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(Thread IKs: dead gay comedy forums)
 
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croup coughfield
Apr 8, 2020
Probation
Can't post for 70 days!

MSDOS KAPITAL posted:

that tracks since aristocrats were historically more likely to betray the new ruling class than people who descended from actual bourgeoisie

i think it was just because it was fashionable in her social circle man

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MSDOS KAPITAL
Jun 25, 2018





I knew I was going out on a limb with that one. oh well

croup coughfield
Apr 8, 2020
Probation
Can't post for 70 days!
tbf thats the reason the local aristocracy sides with the haute bourgeoisie anyway

croup coughfield
Apr 8, 2020
Probation
Can't post for 70 days!
basically all internecine ruling class struggles are about which clique is more fun to do coke with

AnimeIsTrash
Jun 30, 2018

BrutalistMcDonalds posted:

"strategy for a black agenda" by henry winston is interesting. written in the 70s. it's critical of different black liberation strategies like "neo-garveyism."



https://www.marxists.org/archive/winston/1973/strategy-black-agenda.pdf

:pwn:

What does that have to do with what I posted?

MSDOS KAPITAL
Jun 25, 2018





croup coughfield posted:

basically all internecine ruling class struggles are about which clique is more fun to do coke with
or, who the the blowjob queen is

tokin opposition
Apr 8, 2021

I don't jailbreak the androids, I set them free.

WATCH MARS EXPRESS (2023)
getting into an argument at my HOA about who has the tightest bussy on the street

mawarannahr
May 21, 2019

tokin opposition posted:

getting into an argument at my HOA about who has the tightest bussy on the street

living Marxism

unwantedplatypus
Sep 6, 2012
Getting into an argument at my soviet about who has the tightest bussy in the union

tokin opposition
Apr 8, 2021

I don't jailbreak the androids, I set them free.

WATCH MARS EXPRESS (2023)

unwantedplatypus posted:

Getting into an argument at my soviet about who has the tightest bussy in the union

careful, that's what got trotsky kicked out

mila kunis
Jun 10, 2011

mila kunis posted:

been readin the wages of destruction by adam tooze, which goes into incredible detail about nazi political economy from 1933-1945, from trade and monetary policy to profitability and manufacturing

is there any similar book about the USSR after the NEP and before WW2?

got to this point in wages of destruction, it appears the people that dispute that it wasn't USSR that won ww2 "because lend lease" are full of poo poo

quote:

Given the horrendous casualties suffered by the Soviets up to the autumn of 1942, this was as much a testament to the extraordinary mobilizing capacity of Stalin’s regime as a reflection of the underlying demographic balance. Even more remarkable, however, was the fact that, at key points in the line, the Soviets were able to back their superiority in manpower with a similar preponderance of guns, tanks and aircraft. The fact was that despite the optimistic newsreel propaganda, Speer and Milch were losing the battle of the factories. Even leaving aside the British and Americans, who produced under far more favourable circumstances, Germany was being outdone by the embattled Soviet Union. If there was a true ‘armaments miracle’ in 1942 it occurred, not in Germany, but in the armaments factories in the Urals. Despite having suffered territorial losses and disruption that resulted in a 25 per cent fall in total national product, the Soviet Union in 1942 managed to out-produce Germany in virtually every category of weapons. The margin for small arms and artillery was 3:1. For tanks it was a staggering 4:1, a differential compounded by the superior quality of the T34 tank. Even in combat aircraft the margin was 2:1. It was this industrial superiority, contrary to every expectation, that allowed the Red Army, first to absorb the Wehrmacht’s second great onslaught and then in November 1942 to launch a whole series of devastating counterattacks. It would be quite wrong, of course, to attribute the successes of the Red Army after the summer of 1942 entirely to brute force. By the autumn of 1942 the Red Army leadership was developing a capacity for operational planning to match that of all but the very best on the German side. On the other hand, it is also undeniable that the triumphs of Zhukov and his colleagues would have been impossible but for the excellent military material supplied by Russia’s factories.


To avoid misunderstandings, this is emphatically a story of Soviet success not German failure. In the third full year of the war there was little difference between the level of German and British armaments production. Two economies which in 1936 had had industrial sectors of roughly equal size were now producing roughly similar levels of armaments output.125 Britain of course benefited from the abundance of lend-lease, whereas Germany had to make do with far more meagre pickings in occupied Europe. Alongside armaments, Germany in 1942 also produced a far larger volume of investment goods than Britain, an advantage that would pay off by 1944 in substantially higher armaments output. The exceptional performer was the Soviet Union, which in 1942 produced twice as many infantry weapons, as many artillery pieces and almost as many combat aircraft and tanks as the United States, the undisputed manufacturing champion of the world. The Soviet miracle was not due to Western assistance. Lend-lease did not begin to affect the balance on the Eastern Front until 1943.

MeatwadIsGod
Sep 30, 2004

Foretold by Gyromancy
From the aforementioned Economic History of the USSR:

quote:

According to the official history, Soviet industry produced the following during the war:

- 489,900 guns
- 136,800 planes
- 102,500 tanks and self-propelled guns

as well as vast quantities of ammunition of all kinds. The history points out that the following were imported from the US and Great Britain:

- 9,600 guns
- 18,700 planes
- 10,800 tanks (some of them obsolete)

It is true that the USSR produced the bulk of what was used. Furthermore, to the great credit of designers and everyone responsible for manufacturing, the quality of a great deal of Soviet equipment was very good, the tanks being especially effective. True, the Red Army was somewhat backward in signaling equipment, and the air force was under-supplied with bombers. But it is quite beyond dispute that the vast majority of the best aircraft, tanks, and guns were of Soviet manufacture. It is therefore not only a matter of (understandable) national pride, but also of fact, that Western aid supplied comparatively few of Russia's armaments.

The West contributed much more to road transport. One of the weaknesses of the pre-war Soviet economy was in the production of vehicles. In 1928 hardly any were produced, and several new factories had to be built in the thirties. However, the needs of mobile warfare could not be met by Soviet productive capacity. A large part of the growth in the number of vehicles in the armed forces - from 272,000 at the outbreak of war to 665,000 at the end - came from US lend-lease.

Rail transport, however, remained the key and performed remarkably well in the face of truly formidable handicaps, not least of which were uncertain fuel supplies and inevitable over-loading and under-maintenance. The cutting of direct communications by the Germans placed great additional burdens on the railways. Thus in the winter of 1942-43 it was necessary to transport Baku oil to Central Russia via Kazakhstan and Siberia by rail, since both the Volga water route and the North Caucasus pipeline were cut. Coal also had to be transported for longer distances, until the Donets mines could be reactivated. Then the fact that arms and equipment had to be transported from distant industrial centers in the Urals and Siberia was a further source of great strain. Finally, as the Soviet armies advanced they had to restore lines and bridges wrecked by the Germans in their retreat.

Lend-lease and other imports provided a significant number of machine-tools (44,600), locomotives (1,860), nonferrous metals (517,500 tons), cable and wire (172,100 tons); these deliveries certainly helped to overcome some bottlenecks in industry, transport, and communications.

So it was more a question of (comparatively less significant) road transport and industrial inputs than in weapons, aircraft, tanks, etc. when lend-lease started, corroborating the passage from Tooze above.

MeatwadIsGod has issued a correction as of 17:22 on Jul 30, 2022

Algund Eenboom
May 4, 2014

https://www.crossbordertalks.eu/2022/07/29/russia-political-capitalists/ Cool

mila kunis
Jun 10, 2011

Do you see a chance for a revolution that actually leads to social equality in Ukraine?

Or what is the main reason behind the lack of strong leadership that could prevent the hijacking of a revolutionary process? Does Eastern Europe lack socialist leaders because the very word ‘socialism’ has become infamous? Or are there deeper, more complex reasons?

I would say that it is a quite superficial and misleading explanation. An explanation that reproduces the agenda of the minority of the society. If you look at the polls, 30-40% of Ukrainians just a year ago regretted the Soviet Union collapse and believed the USSR was rather a good thing. Despite all the decommunization efforts after the Euromaidan, this number remained stable. Before Euromaidan, this pro-Soviet attitude was even stronger. In addition, the 30-40% I am talking about concerns only the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government before February 24, without Donbass and Crimea, which have been much more pro-Soviet.

Look at the revival of the neo-Soviet identity in Russia, the booming Marxist reading groups organizing thousands of young people and YouTube-channels with millions of followers. Most of them did not live in the Soviet Union even a single day of their lives. This is not the old people’s nostalgia.

The international left remains largely ignorant about these developments in the left movement in our part of the world because of the language barrier and weak connections to the West of the less privileged groups forming the basis of the neo-Soviet revival. But also because of the affinity bias of the international left, when they search for people similar to them and find them only in very small groups of the marginal left-liberal wing of the middle-class civil societies.

Hungry
Jul 14, 2006

mila kunis posted:

got to this point in wages of destruction, it appears the people that dispute that it wasn't USSR that won ww2 "because lend lease" are full of poo poo

The capitalist world has always had to peddle this lie, because the alternative is to acknowledge that the defeat of Nazi fascism was only possible thanks to the industrial miracle of soviet socialism.

CoolCab
Apr 17, 2005

glem
really important not to underestimate how much of the soviet industrial capacity could convert (both in terms of machine time and worker allocation) from making civilian stuff like trucks and trains and into the production of arms because of land lease. that figure on produced locomotives (1,860) hides the fact that the soviet union actually produced a hysterically tiny number of trains during the war, i want to say sub 10? and it's alluded to in the article but they were running their existing stock into the ground so even if it wasn't for german intervention of which there was plenty they'd still have choked to death on production bottlenecks in their logistics chain.

you'd be an idiot to think it was anything but the soviet industrial might combined with some of the most brutal losses that have ever occurred in warfare that strangled nazism in europe, but you'd equally be silly to think they'd have been capable of using that industrial power without the land lease. i think they still would have won the war without it eventually but it would have involved huge chunks of the soviet state and industry retreating into the urals and the conflict overall being even more bloody.

HiroProtagonist
May 7, 2007

this reads like chomsky, eliding everything that happened pre-euromaidan and just assuming it de facto happened rather than looking at why the maidan occurred. basic bitch historiography assuming the western elite just suddenly took an interest after 2014

pseudomarxist bullshit about what i'd expect from some "left wing" german hosted academic

gradenko_2000
Oct 5, 2010

HELL SERPENT
Lipstick Apathy
an excerpt from David Stahel's "Kiev 1941: Hitler's Battle for Supremacy"

quote:

After shouldering the weight of the war alone for twelve months since the defeat of France, it was clear that Britain’s war effort was struggling to cope with the demands placed upon it. Nevertheless, one might also conclude that Britain’s success lay in Germany’s failure, in both the battle of Britain and its abortive blockade. Having survived intact as a major power, Britain was freed by the advent of Hitler’s colossal war in the east to concentrate its resources on offensive operations. This, however, still posed formidable challenges. Strategic bombing was an entirely new development in modern warfare without an established operational doctrine or the technology to support it fully. The British army suffered similar obstacles as it made the difficult transition from a small professional force to a mass army. Since the failure of Hitler’s Barbarossa blitzkrieg gave the British time to build up and improve both, one cannot therefore underestimate the importance of the summer of 1941 in contributing to Britain’s longer-term effectiveness in the war. At the same time, the battle of Kiev and the evident tenacity of the German Wehrmacht warned Britain against complacency and told of the trials yet to come.

Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union promised to open up radical possibilities for both sides. Britain was at last to acquire another major continental ally, while Germany stood to gain economic autarky and complete dominance of the continent (which Hitler hoped would force Britain to agree to terms). In the event, the summer of 1941, while on the surface an apparently successful period of German conquest, expended so much of the Wehrmacht’s offensive strength that a long drawn-out war in the east became inevitable. It was an outcome Hitler and his military commanders had not foreseen and had no contingency for. Instead of benefiting from a wealth of raw materials and new-found strategic freedom, the Germans found themselves even more limited in both. Moreover, as Germany’s army became critically overextended in the Soviet Union, Britain’s comparatively weak forces were able to take the initiative and prove an increasingly troublesome menace on numerous, albeit secondary, fronts. Britain’s offensive strength was still, however, very limited. The great gusto of Churchill’s rhetoric sought to play up the importance of Britain’s military contribu- tion in the second half of 1941, but in reality the British Prime Minister was under few illusions as to the limited significance of the British war effort in aiding the Soviet Union. Indeed, from the Soviet perspective, the whole Anglo-American war effort up until the Allied landings in France in June 1944 was significant only in terms of how many German resources it managed to siphon off from the eastern front. In the late summer of 1941 that figure was pitifully small and, it may be said, contributed to the Soviet disaster at Kiev.

In North Africa Britain faced three German divisions (numbering some 48,500 men) and some seven Italian divisions.20 At the same time the Soviet Union engaged almost 160 German divisions with more than 3 million men,21 supported by an additional three-quarters of a million troops supplied by Germany’s Axis allies. This grossly disproportionate concentration of Axis forces on the eastern front tipped the scales decisively in favour of Britain on all its fronts. Rommel lacked the resources adequately to counter Auchinleck’s advantage in Operation Crusader. The RAF’s bombing campaign proceeded with the great bulk of the Luftwaffe’s resources supporting ground operations in the east and the Royal Navy continued its battle against the U-boats with a commanding superiority in both naval assets and production capacity (including Lend-Lease aid). Thus, as Britain entered its third year of the war in September 1941, events on the eastern front enabled it to start throwing off the immediate fear of invasion and take the fight to Germany, with a steadily growing offensive strength and an increasing admiration for the fighting potential of its new Soviet ally.

...

The groundwork was now set for what would become massive American aid to the Soviet Union, eventually totalling some 10 billion dollars by 1945. Nevertheless, by the end of autumn 1941 only 65 million dollars of American aid had been dispatched to the Soviets. With the new appropriations legislation passed, Roosevelt cabled Stalin to inform him that he could now claim 1 billion dollars in US credit (interest free and without repayment until five years after the war).40 Although the offer was of little immediate benefit in repelling the German offensive towards Moscow, it was much more than a symbolic gesture of solidarity. The supplies would take considerable time to be manufactured and delivered into Soviet hands, but the Red Army’s performance had already ensured there would be an active front waiting for the supplies when they did arrive.

While American aid was of long-term significance, British aid to the Soviet Union during the period of the First Protocol not only was more substantial in quantity but, according to recent research, also played a noteworthy role in the battle for Moscow.41 By the end of 1941, Britain had managed to deliver to the Soviets 699 aircraft, 466 tanks, 867 vehicles and 76,000 tons of other supplies. It was also in the early autumn of 1941 that German military files reveal, for the first time, encounters with British war materiel. In spite of later Soviet attempts to downplay much of the Lend-Lease military aid as inferior to their own (particularly tanks and aircraft), German reports appear less concerned by the quality of the materiel than by the fact that British equipment was turning up at all on the eastern front. It indicated a new degree of co-ordination among Germany’s enemies and was one more worrying implication of the failure to end the war in the summer of 1941 as planned. Whatever the tangible benefits of Lend-Lease aid in the earliest period of the war, its impact on Soviet morale cannot be discounted.

...

It has been estimated that more than a quarter of all Soviet troops killed in World War II died in 1941.48 By another account, the first six months of the war cost the Red Army in excess of 3 million irrecoverable losses (killed, missing in action or POWs) and almost 1.5 million sick and wounded.49 In crude terms, if one applies these losses to the 5.5 million men in the Red Army at the start of the war, roughly 80 per cent had become casualties or prisoners of war by the end of the year.50 Such staggering figures reflect a rate of loss far in excess of any army in military history. Materiel losses were just as massive. An estimated 20,000 Soviet tanks (all types) were lost by the end of the year.51 The extent of such losses has convinced many western historians that the Soviet Union must have been on the brink of collapse in 1941. On the other extreme, Soviet histories lauded a great defensive victory, which was won by the heroic Soviet people through an ‘uncrushable faith in victory’ and a determination to go on fighting until ‘the last drop of blood’.52 In fact, both interpretations are misleading. The Soviet Union was not impervious to defeat, but neither was it on the brink of destruction in 1941.

A general Soviet collapse could only have been induced under two essential conditions. The first was the destruction of the Red Army to such an extent that organized resistance ceased and a new front could not be established further east. The second was the loss of so many strategic centres (industrial regions, oil fields, mines, population centres, etc.) as to deny Soviet industry the basic requirements for continued mass production of modern armaments. Had Germany succeeded in bringing about either of these two eventualities, it would indeed have instigated a collapse. In the event, however, Soviet resilience prevailed.

there's more I'd like to share, especially on the production front, but I'm going to leave it for a second post as this one is long enough already

dead gay comedy forums
Oct 21, 2011


oh look central planning is the loving poo poo when it comes to heavy industry and even more so in warfare woah

and from a purely war effort perspective, the strategic possibilities afforded by it are dramatically increased, which also benefit morale imo. Like, capitalists would rather surrender than think of something like displacing industry over the Urals lmao

Palladium
May 8, 2012

Very Good
✔️✔️✔️✔️
Lol capitalists surrendered to much easier to deal with viruses even when its painfully obvious its in their best interests in the long term otherwise

Harold Fjord
Jan 3, 2004
If there's one thing we should understand it's that no one has any loving idea how to measure their best interest

croup coughfield
Apr 8, 2020
Probation
Can't post for 70 days!
my interest is more wealth in my pocket bing bong

Atrocious Joe
Sep 2, 2011

https://twitter.com/anarchobestie/status/1554528197445763073?s=20&t=gzmQXo4BKD9yHJQ7fmFxUQ

quote:

KEY FINDINGS

There were no statistically significant differences in enlistment between blacks, whites, and Hispanics in either 2006 or 2012. Individuals whose race/ethnicity was categorized as “other” were significantly less likely than whites to have enlisted in these years.

Consistent with the idea of a middle class draft, people were relatively less likely to have enlisted if their parents had low levels of education or higher levels. People from the second SES quartile or, lower middle class, were also most likely to enlist, followed by individuals from the third quartile. In terms of income, people were least likely to enlist if they grew up in families at the top of the income distribution, though this difference is only statistically significant for 2006, two years after the respondents were high school seniors. Individuals were most likely to enlist from the middle two income quartiles.

Rather than a “poverty draft,” these analyses instead suggest that the armed forces depended on the middle class during the recent wars. In addition, there may have been an informal “wealth exemption,” in which the affluent were less likely to enlist than everyone else (at least in the two years immediately after high school). Furthermore, at least during these wars, minorities were not disproportionately likely to enlist.

While advocates and journalists have tended to combine the poor and minorities when voicing concerns about potential inequities in service, researchers have tended to examine these factors separately. The available evidence suggests that people may enlist according to different, potentially overlapping patterns with respect to poverty and race/ethnicity, and future research should attempt to explore those patterns.

who wants to explain to the 19 year old being praised by thousands online that class analysis is more than income.

you can think the troops deserve what's coming and admit they not all petite bourgeois

Ferrinus
Jun 19, 2003

i'm finding this quite easy, i guess in part because i'm a fast type but also because i have a coherent mental model of the world
gonna repost this here from another thread in case i want to find it later/someone in here finds it helpful:

this is a good summary of the rationale behind chinese state capitalism i stumbled across just today (click through for a bunch of screenshots of a long post)

https://twitter.com/bidetmarxman/status/1485766660166324225?s=20&t=gRpa-6Rn3D-KU1XvQNCu9Q

cenotaph
Mar 2, 2013



That's a very good read. Roland Boer's Socialism with Chinese Characteristics: A Guide for Foreigners also has a good explanation of China's use of markets as a socialist tool, among other things. I posted some excerpts in the China thread several months ago.

Torpor
Oct 20, 2008

.. and now for my next trick, I'll pretend to be a political commentator...

HONK HONK

Atrocious Joe posted:

https://twitter.com/anarchobestie/status/1554528197445763073?s=20&t=gzmQXo4BKD9yHJQ7fmFxUQ

who wants to explain to the 19 year old being praised by thousands online that class analysis is more than income.

you can think the troops deserve what's coming and admit they not all petite bourgeois

if this study is like the others they use household incomes of like $70,000 a year as middle class


edit: yeah it is, the highest quartile starts at >$100k which I would describe as the beginning of middle class for family or household income.

I feel like the researches accidentally discovered that the US annihilated it’s middle class and has mostly working class/ poor working class and are in denial.

edit2: the twitterer still doesn’t make the case that calling it a poverty draft is wrong or morally reprehensible. it is absolutely a working class draft, a proletariat draft.

Torpor has issued a correction as of 23:47 on Aug 4, 2022

Cpt_Obvious
Jun 18, 2007

Is there any meaningful difference between workers and gig workers such that it changes their relationship to each other and they become another class?

droll
Jan 9, 2020

by Azathoth
They work for a wage and someone pays them less than the actual value of their labor, so I don't see how they're not proletarian. Is the argument that they might own their car therefore they're not?

The Voice of Labor
Apr 8, 2020

no. you could make the claim that gig workers are inherently more fluid, closer to the lumpenproletariat in that they serve capital as a means to depress wages and rights and that they're harder to organize than factory workers. but given the irregularity and social isolation that's ubiquitous in the modern workplace, I think that would take some mental gymnastics to really harp over.

otoh, gig workers, being extra exploited and also having nothing to loose, especially in terms of company loyalty, could be in a vanguard position. also, being absolutely general labor opens the possibility of trade agnostic unionism, which could be good. still no difference in class, whether there's any kind of meaningful peasant/industrial worker kind of distinction really comes down to whether they can organize to protect their interests

ikanreed
Sep 25, 2009

I honestly I have no idea who cannibal[SIC] is and I do not know why I should know.

syq dude, just syq!

droll posted:

They work for a wage and someone pays them less than the actual value of their labor, so I don't see how they're not proletarian. Is the argument that they might own their car therefore they're not?

There's a case to be made that there's a special subset of the proletariat who gets abused by both capitalists and customers

droll
Jan 9, 2020

by Azathoth
How is a gig worker abused by a customer differently to a restaurant server?

Torpor
Oct 20, 2008

.. and now for my next trick, I'll pretend to be a political commentator...

HONK HONK

ikanreed posted:

There's a case to be made that there's a special subset of the proletariat who gets abused by both capitalists and customers

they are beyond proletariat, we call them proletariat2

The Voice of Labor
Apr 8, 2020

the waiter still gets their paycheck, their cut of the tips and get to come back to work tomorrow if they get a one star rating.

the precariousness is the salient thing

droll
Jan 9, 2020

by Azathoth
If enough customers leave a 1 star rating on a restaurant review service like Google, the owner could fire the server. It's less automated but still the same as the gig worker?

I understand that they're an employee and have a roster and know when they're going to work and have a general idea of how much wages they'll earn vs gig worker being more precarious, but the specific point was that customers abuse them too therefore different subset* class.

droll has issued a correction as of 23:53 on Aug 4, 2022

HiroProtagonist
May 7, 2007

droll posted:

How is a gig worker abused by a customer differently to a restaurant server?

not getting tipped, for an easy #1. an easy #2 is assumed to cater to their every particular circumstance which can range from 'going somewhere you're unfamiliar with and not knowing how to get there' to 'a portion of your pay is in company scrip' which is a thing in restaurants (aka "family meals," just better disguised as such) or #3 having no recourse to being banned from the platform (aka fired) which is a problem for gig workers given that most of that is controlled by a small number of companies vs. the service/restaurant industry.

e: just realized you said "differently," but i'd argue it's the same or worse for the reasons above.

Cpt_Obvious
Jun 18, 2007

Doesn't customer feedback also matter in tipped jobs like food service?

droll
Jan 9, 2020

by Azathoth
Yeah I wanna say that if gig workers are a subset of the proletariat, that this isn't a new thing. Perhaps what is new is the ease of access to information and automation of what always happened to customer service workers. Being sent home early without pay when there are no customers, being punished and fired after enough customer complaints, not being tipped, being verbally abused by customers, these existed for a long time but now it's like hyper abuse thanks to the Internet. When I was in call centers in my early 20s all these happened to us, except the tipping.

my dad
Oct 17, 2012

this shall be humorous
Day laborers were always a thing.

Ferrinus
Jun 19, 2003

i'm finding this quite easy, i guess in part because i'm a fast type but also because i have a coherent mental model of the world
yeah hyper-flexible gig workers who don't even know what their day is going to entail until they've half finished with it are actually a throwback. it's what working in a big factory or whatever was like before labor became organized enough to demand preset workdays, regular breaks, etc. the main difference today is that, because your boss or bosses can control you remotely, you might be sent ranging all across a city rather than across a factory or dockside

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paul_soccer12
Jan 5, 2020

by Fluffdaddy
:synpa:

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