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mdemone posted:I just realized I'm still elated over Scalia's death. Opinions used to be so much more infuriating with him around. yeah at the very least gorsuch's opinions are straight up vogon poetry and there's so little to make heads or tails of that you're too busy to get pissed whereas you knew full well the depths of scalia's contempt.
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Apr 27, 2020 17:20
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 Opinions! NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK, ET AL. Holding / Majority Opinion (Per Curiam): In the District Court, petitioners challenged a New York City rule regarding the transport of firearms. Petitioners claimed that the rule violated the Second Amendment. Petitioners sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the rule insofar as the rule prevented their transport of firearms to a second home or shooting range outside of the city. The District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ claim. After we granted certiorari, the State of New York amended its firearm licensing statute, and the City amended the rule so that petitioners may now transport firearms to a second home or shooting range outside of the city, which is the precise relief that petitioners requested in the prayer for relief in their complaint. Petitioners’ claim for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the City’s old rule is therefore moot. Petitioners now argue, however, that the new rule may still infringe their rights. In particular, petitioners claim that they may not be allowed to stop for coffee,gas, food, or restroom breaks on the way to their second homes or shooting ranges outside of the city. The City responds that those routine stops are entirely permissible under the new rule. We do not here decide that dispute about the new rule; as we stated in Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 482–483 (1990): “Our ordinary practice in disposing of a case that has become moot on appeal is to vacate the judgment with directions to dismiss. However, in instances where the mootness is attributable to a change in the legal framework governing the case, and where the plaintiff may have some residual claim under the new framework that was understandably not asserted previously, our practice is to vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings in which the parties may, if necessary, amend their pleadings or develop the record more fully.” Petitioners also argue that, even though they have not previously asked for damages with respect to the City’s old rule, they still could do so in this lawsuit. Petitioners did not seek damages in their complaint; indeed, the possibility of a damages claim was not raised until well into the litigation in this Court. The City argues that it is too late for petitioners to now add a claim for damages. On remand, the Court of Appeals and the District Court may consider whether petitioners may still add a claim for damages in this lawsuit with respect to New York City’s old rule. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for such proceedings as are appropriate. It is so ordered. Lineup: Per Curiam. Concurrence by Kavanaugh. Dissent by Alito, joined by Gorusch and Thomas (other than Part IV-B) Concurrence (Kavanaugh): I agree with the per curiam opinion’s resolution of the procedural issues before us—namely, that petitioners’ claim for injunctive relief against New York City’s old rule is moot and that petitioners’ new claims should be addressed as appropriate in the first instance by the Court of Appeals and the District Court on remand. I also agree with JUSTICE ALITO’s general analysis of Heller and McDonald. And I share JUSTICE ALITO’s concern that some federal and state courts may not be properly applying Heller and McDonald. The Court should address that issue soon, perhaps in one of the several Second Amendment cases with petitions for certiorari now pending before the Court. Dissent (Alito, joined by Gorsuch and Thomas (other than Part IV-B)): By incorrectly dismissing this case as moot, the Court permits our docket to be manipulated in a way that should not be countenanced. Twelve years ago in District of Columbia v. Heller, we held that the Second Amendment protects the right of ordinary Americans to keep and bear arms. Two years later, our decision in McDonald v. Chicago, established that this right is fully applicable to the States. Since then, the lower courts have decided numerous cases involving Second Amendment challenges to a variety of federal, state, and local laws. Most have failed. We have been asked to review many of these decisions, but until this case, we denied all such requests. … Regrettably, the Court now dismisses the case as moot. If the Court were right on the law, I would of course approve that disposition. Under the Constitution, our authority is limited to deciding actual cases or controversies, and if this were no longer a live controversy—that is, if it were now moot—we would be compelled to dismiss. But if a case is on our docket and we have jurisdiction, we have an obligation to decide it. … Respondents have failed to meet this “heavy burden.” [to prove mootness]. This is so for two reasons. First, the changes in City and State law do not provide petitioners with all the injunctive relief they sought. Second, if we reversed on the merits, the District Court on remand could award damages to remedy the constitutional violation that petitioners suffered. … In this case, the amended City ordinance and the new State law gave petitioners most of what they sought in their complaint, but the new laws did not give them complete relief. It is entirely possible for them to obtain more relief, and therefore this case is not moot. This is so for the following reasons. First, this case is not moot because the amended City ordinance and new State law do not give petitioners all the prospective relief they seek. Petitioners asserted in their complaint that the Second Amendment guarantees them, as holders of premises licenses, “unrestricted access” to ranges, competitions, and second homes outside of New York City, App. 36, and the new laws do not give them that. The new City ordinance has limitations that petitioners claim are unconstitutional, namely, that a trip outside the City must be “direc[t]” and travel within the City must be “continuous and uninterrupted.” Exactly what these restrictions mean is not clear from the face of the rule, and the City has done little to clarify their reach...[W]e are left with no clear idea where the City draws the line, and the situation is further complicated by the overlay of State law. The new State law appears to prevent the City from penalizing any “direc[t]” trip to a range or competition outside the City, but the State law does not define that limitation. The petitioners wanted to enter competitions in upstate New York more than a five hour drive from the City. Could they stop along the way? And if so, for how long? The State has not explained its understanding of this limitation, and in any event, prosecutorial decisions in New York are generally made by the State’s 67 elected district attorneys.The bottom line is that petitioners, who sought “unrestricted access” to out-of-city ranges and competitions, are still subject to restrictions of undetermined meaning. These restrictions may not seem very important, but that is beside the point for purposes of mootness. Nor does it matter whether, in the end, those restrictions would be found to violate the Second Amendment. All that matters for present purposes is that the City still withholds from petitioners something that they have claimed from the beginning is their constitutional right. It follows that the case is not moot. It is as simple as that. … The case is not moot for a separate and independent reason: If this Court were to hold, as petitioners request and as I believe we should, that 38 N. Y. C. R. R. §5–23 violated petitioners’ Second Amendment right, the District Court on remand could (and probably should) award damages. At a minimum, if petitioners succeeded on their challenge to the travel restrictions, they would be eligible for nominal damages. When a plaintiff ’s constitutional rights have been violated, nominal damages may be awarded without proof of any additional injury...And it is widely recognized that a claim for nominal damages precludes mootness. … The per curiam provides no sound reason for holding that this case is moot. The per curiam states that the City’s current rule gave petitioners “the precise relief [they] requested” in their prayer for relief, ante, at 1, but that is not so. Petitioners’ prayer for relief asks the court to enjoin 38 N. Y. C. R. R. §5–23 insofar as it “prohibit[s]” travel outside the City to ranges, competitions, and second homes. The new rule’s conditions unmistakably continue to prohibit some travel outside the City to those destinations. For this reason, petitioners have not obtained the “unrestricted access” that, they have always maintained, the Second Amendment guarantees. Id., at 36. The per curiam implies that the current rule, as interpreted at oral argument by counsel for the City, gives petitioners everything that they now seek, ante, at 1, but that also is not true. Petitioners still claim the right to “unrestricted access” and counsel’s off-the-cuff concessions do not give them that. … The per curiam’s main argument appears to go as follows: Petitioners’ original claim was a challenge to New York’s old rule; this claim is now moot due to the repeal of that rule; and what the petitioners are now asserting is a new claim, namely, that New York’s current rule is also unconstitutional. This argument also misrepresents the nature of the claim asserted in petitioners’ complaint. What petitioners claimed in their complaint and still claim is that they are entitled to “unrestricted access” to out-of-city ranges and competitions. The City’s replacement of one law denying unrestricted access with another that also denies that access did not change the nature of petitioners’ claim or render it moot. … Having shown that this case is not moot, I proceed to the merits of plaintiffs’ claim that the City ordinance violated the Second Amendment. This is not a close question. The answer follows directly from Heller. In Heller, we held that a District of Columbia rule that effectively prevented a law-abiding citizen from keeping a handgun in the home for purposes of self-defense constituted a core violation of the Second Amendment. We based this decision on the scope of the right to keep and bear arms as it was understood at the time of the adoption of the Second Amendment.We recognized that history supported the constitutionality of some laws limiting the right to possess a firearm, such as laws banning firearms from certain sensitive locations and prohibiting possession by felons and other dangerous individuals. But history provided no support for laws like the District’s. For a similar reason, 38 N. Y. C. R. R. §5–23 also violated the Second Amendment. We deal here with the same core Second Amendment right, the right to keep a handgun in the home for self-defense. As the Second Circuit “assume[d],” a necessary concomitant of this right is the right to take a gun outside the home for certain purposes. One of these is to take a gun for maintenance or repair, which City law allows. Another is to take a gun outside the home in order to transfer ownership lawfully, which the City also allows. And still another is to take a gun to a range in order to gain and maintain the skill necessary to use it responsibly. As we said in Heller, “‘to bear arms implies something more than the mere keeping [of arms]; it implies the learning to handle and use them in a way that makes those who keep them ready for their efficient use.’” … [Part IV-B, which Thomas doesn’t join] If history is not sufficient to show that the New York City ordinance is unconstitutional, any doubt is dispelled by the weakness of the City’s showing that its travel restriction significantly promoted public safety. Although the courts below claimed to apply heightened scrutiny, there was nothing heightened about what they did. As noted, the City relied entirely on the declaration of Inspector Lunetta, but this declaration provides little support. Some of what Inspector Lunetta asserted was simply not relevant to the justification for drawing a distinction between trips to a range in the City and trips to a range in a neighboring jurisdiction. For example, he stated that persons holding premises licenses “do not always transport their firearms in a locked box carrying ammunition separately, as required by NYPD rules,” but the issue in this case does not concern the storage of a gun on the way to a range. Similarly, he declared that “[p]remises license holders have not demonstrated proper cause to carry a concealed firearm in public,” but the question before us is not whether petitioners have the right to do what they could if they had carry licenses. … This case is not moot. The City violated petitioners’ Second Amendment right, and we should so hold. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District Court to provide appropriate relief. I therefore respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-280_ba7d.pdf MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS v. UNITED STATES Holding / Majority Opinion (Sotomayor): The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act expanded healthcare coverage to many who did not have or could not afford it. The Affordable Care Act did this by, among other things, providing tax credits to help people buy insurance and establishing online marketplaces where insurers could sell plans. To encourage insurers to enter those marketplaces, the Act created several programs to defray the carriers’ costs and cabin their risks. Among these initiatives was the “Risk Corridors” program, a temporary framework meant to compensate insurers for unexpectedly unprofitable plans during the marketplaces’ first three years. The since-expired Risk Corridors statute, §1342, set a formula for calculating payments under the program: If an insurance plan loses a certain amount of money, the Federal Government “shall pay” the plan; if the plan makes a certain amount of money, the plan “shall pay” the Government. Some plans made money and paid the Government. Many suffered losses and sought reimbursement. The Government, however, did not pay. These cases are about whether petitioners—insurers who claim losses under the Risk Corridors program—have a right to payment under §1342 and a damages remedy for the unpaid amounts. We hold that they do. We conclude that §1342 of the Affordable Care Act established a money-mandating obligation, that Congress did not repeal this obligation, and that petitioners may sue the Government for damages in the Court of Federal Claims. … Insurance carriers had many reasons to participate in these new [Health Benefit] exchanges. Through the Affordable Care Act, they gained access to millions of new customers with tax credits worth “billions of dollars in spending each year.” But the exchanges posed some business risks, too— including a lack of “reliable data to estimate the cost of providing care for the expanded pool of individuals seeking coverage.” This uncertainty could have given carriers pause and affected the rates they set. So the Affordable Care Act created several risk-mitigation programs. At issue here is the Risk Corridors program. The Risk Corridors program aimed to limit participating plans’ profits and losses for the exchanges’ first three years (2014, 2015, and 2016). It did so through a formula that computed a plan’s gains or losses at the end of each year. Plans with profits above a certain threshold would pay the Government, while plans with losses below that threshold would receive payments from the Government. Specifically, §1342 stated that the eligible profitable plans “shall pay” the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), while the Secretary “shall pay” the eligible unprofitable plans. When it enacted the Affordable Care Act in 2010, Congress did not simultaneously appropriate funds for the yearly payments the Secretary could potentially owe under the Risk Corridors program. Neither did Congress limit the amounts that the Government might pay under §1342. Nor did the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) “score”—that is, calculate the budgetary impact of—the Risk Corridors program. In later years, the CBO noted that the Risk Corridors statute did not require the program to be budget neutral. The CBO reported that, “[i]n contrast” to the Act’s other risk-mitigation programs, “risk corridor collections (which will be recorded as revenues) will not necessarily equal risk corridor payments, so that program can have net effects on the budget deficit.” The CBO thus recognized that “[i]f insurers’ costs exceed their expectations, on average, the risk corridor program will impose costs on the federal budget.” … The program’s first year, 2014, tallied a deficit of about $2.5 billion. Profitable plans owed the Government $362 million, while the Government owed unprofitable plans $2.87 billion. At the end of the first year, Congress enacted a bill appropriating a lump sum for CMS’ Program Management. The bill included a rider restricting the appropriation’s effect on Risk Corridors payments out to issuers … All told, the Risk Corridors program’s deficit exceeded $12 billion. The dispute here is whether the Government must pay the remaining deficit...These insurers sued the Federal Government for damages in the United States Court of Federal Claims, invoking the Tucker Act, They alleged that §1342 of the Affordable Care Act obligated the Government to pay the full amount of their losses as calculated by the statutory formula and sought a money judgment for the unpaid sums owed—a claim that, if successful, could be satisfied through the Judgment Fund. … These cases present three questions: First, did §1342 of the Affordable Care Act obligate the Government to pay participating insurers the full amount calculated by that statute? Second, did the obligation survive Congress’ appropriations riders? And third, may petitioners sue the Government under the Tucker Act to recover on that obligation? Because our answer to each is yes, we reverse. … The Risk Corridors statute created a Government obligation to pay insurers the full amount set out in §1342’s formula. An “obligation” is a “definite commitment that creates a legal liability of the government for the payment of goods and services ordered or received, or a legal duty . . . that could mature into a legal liability by virtue of actions on the part of the other party beyond the control of the United States.” The Government may incur an obligation by contract or by statute. Incurring an obligation, of course, is different from paying one. After all, the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause provides that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Creating and satisfying a Government obligation, therefore, typically involves four steps: (1) Congress passes an organic statute (like the Affordable Care Act) that creates a program, agency, or function; (2) Congress passes an Act authorizing appropriations; (3) Congress enacts the appropriation, granting “budget authority” to incur obligations and make payments, and designating the funds to be drawn; and (4) the relevant Government entity begins incurring the obligation. But Congress can deviate from this pattern. It may, for instance, authorize agencies to enter into contracts and “incur obligations in advance of appropriations.” In that context, the contracts “constitute obligations binding on the United States,” such that a “failure or refusal by Congress to make the necessary appropriation would not defeat the obligation, and the party entitled to payment would most likely be able to recover in a lawsuit.” Congress can also create an obligation directly by statute, without also providing details about how it must be satisfied. Consider, for example, United States v. Langston, 118 U. S. 389 (1886). In that case, Congress had enacted a statute fixing an official’s annual salary at “$7,500 from the date of the creation of his office.” Years later, however, Congress failed to appropriate enough funds to pay the full amount, prompting the officer to sue for the remainder. Understanding that Congress had created the obligation by statute, this Court held that a subsequent failure to appropriate enough funds neither “abrogated [n]or suspended” the Government’s pre-existing commitment to pay. The Court thus affirmed judgment for the officer for the balance owed. … Section 1342 imposed a legal duty of the United States that could mature into a legal liability through the insurers’ actions—namely, their participating in the healthcare exchanges. This conclusion flows from §1342’s express terms and context. The first sign that the statute imposed an obligation is its mandatory language: “shall.” “Unlike the word ‘may,’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually connotes a requirement.”Section 1342 uses the command three times: The HHS Secretary “shall establish and administer” the Risk Corridors program from 2014 to 2016, “shall provide” for payments according to a precise statutory formula, and “shall pay” insurers for losses exceeding the statutory threshold...The statute meant what it said: The Government “shall pay” the sum that §1342 prescribes. The Government does not contest that §1342’s plain terms appeared to create an obligation to pay whatever amount the statutory formula provides. It insists instead that the Appropriations Clause, Art. I, §9, cl. 7, and the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U. S. C. §1341, “qualified” that obligation by making “HHS’s payments contingent on appropriations by Congress.” Brief for United States 20. “Because Congress did not appropriate funds beyond the amounts collected” from profitable plans, this argument goes, “HHS’s statutory duty [to pay unprofitable plans] extended only to disbursing those collected amounts.” That does not follow. Neither the Appropriations Clause nor the Anti-Deficiency Act addresses whether Congress itself can create or incur an obligation directly by statute. Rather, both provisions constrain how federal employees and officers may make or authorize payments without appropriations. … And contrary to the Government’s view, §1342’s obligation-creating language does not turn on whether Congress expressly provided “budget authority” before appropriating funds. Budget authority is an agency’s power “provided by Federal law to incur financial obligations,” 88 Stat. 297, 2 U. S. C. §622(2)(A), “that will result in immediate or future outlays of government funds,” As explained above, Congress usually gives budget authority through an appropriations Act or by expressly granting an agency authority to contract for the Government. But budget authority is not necessary for Congress itself to create an obligation by statute. … The next question is whether Congress impliedly repealed the obligation through its appropriations riders. It did not. Because Congress did not expressly repeal §1342, the Government seeks to show that Congress impliedly did so. But “repeals by implication are not favored,” and are a “rarity.”...This Court’s aversion to implied repeals is “especially” strong “in the appropriations context.” … The relevant agencies’ responses to the riders also undermine the case for an implied repeal here. Had Congress “clearly expressed” its intent to repeal, one might have expected HHS or CMS to signal the sea change.But even after Congress enacted the first rider, the agencies reiterated that “the Affordable Care Act requires the Secretary to make full payments to issuers,” 80 Fed. Reg. 10779, and that “HHS w[ould] record risk corridors payments due as an obligation of the United States Government for which full payment is required.”. They understood that profitable insurers’ payments to the Government would not dispel the Secretary’s obligation to pay unprofitable insurers, even “in the event of a shortfall.” Given the Court’s potent presumption in the appropriations context, an implied-repeal-by-rider must be made of sterner stuff. To be sure, this Court’s implied-repeal precedents reveal two situations where the Court has deemed appropriations measures irreconcilable with statutory obligations to pay. But neither one applies here. The first line of cases involved appropriations bills that, without expressly invoking words of “repeal,” reached that outcome by completely revoking or suspending the underlying obligation before the Government began incurring it….The second strand of precedent turned on provisions that reformed statutory payment formulas in ways “irreconcilable” with the original methods….The appropriations bills here created no such conflict as in Mitchell and Fisher. The riders did not reference §1342’s payment formula at all, let alone “irreconcilabl[y]” change it. … [Thomas and Gorsuch don’t care about legislative history so don’t join this bit] We also find unpersuasive the only pieces of legislative history that the Federal Circuit cited. According to the Court of Appeals, a floor statement and an unpublished GAO letter provided “clear intent” to cancel or “suspend” the Government’s Risk Corridors obligation. We doubt that either source could ever evince the kind of clear congressional intent required to repeal a statutory obligation through an appropriations rider. But even if they could, they did not do so here. … Having found that the Risk Corridors statute established a valid yet unfulfilled Government obligation, this Court must turn to a final question: Where does petitioners’ lawsuit belong, and for what relief? We hold that petitioners properly relied on the Tucker Act to sue for damages in the Court of Federal Claims. The United States is immune from suit unless it unequivocally consents. The Government has waived immunity for certain damages suits in the Court of Federal Claims through the Tucker Act, 24 Stat. 505.That statute permits “claim[s] against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” The Tucker Act, however, does not create “substantive rights.”A plaintiff relying on the Tucker Act must premise her damages action on “other sources of law,” like “statutes or contracts.” For that reason, “[n]ot every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker Act.” Nor will every “failure to perform an obligation . . . creat[e] a right to monetary relief ” against the Government. To determine whether a statutory claim falls within the Tucker Act’s immunity waiver, we typically employ a “fair interpretation” test. A statute creates a “right capable of grounding a claim within the waiver of sovereign immunity if, but only if, it ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.’” ... But there are two exceptions. The Tucker Act yields when the obligation-creating statute provides its own detailed remedies, or when the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, provides an avenue for relief. Petitioners clear each hurdle: The Risk Corridors statute is fairly interpreted as mandating compensation for damages, and neither exception to the Tucker Act applies. .. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Lineup: Sotomayor, joined by Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Kavanaugh, and Thomas and Gorsuch (all but Part III-C). Concurrence by Kavanaugh. Dissent by Alito. Dissent (Alito): Twice this Term, we have made the point that we have basically gotten out of the business of recognizing private rights of action not expressly created by Congress. … Today, however, the Court infers a private right of action that has the effect of providing a massive bailout for insurance companies that took a calculated risk and lost. These companies chose to participate in an Affordable Care Act program that they thought would be profitable. I assume for the sake of argument that the Court is correct in holding that §1342 of the Affordable Care Act created an obligation that was not rescinded by subsequent appropriations riders. Thus, for present purposes, I do not dispute the thrust of the analysis in Parts I–III of the opinion of the Court. My disagreement concerns the critical question that the Court decides in the remainder of its opinion. In order for petitioners to recover, federal law must provide a right of action for damages. The Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. §1491, under which petitioners brought suit, provides a waiver of sovereign immunity and a grant of federal-court jurisdiction, but it does not create any right of action. Nor does any other federal statute expressly create such a right of action. The Court, however, holds that §1342 of the Affordable Care Act does so by implication. Because §1342 says that the United States “shall pay” for the companies’ losses, 42 U. S. C. §18062(b)(1), the Court finds it is proper to infer a private right of action to recover for these losses. … The Court concludes that it is proper for us to recognize a right of action to collect damages from the United States under any statute that “‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation.’” The Court is correct that prior cases have set out this test, but as the Court acknowledges, we have “[r]arely” had to determine whether it was met. And we have certainly never inferred such a right in a case even remotely like these. … There is obvious tension between what the Court now calls the “money-mandating” test, ante, at 26–27, and our recent decisions regarding the recognition of private rights of action. Take the statute at issue in our Comcast decision. That provision, 42 U. S. C. §1981(a), states: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.” Our opinion in Comcast suggested that we might not find this “shall have” language sufficient to justify the recognition of a damages claim if the question came before us today as a matter of first impression. But if that is so, how can we reach a different conclusion with respect to the “shall pay” language in §1342 of the Affordable Care Act? Similarly, the Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures . . . shall not be violated.” (Emphasis added.) Can this rights-mandating language be distinguished from what the Court describes as the “money-mandating” language found in §1342? … I am unwilling to endorse the Court’s holding in these cases without understanding how the “money-mandating” test on which the Court relies fits into our general approach to the recognition of implied rights of action. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-1023_m64o.pdf
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Apr 27, 2020 18:49
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GEORGIA ET AL. v. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC. Holding / Majority Opinion (Roberts): The Copyright Act grants potent, decades-long monopoly protection for “original works of authorship.” The question in this case is whether that protection extends to the annotations contained in Georgia’s official annotated code. We hold that it does not. Over a century ago, we recognized a limitation on copyright protection for certain government work product, rooted in the Copyright Act’s “authorship” requirement. Under what has been dubbed the government edicts doctrine, officials empowered to speak with the force of law cannot be the authors of—and therefore cannot copyright—the works they create in the course of their official duties. We have previously applied that doctrine to hold that non-binding, explanatory legal materials are not copyrightable when created by judges who possess the authority to make and interpret the law. We now recognize that the same logic applies to non-binding, explanatory legal materials created by a legislative body vested with the authority to make law. Because Georgia’s annotations are authored by an arm of the legislature in the course of its legislative duties, the government edicts doctrine puts them outside the reach of copyright protection. The State of Georgia has one official code—the “Official Code of Georgia Annotated,” or OCGA. The first page of each volume of the OCGA boasts the State’s official seal and announces to readers that it is “Published Under Authority of the State.” The OCGA includes the text of every Georgia statute currently in force, as well as various non-binding supplementary materials. At issue in this case is a set of annotations that appear beneath each statutory provision. The annotations generally include summaries of judicial decisions applying a given provision, summaries of any pertinent opinions of the state attorney general, and a list of related law review articles and similar reference materials. In addition, the annotations often include editor’s notes that provide information about the origins of the statutory text, such as whether it derives from a particular judicial decision or resembles an older provision that has been construed by Georgia courts. The OCGA is assembled by a state entity called the Code Revision Commission. In 1977, the Georgia Legislature established the Commission to recodify Georgia law for the first time in decades. The Commission was (and remains) tasked with consolidating disparate bills into a single Code for reenactment by the legislature and contracting with a third party to produce the annotations. A majority of the Commission’s 15 members must be members of the Georgia Senate or House of Representatives. The Commission receives funding through appropriations “provided for the legislative branch of state government.” And it is staffed by the Office of Legislative Counsel, which is obligated by statute to provide services “for the legislative branch of government.” Under the Georgia Constitution, the Commission’s role in compiling the statutory text and accompanying annotations falls “within the sphere of legislative authority.” Each year, the Commission submits its proposed statutory text and accompanying annotations to the legislature for approval. The legislature then votes to do three things: (1) “enact[ ]” the “statutory portion of the codification of Georgia laws”; (2) “merge[ ]” the statutory portion “with [the] annotations”; and (3) “publish[ ]” the final merged product “by authority of the state” as “the ‘Official Code of Georgia Annotated.’” The annotations in the current OCGA were prepared in the first instance by Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., a division of the LexisNexis Group, pursuant to a work-for-hire agreement with the Commission. The agreement between Lexis and the Commission states that any copyright in the OCGA vests exclusively in “the State of Georgia, acting through the Commission.” Lexis and its army of researchers perform the lion’s share of the work in drafting the annotations, but the Commission supervises that work and specifies what the annotations must include in exacting detail. Under the agreement, Lexis enjoys the exclusive right to publish, distribute, and sell the OCGA. In exchange, Lexis has agreed to limit the price it may charge for the OCGA and to make an unannotated version of the statutory text available to the public online for free. A hard copy of the complete OCGA currently retails for $412.00. … We hold that the annotations in Georgia’s Official Code are ineligible for copyright protection, though for reasons distinct from those relied on by the Court of Appeals. A careful examination of our government edicts precedents reveals a straightforward rule based on the identity of the author. Under the government edicts doctrine, judges— and, we now confirm, legislators—may not be considered the “authors” of the works they produce in the course of their official duties as judges and legislators. That rule applies regardless of whether a given material carries the force of law. And it applies to the annotations here because they are authored by an arm of the legislature in the course of its official duties. We begin with precedent. The government edicts doctrine traces back to a trio of cases decided in the 19th century. In this Court’s first copyright case, Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591 (1834), the Court’s third Reporter of Decisions, Wheaton, sued the fourth, Peters, unsuccessfully asserting a copyright interest in the Justices’ opinions. In Wheaton’s view, the opinions “must have belonged to some one” because “they were new, original,” and much more “elaborate” than law or custom required. Wheaton argued that the Justices were the authors and had assigned their ownership interests to him through a tacit “gift.” The Court unanimously rejected that argument, concluding that “no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court” and that “the judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter any such right.” That conclusion apparently seemed too obvious to adorn with further explanation, but the Court provided one a half century later in Banks v. Manchester, 128 U. S. 244 (1888). That case concerned whether Wheaton’s state-court counterpart, the official reporter of the Ohio Supreme Court, held a copyright in the judges’ opinions and several nonbinding explanatory materials prepared by the judges. The Court concluded that he did not, explaining that “the judge who, in his judicial capacity, prepares the opinion or decision, the statement of the case and the syllabus or head note” cannot “be regarded as their author or their proprietor, in the sense of [the Copyright Act].” Pursuant to “a judicial consensus” dating back to Wheaton, judges could not assert copyright in “whatever work they perform in their capacity as judges.” Rather, “[t]he whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all.” In a companion case decided later that Term, Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617 (1888), the Court identified an important limiting principle. As in Wheaton and Banks, the Court rejected the claim that an official reporter held a copyright interest in the judges’ opinions. But, resolving an issue not addressed in Wheaton and Banks, the Court upheld the reporter’s copyright interest in several explanatory materials that the reporter had created himself: headnotes, syllabi, tables of contents, and the like. Although these works mirrored the judge-made materials rejected in Banks, they came from an author who had no authority to speak with the force of law. Because the reporter was not a judge, he was free to “obtain[ ] a copyright” for the materials that were “the result of his [own] intellectual labor.” These cases establish a straightforward rule: Because judges are vested with the authority to make and interpret the law, they cannot be the “author” of the works they prepare “in the discharge of their judicial duties.” This rule applies both to binding works (such as opinions) and to non-binding works (such as headnotes and syllabi). Ibid. It does not apply, however, to works created by government officials (or private parties) who lack the authority to make or interpret the law, such as court reporters. The animating principle behind this rule is that no one can own the law. “Every citizen is presumed to know the law,” and “it needs no argument to show . . . that all should have free access” to its contents. Our cases give effect to that principle in the copyright context through construction of the statutory term “author.” Rather than attempting to catalog the materials that constitute “the law,” the doctrine bars the officials responsible for creating the law from being considered the “author[s]” of “whatever work they perform in their capacity” as lawmakers. Because these officials are generally empowered to make and interpret law, their “whole work” is deemed part of the “authentic exposition and interpretation of the law” and must be “free for publication to all.” If judges, acting as judges, cannot be “authors” because of their authority to make and interpret the law, it follows that legislators, acting as legislators, cannot be either. Courts have thus long understood the government edicts doctrine to apply to legislative materials. Moreover, just as the doctrine applies to “whatever work [judges] perform in their capacity as judges,” it applies to whatever work legislators perform in their capacity as legislators. That of course includes final legislation, but it also includes explanatory and procedural materials legislators create in the discharge of their legislative duties. In the same way that judges cannot be the authors of their headnotes and syllabi, legislators cannot be the authors of (for example) their floor statements, committee reports, and proposed bills. These materials are part of the “whole work done by [legislators],” so they must be “free for publication to all.” Under our precedents, therefore, copyright does not vest in works that are (1) created by judges and legislators (2) in the course of their judicial and legislative duties. Applying that framework, Georgia’s annotations are not copyrightable. The first step is to examine whether their purported author qualifies as a legislator. As we have explained, the annotations were prepared in the first instance by a private company (Lexis) pursuant to a work-for-hire agreement with Georgia’s Code Revision Commission. The Copyright Act therefore deems the Commission the sole “author” of the work. Although Lexis expends considerable effort preparing the annotations, for purposes of copyright that labor redounds to the Commission as the statutory author. Georgia agrees that the author is the Commission. The Commission is not identical to the Georgia Legislature, but functions as an arm of it for the purpose of producing the annotations. The Commission is created by the legislature, for the legislature, and consists largely of legislators. The Commission receives funding and staff designated by law for the legislative branch. Significantly, the annotations the Commission creates are approved by the legislature before being “merged” with the statutory text and published in the official code alongside that text at the legislature’s direction. If there were any doubt about the link between the Commission and the legislature, the Georgia Supreme Court has dispelled it by holding that, under the Georgia Constitution, “the work of the Commission; i.e., selecting a publisher and contracting for and supervising the codification of the laws enacted by the General Assembly, including court interpretations thereof, is within the sphere of legislative authority.” That holding is not limited to the Commission’s role in codifying the statutory text. The Commission’s “legislative authority” specifically includes its “codification of . . . court interpretations” of the State’s laws. Ibid. Thus, as a matter of state law, the Commission wields the legislature’s authority when it works with Lexis to produce the annotations. … The second step is to determine whether the Commission creates the annotations in the “discharge” of its legislative “duties.” Banks, 128 U. S., at 253. It does. Although the annotations are not enacted into law through bicameralism and presentment, the Commission’s preparation of the annotations is under Georgia law an act of “legislative authority,” and the annotations provide commentary and resources that the legislature has deemed relevant to understanding its laws. Georgia resists this conclusion on several grounds. At the outset, Georgia advances two arguments for why, in its view, excluding the OCGA annotations from copyright protection conflicts with the text of the Copyright Act. Both are unavailing. First, Georgia notes that §101 of the Act specifically lists “annotations” among the kinds of works eligible for copyright protection. But that provision refers only to “annotations . . . which . . . represent an original work of authorship.” The whole point of the government edicts doctrine is that judges and legislators cannot serve as authors when they produce works in their official capacity. … Second, Georgia draws a negative inference from the fact that the Act excludes from copyright protection “work[s] prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that person’s official duties” and does not establish a similar rule for the States. §101; see also §105. But the bar on copyright protection for federal works sweeps much more broadly than the government edicts doctrine does. That bar applies to works created by all federal “officer[s] or employee[s],” without regard for the nature of their position or scope of their authority. Whatever policy reasons might justify the Federal Government’s decision to forfeit copyright protection for its own proprietary works, that federal rule does not suggest an intent to displace the much narrower government edicts doctrine with respect to the States. That doctrine does not apply to non-lawmaking officials, leaving States free to assert copyright in the vast majority of expressive works they produce, such as those created by their universities, libraries, tourism offices, and so on. … Instead of examining whether given material carries “the force of law,” we ask only whether the author of the work is a judge or a legislator. If so, then whatever work that judge or legislator produces in the course of his judicial or legislative duties is not copyrightable. That is the framework our precedents long ago established, and we adhere to those precedents today. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. It is so ordered. Lineup: Roberts, joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Dissent by Thomas, joined by Alito, and joined by Breyer (other than Part II-A and footnote 6). Dissent by Ginsburg, joined by Breyer. Dissent (Thomas, joined by Alito and joined by Breyer (other than Part II-A and footnote 6)): According to the majority, this Court’s 19th-century “government edicts” precedents clearly stand for the proposition that “judges and legislators cannot serve as authors [for copyright purposes] when they produce works in their official capacity.” And, after straining to conclude that the Georgia Code Revision Commission (Commission) is an arm of the Georgia Legislature, ante, at 9–10, the majority concludes that Georgia cannot hold a copyright in the annotations that are included as part of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (OCGA). This ruling will likely come as a shock to the 25 other jurisdictions—22 States, 2 Territories, and the District of Columbia—that rely on arrangements similar to Georgia’s to produce annotated codes. Perhaps these jurisdictions all overlooked this Court’s purportedly clear guidance. Or perhaps the widespread use of these arrangements indicates that today’s decision extends the government edicts doctrine to a new context, rather than simply “confirm[ing]” what the precedents have always held. Because I believe we should “leave to Congress the task of deciding whether the Copyright Act needs an upgrade,” I respectfully dissent. … [Breyer does not join this part] These precedents [same ones the majority looked at] establish that judicial opinions cannot be copyrighted. But they do not exclude from copyright protection notes that are prepared by an official court reporter and published together with the reported opinions. There is no apparent reason why the same logic would not apply to statutes and regulations. Thus, it must follow from our precedents that statutes and regulations cannot be copyrighted, but accompanying notes lacking legal force can be. It is fair to say that the Court’s 19th-century decisions do not provide any extended explanation of the basis for the government edicts doctrine. … Although we have not been asked to revisit these precedents, it behooves us to explore the origin of and justification for them, especially when we are asked to apply their rule for the first time in over 130 years. The Court’s precedents suggest three possible grounds supporting their conclusion. In Banks, the Court referred to the meaning of the term “author” in copyright law. While the Court did not develop this argument, it is conceivable that the contemporaneous public meaning of the term “author” was narrower in the copyright context than in ordinary speech. At the time this Court decided Banks, the Copyright Act provided protection for books, maps, prints, engravings, musical and dramatic compositions, photographs, and works of art. Judicial opinions differ markedly from these works….The Court in Banks may have had these differences in mind when it concluded that a judge fell outside the scope of the term “author.” History may also suggest a narrower meaning of “author” in the copyright context. In England, at least as far back as 1666, courts and commentators agreed “that the property of all law books is in the king, because he pays the judges who pronounce the law.” Finally, concerns of fair notice, often recognized by this Court’s precedents as an important component of due process, also may have animated the reasoning of these 19th-century cases. As one court put it, “[t]he decisions and opinions of the justices are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, which are binding upon all the citizens. . . . Every citizen is presumed to know the law thus declared, and it needs no argument to show that justice requires that all should have free access to the opinions.” … [Breyer’s back] Allowing annotations to be copyrighted does not run afoul of any of these possible justifications for the government edicts doctrine. First, unlike judicial opinions and statutes, these annotations do not even purport to embody the will of the people because they are not law. The General Assembly of Georgia has made abundantly clear through a variety of provisions that the annotations do not create any binding obligations. OCGA §1–1–7 states that “[a]ll historical citations, title and chapter analyses, and notes set out in this Code are given for the purpose of convenient reference and do not constitute part of the law.” Section 1–1–1 further provides that “[t]he statutory portion of the codification of Georgia laws . . . is enacted and shall have the effect of statutes enacted by the General Assembly of Georgia. The statutory portion of such codification shall be merged with annotations . . . and other materials . . . and shall be published by authority of the state.” Thus, although the materials “merge” prior to publication in the “official” code, the very provision calling for that merger makes clear that the annotations serve as commentary, not law. As additional evidence that the annotations do not represent the will of the people, the General Assembly does not enact statutory annotations under its legislative power. To enact state law, Georgia employs a process of bicameralism and presentment similar to that embodied in the United States Constitution. The annotations do not go through this process, a fact that even the majority must acknowledge. … The text of the Copyright Act supports my reading of the precedents. Specifically, there are four indications in the text of the Copyright Act that the OCGA annotations are copyrightable. As an initial matter, the Act does not define the word “author,” 17 U. S. C. §101, or make any reference to the government edicts doctrine. Accordingly, the term “author” itself does not shed any light on whether the doctrine covers statutory annotations. Second, while the Act excludes from copyright protection “work[s] prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that person’s official duties,” §101; see also §105, the Act contains no similar prohibition against works of state governments or works prepared at their behest. Third, the Act specifically notes that annotations are copyrightable derivative works. §101. Here, again, the Act does not expressly exclude from copyright protection annotations created either by the State or at the State’s request. Fourth, the Act provides that an author may hold a copyright in “material contributed” in a derivative work, “as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work.”. These aspects of the statutory text, taken together, further support the conclusion that the OCGA annotations are copyrightable … We have “stressed . . . that it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives,” because “it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors,” Because the majority has strayed from its proper role, I respectfully dissent. Dissent (Ginsburg, joined by Breyer): Beyond doubt, state laws are not copyrightable. Nor are other materials created by state legislators in the course of performing their lawmaking responsibilities, e.g., legislative committee reports, floor statements, unenacted bills. Not all that legislators do, however, is ineligible for copyright protection; the government edicts doctrine shields only “works that are (1) created by judges and legislators (2) in the course of their judicial and legislative duties.” The core question this case presents, as I see it: Are the annotations in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (OCGA) done in a legislative capacity? The answer, I am persuaded, should be no. To explain why, I proceed from common ground. All agree that headnotes and syllabi for judicial opinions—both a kind of annotation—are copyrightable when created by a reporter of decisions, but are not copyrightable when created by judges, That is so because “[t]he whole work done by . . . judges.,” including dissenting and concurring opinions, ranks as work performed in their judicial capacity. Judges do not outsource their writings to “arm[s]” or “adjunct[s],” to be composed in their stead. Accordingly, the judicial opinion-drafting process in its entirety—including the drafting of headnotes and syllabi, in jurisdictions where that is done by judges—falls outside the reach of copyright protection. One might ask: If a judge’s annotations are not copyrightable, why are those created by legislators? The answer lies in the difference between the role of a judge and the role of a legislator. “[T]o the judiciary” we assign “the duty of interpreting and applying” the law, and sometimes making the applicable law. In contrast, the role of the legislature encompasses the process of “making laws”—not construing statutes after their enactment. The OCGA annotations, in my appraisal, do not rank as part of the Georgia Legislature’s lawmaking process for three reasons. First, the annotations are not created contemporaneously with the statutes to which they pertain; instead, the annotations comment on statutes already enacted. … Second, the OCGA annotations are descriptive rather than prescriptive. Instead of stating the legislature’s perception of what a law conveys, the annotations summarize writings in which others express their views on a given statute. … Third, and of prime importance, the OCGA annotations are “given for the purpose of convenient reference” by the public, they aim to inform the citizenry at large, they do not address, particularly, those seated in legislative chambers. … Because summarizing judicial decisions and commentary bearing on enacted statutes, in contrast to, for example, drafting a committee report to accompany proposed legislation, is not done in a legislator’s law-shaping capacity, I would hold the OCGA annotations copyrightable and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-1150_7m58.pdf
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Apr 27, 2020 18:49
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Glad to see my state eating poo poo in that copyright case.
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Apr 27, 2020 19:39
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skull mask mcgee posted:Glad to see my state eating poo poo in that copyright case. Also, Alito is still a terrible human being
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Apr 27, 2020 19:46
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Slaan posted:Also, Alito is still a terrible human being And Ginsberg, while great on many things, remains awful on copyright.
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Apr 27, 2020 19:51
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what the gently caress Breyer
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Apr 27, 2020 20:05
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Part of me gets a kick reading an opinion when after two lines I go, "Gorsuch. Definitely Gorsuch". He's just so.... chatty.
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Apr 27, 2020 20:36
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VitalSigns posted:what the gently caress Breyer The conservative/liberal divide doesn't really apply as much to copyright and patents.
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Apr 27, 2020 20:41
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hobbesmaster posted:The conservative/liberal divide doesn't really apply as much to copyright and patents. Honestly it doesn't apply at all. The only ways you see it come in are when you have non-patent or non-copyright commitments that influence a viewpoint—Gorsuch's "private property uber alles" in some patent cases, or the liberals on admin law issues in cases relating to PTO or Copyright Office authorities (because they're trying to preserve the administrative state).
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Apr 27, 2020 21:20
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I do appreciate the “bipartisan” undercurrent of “what the gently caress are you doing” they direct at the federal circuit with every patent decision.
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Apr 27, 2020 21:51
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I enjoy Bryer signing onto two separate dissents but not writing his own copyright law blows
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Apr 27, 2020 21:57
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So is there a way that the conservatives could twist the Georgia decision to harm the administrative or legislative power of the government? I've been rolling it around but I can't think of anything.
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Apr 27, 2020 22:04
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Rust Martialis posted:Part of me gets a kick reading an opinion when after two lines I go, "Gorsuch. Definitely Gorsuch". He's just so.... chatty. In high school, I remember they pounded the five-paragraph persuasive essay format into our heads, and they were very insistent that every paper had to start out with an exciting "hook" to grab people's attention before following the thesis's outline point-by-point. Gorsuch's writing reminds me of that desperation to hype up the premise (even if the format is different). Everyone else just does their analysis, and maybe throws some shade in the process, but they don't feel any need to convince the reader in every single opinion that this here! This is an important decision!
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Apr 27, 2020 22:11
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Did I miss where Gorsuch actually wrote any of these opinions, or are you all just falling over yourselves to dunk on the dude anyway?
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Apr 27, 2020 22:57
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rjmccall posted:Did I miss where Gorsuch actually wrote any of these opinions, or are you all just falling over yourselves to dunk on the dude anyway? He wrote two opinions on April 20
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Apr 27, 2020 23:20
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Rewinding for a moment to pick up on something I saw a week ago, from the decision about unanimous juries...Fuschia tude posted:I saw the majority opinion hinged on the common law precedent. Does the fact that Louisiana runs on the civil code instead have any bearing? Do appellate courts and the Supreme Court ever notice or care about the difference? What absolutely fascinates me about this, as an English observer, is what a wonderful example it is of American courts being happy to take and glorify English precedent from beyond living memory, in this case a good long way beyond... quote:The requirement of juror unanimity emerged in 14th century England and was soon accepted as a vital right protected by the common law. ...but apparently they're under no obligation to look at how English law has evolved into the modern day. Since the Juries Act 1974, the judge is allowed (at their discretion) to accept a 10-2 majority verdict in any jury trial, and this is not even slightly controversial.
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Apr 27, 2020 23:38
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The thing is that that is stupid and unanimous juries are a good idea
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Apr 28, 2020 00:07
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Trin Tragula posted:Rewinding for a moment to pick up on something I saw a week ago, from the decision about unanimous juries... Technically the US has all English law before independence 1776 (or maybe 1783?) as a baseline forming “common law” so whatever England did in 1974 is irrelevant.
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Apr 28, 2020 00:16
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Yeah, we look at old English law because it’s considered to be the base of our legal tradition and the background against which our own laws were drafted, not because we’re just so damned impressed by your ancient island wisdom about who gets the lamb if both farmers hosed the ewe and why the Irish aren’t really fully human.
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Apr 28, 2020 00:37
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Has anyone got any resources for studies on the impact of majority verdicts on minority defendants? I'm struggling with Google and I'd love to know if there's anything solid to support whether it had the effect the people passing the laws thought it would.
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Apr 28, 2020 01:13
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rjmccall posted:Yeah, we look at old English law because it’s considered to be the base of our legal tradition and the background against which our own laws were drafted, not because we’re just so damned impressed by your ancient island wisdom about who gets the lamb if both farmers hosed the ewe and why the Irish aren’t really fully human. It’s a little more than that - most Revolutionary states explicitly adopted the English common law as of a particular date as their own, and many post-Revolutionary states adopted it indirectly as “the common law”. And of course certain aspects of constitutional law refer either explicitly to the common law (eg the 7th Amendment in the Bill of Rights) or implicitly via the use of terms of art.
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Apr 28, 2020 01:42
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Trin Tragula posted:Has anyone got any resources for studies on the impact of majority verdicts on minority defendants? I'm struggling with Google and I'd love to know if there's anything solid to support whether it had the effect the people passing the laws thought it would. I’d start with the NAACP’s amicus brief in the case - https://www.supremecourt.gov/Docket...onal%20Fund.pdf - and the sources cited within it.
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Apr 28, 2020 01:46
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Evil Fluffy posted:If no justices signed on to the majority that sounds like as good an excuse as any for someone to say gently caress it and declare they don't recognize the ruling as legitimate if no justice is willing to tied their name to it. Suddenly a t14 grad turned federal clerk turned big law partner just got very angry His name? Evilweasel.
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Apr 28, 2020 03:26
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rjmccall posted:Yeah, we look at old English law because it’s considered to be the base of our legal tradition and the background against which our own laws were drafted, not because we’re just so damned impressed by your ancient island wisdom about who gets the lamb if both farmers hosed the ewe and why the Irish aren’t really fully human. Weird of you to frame it this way seeing as we kept all of the goat-loving nonsensical portions and steadfastly refuse to revisit them because hell, we've been loving them this way since the 14th century so why stop now?
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Apr 28, 2020 03:32
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mdemone posted:I just realized I'm still elated over Scalia's death. Opinions used to be so much more infuriating with him around. I remember thinking "TODAY IS THE DAY" on Scalia's death: a permanent liberal majority for the court in my lifetime. Oh man. What a different naive time that was.
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Apr 28, 2020 06:01
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Javid posted:The thing is that that is stupid and unanimous juries are a good idea I've been reading Wikipedia for a bit on this and Scotland merely requires a majority verdict for criminal cases, seemingly one of the loosest requirements of the countries listed that use jury trials.
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May 6, 2020 14:46
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Thread title true again
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May 6, 2020 16:44
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https://twitter.com/DavidLat/status/1258074898003623937 https://twitter.com/cspanJeremy/status/1258076164234579969
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May 6, 2020 17:52
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jeeves posted:Thread title true again gently caress gently caress gently caress gently caress gently caress Please hold on a few more months, sassy law lady. Please. Then you can quit, relax, and live until you're 150. Just don't give me any more panic attacks.
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May 6, 2020 18:25
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Trump will 100% pick someone worse for the court than Biden will. Biden will 100% not pick someone to properly replace RBG when she leaves.
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May 6, 2020 18:35
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Mikl posted:gently caress gently caress gently caress gently caress gently caress It's not exactly a slam dunk that Biden wins in November, but even if he does and the dems manage to retake the senate, Chuck S. is on record that he thinks bringing back the judicial filibuster is a good idea. Maybe he's smart enough to replace RBG before restoring it I guess, but LOL if McConnell forces Biden to pick from the Federalist list and Biden being the savvy negotiator that he is goes along with it.
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May 6, 2020 18:45
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Oh this guy is center right and 30 years old. Sounds like a good compromise to me  *Is surprised that 6-3 majority strikes down voting laws that don't require the white land owning electorate the founders wanted*
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May 6, 2020 19:25
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xrunner posted:It's not exactly a slam dunk that Biden wins in November, but even if he does and the dems manage to retake the senate, Chuck S. is on record that he thinks bringing back the judicial filibuster is a good idea.
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May 6, 2020 21:36
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TheOneAndOnlyT posted:This gets brought up a lot but it's misleading. Schumer said this in October 2018, notably before the midterms. Bringing back the judicial filibuster for any future Trump appointments probably would have been a good idea. If you assume Chuck Schumer is a particularly tactful Lamar Alexander in a Schumer Skin Suit and bent on sabotaging other centrists then his intent can be clearly inferred 
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May 6, 2020 21:51
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RBG should have retired over a decade ago and no later than 6 years ago. Complete mishandling of the situation. Next democrat to win should demand the resignation of every justice they can pressure to resign and replace them with 25 year old leftist law school graduates.
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May 6, 2020 23:14
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Hurt Whitey Maybe posted:RBG should have retired over a decade ago and no later than 6 years ago. Complete mishandling of the situation. Next democrat to win should demand the resignation of every justice they can pressure to resign and replace them with 25 year old leftist law school graduates. Flashback to 2014: quote:On Tuesday, we learned more about what Ginsburg herself thinks, from an interview she did with Elle's Jessica Weisberg. Here's the key exchange: https://www.vox.com/2014/9/24/6836091/ruth-bader-ginsburg-not-retiring
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May 6, 2020 23:21
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wielder posted:Flashback to 2014:
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May 7, 2020 05:05
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The assumption was that eliminating the Supreme Court filibuster wouldn't happen because the Senate must really like the smell of its own farts if it's keeping this dumb unnecessary 60 vote threshold around in the first place, and it would be an outrageously flagrant power grab to get rid of it. In retrospect, the 2010 gerrymandering spree probably should have been a clue-in that the Republicans were totally cool with outrageously flagrant power grabs and weren't going to respect it themselves if they got the opportunity. The Senate's red state tilt is also responsible for Democrats being reluctant to do anything particularly aggressive with Senate control because they're worried losing red state Senate seats.
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May 7, 2020 07:25
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https://apnews.com/d99cfadbffbf8ca4abed94ac62b8ad11?utm_campaign=SocialFlow&utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=APAP posted:“For no reason other than political payback, Baroni and Kelly used deception to reduce Fort Lee’s access lanes to the George Washington Bridge — and thereby jeopardized the safety of the town’s residents. But not every corrupt act by state or local officials is a federal crime. Because the scheme here did not aim to obtain money or property, Baroni and Kelly could not have violated the federal-program fraud or wire fraud laws,” Justice Elena Kagan wrote for the court. so many perks and services that have become legal corruption because of this ruling galenanorth fucked around with this message at 17:10 on May 7, 2020 |
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May 7, 2020 17:06
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