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Qtotonibudinibudet posted:the decision may do something significant but it's less likely given the abysmal argument. there is still the other case against twitter though  Opinions! Still nothing particularly noteworthy, possible exception of the FLSA case..BARTENWERFER v. BUCKLEY TLDR: If your partner commits fraud, and you’re liable for that fraud, you can’t discharge that debt in bankruptcy. The issue is if the money came from the fraud, not if it was your fault. Holding / Majority Opinion (Barrett) The Bankruptcy Code strikes a balance between the interests of insolvent debtors and their creditors. It generally allows debtors to discharge all prebankruptcy liabilities, but it makes exceptions when, in Congress’s judgment, the creditor’s interest in recovering a particular debt outweighs the debtor’s interest in a fresh start. One such exception bars debtors from discharging any debt for money “obtained by . . . fraud.” 11 U. S. C. §523(a)(2)(A). The provision obviously applies to a debtor who was the fraudster. But sometimes a debtor is liable for fraud that she did not personally commit—for example, deceit practiced by a partner or an agent. We must decide whether the bar extends to this situation too. It does. Written in the passive voice, §523(a)(2)(A) turns on how the money was obtained, not who committed fraud to obtain it. In 2005, Kate Bartenwerfer and her then-boyfriend, David Bartenwerfer, jointly purchased a house in San Francisco. Acting as business partners, the pair decided to remodel the house and sell it at a profit. David took charge of the project. He hired an architect, structural engineer, designer, and general contractor; he monitored their work, reviewed invoices, and signed checks. Kate, on the other hand, was largely uninvolved. [Eventually they sell] In conjunction with the sale, the Bartenwerfers attested that they had disclosed all material facts relating to the property. Yet after the house was his, Buckley discovered several defects that the Bartenwerfers had not divulged: a leaky roof, defective windows, a missing fire escape, and permit problems. Alleging that he had overpaid in reliance on the Bartenwerfers’ misrepresentations, Buckley sued them in California state court. The jury found in Buckley’s favor on his claims for breach of contract, negligence, and nondisclosure of material facts, leaving the Bartenwerfers jointly responsible for more than $200,000 in damages. The Bartenwerfers were unable to pay Buckley, not to mention their other creditors. Seeking relief, they filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which allows debtors to get a “fresh start” by discharging their debts. While that sounds like complete relief, there is a catch—not all debts are dischargeable. The Code makes several exceptions to the general rule, including the one at issue in this case: Section 523(a)(2)(A) bars the discharge of “any debt . . . for money . . . to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.” Buckley filed an adversary complaint alleging that the money owed on the state-court judgment fell within this exception. After a 2-day bench trial, the Bankruptcy Court decided that neither David nor Kate Bartenwerfer could discharge their debt to Buckley. [So the issue is whether or not Kate, mostly uninvolved, can get out from the debt.] “[W]e start where we always do: with the text of the statute.” Section 523(a)(2)(A) states: “A discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . “(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by— “ (A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition.” By its terms, this text precludes Kate Bartenwerfer from discharging her liability for the state-court judgment. (From now on, we will refer to Kate as “Bartenwerfer.”) First, she is an “individual debtor.” Second, the judgment is a “debt.” And third, because the debt arises from the sale proceeds obtained by David’s fraudulent misrepresentations, it is a debt “for money . . . obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud. Bartenwerfer disputes the third premise. She admits that, as a grammatical matter, the passive-voice statute does not specify a fraudulent actor. But in her view, the statute is most naturally read to bar the discharge of debts for money obtained by the debtor’s fraud. … Our precedent, along with Congress’s response to it, eliminates any possible doubt about our textual analysis. In the late 19th century, the discharge exception for fraud read as follows: “[N]o debt created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt . . . shall be discharged under this act.” This language seemed to limit the exception to fraud committed by the debtor herself—the position that Bartenwerfer advocates here. But we held otherwise in Strang v. Bradner. In that case, the business partner of John and Joseph Holland lied to fellow merchants in order to secure promissory notes for the benefit of their partnership. 114 U. S., at 557–558. After a state court held all three partners liable for fraud, the Hollands tried to discharge their debts in bankruptcy on the ground that their partner’s misrepresentations “were not made by their direction nor with their knowledge.” Even though the statute required the debt to be created by the fraud “of the bankrupt,” we held that the Hollands could not discharge their debts to the deceived merchants. The fraud of one partner, we explained, is the fraud of all because “[e]ach partner was the agent and representative of the firm with reference to all business within the scope of the partnership.” And the reason for this rule was particularly easy to see because “the partners, who were not themselves guilty of wrong, received and appropriated the fruits of the fraudulent conduct of their associate in business.” … Congress went even further than mere reenactment. Thirteen years after Strang, when Congress next overhauled bankruptcy law, it deleted “of the bankrupt” from the discharge exception for fraud, which is the predecessor to the modern §523(a)(2)(A). By doing so, Congress cut from the statute the strongest textual hook counseling against the outcome in Strang. The unmistakable implication is that Congress embraced Strang’s holding—so we do too. … All of this said, innocent people are sometimes held liable for fraud they did not personally commit, and, if they declare bankruptcy, §523(a)(2)(A) bars discharge of that debt. So it is for Bartenwerfer, and we are sensitive to the hardship she faces. But Congress has “evidently concluded that the creditors’ interest in recovering full payment of debts” obtained by fraud “outweigh[s] the debtors’ interest in a complete fresh start,” and it is not our role to second-guess that judgment. III We affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment that Kate Bartenwerfer’s debt is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. It is so ordered. Lineup: Barrett, unanimous. Concurrence by Sotomayor, joined by Jackson. Concurrence (Sotomayor, joined by Jackson) The Court correctly holds that 11 U. S. C. §523(a)(2)(A) bars debtors from discharging a debt obtained by fraud of the debtor’s agent or partner. Congress incorporated into the statute the common-law principles of fraud, which include agency and partnership principles. This Court long ago confirmed that reading when it held that fraudulent debts obtained by partners are not dischargeable, and Congress “embraced” that reading when it amended the statute in 1898. The Bankruptcy Court found that petitioner and her husband had an agency relationship and obtained the debt at issue after they formed a partnership. Because petitioner does not dispute that she and her husband acted as partners, the debt is not dischargeable under the statute. The Court here does not confront a situation involving fraud by a person bearing no agency or partnership relationship to the debtor. Instead, “[t]he relevant legal context” concerns fraud only by “agents” and “partners within the scope of the partnership.” With that understanding, I join the Court’s opinion. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-908_n6io.pdf HELIX ENERGY SOLUTIONS GROUP, INC., ET AL. v. HEWITT TLDR: If an employee is paid on a daily rate—so that he receives a certain amount if he works one day in a week, twice as much for two days, three times as much for three, and so on—they are not paid on a salary basis, and thus are entitled to overtime pay. Holding / Majority Opinion (Kagan) The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) guarantees that covered employees receive overtime pay when they work more than 40 hours a week. But an employee is not covered, and so is not entitled to overtime compensation, if he works “in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity,” as those “terms are defined” by agency regulations. Under the regulations, an employee falls within the “bona fide executive” exemption only if (among other things) he is paid on a “salary basis.” Additional regulations elaborate on the salary-basis requirement, as applied to both lower-income and higher-income employees. The question here is whether a high-earning employee is compensated on a “salary basis” when his paycheck is based solely on a daily rate—so that he receives a certain amount if he works one day in a week, twice as much for two days, three times as much for three, and so on. We hold that such an employee is not paid on a salary basis, and thus is entitled to overtime pay. Congress enacted the FLSA to eliminate both “substandard wages” and “oppressive working hours.” The statute addresses the former concern by guaranteeing a minimum wage. It addresses the latter by requiring time-and-a-half pay for work over 40 hours a week—even for workers whose regular compensation far exceeds “the statutory minimum.” The overtime provision was designed both to “compensate [employees] for the burden” of working extra-long hours and to increase overall employment by incentivizing employers to widen their “distribution of available work.” Employees therefore are not “deprived of the benefits of [overtime compensation] simply because they are well paid.” The FLSA, however, exempts certain categories of workers from its protections, including the overtime-pay guarantee. The statutory exemption relevant here applies to “any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity . . . (as such terms are defined and delimited from time to time by regulations of the Secretary [of Labor]).” Under that provision, the Secretary sets out a standard for determining when an employee is a “bona fide executive.” If that standard is met, the employee has no right to overtime wages From as early as 1940, the Secretary’s “bona fide executive” standard has comprised three distinct parts. The first is the “salary basis” test—the subject matter of this case. Ibid. The basic idea for now (greater detail and disputation will follow) is that an employee can be a bona fide executive only if he receives a “predetermined and fixed salary”—one that does not vary with the precise amount of time he works. The second element is the “salary level” test: It asks whether that preset salary exceeds a specified amount. And the third is the “duties” test, which focuses on the nature of the employee’s job responsibilities. When all three criteria are met, the employee (because considered a bona fide executive) is excluded from the FLSA’s protections. Now, though, add a layer of complexity to that description: The Secretary has implemented the bona fide executive standard through two separate and slightly different rules, one applying to lower-income employees and the other to higher-income ones. The so-called “general rule” pertains to employees making less than $100,000 in “total annual compensation,” including not only salary but also commissions, bonuses, and the like. That rule considers employees to be executives when they are “[c]ompensated on a salary basis” (salary-basis test); “at a rate of not less than $455 per week” (salary-level test); and carry out three listed responsibilities—managing the enterprise, directing other employees, and exercising power to hire and fire (duties test). A different rule—the one applicable here—addresses employees making at least $100,000 per year (again, including all forms of pay), who are labeled “highly compensated employees.” That rule—usually known as the HCE rule—amends only the duties test, while restating the other two. In the HCE rule, the duties test becomes easier to satisfy: An employee must “regularly perform[]” just one (not all) of the three responsibilities listed in the general rule. But the salary-basis and salary-level tests carry over from the general rule to the HCE rule in identical form. The HCE rule too states that an employee can count as an executive (and thus lose the FLSA’s protections) only if he receives “at least $455 per week paid on a salary . . . basis.” Two other regulations give content to the salary-basis test at the heart of this case. (After giving full citations, we refer to them simply as §602(a) and §604(b).) The main salary-basis provision, set out in two sentences of §541.602(a), states: “An employee will be considered to be paid on a ‘salary basis’ . . . if the employee regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all or part of the employee’s compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed. Subject to [certain exceptions], an exempt employee must receive the full salary for any week in which the employee performs any work without regard to the number of days or hours worked.” The rule thus ensures that the employee will get at least part of his compensation through a preset weekly (or less frequent) salary, not subject to reduction because of exactly how many days he worked. If, as the rule’s second sentence drives home, an employee works any part of a week, he must receive his “full salary for [that] week”—or else he is not paid on a salary basis and cannot qualify as a bona fide executive. Another provision, §541.604(b), focuses on workers whose compensation is “computed on an hourly, a daily or a shift basis,” rather than a weekly or less frequent one. That section states that an employer may base an employee’s pay on an hourly, daily, or shift rate without “violating the salary basis requirement” or “losing the [bona fide executive] exemption” so long as two conditions are met. First, the employer must “also” guarantee the employee at least $455 each week (the minimum salary level) “regardless of the number of hours, days or shifts worked.” And second, that promised amount must bear a “reasonable relationship” to the “amount actually earned” in a typical week— more specifically, must be “roughly equivalent to the employee’s usual earnings at the assigned hourly, daily or shift rate for the employee’s normal scheduled workweek.” Those conditions create a compensation system functioning much like a true salary—a steady stream of pay, which the employer cannot much vary and the employee may thus rely on week after week. From 2014 to 2017, respondent Michael Hewitt worked for petitioner Helix Energy Solutions Group as a “toolpusher” on an offshore oil rig. Reporting to the captain, Hewitt oversaw various aspects of the rig’s operations and supervised 12 to 14 workers. He typically, but not invariably, worked 12 hours a day, seven days a week—so 84 hours a week—during a 28-day “hitch.” He then had 28 days off before reporting back to the vessel. Helix paid Hewitt on a daily-rate basis, with no overtime compensation. The daily rate ranged, over the course of his employment, from $963 to $1,341 per day. His paycheck, issued every two weeks, amounted to his daily rate times the number of days he had worked in the pay period. So if Hewitt had worked only one day, his paycheck would total (at the range’s low end) $963; but if he had worked all 14 days, his paycheck would come to $13,482. Under that compensation scheme, Helix paid Hewitt over $200,000 annually. Hewitt filed this action under the FLSA to recover overtime pay. Helix asserted in response that Hewitt was exempt from the FLSA because he qualified as a bona fide executive. The dispute on that issue turned solely on whether Hewitt was paid on a salary basis; Hewitt conceded that his employment met the exemption’s other requirements (the salary-level and duties tests). … The critical question here is whether Hewitt was paid on a salary basis under §602(a) of the Secretary’s regulations. Indeed, the parties have taken all other issues off the table. They agree that Hewitt was exempt from the FLSA only if he was a bona fide executive. They agree, as they must, that under the regulations, a high-income employee like Hewitt counts as an executive when (but only when) he is paid on a salary basis; the salary paid is at or above the requisite level ($455 per week); and he performs at least one listed duty. In denying executive status, Hewitt puts all his chips on that standard’s first part: He argues only that he was not paid on a salary basis. Helix then narrows the issues still further. As described above, a worker may be paid on a salary basis under either §602(a) or §604(b). But Helix acknowledges that Hewitt’s compensation did not satisfy §604(b)’s conditions. That is because Helix did not guarantee that Hewitt would receive each week an amount (above $455) bearing a “reasonable relationship” to the weekly amount he usually earned. So again, everything turns on whether Helix paid Hewitt on a salary basis as described in §602(a). If yes, Hewitt was exempt from the FLSA and not entitled to overtime pay; if no, he was covered under the statute and can claim that extra money. The answer is no: Helix did not pay Hewitt on a salary basis as defined in §602(a). That section applies solely to employees paid by the week (or longer); it is not met when an employer pays an employee by the day, as Helix paid Hewitt. Daily-rate workers, of whatever income level, are paid on a salary basis only through the test set out in §604(b) (which, again, Helix’s payment scheme did not satisfy). Those conclusions follow from both the text and the structure of the regulations. And Helix’s various policy claims cannot justify departing from what the rules say. Consider again §602(a)’s text, focusing on how it excludes daily-rate workers. An employee, the regulation says, is paid on a salary basis if but only if he “receive[s] the full salary for any week in which [he] performs any work without regard to the number of days or hours worked.” To break that up just a bit: Whenever an employee works at all in a week, he must get his “full salary for [that] week”— what §602(a)’s prior sentence calls the “predetermined amount.” That amount must be “without regard to the number of days or hours worked”—or as the prior sentence says, it is “not subject to reduction because” the employee worked less than the full week. Nothing in that description fits a daily-rate worker, who by definition is paid for each day he works and no others. Suppose (to approximate the compensation scheme here) such a worker is paid $1,000 each day, and usually works seven days a week, for a total of $7,000. Now suppose he is ill and works just one day in a week, for a total of $1,000. Is that lesser amount (as Helix argues) a predetermined, “full salary for [the] week”—or is it just one day’s pay out of the usual seven? Has the amount been paid “without regard to the number of days” he worked—or precisely with regard to that number? If ordinary language bears ordinary meaning, the answer to those questions is: the latter. A daily-rate worker’s weekly pay is always a function of how many days he has labored. It can be calculated only by counting those days once the week is over—not, as §602(a) requires, by ignoring that number and paying a predetermined amount. … Helix primarily responds by invoking §602(a)’s statement that an employee (to be salaried) must “receive[] each pay period on a weekly[] or less frequent basis” a preset and non-reducible sum. At first glance (and actually, see below, on second too), that language just confirms everything already shown: An employee must be paid on a “weekly [or biweekly or monthly] basis,” not on a daily or hourly one. Or said more fully, the “basis” in that phrase is the unit of time used to calculate pay, and that unit must be a week or less frequent measure; it cannot be a day, or other more frequent measure, as it was for Hewitt. But Helix contends that the single word “receives” converts §602(a)’s focus: In saying that an employee must “receive[]” a fixed amount on a weekly or less frequent basis, the provision mandates only that he get his paycheck no more often than once a week (which of course most employees do). Because Hewitt’s paycheck came every two weeks, and because that check always contained pay exceeding $455 (the salary level) for any week he had worked at all, Helix concludes that Hewitt was paid, under §602(a), on a salary basis. But that interpretation of the “weekly basis” phrase— even putting §602(a)’s other language to the side—is not the most natural one. As just suggested, a “basis” of payment typically refers to the unit or method for calculating pay, not the frequency of its distribution. Most simply put, an employee paid on an hourly basis is paid by the hour, an employee paid on a daily basis is paid by the day, and an employee paid on a weekly basis is paid by the week—irrespective of when or how often his employer actually doles out the money. The inclusion of the word “receives” in §602(a) does not change that usual meaning. … The broader regulatory structure—in particular, the role of §604(b)—confirms our reading of §602(a). Recall that §604(b) lays out a second path—apart from §602(a)—enabling a compensation scheme to meet the salary-basis requirement. And that second route is all about daily, hourly, or shift rates. Whereas §602(a) addresses payments on “a weekly[] or less frequent basis,” §604(b) concerns payments “on an hourly, a daily or a shift basis.” An employee’s earnings, §604(b) provides, “may be computed on” those shorter bases without “violating the salary basis requirement” so long as an employer “also” provides a guarantee of weekly payment approximating what the employee usually earns. … Helix’s argument to the contrary relies on carting §604(b) off the stage. … Our reading of the relevant regulations, as laid out above, properly concludes this case. Helix urges us to consider the policy consequences of that reading, labeling them “farreaching” and “deleterious.” In Helix’s view, holding that §602(a)’s salary-basis test never captures daily-rate workers will give “windfalls” to high earners, disrupt and “increase costs” of industry operations, and “impos[e] significant retroactive liability.” But as this Court has explained, “even the most formidable policy arguments cannot overcome a clear” textual directive. And anyway, Helix’s appeal to consequences appears something less than formidable in the context of the FLSA’s regulatory scheme. Indeed, it is Helix’s own position that, if injected into that plan, would produce troubling outcomes—because it would deny overtime pay even to daily-rate employees making far less money than Hewitt. … A daily-rate employee like Hewitt is not paid on a salary basis under §602(a) of the Secretary’s regulations. He may qualify as paid on salary only under §604(b). Because Hewitt’s compensation did not meet §604(b)’s conditions, it could not count as a salary. So Hewitt was not exempt from the FLSA; instead, he was eligible under that statute for overtime pay. We accordingly affirm the judgment below. It is so ordered. Lineup: Kagan, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Sotomayor, Barrett, and Jackson. Dissent (Gorsuch) The Court granted certiorari to answer this question: “Whether a supervisor making over $200,000 each year is entitled to overtime pay because the standalone regulatory exemption set forth in 29 C.F.R. §541.601 remains subject to the detailed requirements of 29 C.F.R. §541.604 when determining whether highly compensated supervisors are exempt from the [Fair Labor Standards Act]’s overtime-pay requirements.” In other words, we agreed to decide which regulations certain well-paid employees must satisfy to fit within the overtime-pay exemption. Must they satisfy only §541.601? Or must they satisfy §541.601 and §541.604? Unfortunately, this case does not tee up that issue in the way we hoped. With the benefit of briefing and argument, it has become clear that the “critical question here” is not how §541.601 and §541.604 interact. Instead, the critical question is an antecedent one—whether Helix Energy paid Michael Hewitt, the supervisor at issue in this case, “on a salary basis” under §541.602. As the Court explains, the proper interaction between §541.601 and §541.604 matters only if Helix Energy paid Mr. Hewitt on a salary basis consistent with the terms of §541.602. Faced with this development, the Court chooses to take up the question whether Mr. Hewitt was paid on a salary basis under §541.602 and holds he was not. Respectfully, I would dismiss this case as improvidently granted. Dissent (Kavanaugh, joined by Alito) Michael Hewitt earned about $200,000 per year as a supervisor for Helix, a firm that provides services on offshore oil rigs. After being fired, Hewitt sued Helix under the Fair Labor Standards Act and sought hundreds of thousands of dollars in retroactive overtime pay. The Court today rules for Hewitt. I respectfully dissent. Unlike the Court, I would hold that Hewitt was a “bona fide executive” for Helix and therefore not entitled to overtime pay. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, many American workers are legally entitled to overtime pay when they work more than 40 hours per week. But the Act contains several exceptions, including an exception for employees who work in a “bona fide executive . . . capacity.” To determine whether an employee works in a bona fide executive capacity, the Department of Labor’s implementing regulations look to, among other things, (i) the employee’s duties, (ii) how much the employee is paid, and (iii) how the employee is paid—for example, by salary, wage, commission, or bonus. Under the regulations, an employee who performs executive duties and earns at least $100,000 per year with a “predetermined” weekly salary of at least $455 for any week that he works is a bona fide executive and not entitled to overtime pay. Per those regulations, Hewitt readily qualified as a bona fide executive. As everyone agrees, Hewitt performed executive duties, earned about $200,000 per year, and received a predetermined salary of at least $963 per week for any week that he worked. Despite all that, the Court holds that Hewitt was not a bona fide executive and therefore was entitled to overtime pay under the regulations. The Court relies on two alternative rationales. First, the Court reasons that Hewitt’s pay was calculated on a daily-rate basis, while §602 of the regulations requires a certain minimum “predetermined amount” calculated on a weekly or less frequent basis—specifically at least $455 per week. That is known as the salary-basis test. But Hewitt’s daily “predetermined” rate ($963 per day) was higher than the weekly minimum requirement of $455 per week specified in the regulations. If a worker is guaranteed at least $455 for any day that he works, that worker by definition is guaranteed at least $455 for any week that he works. As Helix rightly explains, a supervisor whose “pay is calculated based on a day rate above the weekly minimum receives more than enough on a salary basis to satisfy” the regulation. To be sure, if Hewitt worked multiple days in a week, then his $963 guaranteed weekly salary would only be part of his total weekly compensation. But under the salarybasis test specified in the regulations, an employee’s guaranteed weekly salary of at least $455 need only constitute “all or part” of his total weekly compensation. The Court’s opinion never satisfactorily accounts for §602’s use of the phrase “or part.” Stated simply, the regulations require only that an employee be guaranteed a “predetermined amount” of at least $455 per week as “part” of his total compensation for any week that he works. Hewitt was guaranteed a “predetermined amount” of at least $455 per week (in fact, $963 per week) as part of his total compensation for any week that he worked. And that predetermined minimum amount of $963 was “not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed.” Hewitt always received at least $963 per week that he worked. Of course, this case would be different if Hewitt had been guaranteed, say, only $250 per day that he worked. Under those circumstances, Hewitt would not have been guaranteed at least $455 for any week that he worked. But here, Hewitt was guaranteed $963 for any day that he worked. Therefore, he was guaranteed at least $963 for any week that he worked. The Court’s contrary conclusion boils down to the headscratching assertion that Hewitt was somehow not guaranteed to receive at least $455 for any week that he worked even though (as all agree) he was in fact guaranteed to receive $963 for any day that he worked. … One last point: Although the Court holds that Hewitt is entitled to overtime pay under the regulations, the regulations themselves may be inconsistent with the Fair Labor Standards Act…In any event, I would leave it to the Fifth Circuit on remand to determine whether Helix forfeited the statutory issue. But whether in Hewitt’s case on remand or in another case, the statutory question remains open for future resolution in the lower courts and perhaps ultimately in this Court. I respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-984_j426.pdf CRUZ v. ARIZONA TLDR: If the US Supreme Court reverses a state court criminal case, it is not a “state-law ground” for the state court to decide that reversal is not a “significant change in the law.” This is key because it means a convicted person can challenge their situation based on that reversal. Holding / Majority Opinion (Sotomayor) Petitioner John Montenegro Cruz, a defendant sentenced to death, argued at trial and on direct appeal that his due process rights had been violated by the trial court’s failure to permit him to inform the jury that a life sentence in Arizona would be without parole. Those courts rejected Cruz’s Simmons argument, believing, incorrectly, that Arizona’s sentencing and parole scheme did not trigger application of Simmons. After the Arizona Supreme Court repeated that mistake in a series of cases, this Court summarily reversed the Arizona Supreme Court in Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U. S. 613 (2016) (per curiam), and held that it was fundamental error to conclude that Simmons “did not apply” in Arizona. Relying on Lynch, Cruz filed a motion for state postconviction relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g). That Rule permits a defendant to bring a successive petition if “there has been a significant change in the law that, if applicable to the defendant’s case, would probably overturn the defendant’s judgment or sentence.” The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief after concluding that Lynch was not a “significant change in the law.” The Arizona Supreme Court reached this conclusion despite having repeatedly held that an overruling of precedent is a significant change in the law. The Court granted certiorari to address whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s holding that Lynch was not a significant change in the law for purposes of Rule 32.1(g) is an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment. It is not. Cruz argued at trial and on direct appeal that the trial court violated his due process rights under Simmons by not allowing him to inform the jury that the only sentencing alternative to death in his case was life without parole. P Prior to Cruz’s trial, this Court had repeatedly reaffirmed Simmons’ holding. In case after case, the Court explained that when “a capital defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant ‘to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility, either by a jury instruction or in arguments by counsel.’” … In 2005, Cruz was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a Tucson police officer. Cruz’s conviction occurred over a decade after the decision in Simmons, but became final before the decision in Lynch. trial, Cruz repeatedly sought to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. Citing Simmons, Cruz expressed concern that unless he had “the opportunity to present the mitigating factor that he will not be released from prison,” jurors would be left to “speculate” about Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme and whether it allows for parole. The trial court “conclude[d] that Simmons is distinguishable” and did not act on Cruz’s concern. Cruz also informed the trial court of his intent to call as a witness the chairman of the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency to testify that the board no longer had authority to parole any capital defendants. In response, the State sought to prevent Cruz from offering evidence as to “the prospects of parole for an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment.” The trial court precluded the testimony. … After counsel made closing arguments, the judge instructed the jury that Cruz was eligible for three penalties: (1) “Death by lethal injection”; (2) “Life imprisonment with no possibility of parole or release from imprisonment on any basis”; and (3) “Life imprisonment with a possibility of parole or release from imprisonment” after 25 years. The reference to parole was plainly wrong. See Lynch, 578 U. S., at 615 (the only “release” available under Arizona law is executive clemency, not parole). The judge further instructed the jury that its only choice was whether or not to sentence Cruz to death; if the jury did not vote for death, the judge would then choose between the two remaining possible sentences. The jury sentenced Cruz to death. … [Jurors in a press release] reported that they would rather have voted for life without the possibility of parole, but that they were not given that option … Cruz thereafter moved for a new trial, arguing that the instructions did not give the jury “an accurate and complete understanding of the consequences of a non-death verdict.” The trial judge denied the motion. He concluded, erroneously, that the jury had been “correctly instructed on the law,” and found it “entirely speculative” whether Cruz would be considered for parole after 25 years. … After Cruz’s conviction became final, this Court decided Lynch, thereby reaffirming that Simmons applies in Arizona. Cruz then filed a successive motion for state postconviction relief pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g). That Rule permits a successive petition for postconviction relief if “there has been a significant change in the law that, if applicable to the defendant’s case, would probably overturn the defendant’s judgment or sentence.” Cruz argued that Lynch was a significant change in the law because it “had transformative effects on previously binding Arizona law.” The Arizona Supreme Court denied relief after holding that Lynch was “not a significant change in the law.” … In so holding, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected Cruz’s argument that Lynch should qualify as a significant change in the law under Rule 32.1(g) “because it significantly changed how Arizona applied federal law.” The Arizona Supreme Court responded, without citation to any of its prior cases, that Rule 32.1(g) requires “a significant change in the law, whether state or federal—not a significant change in the application of the law.” … “This Court will not take up a question of federal law in a case ‘if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.’” Here the Court focuses on the second of these requirements: adequacy. “The question whether a state procedural ruling is adequate is itself a question of federal law.” Ordinarily, a violation of a state procedural rule that is “‘firmly established and regularly followed’ . . . will be adequate to foreclose review of a federal claim.” Nevertheless, in “exceptional cases,” a “generally sound rule” may be applied in a way that “renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question.” This is one of those exceptional cases. In particular, this case implicates this Court’s rule, reserved for the rarest of situations, that “an unforeseeable and unsupported state-court decision on a question of state procedure does not constitute an adequate ground to preclude this Court’s review of a federal question.” “Novelty in procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal constitutional rights.” … At issue here is the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision that Cruz’s motion for postconviction relief failed to satisfy Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g). Rule 32.1(g) allows defendants to file a successive or untimely postconviction petition if there has been “a significant change in the law.” Arizona courts have interpreted that phrase to require a “transformative event, a ‘clear break from the past.’” “The archetype of such a change occurs when an appellate court overrules previously binding case law.” Straightforward application of these principles should have led to the conclusion that Lynch was a “significant change in the law” under Rule 32.1(g). Lynch overruled binding Arizona precedent. Before Lynch, Arizona courts held that capital defendants were not entitled to inform the jury of their parole ineligibility. After Lynch, Arizona courts recognize that capital defendants have a due process right to provide the jury with that information when future dangerousness is at issue. It is hard to imagine a clearer break from the past. … The State and the dissent offer various reformulations of the argument that Lynch was not a “significant change in the law” for Rule 32.1(g) purposes, but each fails to grapple with the basic point that Lynch reversed previously binding Arizona Supreme Court precedent. Both the State and the dissent argue that the Arizona Supreme Court was justified in treating Lynch differently than other transformative decisions of this Court, such as Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002), and Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 356 (2010), because Lynch was a summary reversal and so did not “impos[e] a new or changed interpretation of state or federal law.” As the dissent puts the argument: Lynch “did not change the law in Arizona.” These arguments miss the point. While Lynch did not change this Court’s interpretation of Simmons, it did change the operative (and mistaken) interpretation of Simmons by Arizona courts. Lynch thus changed the law in Arizona in the way that matters for purposes of Rule 32.1(g): It overruled previously binding Arizona Supreme Court precedent preventing capital defendants from informing the jury of their parole ineligibility. Contrary to the dissent, it makes no difference that Lynch did not alter federal law. While Arizona Supreme Court decisions applying Rule 32.1(g) to federal decisions such as Ring and Padilla have understandably noted the effect those decisions had on both federal and state law, the analytic focus of Arizona courts has always been on the impact to Arizona law. That focus is unsurprising given that Rule 32.1(g) is a state procedural rule governing the availability of state postconviction relief in state court. … Finally, the dissent attempts to draw a parallel between Rule 32.1(g) and certain procedural rules governing federal prisoners seeking to file delayed or successive §2255 motions. The parallel breaks down, however, because the rules are different. Unlike §2255(h)(2), which requires “a new rule of [federal] constitutional law,” and §2255(f )(3), which requires a right “newly recognized by the [U. S.] Supreme Court,” the relevant portion of Arizona’s Rule 32.1(g) simply requires “a significant change in the law.” As the Arizona Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted that Rule, Lynch should qualify because it overruled binding Arizona precedent, creating a clear break from the past in Arizona courts. The Arizona Supreme Court’s contrary decision was unprecedented and unforeseeable. Only violations of state rules that are “‘firmly established and regularly followed’ . . . will be adequate to foreclose review of a federal claim.” That standard is not met here. In exceptional cases where a state-court judgment rests on a novel and unforeseeable state-court procedural decision lacking fair or substantial support in prior state law, that decision is not adequate to preclude review of a federal question. The Arizona Supreme Court applied Rule 32.1(g) in a manner that abruptly departed from and directly conflicted with its prior interpretations of that Rule. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Lineup: Sotomayor, joined by Roberts, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Dissent (Barrett, joined by Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch) The adequate and independent state grounds doctrine is the product of two fundamental features of our jurisdiction. First, this Court is powerless to revise a state court’s interpretation of its own law. We thus cannot disturb state-court rulings on state-law questions that are independent of federal law. Second, Article III empowers federal courts to render judgments, not advisory opinions. So if an independent state ground of decision is adequate to sustain the judgment, we lack jurisdiction over the entire dispute. Anything we said about alternative federal grounds would not affect the ultimate resolution of the case and would therefore be advisory. The Court holds that the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of Rule 32.1(g) is inadequate to support the judgment below. That assertion is jarring, because the bar for finding inadequacy is extraordinarily high. When, as here, the argument is based on the state court’s inconsistent or novel application of its law, the bar is met only by a decision so blatantly disingenuous that it reveals hostility to federal rights or those asserting them. Given the respect we owe state courts, that is not a conclusion we should be quick to draw— and ordinarily, we are not quick to draw it. … Today’s Court, while admitting that the novelty prong of inadequacy is “reserved for the rarest of situations,” concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of Rule 32.1(g) falls in the same category as Patterson. I respectfully disagree. Unlike the state courts in cases like Patterson, the Arizona Supreme Court did not contradict its own settled law. Instead, it confronted a new question and gave an answer reasonably consistent with its precedent. The ordinary rule in Arizona is that criminal defendants must present any constitutional challenges on direct reviewor in a timely postconviction-review petition. Rule 32.1(g) allows a second or delayed bite at the postconviction-relief apple when “there has been a significant change in the law that, if applicable to the defendant’s case, would probably overturn the defendant’s judgment or sentence.” .. Cruz’s case[], raised a question of first impression: whether a “significant change” occurs when an intervening decision reaffirms existing law, but rectifies an erroneous application of that law. That was the effect of Lynch v. Arizona, which corrected the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of Simmons v. South Carolina, and its progeny. An intervening decision like Lynch, which undisputedly did not change any legal doctrine, has no analog in Arizona’s Rule 32.1(g) jurisprudence. So the Arizona Supreme Court devised a rule: “Rule 32.1(g) requires a significant change in the law, whether state or federal—not a significant change in the application of the law.” By that standard, Lynch did not satisfy Rule 32.1(g). … The Court makes a case for why the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of its own precedent is wrong. If I were on the Arizona Supreme Court, I might agree. But that call is not within our bailiwick. Our job is to determine whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision is defensible, and we owe the utmost deference to the state court in making that judgment. Cases of inadequacy are extremely rare, and this is not one. I respectfully dissent. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-846_lkgn.pdf
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Feb 22, 2023 19:47
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to expand on my previous post (not editing since lol damnit pageroll and quoted), it's actually significant even if the court basically upholds section 230 in its entirety, or even just says "we think these parts of it are ironclad". AFAIK these are the first section 230 SCOTUS cases, so part of the reason they're important is that they will establish the first SCOTUS rulings on the law, so even just confirming parts is significant precedent for any future cases. im not familiar with prior jurisprudence in lower federal courts though
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Feb 22, 2023 20:47
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There are multiple justices who have publicly stated they want to tackle section 230 and a lot of people see gutting it as a way to combat "big tech silencing conservative voices" and effectively allowing the government to dictate speech, something the GOP absolutely wants and is trying to do in some states. Yeah the plaintiff was inept in one of the cases but that honestly doesn't matter. If 5 justices decide "we want to do X" then that's going to happen. Roberts cares about his legacy and perceived legitimacy of the court, even though it hasn't had legitimacy for decades, but he's also got 5 people who give zero fucks to contend with.
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Feb 22, 2023 21:09
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If a employee be hourly they not be salaried. So it be do. Dissent: moron baby, joined by poop troglodyte
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Feb 22, 2023 21:30
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Staluigi posted:If a employee be hourly they not be salaried. So it be do. But what if I'm a company that wants to pay an hourly guy $200k per year, surely then I can ignore the law? Instead of just paying him a salary like every other company?
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Feb 22, 2023 21:34
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Like i know there is a super duper ready to go community of conservative judicial explainers around the country that would definitely jump at the chance to come and explain to me why the dissent isn't exactly as dumb as it looks and that I must be a not law understanding fool to not agree with their dissent, which is fascinating to me because it looks very painfully dumb on its face
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Feb 22, 2023 23:59
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Staluigi posted:Like i know there is a super duper ready to go community of conservative judicial explainers around the country that would definitely jump at the chance to come and explain to me why the dissent isn't exactly as dumb as it looks and that I must be a not law understanding fool to not agree with their dissent, which is fascinating to me because it looks very painfully dumb on its face The dissent is hanging on the plaintiff being guaranteed the minimum the rule requires, i.e. $455 a week, for any week they work at least one day (like $935 or something per day IIRC). As the majority opinion points out, you can’t bootstrap paid by the day into a minimum weekly guarantee that way.
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Feb 23, 2023 00:04
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The dissent seems coherent enough but I think they mostly just want this guy to gently caress off with his bad faith "i was fired so I'm going to complain about my already super high compensation" whinge lawsuit I won't be reading the decision or the code, the majority is probably right.
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Feb 23, 2023 00:26
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They are right and if the dissent had its way you'd almost certainly see wage theft jump even more in the US.
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Feb 23, 2023 00:34
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Decision 2 and 3 there seem surprisingly good. Don't know enough about number 1 to judge.
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Feb 23, 2023 01:44
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Evil Fluffy posted:There are multiple justices who have publicly stated they want to tackle section 230 and a lot of people see gutting it as a way to combat "big tech silencing conservative voices" and effectively allowing the government to dictate speech, something the GOP absolutely wants and is trying to do in some states. they don't need to gut 230 for that though, correct? i would expect the "no silencing conservatives!" stuff to come in the form of a carveout that establishes fines for non-compliance by the company, which is IIRC what the Texas law does, and that's probably also headed to SCOTUS (unsure what the exact status of the NetChoice cases is, but it looks like at least one was already decided by the 5th Circuit). ignoring justices thinking tech policy is a big blob of poo poo their old luddite brains don't understand, section 230 making companies not liable for user posts doesn't really matter as far as opinions being silenced, since without it they'd only be liable if they chose to leave some "i am going to kill X because they are trans this is my protected political opinion" post up and it met the usual 1A exceptions even ignoring that gutting 230 seems backwards for that goal, it's already established that you can have carveouts like the DMCA and SESTA/FOSTA where companies are liable for some types of user content. granted, justices can't create those, but it's not like there's a shortage of legislators willing to instead these cases may allow a carveout though, since they're less about whether section 230 is itself invalid as whether companies' use of algorithmic prioritization breaks the user content wall, i.e. that the ISIS video is user content, but youtube choosing to show it to someone via the algorithm is an intentional action by the company, and therefore something the company is liable for if their action causes harm. you could make the ruling that all such algo prioritization is not covered by 230, but if so, don't you also need something like the Texas law to say "also a company intentionally restricting speech, either by removal or shadowbanning/deprioritization, entitles the affected party to damages"? that seems like it'd be difficult to enforce in practice for algo stuff, since those are often complicated as gently caress, and many implementations could say "the company took no intentional moderation action here: the post was deprioritized because a fuckton of users downvoted it, and we blanket deprioritize anything with a ton of downvotes, whether it's a protected political opinion or, idk, really lovely art" im somewhat reminded of a bit from the excellent The Red Web, where some Russian federal agency approached Yandex to ask them why the gently caress their news engine kept surfacing stories critical of the Russian government to the top of the feed, and the engineers' response was "our algorithm prioritizes poo poo users like reading, and it turns out Yandex Novosti users (i.e. Russians who get their news from sources other than state TV) kinda hate the government and really like stories that poo poo on it, are you going to punish us for this?" granted, it's Russia, so the answer was effectively "yes, deal with it", but still
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Feb 23, 2023 01:57
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Staluigi posted:Like i know there is a super duper ready to go community of conservative judicial explainers around the country that would definitely jump at the chance to come and explain to me why the dissent isn't exactly as dumb as it looks and that I must be a not law understanding fool to not agree with their dissent, which is fascinating to me because it looks very painfully dumb on its face It seems to me like the dissent is trying to rules-lawyer a rather sizeable loophole into overtime laws. Rather than being dumb, it's playing with definitions and rules in a clever but malicious way. They're trying to turn "paid by the day" into "salaried" by proposing that the first day's pay is the person's salary, and that any further days of pay are merely a bonus or something and aren't part of their basic compensation.
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Feb 23, 2023 02:07
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Main Paineframe posted:It seems to me like the dissent is trying to rules-lawyer a rather sizeable loophole into overtime laws. Rather than being dumb, it's playing with definitions and rules in a clever but malicious way. The majority says "but he gets paid more if he works more", while the dissent says "but at least the legal minimum in the first minute". I agree with the majority, but the dissent isn't wholly wrong.
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Feb 23, 2023 02:37
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Qtotonibudinibudet posted:which is IIRC what the Texas law does, and that's probably also headed to SCOTUS (unsure what the exact status of the NetChoice cases is, but it looks like at least one was already decided by the 5th Circuit). 5th Circuit had their reversal of the district court stay of the Texas law vacated by SCOTUS. It’s at SCOTUS and the Court called for the SG’s views, so it won’t even have a cert decision for quite some time. Meanwhile, the 11th Circuit stayed the Florida law - no SCOTUS action. Given the way its fallen out so far, I wouldn’t hold out a lot of hope that SCOTUS is going to find for Texas/Florida on their content moderation bills. (Which is good, they’re terrible bills.)
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Feb 23, 2023 02:42
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Main Paineframe posted:It seems to me like the dissent is trying to rules-lawyer a rather sizeable loophole into overtime laws. Rather than being dumb, it's playing with definitions and rules in a clever but malicious way. I reread the majority (took me a minute my eyes kind of glazed over) and its this but also wanting him to gently caress off. I think this guy knew exactly the conditions under which he was getting $963 a day. I'm with Thomas.
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Feb 23, 2023 02:53
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so, while https://www.scotusblog.com/2023/02/in-lawsuit-against-tech-companies-justices-debate-what-it-means-to-aid-and-abet-terrorism/ goes into more detail about why this is their argument (briefly that they weren't much aware of the content and thus weren't able to actively aid in committing a terrorist act, but if someone--e.g. the extremely reliable and trustworthy Turkish government had told them it was terrorism, that'd be different), lol wtf Twitter counsel https://twitter.com/daphnehk/status/1628571467225919491
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Feb 23, 2023 17:46
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Lmao no government should be able to just unilaterally dictate the line, but especially not the Turkish government. Good lord. How did their counsel even come up with that?
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Feb 23, 2023 19:27
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Elon Musk hates journalists and would love to have a fig leaf to purge them from his platform so he doesn't get any blowback.
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Feb 23, 2023 19:49
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Blue Footed Booby posted:Lmao no government should be able to just unilaterally dictate the line, but especially not the Turkish government. Good lord. How did their counsel even come up with that? Likely because the terrorist attack Twitter is being accused of aiding and abetting was in Istanbul?
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Feb 23, 2023 20:44
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Kalman posted:Likely because the terrorist attack Twitter is being accused of aiding and abetting was in Istanbul? yes, but also the argument is loving stupid no matter what country
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Feb 23, 2023 22:18
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Qtotonibudinibudet posted:yes, but also the argument is loving stupid no matter what country It’s not an argument about the accuracy of the information, it’s that you can’t claim ignorance and thus non-liability if the person then goes on to commit a terrorist act. No one was saying “Twitter is liable under ATA if Turkey says a journalist is a terrorist and Twitter doesn’t remove them”, they’re saying they’re at least potentially liable if that journalist goes on to commit a terrorist act and Twitter didn’t remove them.
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Feb 23, 2023 22:42
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Kalman posted:Likely because the terrorist attack Twitter is being accused of aiding and abetting was in Istanbul? Siri, what is the supremacy clause?
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Feb 23, 2023 22:47
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to my knowledge, we don't have a treaty with Turkey stipulating mutual reciprocal recognition of domestic terror threats, especially where they may so easily concern suppression of ultimately-harmless internal dissent
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Feb 23, 2023 22:48
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Again, not relevant to the issue of "did Twitter know this account belonged to a terrorist?" To analogize to hearsay - the statement wouldn't be offered for the truth of the assertion but as evidence that Twitter had heard the statement "X is a terrorist."
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Feb 23, 2023 22:51
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"This is the office of the House of Saud. The KSA state has decreed that Jimbo Bob is a terrorist. This letter is notice that @jimbobob is a terrorist account. Please take action on this in your country. Any bonesaw incident is unrelated to this action." Do you see how weird it is, and how this is so, so much more than just responsive to the question of notice and knowledge? That "did Twitter know these were terrorists" is itself a question that is impossible to separate from issues of state, domestic and abroad? I want to see Twitter string out as an accessory to murder just as much as any other reasonable person might because they literally are accessories to murder, but this specific argument in this specific case is bizarre. Potato Salad fucked around with this message at 00:00 on Feb 24, 2023 |
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Feb 23, 2023 23:56
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It wasn’t just “if the Turkish government said X is a terrorist”, though my posts were imprecise - the Twitter poster misrepresented Twitter’s argument. Here’s what was actually said in the argument: “If the police chief in Istanbul came to Twitter and said look, we’ve been following these accounts and these people — these — these people appear to be planning some sort of terrorist act, and Twitter basically said, you know, people do lots of things, we’re not going to take these things down, we’re not going to look into it, there, we would have fairly assumed culpable knowledge that there were in fact accounts that they knew about that were asserted it plausibly being used to do this.” And “If in my hypothetical the Turkish police, the Istanbul police come and say there are 10 accounts, 10 Twitter accounts that appear to be involved in planning some sort of terrorist attack here, and Twitter basically says, not our problem, that is the level of knowledge.” And yeah, I do think that if the Turkish police or the Saudi government or whoever go to Twitter and say “these folks appear to be involved in planning a terrorist attack” then Twitter should probably check that out!
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Feb 24, 2023 01:13
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It would be interesting if SCOTUS twisted themselves up into a knot and came to the conclusion that Internet Publishers do have a duty to mitigate access to radicalizing extremist content. Whether it be reducing access to extreme political hate content by deranking it in their search algorithms or, you know, deplatforming voices that emphasize hate speech or content or are actively engaged in advocating for violent actions. Although, even if they did I assume they’d find a way to make it not count towards US political figures.
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Feb 24, 2023 01:51
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IIRC Twitter even coded a procedural Nazi suppression filter, but elected to not actually deploy it because Republican politicians kept getting caught in the dragnet.
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Feb 24, 2023 03:42
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Farchanter posted:IIRC Twitter even coded a procedural Nazi suppression filter, but elected to not actually deploy it because Republican politicians kept getting caught in the dragnet. Proof of concept validated in deployment though
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Feb 24, 2023 03:43
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Farchanter posted:IIRC Twitter even coded a procedural Nazi suppression filter, but elected to not actually deploy it because Republican politicians kept getting caught in the dragnet. Yes. They also have a nazism filter for German users, because they are required to suppress it there
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Feb 24, 2023 03:43
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haveblue posted:Yes. They also have a nazism filter for German users, because they are required to suppress it there It was likely literally the same filter guys.
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Feb 24, 2023 05:39
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Kalman posted:And yeah, I do think that if the Turkish police or the Saudi government or whoever go to Twitter and say “these folks appear to be involved in planning a terrorist attack” then Twitter should probably check that out! Like take a QAnon-brained chud who tweets every week accusing politicians of being part of a pedophile human trafficking ring run out of a pizza restaurant. I don't think there's anything morally wrong with just trashing and ignoring everything they say immediately without investigating it any further, even if they might at some point report something real. In the Istanbul police chief hypothetical, "We don't really believe/trust you (and we don't really have the ability to independently investigate terrorism in Turkey), so we're just going to assume you're harassing dissidents (because you do that a lot)" but hidden behind some PR speak seems like a reasonable response.
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Feb 24, 2023 06:19
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Foxfire_ posted:There is a boy-who-cried-wolf effect to consider though That's why there are reasonableness standards. You're not obligated to investigate sovcit stuff; a governmental "hey these accounts are planning a terrorist attack", courts are going to hold you responsible if you ignore it (unless there's a constant flow of bad faith requests, anyway.)
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Feb 24, 2023 06:22
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snip
Somebody fucked around with this message at 16:02 on Feb 25, 2023 |
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Feb 25, 2023 15:22
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Now that's a blast from the
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Feb 25, 2023 15:49
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If it fits anywhere it's probably the SCOTUS 
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Feb 25, 2023 15:53
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Google Jeb Bush posted:obviously it's more of a bummer for Thomas and wossername, the lawyer who iirc worked for Andrew's firm before The Events Stringer. Since we were talking about them on the last page, a new Thomas-Andrew lawsuit just dropped and woof
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Feb 25, 2023 20:53
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Fuschia tude posted:Stringer. To me the wildest revelation is that a legal podcast helmed by a corporate contract lawyer only ever bothered with a verbal "50/50" agreement. It's an example of peak Lawyer Brain that at every step in the process Andrew Torrez has apparently done the exact opposite of what he, as a lawyer, would presumably be advising his client to do.
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Feb 26, 2023 15:35
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Being in personal control of the money and with only a verbal contract that leaves you in a position of power against the other person is perfect advice for someone who is a controlling sex pest, though.
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Feb 26, 2023 15:50
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Old Kentucky Shark posted:It's an example of peak Lawyer Brain that at every step in the process Andrew Torrez has apparently done the exact opposite of what he, as a lawyer, would presumably be advising his client to do. This is why lawyers should never represent their own interests. It's always a lovely idea. You should always seek independent legal advice in matters that require legal advice, even if you yourself are qualified to provide legal advice.
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Feb 26, 2023 16:11
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