War in Ukraine: thread feedback session open unttil Saturday (i'll regret this)

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Charlz Guybon: Nov 16, 2010

Amazing
https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1597197286161133569

# ? Nov 29, 2022 12:05

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# ? May 26, 2024 15:57

Hannibal Rex: Feb 13, 2010

https://twitter.com/bmilakovsky/status/1592976995654455296?t=1vZgElIdYVSi6i1o5rAejw&s=19

Milakovsky is one of the few people I know who talks about the fate of Russian (ex-)sympathizers in the liberated areas. If you take Ukraine's ambition to reclaim Crimea and all of Donbas seriously, it's something you need to think about.

https://twitter.com/bmilakovsky/status/1573219560177958912?t=5wcNmsBnxm_gJCbSuQwlZA&s=19

Hannibal Rex fucked around with this message at 13:01 on Nov 29, 2022

# ? Nov 29, 2022 12:57

The X-man cometh: Nov 1, 2009

Does any of the Ukrainian AA have the ability to hit a Bear flying at max altitude?
.

# ? Nov 29, 2022 13:19

jarlywarly: Aug 31, 2018

The X-man cometh posted:

Does any of the Ukrainian AA have the ability to hit a Bear flying at max altitude?
.

The never cross into Ukrainian airspace is my understanding, they take off get as close as they need, launch then circle back and land.

# ? Nov 29, 2022 13:27

TheRat: Aug 30, 2006

The X-man cometh posted:

Does any of the Ukrainian AA have the ability to hit a Bear flying at max altitude?
.

Assuming this is referring to the bombers: they're not actually bombing in the traditional sense, they are launching cruise missiles from well within Russian and/or Belarusian airspace, hundreds if not a thousand kilometers away from Ukrainian AA. It's fairly safe to assume that if they tried flying over Kyiv they'd be having a very bad time.

# ? Nov 29, 2022 13:30

Electric Wrigglies: Feb 6, 2015

The X-man cometh posted:

Does any of the Ukrainian AA have the ability to hit a Bear flying at max altitude?
.

Does a Bear fly higher than a Boeing 777-200ER?

# ? Nov 29, 2022 13:46

Blue Footed Booby: Oct 4, 2006; got those happy feet

Electric Wrigglies posted:

Does a Bear fly higher than a Boeing 777-200ER?

From what I can google the bear tops out at 50k feet, the Boeing at 43k. Not sure that's correct but it's what I found.

# ? Nov 29, 2022 15:55

Gort: Aug 18, 2003; Good day what ho cup of tea

Max altitude isn't really relevant, as airliners aren't trying to fly high to avoid AA, and the Bears aren't going to fire from within Ukrainian airspace.

Apparently the airliner that was shot down was at 33,000 feet, for what that's worth.

# ? Nov 29, 2022 16:00

Ynglaur: Oct 9, 2013; The Malta Conference, anyone?

The X-man cometh posted:

Does any of the Ukrainian AA have the ability to hit a Bear flying at max altitude?
.

Yes. Some of the S-300 missile variants from the 1980s can hit targets at almost 100,000 feet: almost twice the Bear's maximum altitude.

Russia isn't flying bombers over Ukrainian air defense, though.

# ? Nov 29, 2022 17:23

Timmy Age 6: Jul 23, 2011; Lobster says "mrow?"; Ramrod XTreme

It's about 1100 km from the Engels bomber base to Kyiv and Russian air-launched cruise missiles have ranges of over 2000 km. The bomber crews could basically just take off, circle above the base to gain altitude, launch the missiles, and land without ever leaving the traffic pattern. The airbase is more than 700 km from the border. There's nothing the Ukrainian air defense can do except try to intercept the incoming missiles because the launch aircraft are coming nowhere near contested airspace.

# ? Nov 29, 2022 18:27

FishBulbia: Dec 22, 2021

https://twitter.com/KevinRothrock/status/1597624765946429442

# ? Nov 29, 2022 18:28

Charlotte Hornets: Dec 30, 2011; by Fritz the Horse

https://t.me/vchkogpu/34710

quote:

Last week, the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported an increase in the number of "weapon" crimes by 30% over the same ten months of last year. Border regions became leaders due to the transit of SMO participants. VChK-OGPU talked to employees of the competent services and found out disappointing forecasts. Hidden behind the official statistics are daily discoveries at railway stations and airports in the belongings of volunteers, mobiles or Redoubt fighters (the Wagner PMC fighters are not documented) of �forgotten� ammunition and bayonet-knives. But the main traffic passes by law enforcement agencies through departmental and humanitarian corridors.

�The black market is full of weapons imported from the SMO zone, now in Russia, even in regions remote from the border, you can get almost any gun. Several high-profile emergencies have already occurred on the territory of the country with good from Ukraine. Of the well-known, for example, the explosion of a grenade launcher in a civilian car carrying humanitarian aid in Mytishchi. And besides this, imagine how many more quiet people who brought and hid trophies at home, and after a while, due to some kind of injustice or in a drunken stupor, they will get the trunks? All this will work out sooner or later, and the FSB is clearly not ready for such a volume of work. It's no secret that over the past decade, the work of the service has been structured in such a way that implementations mainly go through greenhouse gunsmiths. This is for those that they either knew about and got the best practices when it was time to report, or when they prophylactic previously convicted under Article 222 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Everyone in the system understands with horror and expects that the number of not only �weapon� crimes will soon increase.�

In addition, according to the interlocutor, the number of denunciations from citizens has sharply increased. To the crazy calls of psychopaths, to which the police are obliged to respond, were added such messages as slander on saleswomen �dissatisfied with the authorities and the situation in Ukraine� or, for example, �the phone caught a Wi-Fi with the name Ukraine.� According to all appeals, employees are sent to the field, who are forced to compile inspection materials.

# ? Nov 29, 2022 19:21

Dolash: Oct 23, 2008; aNYWAY,
tHAT'S REALLY ALL THERE IS,
tO REPORT ON THE SUBJECT,
oF ME GETTING HURT,

Charlz Guybon posted:

Amazing
https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1597197286161133569

Is it correct to say that Russia does not have the means to rebuild its Cold War era weapon stocks if it loses them all in this war? There are more modern vehicles and weapons, but it doesn't look like they're being produced in numbers to completely refurnish a regional power's military from the ground up. Even if they can rebuild their manpower and train them up, it won't be enough.

# ? Nov 29, 2022 20:04

Nenonen: Oct 22, 2009; Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

Dolash posted:

Is it correct to say that Russia does not have the means to rebuild its Cold War era weapon stocks if it loses them all in this war? There are more modern vehicles and weapons, but it doesn't look like they're being produced in numbers to completely refurnish a regional power's military from the ground up. Even if they can rebuild their manpower and train them up, it won't be enough.

Cold war stocks were huge, the only reason they existed is that they were built by an empire far larger with half a million troops stationed in East Germany alone. It's hard to vision a scenario where Russian federation could mobilize so many men as Red Army at its hey day, or rationalise to itself the need to build tens of thousands of vehicles to just rot in storage. This comes even before we start to speculate whether they could do it materially.

That said, there is still going to be a LOT of old stock left, but much of it takes a lot of work to get into useful condition. And then there's the T-14 Armata... Let's just say that future Victory Day parades are going to be much quicker to watch.

Nenonen fucked around with this message at 20:23 on Nov 29, 2022

# ? Nov 29, 2022 20:18

Hannibal Rex: Feb 13, 2010

Since we talked about it a couple of days ago, this is a good overview on what is known of the Przewod�w missile strike so far. There's nothing to be :tinfoil:

about.

https://twitter.com/OAlexanderDK/status/1596305942987288577?s=20&t=w2VeMJykBBu2uOlw2_sa4A

# ? Nov 29, 2022 20:30

Charliegrs: Aug 10, 2009

Was it ever even confirmed what type of missile it was?

# ? Nov 29, 2022 23:41

Orthanc6: Nov 4, 2009

Charliegrs posted:

Was it ever even confirmed what type of missile it was?

The above article seems to put the pieces together quite definitively; a 5V55 air defense missile, based on multiple pieces of debris and the damaged caused. It also describes how the exact terrain it landed in was quite unique and how that affected the damage.

# ? Nov 29, 2022 23:57

Charliegrs: Aug 10, 2009

Orthanc6 posted:

The above article seems to put the pieces together quite definitively; a 5V55 air defense missile, based on multiple pieces of debris and the damaged caused. It also describes how the exact terrain it landed in was quite unique and how that affected the damage.

I had to Google a 5v55 missile because I never heard of it before. Turns out it's an S300. So yeah, it could have been either Russian or Ukrainian.

# ? Nov 30, 2022 00:08

Fuschia tude: Dec 26, 2004; THUNDERDOME LOSER 2019

Charliegrs posted:

I had to Google a 5v55 missile because I never heard of it before. Turns out it's an S300. So yeah, it could have been either Russian or Ukrainian.

How many air defense missiles are Russia launching near the Polish border, though?

# ? Nov 30, 2022 00:15

Charliegrs: Aug 10, 2009

Fuschia tude posted:

How many air defense missiles are Russia launching near the Polish border, though?

S300s can be used in a ground attack mode. Supposedly the accuracy is pretty bad though since they weren't really designed for it. Also I don't know the range but I image if they are launched one and it ended up in Poland then it was probably fired from maybe Belarus?

Or it was a Ukrainian S300.

# ? Nov 30, 2022 00:19

Nenonen: Oct 22, 2009; Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

Fuschia tude posted:

How many air defense missiles are Russia launching near the Polish border, though?

In theory it could have been a Russian S-300 used in a surface to surface role, but the messaging from NATO partners has been consistent that they know where it came from and apparently it didn't come from outside Ukraine. It should have shown on their radars from long away.

The dark comedy option would be if Russia fired a S-300, which Ukraine fired another S-300 to intercept, and now a bunch of Polish army researchers are puzzled why there are double parts of the missile in Poland?

# ? Nov 30, 2022 00:23

buglord: Jul 31, 2010; Cheating at a raffle? I sentence you to 1 year in jail! No! Two years! Three! Four! Five years! Ah! Ah! Ah! Ah!; Buglord

Is it off topic to ask how Finland/Swedens NATO integration is going? Is Hungary still holding things up in a feint to look strong for the domestic audience, and Turkey still requesting extradited Kurds? Is that a serious demand or do they just want some sort of kickback before pulling the support lever?

# ? Nov 30, 2022 00:24

Paladinus: Jan 11, 2014; heyHEYYYY!!!

Nenonen posted:

In theory it could have been a Russian S-300 used in a surface to surface role, but the messaging from NATO partners has been consistent that they know where it came from and apparently it didn't come from outside Ukraine. It should have shown on their radars from long away.

The dark comedy option would be if Russia fired a S-300, which Ukraine fired another S-300 to intercept, and now a bunch of Polish army researchers are puzzled why there are double parts of the missile in Poland?

They still can't find the supposed second missile. It doesn't look like it's in Poland.

# ? Nov 30, 2022 00:36

Hannibal Rex: Feb 13, 2010

buglord posted:

Is it off topic to ask how Finland/Swedens NATO integration is going? Is Hungary still holding things up in a feint to look strong for the domestic audience, and Turkey still requesting extradited Kurds? Is that a serious demand or do they just want some sort of kickback before pulling the support lever?

Orban has said Hungary will ratify in early 2023. Erdogan is still squeezing Sweden for all he can get, but doesn't really seem to care much for Finland. There's been a NATO meeting in Bucharest today, but I haven't seen anything concrete from that. Erdogan might decide to stall until after his elections in Summer.

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20221128-we-humiliated-ourselves-sweden-s-bid-to-join-nato-meets-continued-resistance-from-turkey

# ? Nov 30, 2022 00:42

aphid_licker: Jan 7, 2009

There is no S-300 variant that can get to the Polish border from Russia. Their range tops out at 200km. Mayyybe it can fly a bit farther than that if you just yeet it on a ballistic trajectory. If it's an S-300, it's a Ukrainian one.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-300_missile_system#Missiles

# ? Nov 30, 2022 01:04

Fuschia tude: Dec 26, 2004; THUNDERDOME LOSER 2019

aphid_licker posted:

There is no S-300 variant that can get to the Polish border from Russia. Their range tops out at 200km. Mayyybe it can fly a bit farther than that if you just yeet it on a ballistic trajectory. If it's an S-300, it's a Ukrainian one.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-300_missile_system#Missiles

As others mentioned, if it were Russian-launched, it might have have originated in Belarus.

I don't think Russia's done much within Belarus since they abandoned their plan to capture Kiev half a year ago, though.

# ? Nov 30, 2022 01:29

Hannibal Rex: Feb 13, 2010

Fuschia tude posted:

As others mentioned, if it were Russian-launched, it might have have originated in Belarus.

I don't think Russia's done much within Belarus since they abandoned their plan to capture Kiev half a year ago, though.

It's in the link I posted.

quote:

1. There were no reports of S-300 missile launches from Belarus on the day of the attack. Reports of missile launches from Belarus are usually very accurate and this time there is no indication of any. At the same time, there has been no evidence of other S-300 missiles launched from Belarus towards Ukraine on the day of the attack. All evidence suggests the attacks were carried out using various cruise missiles and drones. That would mean that a single S-300 converted to a surface attack role was launched, which seems very unlikely.

2. Polish and NATO statements indicate that it was very likely a Ukrainian air defense missile. At the time of the attack three KC-135 Stratotankers were visible on ASB-D Exchange flying over Eastern Poland. The aircraft that these were supporting were not visible, but are likely F-35 performing the ongoing Combat Air Patrol over Poland. The radar systems on these aircraft are likely to be the NATO aircraft which officials have confirmed tracked the missile prior to impact. These would have been able to get a rough sense of where the missiles were launched from as a S-300 converted to a surface attack role is in essence a quasi-ballistic missile.

# ? Nov 30, 2022 03:28

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

Haven't done one of these in a while, because they haven't been terribly interesting/informative lately as combat has slowed down or press briefings occurred days after other media sources covered the same topics.
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transc...round-briefing/

Intro, then questions as I choose.

Highlights:
-Russia switching to aerial attacks on infrastructure, especially civil power grid
-Heavy fighting in Kharkiv along P-66 highway
-Heavy fighting in Bakhmut
-NASAMS performance reportedly good so far (note that this means good where they can range, obviously there are areas beyond NASAMS' coverage)
-No more info regarding Iran and ballistic missiles and weapon supplies
-Russian artillery advantage still exists, but the ratio to which the Russians could outshoot the Ukrainian forces has decreased significantly over time
-Tactical Aircraft (jets) are not off the table, but they are not an immediate need given the nature of the fighting, and the maintenance/training challenge remains high, so it's still a thing in planning for the future, a ways out
-US had "a decent indication that there was a possibility [the missile that landed in Poland] was a Ukrainian-fired air defense system not meant to go into Poland."

quote:

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Good morning. This morning, I'd like to focus my initial remarks on the department's recent -- most recent security assistance package for Ukraine, which we actually released just before the Thanksgiving holiday, on November 23rd.

But before I get into those specifics, I want to offer a bit of context that could help in understanding the urgency and importance of these capabilities that we're providing to Ukraine.

As we see Russian forces struggling on the ground in recent weeks, we have also seen Russia increasingly turning to airstrikes to damage Ukraine's energy grid infrastructure. These are horrific attacks to punish the Ukrainian people as winter approaches. They serve no legitimate military purpose.

The attacks also show Russia's willingness to increase the risk of a nuclear safety incident, which could have harmful consequences not only in Ukraine but across the wider region as well. Russia has shown no sign of relenting in its attacks on Ukraine's civilian infrastructure. And as we have described previously, Iran is providing Russia with an alternative source of weapons as Russia's own supplies diminish.

In this context, air defense capabilities remain an urgent priority for the United States and for our partners, in support of Ukraine. As part of the 25th presidential drawdown package announced earlier this month, we committed missiles for Hawk air defense systems as well as Avenger air defense systems and associated Stinger missiles.

Hawk is a mobile, medium range air defense capability to deny Russian aircraft and missiles flying at high altitudes. The missiles will compliment Spain's recent commitment of Hawk launchers. Avenger is a mobile, short-range air defense system that will improve Ukraine's ability to protect Ukrainian troops and critical infrastructure against unmanned aerial systems and helicopters.

Our allies and partners have stepped up in this area too. Secretary Austin highlighted some of the most recent contributions at the last Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting on November 16th. Sweden announced its largest assistance package yet, which included air defense systems. Spain promised to send two more Hawk launchers and missiles. And Poland has committed short-range air defense capabilities. And a number of allies and partners have committed advanced medium range air-to-air, or what we call AMRAAM, missiles for the NASAMS air defense system that the U.S. has provided.

And that brings me to Wednesday's announcement of our 26th drawdown of equipment from DOD inventories. This package also includes additional AMRAAM missiles for NASAMS. Two of these systems are now operational in Ukraine and we have committed six more.

As the Secretary has noted, their performance so far in intercepting Russian missiles has been very impressive. Presidential drawdown package 26 also includes 150 heavy machine guns with thermal imagery sights to help counter unmanned aerial systems.

Now, beyond air defense, this latest package includes a range of other important capabilities, including additional ammunition for HIMARS, 200 precision-guided 155 millimeter artillery rounds, 10,000 120 millimeter mortar rounds, HARM, or High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles, 150 Humvees, and over 100 light tactical vehicles, 20 million rounds of small arms ammunition, as well as spare parts, as we always provide, in this case, for 155 millimeter howitzers as well as other equipment.

Now, with temperatures dropping in Ukraine, it will be a challenging winter but we expect that Ukrainian forces will continue fighting. In anticipation, our latest package includes over 200 generators for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and this is on top of the winter equipment in our previous package, presidential drawdown package 25, which included tents, heaters, and several thousand pieces of cold weather gear.

So now, in total, the United States has committed more than $19 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of Russia's invasion on February 24th. We will continue to consult closely with Ukraine and coordinate with our allies and partners to provide Ukraine with the capabilities it needs to defend itself against Russian aggression.

Thank you. And over to (inaudible).

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Hi, everybody. Good morning. Good to be back with you after a little hiatus. I'll just give you a quick rundown of what we're seeing on the battlefield here on the 279th day of -- of fighting in Russia's illegal and unprovoked large scale invasion of Ukraine. And I'll -- let me walk you from north to south and then I'll save the balance of the time for questions and conversation.

So in the north, near Kharkiv, still pretty heavy fighting. That line, I want to say it's the P-66 highway, which runs from Svatove down to Kreminna. The -- largely has become the front line trace of both Ukrainian and Russian forces.

We see Russian forces building pretty significant defensive positions in that portion of the battle space, and then as you move further south towards Lysychansk and then continue to move further south towards Bakhmut, those lines have not changed dramatically but the exchange of fighting -- in terms of artillery -- is pretty significant.

As you get into Bakhmut, in particular -- so now continuing further south in and around Bakhmut, that fighting has been very intense. And we have seen over the past several days, in fact, positions that have changed on both sides. So Ukrainian offensive around Bakhmut, which gained some ground against the Russians, and then a Russian counter-offensive which took that ground back.

And again, we've seen this back and forth now for weeks between the Russians and the Ukrainians in the vicinity of Bakhmut and really in the Donetsk Oblast there, as you head south, and then proceed towards Zaporizhzhia.

So Zaporizhzhia -- no significant fighting in and around Zaporizhzhia. I know there was conversation about the Russians supporting the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. We don't have anything in particular on that. Certainly, if that nuclear power plant was handed over responsibly, that'd be a great thing, but no indications of any concern with the nuclear power plant.

And then down to Kherson, you know, since I was on this last, you've seen the Russians move to the east side of the Dnieper River. Although the Ukrainians now own all the ground on the west side of the river, there are significant de-mining operations that are occurring by Ukrainian forces, and the Russians continue to shell to the west side of the river as well. But certainly great gains there in Kherson as the Ukrainians press to the river over the past month.

In terms of the maritime domain, we estimate around three ships that are underway in the Black Sea, including Kalibr-capable ships. Not a lot of air operations from the Russian side. You know, weather has been pretty limiting, I think, in terms of operations on both sides in the air, and we've seen a reduction in air sorties overall. We continue to train the Ukrainians in a number of ways, as do our partners.

...

Q: Hi. Thanks for doing this.

On the latest tranche of military aid, has that already gotten into Ukraine? Can you say if the generators have already gotten in? And are there plans to send more, given the temperature's dropping?

And then on just the operational update, how would you describe the current status of fighting, you know, around the Dnieper River? Is it kind of at a -- a stalemate? Are you seeing still a lot of firepower? Can you give us any sort of sense of how many fighters, both Russian and Ukrainian, are amassed there?

Thanks.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Thanks. I'll take the first couple, and then -- to see if our senior military official would like to take the third.

In terms of the equipment that I just mentioned, most of that is not yet in Ukraine. We just announced it on Wednesday of last week. But with drawdown equipment, typically it's a matter of days or weeks before it arrives in country because we're just pulling it from our stocks and then, you know, immediately delivering it. So I would anticipate soon -- that it will soon be delivered.

The generators specifically, these generators were -- they're relatively small generators that we knew that the Ukrainians could use compatible with their power system. So you know, although we will continue to look for additional capability, I would not expect that we will have a lot more internal to our own supplies. But it's important to put this in context because this is just assistance for the Ukrainian Armed Forces specifically from the Defense Department. And you know, as we speak, my civilian counterparts in civilian agencies of the U.S. government are working actually, with European allies and global partners to support the Ukrainian civilian energy infrastructure.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Tara, in terms of what we're seeing along the Dnieper River, so as I mentioned, you know, the Russians have moved to the east side of the Dnieper River and are continuing to shell across the river into the Kherson oblast. I think it's fair to say there are, you know, several thousand from both sides. There's generally some parity in that portion of the battlespace in terms of numbers of Russians and numbers of Ukrainians. Both have placed the river. As you know, the -- the Russians blew the bridges as they were crossing back to the other side to prevent Ukrainian pursuit across those bridges. �Stalemate" may not be the right term. I don't think I would call it a stalemate. I would just say that, you know, that's a pretty sizable obstacle between the two. And as I mentioned, the Ukrainians are pretty busy demining and trying to pick up the pieces from what the Russians did to the land and to the area on the other side of the river.

...

Q: Yes, so on air defenses, there's still talk about possibly providing a Patriot system to Ukraine, maybe from one of the European countries. Can you address that? And also, you know, we've long asked about possibility of providing aircraft to Ukraine; also, longer-range artillery, if you could address that, as well.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: So Tom, I would say that on air defense, this is our top priority, and we are looking at all the possible capabilities that could help the Ukrainians withstand Russian attacks.

So, you know, all of the capabilities are on the table and we are looking at what the United States can do, we're looking at what our allies and partners can do, and, you know, looking at combinations of capabilities that would be useful.

I think it is important, you know, to note that just in the past couple months, there have been a number of offers of support for air defense. You know, we've heard great things about the IRIST system that Germany contributed. Spain, in addition to the Hawk I mentioned, has contributed the Aspide system. France has committed the Crotale system. And again, additional Hawk launchers on the way.

So we're looking at all these combinations of equipment, even as we look at additional capability that we can provide. I hope that's helpful.

Oh, and that applies, as well, to -- you asked about Tac Air, and, you know, that's the same discussion that we've had previously on this, where we certainly are considering, you know, all the possible, you know, capabilities that will be useful for the Ukrainian future force, but from an aviation perspective, we do see that as a longer term capability need, whereas air defense is an immediate priority for us.

Q: Well, can you say specifically if Patriots are on the table?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I'm just going to say that all capabilities are on the table.

Q: Including Patriots?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Patriot is one of the air defense capabilities that is being considered --

(CROSSTALK)

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: -- all others.

Q: Great. Thanks.

...
Q: Hey, guys. Thank you.

Can you update at all on North Korean artillery deliveries? Obviously we've talked about that in the past, but as far as I can tell, we haven't had any kind of update on that in -- in the last few weeks.

And (inaudible), can I ask about artillery use on the battlefield? There -- there's been a lot of discussion about the Ukrainians firing 4 to 7,000, the Russians firing two or three times that each day, and -- and both sides worried about the numbers in their own inventories. What numbers are we seeing today, in terms of actual artillery shells flying? And -- and is there a concern on -- on our side about getting Ukraine enough of those?

Thanks.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Nick, on North Korea, you know, I'm not sure there's a lot of really new information. In September, we know that the DPRK, you know, publicly denied that it's providing ammunition to Russia, but we do have information that they are covertly supplying Russia's war in Ukraine with artillery shells and we know that DPRK is trying to obfuscate the real destination of their arms shipments by trying to make it appear as though they're being sent to countries in the Middle East or North Africa.

But, you know, we're monitoring this, we're monitoring for deliveries, but I don't have any additional, new information for you on that.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Hey, Nick, on -- on artillery employment -- so first of all, from the very beginning of the conflict, this has been in some cases, an artillery duel. And as you rightly stated, I mean, the Russian ability to outpace the Ukrainians in artillery is nothing new. So in fact, what I would tell you is that has decreased over time, in terms of the ratio at which the Russians have been able to out-shoot the Ukrainians.

We assess part of that is probably due to Russian munition numbers. It's also due in, you know, part to the Ukrainian effectiveness with the employment of their artillery and some of their systems. So, you know, the ability of the Ukrainians to identify Russian artillery systems and Russian radars has been pretty effective, and they've been combining the use of not just their tube artillery, but as you know, the HIMARS and the employment of GMLRS to get after the Russian artillery effectiveness. So I guess what I'm saying is there are a lot of pieces to this.

And then the other piece would be there are a lot of types of artillery. So, you know, there's a lot of time spent on 155 because, you know, we provided a bunch of 155 howitzers, as you know, as did a bunch of our allies and partners.

But there are also 105s, there are also 152s, 122s, and the stockpiles of those munitions, depending on the type, varies. We certainly are -- you know, we keep an eye on this and our Ukrainian partners talk to us clearly about their employment.

...

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Right, and Courtney, to answer your question about clarifying the consideration of tac air and the consideration of air defense, I'm going to go back to something that I know I've discussed with this group before. In terms of fighter aircraft, when we think about that as a future capability area for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to invest in, we have to think about the sustainment and maintenance and training that all go along with having, you know, a tac air fleet. And so that's where it really isn't something that is an immediate priority for us as we consider the Ukrainian Armed Forces' capability needs.

But I contrast that with ground-based integrated air defense systems which are an immediate need. And I don't want to say that there is, you know, a lack of training and maintenance requirements because certainly there are, and we will have to consider training. We're providing training on a number of air defense systems, along with our allies right now, the systems I mentioned earlier. So there is training required, but it's not on the same scale. And similarly, the maintenance is not on the same scale. So we feel that by providing air defense capability in the near term, we will be able to help the Ukrainians with some near-term needs.

Now, I also want to clarify that that doesn't mean that we wouldn't have longer-term investments, because as we have found and as you've seen with our USAI investments, there's certain capabilities that we can provide quickly if they're from drawdown, or in other words, they're coming from U.S. stocks, or if we can contract something that is already available from industry. But in other cases, we have to invest in procurement that takes time, and that's where you see we've provided an initial set of NASAMS that are fielded today and that are helping protect Ukrainians as we speak. But we also have additional NASAMS that will be arriving down the road. So similarly, there may be a mix of air defense capabilities that we can provide very soon, and others that we can provide down the road, and we really are looking at all possible capabilities. I hope that helps.

...

Q: Thanks.

Question about the number the weaponization of winter that you mentioned in your opening remarks. This is being undertaken with precision-guided missiles that Russia still has. Do you see those numbers dwindling even further, or are they coming up on a reserve that you weren't aware of? And what about these reports that they're digging into cruise missiles that were designed to carry nuclear weapons, where they've removed the nuclear weapons and replaced them with ballast so that those can then be launched at targets inertly, and therefore, take away some of the air defense capability that Ukraine has?

Thank you.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I think on this, you know, we are watching Russia continue to double down on its strategy to try to, you know, inflict pain on the Ukrainian people to try to break their will. Obviously, they're not succeeding. We do not believe that they will succeed, but they continue to draw on what stocks they have. I don't have, you know, any specific data for you on, you know, Russian available missile stocks. But I will say that I do expect that they will continue to employ this tactic.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yeah, I would just kind of echo (inaudible) comment. I mean, it's certainly something that they're trying to do to mitigate the effects of the air defense systems that the Ukrainians are employing to a pretty good -- decent effect.

...

Q: Hey there. Thanks.

A lot of pressure, the last question. Real quick, though, I was hoping you could first go back -- the errant missile that landed in Poland, how long did it take you all for the Senior Military Official to determine that this was not a Russian missile? Was it pretty clear right away to you all?

And secondly, to the Senior Defense Official, if you could bring us up to speed on the investigation, how many Americans are there, if the investigation's over now, and what conclusions you might be able to share?

Thanks.

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Phil, that's a nice job on the last question. I don't know why you were nervous about that. Yeah, I wish you'd asked something different. I'm just kidding.

Hey, on the errant missile, I don't know how quickly we had one way or the other. We had -- you know, like everyone else, we try not to jump to conclusions and make an immediate assessment of what had occurred. We did try to look at the facts involved.

As you know, we have the ability to see a lot of things. We had a decent indication that there was a possibility it was a Ukrainian-fired air defense system not meant to go into Poland. And so, you know, walking into that, I think we were able to provide senior leaders an understanding of -- of where we were.

But this is just as an American, not as a Senior Military Official I thought that the approach was really well balanced. I didn't think folks jumped to conclusions, I thought they weighed it.

And then the other piece is this is a Polish investigation. And so, you know, we -- like many other countries, are, you know, leaning forward to provide expertise where it's needed as we press forward.

And so we'll wait to see any final results from the Poles but I do think that, you know, a number of folks reached decent conclusions as this went along.

Q: So pretty much right away, minutes then? Like, that was a -- it was a -- it was a pretty fast determination, correct?

SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yeah, I -- I don't have any more -- anything more on that one, Phil. Yeah, I -- again, I don't have a lot of timings on that.

# ? Nov 30, 2022 05:51

Libluini: May 18, 2012; I gravitated towards the Greens, eventually even joining the party itself.

The Linke is a party I grudgingly accept exists, but I've learned enough about DDR-history I can't bring myself to trust a party that was once the SED, a party leading the corrupt state apparatus ...; Grimey Drawer

Timmy Age 6 posted:

It's about 1100 km from the Engels bomber base to Kyiv and Russian air-launched cruise missiles have ranges of over 2000 km. The bomber crews could basically just take off, circle above the base to gain altitude, launch the missiles, and land without ever leaving the traffic pattern. The airbase is more than 700 km from the border. There's nothing the Ukrainian air defense can do except try to intercept the incoming missiles because the launch aircraft are coming nowhere near contested airspace.

air defense maybe, but considering how ineffective the Russian Airforce has been, relative to their huge size and our expectations back then, it would probably be possible to air strike at the base and destroy the bombers on the ground before the air defense can scramble a proper defense

just supply some more planes and modern jamming equipment to the Ukrainian Airforce, and the problem is solvable, it's not like the Russians can magic up new air plane parts to build new bombers, :lol:

# ? Nov 30, 2022 10:21

cinci zoo sniper: Mar 15, 2013

Libluini posted:

air defense maybe, but considering how ineffective the Russian Airforce has been, relative to their huge size and our expectations back then, it would probably be possible to air strike at the base and destroy the bombers on the ground before the air defense can scramble a proper defense

just supply some more planes and modern jamming equipment to the Ukrainian Airforce, and the problem is solvable, it's not like the Russians can magic up new air plane parts to build new bombers,

Russian bombers are firing at Ukraine from over Moscow basically, if you want a range estimate.

# ? Nov 30, 2022 10:26

TheRat: Aug 30, 2006

And if you start going deep into Russia you're going to run into the mythical S-400, however capable or incapable that might be.

# ? Nov 30, 2022 10:34

cinci zoo sniper: Mar 15, 2013

TheRat posted:

And if you start going deep into Russia you're going to run into the mythical S-400, however capable or incapable that might be.

You�re also going to run into the less mythical Clancychat rule.

# ? Nov 30, 2022 10:35

Libluini: May 18, 2012; I gravitated towards the Greens, eventually even joining the party itself.

The Linke is a party I grudgingly accept exists, but I've learned enough about DDR-history I can't bring myself to trust a party that was once the SED, a party leading the corrupt state apparatus ...; Grimey Drawer

again, sounds solvable to me, with just enough equipment and men

It's not like Russia can replace those bombers, while Ukraine can just beg us for more stuff, and probably get it. Destroying those bombers to end the bombardment of civilians seems like a worthwile goal to me, even if it costs half the Ukrainian air force to achieve.

Ukrainian air defense isn't going anywhere after all, and without tons of cruise missiles saturating the defenses, it's not even like Russia could do anything substantial even if the air strikes take heavy losses.

But then, that's not my call to make, I left the Bundeswehr at the end of my term instead of opting to become an officer just to avoid that kind of callous thinking, how to best use up your soldiers. :shrug:

# ? Nov 30, 2022 10:40

TheRat: Aug 30, 2006

cinci zoo sniper posted:

You�re also going to run into the less mythical Clancychat rule.

I apologise, but I feel like that was a very legitimate answer to a post about the feasibility of counter-airstrikes.

# ? Nov 30, 2022 10:41

jarlywarly: Aug 31, 2018

Libluini posted:

again, sounds solvable to me, with just enough equipment and men

It's not like Russia can replace those bombers, while Ukraine can just beg us for more stuff, and probably get it. Destroying those bombers to end the bombardment of civilians seems like a worthwile goal to me, even if it costs half the Ukrainian air force to achieve.

Ukrainian air defense isn't going anywhere after all, and without tons of cruise missiles saturating the defenses, it's not even like Russia could do anything substantial even if the air strikes take heavy losses.

But then, that's not my call to make, I left the Bundeswehr at the end of my term instead of opting to become an officer just to avoid that kind of callous thinking, how to best use up your soldiers.

A mission to attack a strategic airbase deep inside Russia is likely far beyond the Ukrainians capabilities and doing it with American supplied equipment (long range cruise missiles) is an escalation that is off the cards.

If you sacrifice the Ukrainian air force to destroy the strategic bomber fleet, then it makes it easier for RU jets to operate in Ukraine.

# ? Nov 30, 2022 10:48

dr_rat: Jun 4, 2001

So one question, if they are firing this missile from 1) quite far away 2) a vaguely known area, does that make them easier to intercept? Or would that no really matter at all.

I mean the US apparently have knowledge of that the airplanes were getting loaded up in the first place so obviously they have some sort of eyes on them.

# ? Nov 30, 2022 11:02

Herstory Begins Now: Aug 5, 2003; SOME REALLY TEDIOUS DUMB SHIT THAT SUCKS ASS TO READ ->>

easier in that trajectory is likely known to some extent, but also they're deliberately firing them in very large waves to both saturate air defenses and to bait out as many AD missiles as possible

# ? Nov 30, 2022 11:05

Libluini: May 18, 2012; I gravitated towards the Greens, eventually even joining the party itself.

The Linke is a party I grudgingly accept exists, but I've learned enough about DDR-history I can't bring myself to trust a party that was once the SED, a party leading the corrupt state apparatus ...; Grimey Drawer

jarlywarly posted:

A mission to attack a strategic airbase deep inside Russia is likely far beyond the Ukrainians capabilities and doing it with American supplied equipment (long range cruise missiles) is an escalation that is off the cards.

If you sacrifice the Ukrainian air force to destroy the strategic bomber fleet, then it makes it easier for RU jets to operate in Ukraine.

I already disagreed with that position, see my arguments above. Though my thoughts on what constitutes a worthwile military operation is well-received in Kyiv, I'm sure :lol:

# ? Nov 30, 2022 11:18

Kikas: Oct 30, 2012

Less birds in the sky for Ukraine still means more space for Russian airships, no matter how much ground-based air defense they have. Also there is a lot of discussion about Ukraine having to keep operating within it's borders for the practical reason of "we are the reasonable side, we just want to survive", because this is the sole reason many NATO members supply the weapons in the first place.
As discussed before, as tragic as it is and as horrible it is to say, stopping saturation bombardment of Ukrainian civilians is not helping the Ukrainian Army achieve it's military goals of reclaiming pieces of their country. While it does have some impact, it doesn't warrant additional resources beyond what's already dedicated to it.

# ? Nov 30, 2022 11:23

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# ? May 26, 2024 15:57

cinci zoo sniper: Mar 15, 2013

TheRat posted:

I apologise, but I feel like that was a very legitimate answer to a post about the feasibility of counter-airstrikes.

It�s exceedingly improbable that you�ll ever see counterstrikes against Russia�s strategic bomber fleet.

jarlywarly posted:

A mission to attack a strategic airbase deep inside Russia is likely far beyond the Ukrainians capabilities and doing it with American supplied equipment (long range cruise missiles) is an escalation that is off the cards.

If you sacrifice the Ukrainian air force to destroy the strategic bomber fleet, then it makes it easier for RU jets to operate in Ukraine.

They�re flying road-level and firing their poo poo like dumb artillery in the contested areas of Ukraine, the exact same way Russians have been forced to by Ukrainian air defence. They�re not going anywhere.

# ? Nov 30, 2022 11:30

The Something Awful Forums > Archives > Comedy Goldmine > The Goodmine > War in Ukraine: thread feedback session open unttil Saturday (i'll regret this)

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