December 2021 CE: WTF, FL?

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Internet VFW > December 2021 CE: WTF, FL?

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

LtCol J. Krusinski posted:

Could someone please, PLEASE, copy and paste the strike cell article in here? I�m phone bound and can�t get around the pay-wall.

You�ll gain my eternal gratitude.

Got you. Fromatting may be weird cause of page breaks, but.. :effort:

quote:

A single top secret American strike cell launched tens of thousands of bombs and missiles against the Islamic State in Syria, but in the process of hammering a vicious enemy, the shadowy force sidestepped safeguards and repeatedly killed civilians, according to multiple current and former military and intelligence officials.

The unit was called Talon Anvil, and it worked in three shifts around the clock between 2014 and 2019, pinpointing targets for the United States� formidable air power to hit: convoys, car bombs, command centers and squads of enemy fighters.

But people who worked with the strike cell say in the rush to destroy enemies, it circumvented rules imposed to protect noncombatants, and alarmed its partners in the military and the C.I.A. by killing people who had no role in the conflict: farmers trying to harvest, children in the street, families fleeing fighting, and villagers sheltering in buildings.

Talon Anvil was small � at times fewer than 20 people operating from anonymous rooms cluttered with flat screens � but it played an outsize role in the 112,000 bombs and missiles launched against the Islamic State, in part because it embraced a loose interpretation of the military�s rules of engagement.

�They were ruthlessly efficient and good at their jobs,� said one former Air Force intelligence officer who worked on hundreds of classified Talon Anvil missions from 2016 to 2018. �But they also made a lot of bad strikes.�

The military billed the air war against the Islamic State as the most precise and humane in military history, and said strict rules and oversight by top leaders kept civilian deaths to a minimum despite a ferocious pace of bombing. In reality, four current and former military officials say, the majority of strikes were ordered not by top leaders but by relatively low-ranking U.S. Army Delta Force commandos in Talon Anvil.

U.S. forces and members of the Syrian Democratic Forces patrolling the Kurdish-held town of Darbasiyah in northeastern Syria in 2018.
U.S. forces and members of the Syrian Democratic Forces patrolling the Kurdish-held town of Darbasiyah in northeastern Syria in 2018.Credit...Delil Souleiman / AFP via Getty Images

The New York Times reported last month that a Special Operations bombing run in 2019 killed dozens of women and children, and that the aftermath was concealed from the public and top military leaders. In November, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III ordered a high-level investigation into the strike, which was carried out by Talon Anvil.

But people who saw the task force operate firsthand say the 2019 strike was part of a pattern of reckless strikes that started years earlier.

When presented with The Times�s findings, several current and former senior Special Operations officers denied any widespread pattern of reckless airstrikes by the strike cell and disregard for limiting civilian casualties. Capt. Bill Urban, a spokesman for the military�s Central Command, which oversees operations in Syria, declined to comment.

As bad strikes mounted, the four military officials said, Talon Anvil�s partners sounded the alarm. Pilots over Syria at times refused to drop bombs because Talon Anvil wanted to hit questionable targets in densely populated areas. Senior C.I.A. officers complained to Special Operations leaders about the disturbing pattern of strikes. Air Force teams doing intelligence work argued with Talon Anvil over a secure phone known as the red line. And even within Talon Anvil, some members at times refused to participate in strikes targeting people who did not seem to be in the fight.

The four officials worked in different parts of the war effort, but all interacted directly with Talon Anvil on hundreds of strikes and soon grew concerned with its way of operating. They reported what they were seeing to immediate superiors and the command overseeing the air war, but say they were ignored.

The former Air Force intelligence officer, who worked almost daily on missions from 2016 to 2018, said he notified the main Air Force operations center in the region about civilian casualties several times, including after a March 2017 strike when Talon Anvil dropped a 500-pound bomb on a building where about 50 people were sheltering. But he said leaders seemed reluctant to scrutinize a strike cell that was driving the offensive on the battlefield.

Every year that the strike cell operated, the civilian casualty rate in Syria increased significantly, according to Larry Lewis, a former Pentagon and State Department adviser who was one of the authors of a 2018 Defense Department report on civilian harm. Mr. Lewis, who has viewed the Pentagon�s classified civilian casualty data for Syria, said the rate was 10 times that of similar operations he tracked in Afghanistan.

�It was much higher than I would have expected from a U.S. unit,� Mr. Lewis said. �The fact that it increased dramatically and steadily over a period of years shocked me.�

Mr. Lewis said commanders enabled the tactics by failing to emphasize the importance of reducing civilian casualties, and that Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, who commanded the offensive against the Islamic State in 2016 and 2017, was dismissive of widespread reports from news media and human rights organizations describing the mounting toll.

In a telephone interview, General Townsend, who now heads the military�s Africa Command, said outside organizations that tracked civilian harm claims often did not vet allegations rigorously enough. But he strongly denied that he didn�t take civilian casualties seriously. �There�s nothing further from the truth,� said General Townsend, who added that as commander he ordered monthly civilian casualty reports in Iraq and Syria be made public. He blamed any civilian casualties on �the misfortunes of war� and not because �we didn�t care.�

Image
Smoke billowed from Raqqa after a coalition airstrike in July 2017.
Smoke billowed from Raqqa after a coalition airstrike in July 2017.Credit...Delil Souleiman/AFP via Getty Images
With few Americans on the ground, it was difficult to get reliable counts of civilian deaths, according to Gen. Joseph L. Votel, the head of the military�s Central Command at the time, and General Townsend�s boss.

�Our ability to get out and look after a strike was extraordinarily limited � it was an imperfect system,� General Votel said in a telephone interview. �But I believe we always took this seriously and tried to do our best.�

Tips, Intercepts and Strikes
Officially, Talon Anvil never existed. Nearly everything it did was highly classified. The strike cell�s actions in Syria were gleaned from descriptions of top secret reports and interviews with current and former military personnel who interacted with the group and who discussed it on the condition that they not be named.

The strike cell was run by a classified Special Operations unit called Task Force 9 that oversaw the ground offensive in Syria. The task force had multiple missions. Army Green Berets trained allied Syrian Kurdish and Arab forces. Small groups of Delta Force operators embedded with ground forces, and an assault team of Delta commandos were on call to launch ground raids on high-value targets, including the Islamic State leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Most of the firepower, though, was run by Talon Anvil. It worked out of bland office spaces, first in Erbil, Iraq, and then, as the war progressed, in Syria, at a shuttered cement plant in the north, and at a housing complex near the Iraqi border called Green Village, former task force members said.

The cell used tips from allied ground forces, secret electronic intercepts, drone cameras and other information to find enemy targets, then hit them with munitions from drones or called in strikes from other coalition aircraft. It also coordinated air support for allied Kurdish and Arab forces fighting on the ground.

Outwardly, the operators showed few signs that they were military, said a former task force member who worked with the strike cell during the height of the war in 2017. They used first names and no rank or uniforms, and many had bushy beards and went to work in shorts and footwear that included Crocs and Birkenstocks. But from their strike room, they controlled a fleet of Predator and Reaper drones that bristled with precision Hellfire missiles and laser-guided bombs.

The task force had a second strike cell that worked with the C.I.A. to hunt high-value Islamic State leaders. It used similar tools, but often tracked a target for days or weeks, and accounted for a fraction of the strikes.

Both cells were created in 2014 when the Islamic State had overrun large parts of Iraq and Syria. Within a few years, the self-declared caliphate was attacking allies in the Middle East and launching terrorist attacks in Europe. The United States was desperate for a force that could identify enemy targets, and put Delta Force in charge.

Early in the American-led offensive, which was known as Operation Inherent Resolve, the military struggled to function at �the speed of war,� as only high-ranking generals from outside Delta could approve strikes, according to a RAND Corporation report on the air war. Seventy-four percent of sorties returned without dropping any weapons, and the offensive began to stall.

Tactics changed late in 2016 when General Townsend took command and, in an attempt to keep pace with a rapidly expanding offensive, moved the authority to approve strikes down to the level of on-scene commanders.

Within Task Force 9, that authority was effectively pushed even lower, a senior official with extensive experience in Iraq and Syria said, to the senior enlisted Delta operator on shift in the strike room � usually a sergeant first class or master sergeant.

Image
Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, center, lowered the level of authority to approve strikes to on-scene commanders, increasing the number of strikes.
Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, center, lowered the level of authority to approve strikes to on-scene commanders, increasing the number of strikes.Credit...Mosa'ab Elshamy/Associated Press
Under the new rules, the strike cell was still required to follow a process of intelligence gathering and risk mitigation to limit harm to civilians before launching a strike. That often meant flying drones over targets for hours to make sure the cell could positively identify enemies and determine whether civilians were in the area.

But the Delta operators were under enormous pressure to protect allied ground troops and move the offensive forward, the former task force member said, and felt hobbled by the safeguards. So in early 2017, they found a way to strike more quickly: self-defense.

Most of Operation Inherent Resolve�s restrictions applied only to offensive strikes. There were far fewer restrictions for defensive strikes that were meant to protect allied forces under imminent threat of harm. So Talon Anvil began claiming that nearly every strike was in self-defense, which enabled them to move quickly with little second-guessing or oversight, even if their targets were miles from any fighting, two former task force members said.

The classified rules of engagement warned that self-defense strikes should not be used to circumvent the more restrictive rules for offensive strikes, two officers with knowledge of the rules said. But for Talon Anvil, there was a tenuous logic to the tactic, one of the former task force members said. If defense rules allowed Talon Anvil to attack an enemy target on the front lines, then why not the same type of target 10 or even 100 miles away that might one day be on the front lines? Soon Talon Anvil was justifying nearly every strike as defensive.

�It�s more expedient to resort to self-defense,� said Mr. Lewis, the former Pentagon adviser. �It�s easier to get approved.�

But speeding up strikes meant less time to gather intelligence and sort enemy fighters from civilians, and the four former military personnel who worked with Talon Anvil said that too often the cell relied on flimsy intelligence from Kurdish and Arab ground forces or rushed to attack with little regard to who might be nearby.

One former task force member said the vast majority of Talon Anvil�s strikes killed only enemy fighters, but that the Delta operators in the strike cell were biased toward hitting and often decided something was an enemy target when there was scant supporting evidence. Part of the problem, he said, was that operators, who rotated through roughly every four months, were trained as elite commandos but had little experience running a strike cell. It addition, he said, the daily demands of overseeing strike after strike seemed to erode operators� perspective and fray their humanity.

The former Air Force intelligence officer said he saw so many civilian deaths as a result of Talon Anvil�s tactics citing self-defense that he eventually grew jaded and accepted them as part of the job. Even still, some attacks stood out.

In one, he said, Talon Anvil followed three men, all with canvas bags, working in an olive grove near the city of Manbij in the fall of 2016. The men had no weapons, and were not near any fighting, but the strike cell insisted they must be enemy fighters and killed them with a missile.

Image
Syrians fleeing their homes in the regional capital of Raqqa in July 2017.
Syrians fleeing their homes in the regional capital of Raqqa in July 2017.Credit...Bulent Kilic/Agence France-Presse � Getty Images
In another, as civilians were trying to flee fighting in the city of Raqqa in June 2017, scores of people boarded makeshift ferries to cross the Euphrates River. He said the task force claimed the ferries were carrying enemy fighters, and he watched on high-definition video as it hit multiple boats, killing at least 30 civilians, whose bodies drifted away in the green water.

A senior military official with direct knowledge of the task force said that what counted as an �imminent threat� was extremely subjective and Talon Anvil�s senior Delta operators were given broad authority to launch defensive strikes. At times, the official acknowledged, that led to bad strikes, and those who showed poor judgment were removed. But the official emphasized these instances were rare.

Fighters, or Children?
As airstrikes escalated in 2017, a broad array of U.S. partners working with the strike cell grew troubled by its tactics.

The C.I.A. had officers embedded in Task Force 9 to supply intelligence on Islamic State leaders and coordinate strikes. The agency was pursuing high-value individuals, and often tracked them for days using multiple drones, waiting to strike when civilian deaths could be minimized.

The task force did not always like to wait, two former C.I.A. officers said. C.I.A. personnel were shocked when they repeatedly saw the group strike with little regard for civilians. Officers reported their concerns to the Department of Defense�s Inspector General, and the agency�s leadership discussed the issue with top officers at the Joint Special Operations Command, one former C.I.A. officer said.

The officer said he never saw evidence that these concerns were taken seriously.

A C.I.A. spokesman declined to comment.

Talon Anvil also clashed at times with the Air Force intelligence teams based in the United States that helped to analyze the torrent of footage from drones. The Delta operators would push analysts to say they saw evidence such as weapons that could legally justify a strike, even when there was none, the former Air Force intelligence officer said. If one analyst did not see what Delta wanted, Delta would ask for a different one.

Delta Force and analysts sometimes argued over whether figures in the sights of a drone were fighters or children, one of the former task force members said.

All of the footage from the strikes is stored by the military. In an apparent attempt to blunt criticism and undercut potential investigations, Talon Anvil started directing drone cameras away from targets shortly before a strike hit, preventing the collection of video evidence, the former Air Force intelligence officer and one of the former task force members said.

Another Air Force officer, who reviewed dozens of task force strikes where civilians were reportedly killed, said that drone crews were trained to keep cameras on targets so the military could assess damage. Yet he frequently saw cameras jerk away at key moments, as if hit by a wind gust. It was only after seeing the pattern over and over, he said, that he began to believe it was done on purpose.

A Hunt for Targets
One morning before dawn in early March 2017, Talon Anvil sent a Predator drone over a Syrian farming town called Karama to cripple enemy positions in the area in preparation for an offensive by allies a week later.

For the former Air Force intelligence officer, the mission stands out as an example of Talon Anvil�s flawed way of operating, and how military leaders seemed to look the other way.

At about 4 a.m., he said, the drone arrived over the town�s flat-roofed houses. His Air Force intelligence team was watching from a secure operations center in the United States. A Talon Anvil operator typed a message into the chat room the cell shared with intelligence analysts: All civilians have fled the area. Anyone left is an enemy fighter. Find lots of targets for us today because we want to go Winchester.

Going Winchester meant expending all of the drone�s missiles and 500-pound bombs.

Image
Members of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces patrolling in the town of Karama in 2017.
Members of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces patrolling in the town of Karama in 2017.Credit...Delil Souleiman/Agence France-Presse � Getty Images
As the drone circled, the town appeared to be asleep, the former officer said. Even with infrared sensors, the team did not see movement. Talon Anvil focused in on a building and typed in the chat that a tip from ground forces indicated that the building was an enemy training center. Sensors suggested an enemy cellphone or radio might be in the neighborhood but was unable to pinpoint it to a single block, let alone a single building.

Talon Anvil did not wait for confirmation, and ordered a self-defense strike, the former officer said. The Predator dropped a 500-pound bomb through the roof.

As the smoke cleared, the former officer said, his team stared at their screens in dismay. The infrared cameras showed women and children staggering out of the partly collapsed building, some missing limbs, some dragging the dead.

The intelligence analysts began taking screen shots and tallying the casualties. They sent an initial battle damage assessment to Talon Anvil: 23 dead or severely wounded, 30 lightly wounded, very likely civilians. Talon Anvil paused only long enough to acknowledge the message, the former officer said, then pressed on to the next target.

The former Air Force officer said he immediately reported the civilian casualties to Operation Inherent Resolve�s operations center, then called the center�s liaison officer on the red line. He said he never heard back and saw no evidence that any action was ever taken.

Operation Inherent Resolve made a commitment to investigate and report every case of civilian casualties publicly, but nothing in its reports matches the incident. The true toll of the strike in Karama remains uncertain.

Video
Cinemagraph
Satellite images show significant damage from airstrikes in the Syrian town of Karama.CreditCredit...Satellite images � 2021 Maxar Technologies.
During a five-day window in early March, Operation Inherent Resolve acknowledged that it launched 47 strikes in the region. Satellite images from the time show extensive damage to at least a dozen buildings, including the building that the former officer said he saw bombed. Local media reported that airstrikes in Karama on March 8 and 9 killed between seven and 14 people and wounded 18.

For two years after the strikes, Operation Inherent Resolve said it could not confirm any civilian casualties in the town. Then, in 2019, it acknowledged that one man had been wounded when the coalition struck an enemy fighting position. It gave coordinates a block from the building the former Air Force intelligence officer said he saw destroyed.

In response to questions from The Times this month, a Special Operations official acknowledged its strike cell had hit targets in the town on March 8 and killed 16 fighters, but denied that any civilians had died.

No outside group has ever investigated the secret strike, and it is unclear what steps the military took to determine what happened. The former officer said no military investigators ever contacted him.

The evidence from the strike � the chat room records, bombing coordinates and video � is stored on government servers, the former officer said. But because of the secrecy surrounding Talon Anvil, all of it is classified.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 17:32

Adbot: ADBOT LOVES YOU

# ? May 24, 2024 00:09

AreWeDrunkYet: Jul 8, 2006

mlmp08 posted:

The strike cell article is important. In these forums, a lot of times you'll see former soldiers/marines/etc talking about how cops can pull poo poo they couldn't have as a member of the military. Individual cops might be able to pull individual misconduct, yes, but the machine built to enable dodgy targeting can have effects that reach farther than any individual mil member, save a truly dedicated murderer like Robert Bales, could ever achieve.

e: That's dismissive, sorry. But can any of this really be a surprise after regular reports of things like blowing up first responders ("double tap") or intentionally undercounting civilian casualties ("military aged male")?

AreWeDrunkYet fucked around with this message at 17:57 on Dec 13, 2021

# ? Dec 13, 2021 17:53

pantslesswithwolves: Oct 28, 2008

https://twitter.com/TIME/status/1470372755384291331

God. loving. Dammit.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 18:03

Marshal Prolapse: Jun 23, 2012; by Jeffrey of YOSPOS

Okay I'm going to post the obvious question. How do we fix this problem? I mean I love the drones and the flexibility they offer and the dramatically decreased risk to American and (most) Allied troops by not needing a plane in the air with a human flying it.

I figure the first thing is not delegating launch authority to lower ranks, second, probably should attach a JAG to these units (yes I know evil red tape and constraining "ARE TROOPS" but I'd like us to have better standards and aim to not commit war crimes, unlike say Wagner or the Russian Military).

Also

quote:

If defense rules allowed Talon Anvil to attack an enemy target on the front lines, then why not the same type of target 10 or even 100 miles away that might one day be on the front lines? Soon Talon Anvil was justifying nearly every strike as defensive.

Yeah, I think perhaps "it's coming right for us" should not have such a wide geographical range.

pantslesswithwolves posted:

https://twitter.com/TIME/status/1470372755384291331

God. loving. Dammit.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 18:05

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

It's not "surprise, strikes can be bad," but it is an example of how policy can start at the top. President Obama did a lot of striking, and took some flak for it. President Trump juiced that up by a massive margin and encouraged delegation of strikes and top cover for bad strikes as long as also some strikes hit valid targets. President Biden has immediately reigned in a lot of drone strike operations, especially of the SOF/CIA variety.

What's also notable is that this wasn't CIA doing CIA dodgy-rear end poo poo; it was uniformed members being called out by other uniformed members, but the strikes going forward anyway.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 18:06

AreWeDrunkYet: Jul 8, 2006

pantslesswithwolves posted:

https://twitter.com/TIME/status/1470372755384291331

God. loving. Dammit.

If it's any consolation, he has to go to the grave with that picture of him being on a magazine cover.

Also just to point out that 'person of the year' isn't an endorsement, just acknowledging they made an impact on the news. The alternatives where who, Ashley Babitt and Kyle Rittenhouse?

# ? Dec 13, 2021 18:08

Marshal Prolapse: Jun 23, 2012; by Jeffrey of YOSPOS

mlmp08 posted:

It's not "surprise, strikes can be bad," but it is an example of how policy can start at the top. President Obama did a lot of striking, and took some flak for it. President Trump juiced that up by a massive margin and encouraged delegation of strikes and top cover for bad strikes as long as also some strikes hit valid targets. President Biden has immediately reigned in a lot of drone strike operations, especially of the SOF/CIA variety.

Yep, I think part of the problem was just way too much delegation and a desire to just let the military run things (more for Trump, but these stuff all has a lineage with Obama).

mlmp08 posted:

What's also notable is that this wasn't CIA doing CIA dodgy-rear end poo poo; it was uniformed members being called out by other uniformed members, but the strikes going forward anyway.

Yeah, honestly it appears the CIA SAD people have a "higher" standard or at least tighter targeting requirements.

AreWeDrunkYet posted:

If it's any consolation, he has to go to the grave with that picture of him being on the front of a magazine cover.

Also just to point out that 'person of the year' isn't an endorsement, just acknowledging they made an impact on the news. The alternatives where who, Ashley Babitt and Kyle Rittenhouse?

At least the Taliban guys actually accomplished something this year...I mean yeah that sucks, but still more of an impact than Musk.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 18:08

AreWeDrunkYet: Jul 8, 2006

mlmp08 posted:

It's not "surprise, strikes can be bad," but it is an example of how policy can start at the top. President Obama did a lot of striking, and took some flak for it. President Trump juiced that up by a massive margin and encouraged delegation of strikes and top cover for bad strikes as long as also some strikes hit valid targets. President Biden has immediately reigned in a lot of drone strike operations, especially of the SOF/CIA variety.

What's also notable is that this wasn't CIA doing CIA dodgy-rear end poo poo; it was uniformed members being called out by other uniformed members, but the strikes going forward anyway.

But the policy was bad from the beginning, and I think my argument is that this is more of the expected result from how we handled things as a society rather than a cover-up - case in point, no one (in charge) is really even mad about this or any of the previous reporting on how the military took more initiative on blowing people up from the sky. Yes, oversight varied by administration, but ever since the early 2000s no one has had appetite for military oversight.

It's one thing when institutions recognize certain actions are deplorable and make an attempt to keep them out of the public eye, it's a different one when they're ignored or even encouraged to keep up with the behavior.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 18:14

maffew buildings: Apr 29, 2009; too dumb to be probated; not too dumb to be autobanned

https://mobile.twitter.com/chipfranklin/status/1470115952280932355

I was pretty worried but drat mic drop

# ? Dec 13, 2021 18:18

Defenestrategy: Oct 24, 2010

pantslesswithwolves posted:

God. loving. Dammit.

Can someone explain Elon Musks popularity?

He's not an engineer.

He's not a philanthropist as far as I can tell.

He's not a scientist.

He's not "self made".

I don't think he's ever actually setup a business besides being a large investor.

Like is "being a rich guy who throws money at potentially profitable business" really that worthy of praise?

# ? Dec 13, 2021 18:24

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

I wouldn�t get worked up about TIME Magazine�.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 18:30

not caring here: Feb 22, 2012; blazemastah 2 dry 4 u

Musk is just a techbro trump.

He attracts the not very bright and the people that are trying to get rich from him.

And that's about it.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 18:35

stealie72: Jan 10, 2007

pantslesswithwolves posted:

https://twitter.com/TIME/status/1470372755384291331

So...did the art department deliberately make this a Third Reich portrait? The nazi hair is on him, but everything else is their call.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 18:39

bulletsponge13: Apr 28, 2010

Time made me person of the Year twice. Their standards are pretty loving low.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 18:43

Midjack: Dec 24, 2007

Defenestrategy posted:

Can someone explain Elon Musks popularity?

He's not an engineer.

He's not a philanthropist as far as I can tell.

He's not a scientist.

He's not "self made".

I don't think he's ever actually setup a business besides being a large investor.

Like is "being a rich guy who throws money at potentially profitable business" really that worthy of praise?

He's what a dumb person thinks a smart person is and there are a lot of dumb people out there. He also took advantage of the coincidental rise in prominence of the previously-obscure-outside-of-comic-book-nerds Iron Man/Tony Stark character as a pop culture proxy, hell he had a throwaway appearance in the second movie getting blown off by Stark at an event.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 18:50

Stravag: Jun 7, 2009

pantslesswithwolves posted:

https://twitter.com/TIME/status/1470372755384291331

God. loving. Dammit.

Hitler got one as an attempt to get him to be more normal so maybe they're trying that here too?

# ? Dec 13, 2021 19:01

Mr. Nice!: Oct 13, 2005; bone shaking.
soul baking.

The owner of Time is a huge SpaceX investor.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 19:42

CRUSTY MINGE: Mar 30, 2011; Peggy Hill
Foot Connoisseur

bulletsponge13 posted:

Time made me person of the Year twice. Their standards are pretty loving low.

Time: the JD Power of magazines.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 19:42

McNally: Sep 13, 2007; Ask me about Proposition 305

Do you like muskets?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_57GKDXmXKk&t=85s

"I was Time Magazine's Man of the Year!"

"So was Hitler."

"Not twice!"

# ? Dec 13, 2021 19:49

Marshal Prolapse: Jun 23, 2012; by Jeffrey of YOSPOS

McNally posted:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_57GKDXmXKk&t=85s

"I was Time Magazine's Man of the Year!"

"So was Hitler."

"Not twice!"

Very underrated movie.

Also President Dan Ackroyd.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 19:58

CRUSTY MINGE: Mar 30, 2011; Peggy Hill
Foot Connoisseur

I prefer, was it Colonel? Dan Aykroyd from Sgt Bilko.

Dude is batshit crazy though.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 20:03

Wasabi the J: Jan 23, 2008; MOM WAS RIGHT

Defenestrategy posted:

Can someone explain Elon Musks popularity?

He's not an engineer.

He's not a philanthropist as far as I can tell.

He's not a scientist.

He's not "self made".

I don't think he's ever actually setup a business besides being a large investor.

Like is "being a rich guy who throws money at potentially profitable business" really that worthy of praise?

Yeah weird how a billionaire with investments moving money and messages over the internet would end up being championed by faceless masses on the same medium.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 20:13

Hyrax Attack!: Jan 13, 2009; We demand to be taken seriously

This decision got a lot of people to think and tweet about TIME so good call on their part.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 20:54

lightpole: Jun 4, 2004; I think that MBAs are useful, in case you are looking for an answer to the question of "Is lightpole a total fucking idiot".

Marshal Prolapse posted:

Okay I'm going to post the obvious question. How do we fix this problem? I mean I love the drones and the flexibility they offer and the dramatically decreased risk to American and (most) Allied troops by not needing a plane in the air with a human flying it.

I figure the first thing is not delegating launch authority to lower ranks, second, probably should attach a JAG to these units (yes I know evil red tape and constraining "ARE TROOPS" but I'd like us to have better standards and aim to not commit war crimes, unlike say Wagner or the Russian Military).

Also

Yeah, I think perhaps "it's coming right for us" should not have such a wide geographical range.

When you delegate you have to provide clear, objective guidelines and goals to go along with the authority. You also need to remember you can only ever delegate authority, never responsibility. Since you are responsible, you need to continually check up and make sure the result you are getting lines up with the goals you set. This requires clear, objective measurements. When you start running into "Its impossible, too difficult to measure" kind of responses you are on dangerous ground and need to re-examine your plan.

Lack of these things is usually a sign of incompetent leadership looking to avoid responsibility while lacking a plan and imagination. Most solutions are to remove authority and concentrate it higher up which removes flexibility and hinders people at the tip of the spear when they need to react to an emerging situation. Intervention at early stages is when problems are easier to fix after all. Delegation is a good thing when done right.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 20:59

PeterCat: Apr 8, 2020; Believe women.

Helicopters continue to lust for death:

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-59576082?fbclid=IwAR0ndiRI3HWxeh1WSyJe3HDUMwxBQc_fNdTF-I14BClJxYLE9gGjHsnsUeY

BBC posted:

Chief of Defence Staff Gen Bipin Rawat, his wife and 11 others died after the Mi-17V5 helicopter crashed in the southern state of Tamil Nadu.

An inquiry has been ordered to ascertain the cause of the crash.

India's defence minister Rajnath Singh paid homage to the victims on Thursday in parliament.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 21:18

Elendil004: Mar 22, 2003; The prognosis
is not good.

https://www.tampabay.com/news/breaking-news/2021/12/11/coast-guard-cutter-undergoing-repairs-catches-fire-at-port-tampa-bay/

quote:

A fire broke out Friday night aboard a U.S. Coast Guard cutter in dry dock at Port Tampa Bay, sending flames shooting through the roof of the 150-foot vessel, Tampa Fire Rescue said.

Workers at the dock noticed smoke coming from the Sentinel-class cutter Benjamin Dailey and called 911. The first fire rescue crews responded at 7:30 p.m. and saw flames rising from below the deck through the roof of the 350-ton vessel.

Please don't be arson. Please don't be arson.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 21:34

Crab Dad: Dec 28, 2002; behold i have tempered and refined thee, but not as silver; as CRAB

Looks Mondays can�t end soon enough for some dock yard hands.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 21:49

shame on an IGA: Apr 8, 2005

pissy dockworkers have to be the highest ROI naval weapons system in history at this point

# ? Dec 13, 2021 22:09

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

lightpole posted:

You also need to remember you can only ever delegate authority, never responsibility.

I get that�s how the dictionary works, but not so much in practice.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 22:26

Milo and POTUS: Sep 3, 2017; I will not shut up about the Mighty Morphin Power Rangers. I talk about them all the time and work them into every conversation I have. I built a shrine in my room for the yellow one who died because sadly no one noticed because she died around 9/11. Wanna see it?

shame on an IGA posted:

pissy dockworkers have to be the highest ROI naval weapons system in history at this point

Isn't this like a handful of crimes the british still use capital punishment for

# ? Dec 13, 2021 22:40

shame on an IGA: Apr 8, 2005

Milo and POTUS posted:

Isn't this like a handful of crimes the british still use capital punishment for

it fell off the list in 1971 but the only 3 to outlast it were espionage (1981), piracy(1998), and treason(1998).

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arson_in_royal_dockyards

shame on an IGA fucked around with this message at 23:07 on Dec 13, 2021

# ? Dec 13, 2021 23:05

Platystemon: Feb 13, 2012; BREADS

AreWeDrunkYet posted:

Also just to point out that 'person of the year' isn't an endorsement, just acknowledging they made an impact on the news. The alternatives where who, Ashley Babitt and Kyle Rittenhouse?

Give a group award again and this time make it gender-inclusive.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 23:14

Magugu: Mar 30, 2013; I came to drink, fight, and f@ck. And im fresh outta beer, so what will it be?

pantslesswithwolves posted:

https://twitter.com/TIME/status/1470372755384291331

God. loving. Dammit.

I was Time Person of the Year in 2003 and 2006. Eat my rear end Elon.

# ? Dec 13, 2021 23:57

Platystemon: Feb 13, 2012; BREADS

The whole �Man of the Year� thing started because TIME was shamed for not giving participation trophy to a fascist, and I don�t mean 1938 MotY Adolf Hitler.

# ? Dec 14, 2021 00:02

Marshal Prolapse: Jun 23, 2012; by Jeffrey of YOSPOS

https://youtu.be/bi-tlqvWslg
Some lighter content.

If you�re only on watch a minute or two just start at seven minutes and twenty seconds.

Marshal Prolapse fucked around with this message at 00:14 on Dec 14, 2021

# ? Dec 14, 2021 00:04

CRUSTY MINGE: Mar 30, 2011; Peggy Hill
Foot Connoisseur

# ? Dec 14, 2021 00:15

Platystemon: Feb 13, 2012; BREADS

https://twitter.com/keeptalkingGR/status/1447184586501509122

These Greek doctors for PotY 2021

# ? Dec 14, 2021 01:27

CRUSTY MINGE: Mar 30, 2011; Peggy Hill
Foot Connoisseur

I hope the doctors are allowed to keep the bribes.

# ? Dec 14, 2021 01:30

Defenestrategy: Oct 24, 2010

CRUSTY MINGE posted:

I hope the doctors are allowed to keep the bribes.

what bribes? All I see are contributions in appreciation for adequate delivery of service.

# ? Dec 14, 2021 01:50

Adbot: ADBOT LOVES YOU

# ? May 24, 2024 00:09

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

https://twitter.com/paulmcleary/status/1470483713821745159?s=21

oh, okay

# ? Dec 14, 2021 01:52

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Internet VFW > December 2021 CE: WTF, FL?

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