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Itzena
Aug 2, 2006

Nothing will improve the way things currently are.
Slime TrainerS
I learnt something new about AI's favourite spyplane today: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/29787/the-sr-71-blackbirds-predecessor-created-plasma-stealth-by-burning-cesium-laced-fuel

quote:

The exhaust pipes were sixty inches in diameter, so they returned large amounts of energy at all frequencies of interest and over large angles to the rear,” Lovick, who also worked on the SR-71 and the F-117 Nighthawk stealth combat aircraft, wrote in his own book, Radar Man: A Personal History of Stealth. “We knew that the only way to prevent such echoes was, in effect, to close the apertures.”

Lockheed initially experimented with various metallic mesh screens, but quickly abandoned those efforts, according to Lovick. He says that Dr. Richard Bissell, the CIA’s Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination, who was managing the program, was so worried about this particular issue, he had considered calling for the scrapping of the entire development of a U-2 successor. That’s where the cesium additive, which eventually became known as A-50, came in an idea that Lovick claims saved the A-12 program.

The basic principle behind this is a concept known as “plasma stealth.” In the simplest terms, this involves creating a cloud of plasma, or ionized gas, around some or all of an object. The plasma then absorbs electromagnetic radiation, such as radar waves, preventing them from reflecting back. There are multiple ways to generate the required plasma Lovick’s idea was to inject an alkali metal, via a fuel additive, into the extremely hot exhaust streams, where the heat would turn it into an ionized gas.

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azflyboy
Nov 9, 2005
The Q400 has a lot of circuit breaker panels located just under where the cupholders usually are, so it's a recurring issue on those airplanes.

In response, my employer decided they were going to demand we all use company isued mugs with lids, but said mugs had terrible press-fit lids that fell off constantly (and dropped at least one full cup onto the breakers), so the "company issued sippy cup" experiment lasted maybe a week before the pilots just decided to ignore it.

hobbesmaster
Jan 28, 2008

CarForumPoster posted:

Thats pretty bizarre. I've actually been to the tests for different fluid spills on aircraft stuff. Its definitely a standard part of the qualification process of electrical panels in cockpits. Usually its coffee, coke, water for drinking fluids.

EDIT: They'll do a long list of fluids, DO-160 has a list of common ones, though they don't always do that test.

quote:

"After the aircraft was fully inspected and repaired by our team of engineers, the flight continued via Manchester due to the legal operating hours of the crew. As safety is always our top priority, we have comprehensively investigated this incident and reviewed the procedures of liquids in the cockpit. Our crews were reminded of a careful handling as well as to use appropriate containers for their water or coffee. We apologize for any inconveniences the diversion might have caused to our guests."

It must not have caused any lasting damage. Well, unless theres an A330 maintenance base at Shannon? Could it have been something other than the plane's controls that was actually melting? Maybe an ipad or other tablet they were using for an efb?

Ahha, avherald has more: http://avherald.com/h?article=4c3da991&opt=0

quote:

By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, Feb 6th 2019 22:54Z, last updated Thursday, Sep 12th 2019 17:05Z
A Thomas Cook Airbus A330-200 on behalf of Condor, registration G-TCCF performing flight DE-2116 from Frankfurt/Main (Germany) to Cancun (Mexico) with 332 people on board, was enroute at FL360 over the Atlantic Ocean about 880nm west of Shannon (Ireland) when the crew declared Mayday reporting smoke in the cockpit, turned around and diverted to Shannon. On approach the crew advised the smoke had dissipated, they needed to burn off fuel for about 5 more minutes and landed safely on runway 24 about 2 hours after turning around. Emergency services found no trace of fire, heat or smoke. Four cabin crew and a passenger were taken to a hospital and were treated for smoke inhalation.

The passengers were taken to hotels while maintenance is working to determine the source of the smoke.

The occurrence aircraft remained n the ground in Shannon for about 20.5 hours, then flew to Manchester,EN (UK), remained on the ground in Manchester for about 2 hours and departed for Cancun.

On Feb 7th 2019 the airline reported liquid was spilled onto electronic devices in the cockpit causing the smoke. The aircraft was repaired and departed for Manchester,EN (UK) for a change of cabin crew, then the aircraft will head off for Cancun again.

I wonder if they melted their headsets or something. If the headset cable or USB cables melted onto the panel that'd cause some nasty fumes.

edit: this is a great line for a report imo

quote:

The aircraft manufacturer recommends using the cup holder. The size of cups used by this operator on this route made it more difficult to take cups in and out of the cup holder than larger cups that have a bigger area at the top of the cup holder to grasp. This incompatibility generally discouraged use of the cup holder, despite the policy. In the A330, flight crew were provided with a table in front of them, and it was a natural place to put a drink momentarily. However, objects here are vulnerable to being knocked over because it is a fold out table in a small space. It is also a convenient place to put other things that are likely to be moved during flight, such as the pilot’s log. A lid properly secured on the top of the cup may have reduced the amount of liquid spilled on the centre console.

hobbesmaster fucked around with this message at 16:10 on Sep 13, 2019

hobbesmaster
Jan 28, 2008

azflyboy posted:

The Q400 has a lot of circuit breaker panels located just under where the cupholders usually are, so it's a recurring issue on those airplanes.

In response, my employer decided they were going to demand we all use company isued mugs with lids, but said mugs had terrible press-fit lids that fell off constantly (and dropped at least one full cup onto the breakers), so the "company issued sippy cup" experiment lasted maybe a week before the pilots just decided to ignore it.

Heres a solution that a penny wise pound foolish airline would never buy for you!

Finger Prince
Jan 5, 2007


I had a relief pilot spill his Starbucks into the audio control panel on a a330 once (at the gate, thankfully) and holy crap I've never seen such a haunted comms system! Self dialing random Selcals, spazzing over all the selectable radios, transmitting randomly... Properly hosed. Poor guy felt like such a dumbass. poo poo happens though, he'll be more careful in the future! Luckily we had a spare ACP and we got them going with no delay.

david_a
Apr 24, 2010




Megamarm
Weren’t the Soviets working on plasma stealth too?

madeintaipei
Jul 13, 2012

david_a posted:

Weren’t the Soviets working on plasma stealth too?

The MiG 1.44 was supposed to have something like that, never did though. The 1.44 was pretty good in Ace Combat 5 is all I know.

Kia Soul Enthusias
May 9, 2004

zoom-zoom
Toilet Rascal
I've always wondered how robust those systems are supposed to be. It's statistically impossible that you're never gonna spill anything at some point.

Humphreys
Jan 26, 2013

We conceived a way to use my mother as a porn mule


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pl8u1NtK-7w

Jealous Cow
Apr 4, 2002

by Fluffdaddy

https://youtu.be/7fOKnQWZR3g

Found in the recommendations.

Dude is melting. Not melting down, just melting.

Humphreys
Jan 26, 2013

We conceived a way to use my mother as a porn mule


Jealous Cow posted:

https://youtu.be/7fOKnQWZR3g

Found in the recommendations.

Dude is melting. Not melting down, just melting.

Escape from LAX isn't looking good

FBS
Apr 27, 2015

The real fun of living wisely is that you get to be smug about it.

Jealous Cow posted:

https://youtu.be/7fOKnQWZR3g

Found in the recommendations.

Dude is melting. Not melting down, just melting.

Craig Ferguson sometimes talks about learning to fly thanks in part to Kurt Russel. The full anecdote starts at 1:05:08 but the good bit is here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AsFs4LJ8cx8&t=4106s

Brovine
Dec 24, 2011

Mooooo?
A certain Irish airline was changing so many audio control panels from coffee damage that they ended up adding a spill shield just forward of them in the centre console. Nothing quite as bad as "shorting so much it melted" though.

Nebakenezzer
Sep 13, 2005

The Mote in God's Eye

Security researchers are poking 787 software and are finding security flaws, NO they aren't says Boeing

ThisIsJohnWayne
Feb 23, 2007
Ooo! Look at me! NO DON'T LOOK AT ME!





https://www.imgur.com/t/funny_gifs/sUpua6W

ThisIsJohnWayne fucked around with this message at 16:04 on Sep 15, 2019

Finger Prince
Jan 5, 2007



This again? Haxxoring the airplane through the IFE is like the dream of these guys.
And lol oooh you might be able to corrupt the EFB! And then it won't work! And then it'll go on MEL and get replaced like it does all the time by itself anyway.
The problem with these hacking guys is they don't understand the operating environment or the architecture of the machine they're trying to compromise. It's the equivalent of the blind man feeling the elephants trunk and proclaiming to the world that he's found a snake.
As with all these kinds of subversion attempts, it would just be easier to compromise a human to carry out your nefarious plans. Occam's razor and all that.

TTerrible
Jul 15, 2005

Finger Prince posted:

This again? Haxxoring the airplane through the IFE is like the dream of these guys.
And lol oooh you might be able to corrupt the EFB! And then it won't work! And then it'll go on MEL and get replaced like it does all the time by itself anyway.
The problem with these hacking guys is they don't understand the operating environment or the architecture of the machine they're trying to compromise. It's the equivalent of the blind man feeling the elephants trunk and proclaiming to the world that he's found a snake.
As with all these kinds of subversion attempts, it would just be easier to compromise a human to carry out your nefarious plans. Occam's razor and all that.

Mr Muilenburg you don't have time to be posting here.

standard.deviant
May 17, 2012

Globally Indigent

TTerrible posted:

Mr Muilenburg you don't have time to be posting here.
For reals though just because the EFB is receiving navigational data from a nav data bus doesn't mean it has the ability to send anything back. I have no idea what the engineering looks like on the airplane in question, but I've seen some systems handle one-way data transfer by using a serial cable with an unpinned return.

hobbesmaster
Jan 28, 2008

TTerrible posted:

Mr Muilenburg you don't have time to be posting here.

Part of the design of aviation systems is that the entire thing can’t be compromised even if one part of it is which leads to both Boeing and the researchers being right.

Midjack
Dec 24, 2007



The one talk I saw on airframe infosec was a guy who had some very limited access to a maintenance depot, probably got a friend to sneak him in. He performed steps A and B and determined that step C was possible. He then spent the next 45 minutes twirling his mustache and jerking off about BUT IF I COULD DO STEPS D THROUGH Y THEN I COULD CONTROL THE PLANE, MAYBE. So yeah, there tends to be a lot of hyperbole in the area.

However.

It doesn’t create a lot of confidence when baby basic security errors are present in the stuff that’s easy for the public to inspect, and when the response of the manufacturer is TRUST US WE KNOW WHAT WE’RE DOING when they very demonstrably have killed a bunch of people by loving up software, some skepticism is warranted. It’s difficult to do much effective research without access to a real airplane that you’re okay destroying, which is a little pricey.

Realistically I don’t think it’s likely that we’re going to see a practical attack that jumps from IFE to critical control systems anytime soon but it seems foolish to act like its impossible.

OddObserver
Apr 3, 2009

hobbesmaster posted:

Part of the design of aviation systems is that the entire thing can’t be compromised even if one part of it is which leads to both Boeing and the researchers being right.

As long as the first part is actually true. I used to think that having a single-sensor failure lead to a likely-fatal accident unless a recovery procedure that doesn't work half the time
and hasn't been sufficiently documented would be against design principles, too.

azflyboy
Nov 9, 2005
Boeing: "You can't hack the 787"

Also Boeing: "There's no problem with the MAX"

Ola
Jul 19, 2004

azflyboy posted:

Boeing: "You can't hack the 787"

Also Boeing: "There's no problem with the MAX"

I think they are right about the 787, but they do have a credibility problem.

tactlessbastard
Feb 4, 2001

Godspeed, post
Fun Shoe
Yeah, Lmao at 'Boeing said so'

TTerrible
Jul 15, 2005

azflyboy posted:

Boeing: "You can't hack the 787"

Also Boeing: "There's no problem with the MAX"

This is basically my stance. I understand completely that the IFE network and the control network are completely different things and getting into whatever embedded windows xp / qnx rubbish is running the media server backend shouldn't result in being able to do anything dangerous but my faith in Boeing to not cut corners on engineering isn't at an all time high.

Sagebrush
Feb 26, 2012

Me, sitting in a 152 and tapping my head like the meme: "can't hack into my airplane's electronics if it hasn't got any"

bull3964
Nov 18, 2000

DO YOU HEAR THAT? THAT'S THE SOUND OF ME PATTING MYSELF ON THE BACK.


It's a basic tenet of infosec that you reduce the attack footprint wherever possible even if it can't directly lead to compromise.

Belt and suspenders is the only way to operate on critical systems and that's a lesson that aviation has learned and relearned with lives since the beginning. Edge cases are what bring planes down and these are complex systems where no one person knows how every interaction operates.

Even if further penetration is PHSYICALLY impossible due to things like no return pin for data like mentioned above, that doesn't mean it will always be the case (due to upgrades and changes over the life cycle of the systems involved) or that it wouldn't be possible to re-purpose other paths to do something through another discovered exploit.

quote:

In a follow-up call with WIRED, a company spokesperson said that in investigating IOActive's claims, Boeing had gone so far as to put an actual Boeing 787 in "flight mode" for testing, and then had its security engineers attempt to exploit the vulnerabilities that Santamarta had exposed. They found that they couldn't carry out a successful attack. Honeywell, which supplied Boeing with the code for the CIS/MS, also wrote in a statement to WIRED that "after extensive testing, Honeywell and its partners determined there is no threat to flight safety as the 787’s critical systems cannot be affected."

This is the exact wrong attitude to have. "We tried to do something bad with the bugs that were handed to us and we couldn't so everything is good." The correct answer would be "We determined that the vulnerabilities pose no thread to flight safety but we are undertaking steps to close those vulnerabilities and reviewing our testing procedures to ensure similar vulnerabilities aren't created in the future."

So, it's not a "sky is falling" type of thing, but you don't just shrug stuff like this off either. You take steps to close the issue and review how it became an issue in the first place.

babyeatingpsychopath
Oct 28, 2000
Forum Veteran


bull3964 posted:

It's a basic tenet of infosec that you reduce the attack footprint wherever possible even if it can't directly lead to compromise.

Even if further penetration is PHSYICALLY impossible due to things like no return pin for data like mentioned above, that doesn't mean it will always be the case (due to upgrades and changes over the life cycle of the systems involved) or that it wouldn't be possible to re-purpose other paths to do something through another discovered exploit.

I've messed around on the hardware, software, and interconnect on aviation navigation devices.

They're really dumb. ARINC-429 is a sender/receiver bus architecture. There are devices that send out data with labels. One-direction sends. Anything connected to the bus can get that data. The receive side determines what labels from the receive side show up. Each packet is a fixed length; there can be no buffer overruns.

So your IFE can get info from the nav (airspeed, altitude, time to next waypoint, time to destination, etc), and the nav can get data from the IFE (I'm not sure what it'd be looking for, but w/evs), but the IFE fundamentally can't craft a packet that will cause the nav to DO anything. If the IFE sends an invalid or badly-formatted packet, then it just gets silently dropped. There's just no mechanism wired into the nav system that lets the IFE DO anything.

Even on Garmin HSDB stuff using ethernet, a bad packet is silently dropped. A malformed packet is silently dropped. A well-formed packet outside parameters is silently dropped. A well-formed packet within parameters that disagrees with the cross channel is flagged, and eventually that data stream is disabled. I guess you could eventually walk one side off, but then the pilots can just decide to pay attention to only one side and send the other into reversionary. If you send both sides into reversionary modes, then the external data sources come in over a completely different set of wires, and typically, protocols. i.e. If #1 and #2 both go reversionary, then #1 and #2 HSDB busses go offline and the backup data comes in over RS232 or ARINC429 or RS485 or something, and it's not coming from the same sources.

That all said, I believe that with physical access to actual hardware, it might be possible to figure out an exploit that could make a downing discrepancy; possibly even an in-flight emergency. I don't think a full haxx0r of the gibson crashing the airplane into a mountain is possible. That's why there are still pilots up front with switches that physically remove power from systems to cause them to fail safe.

Platystemon
Feb 13, 2012

BREADS
Breaking the circuit only works if the pilots know what’s causing the malfunction.

MCAS-induced runaway trim was a simpler thing to diagnose and it still repeatedly brought down planes.

hobbesmaster
Jan 28, 2008

Platystemon posted:

Breaking the circuit only works if the pilots know what’s causing the malfunction.

MCAS-induced runaway trim was a simpler thing to diagnose and it still repeatedly brought down planes.

Diagnosing wasn’t an issue, both crews immediately recognized it as a runaway trim issue. The problem there is that if the trim has already run away electrically you have to manually crank the elevators back after you disable power.

Warbird
May 23, 2012

America's Favorite Dumbass

I saw a Diamond DA42 flying around and thought it looked pretty neat. Do any of you have experience with/hot takes for this plans?

Platystemon
Feb 13, 2012

BREADS

hobbesmaster posted:

Diagnosing wasn’t an issue, both crews immediately recognized it as a runaway trim issue. The problem there is that if the trim has already run away electrically you have to manually crank the elevators back after you disable power.

The trick was to skip the checklist and go straight to disabling the electrics.

The first thing on the checklist for whatever symptom a hacker could cause certainly isn’t going to be “disable in‐flight entertainment”.

e.pilot
Nov 20, 2011

sometimes maybe good
sometimes maybe shit

babyeatingpsychopath posted:

I've messed around on the hardware, software, and interconnect on aviation navigation devices.

They're really dumb. ARINC-429 is a sender/receiver bus architecture. There are devices that send out data with labels. One-direction sends. Anything connected to the bus can get that data. The receive side determines what labels from the receive side show up. Each packet is a fixed length; there can be no buffer overruns.

So your IFE can get info from the nav (airspeed, altitude, time to next waypoint, time to destination, etc), and the nav can get data from the IFE (I'm not sure what it'd be looking for, but w/evs), but the IFE fundamentally can't craft a packet that will cause the nav to DO anything. If the IFE sends an invalid or badly-formatted packet, then it just gets silently dropped. There's just no mechanism wired into the nav system that lets the IFE DO anything.

Even on Garmin HSDB stuff using ethernet, a bad packet is silently dropped. A malformed packet is silently dropped. A well-formed packet outside parameters is silently dropped. A well-formed packet within parameters that disagrees with the cross channel is flagged, and eventually that data stream is disabled. I guess you could eventually walk one side off, but then the pilots can just decide to pay attention to only one side and send the other into reversionary. If you send both sides into reversionary modes, then the external data sources come in over a completely different set of wires, and typically, protocols. i.e. If #1 and #2 both go reversionary, then #1 and #2 HSDB busses go offline and the backup data comes in over RS232 or ARINC429 or RS485 or something, and it's not coming from the same sources.

That all said, I believe that with physical access to actual hardware, it might be possible to figure out an exploit that could make a downing discrepancy; possibly even an in-flight emergency. I don't think a full haxx0r of the gibson crashing the airplane into a mountain is possible. That's why there are still pilots up front with switches that physically remove power from systems to cause them to fail safe.

I’d be shocked if the IFE moving map flight data page got the flight information from anything other than its own separate GPS and temperature sensors.


e:

Warbird posted:

I saw a Diamond DA42 flying around and thought it looked pretty neat. Do any of you have experience with/hot takes for this plans?

If I had the means I would own one, they’re absolutely fantastic planes.

e.pilot fucked around with this message at 01:02 on Sep 16, 2019

kathmandu
Jul 11, 2004

Warbird posted:

I saw a Diamond DA42 flying around and thought it looked pretty neat. Do any of you have experience with/hot takes for this plans?

I got my multi rating on one. Fun as hell to fly, needs a ton of rudder input though. A bitch to taxi. Disappointingly low useful load. Incredibly low fuel burn. As much as I like it, I wouldn’t buy a multi with less useful load that a C182.

Arson Daily
Aug 11, 2003

e.pilot posted:

I’d be shocked if the IFE moving map flight data page got the flight information from anything other than its own separate GPS and temperature sensors.

FMC programming changes will change your ETE and ETA times on the WiFi flight tracker we have so there is definitely some talking back and forth there.

ausgezeichnet
Sep 18, 2005

In my country this is definitely not offensive!
Nap Ghost

e.pilot posted:

I’d be shocked if the IFE moving map flight data page got the flight information from anything other than its own separate GPS and temperature sensors.

The Airshow in most corporate aircraft gets position, time and distance information directly from the active FMS. Still doesn’t provide a hacker path back to the FMS unit, though.

Warbird
May 23, 2012

America's Favorite Dumbass

kathmandu posted:

I got my multi rating on one. Fun as hell to fly, needs a ton of rudder input though. A bitch to taxi. Disappointingly low useful load. Incredibly low fuel burn. As much as I like it, I wouldn’t buy a multi with less useful load that a C182.

I’m reading that as “it can’t haul much”. Would it be accurate to compare it to a Miata? Fun to drive/fly, but drat near useless besides that?

Platystemon
Feb 13, 2012

BREADS
What I’m getting out of that is that it’s the OG Honda Insight of the skies.

Elviscat
Jan 1, 2008

Well don't you know I'm caught in a trap?

bull3964 posted:


This is the exact wrong attitude to have. "We tried to do something bad with the bugs that were handed to us and we couldn't so everything is good." The correct answer would be "We determined that the vulnerabilities pose no thread to flight safety but we are undertaking steps to close those vulnerabilities and reviewing our testing procedures to ensure similar vulnerabilities aren't created in the future."

So, it's not a "sky is falling" type of thing, but you don't just shrug stuff like this off either. You take steps to close the issue and review how it became an issue in the first place.

This is totally true from an engineering perspective, but from the corporation you can't ever say this, because tomorrow's headlines are "BOEING ADMITS TO POSSIBLE CYBER VULNERABILITY!" 'Will the next airplane YOU ride on be crashed into a mountain by hackers?' Call it a cultural problem or whatever, even in this thread there's been some gross hyperbole about the MCAS issue.

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Midjack
Dec 24, 2007



Everything in current public discourse is a bunch of bad faith statements anyway; we have long since passed the point where believing the opposite of what you’re told lands you closer to the truth.

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