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Asbury
Mar 23, 2007
Probation
Can't post for 6 years!
Hair Elf

Collapsing Farts posted:

1. Is it the good kinds?
2. Is it mostly only interesting if you're interested in the history of chernobyl
3. Is Jared as cool as he always is?

Like, what's it about. Is it just dread and people dying badly or is there more to it

1 - It's a very good series (judging by the first three episodes so far) with fantastic cinematography, casting, and acting. While it fudges a few things for the sake of drama and story over fact and truth,* it has an excellent eye for late Soviet-era detail. Every episode has a creeping horror to it that's worse than a lot of horror movies. There is a whole lot of dread and more than a few people dying real badly.

2 - No. While Chernobyl is the heart of the story, it also explores the mid-80's USSR government mindset (and a bunch of other minor themes). And even if you aren't interested in the actual disaster, the acting and characterization will carry you through.

3 - Yep.



*which is sort of ironic, really, given the monologue in the opening scene

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SocketWrench
Jul 8, 2012

by Fritz the Horse

Gorson posted:

Realizing now that the KGB agents in the hotel were toasting Legasov because he lied to them.

Someone on the last page was asking about the soldier that went with Sitnikov to the roof, I can't find any information as to who that was or if it happened. Mostly likely it is dramatic license and Sitnikov went there by himself. That soldier would have certainly received a fatal dose just being in the vicinity. The next scene of Sitnikov sitting there being yelled at, knowing he was going to die while his bosses call him a liar will haunt me for a long time.

I also found it interesting that the coal foreman says "we don't dig up bodies". As far as I know, the only body at the site that had not been recovered (and has not been, nor will it ever be) is Kodemchuk. So I'm assuming that line means that rumors were circulating that there were dozens, or hundreds, or thousands of bodies at the site, which is what western media outlets were reporting.

This wiki has some pretty good information on the people involved. This show is extremely accurate compared to many of the first hand accounts.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Individual_involvement_in_the_Chernobyl_disaster

Medvedev said Sitnikov was sent to the roof, but this was before anyone had realized the core was gone. He went willingly by himself after being asked to to get a grasp of the whole situation. Pretty much around the same time the two trainees were sent to put the control rods in by hand

The helicopter scenes were condensed down too. Originally they started by flying over and a man in the back had to open the door and throw sandbags out. It wasn't till a few days later that someone came up with the idea of using parachutes as bags slung under the copters. The one that crashed, as best anyone figures, is after so many flights over the pilot was having trouble with all the radiation doses he'd taken and couldn't think straight. Though I admit watching the one come out of the smoke cloud on the show looked cool as gently caress

V Yeah, as I recall all Stalin had to do was hold up his end of the deal and withdraw back to russia post WWII, which he didn't. He just had to be chill, but he wasn't. And that's what set the stage for what followed. Stalin's paranoia and agressiveness. You know, not counting the whole purge, starvations, invasion of Finland and Poland under him pre war and Lenin being a loving monster himself

SocketWrench fucked around with this message at 16:43 on May 26, 2019

Irom
May 16, 2013

by FactsAreUseless

Mantis42 posted:

Furthermore, everything hosed up about the USSR is a direct result of it being under direct threat from every other major power from it's very inception

who do I write to if I want to apologize for loving up soviet socialism i didn't mean to give them such a hard time that they gulaged tens of millions

Gorson
Aug 29, 2014

SocketWrench posted:

Medvedev said Sitnikov was sent to the roof, but this was before anyone had realized the core was gone. He went willingly by himself after being asked to to get a grasp of the whole situation.

Thanks for the clarification.

I feel like Dyatlov knew all along and was in denial that the core had exploded. The scene right after the explosion starts with him in a sort of daze or state of shock. Then while walking to and from the backup control room he sees the graphite on the roof. He had to have known what it was and the show really seems to imply this with how those scenes were shot. Accounts mention specifically that he saw graphite.

CrazyLoon
Aug 10, 2015

"..."

Gorson posted:

Thanks for the clarification.

I feel like Dyatlov knew all along and was in denial that the core had exploded. The scene right after the explosion starts with him in a sort of daze or state of shock. Then while walking to and from the backup control room he sees the graphite on the roof. He had to have known what it was and the show really seems to imply this with how those scenes were shot. Accounts mention specifically that he saw graphite.

There's a lot of folks that still can't believe someone, who absolutely did have the knowledge of what exactly that meant, would see the graphite strewn all over like that and still insist the core hadn't exploded, but denial is an incredibly powerful thing within humans, especially if you work within a society like what the USSR was that did all it could to promote it in service of its ideology over reality.

Of course eventually reality does win out one way or another, but it is a legit shame it took that many red/brown tanned people from extreme radiation and a reading done by the military to finally get them all to agree that, yes, the core HAD in fact exploded. Thankfully it wasn't too late before they could prevent the far worse explosion that would've followed if they hadn't drained that water, cuz yea...I legit might not have survived my infancy that way.

CrazyLoon fucked around with this message at 16:54 on May 26, 2019

SocketWrench
Jul 8, 2012

by Fritz the Horse

Gorson posted:

Thanks for the clarification.

I feel like Dyatlov knew all along and was in denial that the core had exploded. The scene right after the explosion starts with him in a sort of daze or state of shock. Then while walking to and from the backup control room he sees the graphite on the roof. He had to have known what it was and the show really seems to imply this with how those scenes were shot. Accounts mention specifically that he saw graphite.

Eh, lots of them didn't realize what happened. The first reports back were the two trainees that told them the reactor was damaged.
In the end Dyatlov holds a lot of the blame, as far as I can figure. He tries pushing it all off as the system building a lovely reactor with flaws, but frankly, had he not ordered the safety systems shut off and the test to continue despite it violating multiple safety codes* places the deal squarely on him. Akimov and Tuptonov had tried to argue with him to scrub the test, but he refused.

*one of their safety codes was if the reactor fell to 0 from a certain percentage of power that the reactor should be shut down. The reactor fell to 0 from 5% less than the percentage listed, so he demanded the reactor be forced back to power by violating another safety code of pulling all but a few control rods, including a dozen or so that were to remain in the reactor at all times.
I would really recommend reading The Truth About Chernobyl by Medvedev. He does an amazing job of telling all the details without going too technical so you can understand what's going on. It has some personal notes from people involved, and even has a section on Three Mile Island. Mines all worn and well used from reading multiple times on slow nights at work

Irom
May 16, 2013

by FactsAreUseless

SocketWrench posted:

Eh, lots of them didn't realize what happened. The first reports back were the two trainees that told them the reactor was damaged.
In the end Dyatlov holds a lot of the blame, as far as I can figure. He tries pushing it all off as the system building a lovely reactor with flaws, but frankly, had he not ordered the safety systems shut off and the test to continue despite it violating multiple safety codes* places the deal squarely on him. Akimov and Tuptonov had tried to argue with him to scrub the test, but he refused.

*one of their safety codes was if the reactor fell to 0 from a certain percentage of power that the reactor should be shut down. The reactor fell to 0 from 5% less than the percentage listed, so he demanded the reactor be forced back to power by violating another safety code of pulling all but a few control rods, including a dozen or so that were to remain in the reactor at all times.
I would really recommend reading The Truth About Chernobyl by Medvedev. He does an amazing job of telling all the details without going too technical so you can understand what's going on. It has some personal notes from people involved, and even has a section on Three Mile Island. Mines all worn and well used from reading multiple times on slow nights at work

This is accurate to what I've read too. One thing I'll add is that no one working at the plant, including Dyatlov, understood that RBMKs had this positive void coefficient problem at all. The designers of the RBMK knew, but because of the secretive culture surrounding soviet nuclear tech at the time, the designers didn't share this knowledge with plant operators, thinking as long as regulations were followed to the letter, they were not on a need-to-know basis. Which is just astounding.

ALSO if any adverse events ever took place at other plants (they did), this secretive culture ensured operators at other plants never heard about them. So plant operators were under the impression that the technology behind RBMKs were perfectly safe.

THEN you add the grueling deadlines and production goals set by the soviet leadership that stressed operation to its limits, and an understanding that bending the rules here or there was necessary to get recognized and promoted. I read that Dyatlov was up for 48 hours straight at the time of the disaster because Fomin was due to be transferred or something and he was aiming for his job. A successful result on the backup cooling test would have been great for his record, and he was bending the rules trying to find a (cheap) solution.

Toxic Fart Syndrome
Jul 2, 2006

*hits A-THREAD-5*

Only 3.6 Roentgoons per hour ... not great, not terrible.




...the meter only goes to 3.6...

Pork Pro

SocketWrench posted:

Eh, lots of them didn't realize what happened. The first reports back were the two trainees that told them the reactor was damaged.
In the end Dyatlov holds a lot of the blame, as far as I can figure. He tries pushing it all off as the system building a lovely reactor with flaws, but frankly, had he not ordered the safety systems shut off and the test to continue despite it violating multiple safety codes* places the deal squarely on him. Akimov and Tuptonov had tried to argue with him to scrub the test, but he refused.

*one of their safety codes was if the reactor fell to 0 from a certain percentage of power that the reactor should be shut down. The reactor fell to 0 from 5% less than the percentage listed, so he demanded the reactor be forced back to power by violating another safety code of pulling all but a few control rods, including a dozen or so that were to remain in the reactor at all times.
I would really recommend reading The Truth About Chernobyl by Medvedev. He does an amazing job of telling all the details without going too technical so you can understand what's going on. It has some personal notes from people involved, and even has a section on Three Mile Island. Mines all worn and well used from reading multiple times on slow nights at work

It should also be noted that these kinds of violations were commonplace. The flaws in the reactors were State secrets, so no one knew that hitting the SCRAM would temporarily spike the reactor outside of a few designers. In addition, the Soviet system got most of it's engineers and physicists from the military, which fostered an attitude of always pushing forward. Being able to hack your RBMK into doing what you wanted was seen as a great badge of honor, and because the flaws were kept secret, doing so was considered entirely safe.

etalian
Mar 20, 2006

For Root Causes
-RBMK reactor design had potential critical Failure modes due the design and was also he result how economically the USSR didn't want to build
the safer more expensive designs due to things like needed high tolerance parts
-The Soviet system encouraged secrecy and compartmentalization of knowledge for things like near nuclear plant miss incidents
-The Soviet system was a production/milestone focused in terms of rewards and punishments. Things like cutting corners or ignoring safety protocols were encouraged
to meet arbitrary flow down goals

Wallrod
Sep 27, 2004
Stupid Baby Picture

Irom posted:

THEN you add the grueling deadlines and production goals set by the soviet leadership that stressed operation to its limits, and an understanding that bending the rules here or there was necessary to get recognized and promoted. I read that Dyatlov was up for 48 hours straight at the time of the disaster because Fomin was due to be transferred or something and he was aiming for his job. A successful result on the backup cooling test would have been great for his record, and he was bending the rules trying to find a (cheap) solution.
His work paid off, he met the year's production goal in a few milliseconds :v:

TinTower
Apr 21, 2010

You don't have to 8e a good person to 8e a hero.

Gorson posted:

I also found it interesting that the coal foreman says "we don't dig up bodies". As far as I know, the only body at the site that had not been recovered (and has not been, nor will it ever be) is Kodemchuk. So I'm assuming that line means that rumors were circulating that there were dozens, or hundreds, or thousands of bodies at the site, which is what western media outlets were reporting.

It's an open question regarding whether Khodemchuk's body is even there under all the rubble of the pump room, or if it was vaporised within seconds of the reactor exploding.

etalian
Mar 20, 2006

Irom
May 16, 2013

by FactsAreUseless

soviet dereliction really is :discourse:

theflyingexecutive
Apr 22, 2007

soviet dereliction is the best dereliction in the world

etalian
Mar 20, 2006

Irom posted:

soviet dereliction really is :discourse:

etalian
Mar 20, 2006

SeXReX
Jan 9, 2009

I drink, mostly.
And get mad at people on the internet


:emptyquote:

TinTower posted:

It's an open question regarding whether Khodemchuk's body is even there under all the rubble of the pump room, or if it was vaporised within seconds of the reactor exploding.

It wasn't like an atom bomb with vaporization. The had a pot with a sealed lid with a lot of steam and it blew the seal. Threw the lid into the air and it did a little 90 degree spin and landed like a sharkfin in the now burningreactor.

He was in the turbine facility and was crushed by normal building rubble that feel from the force of that.

MononcQc
May 29, 2007

Toxic Fart Syndrome posted:

It should also be noted that these kinds of violations were commonplace.

It should in general be noted that this is true of almost all guidelines and procedures, in most cultures. By definition, surprising accidents happen in such a way that you find yourself in situations where the guidelines and checklist do not always apply, and there is an unspoken trust in systems that expert operators will be able to improvise, re-prioritize, and adapt based on the information they have.

You will have checklists and procedures that you want to be strictly enforced, but there's always an understood "as long as the context is right" being in there. One place where this frequently happens is probably whenever you deal with an operation room: each condition a patient can have may generally have well-recommended steps when taken in isolation, but in reality your medical team will have to cope with people that have unknown conditions (allergies, medications that were not mentioned interacting with the anaesthetic, weight problems and underlying conditions) that will cause them to have to improvise and handle things otherwise.

Total adherence to checklists and procedures only works when you get the most straightforward issues: the problem situation is obvious (everybody knows what it is), is well-understood (a planned failure mode), often mostly technical (i.e. not sabotage, or someone feeling ill and accidentally grabbing a full throttle control), and happen independently (you don't have to run 2-3 corrective procedures at once, when they may interact). All the other cases and it becomes best effort based on operator expertise and experience.

Trevor Hale
Dec 8, 2008

What have I become, my Swedish friend?

MononcQc posted:

It should in general be noted that this is true of almost all guidelines and procedures, in most cultures. By definition, surprising accidents happen in such a way that you find yourself in situations where the guidelines and checklist do not always apply, and there is an unspoken trust in systems that expert operators will be able to improvise, re-prioritize, and adapt based on the information they have.

You will have checklists and procedures that you want to be strictly enforced, but there's always an understood "as long as the context is right" being in there. One place where this frequently happens is probably whenever you deal with an operation room: each condition a patient can have may generally have well-recommended steps when taken in isolation, but in reality your medical team will have to cope with people that have unknown conditions (allergies, medications that were not mentioned interacting with the anaesthetic, weight problems and underlying conditions) that will cause them to have to improvise and handle things otherwise.

Total adherence to checklists and procedures only works when you get the most straightforward issues: the problem situation is obvious (everybody knows what it is), is well-understood (a planned failure mode), often mostly technical (i.e. not sabotage, or someone feeling ill and accidentally grabbing a full throttle control), and happen independently (you don't have to run 2-3 corrective procedures at once, when they may interact). All the other cases and it becomes best effort based on operator expertise and experience.

This is essentially the Challenger explosion problem right? Tolerances creep up from X to X + 5% and then something that always worked before doesn’t but you’ve moved your hard stop up 30% in the last few years.

Except now you’re throwing in the state secrecy of poo poo that was broken and bad to begin with.

MononcQc
May 29, 2007

Trevor Hale posted:

This is essentially the Challenger explosion problem right? Tolerances creep up from X to X + 5% and then something that always worked before doesn’t but you’ve moved your hard stop up 30% in the last few years.

Except now you’re throwing in the state secrecy of poo poo that was broken and bad to begin with.

In the context of Challenger, the key term that comes over again and again is normalization of deviance, where people grow more accustomed to the deviant behaviour as it keeps happening. To external observers, the activities seem deviant, but people within the organization do not see the deviance because it is seen as normal.

What I'm referring to is not just that people will stop using checklist as they get lazy, it's that there are dynamic circumstances where following the procedures can be wrong, counter-productive, or flat out impossible. Take for example, the U.S. Forest Service's guidelines about how to make proper decisions while fighting wild fires. One list of these is the 10 Standard Firefighting Orders and 18 Watch Out Situations. During an investigation of fires going out of control (The Thirty Mile Fire comes to mind -- the standard report sucked, but this one on it rules), it was noted by a firefighter:

quote:

One crewmember, when asked about the apparent apathy towards the guidelines, responded, "everyone knows that these things (Fire Orders) are just guidelines and can't always be followed." This appears to be a good distance away from the stated management philosophy that "we don't bend them and we don't break them."

There is a distinction to be made between "normalization of deviance" and the people writing the procedures not writing them with the context of people in life-critical situations operating under enormous time pressure, complexity, and frequent environment changes having to apply them. We have to be aware that the instructions and lists of procedures given, on their own, may not always be perfect or adequate.

The people writing a lot of the procedures for RMBK reactors in USSR appeared to believe they would be followed to the letter as if by a program, whereas the operators in fact had to apply them in non-ideal environments. This of its own may not be a problem if your operators have the knowledge and expertise to know why the rules and checklists are written the way they are: then they may know what is a solid unbreakable rule, and what is not, and they can make decisions based on the current context that lets them do appropriate fire-fighting when multiple incidents or conflicting reports are given.

For example, what do you do when a procedure asks you to do something that depends on a reported value where the sensor or dial is broken and you don't have it? How do you work around that? You need to understand the rationale behind procedures and steps to know how to work around issues.

MononcQc fucked around with this message at 21:23 on May 26, 2019

etalian
Mar 20, 2006



TheCool69
Sep 23, 2011
I thought that i almost saw him smile for a split second

ZorajitZorajit
Sep 15, 2013

No static at all...
There's a Joe Biden's campaign joke in that gif somewhere

Despera
Jun 6, 2011
With all the smokers on the show the real Chernobyl was inside them the whole time

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TRL7o2kPqw0

Also the firemens clothing still very radioactive to no surprise.

Despera fucked around with this message at 09:27 on May 27, 2019

SocketWrench
Jul 8, 2012

by Fritz the Horse
^ Basement entrances have actually been filled in. The Ukraine government wasn't too pleased with a youtube vid of a couple asshats rampaging through the basement. So the buried the entrances so no one else can repeat it

Irom posted:

This is accurate to what I've read too. One thing I'll add is that no one working at the plant, including Dyatlov, understood that RBMKs had this positive void coefficient problem at all. The designers of the RBMK knew, but because of the secretive culture surrounding soviet nuclear tech at the time, the designers didn't share this knowledge with plant operators, thinking as long as regulations were followed to the letter, they were not on a need-to-know basis. Which is just astounding.

ALSO if any adverse events ever took place at other plants (they did), this secretive culture ensured operators at other plants never heard about them. So plant operators were under the impression that the technology behind RBMKs were perfectly safe.

THEN you add the grueling deadlines and production goals set by the soviet leadership that stressed operation to its limits, and an understanding that bending the rules here or there was necessary to get recognized and promoted. I read that Dyatlov was up for 48 hours straight at the time of the disaster because Fomin was due to be transferred or something and he was aiming for his job. A successful result on the backup cooling test would have been great for his record, and he was bending the rules trying to find a (cheap) solution.

It also didn't help that Chernobyl's reactors were built rather shoddily. There's testimony from people that had taken part in building and running them that said the pipes leaked all the time, stuff was constantly breaking. The roof was supposed to be covered with fire resistant material, but the demand to get things done and the crappy supply system meant that they used tar instead. Shame this was never shown as the firefighters had to put out a burning roof while sludging through molten tar.
Bryukhanov complained at his trial that he had tried to do things the right way, but when demands to get things done now came through but the supplies were held up or redistributed for whatever reasons he had to cut corners and use what was available.
Reactor 4 was even rushed into service to secure bonuses and praise for the directors. So safety tests and final checks were omitted.

And yeah, part of Dyatlov's insistence through the whole thing was he was aiming at getting a promotion. He was pretty much disliked by everyone there as he was pretty much a dickhead and treated all those under him like poo poo.

Side fact, when everyone was buried, the firefighters were honored as heroes while the workers had their graves vandalized because they were made the fall guys. The only one that avoided this was Tuptonov's, likely because he was so young in the picture on the grave stone. His parents had a bench installed so they could sit next to his grave


I love when they're naked and Lagasov visits them with whoever that was with him. "We're wearing the loving hats"

BTW, in the debate over the three operators that went in to drain the pools, from wiki;

quote:

In addition, on 28 April 1986, three men knowingly took on a likely suicide mission to prevent a steam explosion that would have destroyed an area from Kiev to Minsk, and would have cause the spread of lethal radiation across much of Europe. Plant engineers Alexei Ananenko, Valeri Bespalov and Boris Baranov wore diving equipment and entered the reservoir tanks below the burning reactor, an area which had become filled with firefighting water and coolant water, to locate and open release valves to drain the water. Scientists believe that, once the reactor melted through its concrete slab and plunged into the water, the steam explosion would have released many times more radiation into the atmosphere than the original explosion. Despite severe risk, all three survived the mission, and in 2018 they were awarded the Order For Courage, Third Grade, by President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko. During the April 2018 ceremony, with the Chernobyl New Safe Confinement structure in the background, Poroshenko noted that the three men had been quickly forgotten at the time, with the Soviet news agency still hiding many of the details of the catastrophe, having reported that the three had all died and been buried in "tightly sealed zinc coffins." Ananenko and Bespalov received their awards in person while Baranov, who died in 2005, was awarded posthumously.

SocketWrench fucked around with this message at 12:49 on May 27, 2019

Charlz Guybon
Nov 16, 2010
Someone's melting down

https://twitter.com/KevinRothrock/status/1132072073021595648?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Enews%7Ctwgr%5Etweet

CeeJee
Dec 4, 2001
Oven Wrangler
After watching episode 2 I googled General Pikalov and the second or third hit was, and still is, a 9/11 truther site which went 'And then the commander of all Soviet Chemical Forces, who just happened to be in the neighborhood, went in himself to check the 'radiation' ! Yeah right ! And that's how Big Oil got the Chernobyl hoax rolling !'

The next result was not as out there but still remarkable.

https://twitter.com/hdevreij/status/975390879862190080


Charlz Guybon
Nov 16, 2010

CeeJee posted:

After watching episode 2 I googled General Pikalov and the second or third hit was, and still is, a 9/11 truther site which went 'And then the commander of all Soviet Chemical Forces, who just happened to be in the neighborhood, went in himself to check the 'radiation' ! Yeah right ! And that's how Big Oil got the Chernobyl hoax rolling !'

The next result was not as out there but still remarkable.

https://twitter.com/hdevreij/status/975390879862190080

Does the guy on the right look like an elderly Al Franken, or is it just me?

Iceache
Jul 9, 2009

SeXReX
Jan 9, 2009

I drink, mostly.
And get mad at people on the internet


:emptyquote:
Ive seen that poo poo so many times and i still grin like a stupid gently caress

Asbury
Mar 23, 2007
Probation
Can't post for 6 years!
Hair Elf
cross-quoting from the GBS thread because holy lol:

Vastarien posted:

https://webm.red/WtPv.webm

does this webm poo poo work?

Alkabob
May 31, 2011
I would like to speak to the manager about the socialists, please
I'm still waiting to see if they will show the Elephant's Foot or the azure pool where all the liquidators chilled.

SocketWrench
Jul 8, 2012

by Fritz the Horse

Scooter_McCabe posted:

I'm still waiting to see if they will show the Elephant's Foot or the azure pool where all the liquidators chilled.

Went and looked that up. Picture in '96 the interior was loving pristine. A pic from 2009 and it looks as bad or worse as any other part of the town

Bulky Bartokomous
Nov 3, 2006

In Mypos, only the strong survive.

Show is so-so. Feels rushed and inaccurate. So far it should have been:

Episode 1: 1:23:45 - As it was.
Episode 2: Please Remain Calm - As it was, roughly. Delete introduction of composite scientist character.
Episode 3: I've Got 99 Scientists, but Dylatov Ain't One - 2 hour run time. 30 second introductions of 100 new characters, based on the actual Soviet scientists who participated in managing the catastrophe.
Episode 4: Do You Feel Me, Comrade? - 3 brave Russians find a valve in a nearly pitch black basement under the reactor. Directed by Miguel Sapochnik.

Bulky Bartokomous fucked around with this message at 17:45 on May 27, 2019

Toxic Fart Syndrome
Jul 2, 2006

*hits A-THREAD-5*

Only 3.6 Roentgoons per hour ... not great, not terrible.




...the meter only goes to 3.6...

Pork Pro

"Spicy Rock" gets me every time. :v:

Kawasaki Nun
Jul 16, 2001

by Reene
This show would be better if it were a scrubs style ensemble show about Soviet scientists and maybe season 2 and 3 could deal with the disaster. The rest of time it's just a slice of life series about Soviet science in the 1980s

Anne Whateley
Feb 11, 2007
:unsmith: i like nice words
The strawmanning is interesting but it might be backfiring because

Kawasaki Nun posted:

This show would be better if it were a scrubs style ensemble show about Soviet scientists and maybe season 2 and 3 could deal with the disaster. The rest of time it's just a slice of life series about Soviet science in the 1980s
who wouldn't watch that

Loops
Oct 20, 2011

Here's a nuclear hot take: the series is just trying to stir up drama and portray nuclear power negatively, burns aren't all that bad you guys :downs:

quote:

If the body of the man who propped open the door to the reactor hall really did bleed, it would have had to have been from the fire, or hot metal door, not the radiation.

I don’t know if Mazin and HBO meant for viewers to assume that all of the symptoms that viewers witnessed were from radiation, instead of from fire, or that many more workers and firefighters died right away than actually did, but that was the impression I was left with.

Whatever their intention, our tendency to attribute the harm from Chernobyl to radiation, rather than to fire, is typical of how we view nuclear accidents more broadly.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/michae...e/#101d85aa41fc

Kawasaki Nun
Jul 16, 2001

by Reene

Anne Whateley posted:

The strawmanning is interesting but it might be backfiring because

who wouldn't watch that

They could have season specials on the anniversary of the revolution where different characters are revealed as KGB agents / collaborators which would reveal a previously United subtext to their behavior all season.

In the end it turns out reactionary forces organized within the Chernobyl disaster response team are actually working at the behest of their CIA handlers to erode faith in Soviet science by recording artificially inflated radiation levels emitting from the damaged reactor. They are subsequently gulaged / shot.

Kawasaki Nun fucked around with this message at 20:17 on May 27, 2019

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SocketWrench
Jul 8, 2012

by Fritz the Horse

Loops posted:

Here's a nuclear hot take: the series is just trying to stir up drama and portray nuclear power negatively, burns aren't all that bad you guys :downs:


https://www.forbes.com/sites/michae...e/#101d85aa41fc

The bleeding, sure, I don't think it would do that unless there was a piece of fuel lodge on the door, in which case to do that damage he'd have a lethal dose.

But yeah, the death toll as shown thus far is about right. 14 died within the first two weeks. multiple others were hosed up pretty badly

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