Ukraine: The Aristoblyats

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Raerlynn: Oct 28, 2007; Sorry I'm late, I'm afraid I got lost on the path of life.

Suicide Watch posted:

https://mobile.twitter.com/JulianRoepcke/status/1560658471866867712

Clever, and also makes me wonder why we don't see more of that. Especially if you manage to set them up in a crossfire, I'd imagine you could tie enemy soldiers up for a long long time.

# ? Aug 19, 2022 20:02

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# ? Jun 5, 2024 09:59

BaconAndBullets: Feb 25, 2011

Raerlynn posted:

Clever, and also makes me wonder why we don't see more of that. Especially if you manage to set them up in a crossfire, I'd imagine you could tie enemy soldiers up for a long long time.

Probably the difficulty of moving a turret. Or just setting up the mechanisms for machine guns and the ammo you load with it is all the rounds it has. Could work for some stalling, but probably not nearly as effective as actually manned machine gun positions you have a defense in depth plan with.

Now having a gun position or two with a remote setup combined with manned machine gun nests could cause some major delays of an assault.

# ? Aug 19, 2022 20:17

cult_hero: Jul 10, 2001

BaconAndBullets posted:

Probably the difficulty of moving a turret. Or just setting up the mechanisms for machine guns and the ammo you load with it is all the rounds it has. Could work for some stalling, but probably not nearly as effective as actually manned machine gun positions you have a defense in depth plan with.

Now having a gun position or two with a remote setup combined with manned machine gun nests could cause some major delays of an assault.

Not to mention electronic counter measures jamming your wifi and not having someone there to clear a jam or pick up the gun if it falls over.

It reminds me a lot of the drip guns used at Gallipoli, great as a distraction and sowing confusion, but limited efficacy.

# ? Aug 19, 2022 20:25

Lead out in cuffs: Sep 18, 2012; "That's right. We've evolved."

"I can see that. Cool mutations."

cult_hero posted:

Not to mention electronic counter measures jamming your wifi and not having someone there to clear a jam or pick up the gun if it falls over.

It reminds me a lot of the drip guns used at Gallipoli, great as a distraction and sowing confusion, but limited efficacy.

I mean, cables do exist re the wifi issue. But yeah, all the other stuff.

# ? Aug 19, 2022 21:40

CabooseRvB: Aug 12, 2022; I miss Sheila :c

Depends on what exactly is being jammed or how the Russians are doing it.

Unless they were blasting that area with an oversized microwave, the Ukrainians could definitely get away with controlling that remotely on some untouched frequency.

# ? Aug 19, 2022 21:45

kemikalkadet: Sep 16, 2012

cult_hero posted:

Not to mention electronic counter measures jamming your wifi and not having someone there to clear a jam or pick up the gun if it falls over.

It reminds me a lot of the drip guns used at Gallipoli, great as a distraction and sowing confusion, but limited efficacy.

Yeah I thought of the drip guns too. They're basically being used in the same way too: covering a fighting retreat.

# ? Aug 19, 2022 22:29

my kinda ape: Sep 15, 2008; Everything's gonna be A-OK; Oven Wrangler

I'm pretty sure you see the cable there to the back left of the turret position in the last 10 seconds of the video.

# ? Aug 19, 2022 22:49

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

SDO Background Briefing transcript from today.

Intro then excerpts based on my arbitrary and bad decisions.

https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3134558/senior-defense-official-holds-a-background-briefing/

Highlights:

Military Aid Package:
-US will soon announce another $775 million in military aid. 19th Presidential drawdown package and will include the stuff below
-GMLRS (ammo for HIMARS / MLRS)
-16x 105mm howitzers and 36,000 rounds of 105mm ammunition.
-15x ScanEagle drones (unmanned tactical ISR)
-40x MRAPs with mine rollers. Intended for mine-clearing and/or transport
-Additional HARM (anti-radar) missiles. Ukraine has integrated HARMs onto their aircraft and have successfully employed them against Russian radar systems.
-1,500 TOW missiles. Anti-tank guided missile. Heavier warhead and significantly longer max range than a javelin, but not very man-portable.
-1,000 more javelins
-2,000 more anti-armor rounds for systems like Carl Gustaf
-50x up-armored HMMWVs
-Various optics, demolitions, secure communications, etc.

Q&A:
-US aims to provide aid that can change the status quo now that the battle lines are nearly stationary
-US considers Crimea to be Ukraine for purposes of the questions about using GMLRS to target Russian forces inside Ukraine vs Russian home territory.
-US continuing to deliver GMLRS on a schedule, so announced aid doesn't necessarily mean past aid was used up or indicate delivery timeline. (It sounds like they're talking around describing controlled supply rate, or CSR, which is usually the term for feeding artillery at a level that is sustainable and neither has the guns run dry nor overdelivers ammunition forward, unused)
-US does not have assessment on what is causing explosions in Crimea lately
-US encourages Russia to comply with IAEA requests and not to operate military action around ZPP
-HARM is integrated on Ukrainian MiG fighters
-US has supplied Phoenix Ghost at a rate such that Ukraine has not run dry
-US has not provided ATACMS and suggests Ukraine is fine without that capability
-US has not seen Ukraine take back any significant territory, but is seeing Ukraine continue to weaken Russia's positions on territory Russia still holds
-NASAMS still 2-3 months away from fielding
-Russia has been shifting forces as it finds its forces vulnerable to strikes in unexpected ways
-On topic of western fighters, US is considering that in the future (past statements have implied pretty far future), but in meantime providing new capabilities to existing Ukrainian aircraft like HARMs and thousands of repair parts.
-In response to asking if the HMMWVs, mine-clearing, etc, point toward offensive mindset, SDO says these would enhance Ukraine's mobility in the south.
-Wagner is in increased use to shore up shortfalls in Russian regular forces
-In response to question as to whether it's really a new phase of the war if the lines are stagnant, SDO argues that Russian forces are being hollowed out while stalled, largely due to strikes against C2, logistics, etc, which threatens long term sustainability.

SDO posted:

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: It's a pleasure to be here with you all again. Today, I would like to focus my introductory comments on security assistance to Ukraine. We have another major security assistance package that we are about to unveil, and this continues our tradition of providing the Ukrainians what they need when they need it on the basis of very strong and robust dialogue between our military and theirs.

So this package that we will soon announce will be valued at up to $775 million, and this does come on the heels of our August 8th package that was $1 billion. This is a presidential drawdown package, and is the 19th presidential drawdown package since August of 2021.

So I'm going to walk through each of the capabilities. There are actually a number of different capabilities in this, many of which we have provided before, but I'll go through them each in turn.

So the first kind of bucket of capabilities that I'll cover relate to artillery, obviously a critical area of need. So first, we are providing additional ammunition for the HIMARS system. That's the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. We have been seeing Ukraine employing HIMARS masterfully on the battlefield. This long-range fire capability has changed -- really changed the dynamic on the battlefield. So we want to make sure that Ukraine has a steady stream of ammunition to meet its needs, and that's what we're doing with this package.

The second item in the -- what I would call the artillery bucket, is 16 howitzers. Now, these are the 105 mm howitzers, and then 36,000 105 mm artillery rounds to go with these howitzers. And this particular capability, it complements a capability that was previously provided by the United Kingdom. The U.K. provided 105 mm artillery systems, and we had previously provided accompanying artillery rounds. So this is an increase in artillery rounds, and also some of these systems. We've seen that the Ukrainians have been able to make great use of this on the battlefield, in combination with the previous artillery systems that we provided them, giving them a layered effect with this capability.

And then the third item, I'm putting this in the artillery bucket because it will assist the Ukrainians in their targeting. But this is an unmanned aerial vehicle, so (inaudible) will provide 15 ScanEagle systems. So this will give Ukraine additional ISR to conduct better reconnaissance around the front lines.

Now, the second sort of bucket that I'll identify for our -- this security assistance package relates to mine clearing. We know that Russia has heavily mined areas in parts of southern and eastern Ukraine. We know there's a significant amount of unexploded ordnance, so we will be providing mine-clearing equipment and systems, and we will also be providing for the first time 40 MaxxPro MRAPs, or Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles with mine rollers. So this is going to give the Ukrainians a resilient capability for transporting troops in this challenging terrain.

The next area to identify for this package: missiles and anti-armor. This is a few different things here. First, we are providing additional High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles. These are the HARM missiles. Ukraine has successfully employed these missiles. They have successfully integrated them onto Ukrainian aircraft, and this enables Ukraine to seek and destroy Russian radars, so we'll be providing additional HARM missiles.

The second in this kind of missile category is for the land domain, we're providing TOW missiles, so 1,500 TOW missiles. This stands for Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire-Guided missiles, and here, you're very familiar with Russia's heavy use of armor. And so there is this ongoing need for anti-armor capability, and this is just another one of these capabilities.

Now, in addition to this, we are going back to a system that I know you're all very familiar with and the Ukrainians have made a terrific use of, especially in the early days of the conflict -- this is the Javelin system. So we will be providing 1,000 additional Javelin anti-armor systems. And we see this as a continuing aspect of Ukrainian success.

And then last in this category, we're providing 2,000 anti-armor rounds. Now, these are just the rounds because the Ukrainians have a number of existing anti-armor and anti-personnel weapons systems. Many of them were provided by allies and partners. One example is the Carl Gustaf system. So we're providing these rounds to complement those existing systems.

We are also, in the category of mobility, providing Humvees. In this package, we'll have an additional 50 armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, or HMMMVs. We've already provided hundreds of these and the Ukrainians have been using them and actually also are very capable in sustaining them and maintaining them.

And then I'm just going to quickly run through -- in every package, we have a number of other smaller items. In this package, it includes tactical secure communications systems, demolition munitions, night vision devices, thermal imagery systems, optics and laser range finders.

So in summary, the United States has committed approximately $10.6 billion in security assistance since the beginning of the Biden administration, and since 2014, more than $12.6 billion in security assistance. And this isn't the end, we will continue to consult with the Ukrainians to make sure that we are providing them what they need, when they need it.

So I am more than happy to take your questions.

Q: Hi, thank you. Just more broadly, the Brits have been sort of saying that the operation as a whole, the war as a whole is at sort of a near standstill and neither side is launching major offensives right now. Can you talk a little bit about this as sort of the -- nearly the six month mark in the war and where you think things stand at this point and what this package of weapons hopes to do as you look to the future, in terms of providing the Ukrainians something that will allow them to continue this war as it moves on into the next months and year?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Great, thank you. I appreciate that question. Right now, I would say that you are seeing a complete and total lack of progress by the Russians on the battlefield. So in that sense, we are at a different phase than we -- where we were even a couple of months ago.

You're seeing the Russians still paying, you know, a high price with Ukrainian attacks, especially using that HIMARS system that I referred to earlier, but they are incurring these costs and not able to advance. So as we look at the Ukrainian capability needs, it's very important for us to be able to both sustain the successes that we've seen from the Ukrainians on the battlefield so far -- I talked about how, in this package, we're providing additional Javelins. That's been a capability that we've been providing since the very start and since before the invasion, in fact -- but we're also looking at those new capabilities that will enable them to be successful in the changing battlefield, not just in the east but also in the south, and that's where the mine clearing comes into play.

Q: Hi, thanks again for doing this. When you talked about those rounds that the Ukrainians already have, these anti-armor rounds, is there a specific type that the U.S. is giving them? And is there any hesitation about that?

And just switching to those attacks in the -- Crimea, any guidance as to whether those are actually acts of sabotage, as has been claimed, or whether they're the result of missile fire? And is Crimea considered to be Russian territory for those restrictions that you've placed on the HIMARS? Thank you.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Terrific. So I'll start with the technical question. On the anti-armor rounds, I don't have a name for you but these are for Carl Gustaf systems, Carl Gustaf rifles, so I hope that -- I hope that is helpful in specificity.

And then when -- you know, of course it is absolutely U.S. policy that Crimea is Ukraine. So I want to be clear on that matter. And at the same time, of course we are providing Ukraine with support capability -- you mentioned the HIMARS systems -- but also intelligence so that they can defend themselves on the territory of Ukraine.

Q: Thanks so much for doing this and for taking my question. Ukrainian officials have told us that they feel U.S. weaponry is not reaching them fast enough to launch a major counter-offensive. I wonder what your response to that is? And then also, if you might describe how fast the HIMAR ammo, for example, is getting to them? Is that still the, like, 24 to 48 hour timeframe from when the drawdown happens that we heard about in the past?

And then on Crimea, the parts of Crimea that we're seeing explosions, HIMARS are out of range. So I was wondering if you might be able to say any more about what you think is happening there?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: OK, so in terms of the delivery timelines (inaudible) proud of how rapidly we have been able to provide capability to the Ukrainians, and it has only increased in rapidity since the early days of our security assistance surge.

We have already delivered -- with specific respect to the HIMARS, we have already accounted for delivery of all of the -- what we call the GMLRS, the Guided Multiple Rocket Launch System munitions from the Presidential Drawdown 17 and 18, the last two.

And so now with GMLRS, we're in a mode where we are going to be providing these additional tranches of GMLRS in a very sustainable fashion, in a very predictable fashion for the Ukrainians so that they have exactly what they need to continue to use the HIMARS system. So this will be a recurrent effort, where we'll continue to deliver GMLRS regularly over time.

And in terms of the specifics of exactly what's happening on the ground in Crimea, I do not have any really specific details on that to offer.

...

Q: Two questions here. First, I was wondering if you could just tell us your perspective on how you see the threats and the possibilities of what might happen at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Plant. I know there's a lot of both Russian and Ukrainian I.O. around that. But do you see something imminent happening there, some operation by -- on the part of the Russians? If you could just give us any perspective on that.

And then I was curious, just to come back to the HARMS, is there any background you can provide? Because it -- it's an American missile on essentially a Soviet-era fighter. How and when was that -- was the integration of that done? And what Ukrainian platforms are able to use the HARM?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Terrific. So first on the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Plant, this is a situation that the U.S. government across the board and the national security community is watching very, very closely. We are very concerned about military option -- military operations, rather, at or near any of Ukraine's nuclear power facilities, and you know, very concerned about any reports of damage to specifically Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Plant's power lines. We've been very clear that fighting near a nuclear power plant is dangerous, is responsible, and we want the fighters and Russia to operate with extreme caution and conduct no actions that would result in a potential radiological release.

I think, you know, all of us have seen how Russia has shown complete disregard for the security of Ukraine's nuclear power facilities. You know, we've seen Russia showing a willingness to fire on a nuclear power plant in the past, and so we see Russia's current actions in and around this plant as really the height of irresponsibility, especially when you consider the responsibilities that come with being a nuclear power. So we have been very clear with Russia, that we expect Russia to return full control of this plant, to comply with the request by the IAEA, to comply with its technical safeguards, and provide access to the plant.

And I think the last thing I'll say on this plant is I think we all have to think about the heroism of these Ukrainian nuclear plant workers who have been operating under such dire circumstances in the face of this Russian atrocity.

So next, your question on HARMS. This is more of a technical question. The aircraft that the Ukrainians have integrated -- and you're right, this is a Western-produced missile. The aircraft that they have integrated it with is their MiG aircraft. They're -- they have actually successfully integrated it as something that we determined would be technically-feasible, and based on that feasibility determination, we provided them with this capability. So this is actually the second tranche of HARMS that we're providing.

...

Q: Yeah, thanks. You mentioned that there's a lack of progress by the Russians. What about with Ukraine? Are they making any progress retaking territory, or are they just at a strong defensive mode? And also with the military equipment, what's the status of the NASAMS, the air defense systems? They were supposed to get two. And an update on the Phoenix Ghost. You folks said earlier hundreds would start moving out in August. What's the status on that? And then finally -- we never really got a good explanation about why you're not providing ATACMS, the longer-range missiles. The Ukrainians have already pledged not to fire the HIMARS into Russian territory, so why can't you provide them with the ATACMS?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I mean, thanks, Tom. That's -- a lot of different pieces here. So first, just specifically on the NASAMS delivery, we're expecting that to be within the next two to three months. And on Phoenix Ghost, the concept here is for a rolling delivery, so we will be delivering starting, you know, later this month, but moving forward, we are able to replenish their supplies and ensure that they have sufficient Phoenix Ghosts on hand on a regular basis. So they have not ever reached the point where they have a gap in that capability.

And then I think your last question in terms of ATACMS, -- if I covered all your questions accurately, right now we see that the Ukrainians are able to successfully target Russian key capabilities, key command-and-control nodes, logistic nodes, and they're doing that with the existing GMLRS, with the existing HIMARS. So to your related question about, you know, are -- is there progress, we actually are seeing the Ukrainians on a daily basis successfully weakening the Russian forces as they're deployed throughout (inaudible), so in the east.

Q: Yeah, but they're -- are they retaking territory, or just, again, more defensive and hitting the Russians behind their lines?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: We haven't seen a significant retake of territory, but we do see a significant weakening of Russian positions in a variety of locations.

...

Q: Thank you. I wanted to come back to Crimea, to -- there've been some -- on social media in the last couple days, some assessments about the impact that these explosions have had on the Black Sea aviation fleet for Russia. Can you give us any kind of assessment as to what kind of damage the air combat power of Russia in Crimea has suffered at this point?

And then on HIMARS, I wanted to come back to this again, because if they're so successful and they're having such an effect, why not increase the number of HIMAR Systems in this pipeline that you have now and increase the sustainment capability of the GMLRS? Thank you.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Thanks. Eric, I do not have an overall assessment for you of, you know, the total impact of the recent attacks, I think especially this -- the airfield in Crimea. But you know, certainly, we are seeing this overarching picture of Russian forces being much more vulnerable than they thought they were, and we are seeing movements of Russian forces as a result to try to protect their capabilities.

And in terms of the HIMARS, it is important to note, it's not just the U.S. HIMARS. So the -- U.S. HIMARS, the -- 16 that we have provided are operating in conjunction with Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, MLRS systems provided from the UK and also from Germany.

And what we are seeing the Ukrainians able to do is -- you know, is spread these capabilities out in a very effective way and, you know, concentrate these precision strikes on exactly the right Russian positions -- Russian command and control nodes, Russian logistics nodes -- to achieve a useful effect.

But, you know, we're always looking -- we're always looking at what Ukraine needs, we're always looking at whether -- there is a new capability or an additional capability that we need to provide them. So I wouldn't take our -- you know, our current security assistance posture as static in any way.

...

Q: Hi, thanks for doing this. I have a question about the HARM missiles. Is -- and it -- forgive me if I missed one of the SDO briefings -- but is this the first time that the U.S. has said that -- admitted that they're providing HARM missiles? And if it is, why weren't they announced earlier?

And then secondly, have there been any additional conversations or considerations about sending fighter jets to Ukraine? Thanks.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Great. So on the HARMs, when we first announced the initial provision of HARM missiles, the way that we characterized it in the announcement was not specific. We described that we were providing a counter-radar capability.

But we have spoken to it publicly. I think Dr. Kahl is the most recent -- Dr. Colin Kahl recently did reference it in a briefing here at the Pentagon. We do want to be careful about how we talk publicly about capabilities that will give Ukraine a significant asymmetric and unexpected advantage. In this case, we have seen them using it successfully, so we are more comfortable discussing it, but we are not disclosing the specific numbers of missiles.

And then on your second question on fighters, this is something where we certainly are looking at the Ukrainian Armed Forces' needs in every domain in the -- in the current and in the future. In the current, our focus has been on capabilities that we can get them quickly, that they can use in the current fight in now east and south Ukraine.

So in terms of aviation, we've focused on how we can enhance their existing aircraft fleet. That's where the HARM missiles come into play, giving that -- them that additional advantage. We've also sourced from around the world, you know, thousands of spare parts for their MiGs.

But in the future, we're also looking at other capabilities that we -- that we might be able to provide them and we're doing work now on what the future of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will look like and considering all possibilities.

...

Q: Hi, thank you for doing this. I wanted to follow up on that question. Is it fair to say that this package could better position the Ukrainian forces to launch a counter-offensive? You've got the Humvees, you've got the MRAPs, and you've got these Carl Gustaf recoilless rifles for infantry. These seem like offensive-minded weapons.

Then I had a follow up.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I would absolutely say that these are capabilities that are enhancing the Ukrainians' mobility as they look at this very challenging environment in southern Ukraine, in particular.

...

Q: Thanks very much for doing this. There have been some reports that the Wagner Group has been managing to grow and increase its force strength in Ukraine. What are you seeing from the Wagner Group and is the Wagner Group and its forces, are they facing the same moralE issues that have plague the regular Russian forces?

Also, early this week, Victor Zhora with Ukraine's SSSCIP said that Ukraine is not conducting any offensive cyber operations against Russia but that independent cyber actors who are trying to support Ukraine are. Does the Pentagon agree with that assessment? And how worrisome or dangerous is it that some key cyber operations apparently are being carried out with any real oversight from the Ukrainian military? Is there a chance that some way that could by announcing the actor could alter or enlarge the scope of the conflict?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: OK, so on the Wagner question, yes, we do see Wagner having a presence in Ukraine and conducting operations as part of the Russian military's overall operational effort.

I think that with Wagner, obviously what you see as Russia paying more and more to obtain the human capital it needs for this operation. Russia is resorting increasingly to Wagner as it finds its own regular forces have been depleted, and as you suggest, suffering very low morale.

So Wagner is in part a numbers game and another tool in Russia's tool kit. But I would (inaudible) it a tool that also has its limitations. And of course based on Wagner's track record, what we have seen of Wagner elsewhere in the world in the Middle East and Africa, we know the lawlessness with which they tackle their operations. So this is also a concerning trend in that regard.

I don't have anything specific for you on your question about non-state cyber actors. It's not something that I have information on.

...

Q: OK. And then you -- I think you -- I believe you said that the war entered a new phase. You've talked how the Russians are unable to make any progress. You talked about the HIMARS making -- changing the dynamics of the battlefield. I mean, however, we've been hearing from various Pentagon officials for a while now, long while, that the Russians are stalled. They're not making progress. So I was wondering -- and the Ukrainians, on the other hand, you said they're not taking back any major territories. So I was wondering how the HIMARS actually are changing the dynamics, if the Russian have been stalled for a while and the Ukrainians aren't making any progress, real progress on the field. So what is the change here? Thank you.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Thanks. I think I'd look at a couple of things here. First, you really have to look at Russia's original war objectives and how sweeping those war objectives were, and how little Russia has been able to achieve in terms of those original objectives, when you look at the overall progress of this war since the February 24th invasion. And second, you have to look at not just inches of territory and whether inches of territory have moved in the past, say, few weeks, but rather, what kinds of capabilities are being degraded, what kinds of positions are being destroyed. And that's where the HIMARS have been exceptionally successful. So you're seeing this hollowing out of the Russian forces in Ukraine, but with implications for their longer-term sustainability.

...

# ? Aug 20, 2022 00:56

slurm: Jul 28, 2022; by Hand Knit

Raerlynn posted:

Clever, and also makes me wonder why we don't see more of that. Especially if you manage to set them up in a crossfire, I'd imagine you could tie enemy soldiers up for a long long time.

It's seen pretty often in Syria and the Israelis smuggle them all over the world for assassinations iirc

# ? Aug 20, 2022 01:19

my kinda ape: Sep 15, 2008; Everything's gonna be A-OK; Oven Wrangler

Is this the first time we've sent TOWs to Ukraine? I've seen lots of Stugna-P videos but no TOWs that I can think of.

# ? Aug 20, 2022 01:22

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

my kinda ape posted:

Is this the first time we've sent TOWs to Ukraine? I've seen lots of Stugna-P videos but no TOWs that I can think of.

Yeah, the TOWs are a new capability (as far as US, I dunno if anyone else gave them TOW)

# ? Aug 20, 2022 01:30

Stultus Maximus: Dec 21, 2009; USPOL May

Is there any good reason that we won't send ATACMS, a system we're phasing out and might as well get rid of by using it, to Ukraine?

# ? Aug 20, 2022 01:35

slurm: Jul 28, 2022; by Hand Knit

Stultus Maximus posted:

Is there any good reason that we won't send ATACMS, a system we're phasing out and might as well get rid of by using it, to Ukraine?

What are we replacing it with anyway

# ? Aug 20, 2022 01:39

Jimmy Smuts: Aug 8, 2000

Looking forward to videos of Ukrainians sniping groups of Russians with TOWs, like we saw in Syria with the rebel forces there.
Then again this probably won't happen due to all the armored vehicles the Russians have over there. Turret explosion videos are better anyway.

# ? Aug 20, 2022 01:48

TK-42-1: Oct 30, 2013; looks like we have a bad transmitter

slurm posted:

What are we replacing it with anyway

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precision_Strike_Missile I guess

# ? Aug 20, 2022 03:13

Alchenar: Apr 9, 2008

Jimmy Smuts posted:

Looking forward to videos of Ukrainians sniping groups of Russians with TOWs, like we saw in Syria with the rebel forces there.
Then again this probably won't happen due to all the armored vehicles the Russians have over there. Turret explosion videos are better anyway.

Speaking of which: https://twitter.com/iAmTheWarax/status/1560729704671444992

Now I think that looks like a turret on the way to the moon at the top of the fireball, but that's way too big to be an ammo detonation (at least to my eyes). Anyone got any guesses what happened here?

e:nvm, looks like it was a grad

Alchenar fucked around with this message at 10:11 on Aug 20, 2022

# ? Aug 20, 2022 09:54

A.o.D.: Jan 15, 2006

TK-42-1 posted:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precision_Strike_Missile I guess

Ain't no way that'll ever make it to Ukraine. That thing can hit the Kremlin from the Ukrainian border.

# ? Aug 20, 2022 11:34

Arrath: Apr 14, 2011

A.o.D. posted:

Ain't no way that'll ever make it to Ukraine. That thing can hit the Kremlin from the Ukrainian border.

You mean a field conditions test.

# ? Aug 20, 2022 11:39

A.o.D.: Jan 15, 2006

Arrath posted:

You mean a field conditions test.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HSxECJNYPuA

# ? Aug 20, 2022 11:52

Generation Internet: Jan 18, 2009; Where angels and generals fear to tread.

Alchenar posted:

Speaking of which: https://twitter.com/iAmTheWarax/status/1560729704671444992

Now I think that looks like a turret on the way to the moon at the top of the fireball, but that's way too big to be an ammo detonation (at least to my eyes). Anyone got any guesses what happened here?

e:nvm, looks like it was a grad

You can clearly see the turret; I think it's just another competitor in the autoloader-induced turret toss competition for Russia's tank Olympics.

# ? Aug 20, 2022 12:24

IPCRESS: May 27, 2012

Stewards getting serious about exceeding track limits at the tank olympics.

# ? Aug 20, 2022 13:43

golden bubble: Jun 3, 2011; yospos

https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1557884228477587458

# ? Aug 20, 2022 19:17

Nuclear Tourist: Apr 7, 2005

Generation Internet posted:

Russia's tank Olympics.

Let's check in and see how that is going.

https://twitter.com/ConflictsW/status/1560992033262682112
https://twitter.com/ConflictsW/status/1560681529461850112

# ? Aug 20, 2022 19:31

Just Another Lurker: May 1, 2009

Infrared footage after the attack in Timonovo, Belgorod: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QfqnlNrIkeY

Russians moved their ammo from the supply dump to nearby woods for safety... it didn't end well.

# ? Aug 20, 2022 19:31

Alan Smithee: Jan 4, 2005; A man becomes preeminent, he's expected to have enthusiasms.

Enthusiasms, enthusiasms...

Nuclear Tourist posted:

Let's check in and see how that is going.

https://twitter.com/ConflictsW/status/1560992033262682112
https://twitter.com/ConflictsW/status/1560681529461850112

"Bro!"

# ? Aug 20, 2022 19:32

Wrong Theory: Aug 27, 2005; Satellite from days of old, lead me to your access code

Nuclear Tourist posted:

Let's check in and see how that is going.

If anyone's interested, the U.S. has our own armor competition. It's called the Sullivan Cup! I guess this year they introduced the Bradley to it. There is also the Gainey Cup for cav scouts.

https://www.armorweek.com/sullivan-cup

# ? Aug 20, 2022 19:52

Herstory Begins Now: Aug 5, 2003; SOME REALLY TEDIOUS DUMB SHIT THAT SUCKS ASS TO READ ->>

Alchenar posted:

Speaking of which: https://twitter.com/iAmTheWarax/status/1560729704671444992

Now I think that looks like a turret on the way to the moon at the top of the fireball, but that's way too big to be an ammo detonation (at least to my eyes). Anyone got any guesses what happened here?

e:nvm, looks like it was a grad

idk what that is because that is a fuckoff huge explosion, but a grad seems extremely insufficient.

# ? Aug 20, 2022 20:06

Stravag: Jun 7, 2009

Im just curious A that someone is even pretending the russians would shove an escape pod into an armored vehicle and B an escape pos would some how fit ina russia style tank without the tank becoming taller than an abrams

# ? Aug 20, 2022 21:04

Stultus Maximus: Dec 21, 2009; USPOL May

Stravag posted:

Im just curious A that someone is even pretending the russians would shove an escape pod into an armored vehicle and B an escape pos would some how fit ina russia style tank without the tank becoming taller than an abrams

p. sure that The Warax is not serious.

# ? Aug 20, 2022 21:06

Stravag: Jun 7, 2009

I can't tell with how crazy tankies are if it's a legit parody account or just a tankie now

# ? Aug 20, 2022 21:13

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Online, I learned that ATGMs don�t really work because Russian armor is too good, so HEAT has been obsolete since the 90s. No clear answer why Russia still uses HEAT and ATGMs, maybe theirs work different.

# ? Aug 20, 2022 21:17

Alan Smithee: Jan 4, 2005; A man becomes preeminent, he's expected to have enthusiasms.

Enthusiasms, enthusiasms...

i guess Russian armor didn't get the memo

# ? Aug 20, 2022 21:19

Arrath: Apr 14, 2011

mlmp08 posted:

Online, I learned that ATGMs don�t really work because Russian armor is too good, so HEAT has been obsolete since the 90s. No clear answer why Russia still uses HEAT and ATGMs, maybe theirs work different.

So the Ukrainians have been brewing up Russian tanks left and right with...thoughts and prayers orr?

# ? Aug 20, 2022 21:22

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Arrath posted:

So the Ukrainians have been brewing up Russian tanks left and right with...thoughts and prayers orr?

Tanks are the descendants of horses, so spontaneous self-destruction makes sense.

# ? Aug 20, 2022 21:27

GD_American: Jul 21, 2004; LISTEN TO WHAT I HAVE TO SAY AS IT'S INCREDIBLY IMPORTANT!

Stravag posted:

I can't tell with how crazy tankies are if it's a legit parody account or just a tankie now

Warax is an ex-Marine tanker and one of the big Fellas posters

# ? Aug 20, 2022 21:44

Alchenar: Apr 9, 2008

mlmp08 posted:

Online, I learned that ATGMs don�t really work because Russian armor is too good, so HEAT has been obsolete since the 90s. No clear answer why Russia still uses HEAT and ATGMs, maybe theirs work different.

Russian ERA is so advanced it works even when you replace the explosives with rubber blocks

e: I think I also saw you learned that the Russian army is well suited to fight positional ww1-style trench warfare, which is why they configured their maneuver formations to be infantry light and lFV heavy.

Alchenar fucked around with this message at 22:29 on Aug 20, 2022

# ? Aug 20, 2022 22:22

Nuclear Tourist: Apr 7, 2005

Stravag posted:

Im just curious A that someone is even pretending the russians would shove an escape pod into an armored vehicle and B an escape pos would some how fit ina russia style tank without the tank becoming taller than an abrams

It was a joke because the turret was almost launched into low earth orbit, so you'd need an escape pod because it's basically a spaceship.

# ? Aug 20, 2022 23:32

TK-42-1: Oct 30, 2013; looks like we have a bad transmitter

mlmp08 posted:

Tanks are the descendants of horses, so spontaneous self-destruction makes sense.

poor T-72. thought of ukraine and died

# ? Aug 21, 2022 01:06

Herstory Begins Now: Aug 5, 2003; SOME REALLY TEDIOUS DUMB SHIT THAT SUCKS ASS TO READ ->>

dugin's daughter exploded and twitter people think ukraine has atacms or prsms or something. imo it's an optical illusion and russia should keep stockpiling ammo near the front lines

(those are unrelated, in case it isn't clear)

Herstory Begins Now fucked around with this message at 01:19 on Aug 21, 2022

# ? Aug 21, 2022 01:14

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# ? Jun 5, 2024 09:59

Alan Smithee: Jan 4, 2005; A man becomes preeminent, he's expected to have enthusiasms.

Enthusiasms, enthusiasms...

Herstory Begins Now posted:

dugin's daughter exploded and twitter people think ukraine has atacms or prsms or something. imo it's an optical illusion and russia should keep stockpiling ammo near the front lines

(those are unrelated, in case it isn't clear)

what air defense doing?

# ? Aug 21, 2022 01:21

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Internet VFW > Ukraine: The Aristoblyats

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