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I'm with Blackburn on this one, only biologists should have a vote on laws regulating women's bodies that just makes sense
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Mar 23, 2022 22:24
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I mean to be clear theres a lot more in that post I just didn't have the time to sit down and redo all of Leon's formatting
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Mar 23, 2022 22:28
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Evil Fluffy posted:
And I meant questionable in the sense that the article raised questions that were discussed, not that the ruling was actually shown to be bad because yeah guy complaining had 3 million reasons to be mad he didn't get his legal fee lol
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Mar 23, 2022 22:32
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The regular fuckwads are using the microphone to point out that they are Very Not Racist, Actually Racism Isn't Real, It's All Just A Coincidence, Heil Hitler These hearings are kinda confirming for me that we will not be a democracy in three years time.
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Mar 24, 2022 07:35
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We already ain't a democracy, that ship sailed years ago, so there's that. There's many different things you could point to that are germane if you wish: scotus overturning maps drawn in accordance with state laws, gutting of the vra, Shelby county, citizens united, bush v gore. That's just what's strictly scotus and not even all the horseshit republicans have done like McConnell's obstruction, trump, state level poo poo that's too numerous to even start. It won't even take 3 years for the farce to be completely unmasked, this year's elections will be the death knell.
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Mar 24, 2022 08:00
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If you wanna put on your tinfoil hat, republicans complained about dominion and smartmatic in 2020 because they’ve been using es&s to do rig republican states for a decade plus.
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Mar 24, 2022 12:03
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Mr. Nice! posted:If you wanna put on your tinfoil hat, republicans complained about dominion and smartmatic in 2020 because they’ve been using es&s to do rig republican states for a decade plus. It's not really tinfoil. There's been data supporting it for a while. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/something-fishy-in-south-carolina/ https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/sc-democratic-primary-getting-weirder/amp/ https://apnews.com/article/north-america-lawsuits-us-news-ap-top-news-elections-877ee1015f1c43f1965f63538b035d3f Hieronymous Alloy fucked around with this message at 12:28 on Mar 24, 2022 |
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Mar 24, 2022 12:26
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mdemone posted:I dunno. If he'd been released they'd have fallen all over themselves to let us know. He's 73 and he's been in the hospital for five straight nights. Somebody can work the statistical tables on that but the odds are stacking up. Well the hell scenario is if he somehow falls into a Schivao-esque comatose state, leading towards obstruction on a new justice being added to the court to replace him.
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Mar 24, 2022 15:16
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GhostofJohnMuir posted:i think you can trace a significant amount of responsibility for the current composition of the court and the political realities it represents to robert's rulings on the vra. in the end how much does it matter if roberts stifles the most egregious impulses of the other conservative justices if he's eager to reinforce and accelerate the forces guaranteeing that those same types of highly partisan justices will retain a majority for the foreseeable future? at best it just seems to be taking solace in the prospect that the worst blows will land on the next generation rather than us Whose seat is the result of the previous decision in bush v gore and so on. It’s more correct to say that both of these are the product of the conservative legal project. Their goals are bigger.
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Mar 24, 2022 15:28
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Jaxyon posted:How can you make rulings on the rights of women and deciding who is or is not a woman when you are not a biologist and therefor could not define a woman? by this logic why are these assholes deciding anything? food for thought
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Mar 24, 2022 17:11
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E: wrong thread
VitalSigns fucked around with this message at 17:37 on Mar 24, 2022 |
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Mar 24, 2022 17:22
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A lot of the successes conservatives have had are the result of blindly pushing on simplistic desires and animal passions without considering future consequences. There are definitely entities out there with schemes and multi-year plans about which they try to strategize, but the slide into reactionary hell seems to me largely the result of momentum vs careful planning. Those howling atavisms at school board meetings don’t understand what they’re doing beyond surrendering to the pleasure of emotional frenzy, I don’t think. The people encouraging them just want to kill as many black people as possible.
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Mar 24, 2022 17:30
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Potato Salad posted:The regular fuckwads are using the microphone to point out that they are Very Not Racist, Actually Racism Isn't Real, It's All Just A Coincidence, Heil Hitler At best we stopped being a Democracy 22 years ago and the 2024 election is likely going to be when the GOP retake single party control of the Federal government and never let it go and they've been making drat sure that even a Trump gently caress up like in 2020 can't cost them control in the future. The US is heading towards a bad end and the only question is how bloody it's going to be and if anyone will be around after the dust settles.
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Mar 24, 2022 17:55
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I AM GRANDO posted:A lot of the successes conservatives have had are the result of blindly pushing on simplistic desires and animal passions without considering future consequences. There are definitely entities out there with schemes and multi-year plans about which they try to strategize, but the slide into reactionary hell seems to me largely the result of momentum vs careful planning. Having frenzied idiots who put you into power and focus exclusively on narratives presented by conservative pundits is the product if a multi-decade plan, which is largely bearing fruit in this moment.
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Mar 24, 2022 17:56
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https://twitter.com/kentnish/status/1506726637412532228?s=20&t=stvYlWZhoJaJpC9JvRUEgg
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Mar 24, 2022 17:58
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 Opinion! WISCONSIN LEGISLATURE, ET AL. v. WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION, ET AL. TLDR: The Voting Rights Act is dead as a practical matter. The Supreme Court is going to kill any maps they don’t like through the shadow docket (per curiam opinions without argument). Holding / Majority Opinion (Per Curiam) Because of population shifts revealed by the 2020 decennial census, Wisconsin’s State Assembly and Senate districts are no longer equally apportioned. The Wisconsin Legislature passed new maps to fix the problem, but the Governor vetoed them. At an impasse, the legislature and the Governor turned to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which had already agreed to hear an original action brought by a group of voters seeking to remedy the malapportionment. Rather than attempt to draw new maps itself, the court invited the parties and intervenors—including the legislature and the Governor—to propose maps that complied with the State Constitution, the Federal Constitution, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), and that otherwise minimized changes from the current maps. On March 3, the court issued a decision selecting the Assembly and Senate maps that the Governor had proposed. (Because the State Constitution requires three Assembly districts to be nested within each Senate district, the court analyzed and selected the maps as a unit. ) The Governor’s Assembly map intentionally created seven majority-black districts—one more than the current map. The Governor argued that the addition of a seventh majority-black district was necessary for compliance with the VRA. In adopting the Governor’s map, the court explained: “[W]e cannot say for certain on this record that seven majority-Black assembly districts are required by the VRA.” It nevertheless concluded that the Governor’s map complied with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because there were “good reasons” to think that the VRA “may” require the additional majority-black district. The legislature and the voters who initiated the state-court proceeding now seek relief from that decision. They argue that the court selected race-based maps without sufficient justification, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. They ask this Court either to grant an emergency stay or to construe their application as a petition for certiorari and reverse the decision below. We agree that the court committed legal error in its application of decisions of this Court regarding the relationship between the constitutional guarantee of equal protection and the VRA. We accordingly construe the application for stay presented to JUSTICE BARRETT and by her referred to the Court as a petition for certiorari, grant the petition, reverse the imposition of the Governor’s State Assembly and Senate maps, and remand to the Wisconsin Supreme Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Summarily correcting the error gives the court sufficient time to adopt maps consistent with the timetable for Wisconsin’s August 9th primary election. Under the Equal Protection Clause, districting maps that sort voters on the basis of race “‘are by their very nature odious.’” Such laws “cannot be upheld unless they are narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest.” We have assumed that complying with the VRA is a compelling interest. And we have held that if race is the predominant factor motivating the placement of voters in or out of a particular district, the State bears the burden of showing that the design of that district withstands strict scrutiny. Thus, our precedents hold that a State can satisfy strict scrutiny if it proves that its race-based sorting of voters is narrowly tailored to comply with the VRA. … We said in Cooper that when a State invokes §2 to justify race-based districting, “it must show (to meet the ‘narrow tailoring’ requirement) that it had ‘a strong basis in evidence’ for concluding that the statute required its action.” The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the Governor’s intentional addition of a seventh majority-black district triggered the Equal Protection Clause and that Cooper’s strict-scrutiny test must accordingly be satisfied. Accepting those conclusions, we hold that the court erred in its efforts to apply Cooper’s understanding of what the Equal Protection Clause requires. It is not clear whether the court viewed the Governor or itself as the state mapmaker who must satisfy strict scrutiny, but the court’s application of Cooper was flawed either way. If the former, the Governor failed to carry his burden. His main explanation for drawing the seventh majorityblack district was that there is now a sufficiently large and compact population of black residents to fill it, apparently embracing just the sort of uncritical majority-minority district maximization that we have expressly rejected. He provided almost no other evidence or analysis supporting his claim that the VRA required the seven majority-black districts that he drew. If, on the other hand, the court sought to shoulder strict scrutiny’s burden itself, it fared little better. First…the court believed that it had to conclude only that the VRA might support race-based districting—not that the statute required it…Our precedent instructs otherwise. Thus in Cooper we explained, for example, that “race-based districting is narrowly tailored . . . if a State had ‘good reasons’ for thinking that the Act demanded such steps.”...That principle grew out of the more general proposition that “the institution that makes the racial distinction must have had a ‘strong basis in evidence’ to conclude that remedial action was necessary, ‘before it embarks on an affirmative-action program.’” To be sure, we said in Cooper that States have “‘breathing room’” to make reasonable mistakes; we will not fault a State just because its “compliance measures . . . may prove, in perfect hindsight, not to have been needed.” But that “leeway” does not allow a State to adopt a racial gerrymander that the State does not, at the time of imposition, “judg[e] necessary under a proper interpretation of the VRA.” Second…“to have a strong basis in evidence to conclude that §2 demands . . . race-based steps, the State must carefully evaluate whether a plaintiff could establish the Gingles preconditions . . . in a new district created without those measures.” Rather than carefully evaluating evidence at the district level, the court improperly relied on generalizations to reach the conclusion that the preconditions were satisfied. The court’s entire discussion of the first precondition was to say that “it is undisputed” and “the parties’ submissions demonstrate” that seven sufficiently large and compact majority-black districts could be drawn. Similarly, its discussion of the second precondition consisted of nothing but the statement that “[e]xperts from multiple parties analyzed voting trends and concluded political cohesion existed; no party disagreed.” And while the court did cite one specific expert report for the third precondition—calculating, based on eight previous races, how often white voters in the Milwaukee area defeat the preferred candidate of black voters—it made virtually no effort to parse that data at the district level or respond to criticisms of the expert’s analysis. Third, the court improperly reduced Gingles’ totality-of-circumstances analysis to a single factor. The court acknowledged the Senate factors but concluded that they had no role to play in its analysis. Instead, it focused exclusively on proportionality. We rejected just that approach in De Grandy, explaining that “[n]o single statistic provides courts with a shortcut to determine whether a set of single-member districts unlawfully dilutes minority voting strength.” (“The Court . . . makes clear that proportionality is never dispositive. Lack of proportionality can never by itself prove dilution, for courts must always carefully and searchingly review the totality of the circumstances”). The question that our VRA precedents ask and the court failed to answer is whether a race-neutral alternative that did not add a seventh majority-black district would deny black voters equal political opportunity. Answering that question requires an “‘“intensely local appraisal”’ of the challenged district.” When the Wisconsin Supreme Court endeavored to undertake a full strict-scrutiny analysis, it did not do so properly under our precedents, and its judgment cannot stand. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is reversed as to the selection of the Governor’s State Assembly and Senate maps, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. On remand, the court is free to take additional evidence if it prefers to reconsider the Governor’s maps rather than choose from among the other submissions. Any new analysis, however, must comply with our equal protection jurisprudence. Lineup: Per Curiam. Dissent by Sotomayor, joined by Kagan. Dissent (Sotomayor, joined by Kagan) The Court’s action today is unprecedented. In an emergency posture, the Court summarily overturns a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision resolving a conflict over the State’s redistricting, a decision rendered after a 5-month process involving all interested stakeholders. Despite the fact that summary reversals are generally reserved for decisions in violation of settled law, the Court today faults the State Supreme Court for its failure to comply with an obligation that, under existing precedent, is hazy at best. … Applicants now assert that the Wisconsin Supreme Court misapplied this Court’s precedents in its preliminary assessment of whether the Governor’s map violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court agrees and summarily reverses. In doing so, however, the Court assumes the answers to multiple questions that our precedent leaves uncertain. … In its brief discussion of equal protection and the VRA, the Wisconsin Supreme Court presumed that the framework summarized in this Court’s decision in Cooper v. Harris, 581 U. S. ___ (2017), governed in this posture. The Court tacitly accepts that assumption. Cooper, however, arose in a starkly different posture. Cooper outlines the specific, burden-shifting procedure for adjudicating claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause “[w]hen a voter sues state officials for drawing . . . race-based lines.”...It is far from clear whether this burden-shifting framework should also apply in the unusual circumstance where, as here, a state court is adopting a map in the first instance with no Equal Protection Clause claim before it. Even accepting the assumption that this framework controls, it remains unclear how a court in the posture below should apply it. Again, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was selecting a map itself, not adjudicating a subsequent challenge in the manner that Cooper and other cases have addressed. The court accepted an original action to supervise the redistricting and, with the input of the parties, designed its own process for doing so: accepting proposed maps from litigants rather than “craft[ing its] own map” and determining to “choose the maps that best conform[ed] with [its] directives,” even if those maps were “imperfect,” rather than “modify[ing]” the lines they drew. Although the Governor reported that he considered race in drawing his Assembly map, the Wisconsin Supreme Court selected the Governor’s map because it scored best on a race-neutral “least change” metric. Our precedents offer no clear answers to the question whose motives should be analyzed in these circumstances (the four justices who selected the map based on the “least change” criteria, the Governor, or some combination) or how. The Court does not purport to answer this question. The Court also faults the Wisconsin Supreme Court for failing to scrutinize each of the Gingles preconditions independently after the parties agreed that some majority-Black districts needed to be drawn in Milwaukee. But courts generally are not mandated to investigate “‘undisputed’” and nonjurisdictional issues. The Court points to no precedent requiring a court conducting a malapportionment analysis to embark on an independent inquiry into matters that the parties have conceded or not contested, like the Gingles preconditions here. This Court’s intervention today is not only extraordinary but also unnecessary. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rightly preserved the possibility that an appropriate plaintiff could bring an equal protection or VRA challenge in the proper forum. I would allow that process to unfold, rather than further complicating these proceedings with legal confusion through a summary reversal. I respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/21a471_097c.pdf
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Mar 24, 2022 19:15
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I have a friend who's always voted liberal, but thanks to too much joe rogan and his hobby of guns he's sliding more and more conservative. Typical mid 30's great guy but doesn't like "woke culture" and the usual brain rot stuff. To be fair to him, some of the folks we both know are the worst of the worst kind of liberal where because he's a white guy they act like his opinion doesn't matter at all (these are always upper middle class white woman btw). My point of all of this I asked him if he's watched the hearing, and his response was "naw, libs will just claim it's super racist while they were super harsh on the last three nominees." Now, regardless of one of those seats being stolen, I figured this thread is the one to ask for more details on why Kav and handmaidens tale are bad judges. (I know Kav had debts mysteriously paid for, and the rape, but what about her?) more info would be appreciated next time this comes up over board games with friends.
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Mar 24, 2022 21:20
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GoutPatrol posted:Well the hell scenario is if he somehow falls into a Schivao-esque comatose state, leading towards obstruction on a new justice being added to the court to replace him. I volunteer as tribute to pull the plug my drat self
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Mar 24, 2022 21:20
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Opinion! 8-1 defendant victory (limited; they get to have a religious adviser pray audibly and lay on hands during the execution). RAMIREZ v. COLLIER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ET AL TLDR: Your pastor can lay on hands and pray audibly while the State executes you, if you like. Holding / Majority Opinion (Roberts) A Texas jury sentenced John Ramirez to death for the brutal murder of Pablo Castro. In this litigation, Ramirez does not challenge his conviction. Nor does he challenge his sentence. He asks instead that his long-time pastor be allowed to pray with him and lay hands on him while he is being executed. He says that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), requires this accommodation. Ramirez sought a preliminary injunction ordering Texas to permit his religious exercise if the State went forward with his execution. The District Court and Court of Appeals declined to grant such relief. We then stayed the execution and granted certiorari. [Ramirez murdered Castro, was tried, sentenced to death, etc. Has a couple of grievances over his pastor, resulting in rescheduling.] On June 11, 2021, Ramirez filed the grievance that is at the center of this case. Having successfully petitioned the State to allow his pastor into the execution chamber, he requested that his pastor be permitted to “lay hands” on him and “pray over” him while the execution was taking place. Ramirez’s grievance explains that it is “part of my faith to have my spiritual advisor lay hands on me anytime I am sick or dying.” Texas denied the grievance on July 2, 2021. It said that spiritual advisors are “not allowed to touch an inmate while inside the execution chamber,” though it did not point to any provision of its execution protocol requiring this result. Ramirez appealed within the prison system by filing a Step 2 grievance on July 8, 2021. But with less than a month to go until his September 8 execution date, prison officials had still not ruled on that appeal. So on August 10 he filed suit in Federal District Court. Ramirez alleged that the refusal of prison officials to allow Pastor Moore to lay hands on him in the execution chamber violated his rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment. Ramirez sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief barring state officials from executing him unless they granted the religious accommodation. On August 16, 2021, Ramirez’s attorney inquired whether Pastor Moore would be allowed to pray audibly with Ramirez during the execution. Prison officials responded three days later that the pastor would not. So on August 22 Ramirez filed an amended complaint seeking an injunction that would allow Pastor Moore to lay hands on him and pray with him during the execution. … The question [before the Court] is whether Ramirez’s execution without the requested participation of his pastor should be halted, pending full consideration of his claims on a complete record. The parties agree that the relief sought is properly characterized as a preliminary injunction. Under such circumstances, the party seeking relief “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” The prison officials begin by arguing that Ramirez cannot hope to succeed on his claims, because he failed to exhaust all available remedies before filing suit. Such exhaustion is mandatory under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), even in the execution context.…We are persuaded—at least in the current posture of the case—that Ramirez properly exhausted these administrative remedies. The record indicates that Ramirez tried to resolve the issue informally with a prison chaplain. When that did not work, he filed a Step 1 grievance requesting that his pastor be allowed to “‘lay hands on me’ & pray over me while I am being executed.” Prison officials denied that grievance, and Ramirez timely appealed. His Step 2 grievance reiterated, “I wish to have my Spiritual Advisor ‘lay hands on me’ to pray over me during my upcoming execution.” Ramirez’s grievances thus “clearly stated” that he wished to have his pastor touch him and pray with him during his execution. In the context of Texas’s grievance system, that is enough. Respondents briefly argue that Ramirez failed to exhaust Texas’s grievance process because he filed suit before prison officials ruled on his Step 2 grievance…We need not definitively resolve the issue as respondents failed to raise it below. Respondents also argue that Ramirez failed to properly exhaust his request for audible prayer in the execution chamber. The gist of their argument is that while his grievances clearly requested prayer, they did not clearly request audible prayer. We disagree. … Nor are we persuaded by respondents’ argument that Ramirez should have filed his grievance sooner. In Texas, prisoners must raise a grievance within “15 days from the date of the alleged incident or occurrence.” Respondents contend that Ramirez should have filed his grievance within 15 days of when Texas issued its revised execution protocol (April 21, 2021), or within 15 days of when he learned that his pastor would be allowed inside the chamber (May 4, 2021). Both suggestions are untenable. Neither the revised execution protocol nor the State’s decision to admit Pastor Moore put Ramirez on notice that religious touch and audible prayer would be banned inside the execution chamber. To the contrary, Texas had long permitted such activities. Ramirez says—and respondents do not dispute—that he first learned of the prohibition on religious touch on June 8, 2021. Ramirez filed the grievance that sparked this litigation just three days later, on June 11. We thus have little trouble concluding that the grievance was timely, and that we may proceed to the merits. … RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution”—including state prisoners—“even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” A plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that a prison policy “implicates his religious exercise.” Although RLUIPA protects “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief,” a prisoner’s requested accommodation “must be sincerely based on a religious belief and not some other motivation.” The burden on the prisoner’s religious exercise must also be “substantial[ ].” Once a plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden flips and the government must “demonstrate[ ] that imposition of the burden on that person” is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.This allocation of respective burdens applies in the preliminary injunction context. To begin, we think Ramirez is likely to succeed in proving that his religious requests are “sincerely based on a religious belief.” Ramirez seeks to have his pastor lay hands on him and pray over him during the execution. Both are traditional forms of religious exercise. … Because Ramirez is likely to succeed in showing that Texas’s policy substantially burdens his exercise of religion, respondents must prove that their refusal to accommodate the exercise both (1) furthers “a compelling governmental interest,” and (2) is the “least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Under RLUIPA, the government cannot discharge this burden by pointing to “broadly formulated interests.” It must instead “demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law [to] the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.” Here, the government has not shown that it is likely to carry that burden. As for audible prayer, there is a rich history of clerical prayer at the time of a prisoner’s execution, dating back well before the founding of our Nation. SFor example, at Newgate Prison—one of London’s most notorious jails—an Anglican priest would stand and pray with the condemned in their final moments. By the early 1700s, that practice had evolved to permit prisoners to be “attended by a minister, or even a priest, of their own communion.” Prayer at the time of execution was also commonplace in the American Colonies…A tradition of such prayer continued throughout our Nation’s history…The practice continues today. … Despite this long history, prison officials now insist that a categorical ban on audible prayer in the execution chamber is the least restrictive means of furthering two compelling governmental interests. First, prison officials say that absolute silence is necessary in the execution chamber so they can monitor the inmate’s condition through a microphone suspended overhead…[They] acknowledge that both the Federal Government and Alabama have recently permitted audible prayer or speech in the execution chamber, but then assert that, “under the circumstances in Texas’s chamber, allowing speech during the execution is not feasible.” Respondents do not explain why. Nor do they explore any relevant differences between Texas’s execution chamber or process and those of other jurisdictions. Instead, they ask that we simply defer to their determination. That is not enough under RLUIPA. Nor is there a basis for deference, given that Texas has “historically and routinely allowed prison chaplains to audibly pray” with the condemned during executions, a fact Texas does not dispute. Second, prison officials say that if they allow spiritual advisors to pray aloud during executions, the opportunity “could be exploited to make a statement to the witnesses or officials, rather than the inmate.” They note that such statements might cause further trauma to the victim’s family or otherwise interfere with the execution. Ibid. We agree that the government has a compelling interest in preventing disruptions of any sort and maintaining solemnity and decorum in the execution chamber. But there is no indication in the record that Pastor Moore would cause the sorts of disruptions that respondents fear. Respondents’ argument thus comes down to conjecture regarding what a hypothetical spiritual advisor might do in some future case. “Such speculation is insufficient to satisfy” respondents’ burden, and fails to engage in the sort of case-by-case analysis that RLUIPA requires. What’s more, there appear to be less restrictive ways to handle any concerns. … Respondents’ categorical ban on religious touch in the execution chamber fares no better. They point to three governmental interests they say are compelling: security in the execution chamber, preventing unnecessary suffering, and avoiding further emotional trauma to the victim’s family members. All three goals are commendable. But again, respondents fail to show that a categorical ban on touch is the least restrictive means of accomplishing any of them. … Under Texas’s current protocol, spiritual advisors stand just three feet from the gurney in the execution chamber. A security escort is posted nearby, ready to intervene if anything goes awry. We do not see how letting the spiritual advisor stand slightly closer, reach out his arm, and touch a part of the prisoner’s body well away from the site of any IV line would meaningfully increase risk. And that is all Ramirez requests here. … Respondents next argue that allowing the pastor to touch Ramirez in the execution chamber might lead to preventable suffering…We think that preventing accidental interference with the prison’s IV lines is a compelling governmental interest. But we also think it is one reasonably addressed by means short of banning all touch in the execution chamber. For example, Texas could allow touch on a part of the body away from IV lines, such as a prisoner’s lower leg. That seems to have been the practice of many prison chaplains during past Texas executions. … Texas does nothing to rebut these obvious alternatives, instead suggesting that it is Ramirez’s burden to “identify any less restrictive means.” That gets things backward. Once a plaintiff has made out his initial case under RLUIPA, it is the government that must show its policy “is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.” Finally, respondents say that allowing certain forms of religious touch might further traumatize a victim’s family members who are present as witnesses, reminding them that their loved one received no such solace. As we have already noted, maintaining solemnity and decorum in the execution chamber is a compelling governmental interest. But here what is at issue is allowing Pastor Moore to respectfully touch Ramirez’s foot or lower leg inside the execution chamber. Respondents do not contend that this particular act will result in trauma. See ibid. Instead, their real concern seems to be with other, potentially more problematic requests down the line. RLUIPA, however, requires that courts take cases one at a time, considering only “the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.” As a result, respondents’ final argument is unavailing. We conclude that Ramirez is likely to prevail on his claim that Texas’s categorical ban on religious touch in the execution chamber is inconsistent with his rights under RLUIPA. Our conclusion that Ramirez is likely to prevail on the merits of his RLUIPA claims does not end the matter. As noted earlier, he must also show “that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” We think these factors also favor an injunction. Ramirez is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief because he will be unable to engage in protected religious exercise in the final moments of his life. Compensation paid to his estate would not remedy this harm, which is spiritual rather than pecuniary. Additionally, the balance of equities and public interest tilt in Ramirez’s favor. Ramirez “does not seek an open-ended stay of execution.” Rather, he requests a tailored injunction requiring that Texas permit audible prayer and religious touch during his execution. … Respondents argue that Ramirez has engaged in inequitable conduct. As they see it, this should bar the equitable relief that Ramirez seeks. … Here, however, the record does not support the conclusion that Ramirez engaged in such misconduct. Respondents argue that Ramirez inequitably delayed this litigation by filing suit just four weeks before his scheduled execution. But this is not a case in which a litigant “slept upon his rights.” To the contrary, Ramirez had sought to vindicate his rights for months. … As we have explained, the resolution of RLUIPA claims in the prisoner context requires a case-specific consideration of the particular circumstances and claims. At the same time, timely resolution of such claims could be facilitated if States were to adopt policies anticipating and addressing issues likely to arise. Doing so would assist both prison officials responsible for carrying out executions and prisoners preparing to confront the end of life according to their religious beliefs. The first step would be to specify reasonable rules on the time for prisoners to request religious accommodations, and for prison officials to respond. States could also adopt streamlined procedures for claims involving requests like those at issue in this case, so that these potentially complicated matters can be litigated at all levels well in advance of any scheduled execution. If spiritual advisors are to be admitted into the execution chamber, it would also seem reasonable to require some training on procedures, including any restrictions on their movements or conduct. When a spiritual advisor would enter and must leave could be spelled out. If the advisor is to touch the prisoner, the State might also specify where and for how long. And, as noted, if audible prayer is to occur, a variety of considerations might be set forth in advance to avoid disruption. It may also be reasonable to document the advisor’s advance agreement to comply with any restrictions. If States adopt clear rules in advance, it should be the rare case that requires last-minute resort to the federal courts. If such cases do arise and a court determines that relief is appropriate under RLUIPA, the proper remedy is an injunction ordering the accommodation, not a stay of the execution. This approach balances the State’s interest in carrying out capital sentences without delay and the prisoner’s interest in religious exercise. One final point bears mentioning. Our holding today arises in the context of a preliminary injunction. And our analysis turns on Texas’s specific execution protocol, chamber, and historical practices. Further proceedings on remand, if necessary, might shed additional light on Texas’s interests, and on whether its policies are narrowly tailored. But such proceedings might also contribute to further delay in carrying out the sentence. The State will have to determine where its interest lies in going forward. We hold that Ramirez is likely to prevail on the merits of his RLUIPA claims, and that the other preliminary injunction factors justify relief. If Texas reschedules Ramirez’s execution and declines to permit audible prayer or religious touch, the District Court should therefore enter appropriate preliminary relief. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Lineup: Roberts, joined by Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Concurrence by Sotomayor. Concurrence by Kavanaugh. Dissent by Thomas. Concurrence (Sotomayor) The opinion of the Court, which I join in full, explains why clear rules governing the presence of spiritual advisors at executions are necessary to ensure that any disputes are resolved in a timely fashion before a scheduled execution date. I write separately to underscore the interaction between prison officials’ obligations to set such rules and the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Under the PLRA, prison officials and incarcerated individuals share an obligation to act in good faith in resolving disputes: Incarcerated individuals must timely raise their claims through the prison grievance system, and prison officials must ensure that the system is a functioning one. To that end, the PLRA requires incarcerated individuals to exhaust the prison’s administrative grievance process before turning to the courts only where that process is actually “available.” An administrative process is not available if it is not “‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained of.’” Availability is a practical determination that requires considering both whether the administrative system is accessible as designed and whether prison administrators and officers ensure meaningful access to it in practice. … To ensure that administrative remedies are available in the execution context, prison officials bear a twofold responsibility. First, they must ensure that rules clearly and timely inform an individual facing execution of any relevant protocols, so that the individual in turn may timely raise concerns. Second, the officials must ensure that the administrative process proceeds swiftly enough to permit exhaustion with sufficient time for the individual to seek judicial review, if necessary, prior to a scheduled execution. Finally, to act in good faith means that neither incarcerated individuals nor prison officials should unnecessarily wait to act until the end of time available to them. Because I agree with the Court that Ramirez exhausted his administrative remedies, it is unnecessary to address whether they qualified as available such that exhaustion was actually a prerequisite to suit. It raises questions, however, that the record indicates that the prison failed to provide Ramirez with notice of its restrictions on a spiritual advisor’s actions in the execution room. Timely notice of policies is essential to ensure the ability to timely raise, or seek informal resolution of, any claims related to those policies. It also raises questions that the prison took 39 [of 40] days to deny Ramirez’s Step 2 grievance, even though the prison had considered and rejected his request previously and maintains that its established policies foreclosed it. Such delay creates an impression, whether valid or not, that the prison is trying to “thwart inmates from taking advantage of [the] grievance process” and cut short their opportunity to obtain judicial review. At its heart, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act requires commitment on both sides to achieve a timely resolution of disputes, as does the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Consistent with these principles, incarcerated individuals should know that delays in raising their requests can result in denial. They should not, however, be penalized for delays attributable to prison administrators. Concurrence (Kavanaugh) I join the Court’s opinion in full, and I write separately to add three points: one about the recent history of litigation involving religious advisors in execution rooms; a second about the difficulty of applying RLUIPA’s compelling interest and least restrictive means standards; and a third about state execution procedures going forward. First, the recent history. The question of religious advisors in the execution room came to this Court three years ago as a question of religious equality. Some States had long permitted state-employed chaplains in the execution room. But those state-employed chaplains were mostly Christian. Those States did not allow inmates to have their own religious advisors in the room. Therefore, a Christian inmate could have the state-employed Christian chaplain in the room, but a Buddhist inmate, for example, could not have a Buddhist religious advisor in the room. The Court correctly determined that this practice constituted unlawful religious discrimination because it treated inmates of different religions differently. … The bedrock religious equality principle was easy for States to apply: States could either (i) always allow a religious advisor into the execution room or (ii) always exclude a religious advisor, including any state-employed chaplain. But States could not allow religious advisors of some religions while excluding religious advisors of other religions. Then, however, a different kind of claim emerged. In States that equally barred all advisors from the execution room, some inmates brought a religious liberty claim—a claim seeking a religious exemption from an otherwise neutral and generally applicable rule excluding all advisors. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, known as RLUIPA, proscribes the State from substantially burdening an inmate’s religious exercise except when the State has a compelling interest and employs the least restrictive means to achieve that interest. Suing under RLUIPA, some inmates argued that the State did not have a sufficiently “compelling” interest to exclude religious advisors from the execution room—or at least that the State could satisfy its asserted safety, security, and solemnity interests by means less restrictive than excluding all religious advisors from the room. And then, in this case, still another kind of claim emerged. Ramirez not only wants a religious advisor in the execution room. He also wants the advisor to be able to engage in audible prayer and even to be able to physically touch him during the execution process. Ramirez argues that the State does not have a sufficiently “compelling” interest to prevent such activities by religious advisors, or at least could satisfy its compelling interests by less restrictive means. … Second, the Court’s holding implicates significant issues about how the Court decides whether a State’s asserted interest is sufficiently “compelling” and how the Court assesses whether less restrictive means could satisfy that compelling interest. This case illustrates both the difficulty of those inquiries and the important role that history and state practice often play in the analysis. The compelling interest standard of RLUIPA—like the compelling interest standard that the Court employs when applying strict scrutiny to examine state limitations on certain constitutional rights—necessarily operates as a balancing test. … Here, the State asserts that it has a compelling interest in ensuring the safety, security, and solemnity of the execution room. To further those interests, the State has sought to restrict the number of people in the room, as well as their activities. As the United States pointed out at oral argument, any disruption or interference could be “catastrophic.” And a religious advisor would not ordinarily be allowed in a public hospital’s operating room during a major life-or-death surgical procedure, so why should one be allowed into the execution room? The Court has no difficulty reaching the commonsense conclusion that the State has a compelling interest in ensuring safety, security, and solemnity in the execution room. The more difficult question is: How much risk of disruption or interference must the State tolerate in order to accommodate the inmate’s religious liberty claim under RLUIPA? … The core problem is that a State’s understandable goal of avoiding a higher risk of great harm does not easily map onto the compelling interest/least restrictive means standards. In particular, it is difficult for a court applying those standards to know where to draw the line—that is, how much additional risk of great harm is too much for a court to order the State to bear. … Importantly, however, the Court does not merely point to its own policy assessment of how much risk the State must tolerate in the execution room. The Court also relies in part on the history of religious advisors at executions…And perhaps even more relevant, the Federal Government and some States have recently allowed inmates’ religious advisors into the execution room. Those religious advisors have been allowed to engage in audible prayer and limited touching of the inmate without apparent problems. As the Court explains, experience matters in assessing whether less restrictive alternatives could still satisfy the State’s compelling interest. … Third, turning from the doctrinal to the practical, States seek clarity going forward. States understandably want to know what they may and may not do to regulate the time and manner of audible prayer and touching in the execution room. In its opinion today, the Court supplies some guidance. Because the Court’s guidance does not purport to answer every question, however, a dose of caution for the States is probably in order, especially given the Court’s recent case law on this issue and the extraordinary micromanagement of the execution room that RLUIPA has ushered in. The States of course may ensure the safety, security, and solemnity of the execution room. But to avoid persistent future litigation and the accompanying delays, it may behoove States to try to accommodate an inmate’s timely and reasonable requests about a religious advisor’s presence and activities in the execution room if the States can do so without meaningfully sacrificing their compelling interests in safety, security, and solemnity. Doing so not only would help States avoid future litigation delays but also would serve the exceptionally powerful interests of victims’ families in finally obtaining closure. With those comments, I join the Court’s opinion in full. Dissent (Thomas) Petitioner John Henry Ramirez stabbed Pablo Castro 29 times during a robbery that netted $1.25. Castro bled to death in a parking lot. Since that day, Ramirez has manufactured more than a decade of delay to evade the capital sentence lawfully imposed by the State of Texas. This Court now affords yet another chance for him to delay his execution. Because I think Ramirez’s claims either do not warrant equitable relief or are procedurally barred, I respectfully dissent. [Thomas, as always, then goes through the crime in bloody detail.] First, I disagree with the majority that Ramirez’s demand for in-chambers touching merits relief. An “equitable remedy,” such as a stay of execution or a preliminary injunction, is “not available as a matter of right” to a death-row inmate who has sued the State under §1983. The parties agree that Ramirez seeks a particular type of equitable relief: a preliminary injunction. A federal court may issue this “extraordinary remedy” only if the prisoner shows that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he will be irreparably injured absent the injunction, and that the equities, taking the public interest into account, balance in his favor. Two components of the equitable balance are especially relevant here. First, federal courts “should police carefully” against abusive litigation designed “to interpose unjustified delay” and deny relief if they detect gamesmanship.Second, federal courts “must take into consideration” the weighty interest that States and victims have in carrying out capital sentences in a timely manner. These equitable factors foreclose Ramirez’s request for extraordinary relief. … Ramirez’s shifting litigation position lays bare what he really wants: “to manipulate the judicial process” to win further delay. The record all but speaks for itself. In August 2020, when Ramirez first demanded that Texas allow his pastor into the chamber, he explicitly avowed that his pastor “need not touch” him “at any time in the execution chamber.” Taking Ramirez at his word, Texas eventually acquiesced. But then Ramirez flipped his position and filed another administrative grievance and §1983 complaint demanding what he had earlier disclaimed: touching in the execution chamber. This is a textbook example of dilatory and abusive “piecemeal litigation” against which we have warned courts in equity to guard. Like Chief Judge Owen, I think that the shift in Ramirez’s litigation posture alone justifies denying equitable relief because it “indicates that the change in position is strategic and that delay is the goal.” But if any doubt remained on that score, the history of this case dispels it. Ramirez’s current RLUIPA suit is but the latest iteration in an 18-year pattern of evasion. … In the end, none of Ramirez’s federal habeas claims merited even a single certificate of appealability, let alone relief. Yet, through ceaseless litigation, strategic delay, and a “[l]ast-minute” blitz on the District Court, Ramirez parlayed his federal habeas petition into a 7-year deferral of his lawfully imposed sentence. We should interpret Ramirez’s actions in the instant litigation in light of that history, recognize that his shifting in-chambers-touching claim is just another chapter in that history, and reject his most recent attempt to delay his execution. … Second, a court balancing the equities must consider that “[b]oth the State and the victims of crime have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence.” The State’s interest inheres in our form of government, given that “our federal system” protects a State from “repeated frustration” of its imposition of a capital sentence. “[T]he question of capital punishment belongs to the people and their representatives . . . to resolve,” and the people are entitled to see their chosen sentence carried out. Meanwhile, victims share the State’s interest in the timely execution of a lawful sentence. “Only with real finality can the victims of crime move forward knowing the moral judgment” of the State “will be carried out.” … Ramirez also asks us to intervene in his long-delayed execution because Texas will not allow his pastor to pray audibly in the execution chamber. Given Ramirez’s history, I suspect that his goal in raising this claim is also to secure delay. But his audible-prayer claim suffers from an antecedent defect: Ramirez did not comply with the PLRA by exhausting the administrative remedies available to him before bringing his claim to federal court. Because he failed to carry out this mandatory, congressionally imposed threshold requirement, I would dismiss his claim. [He disagrees with the majority on every administrative exhaustion point. They are all factual characterizations.] In RLUIPA, Congress created a potent tool with which prisoners can protect their sincerely held religious beliefs. But, like any tool, it can be wielded abusively. And few have a greater incentive to do so than death-row inmates. To counter such abuse, federal courts sitting in equity have a duty to dismiss piecemeal, late-breaking, dilatory, specious, speculative, or manipulative litigation. RLUIPA itself complements that process by requiring a prisoner to demonstrate sincerity. Meanwhile, Congress passed the PLRA to force prisoners to exhaust their complaints through state prisons’ administrative review processes so that prison officials might resolve, or at least build a record to help shed light on, an alleged problem before it escalates to litigation. Federal courts have a duty under the PLRA to dismiss these unexhausted claims. Today, the Court shrugs off both of these duties. It grants equitable relief for a demonstrably abusive and insincere claim filed by a prisoner with an established history of seeking unjustified delay, harming the State and Ramirez’s victims in the process. The Court also forgives the same prisoner’s complete failure to exhaust another claim. Because I would deny equitable relief for the first claim and dismiss the second under the PLRA, I respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/21-5592_feah.pdf
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Mar 24, 2022 21:27
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LionArcher posted:(I know Kav had debts mysteriously paid for, and the rape, but what about her?) I'll leave problems with her jurisprudence to the law-knowers, since I am not one. But as an observer of Barrett the person, here are two things that stuck out to me at the time she was confirmed: 1) She's an extreme Christian weirdo, even relative to the usual kinds of weirdness observed among contemporary American Catholics. (This People of Praise poo poo is weird, even for hardcore Catholics.) She's a weirdo who falls outside even the mainstream of faculty at the (Catholic-affiliated) University of Notre Dame. (She didn't want to send her kids to St. Joseph High, the well-known Catholic high school in South Bend where all the normal Catholics and Notre Dame faculty send their kids to - instead, she sent them to a relatively-unknown and small "Christian" school.) There are a lot of small details like these that might not sound like much to someone unfamiliar with the current state of Catholicism in America, or with Notre Dame/South Bend, but seem extremely weird if you do have that familiarity. 2) Any highbrow claims about sound judicial "temperament" were revealed as bullshit the moment she flew her whole family down, children and all, to parade around her big White House announcement, full of unmasked and untested attendees, in the height of a pandemic. Her kids' school saw a COVID outbreak roughly two weeks later. (Incidentally, several Notre Dame faculty members in attendance, including the university president, also got sick with COVID that following week. It was something of a scandal at the university, which had enacted strict masking and testing requirements and travel limitations on its own students that semester, only to have the university president and a bunch of law school faculty flaunt their own rules to go hang at the White House.)
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Mar 24, 2022 22:00
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https://twitter.com/mjs_DC/status/1507107449710559243?s=20&t=HN8IhcbEelEFius22Swskw
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Mar 24, 2022 22:35
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OniPanda posted:We already ain't a democracy, that ship sailed years ago, so there's that. There's many different things you could point to that are germane if you wish: scotus overturning maps drawn in accordance with state laws, gutting of the vra, Shelby county, citizens united, bush v gore. That's just what's strictly scotus and not even all the horseshit republicans have done like McConnell's obstruction, trump, state level poo poo that's too numerous to even start. It won't even take 3 years for the farce to be completely unmasked, this year's elections will be the death knell. This summer is going to be wild if Roe vs. Wade is repealed. I do wonder if Roberts will be able to persuade others to at least make it a partial repeal with certain exceptions.
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Mar 24, 2022 23:02
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It's going to be gutted and the empty shell left in place to manage headlines and dems will play along and fundraise off it while media will play ball with the narrative.
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Mar 24, 2022 23:05
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Crosby B. Alfred posted:This summer is going to be wild if Roe vs. Wade is repealed. I do wonder if Roberts will be able to persuade others to at least make it a partial repeal with certain exceptions. Roe is functionally dead already. Multiple states have laws banning abortion that are in effect now that the SCOTUS would have stopped if they were going to leave Roe intact.
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Mar 24, 2022 23:06
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Clarance Thomas should be impeached, even if he is dying. (he probably isn't)
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Mar 25, 2022 00:28
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It’s been six days in the hospital when it should have been two. I’ll get excited when it’s been 30.
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Mar 25, 2022 00:57
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Lifetime appointment, it would take 67 senators to impeach him, he will never resign, and USSC has no binding ethical rules he has to comport himself by, at all. Amazing.
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Mar 25, 2022 01:00
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MrMojok posted:Lifetime appointment, it would take 67 senators to impeach him, he will never resign, and USSC has no binding ethical rules he has to comport himself by, at all. Even if they don't have the votes it should still be put to a vote. Force the traitors to keep voting the wrong way for history books to judge them at least. If helping your wife attempt a coup isn't "bad behavior", nothing is. This situation is too serious to do nothing about. People with ethics in Congress shouldn't give up before trying, even if it is super unlikely.
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Mar 25, 2022 01:04
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Spacebump posted:Even if they don't have the votes it should still be put to a vote. Force the traitors to keep voting the wrong way for history books to judge them at least. If helping your wife attempt a coup isn't "bad behavior", nothing is. This situation is too serious to do nothing about. People with ethics in Congress shouldn't give up before trying, even if it is super unlikely. Found your problem
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Mar 25, 2022 01:06
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Mr. Nice! posted:Roe is functionally dead already. Multiple states have laws banning abortion that are in effect now that the SCOTUS would have stopped if they were going to leave Roe intact. It's also going to open the door for so many terrible laws modeled on it, where you are going to allow private citizens to sue over what should be rights
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Mar 25, 2022 01:30
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FlamingLiberal posted:Yes the Texas law in particular is still standing, and the courts have effectively made it impossible to challenge on the Constitutional level for very dumb and bad reasons Idaho already passed a mirror of it that goes into effect in 29 days.
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Mar 25, 2022 02:37
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Mr. Nice! posted:Roe is functionally dead already. Multiple states have laws banning abortion that are in effect now that the SCOTUS would have stopped if they were going to leave Roe intact. I don't disagree but people don't quite understand this and the media hype machine will blast this everywhere if it's repealed. I fully expect people to explode over it and they should.
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Mar 25, 2022 05:55
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Taking bets on how long the Repubz will Weekend at Bernie's him. Dude has spent his entire SCOTUS career not talking or poo poo for a reason, so that he can continue his lovely reign well into his undeath.
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Mar 25, 2022 07:19
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Check the date https://twitter.com/thee_snek/status/1483948274147074057?s=20&t=Uzu2dVyaVTB9yaRgt2qQIQ
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Mar 25, 2022 13:26
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jeeves posted:Taking bets on how long the Repubz will Weekend at Bernie's him. They'll just say that since his death isn't confirmed his seat isn't vacant and that a justice has no obligation to prove they're still alive. The Dems will just shrug and say we need to focus on more important things like continuing to not do anything to help the American people.
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Mar 25, 2022 14:05
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If Thomas dies, but its too late to appoint someone centrist because the Senate has/is about to flip to Republicans, does Biden need to fill the empty seat at all during his term? Can he go, "Well you guys are only letting me nominate Baby Chud, so go gently caress yourself, the Supreme Court will make do with 8 judges from now on"?
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Mar 25, 2022 14:28
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Pleasant Friend posted:If Thomas dies, but its too late to appoint someone centrist because the Senate has/is about to flip to Republicans, does Biden need to fill the empty seat at all during his term? I can’t imagine Mitch has much room to force a nomination since he previously just decided to ignore one. Also this is such a loving slam dunk for the Dems and they’re just gonna sit back and do nothing https://twitter.com/helenkennedy/status/1507346161048428559?s=21
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Mar 25, 2022 14:30
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FizFashizzle posted:I can’t imagine Mitch has much room to force a nomination since he previously just decided to ignore one. The Senate can't force a nominee, they could tell Biden "you only get to nominate the person Ginny Thomas picks" and he could just nominate someone else even though the GOP would ignore that nomination until they retake the WH in 2024. That the Dems are doing literally nothing on consequence with the Jan 6th committee has been expected since the outset. Anyone who actually thought this would be anything other than grandstanding until they hand Congress back to the GOP was out of their loving minds. The party of Too Big To Jail isn't going to prosecute the prior admin for anything, even though the next GOP president is going to do everything they can to make an example out of Dems.
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Mar 25, 2022 14:34
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Pleasant Friend posted:If Thomas dies, but its too late to appoint someone centrist because the Senate has/is about to flip to Republicans, does Biden need to fill the empty seat at all during his term? If the Senate can leave the seat open for a year through deliberate inaction, so can the president The only real limit on shrinking the court by attrition is that there have to be 5 justices present to make quorum; if the court is majority empty seats then it cannot function. Which might honestly be an improvement from where we are today
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Mar 25, 2022 14:35
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Spacebump posted:Even if they don't have the votes it should still be put to a vote. Force the traitors to keep voting the wrong way for history books to judge them at least. If helping your wife attempt a coup isn't "bad behavior", nothing is. This situation is too serious to do nothing about. People with ethics in Congress shouldn't give up before trying, even if it is super unlikely. History is going to be written by the fascists who actually get things for their voters, not the centrists whose only position is that nothing is possible. Your grandchildren will be taught that the plots of Pizzagate and Big Lie were real. poo poo, that's already happening today. I'm not kidding.
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Mar 25, 2022 14:56
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