Starsfan posted:

I mean it's really hard to judge how the Russians stand with shell inventories because from what I understand

1) the amount of shells they historically produced / had available at the start of the war is not actually a known quantity
2) the amount of shells they have produced post-sanctions this last year is not a known quantity
3) it is not actually known how many shells they fire a day and tough to estimate because there are large sections of the front where they may use artillery not at all or very sparingly whereas there are sections of the front where they are outgunning the Ukrainians by a very wide margin

All of the % remaining estimations you see presented in the western media are typically based off of estimates of pre-war inventories, assumptions of well below replacement level production (or in some cases no production) of shells by Russia since the war started, and estimates of usage that seem to be calculated by taking the amount of shells the Ukrainians claim to be shooting a day and then multiplying it by some factor based on guess work and 3rd hand reporting..

Lostconfused posted:

Marenghi posted:

Tens of thousands of shells produced every year? So what's that, a couple days worth of shelling in the Ukraine?

They must have 100s of these factories to keep up with the war effort.

For Russians it could be a day if things are quiet.

Виктор Мураховский posted:

Shell famine

Miscalculations by the General Staff in the ammunition accumulation rate (900 rounds) led in 1914 to an acute shortage of shells for the army in action. Emergency measures were needed to save the army from a complete shell famine. The military industry was not prepared to meet this challenge.

Although the measures taken made it was possible to improve the supply of the front with artillery shells in the first half of 1915, the "shell famine" was only fully eliminated in 1916.

The modern munitions and special chemicals industry.
It is engaged in the development and production of ammunition (AP) and cartridges of all types, gunpowder, rocket fuel, chemical poisons and special agents. As of 2022, the munitions and special chemicals industry comprised 91 enterprises.

The Russian Army in the early 1990s inherited about 15 million tonnes of missiles and ammunition from the Soviet Army, stored in 180 arsenals, bases and warehouses.

As of 1 January 2013, the availability of ammunition in the Russian Armed Forces is 3.7 million tonnes, of which 1.1 million tonnes are unserviceable. In other words, there are 2.6 million tonnes suitable.

In 2020, almost 300,000 rounds of ammunition were repaired at the arsenals using their own resources, and over 20,000 shells for multiple-launch rocket systems were collected.

The real need for ammunition is MILLIONS of pieces per year.

_{(from t.me/Viktor_Murakhovskiy/398, via tgsa)}

Коты и кошка Крамника posted:

To understand the scale - one million tons of ammunition in terms of 152mm rounds (projectile+charge) is approximately 16 million shots. About the same amount of ammunition per 122mm Grad MLRS rocket launcher. Peak consumption during summer battles is up to 60,000 rounds per day. Average, taking into account periods of calm - up to 20 thousand rounds per day.

Is it a lot or not? The consumption during the war, according to western estimates, reaches 7 million rounds of shells over 100mm caliber during the past 10 months. Annual production is unknown, roughly estimated (see here for an example Western estimate) in 2021 it could reach for 152mm shells about 300k a year, and that is a lot - about 10 times the annual production of 155mm shells in the USA before the conflict. But not enough given the consumption. Is a multiple of that possible given the defence industry's shift to a tightened regime? Yes.

And by an order of magnitude or more, in order to ensure the consumption of 300,000 rounds in less than two weeks?

That would require a general mobilization of the economy and more than one year of preparatory work with a fundamental restructuring of the entire political and economic system of the country, the probability of which everyone is free to assess for himself.

In the West, the problem is exactly the same - and to a greater extent, given that no NATO country has deployed full-flow ammunition production today, and such deployment is still only planned and estimated in the United States. However, the potential production volume there could be much higher, given the capabilities of US partners and allies outside NATO. At the same time, its full utilisation is only possible in a direct conflict between Russia and NATO, whereas if limited to Ukrainian territory it would be limited by the capacity of the Ukrainian military machine and Ukrainian infrastructure, with natural demographic and geographic limits.

The political question of ending the war hinges somewhere here - at the intersection point where the reduction of stocks on both sides, the growth of industrial capabilities, the resulting limits to the combat capabilities of both sides (which they will achieve at _different_ times) and the willingness to pay for it - in every sense of the word.

_{(from t.me/kramnikcat/2986, via tgsa)}

Weka posted:

Merry Christmas!

I did some reading on the AMX-10s and they seem like the most awful thing in the world to maintain.

Inflation in the USA seems to be up significantly.

https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/current-inflation-rates/

When you adjust the DOW for inflation, it's down 11.5%

I'm too lazy to do much digging but Brent crude is slightly cheaper in Europe than at the beginning of 2021.

Ardennes posted:

Technically, Russian forces could respond to Ukrainian fire, basically there wasn't a ceasefire

Cpt_Obvious posted:

Yeah that's called demand destruction, when the price surges so high that people lower their consumption to compensate.

Meanwhile, oil company profits are record high.

Hatebag posted:

That inflation predates the war, though. I don't think you can attribute the majority of inflation in 2022 to the war either. I think a lot of this inflation is due to covid killing or disabling a lot of people, constricting the available labor supply, and impeding manufacturing/distribution.

Leandros posted:

How many weapons shot in self-defense trigger sirens?

Leandros posted:

How many weapons shot in self-defense trigger sirens?

Vomik posted:

are RAAM any different than a standard landmine?

Ardennes posted:

I get the feeling the West really just gives the Ukrainians everything they don't want.

Lostconfused posted:

Ardennes posted:

By according to those estimates, the Russians should have long have been out of shells. In addition, by most reports there is long-term storage of shells that doesn’t seem to be taken into account.

Beyond that, we know the Russians are still firing and there is daily reports of continued mass use of artillery. Wagner mercenaries are also pushing up heavily at the moment.

Basically, it doesn’t really smell right as the Russians seem to be still firing away (also a bunch of new factories opened just before the war and were ramping up production).

Ardennes posted:

By according to those estimates, the Russians should have long have been out of shells.

Lostconfused posted:

16 million rounds per ton,

Lostconfused posted:

mlmp08 posted:

16 million rounds per million tons was the original claim. I assume includes dunnage and powder.

16 million per ton would be like BB gun ammo or something.

E: if metric tons, less. Each round would be like .1 grams.

Leandros posted:

How many weapons shot in self-defense trigger sirens?

Weka posted:

Looks like fuel has been the primary driver of inflation since March 2021. Shoutout to clothes for also doing numbers.

Isentropy posted:

The Ukrainian security state would never show such bad faith as to turn on the alarms after an artillery exchange they started first

Not to be snarky but I'm just not getting it here. There's also the possibility that the people who run civil defense alarms have no clue what the army is doing.

Leandros posted:

The reports were "all over ukraine" and I'm pretty sure a lot of that does not fall under the range of artillery

CongoJack posted:

Ork weapons and vehicles work so long as the orks believe they will work. This explains why they never run out of shells and why the Ukrainians cannot use any of the thousands of captured Russian vehicles.

Starsfan posted:

well there's 2 options. Either the estimates / reported stockpile numbers are complete loving garbage or Russia is actually out of shells and missiles and the entire war effort is currently being supported by North Korea.

Frosted Flake posted:

There's an element of post 1991 technological wizardry here too which is part and parcel of seeking "efficiency". Units connected by computers ordering supplies which are tracked by bar code etc etc on trucks tracked throughout their routes, you can see the practical benefits but also where like civilian supply chains and orders being placed in real time as orders go through the cash registers, that this can quickly become a fantasy that fucks up supply chains. For sure losing tonnes of ammunition which used to happen, or delivering the wrong calibre, that sucked, but also, just dump ammo, POL, food and water on combat units, stop trying to think yourself into efficiency. It's a great idea in theory, there are practical benefits, but holy poo poo does this have the potential to hamstring us. War is a waste anyways, just deliver essential supplies and worry about ordering thing like uniform items or traffic pylons.

FM 4-0 Sustainment Operations posted:

Ammunition planning includes determining ammunition requirements, echeloning capabilities and
ammunition units, establishing split-based operations where required, pre-configuring ammunition and
resupply, and when required, using civilian, contractor, allied, and host nation capabilities. A combat
configured load is a mixed ammunition package designed to provide for the complete round concept, type of
unit, type of vehicle, capacity of transporter, and weapons system (ATP 4-35). Contents of the package are
predetermined and provide optimum distribution velocity, quality and mix to support a particular weapon
system or unit. Combat configured loads are built at the national-provider level or in a theater. Combat
configured loads built at the national-provider level may be re-configured in theater at an ammunition supply
point as required and delivered as far forward to the using unit as possible.
Sustainment and supported units should consider building combat configured loads to meet the class
V demands for initial entry operations and large-scale combat operations. Configured loads represent a way
of requesting or pushing ammunition rapidly with a mix of all or most of the munitions a weapons platform
or unit needs. Combat configured loads can be quickly distributed to the platform level with little to no
intermediate handling but are resource intensive. Building, storing, transporting, and rebuilding the
configured load with unused class V requires significant amounts of personnel, facilities, haul, and security.

quote:

Regularly scheduled combat configured loads with packages of potable and non-potable water,
ammunition, fuel, and repair parts tailored to BCT enable offensive momentum and freedom of action. If
communications are degraded, the BSB will automatically push critical supplies to units in the offense.

quote:

What’s Ahead in the War in Ukraine
December 22, 2022
Alex Vershinin

The war in Ukraine has dragged on for nearly 10 months. After an initial Russian cavalry dash seized over 20% of Ukraine, Russian forces then smashed into determined Ukrainian resistance, ending in an embarrassing retreat from Kyiv. From then, the war became an attritional contest between Russia on one side and Ukraine fighting at the head of a Western coalition on the other. During the summer, Russian offensives captured Lyman, Lisichansk and Severo Donetsk. In the fall, Ukrainian offensives recaptured Kharkiv province and Kherson city, shrinking Russian control to roughly 50% of the territories they had captured since Feb. 24, according to one estimate. The opposing sides have adopted two opposing strategies: Russians are fighting a traditional firepower-centric war of attrition; Ukraine is pursuing a terrain-focused war of maneuver. These opposing strategies are as much a product of national resource availability as a deliberate choice. As freezing ground ushers in the winter campaign season, both sides will follow their strategies into limited offensives.

So far both strategies appear to work. Ukraine has recaptured large swaths of territory but exhausted itself during the fall offensive. It suffered frightful losses and depleted key stockpiles of equipment and ammunition. There is still capacity to replace losses and establish new combat formations, but those are rapidly withering.

I believe that neither side will achieve spectacular territorial gain, but the Russian side is more likely to achieve its goals of draining Ukrainian resources while preserving its own.

The Ukrainian Strategy
The Ukrainians’ terrain-focused war of maneuver is constrained by two factors: limited artillery ammunition and equipment production, and coalition considerations. Ukraine started the war with 1,800 artillery pieces of Soviet caliber. These allowed firing rates of 6,000 to 7,000 rounds a day against 40,000 to 50,000 Russian daily rounds. By now this artillery is mostly out of ammunition, and in its place Ukraine is using 350 Western caliber artillery pieces, many of which are destroyed or breaking down from overuse. Meanwhile, Western nations are themselves running out of ammunition; the U.S. is estimated to produce only 15,000 155mm shells a month. This constraint has forced Ukraine to adopt mass infantry formations focused on regaining territory at any cost. Ukraine simply cannot go toe to toe with Russia in artillery battles. Unless Ukrainian troops close to direct fire fights with Russian troops, there is a significant chance that they will be destroyed at a distance by Russian artillery.

Ukraine’s second constraint is the coalition nature of its warfare. Since running out of its own stocks, Ukraine is increasingly reliant on Western weaponry. Maintaining the Western coalition is crucial to the Ukrainian war effort. Without a constant string of victories, domestic economic concern may cause coalition members to defect. If Western support dries up due to depletion of stock or of political will, Ukraine’s war effort collapses for lack of supplies. In some ways, Ukraine has no choice but to launch attacks no matter the human and material cost.

Ukraine built an infantry-centric army of highly motivated conscripted troops with limited to no training. They support the core fighting force of the prewar professional army and about 14 new brigades equipped with Western-donated weapons and vehicles. On the battlefield, strike groups attack quickly, penetrating deep and fast, then hand over captured areas to draftees to defend. This tactic worked well in areas where the shortage of Russian manpower prevented a solid front, such as in the Kharkiv region. In the Kherson region, where Russia had sufficient density of forces, this tactic resulted in large casualties and little progress, until logistic issues caused Russia to retreat.

The Achilles heel of this strategy is manpower. Ukraine started the war with 43 million citizens and 5 million military-aged males, but according to the U.N., 14.3 million Ukrainians have fled the war, and a further 9 million are in Crimea or other Russian-occupied territories. This means Ukraine is down to about 20 to 27 million people. At this ratio, it has less than 3 million draftable men. A million have been drafted already, and many of the rest are either not physically fit to serve or occupy a vital position in the nation’s economy. In short, Ukraine might be running out of men, in my view.

The Russian Strategy
The Russian forces are limited by manpower but strengthened by massive artillery and equipment stockpiles enabled by a robust military industrial complex. While there have been numerous reports in Western media that the Russian army is running out of artillery ammunition, so far there’s been no visible slacking of Russian artillery fire on any front. Based on these factors, the Russian side has relied on a traditional firepower-centric war of attrition. The goal is to force an unsustainable casualty rate, destroying Ukrainian manpower and equipment, while preserving Russia’s own forces. Territory is not important; its loss is acceptable to preserve combat power. At Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson, the Russian army refused to fight under unfavorable conditions and withdrew, accepting the political cost to preserve its forces.

To execute this strategy, the Russian army relies on firepower, particularly its artillery. Each Russian brigade has three artillery battalions compared to just one in each Western brigade. Paired with correction by massed quantities of UAVs and quadcopters, Russian artillery pulverizes Ukrainian forces before infantry mops up survivors. It is a slow, grinding war, but with a casualty ratio that is significantly in Russia’s favor. Russia couldn’t attack because it lacked the manpower to secure the flanks of advancing troops. Up to now, Russians could only advance in Donbas, where advance did not extend the frontline. Even here the intent was more to draw in Ukrainian forces and destroy them rather than capture the city of Bakhmut. Mobilization has the potential to overcome Russia’s manpower shortages and enable offensive operations, while equipping its forces is possible due to the mobilization of industry. Precision munition production is also up, despite consistent doubt in Western press. Video of strikes by Russian "Lancet 3” loitering kamikaze drones is up up by 1,000% since Oct. 13, according to one estimate, indicating a major increase in production.

The Coming Winter
If the Ukrainians decide to launch a major offensive, they could do so in two places, in my view. The first is in the north, in the Kharkiv region, but limited crossing over the Oskil River generates the same logistical challenges the Russians faced at Kherson. The second is in the south, to cut off the Russian land bridge to Crimea, eventually capturing the peninsula. This is unlikely to succeed. The Ukrainian army would be attacking in terrain ideal for Russian artillery. It could become a repeat of the battle at Kherson, but without Russian logistics difficulties, stemming from a limited number of crossings over the Dnipro River, with just as little gain and the same heavy losses marked by whole mechanized companies wiped out, endless scenes of ambulance convoys and new cemeteries all over Ukraine. The levels of attrition would play right into Russian hands. The political pressure on the Ukrainian government to justify the losses taken from Russian artillery in Donbas by retaking territory elsewhere, as well as the pressure from the Western coalition, may drive Ukraine to attack regardless.

For the Russian leadership the question is: When and where to attack? The timing depends on Russian artillery ammunition stocks. If they are high, Russia may attack in winter, otherwise it may stockpile and attack in spring after the mud season. Timing is also driven by the training requirements for the mobilized reservists. Longer training increases the effectiveness of the reservists and reduces casualties, thus lowering political risk for the Kremlin. Ultimately, the pressures that the Russian leadership views as most important will decide the outcome. Will the pressure from domestic politics for a quick victory win out, or will military considerations favor delaying until the end of spring mud season in March/April? So far, the Kremlin has gone with military considerations ahead of political ones, suggesting that Russia will launch only a limited offensive this winter.

Location is another factor. The Kharkiv front is heavily wooded, restricting the effectiveness of firepower, and it is strategically meaningless without attacking the city of Kharkiv. This major urban center would take months to capture at very high cost. A limited attack to regain the Oskil River line would improve Russia’s defensive line but present no strategic gain. In Donbas, the Russian army is already maintaining pressure. Extra manpower and artillery units won’t speed up that offensive much. For the Russian army, the Zaporizhzhia front holds the most promise. The Pologi-Gulai Polie-Pokrovskoye railroad is ideally placed to supply a Russian offensive driving north from Pologi. Eventually capturing Pavlograd would allow the capture of Donbas by cutting off two main railroads and highways supplying the Ukrainian army in Donbas and attacking the Ukrainian army there from the rear. The open terrain is ideal for the Russian firepower-centric strategy, and a chance to draw in and destroy the last of the Ukrainian operational reserves and further attrite its manpower is directly in line with Russian objectives. Lastly, the hard frozen ground would make new defensive positions hard to dig without heavy equipment. The limited attack vicinity of Ugledar could be a shaping operation to secure the eastern flank of the future offensive.

Conclusion
Wars of attrition are won through careful husbandry of one’s own resources while destroying the enemy’s. Russia entered the war with vast materiel superiority and a greater industrial base to sustain and replace losses. They have carefully preserved their resources, withdrawing every time the tactical situation turned against them. Ukraine started the war with a smaller resource pool and relied on the Western coalition to sustain its war effort. This dependency pressured Ukraine into a series of tactically successful offensives, which consumed strategic resources that Ukraine will struggle to replace in full, in my view. The real question isn’t whether Ukraine can regain all its territory, but whether it can inflict sufficient losses on Russian mobilized reservists to undermine Russia’s domestic unity, forcing it to the negotiation table on Ukrainian terms, or will Russian’ attrition strategy work to annex an even larger portion of Ukraine.

Frosted Flake posted:

Anyways all of this goes against modern notions of how these things should work.

Lostconfused posted:

Unless I am doing the math wrong, 2.6 million tons, 16 million rounds per ton, 60 thousand per day is enough to last 2 years without even producing anything at all. Even if half of that was used up between 2013 and 2022, it would still be enough for almost a year.

sum posted:

A couple weeks old, but sober English-language analysis of the war is rare enough that it's worth looking at. The author's a retired US Army Lt. Colonel, and the TL;DR is that Russia is fighting a force-preserving war of attrition while meanwhile Ukraine is forced to keep a costly offensive posture to keep Western aid deliveries up.
https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/whats-ahead-war-ukraine

quote:

At this ratio, it has less than 3 million draftable men. A million have been drafted already, and many of the rest are either not physically fit to serve or occupy a vital position in the nation’s economy. In short, Ukraine might be running out of men, in my view.

sum posted:

A couple weeks old, but sober English-language analysis of the war is rare enough that it's worth looking at. The author's a retired US Army Lt. Colonel, and the TL;DR is that Russia is fighting a force-preserving war of attrition while meanwhile Ukraine is forced to keep a costly offensive posture to keep Western aid deliveries up.
https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/whats-ahead-war-ukraine

gradenko_2000 posted:

Sounds like Russia is playing a...

... Shell game