War in Ukraine: thread feedback session open unttil Saturday (i'll regret this)

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fatherboxx: Mar 25, 2013

https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1623664757638107136?t=3LGdx55lR2iASyakKWitnQ&s=19

(Of course Yermak loves cryptic tg posts that dont amount to much, so should wait for more official/formal statements)

On the other front, Putin will finally make a speech to the Russian parliament that he shifted from last year, on February 21. As usual, either its going to be something important (second wave of mobilization etc) or another idiotic hour long crybaby act with historical anecdotes.

https://twitter.com/Republic_Mag/status/1623988648055132160?t=llOgnCOlilZs-up2K1gfDQ&s=19

fatherboxx fucked around with this message at 11:29 on Feb 10, 2023

# ? Feb 10, 2023 11:22

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# ? May 23, 2024 10:24

mmkay: Oct 21, 2010

Hannibal Rex posted:

https://twitter.com/CinC_AFU/status/1623979433911615492?t=QwwkNYDJ4P5mOc9CxXyvTA&s=19

Did we ever get more details about how/why the missile impact in Poland happened?

I don't recall anything appearing on the news since like a week after the impact, could've just missed it though.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 11:26

Saladman: Jan 12, 2010

Hannibal Rex posted:

https://twitter.com/CinC_AFU/status/1623979433911615492?t=QwwkNYDJ4P5mOc9CxXyvTA&s=19

Did we ever get more details about how/why the missile impact in Poland happened? This looks like Russia is deliberately routing cruise missiles across neighboring states now.

If Ukraine intercepts it, they may get a repeat of the Polish incident. If they wait, they have a lower chance to intercept successfully.

Weird, sounds more like a fired missile that just forgot to have targeting coordinates, like the Ukrainian drone that crashed in Croatia back in March. That tweet does not indicate that Russia is firing over neighboring states into Ukraine; it is the opposite direction -- going from Ukraine into Moldova and then into Romania... and then back into Ukraine. Maybe it's intentional but I doubt it. Although looking at a map there's no way that can happen in a straight line accidentally. It doesn't sound like it even targeted something in Ukraine based on the context of that twit? Definitely bizarre.

E: Actually it could still be a straight line, if fired in a very particular angle. I think we'd need more context.

Saladman fucked around with this message at 11:43 on Feb 10, 2023

# ? Feb 10, 2023 11:38

Charlz Guybon: Nov 16, 2010

One of the top vidoes on R/ukraine right now is a column of Russian tanks driving into a mine field one after another at Vuhledar.

It's been a year. How does this poo poo still happen!?

# ? Feb 10, 2023 11:46

Charlotte Hornets: Dec 30, 2011; by Fritz the Horse

Charlz Guybon posted:

One of the top vidoes on R/ukraine right now is a column of Russian tanks driving into a mine field one after another at Vuhledar.

It's been a year. How does this poo poo still happen!?

Girkin will answer you.
https://t.me/s/strelkovii

quote:

Since the defeat near Vuhledar is already widely known (many videos shot by drones of Kyiv partners are posted on the network), I will have to comment separately (I didn�t want to do this before, as well as report losses).

It seems that all the events of the past year passed by our generals. However, since some of them are (at least from the moment they entered military schools) complete cretins, all the mistakes that were made before were exemplarily repeated. The advance of tank and motorized columns along narrow roads along rare forest plantations on ideally flat terrain (since there are minefields on the sides), not covered from the air and by EW forces, ended in defeat. Part of the equipment was destroyed by ATGM strikes (launched from the high-rise buildings of Ugledar), part was shot by enemy artillery, which fired extremely accurately. More than 30 units of armored vehicles were lost (I will not give a breakdown by type), losses of "two hundred" only among tankers - many dozens. Marines, special forces and motorized riflemen died even more. And - most importantly - all these losses turned out to be "one-sided" - the ukry shot the attackers "like in a shooting range", our fighters could not inflict counter losses on them. The enemy again without much difficulty held his positions in the fortified area, which had already been repeatedly attempted to take in the spring and summer of last year (also "head-on").

At the same time, our military leaders (so as not to "get up twice") habitually sent for slaughter in the familiar area in the Donetsk "industrial complex" (they went on the assault dozens of times) to Avdeevka "renamed the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" battalions of the former NM of the DPR and volunteer units. Without supporting them with either normal artillery fire (which was extremely inaccurate), or armored vehicles (which were "protected from mines", and it was not possible to clear the area for technical reasons). They killed two more companies of assault infantry with the same result as before - that is, to no avail.

In general, this was the end of the "offensive of the Russian army on the entire Donetsk front" widely announced over the network by "cheers-military corps". Complemented by the rebellion (refusal to take the position) of the battalion of Tuvinian nomads and not only (in principle, I do not report anything about this kind of events until they are "leaked" by someone into the network and become publicly available).

And that's all for now.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 11:47

fatherboxx: Mar 25, 2013

Charlz Guybon posted:

One of the top vidoes on R/ukraine right now is a column of Russian tanks driving into a mine field one after another at Vuhledar.

It's been a year. How does this poo poo still happen!?

You cant really conjure officers to train people out of thin air and soldiers/commanders who learned from mistakes tend to die or rotate out.

Also it is likely that this offensive was rushed to get results by the first anniversary of invasion.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 11:51

steinrokkan: Apr 2, 2011; Soiled Meat

Charlz Guybon posted:

One of the top vidoes on R/ukraine right now is a column of Russian tanks driving into a mine field one after another at Vuhledar.

It's been a year. How does this poo poo still happen!?

Christ, they literally create a contiguous wall of blown up vehicles touching side to side. The utter idiocy on display would be incredible if not recorded.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 11:54

Dick Ripple: May 19, 2021

Assaulting fortified/entrenched enemy is not an easy task, even more so when you have little or no training.

The Ukrainians are happy to showcase these Russia failures, for obvious reasons. However it is not like it has been entirely one sided affair, as told by the casualty estimates. Hopefully Russian ineptitude is not showcased to the Ukrainian soldiers to much, to not underestimate them. For experienced troops/commands I do not think that is a problem, but it is probably important to communicate to fresh troops that although the Russians are going to do Russian army things, they can still kill you.

Dick Ripple fucked around with this message at 12:29 on Feb 10, 2023

# ? Feb 10, 2023 11:57

Charlz Guybon: Nov 16, 2010

The losses are pilling up. The Russians had 3000 active tanks a year ago. They've lost at least 1700. Probably well over 2000. They're not going to be able to keep this up. They will literally run out of tanks in another six months at this rate.

https://mobile.twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1623949694903648256

Charlz Guybon fucked around with this message at 12:05 on Feb 10, 2023

# ? Feb 10, 2023 12:03

Paracausal: Sep 5, 2011; Oh yeah, baby. Frame your suffering as a masterpiece. Only one problem - no one's watching. It's boring, buddy, boring as death.

Charlz Guybon posted:

One of the top vidoes on R/ukraine right now is a column of Russian tanks driving into a mine field one after another at Vuhledar.

It's been a year. How does this poo poo still happen!?

New offensive. New troops. Same mistakes.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 12:27

Charlz Guybon: Nov 16, 2010

Paracausal posted:

New offensive. New troops. Same mistakes.

This is Luigi Cardona levels of incompetence.

Charlz Guybon fucked around with this message at 12:37 on Feb 10, 2023

# ? Feb 10, 2023 12:32

Charlotte Hornets: Dec 30, 2011; by Fritz the Horse

An interesting read from the Russian source why they couldn't push further from Izyum towards Slovyanks during spring-summer 2022. Autotranslate so it's a bit messy. It's from some FSB guy who was active in Donbass since 2014 who wrote a book of the war so far.

https://m.politnavigator.net/otstup...54e725a401cb67e

quote:

Now consider the example of the Kharkov retreat, which has both the most important strategic significance - which ultimately deprived the Russian troops of the prospect of closing the "Slavic Cauldron", and which led to significant changes in the perception of the NMD in Russian society and in its government, and, as a result, initiating the process of partial mobilization.

In fact, the retreat had two waves. And if the first was carried out as part of a rollback to the positions of the city of Izyum and its environs at the beginning of May 2022 as part of the general logic of curtailing the first stage of the SMO, then the second - September, turned out to be quite unexpected and led to a significant transformation of the theater.

Izyum itself was an important strategic hub connecting the Donbass and Kharkiv, and in theory allowed the Russian forces to close the encirclement of the largest grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Donbass. Its abandonment led to the collapse of the entire Kharkov direction, the loss of Kupyansk, Balakleya and a large number of other settlements, strengthened the offensive capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and created a springboard for an attack in the direction of the Luhansk Republic. In fact, this retreat marked the transition of Russia from an offensive operation to a viscous and unstable defense.

Izyum has become a prime example of errors in tactics, failures due to systemic lies in reports, weak motivation, and problems with the use of forces for their intended purpose.

It was in Izyum, which came under the control of the Russian army at the end of March, that the Russian group retreated from Kharkov.

During the initial battles for the city, falsifications with personnel appeared here for the first time at the system level. Despite Putin's strict instructions, during the spring battles for the city, some storming army units were staffed by 30-40 percent of contract soldiers. The rest - conscripts and "dead souls", which allowed games with postscripts, reporting, rations, property and allowances. The system, imperceptible in peacetime, flared up in wartime. Later, after the spring retreat and regrouping, these facts also played their negative role.

And it was here, after leaving Kharkov, that large command posts were located, including those of the army level - the First Tank, 20th, 29th, 35th, 36th armies, 64th and 38th brigades, points army intelligence department.

It would seem that with such a headquarters management concentration, it would be logical to demonstrate exemplary training, interaction, supply and, of course, the practical implementation of military art.

It happened differently.

So, what was probably the Russian strategic plan in Izyum? As we remember, the completion of the first stage of the SMO assumed the abandonment of the original plan for the lightning-fast capture of Kyiv, the reboot of the administrative vertical and the correction of the national policy of Ukraine.

The plan for the second stage most likely boiled down to closing the ring around the Donbass grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, cutting it into several boilers and gradually cutting it out.

Izyum's reference point was quite suitable for this. The road from Izyum to the key, symbolic and strategically important city of Slavyansk took 48 kilometers.

The operational plan of the Russian advance passed through the settlements of Malaya Kamyshevakha - Brazhkovka - Suligovka with access to the key settlement of Dolgenkoe and subsequent advance through Krasnopolye to Slavyansk. Units of the Central Military District were moving towards, meeting with which closed the cauldron.

And here all the accumulated, both strategic and tactical, military problems of Russia manifested themselves in full.

The laid route seemed logical only in the course of planning on maps. If the planners had approached the issue of the offensive more creatively (and even better, they would have remembered the experience of the Great Patriotic War in these places), then, undoubtedly, the assault on Dolgenkiy would have become only a diversionary maneuver due to the suicidal nature of a frontal attack on forests narrowing the maneuver through minefields on well equipped defensive structures, and a real breakthrough would be simultaneously carried out in the directions around Velikaya Kamyshevakhi, Oskol or Dolina - Krestishche, as in areas less prepared for defense with fewer critical heights, engineering defensive structures, forests and uneven terrain. But map planning is known for its "quality."

As a result, the army was faced with the fact that the proposed offensive passes through forest belts with heights held by the enemy. The settlements encountered on the way were equipped in fortified areas. Numerous pioneer camps and recreation centers became strongholds. The summer period and green blossoms allowed the Ukrainians to create numerous ambushes, and the distances between them were covered with mines.

Attempts to pass armored vehicles through the forests were unsuccessful - anti-tank mines were installed even on tree branches. The use of demining machines proved to be difficult, and there was not enough equipment. Snipers and aviation in the conditions of green forests showed inefficiency. Moreover, a number of Western models of anti-aircraft systems pierced the combat army aviation protection of Russian aircraft and helicopters, which is why their use was episodic, and the aviation itself tried to work at a long distance by the �cabriar� method, that is, a canopy, which naturally reduced efficiency. .

Based on the Chechen experience, the army leadership of the Russian army tried to use the offensive lull to "clean up" the forests. Army special forces and volunteer detachments were thrown into the battle.

It can be assumed that this made it possible to report, but with a different organization of combat work, a normal strategic breakthrough with the necessary consolidation of forces would not require such wasteful measures for combat-ready personnel, especially from among the units so necessary for solving special tasks. The functions of cleansing would then fall on the National Guard and the special services.

However, as a result, numerous losses did not at all correspond to the profile of special forces soldiers, experienced motivated volunteers and the circumstances of use.

The village of Dolgenkoye became a symbol of Izyum stagnation.

The tactics chosen by the Russian army leadership boiled down to sluggish assaults on the village and adjacent territories stretched along the roads. At the same time, one of the main army laws was almost always violated - the assault on an unsuppressed defense is akin to a crime.

Arguments often sounded like this: �at a distance of less than a hundred meters, the enemy�s cannon is not dangerous, so you need to run faster. And the minefield is not infinite, you just need to get around it. Anti-personnel mines? Crawling on the belly, they must be carefully scattered, for example, with a broom. Such pearls characterized the general level of training and command attitudes.

The forces allocated for the assaults were insufficient, because of which the personnel were wasted, the assaults turned out to be fatal. Casualties among personnel and equipment increased threateningly and at high speed. At the same time, losses in equipment of the 4th Kantemirovskaya division as part of the First Tank Army stationed in Izyum often exceeded losses in personnel.

This means that the equipment that is so necessary and scarce for really warring units was simply abandoned. In some cases, the �deliveries� of Russian abandoned trophies to the enemy exceeded the supply of foreign samples from Western sponsors to the Ukrainian army. Subsequently, significant Ukrainian forces began to fight the Russian army with Russian weapons and armored vehicles.

Why did it happen? It can be assumed that again the lies of the reports and falsifications had their say.

According to papers, the army units allocated for assaults numbered one number of personnel, but in fact, there were probably two, three or more times less people. At the same time, their motivation was often at a low level. Right at the front line, contract servicemen massively wrote dismissal reports or simply refused to go into battle, which the commanders were simply afraid to report on. It was here, in Izyum, that the total non-combat readiness of the Western Military District was fully manifested. A relative exception was the forces of the 20th Army based here, but they also showed the whole set of typical army diseases.

The various special forces attached to them as an assault reinforcement, on the contrary, being motivated, went forward, but, not having massive support from combat units, died. As a result, in the theoretical calculation of "one commando or volunteer for ten soldiers", the inverse proportion was often observed. At the same time, the form of reporting on �two hundredths� became fashionable among the army leadership, when the commander, in support of his reports that he really tried to do something, reported on the dead and wounded soldiers, which was supposed to demonstrate the significance of the efforts.

So the military special forces were utilized. Why did this happen? Even the Donbass experience showed the truth - such units were used on the front line not according to their profile, simply because they were the most combat-ready. Or, often, rather, just the only combat-ready ones. Then who will conduct the much-needed reconnaissance? Direct artillery, carry out sabotage activities, destroy command posts, air defense points, bridges, Hymars, Caesars and 777s? The correct answer with this approach is no one.

Technical equipment also played a role. Again, the lack of means of communication and, as a result, interactions led to desynchronization and loss of offensiveness.

Often on the front line one could observe the following picture: Ukrainian drones and quadrocopters of various sizes soared in the sky at various heights. Above - large reconnaissance.

They slowly and smoothly cut through the sky at a height inaccessible to small arms. Below - medium quadcopters with hooks for mines. They often rose in swarms, hunted for ammunition delivery vehicles, command staff vehicles. If five or six such copters were hovering over the car, then there was almost no chance of getting away. One - two mines, and the transport was destroyed. The third, most annoying category is small reconnaissance quadrocopters of a tactical level, hovering over the fighters day and night.

In theory, they could be shot down by the so-called �drono-piercers� - UAV radio-frequency suppressors or, in extreme cases, pump-action shotguns with shot or buckshot. Naturally, the fighters had neither one nor the other. The army was not prepared for this.

It should also be taken into account that the work of the Ukrainian drones was provided by the electronic warfare forces, which alternated their activity with the rise of the �birds�. Often, the Ukrainian side used electronic equipment that intercepted the control of Russian home-grown drones bought with the money of sponsors. Attempts to tie these quadcopters to fishing line and other small household tricks were unsuccessful. The difference in technical equipment was significant.

At the same time, apparently, the �Izyum standing� was not identified by the command as relatively permanent. As a result, no proper measures were taken to equip continuous defense, with the exception of the most dangerous areas, although military science demanded the opposite.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 12:33

Paladinus: Jan 11, 2014; heyHEYYYY!!!

fatherboxx posted:

https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1623664757638107136?t=3LGdx55lR2iASyakKWitnQ&s=19

(Of course Yermak loves cryptic tg posts that dont amount to much, so should wait for more official/formal statements)

Yermak later changed his statement to 'will soon probably be resolved'.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 12:59

Tuna-Fish: Sep 13, 2017

Charlz Guybon posted:

The losses are pilling up. The Russians had 3000 active tanks a year ago. They've lost at least 1700. Probably well over 2000. They're not going to be able to keep this up. They will literally run out of tanks in another six months at this rate.

Not quite. If you look at the list, a lot of their losses are types that were not in active service a year ago. All the T-62:s, for one.

This does tell us that they are running short on their better tank types. At first, they were just using T-62:s as self-propelled artillery, now they have definitely started using them at the front.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 14:11

cinci zoo sniper: Mar 15, 2013

GhostofJohnMuir posted:

does timing the new offensive on the anniversary of the old offensive risk running into the exact same issue where if you aren't able to decisively achieve your operational objectives in a month suddenly your frontline combat units have an extended line of communication running through a sea of mud?

Yes, the sea of mud is scheduled in about 4-6 weeks from now.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 14:32

Xarn: Jun 26, 2015

This time they will be prepared for it though, right? I can't imagine the level of incompetence it would take not to be prepared for it this time.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 14:44

Herstory Begins Now: Aug 5, 2003; SOME REALLY TEDIOUS DUMB SHIT THAT SUCKS ASS TO READ ->>

About the same level of incompetence as Russia has its own mud season, too. At no point should the mud have been a surprise.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 14:51

Icon Of Sin: Dec 26, 2008

Xarn posted:

This time they will be prepared for it though, right? I can't imagine the level of incompetence it would take not to be prepared for it this time.

There�s no preparing for it. You stick to the roads, or your vehicle stays where it sank up to above the tires until the mud dries. The only thing that could make it through that soup is a hovercraft, and that�s less �through� than �gently caress it, we�re not touching it and you can�t make us�.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 14:54

cinci zoo sniper: Mar 15, 2013

Xarn posted:

This time they will be prepared for it though, right? I can't imagine the level of incompetence it would take not to be prepared for it this time.

On one hand, there's the aforementioned Reddit video ( :nms:

landmines kill a lot of people https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/10yldex/a_column_of_russian_vehicles_hit_a_minefield_one/). On the other hand, that is anecdotal, and Vuhledar, where this seems to have happened, not only has plenty more of rather unfortunate for RuAF footage coming out of it, but also happens to be, alongside Bakhmut, an area where Russian forces rely on paramilitary auxiliaries. Wagner in Bakhmut, specifically, and the fabled 3rd Army Corps (remember all the pensioner volunteers? those guys) + solo volunteer groups like Alga (Tatarstan) around Vuhledar. In other words, there's enough undertrained people in both of those to get a steady stream of baffling videos that don't necessarily reflect the reality on the whole.

Kreminna-Svatove will be much more indicative, imo, since there's a litany of professional soldiers slated for it, with a lot of institutional capacity reserved � if I had to guess, if Russians can't break through there they won't be able to do it anywhere else seriously either, assuming that Ukrainians don't run out of food or bullets. To steal from a recent ISW post:
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2023

highlighting mine posted:

Russian forces have regained the initiative in Ukraine and have begun their next major offensive in Luhansk Oblast. The pace of Russian operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line in western Luhansk Oblast has increased markedly over the past week, and Russian sources are widely reporting that conventional Russian troops are attacking Ukrainian defensive lines and making marginal advances along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border, particularly northwest of Svatove near Kupyansk and west of Kreminna.[1] Geolocated combat footage has confirmed Russian gains in the Dvorichne area northwest of Svatove.[2] Russian military command additionally appears to have fully committed elements of several conventional divisions to decisive offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line, as ISW previously reported.[3] Elements of several regiments of the 144th and 3rd Motor Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) and a regiment of the 90th Tank Division (Central Military District), supported by elements of the 76th Airborne Division and unspecified Southern Military District elements, are conducting offensive operations along the entire Svatove-Kreminna line and are reportedly advancing against Ukrainian defenses.[4]

The commitment of significant elements of at least three major Russian divisions to offensive operations in this sector indicates the Russian offensive has begun, even if Ukrainian forces are so far preventing Russian forces from securing significant gains. The Russian offensive likely has not yet reached its full tempo; Russian command has not yet committed elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District), which deployed to Luhansk Oblast in January after deploying to Belarus.[5] Russian forces are gradually beginning an offensive, but its success is not inherent or predetermined. While Russian forces in Luhansk Oblast now have the initiative (in that Russian forces are setting the terms of battle, ending the period of Ukrainian initiative from August 2022), the full commitment of these forces could lead to their eventual culmination along the Svatove-Kreminna line without achieving their objectives of capturing all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. That culmination would likely provide a window of opportunity for Ukrainian forces to exploit with their own counteroffensive.[6]

But yeah, I guess it's also fair to point out that mud happens there at the same time in that area roughly at the same time each year for at least a century.

cinci zoo sniper fucked around with this message at 15:20 on Feb 10, 2023

# ? Feb 10, 2023 15:15

Karma Comedian: Feb 2, 2012

fatherboxx posted:

https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1623664757638107136?t=3LGdx55lR2iASyakKWitnQ&s=19

(Of course Yermak loves cryptic tg posts that dont amount to much, so should wait for more official/formal statements)

On the other front, Putin will finally make a speech to the Russian parliament that he shifted from last year, on February 21. As usual, either its going to be something important (second wave of mobilization etc) or another idiotic hour long crybaby act with historical anecdotes.

https://twitter.com/Republic_Mag/status/1623988648055132160?t=llOgnCOlilZs-up2K1gfDQ&s=19

Maybe?
https://twitter.com/KpsZSU/status/1623973246113652740?t=rTCRkgRVE-608dKKgPWlBA&s=19

# ? Feb 10, 2023 15:33

Moon Slayer: Jun 19, 2007

What's the Ukrainian word for the rasputitsa, and is it as fun to say?

# ? Feb 10, 2023 15:37

cinci zoo sniper: Mar 15, 2013

Moon Slayer posted:

What's the Ukrainian word for the rasputitsa, and is it as fun to say?

It's бездоріжжя, and it's much more fun to watch a non-Slavic speaker try to pronounce it than to pronounce it yourself.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 15:38

OddObserver: Apr 3, 2009

cinci zoo sniper posted:

It's бездоріжжя, and it's much more fun to watch a non-Slavic speaker try to pronounce it than to pronounce it yourself.

It's a little unfair since they likely get it within the -zhzhia transliteration like a certain city, for extra challenge.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 16:02

cinci zoo sniper: Mar 15, 2013

OddObserver posted:

It's a little unfair since they likely get it within the -zhzhia transliteration like a certain city, for extra challenge.

Within?

# ? Feb 10, 2023 16:20

Nenonen: Oct 22, 2009; Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

Someone made it across the border from Russia to Finland on skis, then applied for asylum. Sounds like a Russian mobnik or Wagner deserter, at least not like anyone from Middle East like in 2015. This happened in Suomussalmi.

I'm sure the Finnish ski team will welcome him regardless, the championships will start in Planica in two weeks :v:

Meanwhile on the same day (Wednesday) Finnish border guards stopped a Russian trying to leave to Russia, because he had overstayed his Schengen visa. He had been in EU for three years so probably at least a couple of years overdue. He was issued a three years ban to enter the Schengen area.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 16:38

OddObserver: Apr 3, 2009

cinci zoo sniper posted:

Within?

....with. Not sure if my brain or autocomplete glitch. Anyway, sadly the UA Wikipedia doesn't have a pronunciation guide for this, but has some alternative terms:

quote:

Деколи бездоріжжя вживається як синонім до слів �ро́зкаль�, �ро́зтань�, що означають період навесні (рідше восени), коли дороги стають непрохідними чи непроїжджими у результаті опадів, або танення снігів.

(https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%91%D0%B5%D0%B7%D0%B4%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%96%D0%B6%D0%B6%D1%8F)

and Wiktionary does have the audio:
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%B7%D0%B4%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%96%D0%B6%D0%B6%D1%8F

# ? Feb 10, 2023 16:41

adebisi lives: Nov 11, 2009

Charlz Guybon posted:

The losses are pilling up. The Russians had 3000 active tanks a year ago. They've lost at least 1700. Probably well over 2000. They're not going to be able to keep this up. They will literally run out of tanks in another six months at this rate.

People were saying the same thing 6 months ago or earlier. I wouldn't get your hopes up.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 17:03

mllaneza: Apr 28, 2007; Veteran, Bermuda Triangle Expeditionary Force, 1993-1952

Charlz Guybon posted:

One of the top vidoes on R/ukraine right now is a column of Russian tanks driving into a mine field one after another at Vuhledar.

It's been a year. How does this poo poo still happen!?

Not great, not terri... <checks notes>, okay, terrible.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 17:03

Charlotte Hornets: Dec 30, 2011; by Fritz the Horse

There's another photobook of some Russian bmp and tank raids between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata. I guess this is what Girkin referred to in his today's morning rant about sending 3 assault companies to their death.

:nms:

https://twitter.com/OSINTua/status/1624061211561041920

# ? Feb 10, 2023 17:14

lumpentroll: Mar 4, 2020

# ? Feb 10, 2023 18:33

cinci zoo sniper: Mar 15, 2013

lumpentroll posted:

.

Shying away from your emptyquote of Space Camp fuckup's post, eh?

# ? Feb 10, 2023 18:35

lumpentroll: Mar 4, 2020

cinci zoo sniper posted:

Shying away from your emptyquote of Space Camp fuckup's post, eh?

didn�t realize where it was. we�re bullying majorian atm

(USER WAS PUT ON PROBATION FOR THIS POST)

# ? Feb 10, 2023 18:36

cinci zoo sniper: Mar 15, 2013

https://www.ft.com/content/dc898690-653a-47f1-af56-b0216abd7dcd Russia is cutting 5% of its oil production (0.5% global) in retaliation for the price caps (pretty sure this is about the recent diesel/refined products caps more than it is about the crude cap), the cut targeting �the collective west�.

quote:

Christyan Malek, global head of energy strategy at JPMorgan, said Moscow�s move would �be viewed in some quarters as Russia starting to�weaponise oil�. But he added that a more practical reason could be to prevent the market from being �too oversupplied� as Russia reroutes exports from Europe to Asia.

Edit: Other things of note � CIT has translated their Makiivka strike investigation (https://notes.citeam.org/makiivka-en), and Moldova's government has collapsed following the missile flyby, metaphorically at least (https://www.ft.com/content/654a52e8-f90a-4b7b-9d8e-339ec0a189bc).

lumpentroll posted:

didn�t realize where it was. we�re bullying majorian atm

Ah. I cannot say that I condone it, but the situation is at least understandable then.

cinci zoo sniper fucked around with this message at 18:49 on Feb 10, 2023

# ? Feb 10, 2023 18:45

PederP: Nov 20, 2009

Anders Puck Nielsen has another good video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EeP_ZZbBIl4

I agree with his assessment that the West is downplaying and ignoring any Russian provocation. There simply isn't anything to be gained by reacting. Governments don't want escalation, so acknowledging the provocation and hybrid warfare will just display weakness. I am not so sure I agree that the hybrid warfare has manageable impact (especially in the socio-political sphere I think they do create significant damage to stability and cohesion). I also think that Kremlin might dial up the provocations until they do get a response of some kind.

Personally it can also be argued that downplaying the hybrid warfare clearly shows actors inside Russia that the West does not want escalation and is sincere when stating this in public. This is more useful than some might think, as it increases the chance that those in the Russian leadership who do not want direct confrontation with the West know that this is a very possible outcome. Those who see it as weakness to be exploited would do so anyway. But those who in the early days of the war, might have suspected a desire for confrontation when the West surprised Russia through a firm opposition and relative unity, should know by now that that the governments of the West will go to quite some lengths to avoid confrontation. Note that I don't think this applies to stalling on military materiel aid and other indirect assistance to Ukraine - because that does show weakness and embold the warmongers in Russia.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 19:01

KirbyKhan: Mar 20, 2009; Soiled Meat

War bad!

(USER WAS PUT ON PROBATION FOR THIS POST)

# ? Feb 10, 2023 19:07

NoiseAnnoys: May 17, 2010

PederP posted:

Anders Puck Nielsen has another good video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EeP_ZZbBIl4

I agree with his assessment that the West is downplaying and ignoring any Russian provocation. There simply isn't anything to be gained by reacting. Governments don't want escalation, so acknowledging the provocation and hybrid warfare will just display weakness. I am not so sure I agree that the hybrid warfare has manageable impact (especially in the socio-political sphere I think they do create significant damage to stability and cohesion). I also think that Kremlin might dial up the provocations until they do get a response of some kind.

Personally it can also be argued that downplaying the hybrid warfare clearly shows actors inside Russia that the West does not want escalation and is sincere when stating this in public. This is more useful than some might think, as it increases the chance that those in the Russian leadership who do not want direct confrontation with the West know that this is a very possible outcome. Those who see it as weakness to be exploited would do so anyway. But those who in the early days of the war, might have suspected a desire for confrontation when the West surprised Russia through a firm opposition and relative unity, should know by now that that the governments of the West will go to quite some lengths to avoid confrontation. Note that I don't think this applies to stalling on military materiel aid and other indirect assistance to Ukraine - because that does show weakness and embold the warmongers in Russia.

hybrid warfare is losing a bit of its initial punch too, especially as EU countries crack down on russian disinfo and political parties astroturfed by russia are losing in elections. the exception seems to be germany, but that's kind of also to be expected.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 20:01

Svaha: Oct 4, 2005

Karma Comedian posted:

Maybe?
https://twitter.com/KpsZSU/status/1623973246113652740?t=rTCRkgRVE-608dKKgPWlBA&s=19

The investigation into Malaysia Airlines flight 17 just wrapped up and concluded that Russia supplied the missiles that shot it down. That flight was full of Dutch people. There is a good chance they will get them.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 20:04

sharknado slashfic: Jun 24, 2011

Charlz Guybon posted:

This is Luigi Cardona levels of incompetence.

I've thought of Isonzo so many times reading these updates

# ? Feb 10, 2023 20:21

khwarezm: Oct 26, 2010; Deal with it.

If Russia is gearing up for another major offensive, what would be the optimistic but still reasonably realistic things they could achieve?

I know when I make posts like this I'm opening myself up to a comment like 'prevent Moscow from falling to Ukraine lol', but I'm pretty serious in this question, I don't want to be caught in an illusion of thinking that poor showings last year mean that Russia is a total write off and can't seriously make gains in Ukraine right now. Even if it comes down to a crude battle of attrition that probably favours Russia over the long run, at least in terms of manpower.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 20:24

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# ? May 23, 2024 10:24

WarpedLichen: Aug 14, 2008

khwarezm posted:

If Russia is gearing up for another major offensive, what would be the optimistic but still reasonably realistic things they could achieve?

I know when I make posts like this I'm opening myself up to a comment like 'prevent Moscow from falling to Ukraine lol', but I'm pretty serious in this question, I don't want to be caught in an illusion of thinking that poor showings last year mean that Russia is a total write off and can't seriously make gains in Ukraine right now. Even if it comes down to a crude battle of attrition that probably favours Russia over the long run, at least in terms of manpower.

I dunno what kind of answer you want because the answer is gonna be claim some more territory and the how far is real hand wavey stuff depending on how optimistic/pessimistic you want to get.

For a real answer I would just read Jomini of the West:
https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1623857574679392257?cxt=HHwWgsC9iYr3jIktAAAA

He has a good summary of theater goals and you can just assume what you want about whether or not Russia can/will succeed at those goals. If you think the Russians will succeed at all their first order goals and move onto second order goals you're probably a lot more optimistic about Russian chances than a lot of other people.

# ? Feb 10, 2023 20:37

The Something Awful Forums > Archives > Comedy Goldmine > The Goodmine > War in Ukraine: thread feedback session open unttil Saturday (i'll regret this)

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