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I'm not a lawgoon but doesn't texas have like no standing to even bring this case?
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Dec 10, 2020 17:51
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Charlz Guybon posted:You vastly underestimate the pettiness of Americans in particular and people in general. I've autoblocked all calls from numbers not in my contact list for a long time now, it's really nice.
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Dec 10, 2020 17:55
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cr0y posted:I'm not a lawgoon but doesn't texas have like no standing to even bring this case? I'm a lawyer (but I don't deal with constitutional law in my work so take whatever I say as only slightly better than IANAL) and that would be my take as well.
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Dec 10, 2020 17:55
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haveblue posted:Specifically, the problem with it is that it bans devices that "store or produce" phone numbers using a "random or sequential number generator", neither of which have applied to the state of the art in automated calling for years. yea and the rule making that developed the "capacity" theory to make predictive dialers qualify as an ATDS also made your cell phone an ATDS. whoops! also your tablets, your computer, your google/apple/amazon smart speakers, etc
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Dec 10, 2020 17:56
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Nitrousoxide posted:I'm a lawyer (but I don't deal with constitutional law in my work so take whatever I say as only slightly better than IANAL) and that would be my take as well. For what it's worth, same here. I can't think of any conceivable basis for a claim that another state's vote result created an actual harm to you.
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Dec 10, 2020 17:58
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Cabbages and Kings posted:Obviously I'd rather have this denied cert, than have 4 days of mild anxiety about it, but I do still have a box of Restas... This petition wasn't appealed from anywhere so would it have been possible to deny cert?
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Dec 10, 2020 17:58
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cr0y posted:I'm not a lawgoon but doesn't texas have like no standing to even bring this case?
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Dec 10, 2020 18:01
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Sarcastro posted:For what it's worth, same here. I can't think of any conceivable basis for a claim that another state's vote result created an actual harm to you. The damage is that Biden is president and he wants to attack and dethrone God! That's probably the argument
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Dec 10, 2020 18:18
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All signers to the suit are subsequently tried for treason (I didn't read the complaint)
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Dec 10, 2020 18:28
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cr0y posted:The damage is that Biden is president and he wants to attack and dethrone God! As a non-lawyer, it seems kind of similar to Alan Dershowitz's argument during Trump's impeachment that it was good for the country for Trump to be reelected and therefore sabotaging Biden counted as part of his presidential duties to do what was good for the country.
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Dec 10, 2020 18:37
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saintonan posted:This petition wasn't appealed from anywhere so would it have been possible to deny cert?
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Dec 10, 2020 18:41
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cr0y posted:The damage is that Biden is president and he wants to attack and dethrone God! 
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Dec 10, 2020 18:42
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cr0y posted:I'm not a lawgoon but doesn't texas have like no standing to even bring this case? Standing, more than anything else, is a tool for the court to dispose of cases they do not want to rule on the merits. If the court wishes to find standing, they can. If they wish to reject the case without ruling on the merits, they can find a way to deny standing.
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Dec 10, 2020 19:45
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Nonexistence posted:All signers to the suit are subsequently tried for treason (I didn't read the complaint) Possibly hyperbolic (though uh, I'm open to it), but they should arguably get disbarred and should absolutely get sanctioned for such a frivolous filing.
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Dec 10, 2020 20:16
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Nitrousoxide posted:No idea, but I would say the longer we go the more likely they are to to take the case. If that happened I'd put money on one or more of the states rejecting the SCOTUS's ruling and possibly their legitimacy as a judicial body. torgeaux posted:Good because it let a non-Christian religion assert RFRA. Bad because RFRA is terrible and should be limited at every opportunity. Also bad because they know that by ruling in favor of a non-Christian religion this way it's opening the doors for a new wave of theocratic rulings in favor of white wing extremists. Nitrousoxide posted:I'm a lawyer (but I don't deal with constitutional law in my work so take whatever I say as only slightly better than IANAL) and that would be my take as well. In a remotely just world anyone who signed on to it would be disbarred as well.
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Dec 10, 2020 20:47
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Nitrousoxide posted:No idea, but I would say the longer we go the more likely they are to to take the case. Biden would say something about how the court has spoken, its constitutional legitimacy cannot be questioned, this is why you need to vote harder next time to give the Democrats a victory so big Republicans can't reasonably challenge it in good faith.
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Dec 10, 2020 23:59
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I don't think the supreme court suddenly taking an unprecedented drastic step a weekend before the electors vote would be something people would just be okay with, especially since this case is legal nonsense that the court already rejected 9-0.
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Dec 11, 2020 01:36
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I won't happen, but it would be really cool if the SCOTUS issued a 9-0 opinion that just said "shame on you all for bringing this poo poo to our doorstep. We're not reading 500 pages of nonsense that's already been adjudicated."
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Dec 11, 2020 01:51
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What's most likely going to happen is they'll deny the petition in one line.
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Dec 11, 2020 01:51
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Since we didn't hear anything today on Texas v Pennsylvania et al, we're probably not going to hear anything until Monday, right? As in, the day the electors meet?
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Dec 11, 2020 02:22
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I would imagine they would issue their opinion on whether there are going to take the case before then.
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Dec 11, 2020 02:25
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 Opinions! These are all the early unanimous chaff-clearing. If I get *real* bored I'll note the 3 earlier per curiams, but don't get your hopes up.TANZIN ET AL. v. TANVIR ET AL. TLDR: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) allows claims for money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities where religious exercise has been unlawfully burdened. In this case, plaintiffs are all Muslims who claim the FBI put them on the No Fly List when they refused to become FBI informants; their claims for money damages can go forward. Majority Opinion (Thomas): The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) prohibits the Federal Government from imposing substantial burdens on religious exercise, absent a compelling interest pursued through the least restrictive means. It also gives a person whose religious exercise has been unlawfully burdened the right to seek “appropriate relief.” The question here is whether “appropriate relief” includes claims for money damages against Government officials in their individual capacities. We hold that it does….RFRA secures Congress’ view of the right to free exercise under the First Amendment, and it provides a remedy to redress violations of that right. Respondents Muhammad Tanvir, Jameel Algibhah, and Naveed Shinwari are practicing Muslims who claim that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents placed them on the No Fly List in retaliation for their refusal to act as informants against their religious communities. Respondents sued various agents in their official capacities, seeking removal from the No Fly List. They also sued the agents in their individual capacities for money damages. According to respondents, the retaliation cost them substantial sums of money: airline tickets wasted and income from job opportunities lost. More than a year after respondents sued, the Department of Homeland Security informed them that they could now fly, thus mooting the claims for injunctive relief. The District Court then dismissed the individual-capacity claims for money damages, ruling that RFRA does not permit monetary relief. The Second Circuit reversed. It determined that RFRA’s express remedies provision, combined with the statutory definition of “Government,” authorizes claims against federal officials in their individual capacities. Relying on our precedent and RFRA’s broad protections for religious liberty, the court concluded that the open-ended phrase “appropriate relief” encompasses money damages against officials. We granted certiorari, 589 U. S. ___ (2019), and now affirm. As usual, we start with the statutory text. A person whose exercise of religion has been unlawfully burdened may “obtain appropriate relief against a government.” We first have to determine if injured parties can sue Government officials in their personal capacities. RFRA’s text provides a clear answer: They can. Persons may sue and obtain relief “against a government,” §2000bb–1(c), which is defined to include “a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States.” §2000bb–2(1). The Government urges us to limit lawsuits against officials to suits against them in their official, not personal, capacities. A lawsuit seeking damages from employees in their individual capacities, the Government argues, is not really “against a government” because relief “can be executed only against the official’s personal assets.” The problem with this otherwise plausible argument is that Congress supplanted the ordinary meaning of “government” with a different, express definition. “‘When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition,’ even if it varies from a term’s ordinary meaning.” … The question then becomes what “appropriate relief” entails. Without a statutory definition, we turn to the phrase’s plain meaning at the time of enactment. S“Appropriate” means “[s]pecially fitted or suitable, proper.” 1 Oxford English Dictionary, at 586; see also Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 57 (10th ed. 1996) (“especially suitable or compatible”). Because this language is “open-ended” on its face, what relief is “‘appropriate’” is “inherently context dependent.” In the context of suits against Government officials, damages have long been awarded as appropriate relief...Though more limited, damages against federal officials remain an appropriate form of relief today. ... We conclude that RFRA’s express remedies provision permits litigants, when appropriate, to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is affirmed. Lineup: Unanimous except Barrett did not participate (argued before she was confirmed). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-71_qol1.pdf JOHN C. CARNEY, GOVERNOR OF DELAWARE, PETITIONER v. JAMES R. ADAMS TLDR: The plaintiff, a Delaware lawyer, brought this lawsuit in federal court. He claimed that Delaware’s party-membership requirements for its judiciary violate the Federal Constitution. We agreed to consider the constitutional question, but only if the plaintiff has standing to raise that question. We now hold that he does not. Majority Opinion (Breyer) The Delaware Constitution contains a political balance requirement applicable to membership on all five of its courts: the Supreme Court, the Chancery Court, the Superior Court, the Family Court, and the Court of Common Pleas. The provision says that no more than a bare majority of judges on any of these courts “shall be of the same political party.”(We shall call this requirement the “bare majority” requirement.) The Delaware Constitution also contains a second requirement applicable only to the Supreme Court, the Chancery Court, and the Superior Court. It says that the remaining members of those three courts (those not in the bare majority) “shall be of the other major political party.” (We shall call this the “major party” requirement.) Thus, all five courts are subject to the “bare majority” requirement, and three of the five courts are additionally subject to the “major party” requirement. On February 21, 2017, plaintiff-respondent James R. Adams sued Delaware’s Governor, John Carney, in Federal District Court. Adams, then a newly registered political independent, claimed that both of Delaware’s political balance requirements violated his First Amendment right to freedom of association by making him ineligible to become a judge unless he rejoined a major political party. Governor Carney moved to dismiss for lack of standing, and Adams filed an amended complaint in an attempt to rectify the problem. After discovery largely centered on Adams’ history and intentions in seeking a judgeship, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. Governor Carney argued (1) that Adams lacked standing to assert his constitutional claim, and (2) that, in any event, the requirements were constitutional. Adams argued only that he was entitled to summary judgment on the merits because the political balance requirements made independents like him ineligible for a judgeship. The District Court denied Governor Carney’s summary judgment motion. [Then Carney lost in the district court and the court of appeals, on slightly different grounds.] Governor Carney then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari...We granted his petition but asked that the parties first address the question whether Adams has demonstrated Article III standing to bring this lawsuit. … This case begins and ends with standing. The Constitution grants Article III courts the power to decide “Cases” or “Controversies.” We have long understood that constitutional phrase to require that a case embody a genuine, live dispute between adverse parties, thereby preventing the federal courts from issuing advisory opinions. The doctrine of standing implements this requirement by insisting that a litigant “prove that he has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Two aspects of standing doctrine are relevant here. First, standing requires an “‘injury in fact’” that must be “concrete and particularized,” as well as “‘actual or imminent.’” It cannot be “‘“conjectural or hypothetical.”’” Second, a grievance that amounts to nothing more than an abstract and generalized harm to a citizen’s interest in the proper application of the law does not count as an “injury in fact.” And it consequently does not show standing. … We here must ask whether Adams established that, at the time he filed suit, Delaware’s major party provision caused him a concrete, particularized “injury in fact” over and above the abstract generalized grievance suffered by all citizens of Delaware who (if Adams is right) must live in a State subject to an unconstitutional judicial selection criterion. … Adams suffered a “generalized grievance” of the kind we have just described. He, like all citizens of Delaware, must live and work within a State that (in his view) imposes unconstitutional requirements for eligibility on three of its courts...But that kind of interest does not create standing. Rather, the question is whether Adams will suffer a “‘personal and individual’” injury beyond this generalized grievance—an injury that is concrete, particularized, and imminent rather than “conjectural or hypothetical.” Adams says he has. He claims that Delaware’s major party requirement in fact prevents him, a political independent, from having his judicial application considered for three of Delaware’s courts. To prove this kind of harm, however, Adams must at least show that he is likely to apply to become a judge in the reasonably foreseeable future if Delaware did not bar him because of political affiliation. And our cases make clear that he can show this only if he is “‘able and ready’” to apply. We have examined the summary judgment record to determine whether Adams made this showing. And, as we have said, we conclude that he has not. … the record showed that, between 2012 and 2016, during which time Adams was a practicing lawyer and a registered Democrat, Delaware’s five courts had a combined total of 14 openings for which Adams, then a Democrat, would have been eligible. Yet he did not apply for any of them. [more evidence summary follows] ... our holding follows from a straightforward application of precedent to the particular summary judgment record before us. And, as we have explained, in the context set forth by the evidence, Adams has not shown that he was “able and ready” to apply in the imminent future. Consequently, he has failed to show that “personal,” “concrete,” and “imminent” injury upon which our standing precedents insist. For these reasons, we reverse the Third Circuit’s decision in respect to standing, vacate the judgment, and remand with instructions to dismiss the case. Lineup: Unanimous except Barrett did not participate (argued before she was confirmed). Concurrence by Sotomayor. Concurrence (Sotomayor): I agree that respondent Adams did not demonstrate Article III standing to bring this suit. Because the constitutional questions in this case will likely be raised again, I write separately to highlight two important considerations that may inform their answers. First, there are potentially material differences between two separate rules the Delaware Constitution imposes on its courts: the “major party” requirement and the “bare majority” requirement. Bare majority requirements preclude any single political party from having more than a bare majority of the seats in a public body. Such requirements have existed in various forums for roughly 150 years, currently feature in a large number of public bodies, and have been shown to help achieve ideological diversity. Major party requirements like Delaware’s, by contrast, preclude anyone who is not a member of the two major political parties from serving in a public body. They are far rarer than their bare majority cousins, and they arguably impose a greater burden on First Amendment associational rights. These differences may require distinct constitutional analyses. Second, that possibility, in turn, raises the question whether Delaware’s major party and bare majority requirements are severable from one another, such that one requirement could remain even if the other were constitutionally unenforceable. It is worth noting that federal courts are not ideally positioned to address such a sensitive issue of state constitutional law. They may therefore be well advised to consider certifying such a question to the State’s highest court. Certification may be especially warranted in a case such as this, where invalidating a state constitutional provision would affect the structure of one of the State’s three major branches of government. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-309_4f15.pdf UNITED STATES v. BRIGGS TLDR: If the Uniform Code of Military Justice says a crime is punishable by death, that crime has no statute of limitations - like all other capital crimes under the UCMJ - whether or not that crime was actually constitutionally punishable by death at the time a person committed it. Majority Opinion (Alito): During the period at issue, Article 120(a) of the UCMJ provided that rape could be “punished by death,” and Article 43(a), which was amended in 1986, provided that an offense “punishable by death” could be tried and punished “at any time without limitation,” The crux of the question before us is the meaning of the phrase “punishable by death” in the latter provision. Respondents contend—and the CAAF held—that the phrase means capable of punishment by death when all applicable law is taken into account. Because this Court held in Coker v. Georgia, that the Eighth Amendment forbids a death sentence for the rape of an adult woman, respondents argue that they could not, in fact, have been sentenced to death, and therefore the statute of limitations for their crimes (committed in 1998, 2000, and 2005) was the 5-year statute that generally governed non-capital offenses. By contrast, the Government argues that Article 43(a)’s reference to “punishable by death” means capable of punishment by death under the penalty provisions of the UCMJ, and since Article 120(a) provided (despite Coker) that rape could be punished by death, it follows that there was no time limit for filing rape charges against respondents. The interpretation advocated by respondents and adopted by the CAAF finds support at first blush in contemporaneous dictionary definitions of the term “punishable.” But upon inspection, definitions shed little light on the dispute because they largely re-raise the question over which the parties divide: capable of being punished under what law? In essence, the Government sees the term “punishable” in Article 43(a) as something of a term of art that is defined by the specification of the punishments set out in the penalty provisions of the UCMJ. On balance, we find the Government’s interpretation more persuasive. The meaning of a statement often turns on the context in which it is made, and that is no less true of statutory language. And in these cases, context is determinative. The phrase “punishable by death” appears in a statute of limitations provision for prosecutions under the UCMJ, and for at least three reasons, that context weighs heavily in favor of the Government’s interpretation. First, a natural referent for a statute of limitations provision within the UCMJ is other law in the UCMJ itself. The UCMJ is, after all, a “uniform code,” one that reformed and modernized the old system of military justice “from top to bottom.” No one would read Article 43’s references to “offense[s]” to include those under state law, for example. … Second, one principal benefit of statutes of limitations is that typically they provide clarity, and it is therefore reasonable to presume that clarity is an objective for which lawmakers strive when enacting such provisions....If “punishable by death” in Article 43(a) means punishable by death under the penalty provisions of the UCMJ, the rule regarding the latest possible date for commencing a rape prosecution is clear: The prosecution may be brought “at any time without limitation.” By contrast, if “punishable by death” meant punishable by death after all applicable law is taken into account, the deadline for filing rape charges would be unclear. The deadline would depend on the answer to an unresolved constitutional question about which the parties in these cases vigorously disagree. … Third, the factors that lawmakers are likely to take into account when fixing the statute of limitations for a crime differ significantly from the considerations that underlie our Eighth Amendment decisions. We therefore should not lightly assume that Congress tied the meaning of the statutes of limitations in Article 43 to the Eighth Amendment. … Viewing Article 43(a) in context, we are convinced that “punishable by death” is a term of art that is defined by the provisions of the UCMJ specifying the punishments for the offenses it outlaws. And under this interpretation, respondents’ prosecutions were timely. The judgments of the CAAF are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Viewing Article 43(a) in context, we are convinced that “punishable by death” is a term of art that is defined by the provisions of the UCMJ specifying the punishments for the offenses it outlaws. And under this interpretation, respondents’ prosecutions were timely. The judgments of the CAAF are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Lineup: Unanimous except Barrett did not participate (argued before she was confirmed). Concurrence by Gorsuch. Concurrence (Gorsuch): I continue to think this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from the CAAF. But a majority of the Court believes we have jurisdiction, and I agree with the Court’s decision on the merits. I therefore join the Court’s opinion. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-108_8njq.pdf RUTLEDGE, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARKANSAS v. PHARMACEUTICAL CARE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION TLDR: Arkansas’ Act 900 regulates the price at which pharmacy benefit managers reimburse pharmacies for the cost of drugs covered by prescription-drug plans. The question presented in this case is whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §1001 et seq., pre-empts Act 900. The Court holds that the Act has neither an impermissible connection with nor reference to ERISA and is therefore not preempted. I know you fell asleep reading just the summary. Holding / Majority Opinion (Sotomayor): Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) are a little-known but important part of the process by which many Americans get their prescription drugs. Generally speaking, PBMs serve as intermediaries between prescription-drug plans and the pharmacies that beneficiaries use. … The amount a PBM “reimburses” a pharmacy for a drug is not necessarily tied to how much the pharmacy paid to purchase that drug from a wholesaler. Instead, PBMs’ contracts with pharmacies typically set reimbursement rates according to a list specifying the maximum allowable cost (MAC) for each drug. PBMs normally develop and administer their own unique MAC lists. … In 2015, Arkansas adopted Act 900 in response to concerns that the reimbursement rates set by PBMs were often too low to cover pharmacies’ costs, and that many pharmacies, particularly rural and independent ones, were at risk of losing money and closing. In effect, Act 900 requires PBMs to reimburse Arkansas pharmacies at a price equal to or higher than that which the pharmacy paid to buy the drug from a wholesaler. … Respondent Pharmaceutical Care Management Association (PCMA) is a national trade association representing the 11 largest PBMs in the country. After the enactment of Act 900, PCMA filed suit in the Eastern District of Arkansas, alleging, as relevant here, that Act 900 is preempted by ERISA. See 29 U. S. C. §1144(a) (ERISA preempts “any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan”) … To determine whether a state law has an “impermissible connection” with an ERISA plan, this Court considers ERISA’s objectives “as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive.” ERISA was enacted “to make the benefits promised by an employer more secure by mandating certain oversight systems and other standard procedures.” In pursuit of that goal, Congress sought “to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law,” thereby “minimiz[ing] the administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives” and ensuring that plans do not have to tailor substantive benefits to the particularities of multiple jurisdictions. ERISA is therefore primarily concerned with preempting laws that require providers to structure benefit plans in particular ways, such as by requiring payment of specific benefits, or by binding plan administrators to specific rules for determining beneficiary status. A state law may also be subject to pre-emption if “acute, albeit indirect, economic effects of the state law force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage.” As a shorthand for these considerations, this Court asks whether a state law “governs a central matter of plan administration or interferes with nationally uniform plan administration.” If it does, it is preempted. Crucially, not every state law that affects an ERISA plan or causes some disuniformity in plan administration has an impermissible connection with an ERISA plan. That is especially so if a law merely affects costs. … Act 900 is merely a form of cost regulation. It requires PBMs to reimburse pharmacies for prescription drugs at a rate equal to or higher than the pharmacy’s acquisition cost. PBMs may well pass those increased costs on to plans, meaning that ERISA plans may pay more for prescription-drug benefits in Arkansas than in, say, Arizona. But “cost uniformity was almost certainly not an object of pre-emption.” Nor is the effect of Act 900 so acute that it will effectively dictate plan choices. Indeed, Act 900 is less intrusive than the law at issue in Travelers, which created a compelling incentive for plans to buy insurance from the Blues instead of other insurers. Act 900, by contrast, applies equally to all PBMs and pharmacies in Arkansas. As a result, Act 900 does not have an impermissible connection with an ERISA plan. … Act 900 also does not “refer to” ERISA. A law refers to ERISA if it “‘acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans or where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation.’” Act 900 does not act immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans because it applies to PBMs whether or not they manage an ERISA plan. Indeed, the Act does not directly regulate health benefit plans at all, ERISA or otherwise. It affects plans only insofar as PBMs may pass along higher pharmacy rates to plans with which they contract. ERISA plans are likewise not essential to Act 900’s operation. Act 900 defines a PBM as any “entity that administers or manages a pharmacy benefits plan or program,” and it defines a “pharmacy benefits plan or program,” in turn, as any “plan or program that pays for, reimburses, covers the cost of, or otherwise provides for pharmacist services to individuals who reside in or are employed in [Arkansas].” Under those provisions, Act 900 regulates PBMs whether or not the plans they service fall within ERISA’s coverage. In sum, Act 900 amounts to cost regulation that does not bear an impermissible connection with or reference to ERISA. The judgment of the Eighth Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Lineup: Unanimous except Barrett did not participate (argued before she was confirmed). Concurrence by Thomas. Concurrence (Thomas): I join the Court’s opinion in full because it properly applies our precedents interpreting the pre-emptive effect of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U. S. C. §1144. I write separately because I continue to doubt our ERISA preemption jurisprudence.The plain text of ERISA suggests a two-part pre-emption test: (1) do any ERISA provisions govern the same matter as the state law at issue, and (2) does that state law have a meaningful relationship to ERISA plans? Only if the answers to both are in the affirmative does ERISA displace state law. But our precedents have veered from the text, transforming §1144 into a “vague and ‘potentially boundless’. . . ‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption” clause that relies on “generalized notions of congressional purposes.” Although that approach may allow courts to arrive at the correct result in individual cases, it offers little guidance or predictability. We should instead apply the law as written. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/18-540_m64o.pdf
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Dec 11, 2020 03:15
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Is "Although that approach may allow courts to arrive at the correct result in individual cases," as a wacky a clause as it sounds?
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Dec 11, 2020 04:02
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Seems straightforward to me but I can see why it’s seem weird if you don’t read case law all day
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Dec 11, 2020 04:45
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raminasi posted:Is "Although that approach may allow courts to arrive at the correct result in individual cases," as a wacky a clause as it sounds? Nah. It's just Thomas saying "you may be right, just like a stopped clock is right twice a day." I could diagram the sentence if that wasn't such a pain in the rear end on a computer.
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Dec 11, 2020 05:36
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Can I have a link to that original painting without the flag edited in?
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Dec 11, 2020 05:48
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VitalSigns posted:Nah secession and war is way too risky for our comfortable geriatric Democratic leadership. https://twitter.com/GlennKesslerWP/status/1318662550804926464
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Dec 11, 2020 05:50
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I really, REALLY wish the Joe Biden conservatives imagine was actually running for President because it would have ruled.
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Dec 11, 2020 05:50
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Charlz Guybon posted:Can I have a link to that original painting without the flag edited in? Here Platystemon fucked around with this message at 06:04 on Dec 11, 2020 |
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Dec 11, 2020 06:01
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A question for the lawgoons here; In the Texas v Pennsylvania suit, Texas seems to be claiming that it's unconstitutional for states to change their election rules in any way that isn't explicitly described in the state constitution or a given statue and doesn't involve the legislature. In June, the Governor of Texas issued an executive order changing the timeline for in-person voting and when ballots could be mailed in, and a lawsuit challenging that move was thrown out by the Texas supreme court, so the changes applied without the legislature approving it, and in contradiction of a law that specified when voting can start. Given the claims in Texas v Pennsylvania, it seems to me that Texas should now be suing itself and demanding SCOTUS throw out it's election results, since Abbot did something blatantly unconstitutional. Am I missing something, or is Texas applying one hell of a double standard here? azflyboy fucked around with this message at 06:22 on Dec 11, 2020 |
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Dec 11, 2020 06:13
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You are missing something - Applying any form of consistent logic or even much thought to these lawsuits is utterly pointless. They are a derivative red herring pile of nonsense. Anyone that was in any way affiliated with these efforts should be pilloried and locked out of any position of influence or power for the rest of their lives.
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Dec 11, 2020 07:00
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For anyone that isn't Trump, the point of the lawsuits is to sell the narrative that Republicans were robbed, Democrats are corrupt, and the Biden presidency is illegitimate. That'll make it easier for them to implement onerous voter suppression, rile folks up for 2022, and to sell their obstructionism even when it materially harms their base.
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Dec 11, 2020 07:06
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azflyboy posted:A question for the lawgoons here; What they're requesting isn't that the states don't get a say in the presidential election, but rather than since the votes aren't "trustworthy" that the State governments should get to decide who gets to be the next president. They doubtless figure that even if SCOTUS says "sure, but Texas has to do it too" that Texas would still vote for Trump. I don't know how this would work out for the four states in question, but I assume they want to pick and choose in such a way that Republicans decide who wins (I know Pennsylvania, at least, has a Democratic governor). Also, yes, they are probably less interested in winning then trying to work up their base/trying to keep Trump from throwing a tantrum that might endanger their chances in the Georgia runoffs. The lawsuit doesn't have to make any sense to do those things. Bremen fucked around with this message at 07:15 on Dec 11, 2020 |
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Dec 11, 2020 07:08
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haveblue posted:Specifically, the problem with it is that it bans devices that "store or produce" phone numbers using a "random or sequential number generator", neither of which have applied to the state of the art in automated calling for years. I’m sympathetic to “Congress wrote this law badly and we’re not going to rewrite it for them”, but I also think that the general English definition of ‘random’ can totally encompass the systems at use here, even if they are deterministic and don’t meet mathematical measures of randomness.
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Dec 11, 2020 07:09
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Platystemon posted:I’m sympathetic to “Congress wrote this law badly and we’re not going to rewrite it for them”, but I also think that the general English definition of ‘random’ can totally encompass the systems at use here, even if they are deterministic and don’t meet mathematical measures of randomness. I'm not an expert, but I understood that modern phone spam comes from lists of numbers that are not generated at all but acquired from data brokers. Something that the law as written would clearly permit, so it absolutely needs to be fixed by Congress.
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Dec 11, 2020 07:38
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Platystemon posted:I’m sympathetic to “Congress wrote this law badly and we’re not going to rewrite it for them”, but I also think that the general English definition of ‘random’ can totally encompass the systems at use here, even if they are deterministic and don’t meet mathematical measures of randomness. There’s nothing random about the system at issue in that case, or the systems which there are larger implications for. The FB texts are question are those texts you get when the system recognizes a login from a new device to your account. There is a trigger event, the login, that causes the system to pull a preset number associated with a specific account and send a text message to it. There’s nothing random in that The ninth circuit, which issued the Marks opinion, acknowledged that their opinion made every smart phone into an ATDS And depending on how you define the scope of the phrase “human intervention” (which is the other big issue in tcpa law right now) arguably a speed dial system constitutes an ATDS under marks EwokEntourage fucked around with this message at 07:56 on Dec 11, 2020 |
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Dec 11, 2020 07:48
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haveblue posted:I'm not an expert, but I understood that modern phone spam comes from lists of numbers that are not generated at all but acquired from data brokers. Something that the law as written would clearly permit, so it absolutely needs to be fixed by Congress. Like I said, the law is poorly written. If pulling the numbers from an existing list is fundamentally different than creating them programmatically, just store every phone number in the North American Numbering Plan to a hard drive and you can then move through them at will without violating the law. Every ten‐digit number can be stored on a flash drive of modest size. Committing that list to flash cells takes some trickery since you can’t sequentially generate and store them, but you could do stuff like scan phone books, use OCR on the text, and fill in the gaps.
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Dec 11, 2020 07:56
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EwokEntourage posted:There’s nothing random about the system at issue in that case, or the systems which there are larger implications for. Yeah O.K. that goes too far in the other direction, to absurdity. Two factor authentication isn’t spam any more than it is if a human at the bank calls you because your checks have suspicious signatures. The court need not make all spam telephony legal to make this legal.
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Dec 11, 2020 07:59
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The gadelhak opinion out of the 7th circuit goes over why there’s no good way to read the tcpa to do what you want it to do without congress changing the statute itself
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Dec 11, 2020 08:09
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EwokEntourage posted:The gadelhak opinion out of the 7th circuit goes over why there’s no good way to read the tcpa to do what you want it to do without congress changing the statute itself It all hinges on the intent of one comma. That’s hardly a dealbreaker. quote:The phrase could describe the manner in which the telephone numbers are to be called, regardless of how they are stored, produced, or generated. GOT ’EM I don’t care that none of the other courts took this position. They just didn’t give it the thought it deserved.  Side note: quote:But this first interpretation runs into a problem: as one district court wrote, “it is hard to see how a number generator could be used to ‘store’ telephone numbers.” I solved the problem with my “just store every ten‐digit number ahead of time” hypothetical loophole. Platystemon fucked around with this message at 08:58 on Dec 11, 2020 |
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Dec 11, 2020 08:52
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