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Herstory Begins Now
Aug 5, 2003
SOME REALLY TEDIOUS DUMB SHIT THAT SUCKS ASS TO READ ->>

Kikas posted:

Considering a proposition to build something to deliver in spring 2023 is quite far off, there are tons of things that can change until then. As it stands now it's a "thought and a prayer". However some parts of the article sound very fearmongery, uncharacteristic for Reuters. I doubt that the american arms stocks are "shrinking" significantly., they still got poo poo to spare.

There's been a bunch of conversation and some action over the last few months about how sustainable support to Ukraine is and there was some reporting in the last few days specifically about 155mm artillery and Ukraine's use vis a vis amount manufactured annually. A bunch of other weapon systems aren't really low on stocks (last math I saw on GMLRS for instance suggested 1.5-2 years with out any new manufacture off of current stocks), but there's still active conversation going on to make sure that what is needed exists in 12 months. The big senate bill in September allocated a bunch of money for restarting and developing new manufacturing lines for a variety of munitions.

New thing there afaict is that there's conversation happening about how to get Ukraine longer range capability, even tentatively. That's a change from from 2 months ago when the US line was 'we believe that the current level of support is sufficient for Ukraine's needs.' Whole thing isn't super novel and tbf the war is at a point where the question of what will need to be provided in 6 12 or 18 months needs to be considered and accounted for now.

As an aside, it also hints that there might be some truth to the theory that the US's unwillingness to provide ATACMS is related to them too being vital to national defensive plans to be spared to Ukraine.

Herstory Begins Now fucked around with this message at 11:01 on Nov 28, 2022

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ShadowHawk
Jun 25, 2000

CERTIFIED PRE OWNED TESLA OWNER
https://about.fb.com/news/2022/11/metas-adversarial-threat-report-q3-2022/

Facebook has taken down a massive Russian influence operation targeting mostly Germany.

Gort
Aug 18, 2003

Good day what ho cup of tea
I note they don't say how long these operations were allowed to run on their systems.

3D Megadoodoo
Nov 25, 2010

Rigel posted:

To make a silly fantasy wargame analogy, this is like running out of boulders for your catapults, and having your... I dunno.... say ogres, pick up the catapults and throw them at the other side. That might cause a lot of damage, but then what?

First you invade them, then you bomb them, then they fight you, then you win.

Charlz Guybon
Nov 16, 2010
Surely this was too crazy, even for Putin?

https://twitter.com/Newsweek/status/1595828588581904384

Rinkles
Oct 24, 2010

What I'm getting at is...
Do you feel the same way?
Without corroboration from elsewhere, I don’t take anything Newsweek posts seriously anymore.

Rigel
Nov 11, 2016

I guess that this isn't Clancychat because its Newsweek, but I assume this also just merits a dismissive guffaw before we move on.

At best, perhaps some former analyst had been tasked with wargaming Japan, it doesn't mean that it was a viable option that anyone took seriously. The US has all kinds of plans that we flesh out and put on the shelf "just in case" that are currently insane.

Russia's biggest strength would be completely useless in this hypothetical attack, how the hell are they getting their artillery and infantry over without being just completely blown to poo poo? With what navy?

cinci zoo sniper
Mar 15, 2013





Is Japan in Ukraine?

Antigravitas
Dec 8, 2019

Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:
I'd give that a rating of 5 out of 10 "FSB-Letters".

Rigel
Nov 11, 2016

cinci zoo sniper posted:

Is Japan in Ukraine?

If it was credible, then I think the whole "russia had already decided they were going to attack someone somewhere before inventing a justification, and weighed other options before settling on Ukraine" thing would be related enough to talk about.

But its probably not credible, so...

cinci zoo sniper
Mar 15, 2013




Rigel posted:

If it was credible, then I think the whole "russia had already decided they were going to attack someone somewhere before inventing a justification, and weighed other options before settling on Ukraine" thing would be related enough to talk about.

But its probably not credible, so...

I’m not dictator, but I don’t think that invading other countries works like picking a bar fight. And no, this is not an invitation to offer another pitch for how totally real Newsweek Japan invasion by Russia merits being mentioned at all in this thread.

Sandweed
Sep 7, 2006

All your friends are me.

cinci zoo sniper posted:

I’m not dictator, but I don’t think that invading other countries works like picking a bar fight. And no, this is not an invitation to offer another pitch for how totally real Newsweek Japan invasion by Russia merits being mentioned at all in this thread.

It actually works like a Stellaris match where you always attack your neighbor that isn't in a military alliance to annex their territory, without declaring war on the rest of the galaxy.

Saladman
Jan 12, 2010

Hannibal Rex posted:

If you want to do some light reading on previous experiences with targeting national power grids.

Every situation is very different though. South Korea and either Vietnam didn't really have much in the way of national power grids in 1953 and 1968 respectively and the majority of the population definitely wouldn't have been used to electricity nor central heating (nor would they need it in Vietnam). Iraq would have blown up in a powder keg of ethnic violence even if everyone had their A/C working properly in 2003, and the US still would have annihilated the Iraqi standing army, so there I agree it's pointless - although again a different situation since being really uncomfortably hot is quite different from actually freezing to death.

I mean it's interesting to see the article, I'm just not sure there are that many potential parallels to draw in those specific 3 examples.

aphid_licker
Jan 7, 2009


Saladman posted:

Every situation is very different though. South Korea and either Vietnam didn't really have much in the way of national power grids in 1953 and 1968 respectively and the majority of the population definitely wouldn't have been used to electricity nor central heating (nor would they need it in Vietnam). Iraq would have blown up in a powder keg of ethnic violence even if everyone had their A/C working properly in 2003, and the US still would have annihilated the Iraqi standing army, so there I agree it's pointless - although again a different situation since being really uncomfortably hot is quite different from actually freezing to death.

I mean it's interesting to see the article, I'm just not sure there are that many potential parallels to draw in those specific 3 examples.

Yeah this is what I'm thinking as well.

Charlotte Hornets
Dec 30, 2011

by Fritz the Horse
Seems the Russians have had some notable success around Bakhmut. Seems the area and road between Horlivka and Bakhmut is pretty much under Russian control now after they took over the Mayorsk area a week or two ago.

https://twitter.com/JulianRoepcke/status/1597211916115615749

sean10mm
Jun 29, 2005

It's a Mad, Mad, Mad, MAD-2R World
Another problem with comparing Russian missile attacks to past strategic bombing campaigns is that they're dropping like 1% as many tons of explosives as real strategic bombing campaigns did. Yeah they have more precise weapons compared to World War II or whatever but they're kind of lovely by modern (or possibly even 1991 Gulf War) standards and there's just not that many of them.

Charlotte Hornets
Dec 30, 2011

by Fritz the Horse

sean10mm posted:

Another problem with comparing Russian missile attacks to past strategic bombing campaigns is that they're dropping like 1% as many tons of explosives as real strategic bombing campaigns did. Yeah they have more precise weapons compared to World War II or whatever but they're kind of lovely by modern (or possibly even 1991 Gulf War) standards and there's just not that many of them.

They have made half of Ukraine go dark after 2 separate raids. If that is not success, I don't know what else is.
The X-101 and X-555 are modern missiles made in the 2000s, so they aren't really using some Cold War stuff in those raids. The "Kalibrs" are also pretty new.

sean10mm
Jun 29, 2005

It's a Mad, Mad, Mad, MAD-2R World

Charlotte Hornets posted:

They have made half of Ukraine go dark after 2 separate raids. If that is not success, I don't know what else is.
The X-101 and X-555 are modern missiles made in the 2000s, so they aren't really using some Cold War stuff in those raids. The "Kalibrs" are also pretty new.

You think some blackouts are gonna have any kind of decisive effect on anything, big picture? Especially considering the expense involved for Russia to cause them?

Eric Cantonese
Dec 21, 2004

You should hear my accent.

Charlotte Hornets posted:

Seems the Russians have had some notable success around Bakhmut. Seems the area and road between Horlivka and Bakhmut is pretty much under Russian control now after they took over the Mayorsk area a week or two ago.

https://twitter.com/JulianRoepcke/status/1597211916115615749

Is there truth in what the various replies are saying about how taking Bakhmut would help the Russians complete control of the Donbas? This seems like a bad, but inevitable result of how much Russia has poured resources and men into that area.

Kikas
Oct 30, 2012
Yeah, that's a big thing nowadays. Blackouts create fog of war, civiliands in need and peril, disrupt supply chains, make making food harder/impossible and remove visual and audio noise to filter out, while also disprupting communications. In 2022 we are far more relying on electricity than ever before so even if that didn't inconvinience I dunno, WW2 Britain, this is a big as gently caress deal now.

alex314
Nov 22, 2007

Personally: nope, and every person that's sitting in a cold, dark home will hate Russians even more.
But I get the logic of hitting civilian infrastructure, since it forces the government and allies to switch the volume of help toward helping the people. It also forces the spread of antiair stuff around the whole country.

Charlotte Hornets
Dec 30, 2011

by Fritz the Horse

sean10mm posted:

You think some blackouts are gonna have any kind of decisive effect on anything, big picture? Especially considering the expense involved for Russia to cause them?

It has 0 effect for army at the front, but a massive effect for the rear.
Since Ukraine has no means to protect against those raids and the West provides a couple of AA equipment which make no difference in the grand scheme of things and is more of a "hey, we are doing something".
Also Ukrainians aren't allowed to retaliate, e.g HIMARS can't be used to nightmare Belgorod for example. So there is no deterrence also unfortunately
Nobody also knows how big the missile arsenal for Russia is, so the scale of expense is up in the air.

(USER WAS PUT ON PROBATION FOR THIS POST)

Nenonen
Oct 22, 2009

Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

Eric Cantonese posted:

Is there truth in what the various replies are saying about how taking Bakhmut would help the Russians complete control of the Donbas? This seems like a bad, but inevitable result of how much Russia has poured resources and men into that area.

In the end it depends on how much the attacks and defence have cost either side relatively. For example if Russians gain ground by bleeding out whatever reserves they gained by pulling out in Kherson then it works for Ukraine as they prepare for their next offensives. But we don't know really what these battles have cost to either side.

the holy poopacy
May 16, 2009

hey! check this out
Fun Shoe

Eric Cantonese posted:

Is there truth in what the various replies are saying about how taking Bakhmut would help the Russians complete control of the Donbas? This seems like a bad, but inevitable result of how much Russia has poured resources and men into that area.

Bakhmut is in Donetsk Oblast, so by definition Russia can't complete its conquest of Donetsk without taking it.

It also sits at a strategic crossroads and taking it gives Russia a leg up on taking the next chunk out of Donetsk, but it's not like it's the last roadblock between Russian forces and the oblast's borders.

Charlotte Hornets
Dec 30, 2011

by Fritz the Horse

Nenonen posted:

In the end it depends on how much the attacks and defence have cost either side relatively. For example if Russians gain ground by bleeding out whatever reserves they gained by pulling out in Kherson then it works for Ukraine as they prepare for their next offensives. But we don't know really what these battles have cost to either side.

The Russians have major logistical and obvious artillery advantage here or in general all the way from Bakhmut to Ugledar unfortunately. In a mutual grind they will come on top in any case as things stand.
If the Russians can build off their success of the area south of Bakhmut and make their way westwards to cut or put under artillery control the Bakhmut-Kostiantynivka highway then Ukrainians have no choice but to abandon it.
Also it will make situation in the Toretsk and Niu York area also untenable. And this is an area of rough terrain, 8 years of fortifications and minefields and numerous slag heaps that basically can't be stormed head one.

So the situation is pretty critical for the Ukrainians unfortunately if they can't stem the bleeding.

KYOON GRIFFEY JR
Apr 12, 2010



Runner-up, TRP Sack Race 2021/22

Charlotte Hornets posted:

It has 0 effect for army at the front, but a massive effect for the rear.
Since Ukraine has no means to protect against those raids and the West provides a couple of AA equipment which make no difference in the grand scheme of things and is more of a "hey, we are doing something".
Also Ukrainians aren't allowed to retaliate, e.g HIMARS can't be used to nightmare Belgorod for example. So there is no deterrence also unfortunately
Nobody also knows how big the missile arsenal for Russia is, so the scale of expense is up in the air.

Surely THIS time is the time that strategic strikes against civilian targets will break the will of the civilians and bring the enemy to the negotiation table. Even destroying the vast majority of Japanese cities through firebombing (with zero Japanese capability to retaliate) didn't bring that about. What makes you think this time is different?

Charlotte Hornets
Dec 30, 2011

by Fritz the Horse

KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:

Surely THIS time is the time that strategic strikes against civilian targets will break the will of the civilians and bring the enemy to the negotiation table. Even destroying the vast majority of Japanese cities through firebombing (with zero Japanese capability to retaliate) didn't bring that about. What makes you think this time is different?

Well, the biggest fear is that Ukraine will be pushed by EU (France and Germany) and US to sign some poo poo Minsk-3 type of deal. And since Ukraine is dependent on these same people and rationally they will ask to admit that there is only much they can do that's it better to take a poo poo deal just like in 2015.

Ynglaur
Oct 9, 2013

The Malta Conference, anyone?

cinci zoo sniper posted:

Is Japan in Ukraine?

https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/09/aid-from-asia-japans-military-support.html

Your question made me curious, and they've sent some non-lethal equipment (armor, helmets, small drones, rations).

sean10mm posted:

Another problem with comparing Russian missile attacks to past strategic bombing campaigns is that they're dropping like 1% as many tons of explosives as real strategic bombing campaigns did. Yeah they have more precise weapons compared to World War II or whatever but they're kind of lovely by modern (or possibly even 1991 Gulf War) standards and there's just not that many of them.

Quick stats in case this part of the conversation goes further: about 10% of the air-delivered munitions in the Gulf War in 1991 were precision munitions. About 90% of the air-delivered munitions in the Iraq Invasion in 2003 were precision munitions.

The latter was the first time large tactical formations (~battalion in strength) were effectively destroyed with air power alone. You can make an argument that NATO vs. Serbia was the first time "strategic bombing alone" brought about strategic defeat. So, while the number and ratio of precision munitions Russia is using is much higher, history doesn't have many examples of such strategic bombing--however precise--helping much to achieve strategic ends. Maybe this time will be different--the point about the relative ubiquitousness of electricity now compared to the past is a good one. But I wouldn't hold my breath.

saratoga
Mar 5, 2001
This is a Randbrick post. It goes in that D&D megathread on page 294

"i think obama was mediocre in that debate, but hillary was fucking terrible. also russert is filth."

-randbrick, 12/26/08

Eric Cantonese posted:

Is there truth in what the various replies are saying about how taking Bakhmut would help the Russians complete control of the Donbas? This seems like a bad, but inevitable result of how much Russia has poured resources and men into that area.

It was really important when they still held Izyum and Lyman since it would have put pinched Ukraine out of the salient between the two cities, which would have been a huge victory. Now that the Russians have been rolled back and Ukraine controls the roads through Lyman I don't think strategically it is very important. When Lyman was lost and the strategic value lost, they should have pulled back from the attack there. Now they're just throwing away men and equipment for moonscape.

Hieronymous Alloy
Jan 30, 2009


Why! Why!! Why must you refuse to accept that Dr. Hieronymous Alloy's Genetically Enhanced Cream Corn Is Superior to the Leading Brand on the Market!?!




Morbid Hound

Charlotte Hornets posted:

Well, the biggest fear is that Ukraine will be pushed by EU (France and Germany) and US to sign some poo poo Minsk-3 type of deal. And since Ukraine is dependent on these same people and rationally they will ask to admit that there is only much they can do that's it better to take a poo poo deal just like in 2015.

This argument kinda collapsed when Ukraine started winning battlefield victories and taking territory back.


Charlotte Hornets posted:

It has 0 effect for army at the front, but a massive effect for the rear.

I think this needs substantiating.


The Acoup blog has a great rundown of strategic bombing attempts over the past century.




quote:

So why does strategic bombing, especially terror or ‘morale’ bombing seem so resilient as an idea in so many militaries? Well, the first answer goes back to institutional incentives and how the salaries of a great many aviators depend on not understanding just how weak a strategy strategic airpower is. “The purpose of our air forces is to win wars” is a much better argument to take to political leaders for funding than “the purpose of our air forces is to support our ground forces.” The latter implies that the ground forces should set priorities and that the air forces ought to, for the most part, subordinate their efforts to those priorities. And of course given the choice of priorities, ground forces will tend to prioritize…ground forces, with deleterious career and prestige outcomes for everyone else. Combine this with the fact that the sort of folks who join a military’s air branch – any military’s air branch – are going to tend to be the sort of people who already believe in airpower and it isn’t hard to see how strategic airpower (as distinct from other forms of airpower) rapidly becomes a solution in search of a problem.

The second answer seems to be that strategic airpower is both intuitive and tempting. It is intuitive in that it makes a certain immediate sense, even though like many intuitive things it is not really true. Nevertheless it feels like it should work and moreover – and this is the tempting bit – it would be really nice (for some decision-makers) if it did work, since it would offer the promise of exerting a lot of strategic leverage without risking the casualties and unpredictable messiness of ground operations. It might shorten horrible wars, or even bring and end to war itself (of course in practice it appears capable of neither of those things)! And so the answer of ‘we can bomb the problem away’ is always going to have an essential appeal even though it isn’t true, while the institutional incentives above practically guarantee that there will always be someone in the room who has an interest in believing and advocating for that ‘solution.’

Finally – and this is where I think we come back to the War in Ukraine – strategic bombing is emotionally satisfying even as it doesn’t work. It is a human instinct, when another human is doing something you don’t like – like refusing to lose on the battlefield – to retaliate, to punish that person. Strikes on civilian centers are perhaps the purest expression of this instinct, inflicting maximum pain (because civilian centers, unlike actual military targets, are not hardened against attack) at a minimum of risk and cost. We’ve discussed this ‘strategic sin’ before, terming it emotive strategy, but humans are emotional beings and so the temptation to ‘punish’ rather than pursue interests in a rational way will always exist.


https://acoup.blog/2022/10/21/collections-strategic-airpower-101/

And further specifically on Ukraine:

quote:

How likely is this Russian effort to succeed? Well, what we’ve seen so far is that air campaigns dropping millions of tons of high explosives have generally failed to compel a civilian population to seek peace. By contrast, a Shahed 136 drone carries a 40kg explosive payload. For comparison that means it would take ninety Shahed 136 drones to equal the payload of a single B-17 Flying Fortress and eight-eight thousand to equal the explosive power of the February, 1945 raids against Dresden. Those are efforts which, I feel the need to stress, didn’t work to collapse German civilian morale. Meanwhile the Shahed 136, while very cheap as a drone is very expensive as a bomb; at c. $20,000 a pop, matching the Dresden raids would require almost $2bn assuming the production capacity for that many drones existed (and it doesn’t). As Russia’s distance from Ukraine’s key civilian centers grows, the cost of delivering explosives to them increases,12 reducing Russia to demonstration attacks that, while horrible, have little chance of inflicting harm on Ukraine at a level that is remotely meaningful in this sort of war.

Consequently these ‘punishment’ strikes seem likely to merely harden Ukrainian will to resist and sustain international support for Ukraine; they are expensive and almost entirely counter-productive for Russia’s actual war aims. Such attacks won’t degrade Ukrainian will to continue a fight that most Ukrainians believe they are winning, but it will generate headlines and images which will reinforce public opinion among Ukraine’s supporters that Putin’s war effort has to be defeated. Crucially it strengthens arguments that NATO’s European members should tough it out through a difficult winter in response to manifest Russian inhumanity, the exact opposite of the outcome Putin needs. At the same time, Russian resources are finite; every rocket, missile or drone lobbed into Kyiv (or other Ukrainian cities) is a valuable munition no longer ready for use on the front lines. In many cases the munitions Putin is firing in these ‘revenge’ strikes are fairly expensive, fairly scarce precision munitions. The Shahed 136 is a lot cheaper than other long-range precision munitions, but one has to imagine that Russian troops would prefer Russian loitering munitions to try to target Ukrainian ground forces; longer-range precision platforms are very expensive. As with much ’emotive strategy,’ the things that make Putin ‘feel better’ push victory further away – or in this case, hasten defeat.

Which also explains neatly why Ukraine, despite being in a position to potentially lob munitions indiscriminately into cities like Belgorod, has mostly avoided doing that; Ukrainian forces having restricted themselves largely to clear logistics targets like ammunition and fuel depots or trainyards when striking beyond the front lines. Strategically, Ukraine needs to degrade Russian will (keep drinking!) – both political and civilian – while sustaining the international support that enables it to continue fighting and upon which Ukraine must pin its hopes for post-war rebuilding. Striking civilian targets, while perhaps emotionally satisfying to some after the brutality of Russian actions in Ukraine, would run counter to these goals: it would fragment Ukraine’s international support and potentially harden Russian public opinion in support of Putin and his war. Instead, Ukraine remains focused on winning the war in the field, degrading Russian morale by demonstrating that the war is unwinnable.

In conclusion then, the Russian escalation of air attacks on civilian targets seems unlikely to significantly alter the trajectory of the war beyond increasing the sum of human misery it inflicts. ‘Morale bombing’ of this sort, while coming with a long history, has an extremely low – arguably zero – success rate at achieving major political concessions. The promise of achieving in the air what cannot be done on the ground continues to suffer from the simple fact that as humans do not live in the air, conditions on the ground have greater coercive power; aircraft can only raid, they cannot occupy and humans can tolerate a stunning amount of raiding if they believe victory is still possible on the other side of it. The promise of strategic airpower remains just that: a promise, more frequently broken than kept.

Hieronymous Alloy fucked around with this message at 18:08 on Nov 28, 2022

OddObserver
Apr 3, 2009
...Meanwhile:
https://twitter.com/yarotrof/status/1597256731343495173

Charlotte Hornets
Dec 30, 2011

by Fritz the Horse

saratoga posted:

It was really important when they still held Izyum and Lyman since it would have put pinched Ukraine out of the salient between the two cities, which would have been a huge victory. Now that the Russians have been rolled back and Ukraine controls the roads through Lyman I don't think strategically it is very important. When Lyman was lost and the strategic value lost, they should have pulled back from the attack there. Now they're just throwing away men and equipment for moonscape.

It's obvious that Russia has scaled back its ambitions e.g trying to encircle Slovyansk and Kramatorsk already failed in May.

But losing Bakhmut will mean the Siversk-Solder-Bakhmut will collapse
Losing Bakhmut will take the front to Kostiantynivka
Losing Bakhmut means losing Toretsk/New York

Also the situation is critical in the Donetsk front.
Marinka is pretty much under Russian control
Pavlivka buffer was lost, so Ugledar line is in dire straits now from south and east
South of Avdiivka Russians have claimed lots of fortified positions and can cut the major road through Orlivka which feeds the general area.

Situation is not good by any means.

ChubbyChecker
Mar 25, 2018

Rinkles posted:

Without corroboration from elsewhere, I don’t take anything Newsweek posts seriously anymore.

yeah, newsweek is absolute trash, and has been for years

KYOON GRIFFEY JR
Apr 12, 2010



Runner-up, TRP Sack Race 2021/22

Charlotte Hornets posted:

Well, the biggest fear is that Ukraine will be pushed by EU (France and Germany) and US to sign some poo poo Minsk-3 type of deal. And since Ukraine is dependent on these same people and rationally they will ask to admit that there is only much they can do that's it better to take a poo poo deal just like in 2015.

I have yet to see any evidence of anyone pressuring Ukraine to sign a bad peace deal. Can you please provide something that actually substantiates your concerns?

Shes Not Impressed
Apr 25, 2004


Charlotte Hornets posted:

It's obvious that Russia has scaled back its ambitions e.g trying to encircle Slovyansk and Kramatorsk already failed in May.

But losing Bakhmut will mean the Siversk-Solder-Bakhmut will collapse
Losing Bakhmut will take the front to Kostiantynivka
Losing Bakhmut means losing Toretsk/New York

Also the situation is critical in the Donetsk front.
Marinka is pretty much under Russian control
Pavlivka buffer was lost, so Ugledar line is in dire straits now from south and east
South of Avdiivka Russians have claimed lots of fortified positions and can cut the major road through Orlivka which feeds the general area.

Situation is not good by any means.

Who is speculating this besides you?

Hieronymous Alloy
Jan 30, 2009


Why! Why!! Why must you refuse to accept that Dr. Hieronymous Alloy's Genetically Enhanced Cream Corn Is Superior to the Leading Brand on the Market!?!




Morbid Hound

KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:

I have yet to see any evidence of anyone pressuring Ukraine to sign a bad peace deal. Can you please provide something that actually substantiates your concerns?

I'm not sure any state actor even wants peace right now. Everyone who isn't Russia is winning and Russia can't accept a peace that would involve admitting loss.

Charlotte Hornets
Dec 30, 2011

by Fritz the Horse

Shes Not Impressed posted:

Who is speculating this besides you?

If you can actually read maps (there's lot of them by various sources and they are nearly identical for who controls what) then everything is so telegraphed in what the Russians and are trying to do offense wise. Since in this front there are no WW2 style deep tank/mech fist breakthroughs but slow and methodical grind it's obvious what avenues the Russians will use to gain ground. Note, it's not storming Avdiivka or Bakhmut head one armed with only sapper spades.

Charlotte Hornets
Dec 30, 2011

by Fritz the Horse

KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:

I have yet to see any evidence of anyone pressuring Ukraine to sign a bad peace deal. Can you please provide something that actually substantiates your concerns?

The lacklustre military support and invisible red lines (e.g the same Belgorod can't be meaningfully touched)
Basically providing Ukraine with the bare minimum to make sure they won't collapse but also making sure they can't go on the offensive or at least achieve parity.
Talking about some national security interests why ATACMS can't be provided yet at the same time signing future deals to provide the same missiles to Lithuania, Australia and Estonia.

Basically hold the line and hope Russia comes to it's senses seems to be the tactic if there is any tactic at all to help Ukraine get some actual leverage.

Rigel
Nov 11, 2016

Charlotte Hornets posted:

Basically hold the line and hope Russia comes to it's senses seems to be the tactic if there is any tactic at all to help Ukraine get some actual leverage.

The current situation is completely untenable for Russia. If things don't improve and remain more or less where its at, Russia is going to break first. At some point they will run out of prisoners and old men to throw into Ukraine without winter gear, guns that aren't rusted out, or functioning equipment.

Its Russia that needs things to improve dramatically very soon, not Ukraine.

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HonorableTB
Dec 22, 2006

Charlotte Hornets posted:

It's obvious that Russia has scaled back its ambitions e.g trying to encircle Slovyansk and Kramatorsk already failed in May.

But losing Bakhmut will mean the Siversk-Solder-Bakhmut will collapse
Losing Bakhmut will take the front to Kostiantynivka
Losing Bakhmut means losing Toretsk/New York

Also the situation is critical in the Donetsk front.
Marinka is pretty much under Russian control
Pavlivka buffer was lost, so Ugledar line is in dire straits now from south and east
South of Avdiivka Russians have claimed lots of fortified positions and can cut the major road through Orlivka which feeds the general area.

Situation is not good by any means.

I was extremely confused about the "New York" part of your post until I scoured a map and saw, sure enough, there is a Ukrainian New York :o

Charlotte Hornets posted:

The lacklustre military support and invisible red lines (e.g the same Belgorod can't be meaningfully touched)
Basically providing Ukraine with the bare minimum to make sure they won't collapse but also making sure they can't go on the offensive or at least achieve parity.
Talking about some national security interests why ATACMS can't be provided yet at the same time signing future deals to provide the same missiles to Lithuania, Australia and Estonia.

Basically hold the line and hope Russia comes to it's senses seems to be the tactic if there is any tactic at all to help Ukraine get some actual leverage.

The key thing here is that the US has formal, legal defense treaties with Lithuania, Australia, and Estonia. It has no such obligations to Ukraine. It's an important distinction to make.

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