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Fangz
Jul 5, 2007

Oh I see! This must be the Bad Opinion Zone!
In the end saying "they didn't do X because of the threat of German reprisals" is just another way of saying "they didn't do X because they were cowards". You can argue that it's emotionally understandable but it doesn't become "reasonable", and once you've established that these guys were cowards, why exactly should the British trust them to stand up to future German demands under further threat of reprisals? If they are scared of bad guys doing bad things, then they shouldn't be in positions of power in the armed forces.

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Nessus
Dec 22, 2003

After a Speaker vote, you may be entitled to a valuable coupon or voucher!



I had never heard of most of this stuff, and while it's probably 2021 backfilling the details in my head, this does sound an awful lot like maybe these French naval guys were not that interested in fighting Hitler, and perhaps may have thought he had some good ideas, even if they may not have been aware of the full depth of Hitler's, y'know, Hitlerism as of yet.

Ice Fist
Jun 20, 2012

^^ Please send feedback to beefstache911@hotmail.com, this is not a joke that 'stache is the real deal. Serious assessments only. ^^

Randomcheese3 posted:

The Force du Raid at Oran had two old battleships and the two large cruisers of the Dunkerque class.

You're deliberately downplaying the threat the French squadron at Mers posed to the British fleet in the Mediterranean. If they're cruisers - then what the hell were the Japanese doing going and sinking all those cruisers at Pearl Harbor?

Nebakenezzer
Sep 13, 2005

The Mote in God's Eye

bewbies posted:

why didn't the French take one of the options presented by the British at mers El kebir?

Because the commanding officer decided to freak out about protocol, and he refused to see the envoys the allies sent because they were not Fleet Admirals or whatever that douchebag's rank was.

e: Beaten like a Fairey Battle

Nebakenezzer fucked around with this message at 21:33 on Oct 23, 2021

SeanBeansShako
Nov 20, 2009

Now the Drums beat up again,
For all true Soldier Gentlemen.
Don't shoot the messager Gensoul.

OPAONI
Jul 23, 2021

Nessus posted:

I had never heard of most of this stuff, and while it's probably 2021 backfilling the details in my head, this does sound an awful lot like maybe these French naval guys were not that interested in fighting Hitler, and perhaps may have thought he had some good ideas, even if they may not have been aware of the full depth of Hitler's, y'know, Hitlerism as of yet.

One thing I've heard that sticks with me is this: if you had told someone in Europe in 1920 that a country with a long history of antisemitism that had been brutalized by WWI would start WWII in aggressive moves against its neighbors, most people would have thought you meant France.

Nessus
Dec 22, 2003

After a Speaker vote, you may be entitled to a valuable coupon or voucher!



OPAONI posted:

One thing I've heard that sticks with me is this: if you had told someone in Europe in 1920 that a country with a long history of antisemitism that had been brutalized by WWI would start WWII in aggressive moves against its neighbors, most people would have thought you meant France.
I heard this story but in the form of "and it will attempt to kill the Jews of Europe."

Trin Tragula
Apr 22, 2005

Are we really struggling to deal with the possibility that a Frenchman might have an unreasonably large ego and take offence when mildly slighted? This would not exactly constitute scoop of the century in 1940.

Uncle Enzo
Apr 28, 2008

I always wanted to be a Wizard
At least one poster has said one of the British missteps was relating a message in poor written French.

I just nodded, it made perfect sense to me, having lived in France. Then I thought about other nations where "oh this really important communique was written poorly" was taken as an insult.

????

There's instances where poor communications or phrasing led to problems or unnecessary bloodshed, but that's out of misunderstanding, not pride at them insulting your noble language.

SeanBeansShako
Nov 20, 2009

Now the Drums beat up again,
For all true Soldier Gentlemen.

Trin Tragula posted:

Are we really struggling to deal with the possibility that a Frenchman might have an unreasonably large ego and take offence when mildly slighted? This would not exactly constitute scoop of the century in 1940.

Post avatar combo, said avatar encountered many men with crazy bad egos.

Randomcheese3
Sep 6, 2011

"It's like no cheese I've ever tasted."

Acebuckeye13 posted:

You're really underrating the French fleet here. Dunkerque and Strasbourg were undergunned compared to other treaty-era battleships, but they were still absolutely battleships, or at the very least battlecruisers, and should be considered as such. And while Bretagne and Provence were older ships, they were contemporaneous with the British vessels, if somewhat less capable—Bretagne, Provence, Resolution, and Valiant all having been commissioned in 1916.


Dunkerque and Strasbourg, by role, were intended to fight cruisers in defence of trade, rather than to fight in the battleline; this is why I consider them 'large cruisers', rather than battleships or battlecruisers. In terms of armament or armour, they were outclassed by any British battleship. While they were faster than the older British battleships, Hood had them beaten in almost any category. The Bretagne-class had been commissioned starting in 1916, but they belonged to an earlier generation of dreadnoughts than the British 'R' or Queen Elizabeth classes -13.5in guns against 15in guns being the main seperator. The Bretagnes were, in terms of armament, armour and machinery, more similar to the British King George V class, all of which had been scrapped or rendered useless for war by 1939, as they were horrifically obsolete by this time. The British ships had also received more extensive refits, especially to things like fire control. In 1940, Valiant outclassed Bretagne in every single way, outranging her by ~10,000 yards, having a superior AA battery, a better armour scheme, and a higher top speed.

Acebuckeye13 posted:

The British did have the battleship advantage over the French, with the 3 ships in Force H and 4 ships in the Mediterranean Fleet (Malaya, Ramillies, Royal Sovereign and Warspite, all of First World War vintage), but the concern was that if the Axis took the ships, they would have an overwhelming advantage in firepower when combined with the Italian fleet of six battleships, which included the two brand-new Littorio-class ships Vittorio Veneto and Littorio. The Italian Navy was no pushover, and them gaining control of the French fleet (Or even part of the fleet) would have made it extremely difficult for the British to contest the Med, if not entirely impossible.

You're right; Mediterranean Fleet had four not five battleships - that was me miscounting. There were also concerns that the French might join up with the Italians. However, there was also no evidence that they would do so, and not inconsiderable evidence that they would not, but only if you trusted the French to do what they said.

Fangz posted:

In the end saying "they didn't do X because of the threat of German reprisals" is just another way of saying "they didn't do X because they were cowards". You can argue that it's emotionally understandable but it doesn't become "reasonable", and once you've established that these guys were cowards, why exactly should the British trust them to stand up to future German demands under further threat of reprisals? If they are scared of bad guys doing bad things, then they shouldn't be in positions of power in the armed forces.

On the one hand, yes, a failure to join the Free French forces is, fundamentally, an act of moral cowardice. However, given the scale of German reprisals, it is also an understandable one that I do not judge people for making. German reprisals were not solely targeted against those who defected, but also against their families and communities. Many who served with the Free French Army did so under noms de guerre, such as General Leclerc, to avoid putting their families at risk. This was harder to do if you were an admiral taking your fleet over to the British. Large numbers of people defecting were also harder to hide and harder for the Germans to overlook. I personally feel it is fair to ask a soldier to risk their life, or to ask an officer to risk the lives of those under their command, but I do not feel it is fair to ask them to risk the lives of innocent civilians. This was a tendency noted at the time. On the 23rd June 1940, the British Naval Liason Officer at Bizerta reported that "Officers who often themselves
have lost all, would like to continue with British, but do not appear
prepared to demand sacrifice from their men of loss of families, upon
whom reprisals are indicated", while the Commander in Chief at Portsmouth stated that morale aboard French ships at the port was deteriorating due to the possibility of reprisals against the families of their crews.


Ice Fist posted:

You're deliberately downplaying the threat the French squadron at Mers posed to the British fleet in the Mediterranean. If they're cruisers - then what the hell were the Japanese doing going and sinking all those cruisers at Pearl Harbor?

As noted above, the thing that made the Dunkerques large cruisers in my eyes was their intended role - trade defence - rather than any technical feature such as armour or armament. Fighting battleships was an entirely secondary role, with French naval doctrine considering them only suitable for combat against the older Italian dreadnoughts, rather than any more modern battleship. This role meant that they had compromised on armour and armament. Compared to the British battleships, they had weaker guns and armour, and Hood could outrun them.


Fangz posted:

I'm talking about the request made by Auphan, the Vichy Secretary of the Navy on the 15th of November. The fleet at Toulon was not drained of fuel either, the crews had specifically stockpiled enough to make it to Allied held North Africa. In the event of the scuttling, a few ships ignored the order and defected anyway, they reached the allies successfully.

Having checked things rather than relying on solely memory, the decision not to sail for North Africa was made by Admiral de Laborde, established as commander of the French Fleet well after Mers-el-Kebir. Laborde was notably sympathetic to the Germans, and apparently wished to maintain good relations with them, in addition to the other factors I described.

None of the major ships at Toulon sailed for North Africa. The only ships that did with any success were the submarines. with four reaching North Africa and a fifth being scuttled in the entry-way to Toulon harbour following damage from German bombing raids.

Fangz posted:

The excuse of the "threat of reprisals" does not wash because the Free French army was already fighting for the Allies for years at this point, and the rank and file of the French navy was plenty willing to consider defection. And like, why would scuttling not incur reprisals while defection would? You can't argue that they had not enough time either, they had two weeks from time instructions from their Vichy superiors came. The most likely conclusion given their inaction was that the intent of the French admirals was to side with the Axis as per the Raeder plan, but Hitler hosed things up. Note that Laborde had already previously advocated that the Vichy fleet sail out and attack the Allies during Operation Torch.


At least in 1940, the rank-and-file of the French Navy was largely less willing to join the Allies than their officers were. The Free French Army had fought for the Allies for several years by 1942, but this largely recruited in French Africa where the Germans could not reach - where there were Europeans serving, these often either served under psuedonyms like General Leclerc or had no family ties in France like the Spanish Republicans of La Nueve.

Defection was far more likely to draw reprisals than a scuttling was because of the legal language of the Armistice of Compiegnes. This allowed reprisals against Frenchmen who joined the British, but also gave the French control over their fleet. While French officers had no reason to trust the Germans to stick to this, it was at least something they could point to in their defence.

Fangz posted:

These guys were convicted for treason for doing the scuttling after the war, BTW. I think trying to portray their actions as heroic and loyal to France really requires a *lot* of mental gymnastics.

I don't disagree with this, I'm just trying to explain how they saw themselves.


Fangz posted:

There absolutely was a clear risk, the air dropped mines did not close off the harbour completely - some ships (incl the battleship Strasbourg) escaped after all, if there was a longer delay even more ships would have escaped. The French was also shooting at the mining planes and downed one, killing the aircrew.

Gensoul's first ship did not start to get underway until a little under 45 minutes after the last meeting between Gensoul and Holland ended. This was, not coincidentally, five minutes after the British opened fire; Strasbourg started steaming to avoid the British shelling. Somerville, meanwhile, could not act on the results of the last meeting between Holland and Gensoul, due to pressure to sink the French from the Admiralty. He received the results of this meeting literally one minute before his final ultimatum was due to end.

None of the minelaying aircraft were lost, but two of the aircraft that attacked Strasbourg after she left Oran were shot down by her AA fire and a Blackburn Skua crashed due to fuel exhaustion or through AA damage, per Ark Royal's report on the action and David Hobbs' book on the Fleet Air Arm in the Mediterranean. In all cases, their crews were rescued.

Uncle Enzo posted:

At least one poster has said one of the British missteps was relating a message in poor written French.

I just nodded, it made perfect sense to me, having lived in France. Then I thought about other nations where "oh this really important communique was written poorly" was taken as an insult.

????

There's instances where poor communications or phrasing led to problems or unnecessary bloodshed, but that's out of misunderstanding, not pride at them insulting your noble language.

The problem wasn't so much about how it was written, it was more about how it was relayed. The message, which described the British negotiating position, had been sent not to the French commander, but had been sent out indiscriminately to the fleet as a whole. This implied that the British didn't trust the commander, Gensoul, which was not a good start to negotiations. It being in awful French was merely the cherry on top of a combination of things that implied that the British were not taking things as seriously as one might have wanted.

Randomcheese3 fucked around with this message at 01:40 on Oct 24, 2021

Jobbo_Fett
Mar 7, 2014

Slava Ukrayini

Clapping Larry
If you received a poorly translated and the words you read were different than the intended message, I could see it being insulting or misleading or confusing to have to deal with.

Fangz
Jul 5, 2007

Oh I see! This must be the Bad Opinion Zone!

quote:

You're right; Mediterranean Fleet had four not five battleships - that was me miscounting. There were also concerns that the French might join up with the Italians. However, there was also no evidence that they would do so, and not inconsiderable evidence that they would not, but only if you trusted the French to do what they said.
We just established that the French fleet would be put under the command of a German sympathiser who wanted to directly support the Germans against the British.


quote:

Defection was far more likely to draw reprisals than a scuttling was because of the legal language of the Armistice of Compiegnes. This allowed reprisals against Frenchmen who joined the British, but also gave the French control over their fleet. While French officers had no reason to trust the Germans to stick to this, it was at least something they could point to in their defence.

These events took place *after* the Germans broke the terms of the armistice and began to occupy Vichy France.


quote:

At least in 1940, the rank-and-file of the French Navy was largely less willing to join the Allies than their officers were. The Free French Army had fought for the Allies for several years by 1942, but this largely recruited in French Africa where the Germans could not reach - where there were Europeans serving, these often either served under psuedonyms like General Leclerc or had no family ties in France like the Spanish Republicans of La Nueve.

I am talking about November '42. You had the crew of the Strasbourg literally chanting support of de Gaulle. You had secretive stores of fuel for the journey to North Africa. Meanwhile the commander of the fleet is offering to fight against Torch and doing good damndest to help the Germans.


quote:

Gensoul's first ship did not start to get underway until a little under 45 minutes after the last meeting between Gensoul and Holland ended. This was, not coincidentally, five minutes after the British opened fire; Strasbourg started steaming to avoid the British shelling. Somerville, meanwhile, could not act on the results of the last meeting between Holland and Gensoul, due to pressure to sink the French from the Admiralty. He received the results of this meeting literally one minute before his final ultimatum was due to end.
How does this contradict the point that Gensoul preparing his ships to move created a risk for the British that his ships would escape if negotiations dragged on for too long, and also raised the question of whether his later negotiations were in fact a delaying action to buy time for more of his fleet to make a breakout?

Fangz fucked around with this message at 03:54 on Oct 24, 2021

SlothfulCobra
Mar 27, 2011

The fall of France is just some really weird territory with regard to what sovereignty or democracy even is. The government surrendered, but a smattering of officials, not really including anyone very important in the government, fled to lead all the extra bits of the country that didn't accept the surrender of the official government and kind of...seceded? Revolted? But they took upon themselves a self-decided mandate for the nation in opposition.

Like it makes sense because it was all one big war and France was allied with a big block so there was a clear pre-surrender mandate to stick with, and we accept the implicit illegitimacy of Nazi-occupied France because...they're Nazis, and they also lost so their side of things wasn't made into official histories, but we're not so eager to declare other postwar occupation governments as immediately illegitimate.

And I guess some of the confusion comes from the nature of how democracies are supposed to work, where big decisions are supposed to take into account the opinions of the masses, while something like the Spanish colonies immediately rebelling against Napoleon flows more easily from the way that the feudalistic relationships work where local lords hold ultimate authority over their provinces anyways, so those individual lords refusing to acknowledge the new monarch is more of an age-old tradition going way back.

Uncle Enzo posted:

At least one poster has said one of the British missteps was relating a message in poor written French.

I just nodded, it made perfect sense to me, having lived in France. Then I thought about other nations where "oh this really important communique was written poorly" was taken as an insult.

????

There's instances where poor communications or phrasing led to problems or unnecessary bloodshed, but that's out of misunderstanding, not pride at them insulting your noble language.

There was that one war that Bismarck orchestrated where he managed to make statements that seemed innocent in every other language but extremely inflammatory in French. I don't think I've heard of that happening with any other language. Weird place.

I guess Japanese I can imagine something like that happen because it has a lot of extra formalities that don't exist in English, so that seems ripe for offending, but I don't know of any particular examples of that causing a major incident.

Zhanism
Apr 1, 2005
Death by Zhanism. So Judged.
In the end the math is the math. An italian fleet that could potentially add four more French battleships would absolutely make it almost impossible for the British to control the mediterranean. All of Britain's oil comes through the mediterranean. With hindsight it's easy to feel that the outcome of the entire war would not have changed if the attack did not happen. But at that point in time like other people have pointed out britian was going about it alone and they can take absolutely zero chance of the Mediterranean being lost. When given the choice between potentially losing the Mediterranean and attacking the French fleet the math is easy and right and wrong etc are irrelevant.

Slim Jim Pickens
Jan 16, 2012
De Gaulle had no legal justification for what he did. I guess you could call him a rebel. The only precedent is that every other occupied country in Europe set up a government-in-exile. At the same time, you gotta respect game

Slim Jim Pickens
Jan 16, 2012

Zhanism posted:

In the end the math is the math. An italian fleet that could potentially add four more French battleships would absolutely make it almost impossible for the British to control the mediterranean. All of Britain's oil comes through the mediterranean. With hindsight it's easy to feel that the outcome of the entire war would not have changed if the attack did not happen. But at that point in time like other people have pointed out britian was going about it alone and they can take absolutely zero chance of the Mediterranean being lost. When given the choice between potentially losing the Mediterranean and attacking the French fleet the math is easy and right and wrong etc are irrelevant.

Slim Jim Pickens posted:

The Brits lost regular use of the Central Mediterranean the minute that Italy entered the war! They were sending supplies the long way around Africa the whole time!!!!!!!! The only convoys going through the Med were the extremely heavily armed ones to Malta!!!!! Stop saying this poo poo!!!!!


Who's teaching people this crarp!?

Xiahou Dun
Jul 16, 2009

We shall dive down through black abysses... and in that lair of the Deep Ones we shall dwell amidst wonder and glory forever.



Wait so first Gensoul was offended by the bad French, I wanna see this letter. I read French, lay it on me.

Slim Jim Pickens
Jan 16, 2012

Xiahou Dun posted:

Wait so first Gensoul was offended by the bad French, I wanna see this letter. I read French, lay it on me.

Jobbo_Fett
Mar 7, 2014

Slava Ukrayini

Clapping Larry



https://www.argunners.com/operation-catapult-attack-mers-el-kebir-british-vs-french/

French Western Mediterranean Fleet:

4 Battleships
10 heavy / light Cruisers
37 Destroyers
36 Submarines
various oilers / supply and repair vessels …


French Eastern Mediterranean Fleet:

1 Battleship
4 heavy / light Cruisers
3 Destroyers
various oilers / supply and repair vessels …



Royal Navy as of June 1940
15 Battleships
3 Battlecruisers
7 Aircraft carriers
66 Cruisers (heavy & light)
184 Destroyers (of all types)
60 Submarines (mostly modern & 9 building)
45 Escort and Patrol vessels
56 flower class corvettes on order and or on the stocks.



quote:

July 3rd
0810: The first meeting (negotiation) between the French forces “Was” to take place at 8:10 am, however it ended before it began with Gensoul refusing to see Captain Holland.

0847: Admiral Gensoul did not appreciate in the least Holland’s “gunboat” diplomacy and ordered the HMS Foxhound complete with Captain Holland to leave the Harbor immediately. Holland knowing full well the seriousness of the situation and the losses that would take place on both sides if operation catapult was carried out ordered a launch to return to the harbor in an attempt to meet with the French admiral. He was intercepted in mid stride by a French flag Lieutenant Dufay who again informed the British Captain that Admiral Gensoul would under no circumstances see Holland and again ordered him back to his ship and out of the harbor immediately. In an act of desperation Holland gave Lieutenant Dufay a copy of the text of the British terms asking him to at the very least give the text to Gensoul to review since he refuses to meet face to face attempting to impress upon Dufay the seriousness of the situation and the very brief time table at hand and assist.

0945: Admiral Gensoul read the British ultimatum and quickly became enraged. He then immediately signaled the French admiralty in Toulon informing them that he was being confronted by fleet of Royal navy war ships at (Mers-el–Kiber and Oran with orders to sink his ships within 6 hours. Gensoul added that he intended to reply force with force.

0950: While waiting for a reply from the French admiral Holland became aware that the French were making ready their ships and raising steam, seemingly preparing to leave harbor. Holland immediately reported this to First Sea Lord Sir Alfred Dudly Pound who then ordered Somerville to have the entrances / exits of the harbor effectively mined to prevent the French from leaving.

1000: Holland received a message from Admiral Gensoul who did in fact refuse to accept any of the four British terms. He also forcefully inform Holland that he would immediately following being fired upon by force H his warships would take action against the British- they were quite prepare to fight.

1300: Holland with time drawing down was more convinced than ever that he must have an extension to the time table and try his utmost to reach the French admirals “good sense”. That it was most certainly in British and French best interest if a resolve to the current situation could be found and was in fact he was granted an extension until 4:30pm in an effort to find an agreement.

1615: Gensoul finally relented and agreed to meet with Holland. He then at this time informed Holland that as long as the Germans and Italians allowed the French fleet to remain in French ports (with a reduced crew) he would therefore do so. While this meeting was taking place the British began the process of mining the exits to the harbor. This act (seen as hostile) and in sensed the French admiral but negotiations continued and more delays being granted until it became quite apparent that the French were stalling for time the talks became more and more volatile from then on.

{During this time Somerville was informed that the British admiralty intercepted a signal from the French admiralty instructing Gensoul to stand firm and that orders have been given to prepare all French naval and air forces in the western Mediterranean to prepare for battle and proceed with all speed to Mers-el-Kegir and.}

1715: After nearly three hours of additional extensions a message from Holland was received aboard the Dunkerque which read… “If none of the British proposals are accepted by the French admiralty no later than 5:30pm, I will be therefore necessary to sink your ships. This message did of course put an end to negotiations for a peaceful settlement.

1730: Force H led by the “Mighty Hood” opened fire with broadside after broadside of 15” HE shells screaming in marking the first exchange of naval gunfire between the two nations for 125 years. The Royal Navy’s shells were coming in fast and accurate to the stationary French ships. The French warships were certainly at a severe disadvantage; either not moving or just starting to move as well as being hemmed in the port and not free to maneuver.

Although the French returned fire but by the time the cordite smoke cleared most of the French warships lay on the bottom of the harbor, burning or beached leaving 1,297 French sailors dead and 354 wounded. At this time Somerville ordered a cease fire after he received a plea from the French to stop the bloodshed, instead the French used this break in the action to attempt to allow as many (still operational) ships as possible to escape to open sea. During this 13 minute (virtually one) sided shelling.

The battleship Bretagne was sunk with a heavy loss of life due to a 15” HE shell plunging into her magazine. The Battleship Dunkerque was heavily damaged and sunk in the mud of the harbor. The Provence was hit multiple times was then beached by her crew to prevent her sinking. The Destroyer Mogador, heavily damaged with a loss of 37 lives. The battleship Strasbourg did manage to escape during the smoke and flames and ceased fire.

At Dakar: the Battleship Richelieu was severely damaged by aircraft for the Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS Hermes.

At Plymouth and Portsmouth armed British sailors and Royal marines stormed and took control of the French ships in harbor there.

There was however more bloodshed during the armed takeover of the French submarine “Surcouf”. Here a French officer got killed and two British officers wounded.

2000 (approx): The French Charge d’effairs formally protested the action even going so far as having the Admiral of the fleet Darlan order all French warships to engage any and all the British warships whenever and wherever they were found.

Jobbo_Fett fucked around with this message at 04:36 on Oct 24, 2021

Jobbo_Fett
Mar 7, 2014

Slava Ukrayini

Clapping Larry

quote:

Mers El-Kébir… le « Grand Port », mot composé arabe, évoque la mer, que ce lieu géographique essaie d’étreindre dans la tenaille, largement ouverte de sa rade, et l’installation portuaire que la France de la seconde moitié du XX° siècle y a créée (1928 – 1945)…

Mieux abrité que Gibraltar, le port possède une des rades les plus belles et les plus sûres de l’Algérie. Le site profite enfin de la proximité de l’agglomération urbaine d’Oran, créée au début du X° siècle.

Le but de la base navale est, non seulement de compléter la défense des côtes algériennes, de maintenir l’intégrité du territoire français, mais aussi d’assurer la liberté des communications et d’organiser notre présence dans la Méditerranée occidentale, en cas de conflit, face à une Italie hostile (en 1939) et à une Espagne d’une neutralité bienveillante envers les pays de l’Axe Berlin-Rome.

L’armistice franco-allemand du 25 juin 1940 consacre l’échec de nos armées sur terre ; notre flotte, une des plus puissantes -qui n’avait pas été vaincue- est libre.
Ni l’amiral Darlan, ni le général Weygand n’ont l’intention « …de livrer à l’ennemi une unité quelconque de notre flotte de guerre » et de Gaulle le dira, le 16 juin à Churchill en ces termes « La flotte ne sera jamais livrée, d’ailleurs, c’est le fief de Darlan ; un féodal ne livre pas son fief. Pétain lui-même n’y consentirait pas ».

Les Anglais, de leur côté, désirent que notre flotte, riche en unités lourdes et légères, se rende dans leurs ports. Elle aurait pu le faire, le 16 juin 1940, mais personne ne lui en donne l’ordre et la Marine reçoit l’assurance, « qu’en aucun cas, la flotte ne sera livrée intacte », mais qu’elle se repliera probablement en Afrique ou sera coulée précise l’Amiral Darlan. Hitler ne demande pas livraison de notre flotte (le projet d’armistice ne le prévoyant d’ailleurs pas), pas plus que de nos colonies, sachant qu’il n’est pas dans nos intentions d’accepter de telles exigences.

Les 18 et 19 juin, sont sabordées ou détruites, des unités en construction à Cherbourg, celles en réparations à Brest, Lorient, La Pallice et au Verdon. Les bâtiments capables de prendre la mer appareillent partie pour Plymouth, partie pour Casablanca, même le cuirassé Jean Bart inachevé.

Le 27 juin, Churchill, en dépit des assurances données par le gouvernement Français, décide, dans le plus grand secret, de mettre « hors d’état de nuire » la marine française. Cette opération aura pour nom Catapult.

Le 30 juin, dans un accès de colère, l’amiral North s’adresse à l’amiral Somerville :

– Qui a eu cette fichue idée (opération Catapult) ?

– Churchill ! répondit Somerville

–No « Catapult », but, « Boomerang » ! Cette opération nous met en danger, répliqua North. Winnie (Churchill) est fou ! Je vois ce qu’il veut mais c’est une solution criminelle.

Les bâtiments de la Méditerranée, le 3 juillet 1940, sont amarrés le long de la jetée de Kébir, d’Est en Ouest : le transport Commandant Teste, les cuirassés Bretagne et Provence, les croiseurs Strasbourg et Dunkerque. Leur font vis-à-vis, dans le fond ouest de la baie, six contre-torpilleurs : Mogador, Volta, Tigre, Lynx, Terrible, Kersaine…les fleurons de la flotte française. Au mât du Dunkerque, flotte la marque de l’Amiral Gensoul, commandant en chef… La démobilisation doit commencer dans quelques jours, les équipages se préparent à aller en promenade pour se distraire à terre.

Les clauses de l’armistice ont été scrupuleusement observées, et dans le délai qui avait été fixé. Sur nos bâtiments, les culasses des pièces ont été démontées ; il en a été de même dans les batteries de côtes et de D.C.A. Dans les hangars d’aviation, les mesures de démobilisation ont été prises ; on a vidé les réservoirs de leur essence, démonté les canons des chasseurs et les mitrailleuses de tous les appareils ; les munitions ont été rassemblées et mises en dépôt.

Vers 7 heures du matin, un torpilleur anglais, le Foxhound, se présente devant Mers El-Kébir. Un premier message annonce qu’il a à son bord un officier britannique, chargé d’apporter au commandant en chef de la flotte de l’Atlantique une communication de la plus haute importance. Mais une véritable force navale l’accompagne : le Hood, bâtiment de 42000 tonnes, le plus grand cuirassé du monde, armé de pièces de 380 ; le Vaillant, la Résolution, armés également de pièces de 380 ; l’Ark-Royal, le plus rapide des porte-avions anglais, tous escortés de bâtiments légers et de torpilleurs.

Sur les bâtiments français, l’arrivée inattendue de cette imposante armada provoque de l’étonnement, qui sera bientôt de la stupeur. Un officier d’état-major français est envoyé par l’amiral Gensoul à la rencontre de l’officier britannique, le commandant Holland. Celui-ci est porteur d’un document qu’on peut résumer ainsi :

« La flotte de l’Atlantique est invitée à rallier la flotte britannique, ou à défaut, un port de l’Amérique, avec équipages réduits. En cas de refus de cette offre, elle devra se saborder, sinon, par ordre du gouvernement de Sa Majesté, la flotte britannique usera de la force. »

L’amiral Gensoul réaffirma au parlementaire britannique que les craintes de voir les bâtiments français tomber aux mains des Allemands et des Italiens étaient injustifiées : « La marine française n’a pas l’habitude de manquer à sa parole ! », s’exclama-t-il.

Plus tard, il affirmera qu’il ne pouvait accepter « un ultimatum se terminant par : « ou vous coulez vos bateaux ou je vous coule. C’est exactement : la bourse ou la vie… quelquefois, on donne sa bourse pour sauver sa vie. Dans la Marine, nous n’avons pas cette habitude-là ». Servitude et grandeur militaires !

Ainsi, nos bâtiments, contre la force, se défendraient par la force.

Au moment où l’officier britannique sort de la rade, le commandant de la flotte anglaise signale : « Si les propositions britanniques ne sont pas acceptées, il faut que je coule vos bâtiments. »

Les bateaux français, aux feux éteints, disposés pour un désarmement rapide, reçoivent l’ordre à 7h55 : « Prendre dispositions de « combat », puis à 9h10 : « Flotte anglaise étant venue nous proposer ultimatum inacceptable, soyez prêts à répondre à la force par la « force ».

En effet, le 3 juillet 1940, vers 10h, l’Amiral anglais Somerville adresse un ultimatum aux unités de la flotte française : « Coulez vos bâtiments de guerre dans un délai de 6 heures, ou nous vous y contraindrons par la force. »

Après un conseil tenu par l’Amiral Jarry, commandant la Marine à Oran, le général de Saint-Maurice et le Préfet Boujard, celui-ci informe la population, par un communiqué affiché à 13h30, « qu’une alerte réelle pourrait avoir lieu l’après-midi, l’invite à se réfugier dans les abris, tranchées, etc…, renvoie les élèves dans leur famille ». Les consulats anglais du département sont gardés et surveillés, pour parer à toute manifestation. Les services de défense passive, l’hôpital, les services sanitaires, la Croix-Rouge et la police sont alertés. La dispersion des habitants de Mers El-Kébir est décidée, seul le Maire, les conseillers municipaux, les fonctionnaires et ouvriers de la Centrale et des travaux portuaires restent à leur poste.

Dès 14h, heure approximative de l’expiration de l’ultimatum, les avions de l’Ark Royal volant sur l’eau déposent des mines magnétiques, à l’entrée du port et de la rade de Mers El-Kébir. L’escadre française est pratiquement bloquée (Churchill l’a reconnu). L’Amiral Gensoul cherche à gagner du temps pour permettre aux batteries côtières, aux avions de la Sénia (aéroport situé à la périphérie d’Oran), aux unités de la Flotte, de se réarmer pour le combat et aussi de laisser à nos alliés d’hier le temps de réfléchir à la portée de leur ultimatum. L’amiral anglais répond à une demande de cesser le feu qu’il ne l’arrêtera « que quand toute la flotte française sera coulée ».

A 16h56, la flotte anglaise commence le feu. Abritée derrière l’éperon rocheux du fort de Mers El-Kébir, elle tire à cadence accélérée sur nos bâtiments qui cherchent à sortir de la rade. Les consignes s’exécutent partout avec ordre, à Oran comme à Kébir. Après 12 ou 15 minutes de « tir au gîte », les batteries côtières du Santon et de Canastel répondent au feu des Anglais ; le Strasbourg sort des passes. Le bilan s’établit ainsi : le croiseur Bretagne, atteint, explose, coule en sept minutes et disparaît sous l’eau : 150 hommes seulement sur 1300 fuient la mort, soit à la nage, soit en chaloupes. Le croiseur Dunkerque, n’ayant pu prendre la mer, à cause d’une avarie à son gouvernail, reçoit un obus qui tue 150 marins, plus de 100 mécaniciens et chauffeurs, 2 ingénieurs… Le bâtiment est hors de combat. Le croiseur Provence, touché, peut par ses propres moyens, aller s’échouer sur la côte de Kébir : il y a 4 morts. Le contre-torpilleur Mogador X61, incendié par l’arrière, s’échoue et compte 14 morts. Le Rigaut de Genouilli est atteint, seul le Commandant Teste, non cuirassé, amarré à la jetée en construction, est intact. Le Strasbourg fonce vers la haute mer, part vers Alger, puis Toulon.

Et partout ces mêmes visions apocalyptiques ; parmi les carcasses d’acier éventrées, calcinées, retentissent les cris déchirants de centaines et de centaines de marins agonisants, mutilés, brûlés ou suffoquant au milieu d’une fumée âcre et d’un mazout noirâtre qui étouffent leurs dernières plaintes.

Aussitôt les secours s’organisent. Le Maire de Mers El-Kébir, M. Boluix-Basset, les pêcheurs, gendarmes, pompiers, marins rescapés et la population aident au sauvetage des hommes des bâtiments atteints, jetés à l’eau valides ou blessés. Une chapelle ardente est installée dans la salle du cinéma de Kébir. Les obsèques des 1380 marins –assassinés- ont lieu le 5 juillet, au cimetière de Mers El-Kébir, en présence du Maire, du Préfet et de l’Amiral Gensoul qui s’adressera une dernière fois à ses hommes en ces termes : « Vous aviez promis d’obéir à vos chefs, pour tout ce qu’ils vous commanderaient pour l’Honneur du Pavillon et la grandeur des armes de la France. Si, aujourd’hui, il y a une tache sur un pavillon, ce n’est certainement pas sur le nôtre. »

Le drame n’est pas terminé pour autant. La haine ancestrale de nos « alliés » va se concrétiser ce 6 juillet 1940. A 6h30, par trois fois en vagues successives, des avions britanniques survolent la rade, à basse altitude, déposent des mines magnétiques entre le Dunkerque et la passe, prennent le navire comme cible. Torpilles et bombes atteignent le bâtiment qui s’enfonce et échoue sur le fond, en donnant de la bande. Les trois chalutiers ou remorqueurs, coopérant à l’évacuation des morts du 3 juillet, sont coulés à leur tour. La D.C.A côtière, les batteries du Santon, Bel Horizon et Lamoune, les mitrailleuses installées sur la côte, au stade de la Marsa et à l’usine électrique répondent. Le drame, c’est que cette attaque fera encore 205 tués et 250 blessés atteints gravement. Au total, la marine française déplore plus de 1927 morts ou disparus et plusieurs centaines de blessés dont la plupart gravement brûlés. Deux avions anglais sont abattus.

Ce qui est horrible, c’est que les marins anglais ont tué en une semaine plus de marins français que la Flotte allemande pendant toute la seconde guerre mondiale. Nous ne sommes pas loin des 2403 morts du drame de Pearl Harbor, l’un des grands événements de cette guerre puisqu’il décida de l’entrée en guerre des Etats-Unis d’Amérique. Mais les Japonais étaient leurs ennemis, les Anglais étaient nos alliés. C’est là un crime inqualifiable… impardonnable.

Le 8 juillet, De Gaulle, parlant au micro de la BBC, déclare :

« En vertu d’un engagement déshonorant, le gouvernement qui fut à Bordeaux avait consenti à livrer nos navires à la discrétion de l’ennemi… J’aime mieux savoir que le « Dunkerque » notre beau, notre cher, notre puissant « Dunkerque » échoué devant Mers El-Kébir, que de le voir un jour, monté par les Allemands, bombarder les ports anglais, ou bien Alger, Casablanca, Dakar. » … et pas le moindre mot de compassion envers les victimes de cette tragédie.

Pour la première fois se trouvait ainsi affirmée, dans la bouche même d’un général français, une contrevérité : Alger, Casablanca, Dakar, donc les clés de l’Empire, allaient être utilisées contre les alliés britanniques. Et comme il vouait une haine viscérale à « l’Empire » qu’il considérait comme « Pétainiste » et qu’il fallait absolument mettre au pas pour la réalisation future de ses desseins, il donna à la flotte britannique, le 23 septembre 1940, la consigne de bombarder Dakar. Ce fut l’échec. L’insuccès des Britanniques fit comprendre aux uns et aux autres qu’il était vain de vouloir détacher l’Empire français de la Métropole et que la poursuite des attaques servirait de prétexte à une intervention allemande.

Dans ses mémoires, Churchill n’a pas caché son embarras. Il a comparé Mers El-Kébir à une tragédie grecque : « Ce fut une décision odieuse, la plus inhumaine de toutes celles que j’ai eues à partager », écrira-t-il.

Les historiens, les politiques, les « moralistes » et les censeurs qui ont eu à juger des hommes, des gouvernants, et à écrire l’Histoire, ont dédaigné de prendre en considération le traumatisme dévastateur que cet événement tragique avait produit dans les esprits…

Mers El-Kébir explique en grande partie l’attitude de bon nombre de nos gouvernants de Vichy durant le conflit comme elle explique aussi celle des autorités civiles et militaires d’Algérie en 1942-1943 et d’une population acquise au Maréchal Pétain mais volontaire pour poursuivre la lutte avec Darlan et Giraud contre les puissances de l’Axe.

L’Afrique du Nord, malgré son traumatisme, accepta de rentrer en guerre en 1942 et sera avec son « armée d’Afrique », l’une des composantes de la victoire finale. Elle conservera, néanmoins, son hostilité à De Gaulle, que ce dernier, devenu président du Comité de la Libération devait justifier… Il se souviendra toujours de ce sentiment d’inimitié à son égard et, dès 1958, remis au Pouvoir par ceux-là mêmes qui l’avaient blâmé, leur fera supporter amèrement le poids de sa rancune…

Ces morts Français, bannis de la mémoire nationale, auraient pu reposer en paix. Or, le 5 Juillet 2005, jour anniversaire d’une autre tragédie (Le massacre de plus de trois mille Européens, le 5 Juillet 1962 à Oran), le cimetière de Mers El-Kébir fut saccagé sans qu’aucune autorité gouvernementale française, aucun média, aucune association humanitaire et « antiraciste », n’élevassent la moindre protestation, préférant s’humilier à « commémorer » la « répression » (beaucoup plus commerciale) de Sétif par l’armée française en 1945.

Aujourd’hui encore, le souvenir de cette lâche agression britannique contre une flotte au mouillage et désarmée demeure vivace dans la Marine et, paraphrasant Talleyrand, on peut affirmer que « Mers El-Kébir a été pire qu’un crime, une faute ».

Quant aux survivants de cette tragédie qui défilèrent devant les cercueils de leurs camarades, ils ont conservé depuis, ce visage dur des hommes qui n’oublient pas

http://www.contre-info.com/3-juillet-1940-lagression-britannique-sur-mers-el-kebir-1927-marins-francais-tues

Zhanism
Apr 1, 2005
Death by Zhanism. So Judged.

Jobbo_Fett posted:


Royal Navy as of June 1940
15 Battleships
3 Battlecruisers
7 Aircraft carriers
66 Cruisers (heavy & light)
184 Destroyers (of all types)
60 Submarines (mostly modern & 9 building)
45 Escort and Patrol vessels
56 flower class corvettes on order and or on the stocks.

When was the last time the British empire gathered literally every ship in one theater? Pretty much never, those 15 battleships were spread in the home fleet, guarding vs the Germans and even in the med it's was split into two fleets plus not all are active at once, there's always a few in dock or repair. The 6 Italian and 4 french battleships together would have had interior lines and could overwhelm each of those in detail.

Yes I'm sorry I was wrong on the oil. But did the British fight so hard to hold eypgt and Malta because it wasn't important? How much better would the Italians or the Germans have done if they controlled their supplies fight across North Africa?

The British chose to destroy their former allies, which they didn't want to, because they couldn't afford to not contest the med. This shows how serious they thought the situation for. It's easy now to say they should have done this and that but they had imperfect info, time constraints and an actual war on their asses.

Until someone gets a time message back to them, I don't see why what they did is so hard to justify. It's not like they were happy to do it, no one in that operation wanted it or liked it

Jobbo_Fett
Mar 7, 2014

Slava Ukrayini

Clapping Larry

Zhanism posted:

When was the last time the British empire gathered literally every ship in one theater? Pretty much never, those 15 battleships were spread in the home fleet, guarding vs the Germans and even in the med it's was split into two fleets plus not all are active at once, there's always a few in dock or repair. The 6 Italian and 4 french battleships together would have had interior lines and could overwhelm each of those in detail.

Yes I'm sorry I was wrong on the oil. But did the British fight so hard to hold eypgt and Malta because it wasn't important? How much better would the Italians or the Germans have done if they controlled their supplies fight across North Africa?

The British chose to destroy their former allies, which they didn't want to, because they couldn't afford to not contest the med. This shows how serious they thought the situation for. It's easy now to say they should have done this and that but they had imperfect info, time constraints and an actual war on their asses.

Until someone gets a time message back to them, I don't see why what they did is so hard to justify. It's not like they were happy to do it, no one in that operation wanted it or liked it

Just for reference, I didn't post that as a comparison between the French in the Mediterranean and a bizarro world where the entirety of the Royal Navy is also in the Mediterranean, but it does offer context in showing what the French did have in that area, that could have bolstered the Germans or Italians in some alternate timeline where they are incorporated into a fighting force for the Axis.

Also I don't think I have any of the books used as sources on Wikipedia and the one digital article appears to be behind a paywall? I should check my Oxford's companion to see what it says...

Jobbo_Fett fucked around with this message at 04:55 on Oct 24, 2021

Mandoric
Mar 15, 2003

SlothfulCobra posted:

The fall of France is just some really weird territory with regard to what sovereignty or democracy even is. The government surrendered, but a smattering of officials, not really including anyone very important in the government, fled to lead all the extra bits of the country that didn't accept the surrender of the official government and kind of...seceded? Revolted? But they took upon themselves a self-decided mandate for the nation in opposition.

Like it makes sense because it was all one big war and France was allied with a big block so there was a clear pre-surrender mandate to stick with, and we accept the implicit illegitimacy of Nazi-occupied France because...they're Nazis, and they also lost so their side of things wasn't made into official histories, but we're not so eager to declare other postwar occupation governments as immediately illegitimate.

And I guess some of the confusion comes from the nature of how democracies are supposed to work, where big decisions are supposed to take into account the opinions of the masses, while something like the Spanish colonies immediately rebelling against Napoleon flows more easily from the way that the feudalistic relationships work where local lords hold ultimate authority over their provinces anyways, so those individual lords refusing to acknowledge the new monarch is more of an age-old tradition going way back.

There was that one war that Bismarck orchestrated where he managed to make statements that seemed innocent in every other language but extremely inflammatory in French. I don't think I've heard of that happening with any other language. Weird place.

I guess Japanese I can imagine something like that happen because it has a lot of extra formalities that don't exist in English, so that seems ripe for offending, but I don't know of any particular examples of that causing a major incident.

Oh, you could definitely do it in English; "Bigshot Joey done went and~" as opposed to "President Biden has, regrettably, made the decision to~" is if anything so much more unthinkable than "バイデンの奴、~とやっちまった" that it begins to scan as hilarious.

Japanese gets its rep because its politeness is strictly formalized in a restricted set of accepted grammar, and thus it's something you can print on a textbook page as Needed To Remember, plus there are categories on the higher side a learner will never qualify to hear themselves. The English approach, where it's unthinking, varying convention rather than specification, and demands its strongest form for every Dominos manager, is kind of the scary one.

Jobbo_Fett
Mar 7, 2014

Slava Ukrayini

Clapping Larry

Oxford's Companion WW2 Entry on Mers-El-Kebir posted:


Algerian port where the French fleet was at anchor when on 3 July 1940 it was bombarded by the Ryoal Navy.

When the *armistice between France and Germany was signed on 25 June 1940, the fate of the powerful French fleet, the fourth largest in the world, was of critical importance tot he British. Most of its main units were scattered among various Mediterranean ports, though some were in British ones and a few were in the French West Indies. The warships at the Mers-El-Kebir naval base included the modern battlecruisers Dunkerque and Strasbourg (both superior to any German battlecruiser), two older battleships, and six large destroyers, while seven destroyers and four submarines were at nearby Oran.

The terms of the armistice stipulated that the French fleet would not be used by the Germans or Italians, but would be immobilized under their control, and the *Vichy French navy minister, Admiral *Darlan, had instructed his captains that under ni circumstances were their ships to fall into German hands. The full text of this message was not available to the British who, in any case, were concerned about the ultimate fate of these powerful vessels. It was therefore decided that the French fleet must be put permanently out of Hitler's reach, and that the vacuum created by its absence in the Mediterranean should be filled by creating *Force H under Admiral *Somerville.

As a first move all French ships in British ports were seized on 3July 1940. The same day Force H was dispatched to Mers-El-Kebir where Somerville opened negotiations with Admiral Marcel Gensoul who commanded the French naval forces there. Initially, Gensoul refused to see Somerville's emissary and the negotiations were conducted in writing. The French admiral was given four options:

1. put to sea and join forces with the Royal Navy;
2. sail with reduced crews to any British port where the ships would be impounded and the crews repatriated;
3. sail with reduced crews to a French port int he West Indies where the ships would be immobilized;
4. scuttle his ships within six hours.

The Admiralty also instructed Somerville that should Gensoul refuse all these offers it would allow the ships to be immobilized in their present berths. Givne the conditions laid down by the Admiralty, this was an impractical proposition and so was never mentioned to Gensoul. He was told that if he refused to agree to any of the terms his ships were to be sunk. Gensoul reported the negotiations to the French Admiralty by signalling only that he had been told to scuttle his ships within six hours or force would be used. As a consequence, and not surprisingly, Gensoul was given full authority to resist.

When Gensoul at last agreed to meet an emissary, Somerville, who was profoundly unhappy about using force, delated taking any action for as long as possible. But while the emissary was still aboard Gensoul's flagship, Dunkerque, the French admiralty sent a plain-language signal ordering all French naval forces to the Mediterranean to move to Oran and to put themselves at Gensoul's disposal. This message was intercepted by the Admiralty which ordered Somerville to proceed quickly before he had to deal with reinforcements as well as with the forces before him.

Somerville's emissary left Dunkerque at 1725 having already informed Somerville that Gensoul still refused to comply exactly with any of the four options, and at 1754 Somerville opened fire. The battleship Bretagne blew up, several other ships were seriously damaged, and 1,297 lives were lost. Dunkerque was only slightly damaged, but was crippled by torpedo aircraft during a second attack on 6 July. Strasbourg and six other ships escaped, as did some cruisers stationed at Algiers.

Two days after the bombardment the French battleship Richelieu, at Dakar, was attacked by torpedo aircraft from the carrier Hermes and damaged, but at Alexandria the British C-in-C Mediterranean, Admiral *Cunningham, persuaded the French admiral to disarm his ships, thus avoiding more bloodshed.

Mers-El-Kebir created great tension between the French and the British. The Vichy government broke off diplomatic relations and French torpedo bombers made a retaliatory raid on Gibraltar. But it clearly showed the world in general, and the Americans in particular, that though apparently on the brink of defeat the British would stop at nothing to win the battle for the *Mediterranean and to achieve eventual victory.

Note: Marder, A., From the Dardanelles to Oran: Studies of the Royal Navy in War and Peace, 1915-1940 (Oxford, 1974)

Acebuckeye13
Nov 2, 2010

Against All Tyrants

Ultra Carp

Randomcheese3 posted:

Dunkerque and Strasbourg, by role, were intended to fight cruisers in defence of trade, rather than to fight in the battleline; this is why I consider them 'large cruisers', rather than battleships or battlecruisers. In terms of armament or armour, they were outclassed by any British battleship. While they were faster than the older British battleships, Hood had them beaten in almost any category.

Eeeehhhhhh, while I understand your reasoning, I think it's still a mistake to refer to them merely as "Large Cruisers." While each individual British battleship was certainly more capable, they were still very powerful warships with battleship-grade weapons and armor. Nothing less than a battleship is going to stand up to 13" guns, and nothing less than a battleship would have been sufficient to defeat or deter them on the open seas. There's certainly a reason the British considered it so important that they be neutralized or sunk.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

Randomcheese3 posted:

Dunkerque and Strasbourg, by role, were intended to fight cruisers in defence of trade, rather than to fight in the battleline; this is why I consider them 'large cruisers', rather than battleships or battlecruisers. In terms of armament or armour, they were outclassed by any British battleship.

This is not how battleships or battlecruisers were defined and it goes against what the French actually considered them to be: they were (and are still) referred to as either being a navire de ligne (ship of the line) or a cuirassé (battleship).

Taerkar
Dec 7, 2002

kind of into it, really

Their final configuration was designed to handle the German Deutschlands and the Strasbourg was further modified with more belt armor because of the Italian Littorios.

Hell, they were better or comparably armored to most of the British battlecruisers before the chonky boy that was Hood

Nessus
Dec 22, 2003

After a Speaker vote, you may be entitled to a valuable coupon or voucher!



Slim Jim Pickens posted:

De Gaulle had no legal justification for what he did. I guess you could call him a rebel. The only precedent is that every other occupied country in Europe set up a government-in-exile. At the same time, you gotta respect game
I imagine that it helped considerably that his side won the war and also did not come under the loving embrace of Joseph Stalin

Rocko Bonaparte
Mar 12, 2002

Every day is Friday!
Let's say you were given a self-published book from somebody you don't immediately want to piss off, but they hope that you will read it. Let us say that it is supposed to be the first book in a historical fiction series about a Scottish "military family" that moved to the US in the 1740s, with each book following a subsequent generation's involvement in various wars and such. Let's say you got this from somebody in Texas and you fully expect that they'll be fighting for the Confederacy in one of the books. What kind of bingo card of tropes would you assemble and prepare to fill out before becoming violent with the first book?

I'm going to assume one of the bingo squares would have to do with something about liberty and the King of England instead of them fleeing after cattle raiding instead.

Edit: I just think there's some kind of Southern land mine here I don't really understand and somebody here probably knows a strange amount of detail about Scots-Irish obsessions in the US.

Nenonen
Oct 22, 2009

Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa
It seems to me utterly paranoid to think that Germans would have just grabbed French battleships and used them against Britain. Germans if any knew how quick it was to scuttle an entire fleet under threat, and even in the unlikely occasion that they could have taken over the ships intact and with zero sabotage, they would have needed to train an entire crew to run the drat things. And a battleship is such a complex vessel that I doubt they would have gotten anywhere in a long while.

Brits simply panicked in 1940. It seems like this was characteristic for Churchill, grasping at any straws you can just because you can. Or rather, because Britain had a stronk navy, it had to be utilized even in situations where there was no apparent benefit. Gallipoli comes to mind.

Alchenar
Apr 9, 2008

Slim Jim Pickens posted:

De Gaulle had no legal justification for what he did. I guess you could call him a rebel. The only precedent is that every other occupied country in Europe set up a government-in-exile. At the same time, you gotta respect game

Oh yeah France has no other precedent for a general-in-exile returning from overseas to overthrow a foreign imposed government and restore France to greatness.

feedmegin
Jul 30, 2008

Nenonen posted:

It seems to me utterly paranoid to think that Germans would have just grabbed French battleships and used them against Britain.

....but they tried to do exactly that??

feedmegin
Jul 30, 2008

Rocko Bonaparte posted:

Let's say you were given a self-published book from somebody you don't immediately want to piss off, but they hope that you will read it. Let us say that it is supposed to be the first book in a historical fiction series about a Scottish "military family" that moved to the US in the 1740s, with each book following a subsequent generation's involvement in various wars and such. Let's say you got this from somebody in Texas and you fully expect that they'll be fighting for the Confederacy in one of the books. What kind of bingo card of tropes would you assemble and prepare to fill out before becoming violent with the first book?

I'm going to assume one of the bingo squares would have to do with something about liberty and the King of England instead of them fleeing after cattle raiding instead.

Edit: I just think there's some kind of Southern land mine here I don't really understand and somebody here probably knows a strange amount of detail about Scots-Irish obsessions in the US.

The obvious jumping off point would be a Highlander fleeing or being deported after the '45. Probably fought at Culloden.

Slim Jim Pickens
Jan 16, 2012

Alchenar posted:

Oh yeah France has no other precedent for a general-in-exile returning from overseas to overthrow a foreign imposed government and restore France to greatness.

This was regarded by everybody else as illegal and they collected a big multinational army to destroy him

Nessus posted:

I imagine that it helped considerably that his side won the war and also did not come under the loving embrace of Joseph Stalin

Well he won, and more importantly, he won all the intra-france power struggles with the various defectors, as well as the political recognition fight with the UK and USA, who were otherwise going to appoint whoever they liked as head of Free French forces. In terms of Game, he was France's Mao,

Polyakov
Mar 22, 2012


Nenonen posted:

It seems to me utterly paranoid to think that Germans would have just grabbed French battleships and used them against Britain. Germans if any knew how quick it was to scuttle an entire fleet under threat, and even in the unlikely occasion that they could have taken over the ships intact and with zero sabotage, they would have needed to train an entire crew to run the drat things. And a battleship is such a complex vessel that I doubt they would have gotten anywhere in a long while.

Brits simply panicked in 1940. It seems like this was characteristic for Churchill, grasping at any straws you can just because you can. Or rather, because Britain had a stronk navy, it had to be utilized even in situations where there was no apparent benefit. Gallipoli comes to mind.

Its not paranoia when they are really out to get you. You have a collaborationist government in Vichy france, presumably thousands if not millions of Frenchmen willing to cooperate with it, even if not enthusiastically, why exactly is it so implausible to think that they could crew the vessels? This is a government who has already broken the diplomatic agreement to fight to the last together. Are you really willing to bet the outcome of a war that you are quite badly losing at this stage on the word of such people? Its a very cold, ruthless but intensely calculated move, a type of move that hundreds are made in the course of any war. The comparison to Gallipoli is... deranged? I have no idea what you are getting at.

Also seperately Toulon 1944.

feedmegin
Jul 30, 2008

Randomcheese3 posted:

Dunkerque and Strasbourg, by role, were intended to fight cruisers in defence of trade, rather than to fight in the battleline; this is why I consider them 'large cruisers', rather than battleships or battlecruisers.

Tell me exactly what do you think the doctrinal role of a battleCRUISER is? (It's not to fight in the line of battle even if they were misused that way)

FrangibleCover
Jan 23, 2018

Nothing going on in my quiet corner of the Pacific.

This is the life. I'm just lying here in my hammock in Townsville, sipping a G&T.
If Holland wasn't acceptable, who did Somerville have with him who outranked Holland and wasn't him himself? Like, this is the captain of Ark Royal, in less than a year he's going to be given Hood and PoW. He's not just some random.

Randomcheese3
Sep 6, 2011

"It's like no cheese I've ever tasted."

Xiahou Dun posted:

Wait so first Gensoul was offended by the bad French, I wanna see this letter. I read French, lay it on me.

David Brown, in his Road to Oran, quotes the message as:

quote:

La Marine Royale espère que les propositions vont vous permettre, la
Marine Nationale Française vaillante et glorieuse, de se ranger a nos
côtés. En ce cas vos bâtiments resteraient toujours les votres et personne
n’aurait pas besoin d’aucun anxiété dans l’avenir. La Flotte Britannique
est au large d’Oran pour vous accueillir.


I should reiterate that the major problem that Gensoul had with it was that it was not a private communication to him, but a general message broadcast to the whole fleet, making public what he expected to be relatively private negotiations. It being in poor French merely exacerbated the problems, implying that the British were also not taking those negotiations seriously.


Acebuckeye13 posted:

Eeeehhhhhh, while I understand your reasoning, I think it's still a mistake to refer to them merely as "Large Cruisers." While each individual British battleship was certainly more capable, they were still very powerful warships with battleship-grade weapons and armor. Nothing less than a battleship is going to stand up to 13" guns, and nothing less than a battleship would have been sufficient to defeat or deter them on the open seas. There's certainly a reason the British considered it so important that they be neutralized or sunk.

I generally use the term 'large cruisers' to refer to ships like the Dunkerques, Deutschlands and Alaskas. All these classes had heavy enough armament and thick enough armour to kill any treaty cruiser out there, but not quite on the same level as battleships. They were built primarily for the commerce war, protecting or attacking merchant shipping, rather than for battlefleet action as battleships and battlecruisers were. They were still powerful ships, it's just useful to have a term that distinguishes them by role.



feedmegin posted:

Tell me exactly what do you think the doctrinal role of a battleCRUISER is? (It's not to fight in the line of battle even if they were misused that way)

Battlecruisers were built primarily to provide heavy support to a fleet's scouting cruisers; when a battlefleet action was joined, they would be attached to the battleline to provide it with a fast wing to outflank the enemy line, screen the fleet's withdrawal or chase a fleeing enemy. They were never expected to form the primary part of the battleline, and were never used that way - at Jutland, the vast majority of the damage done to the British and German battlecruisers was done by other battlecruisers. The German battlecruisers did take damage from the Grand Fleet, but this only came when Scheer deployed them to screen his second withdrawal.

This role was one they had inherited from the first-class armoured cruisers that preceded them - a British 1901 exercise report, for example, stated that 'The opinion on the use of armoured Cruisers is practically unanimous,
that with their speed and protection they should be utilised
for attacking the van and rear of the enemy from the very commencement
of the engagement'. The design document that led to the Invincibles stated clearly that the main missions of the new 'armoured cruiser' was to scout for the fleet, chase off enemy scouts and to chase and harass a fleeing fleet. She should also be able to, if needs be, sit in the line of battle.

FrangibleCover posted:

If Holland wasn't acceptable, who did Somerville have with him who outranked Holland and wasn't him himself? Like, this is the captain of Ark Royal, in less than a year he's going to be given Hood and PoW. He's not just some random.

Somerville had Vice Admiral Wells with him; Wells was Vice Admiral Commanding Aircraft Carriers, Force H, and might have been more acceptable to Gensoul. At the same time, Holland was an emminently sensible decision from his point of view, given Holland's rank, history and so on. He could not necessarily predict how Gensoul would react.

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feedmegin
Jul 30, 2008

Randomcheese3 posted:

Battlecruisers were built primarily to provide heavy support to a fleet's scouting cruisers

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battlecruiser 'The goal of the design was to outrun any ship with similar armament, and chase down any ship with lesser armament; they were intended to hunt down slower, older armoured cruisers and destroy them with heavy gunfire while avoiding combat with the more powerful but slower battleships'

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunkerque-class_battleship ' Smaller and less heavily armed and armoured than all other treaty battleships, the Dunkerques have sometimes been referred to as battlecruisers.'

Of course, the one time there was a real 'line of battle' was Jutland, pretty much, but in WW2 they were (mis)used to fight enemy battleships. That wasn't their intended role, though, their intended role was exactly that of the Dunkerque class. They could fulfil that role with good effect (at great risk), however, and so could have the Dunkerques.

I'm sorry, but downgrading these ships to just 'cruisers' to reduce their apparent threat is at odds with, like, everybody on earth and has me wondering here if you are literally the reincarnation of Pierre Laval or something.

feedmegin fucked around with this message at 13:02 on Oct 24, 2021

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