious freedoms. But here, even though Trump said many times that he wanted a "total Muslim ban," SCOTUS refused to consider whether his words had any relation to his order to kick out people from Muslim countries. Good ol' double standards.
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Mar 3, 2019 12:05
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Corsair Pool Boy posted:Asking from ignorance: practically, what does imprisoning US citizens based on their ancestry have to do with banning the travel of non-citizens from certain countries to the US? It's because the way the court has treated the Muslim Ban basically says that its okay to do the Muslim Ban as long as you superficially pretend its not a Muslim Ban - what the bolded section describes as 'facially neutral'. So, if Korematsu had been more facially neutral with sufficient pretense that it was not based on race, this courts logic would have okayed it on national security grounds. it's like when racist grandpa complains about the Urban Ferals and the SCOTUS is over here saying 'it is wholly inapt to liken his complaints to racism!'
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Mar 3, 2019 17:48
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TheDeadlyShoe posted:It's because the way the court has treated the Muslim Ban basically says that its okay to do the Muslim Ban as long as you superficially pretend its not a Muslim Ban - what the bolded section describes as 'facially neutral'. So, if Korematsu had been more facially neutral with sufficient pretense that it was not based on race, this courts logic would have okayed it on national security grounds. To add to this, countering that "Muslim isn't a race" doesn't work because religion is a protected class just like race is. It's important to keep in mind that restrictions on government powers are often agnostic to whether those powers are exercised against citizens or foreign nationals. Citizenship grants certain access and services, but when the Constitution says the government can't enact laws targeting a protected class, there's no "but foreigners" exception.
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Mar 4, 2019 12:09
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 Opinions! Today, surprisingly, we get a dissent from Gorsuch that seems to make sense, along with a final answer on a copyright question that had been open (or, rather, closed differently in different circuits) for as long as I had been paying attention to the law. RIMINI STREET, INC., ET AL. v. ORACLE USA, INC., ET AL. Holding / Majority Opinion: Lineup: Kavanaugh, unanimous. The Copyright Act gives federal district courts discretion to award “full costs” to a party in copyright litigation. 17 U. S. C. §505. In the general statute governing awards of costs, Congress has specified six categories of litigation expenses that qualify as “costs.” See 28 U. S. C. §§1821, 1920. The question presented in this case is whether the Copyright Act’s reference to “full costs” authorizes a court to award litigation expenses beyond the six categories of “costs” specified by Congress in the general costs statute. The statutory text and our precedents establish that the answer is no. The term “full” is a term of quantity or amount; it does not expand the categories or kinds of expenses that may be awarded as “costs” under the general costs statute. In copyright cases, §505’s authorization for the award of “full costs” therefore covers only the six categories specified in the general costs statute, codified at §§1821 and 1920. We reverse in relevant part the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. … Oracle sued Rimini and its CEO in Federal District Court in Nevada, asserting claims under the Copyright Act and various other federal and state laws….A jury found that Rimini had infringed various Oracle copyrights and that both Rimini and its CEO had violated California and Nevada computer access statutes...After judgment, the District Court ordered the defendants to pay Oracle an additional $28.5 million in attorney’s fees and $4.95 million in costs; the Court of Appeals reduced the latter award to $3.4 million. The District Court also ordered the defendants to pay Oracle $12.8 million for litigation expenses such as expert witnesses, e-discovery, and jury consulting….[T]he U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s $12.8 million award. The Court of Appeals recognized that the general federal statute authorizing district courts to award costs, 28 U. S. C. §§1821 and 1920, lists only six categories of costs that may be awarded against the losing party. And the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the $12.8 million award covered expenses not included within those six categories. But the Court of Appeals, relying on Circuit precedent, held that the District Court’s $12.8 million award for additional expenses was still appropriate because §505 permits the award of “full costs,” a term that the Ninth Circuit said was not confined to the six categories identified in §§1821 and 1920. We granted certiorari to resolve disagreement in the Courts of Appeals over whether the term “full costs” in §505 authorizes awards of expenses other than those costs identified in §§1821 and 1920. … Congress has enacted more than 200 subject-specific federal statutes that explicitly authorize the award of costs to prevailing parties in litigation. The Copyright Act is one of those statutes. That Act provides that a district court in a copyright case “in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an officer thereof.” 17 U. S. C. §505. In the general “costs” statute, codified at §§1821 and 1920 of Title 28, Congress has specified six categories of litigation expenses that a federal court may award as “costs,”1 and Congress has detailed how to calculate the amount of certain costs. Sections 1821 and 1920 in essence define what the term “costs” encompasses in the subject-specific federal statutes that provide for an award of costs. Sections 1821 and 1920 create a default rule and establish a clear baseline against which Congress may legislate. Consistent with that default rule, some federal statutes simply refer to “costs.” In those cases, federal courts are limited to awarding the costs specified in §§1821 and 1920. If, for particular kinds of cases, Congress wants to authorize awards of expenses beyond the six categories specified in the general costs statute, Congress may do so. For example, some federal statutes go beyond §§1821 and 1920 to expressly provide for the award of expert witness fees or attorney’s fees. Indeed, the Copyright Act expressly provides for awards of attorney’s fees as well as costs. 17 U. S. C. §505. And the same Congress that enacted amendments to the Copyright Act in 1976 enacted several other statutes that expressly authorized awards of expert witness fees. But absent such express authority, courts may not award litigation expenses that are not specified in §§1821 and 1920. ... Our cases, in sum, establish a clear rule: A statute awarding “costs” will not be construed as authorizing an award of litigation expenses beyond the six categories listed in §§1821 and 1920, absent an explicit statutory instruction to that effect….Here, the Copyright Act does not explicitly authorize the award of litigation expenses beyond the six categories specified in §§1821 and 1920. .... Oracle advances three substantial arguments. But we ultimately do not find those arguments persuasive. First, although Oracle concedes that it would lose this case if the Copyright Act referred only to “costs,” Oracle stresses that the Copyright Act uses the word “full” before “costs.” Oracle argues that the word “full” authorizes courts to award expenses beyond the costs specified in §§1821 and 1920. We disagree. “Full” is a term of quantity or amount. It is an adjective that means the complete measure of the noun it modifies. See American Heritage Dictionary 709 (5th ed. 2011); Oxford English Dictionary 247 (2d ed. 1989). As we said earlier this Term: “Adjectives modify nouns—they pick out a subset of a category that possesses a certain quality.” Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 8). The adjective “full” in §505 therefore does not alter the meaning of the word “costs.” … Second, Oracle maintains that the term “full costs” in the Copyright Act is a historical term of art that encompasses more than the “costs” listed in the relevant costs statute—here, §§1821 and 1920. We again disagree....From 1789 to 1853, federal courts awarded costs and fees according to the relevant state law of the forum State. In 1853, Congress departed from that state-focused approach. That year, Congress passed and President Fillmore signed a comprehensive federal statute establishing a federal schedule for the award of costs in federal court. … The term “full [c]osts” appeared in the first copyright statute in England, the Statute of Anne. 8 Anne c.19, §8 (1710)...Oracle argues that English copyright statutes awarding “full costs” allowed the transfer of all expenses of litigation, beyond what was specified in any costs schedule. According to Oracle, Congress necessarily imported that meaning of the term “full costs” into the Copyright Act in 1831. [O]ur decision in Crawford Fitting explained that courts should not undertake extensive historical excavation to determine the meaning of costs statutes. We said that §§1821 and 1920 apply regardless of when individual subject-specific costs statutes were enacted. 482 U. S., at 445. The Crawford Fitting principle eliminates the need for that kind of historical analysis and confirms that the Copyright Act’s reference to “full costs” must be interpreted by reference to §§1821 and 1920. … Third, Oracle advances a variety of surplusage arguments. Oracle contends, for example, that the word “full” would be unnecessary surplusage if Rimini’s argument were correct. We disagree. The award of costs in copyright cases was mandatory from 1831 to 1976. See §40, 35 Stat. 1084; §12, 4 Stat. 438–439. During that period, the term “full” fixed both a floor and a ceiling for the amount of “costs” that could be awarded. In other words, the term “full costs” required an award of 100 percent of the costs available under the applicable costs schedule. … The Copyright Act authorizes federal district courts to award “full costs” to a party in copyright litigation. That term means the costs specified in the general costs statute, §§1821 and 1920. We reverse in relevant part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-1625_lkhn.pdf BNSF RAILWAY CO. v. LOOS Holding / Majority Opinion: Respondent Michael Loos was injured while working at petitioner BNSF Railway Company’s railyard. Loos sued BNSF under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §51 et seq., and gained a $126,212.78 jury verdict. Of that amount the jury ascribed $30,000 to wages lost during the time Loos was unable to work. BNSF moved for an offset against the judgment. The lost wages awarded Loos, BNSF asserted, constituted “compensation” taxable under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA), 26 U. S. C. §3201 et seq. Therefore, BNSF urged, the railway was required to withhold a portion of the $30,000 attributable to lost wages to cover Loos’s share of RRTA taxes, which came to $3,765. The District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the requested offset, holding that an award of damages compensating an injured railroad worker for lost wages is not taxable under the RRTA. The question presented: Is a railroad’s payment to an employee for working time lost due to an on-the-job injury taxable “compensation” under the RRTA, 26 U. S. C. §3231(e)(1)? We granted review to resolve a division of opinion on the answer to that question....We now hold that an award compensating for lost wages is subject to taxation under the RRTA. In 1937, Congress created a self-sustaining retirement benefits system for railroad workers. The system provides generous pensions as well as benefits “correspon[ding] . . . to those an employee would expect to receive were he covered by the Social Security Act.” Two statutes operate in concert to ensure that retired railroad workers receive their allotted pensions and benefits. The first, the RRTA, funds the program by imposing a payroll tax on both railroads and their employees. The RRTA refers to the railroad’s contribution as an “excise” tax, 26 U. S. C. §3221, and describes the employee’s share as an “income” tax, §3201. Congress assigned to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) responsibility for collecting both taxes. §§3501, 7801. [As to the income tax, the railroad deducts the amount owed by the employee from her earnings and then forwards that amount to the IRS.] The second statute, the Railroad Retirement Act (RRA), 50 Stat. 307, as restated and amended, 45 U. S. C. §231 et seq., entitles railroad workers to various benefits and prescribes eligibility requirements. The RRA is administered by the Railroad Retirement Board. Taxes under the RRTA and benefits under the RRA are measured by the employee’s “compensation.” The RRTA and RRA separately define “compensation,” but both statutes state that the term means “any form of money remuneration paid to an individual for services rendered as an employee.” This language has remained basically unchanged since the RRTA’s enactment in 1937...The IRS’s reading of the word “compensation” as it appears in the RRTA has remained constant. One year after the RRTA’s adoption, the IRS stated that “compensation” is not limited to pay for active service but reaches, as well, pay for periods of absence. This understanding has governed for more than eight decades...In 1994, the IRS added, specifically, that “compensation” includes “pay for time lost.” … Given the textual similarity between the definitions of “compensation” for railroad retirement purposes and “wages” for Social Security purposes, our decisions on the meaning of “wages” in Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358 (1946), and United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 572 U. S. 141 (2014), inform our comprehension of the RRTA term “compensation.”...Emphasizing that the phrase “any service . . . performed” denotes “breadth of coverage,” we held that “wages” means remuneration for “the entire employer-employee relationship”; in other words, “wages” embraced pay for active service plus pay received for periods of absence from active service. … [W]e hold that “compensation” under the RRTA encompasses not simply pay for active service but, in addition, pay for periods of absence from active service—provided that the remuneration in question stems from the “employer-employee relationship.” Damages awarded under the FELA for lost wages fit comfortably within this definition. The FELA “makes railroads liable in money damages to their employees for on-the-job injuries.” If a railroad negligently fails to maintain a safe railyard and a worker is injured as a result, the FELA requires the railroad to compensate the injured worker for, inter alia, working time lost due to the employer’s wrongdoing. FELA damages for lost wages, then, are functionally equivalent to an award of backpay, which compensates an employee “for a period of time during which” the employee is “wrongfully separated from his job.” Just as Nierotko held that backpay falls within the definition of “wages,” ibid., we conclude that FELA damages for lost wages qualify as “compensation” and are therefore taxable under the RRTA. … In harmony with this Court’s decisions in Nierotko and Quality Stores, we hold that “compensation” for RRTA purposes includes an employer’s payments to an employee for active service and for periods of absence from active service. It is immaterial whether the employer chooses to make the payment or is legally required to do so. Either way, the payment is remitted to the recipient because of his status as a service-rendering employee. For the reasons stated, FELA damages for lost wages qualify as RRTA-taxable “compensation.” The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lineup: Ginsburg, joined by Roberts, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Dissent by Gorsuch, joined by Thomas. Other Opinions: Dissent (Gorsuch and Thomas): BNSF Railway’s negligence caused one of its employees a serious injury. After a trial, a court ordered the company to pay damages. But instead of sending the full amount to the employee, BNSF asserted that it had to divert a portion to the Internal Revenue Service. Why? BNSF said the money represented taxable “compensation” for “services rendered as an employee.” Today, the Court agrees with the company. Respectfully, I do not. When an employee suffers a physical injury due to his employer’s negligence and has to sue in court to recover damages, it seems more natural to me to describe the final judgment as compensation for his injury than for services (never) rendered. ... [T]he words “remuneration for services rendered” naturally cover things like an employee’s salary or hourly wage. Nor do they stop there, as the Court correctly notes. Rather, and contrary to the court of appeals’ view, those words also fairly encompass benefits like sick or disability pay. After all, an employer offers those benefits to attract and keep employees working on its behalf. In that way, these benefits form part of the “quid pro quo” (compensation) the employer pays to secure the “duty or labor” (services) the employee renders. But damages for negligence are different. No one would describe a dangerous fall or the wrenching of a knee as a “service rendered” to the party who negligently caused the accident. BNSF hardly directed Mr. Loos to fall or offered to pay him for doing so. In fact, BNSF didn’t even pay Mr. Loos voluntarily; he had to wrest a judgment from the railroad at the end of a legal battle. So Mr. Loos’s FELA judgment seems to me, as it did to every judge in the proceedings below, unconnected to any service Mr. Loos rendered to BNSF. Instead of being “compensation” for “services rendered as an employee,” it seems more natural to say that the negligence damages BNSF paid are “compensation” to Mr. Loos for his injury. That’s exactly how we usually understand tort damages—as “compensation” for an “injury” caused by “the unlawful act or omission or negligence of another.” … Congress reversed field. In 1975, it removed payments “for time lost” from the RRTA’s definition of “compensation.” And in 1983, Congress overwrote the last remaining reference to payments “for time lost” in a nearby section.To my mind, Congress’s decision to remove the only language that could have fairly captured the damages here cannot be easily ignored. Yet BNSF would have us do exactly that. On its account, the RRTA’s discussions about compensation for time lost and personal injuries only ever served to illustrate what has qualified all along as remuneration for “services rendered.” So, on its view, when Congress first added and then removed language about time lost and personal injuries, it quite literally wasted its time because none of its additions and subtractions altered the statute’s meaning. Put another way, BNSF asks us to read back into the law words (time lost, personal injury) that Congress deliberately removed on the assumption they were never really needed in the first place. … Where the RRTA directs the taxation of railroad employee income to fund retirement benefits, the RRA controls the calculation of those benefits. And, unlike the RRTA, that statute continues to include “pay for time lost” in the definition of “compensation” it uses to calculate benefits. Normally, when Congress chooses to exclude terms in one statute while introducing or retaining them in another closely related law, we give effect to rather than pass a blind eye over the difference. Nor is there any question that Congress knows exactly how to tax a favorable tort judgment when it wants. Its failure to offer any comparably clear command here should, once more, tell us something. ... By this point BNSF is left with only one argument, which it treats as no more than a last resort: Chevron deference….Though I may disagree with the result the Court reaches, my colleagues rightly afford the parties before us an independent judicial interpretation of the law. They deserve no less. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-1042_7mio.pdf FOURTH ESTATE PUBLIC BENEFIT CORP. v. WALLSTREET.COM, LLC, ET AL. Holding / Majority Opinion: Impelling prompt registration of copyright claims, 17 U. S. C. §411(a) states that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.” The question this case presents: Has “registration . . . been made in accordance with [Title 17]” as soon as the claimant delivers the required application, copies of the work, and fee to the Copyright Office; or has “registration . . . been made” only after the Copyright Office reviews and registers the copyright? We hold, in accord with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, that registration occurs, and a copyright claimant may commence an infringement suit, when the Copyright Office registers a copyright. Upon registration of the copyright, however, a copyright owner can recover for infringement that occurred both before and after registration. … We granted Fourth Estate’s petition for certiorari to resolve a division among U. S. Courts of Appeals on when registration occurs in accordance with §411(a). Compare, e.g., 856 F. 3d, at 1341 (case below) (registration has been made under §411(a) when the Register of Copyrights registers a copyright), with, e.g., Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F. 3d 612, 621 (CA9 2010) (registration has been made under §411(a) when the copyright claimant’s “complete application” for registration is received by the Copyright Office). … Before pursuing an infringement claim in court, however, a copyright claimant generally must comply with §411(a)’s requirement that “registration of the copyright claim has been made.” §411(a). Therefore, although an owner’s rights exist apart from registration, see §408(a), registration is akin to an administrative exhaustion requirement that the owner must satisfy before suing to enforce ownership rights, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. … All parties agree that, outside of statutory exceptions not applicable here, §411(a) bars a copyright owner from suing for infringement until “registration . . . has been made.” Fourth Estate and Wall-Street dispute, however, whether “registration . . . has been made” under §411(a) when a copyright owner submits the application, materials, and fee required for registration, or only when the Copyright Office grants registration. … [§411(a)’s second] sentence sets out an exception to this rule: When the required “deposit, application, and fee . . . have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been refused,” the claimant “[may] institute a civil action, if notice thereof . . . is served on the Register.” Read together, §411(a)’s opening sentences focus not on the claimant’s act of applying for registration, but on action by the Copyright Office—namely, its registration or refusal to register a copyright claim. If application alone sufficed to “ma[ke]” registration, §411(a)’s second sentence—allowing suit upon refusal of registration—would be superfluous. What utility would that allowance have if a copyright claimant could sue for infringement immediately after applying for registration without awaiting the Register’s decision on her application? … The third and final sentence of §411(a) further persuades us that the provision requires action by the Register before a copyright claimant may sue for infringement. The sentence allows the Register to “become a party to the action with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim.” This allowance would be negated, and the court conducting an infringement suit would lack the benefit of the Register’s assessment, if an infringement suit could be filed and resolved before the Register acted on an application. … Other provisions of the Copyright Act support our reading of “registration,” as used in §411(a), to mean action by the Register. Section 410 states that, “after examination,” if the Register determines that “the material deposited constitutes copyrightable subject matter” and “other legal and formal requirements . . . [are] met, the Register shall register the claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of registration.” §410(a). But if the Register determines that the deposited material “does not constitute copyrightable subject matter or that the claim is invalid for any other reason, the Register shall refuse registration.” §410(b). Section 410 thus confirms that application is discrete from, and precedes, registration. Section 410(d), furthermore, provides that if the Copyright Office registers a claim, or if a court later determines that a refused claim was registrable, the “effective date of [the work’s] copyright registration is the day on which” the copyright owner made a proper submission to the Copyright Office. There would be no need thus to specify the “effective date of a copyright registration” if submission of the required materials qualified as “registration.” True, the statutory scheme has not worked as Congress likely envisioned. Registration processing times have increased from one or two weeks in 1956 to many months today. See GAO, Improving Productivity in Copyright Registration 3 (GAO–AFMD–83–13 1982); Registration Processing Times. Delays in Copyright Office processing of applications, it appears, are attributable, in large measure, to staffing and budgetary shortages that Congress can alleviate, but courts cannot cure. See 5 W. Patry, Copyright §17:83 (2019). Unfortunate as the current administrative lag may be, that factor does not allow us to revise §411(a)’s congressionally composed text. For the reasons stated, we conclude that “registration . . . has been made” within the meaning of 17 U. S. C. §411(a) not when an application for registration is filed, but when the Register has registered a copyright after examining a properly filed application. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is accordingly Affirmed. Lineup: Ginsburg, unanimous. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-571_e29f.pdf [internal citations inconsistently omitted throughout]
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Mar 4, 2019 16:54
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I don’t think I agree with Gorsuch there. The fact that he had to sue for compensation means that he should probably receive damages for time wasted in court (and time without compensation), but I’m not seeing why it should negate tax liability. It would make sense to allow the award amount to be reconsidered in light of the additional tax burden, though. Here we’re talking about a clearly sympathetic plaintiff, but avoiding taxes on court-ordered compensation seems like a pretty slippery slope. E: or is it just withholding? Stickman fucked around with this message at 17:13 on Mar 4, 2019 |
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Mar 4, 2019 17:04
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Stickman posted:I don’t think I agree with Gorsuch there. The fact that he had to sue for compensation means that he should probably receive damages for time wasted in court (and time without compensation), but I’m not seeing why it should negate tax liability. It would make sense to allow the award amount to be reconsidered in light of the additional tax burden, though. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Railroad_Retirement_Board Railroad workers have a separate social security/medicare thing from other workers. Its analogous to figuring out if compensation for lost wages is supposed to have FICA taken out.
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Mar 4, 2019 17:16
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Stickman posted:I don’t think I agree with Gorsuch there. The fact that he had to sue for compensation means that he should probably receive damages for time wasted in court (and time without compensation), but I’m not seeing why it should negate tax liability. It would make sense to allow the award amount to be reconsidered in light of the additional tax burden, though. It's withholding as though the payment of 30k for time lost was, say, wage payments. I don't trust Gorsuch enough to believe there isn't some angle here and I assume it's "this is a tax on a business and I hate it." Railroads didn't exist in 1789 so I see where Thomas is coming from here.
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Mar 4, 2019 17:25
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Neil "Notax" Gorsuch
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Mar 4, 2019 17:36
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I agree with Gorsuch, what the hell  Dudes hurt on the job shouldn't have to pay taxes on their workers comp
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Mar 4, 2019 19:36
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FAUXTON posted:It's withholding as though the payment of 30k for time lost was, say, wage payments. It’s not a tax on a business - the railroad gets to deduct the payments. It’s a tax on the employees “back pay”. Gorsuch notes this may let the railroad manipulate settlements to minimize the amount classified the way - and taxes for the employee - while paying less ultimately. I’ve seen this done in the employment discrimination claim context - the ex employee wants all amounts to be for emotional damages and the like rather than for lost wages because the latter are taxed as normal payroll rather than being settled up at the end of the year as other income (or not). FAUXTON posted:Railroads didn't exist in 1789 so I see where Thomas is coming from here. The RRTA dates to 1937 so that’s a bit of a moot point.
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Mar 4, 2019 19:43
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Nissin Cup Nudist posted:I agree with Gorsuch, what the hell It's not taxes on worker's comp. It's taxes specifically on the portion of the settlement that is lost wages, as they represent lost income. It should be taxed like normal income.
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Mar 4, 2019 19:44
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ulmont posted:It’s not a tax on a business - the railroad gets to deduct the payments. It’s a tax on the employees “back pay”. Gorsuch notes this may let the railroad manipulate settlements to minimize the amount classified the way - and taxes for the employee - while paying less ultimately. Okay, then "it's a tax and I hate it." Or if it meant other items like union dues were deducted and forwarded. ulmont posted:The RRTA dates to 1937 so that’s a bit of a moot point.  Fair enough. Neither railroads nor the RRTA existed in 1789.
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Mar 4, 2019 19:52
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vyelkin posted:Neil "Notax" Gorsuch Can we break Gorsuch's spine, please?
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Mar 4, 2019 20:01
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ulmont posted:The RRTA dates to 1937 so that’s a bit of a moot point. I love all the weird old tax carve-outs that are still lingering along, making my TurboTax experience that much more annoying Are you a War Widow y/n Do you have a Railroad Pension y/n Are you Blind y/n Are you a Blind War Widow with a Railroad Pension y/n
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Mar 4, 2019 20:45
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FAUXTON posted:It's withholding as though the payment of 30k for time lost was, say, wage payments. Unless I'm misreading, the issue appears to be that Loos was not actually given back pay, he was given a court-ordered judgment equal to back pay for time lost after the railroad failed to give him back pay. That's fundamentally different than back pay administratively, and because there was a cost to Loos to win it in the first place there would be some moral argument against taxing back pay that is not back pay.
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Mar 5, 2019 02:00
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Sodomy Hussein posted:Unless I'm misreading, the issue appears to be that Loos was not actually given back pay, he was given a court-ordered judgment equal to back pay for time lost after the railroad failed to give him back pay. That's fundamentally different than back pay administratively, and because there was a cost to Loos to win it in the first place there would be some moral argument against taxing back pay that is not back pay. I think that's where Gorsuch is drawing his distinction - the majority opinion classifies the 30k as part of a larger 6 figure judgement with 30k of that being considered lost wages due to being unable to work because of the injury. Gorsuch says it's damages, the majority says it's back pay.
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Mar 5, 2019 02:15
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FAUXTON posted:I think that's where Gorsuch is drawing his distinction - the majority opinion classifies the 30k as part of a larger 6 figure judgement with 30k of that being considered lost wages due to being unable to work because of the injury. Gorsuch says it's damages, the majority says it's back pay. I gotta say, I'm with Stupid here
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Mar 5, 2019 02:18
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also Gorsuch has to throw in a snipe at Chevron deference because that is the legal precedent he was born to murder
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Mar 5, 2019 02:21
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Sodomy Hussein posted:I gotta say, I'm with Stupid here I mean I don't disagree that it's lovely for him to get shaved on the taxes but the court can (should? will?) force them to net out 30k for the guy and eat the tax. Insisting it's a more nebulous "damages" probably opens it to relitigating in circumstances far less favorable to Loos.
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Mar 5, 2019 02:27
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Sodomy Hussein posted:Unless I'm misreading, the issue appears to be that Loos was not actually given back pay, he was given a court-ordered judgment equal to back pay for time lost after the railroad failed to give him back pay. That's fundamentally different than back pay administratively, and because there was a cost to Loos to win it in the first place there would be some moral argument against taxing back pay that is not back pay. No it isn’t. It’s back pay. It wasn’t a judgement equal to back pay. Back pay was a part of the overall judgement. None of the additional awards amounts were taxed as back pay. They owed him wages, and those wages are required to be taxed. Anytime a company is sued and has to give back pay, like in a case of a company violating the minimum wage law, the back pay is taxed.
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Mar 5, 2019 02:33
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If the 30k was back pay then it should be treated like normal pay. The plaintiff could / should be entitled to other damages that would not be considered back pay. How you classify damages is important to tax understandings, and trying to treat all damages equally doesn’t work Also “the wrenching of a knee” is again another terrible phrasing from him
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Mar 5, 2019 03:24
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It's in the opening paragraph of the quoted majority opinion, too.
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Mar 5, 2019 03:39
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Is the issue that they just took it, instead of giving him the choice to take it all and pay taxes on it himself? Like I can't imagine a good reason for them not to just hand the whole 30k over and let him deal with the tax bullshit himself if he got pissy about it, but if that happened we wouldn't be discussing it in this thread. Is there some reason he doesn't have the same option everyone does to handle it that way?
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Mar 5, 2019 04:29
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FAUXTON posted:It's in the opening paragraph of the quoted majority opinion, too. Wrenching of the knee?
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Mar 5, 2019 04:41
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Javid posted:Is the issue that they just took it, instead of giving him the choice to take it all and pay taxes on it himself? Like I can't imagine a good reason for them not to just hand the whole 30k over and let him deal with the tax bullshit himself if he got pissy about it, but if that happened we wouldn't be discussing it in this thread. Is there some reason he doesn't have the same option everyone does to handle it that way? Because it’s his regular pay. Employers are obligated to withhold at least FICA taxes on all wages. No employer is going to give an employee the option of whether or not they will withhold FICA taxes from wages. Note that this applies only to W2 employees such as the railroad worker in the present case.
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Mar 5, 2019 04:45
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