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Vietnom nom nom
Oct 24, 2000
Forum Veteran
https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/07/u-s-military-air-to-air-missiles-ukrainian-migs-00085877

U.S. is looking at mounting AIM-120 air-to-air missiles on MiG's. Not a lot of meat on the bone of this story yet, mostly just confirming that it's being actively looked at. Would be a bit of a hack to get the aircraft and missile to interface since the aircraft's radar has to provide initial guidance. We already provided AGM-88 HARMs for ground attack, but there isn't a lot of hard info about how integrated they are with aircraft systems since they have the capability to be essentially dumb fired.

Hard to know how much air-to-air combat will ensue in any Ukrainian offensive, but this does imply that the U.S. wants them to have the capability to provide air support.

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fizzy
Dec 2, 2022

by Jeffrey of YOSPOS
Round-Up of News of the Day


Office of the President of Ukraine

quote:

https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-zavzhdi-pamyatatime-svoyih-geroyiv-nasha-pamyat-pro-81485

Ukraine will always remember its heroes, our memory of them will endure, and our enemy will perish - address by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy
7 March 2023 - 19:00

Today, Dmytro Kotsiubaylo, "Da Vinci", Hero of Ukraine, volunteer, man-symbol, man of courage, was killed in action. A fighter of the 67th separate mechanized brigade, a commander of a battalion. He was killed in the battle near Bakhmut, in the battle for Ukraine.

Since 2014, he has been defending our independence and the dignity of our people. One of the youngest heroes of Ukraine. One of those whose personal history, character, and courage have forever become the history, character, and courage of Ukraine.

For more than nine years, Ukrainian heroes have been fighting for Ukraine's future in fierce battles for the country. Peace and relative safety in the rear cities is their feat. Our confidence in Ukraine's victory is their resilience and strength.

Ukraine will always remember its heroes. Our memory of them will endure, and the enemy that came to Ukraine will perish.

...


Kyiv Independent

quote:

https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/hero-of-ukraine-dmytro-kotsiubailo-killed-in-action

Hero of Ukraine Dmytro Kotsiubailo killed in action near Bakhmut
by The Kyiv Independent news desk
March 7, 2023 7:40 pm

Dmytro Kotsiubailo, commander of the First Mechanized Battalion "Da Vinci Wolves" and Hero of Ukraine, was killed in action near Bakhmut, President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on March 7.

"He has been defending our independence and the dignity of our people since 2014. One of the youngest heroes of Ukraine. One of those whose personal history, character, and courage forever became the history, character, and courage of Ukraine," Zelensky said in a video address.

Kotsiubailo (call sign Da Vinci) became one of the youngest Ukrainian servicemen to receive the Hero of Ukraine national title in 2021. He was killed at the age of 27.

Kotsiubailo, whose battalion is part of the 67th Mechanized Brigade, took part in the EuroMaidan in 2014, soon after joining the Right Sector Ukrainian Volunteer Corps and fighting off Russia in Ukraine's Donbas region.

In November 2022, the Right Sector Ukrainian Volunteer Corps was reformatted into the 67th Separate Mechanized Brigade, with Kotsiubailo as head of one of the brigade's battalions. The Right Sector is a Ukrainian nationalist movement.



quote:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmytro_Kotsiubailo

Dmytro Kotsiubailo
(Redirected from Dmytro Kotsyubaylo)

Dmytro Kotsiubailo (Ukrainian: Дмитро Іванович Коцюбайло, nickname Da Vinci (Ukrainian: Да Вінчі); 1 November 1995 – 7 March 2023) was a Ukrainian volunteer, soldier, junior lieutenant, a commander of the 1st Mechanized Battalion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He was a participant in the Russo-Ukrainian War. He is a Hero of Ukraine (2021). He was a member of the Leadership of the Right Sector (2020—2023). Kotsiubailo was the youngest battalion commander in the history of the Ukrainian Army.

Kotsiubailo was the first volunteer to be awarded the title Hero of Ukraine for life.[1] In 2022 he was included in the 30 under 30: Faces of the Future rating by Forbes.[2]


quote:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_Sector

Right Sector

Right Sector (Ukrainian: Пра́вий се́ктор, Pravyi sektor) is a loosely defined coalition of right-wing to far-right[10] Ukrainian nationalist organizations.[3][11] It originated in November 2013 as a right-wing, paramilitary confederation of several radical nationalist organizations at the Euromaidan revolt in Kyiv,[6] where its street fighters participated in clashes with riot police.[12][13] The coalition became a political party on 22 March 2014, at which time it claimed to have roughly 10,000 members.[14][15] Founding groups included Trident (Tryzub), led by Dmytro Yarosh and Andriy Tarasenko, and the Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian National Self-Defense (UNA–UNSO), a political and paramilitary organization.[16][17][18] Other founding groups included the Social-National Assembly and its Patriot of Ukraine paramilitary wing, White Hammer, and Carpathian Sich. White Hammer was expelled in March 2014,[19] and Patriot of Ukraine left the organization, along with many UNA–UNSO members, in the following months.[20]

...

The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported antisemitic incidents involving Svoboda and Right Sector during the demonstration, where their militants were calling political opponents "Zhyd" and flying flags with neo-Nazi symbols. According to Haaretz, these organizations were also distributing translated editions of Mein Kampf and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion to the demonstrators in Independence Square.[55]


Right Sector has been described in various ways by the media.[131] BBC News describes it as a "Ukrainian nationalist group"[22] and an "umbrella organization of far-right groups",[132] while Time has described it as a "radical right-wing group ... a coalition of militant ultra-nationalists",[25] with an ideology that "borders on fascism".[13] The New York Times has described it as a "nationalist group" and a "coalition of once-fringe Ukrainian nationalist groups".[4] The Guardian has identified it as a "nationalist Ukrainian group",[133] Reuters as a "far-right nationalist group",[134] Agence France Presse as a "far-right" group,[10] and The Wall Street Journal as an "umbrella group for far-right activists and ultranationalists".[135] Die Welt, the New York Times, and Le Monde diplomatique have described some of Right Sector's constituent groups as radical right-wing, neofascist, or neo-Nazi, but also that it distanced itself from antisemitism.[136][42][45] According to a publication in The Washington Post, "Operating in Ukraine are several nationalist paramilitary groups, such as the Azov movement and Right Sector, that espouse neo-Nazi ideology. While high-profile, they appear to have little public support. Only one far-right party, Svoboda, is represented in Ukraine’s parliament, and it only holds one seat."[137]

...

Huggybear
Jun 17, 2005

I got the jimjams

Vietnom nom nom posted:

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/07/u-s-military-air-to-air-missiles-ukrainian-migs-00085877

U.S. is looking at mounting AIM-120 air-to-air missiles on MiG's. Not a lot of meat on the bone of this story yet, mostly just confirming that it's being actively looked at. Would be a bit of a hack to get the aircraft and missile to interface since the aircraft's radar has to provide initial guidance. We already provided AGM-88 HARMs for ground attack, but there isn't a lot of hard info about how integrated they are with aircraft systems since they have the capability to be essentially dumb fired.

Hard to know how much air-to-air combat will ensue in any Ukrainian offensive, but this does imply that the U.S. wants them to have the capability to provide air support.

I wonder what the air war is like now. There seems to be so little coverage or awareness, just tidbits like the video and article of UAF Mi-8s fitted with rocket launchers, and a recent tweet about Bakhmut where it is indicated that Ukrainian soldiers are "regularly strafed" by Russian attack helicopters. It seems like aircraft have depleted on both sides, whereas helicopters are still in use probably because of their ability to fly NOE so well. That said, it suggests that Ukranian MANPADs may be in shorter supply...although I have not seen indications that Ukraine has been asking for these.

fizzy
Dec 2, 2022

by Jeffrey of YOSPOS
A history of the strategic value of Bakhmut


24 January 2023 - "US and Western officials"

quote:

https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/24/politics/ukraine-shift-tactics-bakhmut/index.html

The US and its allies want Ukraine to change its battlefield tactics in the spring
By Natasha Bertrand, Alex Marquardt and Katie Bo Lillis, CNN
Updated 8:18 AM EST, Tue January 24, 2023

Now, ahead of what is widely expected to be a brutal spring of fighting, there is a tactical opening, US and Western officials say. In recent weeks they have begun suggesting that Ukrainian forces cut their losses in Bakhmut, which they argue has little strategic significance for Ukraine, and focus instead on planning an offensive in the south.


7 February 2023 - Yehor Cherniev, a Ukrainian lawmaker and head of the Ukrainian delegation to the NATO parliamentary assembly

quote:

https://time.com/6253515/bakhmut-battle-ukraine-russia/

Why Russia Is So Determined To Capture Bakhmut
BY YASMEEN SERHAN AND TARA LAW
FEBRUARY 7, 2023 1:03 PM EST

Yehor Cherniev, a Ukrainian lawmaker and head of the Ukrainian delegation to the NATO parliamentary assembly, tells TIME that although Bakhmut “is not of strategic importance” to Kyiv, they will nonetheless “try to hold it as long as possible.”


4 March 2023 - U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin

quote:

https://www.voanews.com/a/us-defense-chief-says-ukraine-s-bakhmut-has-more-symbolic-than-strategic-value/6991380.html

US Defense Chief: Ukraine's Bakhmut Is Symbolic Rather Than Strategic
March 06, 2023 6:06 AM
UPDATE March 06, 2023 12:54 PM

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said Monday if Russian troops manage to seize control of the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, that would not represent a decisive shift in the conflict.

"I think it is more of a symbolic value than it is strategic and operational value," Austin told reporters during a visit to Jordan.


6 March 2023 - "Analysts"

quote:

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ukraine-vows-to-hold-bakhmut-as-russia-continues-fight-to-capture-the-city
Updated on Mar 6, 2023 12:50 PM EST
Published on Mar 6, 2023 9:32 AM EST

Ukraine vows to hold Bakhmut as Russia continues fight to capture the city

Russian forces that invaded Ukraine just over a year ago have been unable to deliver a knockout blow that would allow them to seize Bakhmut. Analysts say it does not have major strategic value and that its capture would be unlikely to serve as a turning point in the conflict.


7 March 2023 - "Analysts"

quote:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/03/bakhmut-battle-ukraine-russia/
By Claire Parker
Updated March 7, 2023 at 1:57 p.m. EST
Published March 3, 2023 at 11:33 a.m. EST

Before the war, Bakhmut was mostly known as a center of the salt industry. But the relentless, intensifying fight for control of the city — which analysts say holds little strategic importance — has made it a rallying cry and political battleground for both sides.


7 March 2023 - "Military experts and close watchers of the Ukrainian battlefields"

quote:

https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-war-bakhmut-significance/32307329.html

If Bakhmut Falls: What The Battle For A City Of Little Military Significance Means For The Ukraine War
By Mike Eckel
March 07, 2023 17:47 GMT

For military experts and close watchers of the Ukrainian battlefields, Bakhmut's symbolic importance far outweighs its strategic importance. Straddling the Bakhmutka River, just 20 kilometers west of the Luhansk region administrative border, the city, with a prewar population of around 70,000, used to be known mostly for its sparkling wines and salt mines.


7 March 2023 - "Analysts"

quote:

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64864496

Ukraine war: Bakhmut defenders double down - Zelensky
7 March 2023

Analysts say Bakhmut has little strategic value, but has become a focal point for Russian commanders who have struggled to deliver any positive news to the Kremlin.


7 March 2023 - Institute for the Study of War

quote:

https://www.euronews.com/2023/03/07/ukraine-to-continue-fight-for-bakhmut-as-russian-troops-struggle-to-make-gains

Ukraine to continue fight for Bakhmut as Russian troops struggle to make gains
By Oleksandra Vakulina
Updated: 07/03/2023 - 18:00

However, the Institute for the Study of War said that Bakhmut is not intrinsically significant - operationally or strategically.





7 March 2023 - President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky

quote:

https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/07/europe/ukraine-volodymyr-zelensky-cnn-interview-bakhmut-intl/index.html

Exclusive: Zelensky warns of ‘open road’ through Ukraine’s east if Russia captures Bakhmut, as he resists calls to retreat
By Rob Picheta, CNN
Updated 5:19 PM EST, Tue March 7, 2023

Russian troops will have “open road” to capture key cities in eastern Ukraine if they seize control of Bakhmut, President Volodymyr Zelensky warned in an interview with CNN, as he defended his decision to keep Ukrainian forces in the besieged city.

“This is tactical for us,” Zelensky said, insisting that Kyiv’s military brass is united in prolonging its defense of the city after weeks of Russian attacks left it on the cusp of falling to Moscow’s troops.

“We understand that after Bakhmut they could go further. They could go to Kramatorsk, they could go to Sloviansk, it would be open road for the Russians after Bakhmut to other towns in Ukraine, in the Donetsk direction,” he told CNN’s Wolf Blitzer in an exclusive interview from Kyiv. “That’s why our guys are standing there.”

(USER WAS PUT ON PROBATION FOR THIS POST)

Small White Dragon
Nov 23, 2007

No relation.
I don't know if anyone listens to NPR's State of Ukraine, but I thought this latest episode was interesting (and also depressing outlook wise)

NPR State of Ukraine posted:

Ukrainian soldiers speak bluntly about the challenges they face
After a year of war, Russia and Ukraine have lost many of their best troops. The problem for Ukraine is that Russia's far larger population means it likely could access far more troops to send to the front. NPR's Frank Langfitt talks to two front-line Ukrainian soldiers about the future of the conflict.

Antigravitas
Dec 8, 2019

Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:

Irony Be My Shield posted:

Hersh's piece leans very heavily into pro-Russian narratives, including some that are obviously and demonstrably false (eg the idea that the only reason Germany currently isn't importing Russian gas is due to the sabotage - Russia cut the flow of gas off well before and has not restored it since even though there is a surviving pipeline). It's catnip for people who already support Russia but it's unlikely to convince many who weren't already on that team.

I'd just like to point out that the surviving pipe is part of NS2, which was dead before the invasion. Russia graciously offered to export gas if only Germany let NS2 open, but at the point of the explosions full divestment from Russia had already been decided and was under way. The attacks did gently caress all beyond demonstrating that infrastructure was vulnerable.

Tevery Best
Oct 11, 2013

Hewlo Furriend

Huggybear posted:

I wonder what the air war is like now. There seems to be so little coverage or awareness, just tidbits like the video and article of UAF Mi-8s fitted with rocket launchers, and a recent tweet about Bakhmut where it is indicated that Ukrainian soldiers are "regularly strafed" by Russian attack helicopters. It seems like aircraft have depleted on both sides, whereas helicopters are still in use probably because of their ability to fly NOE so well. That said, it suggests that Ukranian MANPADs may be in shorter supply...although I have not seen indications that Ukraine has been asking for these.

It's not that. The Russians (and Ukrainians to a lesser extent) are using helicopters by flying into the air, pulling the nose up and firing a bunch of dumb rockets over parabolic arcs into enemy positions from beyond MANPADS range. It's not the most efficient way, but it is the safest.

Kikas
Oct 30, 2012

Tevery Best posted:

It's not that. The Russians (and Ukrainians to a lesser extent) are using helicopters by flying into the air, pulling the nose up and firing a bunch of dumb rockets over parabolic arcs into enemy positions from beyond MANPADS range. It's not the most efficient way, but it is the safest.

So that is what, over 15-20km? That's basically an airborne Katyusha at this point, incredible.

On Bakhmut, there's an article (in Polish, paywalled so I reposted it here)with a bit more analysis of the meeting of Zelensky and the 2 generals, Załużny and Syryjski - out of these 2, Syryjski is the more interesting one: Currently he's the leader of the ground forces and, importantly, he has graduated from the Moscow Higher Military Command School - meaning he knows Russian style of warfare and the tactics used.

It's more of "let them fight and bleed themselves dry" but the reasoning is that Ukraine can hold on so long and inflict serious damage because of the military structure of Russia. There are 4 command centers fighting in this war, and they are all fighting on their own. The Eastern, Western, Central and Southern command are all separated and with their own leadership. The central one is the one fighting in Bakhmut, while the other ones are doing their own thing. And they won't help eachother out, since they all have their own piece of the land to worry about.
So by keeping one part of the russian forces occupied, they can actually inflict significant damage - it's not that Russians will just "throw more men", because they don't cooperate like that. Unfortunately, the central one is the one with Wagner so that's what we're seeing. And Bakhmut will fall eventually. But I don't think that Ukraininan leaders are huffing their own farts and counting on the Stalingrad 2.0 scenario, it's a cold calculation that fighting there is the best option. Even for the upoming counterattack after leaving the city.

Antigravitas
Dec 8, 2019

Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:
They aren't shooting beyond visual range, just pulling up the nose a bit. 4km or so, perhaps more with a more aggressive ballistic arc. The firing computer has a mode for this iirc, so they have CCIP available.

Warbadger
Jun 17, 2006

Antigravitas posted:

They aren't shooting beyond visual range, just pulling up the nose a bit. 4km or so, perhaps more with a more aggressive ballistic arc. The firing computer has a mode for this iirc, so they have CCIP available.

They're pulling the nose up pretty substantially in many of the recorded incidents and would have no line of sight to the target. The rockets in question are designed for direct fire at high velocity and become unstable/inaccurate when fired in a ballistic arc over longer distances where they end up very low velocity (same reason the FFARs off the back of a technical are ineffective). The CCIP bit is also very questionable - I haven't seen a reliable source on that claim.

It's an incredibly inaccurate way to fire rockets, which is why it's not really impacting anything. But the helicopters don't need to climb off the deck or approach close enough to hostile lines to get shot down. Which is why you only started seeing this after a large chunk of the Russian attack helicopter fleet was already burning in Ukrainian fields after attempts to use them the way they're designed to be used.

Warbadger fucked around with this message at 13:35 on Mar 8, 2023

Antigravitas
Dec 8, 2019

Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:
I was under the impression that they were shooting basically from the edge of the envelope of the rockets, not like some artillery system. If they are doing beyond visual range, that's… kind of a waste of ammunition.

They are inaccurate as gently caress at that range, that much is certain. I can't find where I read it, but I am reasonably certain that shooting with a ballistic trajectory was a manoeuvre supported by the firing computer.

Of course I may be conflating the two. I haven't been watching too many videos of helicopters firing their rockets, but the ones I've seen weren't pitched up too high.

Kikas
Oct 30, 2012

Antigravitas posted:

I was under the impression that they were shooting basically from the edge of the envelope of the rockets, not like some artillery system. If they are doing beyond visual range, that's… kind of a waste of ammunition.

They are inaccurate as gently caress at that range, that much is certain. I can't find where I read it, but I am reasonably certain that shooting with a ballistic trajectory was a manoeuvre supported by the firing computer.

Of course I may be conflating the two. I haven't been watching too many videos of helicopters firing their rockets, but the ones I've seen weren't pitched up too high.

I know it is supported like that on some bombers and dumb munitions, haven't seen anything on helicopters and rockets.

Antigravitas
Dec 8, 2019

Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:
If they are shooting beyond the horizon I retract everything I've said on this, because… the gently caress?

mlmp08
Jul 11, 2004

Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration
Nap Ghost

Antigravitas posted:

I was under the impression that they were shooting basically from the edge of the envelope of the rockets, not like some artillery system. If they are doing beyond visual range, that's… kind of a waste of ammunition.

They are inaccurate as gently caress at that range, that much is certain. I can't find where I read it, but I am reasonably certain that shooting with a ballistic trajectory was a manoeuvre supported by the firing computer.

Of course I may be conflating the two. I haven't been watching too many videos of helicopters firing their rockets, but the ones I've seen weren't pitched up too high.

There is FLIR footage of such rocket attacks (I haven't linked it because while the video itself doesn't show anyone at all being hurt, I can't find a YouTube link anymore, and the site where I can find it is pretty loving sketch with NMS poo poo advertised).

In some cases, the troops on the receiving end have stated that while there's rather little chance of being killed by such rocket attacks, it keeps people up, causes reporting, etc, so is just a way to generally harass and exhaust troops at night.

In the HUD footage, for a lot of these, you can see that they're not getting the aimpoint/predicted impact point. They're doing the vague artillery math of going to a point, pulling back to X degrees, and firing, which will at least get you plus or minus a km or so of target, maybe better. In contrast, there's early war footage of attack helos actually using their rockets and guns pippers and putting accurate direct fire onto enemy forces.

Antigravitas
Dec 8, 2019

Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:
I guess I'm misremembering then. And I am very disturbed.

Icon Of Sin
Dec 26, 2008



mlmp08 posted:

In some cases, the troops on the receiving end have stated that while there's rather little chance of being killed by such rocket attacks, it keeps people up, causes reporting, etc, so is just a way to generally harass and exhaust troops at night.

Weird to see an actual army employ the afghan insurgent method of rocket attacks.

Antigravitas
Dec 8, 2019

Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:
On the cluster bomb topic: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-seeks-us-cluster-bombs-adapt-drone-use-lawmakers-2023-03-06/

quote:

Ukraine has broadened a request for controversial cluster bombs from the United States to include a weapon that it wants to cannibalize to drop the anti-armor bomblets it contains on Russian forces from drones, according to two U.S. lawmakers.

That's quite a twist.

OddObserver
Apr 3, 2009
Are those more powerful than grenades in some way? Or are they beginning to run out of grenades...?

SaTaMaS
Apr 18, 2003

OddObserver posted:

Are those more powerful than grenades in some way? Or are they beginning to run out of grenades...?

quote:

The Ukrainian military believes these submunitions "have better armor-piercing capability" than the weapons it has been dropping from drones, said Smith, the top Democrat on the Armed Services Committee.

Antigravitas
Dec 8, 2019

Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CBU-100_Cluster_Bomb

It's an AT cluster bomb and the bomblets are designed for AT.

It's an interesting twist because for obvious reasons, everyone is a bit iffy about delivering cluster bombs.

Charlotte Hornets
Dec 30, 2011

by Fritz the Horse


Looks like a miniature HEAT round

Icon Of Sin
Dec 26, 2008



Charlotte Hornets posted:



Looks like a miniature HEAT round

Pretty sure anything AT is going to look similar-ish. Until there’s a breakthrough, that is :dadjoke:

Fragrag
Aug 3, 2007
The Worst Admin Ever bashes You in the head with his banhammer. It is smashed into the body, an unrecognizable mass! You have been struck down.
It obviously has better AP capabilities with that shaped charge than a mortar round or frag grenade.

I wonder if they'll be able to ship just the bomblets and which poor grunt is going to have to open up all of those cluster bombs and take all of the bomblets out.

Edgar Allen Ho
Apr 3, 2017

by sebmojo
These things are banned by most countries because they tend to not detonate and kill random civilians after the threat is gone, yes including "anti-armour" rockeyes. I'd really rather not saturate any occupied ukrainian cities with them or proliferate them tbqh

Nenonen
Oct 22, 2009

Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

Charlotte Hornets posted:



Looks like a miniature HEAT round

The forbidden lawn dart (or NLAW dart, if you will)

OctaMurk
Jun 21, 2013

Edgar Allen Ho posted:

These things are banned by most countries because they tend to not detonate and kill random civilians after the threat is gone, yes including "anti-armour" rockeyes. I'd really rather not saturate any occupied ukrainian cities with them or proliferate them tbqh

this is true of all the other drone dropped munitions, many of which are also repurposed cluster bomblets

Dwesa
Jul 19, 2016

Edgar Allen Ho posted:

These things are banned by most countries because they tend to not detonate and kill random civilians after the threat is gone, yes including "anti-armour" rockeyes. I'd really rather not saturate any occupied ukrainian cities with them or proliferate them tbqh
I guess the chances might be lower if you drop those individually and not in hundreds.

Anyway, article mentions that White House is not inclined to send them to Ukraine.

mobby_6kl
Aug 9, 2009

by Fluffdaddy

Edgar Allen Ho posted:

These things are banned by most countries because they tend to not detonate and kill random civilians after the threat is gone, yes including "anti-armour" rockeyes. I'd really rather not saturate any occupied ukrainian cities with them or proliferate them tbqh
I'd rather not saturate occupied cities with russian tanks.

The main issue is that these are typically dropped randomly from a bomb over a large area, instead of directly on top of a target from a drone.

saratoga
Mar 5, 2001
This is a Randbrick post. It goes in that D&D megathread on page 294

"i think obama was mediocre in that debate, but hillary was fucking terrible. also russert is filth."

-randbrick, 12/26/08

Edgar Allen Ho posted:

These things are banned by most countries because they tend to not detonate and kill random civilians after the threat is gone, yes including "anti-armour" rockeyes. I'd really rather not saturate any occupied ukrainian cities with them or proliferate them tbqh

Trench lines are so full of artillery shells and rockets fired by the tens of thousands that they're going to take decades to clean up. Drones dropping individual explosives one at a time hardly make any difference, and may actually be less damaging because they fall from a short distance and won't penetrate into the ground.

Nenonen
Oct 22, 2009

Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa
The drone bombs that hit their target and work are actually worse, you can get lots of scattered UXO when a T-72 or BMP blows up. :ohdear:

Kavros
May 18, 2011

sleep sleep sleep
fly fly post post
sleep sleep sleep

Icon Of Sin posted:

Pretty sure anything AT is going to look similar-ish. Until there’s a breakthrough, that is :dadjoke:

This joke? it goes deep

saratoga posted:

Trench lines are so full of artillery shells and rockets fired by the tens of thousands that they're going to take decades to clean up. Drones dropping individual explosives one at a time hardly make any difference, and may actually be less damaging because they fall from a short distance and won't penetrate into the ground.

I am starting to think back to the history of areas in modern day france which are still unoccupied due to catastrophic war damage/refuse and thinking about how much of ukraine will be similarly uninhabitable for lifetimes

cinci zoo sniper
Mar 15, 2013




Edgar Allen Ho posted:

These things are banned by most countries because they tend to not detonate and kill random civilians after the threat is gone, yes including "anti-armour" rockeyes. I'd really rather not saturate any occupied ukrainian cities with them or proliferate them tbqh

I think UXOs is a solid concern, but I'm not sure if this would be a meaningful threat profile change given the intensity and scrappiness of warfare going on. Specifically, I say that since the ask seems to be to get the cluster submunitions, to be dropped 1 piece at a time via drones. Rather than to get the cluster bombs themselves and then spray wheat fields with piles of grenades.

cr0y
Mar 24, 2005



Antigravitas posted:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CBU-100_Cluster_Bomb

It's an AT cluster bomb and the bomblets are designed for AT.

It's an interesting twist because for obvious reasons, everyone is a bit iffy about delivering cluster bombs.

Then in a sane world the United States can do one of a couple things

1) neuter them so they can't be used as a deployable munition in the form of a clusterbomb

2) dismantle them themselves and handover The individual bomblets

3) give Ukraine something similar that isn't part of a cluster munition that might actually work out better because it is purpose-built for this sort of thing (I don't think the United States has anything that is built to be dropped from a DJI though)

Hannibal Rex
Feb 13, 2010
This is a detailed three-part series of articles on how the Nord Stream sabotage went down from the Danish perspective. The focus is on how ill-prepared Denmark's crisis management was. You'll have to translate it, but it's an interesting read.

https://www.zetland.dk/historie/sO0VrdNb-mo46mbZz-281a8
https://www.zetland.dk/historie/sO9aZd56-mo46mbZz-4933a
https://www.zetland.dk/historie/s8D3lK6d-mo46mbZz-f5c1c

quote:

On Monday morning – around eight hours after the explosion – a team of seismologists met in inner Copenhagen. It was a regular routine that they met every morning and looked at the graphs from the past 24 hours to see if anything startling had happened in the Danish underground. If the seismologists from the National Geological Surveys for Denmark and Greenland - usually known as GEUS - discovered data from the graph on Bornholm, they would have crucial knowledge about the explosion and the location of the leak, which the Norwegian Defense Forces currently lacked. But the researchers only looked at data up to 2 a.m. Monday. As mentioned, the explosion happened at 2.03 Danish time. In other words: If the explosion had happened just four minutes earlier, it would have appeared in the material the seismologists had in front of them. But the seismologists were evidently right this morning “ unfortunate”, as one employee later remarked. GEUS found nothing interesting in their graphs, and there was therefore naturally nothing to alert other authorities about.

quote:

The three-masted Norwegian school ship Christian Radich with large white sails was on his way from Oslo to Gotland and was heading directly for the new leaks. The mate now got a call over the radio. A ship in the distance reported that something out in the dark sea was standing upright. It was quite mysterious. The sea was bubbling or something reminiscent of it. Just over 20 minutes had passed since the latest explosions, and neither the Ministry of Defence, the Prime Minister's Office nor the training ship out on the Baltic Sea knew yet that another attack had taken place. Fridtjof Jungeling was sitting in his cabin this Monday evening, and the experienced 50-year-old captain actually had time off after setting the ship on the right course with the 28 maladjusted youngsters that the school system had abandoned. Now they were going on a four-week trip to teach the young men how to become real sailors. He was looking forward to the sailing trip.

It was then that the mate called his captain to the bridge. He had something Fridtjof Jungeling needed to see. They looked at the radar, which showed two strange spots that the ship was heading directly for. It was a type they had never seen before. They moved in a way that radar images usually don't. Something was completely wrong. The coxswain grabbed the helm and changed course drastically 45 degrees to port so that the school ship moved away from the pulsing spots. A strange smell now blew from the sea. Like rotten eggs or a camping kitchen with a gas burner.

quote:

Anders Puck Nielsen is a military analyst at the Center for Maritime Operations at the Norwegian Defense Academy. He says that the Nord Stream explosions have exposed a truth that many in the Armed Forces have thought about for a long time: that we are almost blind when it comes to the Baltic Sea.

" We have excellent surveillance in the Great Belt, but on the other hand there is almost free space in the Baltic Sea. So are we missing something? Yes, you can say that: the Danish defense is designed for peacetime here at home. It is one we send out into the world, but it is not built to defend our own territory,” he says.

Because even if it will be impossible to keep an eye on all the cables and submarine gas pipes in the Baltic Sea, there are possibilities: Submarines and corvettes that can patrol and sonar equipment that can monitor would make it significantly more difficult to carry out attacks.

In 2005, the Swedish Defense Forces' anti-submarine defense was closed down, so today we have no submarines. Once the Danish fleet consisted of 30 warships, today we have 15, and many of them can't really help if the waves get higher than a meter. For the investigation of the sabotage against the Nord Stream, the Danish defense had to hire a private company to investigate what had happened on the seabed.

quote:

Let's leave the crime scene and instead move to what we might call the forensics section of the article. Because how on earth do you manage to blow up a tonne-heavy gas pipe made of concrete and steel? Peter Hald, a chemist specializing in explosives at Aarhus University and a former officer at the Norwegian Army's Engineer Regiment, can enlighten us on that.

To him, there are three ways to accomplish such a mission. The first was actually already foreseen in 2007, when the Swedish Total Defense Research Institute wrote in a report that “ one diver will be enough to place a bomb”. It therefore only requires a boat, a diver, a small team of helpers and a decent amount of explosives. And that means the attack could have been made by a fairly small group.

The second scenario is that a ship from the surface could place the bomb using an underwater drone. This is actually how we ourselves like best to blow things up – such as old mines – on the seabed in Denmark, explains Peter Hald. Here, a boat can in principle send out a remote-controlled bomb several months or years in advance.

The third option requires that you have a submarine at your disposal. According to Peter Hald, it could very likely be used to place the bombs near the gas pipes via a torpedo tube. The submarine, he explains, is quite obvious, then " it has just been designed not to be seen" and can get very close to the gas pipelines. Denmark does not monitor the movements of submarines in the Baltic Sea.

quote:

While it seems contradictory that Russia would blow up its own gas pipeline, what about ... the country that Russia is trying to invade? Ukraine is far from the Baltic Sea, but one of the theories is that it was Ukrainian special forces who blew up the pipes. So that's theory number two: the Ukrainians did it.

Let me just be quite clear: It's not a theory you find many people talk about a lot. But it's out there. And the most important clue is a warning from the CIA, which was allegedly sent to European authorities in the summer of 2022. It has not been possible to get this information independently confirmed -  the CIA actually answers the phone when you call, but they do not say much. But the usually well-informed German TV program Tagesschau on ARD has described that the warning from the CIA to, among other things, German authorities was that Ukrainians were allegedly planning to gain access to a boat in Sweden from which they could attack the Nord Stream pipes. However, it is important to add that the CIA itself – according to the TV station – assessed the credibility of this information to be " low". And at the same time one must ask: If Ukraine was behind the attack, why did the explosions happen so close to Denmark? Why not somewhere closer to Russia?

On the day of the Nord Stream attack, something quite remarkable happened. Because after the first explosion close to Bornholm's coast, but still before anyone had found the crime scene, the Ukrainian intelligence service issued a rather wild message on Facebook . Here they wrote that, according to their information, Russia was planning a cyber attack against Ukraine and " critical infrastructure of Ukraine's allies". They added that the attacks would probably take place in the energy sector and that there could also be physical attacks. It was 10:55 a.m. By this time, it had been nine hours since the first pipe had exploded, and the next explosion occurred eight hours later. The warning therefore came almost exactly midway between the two explosions at a time when no media has described the gas leak. How did the Ukrainians know about this suspicion? And does that make the arrow point further towards them or Russia?

Moon Slayer
Jun 19, 2007

Foreign Affairs has an interesting article about Russia's half measures despite talking tough.

quote:

Russia’s Halfway to Hell Strategy
Why Putin Has Not Yet Launched a Total War in Ukraine

By Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan

March 6, 2023

On September 21, 2022, when Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his large-scale mobilization of fighting-age men, it was seen as a dramatic move toward total war. No longer could the Kremlin downplay the war in Ukraine as a mere “special operation” in which ordinary Russians had little involvement. Fearful of what was to come, hundreds of thousands of young men fled the country as rumors circulated that the security services were going to close the borders to prevent more people from leaving—and take drastic measures to pressure those who had left to return and fight. Many also assumed that Putin’s order would be followed by a second, even broader draft, and that all of Russian society would soon be put on a continual war footing.

Yet few of these rumors proved true. For the remainder of 2022, and even through the first anniversary of the war in late February, Russia’s borders remained open, and a second mobilization never happened. Instead, the country was left in a state of “partial mobilization,” as Putin had called it. Indeed, despite huge numbers of Russian casualties in Ukraine, not every family has been affected, and for many middle-class Russians, life has continued much as it did before.

The surprising reality of the September mobilization has highlighted a larger feature of Putin’s war in Ukraine. Often, the Kremlin has initially appeared to take a maximalist course. Instead of invading eastern Ukraine, it launched a full-scale assault on the whole country and tried to take Kyiv. In addition to deploying tanks, missiles, and heavy artillery, Putin has repeatedly made threats about using nuclear weapons. And he has seemingly been willing to sacrifice tens of thousands of men to fuel his war. At home, meanwhile, the government has announced extreme measures to clamp down on the Russian media and popular dissent as well as to put the Russian economy on a war footing.

Yet many of these moves have been considerably less severe in practice than they seem on paper. In Ukraine, despite increasing attacks on civilian areas, Russia has held back from using its full arsenal. And although Putin has done much to tighten his grip on Russian society in the year since the invasion, many of his most far-reaching domestic measures have been incompletely implemented. Again and again, the Kremlin has stopped short of total militarization and total mobilization—whether of the economy or of society at large.

By many indications, this partial approach to total war is not haphazard, nor is it simply the result of failed execution. Instead, Russia appears to be pursuing a deliberate strategy aimed at both the West and its own population. By staking out a maximalist stance on the war, the Kremlin can suggest to the West that it is prepared to do whatever it takes to win in Ukraine, without necessarily having to make good on its threats. At home, meanwhile, the Russian government can convey to ordinary Russians that it has the option of tightening the screws further, but that it is not going out of its way to alienate the population. In both cases, the strategy offers Putin an open path toward further escalation, but without the immediate costs.

SELECTIVE CENSORSHIP, NARROW NATIONALIZATION

Since the opening weeks of the invasion in February 2022, the Kremlin’s calibrated actions have often defied its total-war rhetoric. Consider how the government has sought to manage Russian society. Almost immediately, the military offensive was followed by a frontal attack on Russia’s independent media and civil society. In March, the popular liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy and the independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta were shut down; journalists were forced into exile; and draconian new censorship laws were introduced. Most important, the government took aim at social media, apparently seeking to silence any circulation of independent information about the war.

Yet the measures were oddly incomplete. The Russian authorities swiftly outlawed and blocked Facebook, as well as some other platforms, including Instagram. For years, Facebook had been known for being one of the only online spaces where liberal Russians could talk freely about politics; unsurprisingly, the government designated Facebook as a company that conducted “extremist activities.” Many social media users took this step to mean that even logging in to Facebook might lead to criminal prosecution, and thousands of people deleted the Facebook app from their smartphones in case they were stopped by police and their phones searched. But enforcement never followed. Even more striking was the selective nature of the social media crackdown. The government has not censored YouTube or Telegram, the messaging app, which are two of the most popular platforms in Russia. Instead, they have been allowed to flourish, and become even more important, as the war has progressed.

A similar pattern has unfolded with Putin’s economic policies. In the spring of 2022, the Kremlin seemed prepared to take far-reaching steps to expand government control of the economy. Draft legislation on a nationalization program was promptly prepared and sent to the Duma, and foreign companies worried that their assets and operations would be seized. To many observers, there was also a logic for such moves: foreign companies were rapidly leaving the country, raising the specter of massive layoffs and possible social unrest—a scenario the Kremlin was anxious to avoid. It was for much the same reasons that the Bolsheviks had initially nationalized factories and banks after the Russian Revolution in 1917. 

Yet the 2022 draft legislation was never signed into law, and foreign companies were mostly left to make their own arrangements about their Russian assets. In October, the government did order industries that were crucial for the war effort to come under direct state control via a new special coordinating council on military supplies. But fears of a completely militarized economy have proved to be overblown.

PRESIDENT PUTIN, NOT GENERAL STALIN

To the extent that Russia is seeking to fight a total war, as many Western commentators have suggested, Putin’s handling of the mobilization question has been especially striking. Not only has the Kremlin avoided a second wave of mobilization, despite significant manpower demands, but it has also made extensive use of mercenaries from the Wagner paramilitary organization, some of whom have been recruited from Russian prisons. In this way, rather than pursue a full-scale mobilization, the Russian government has for the time being opted to use other resources while keeping the mobilization only partial. The tactic appears to be serving its purpose: in recent weeks, Wagner has been the only unit that was on the offensive, and although it has suffered heavy casualties, its losses are not of concern to the military.

At the same time, Putin has shown relative restraint toward officials or agencies within the government that are implicated in some of the war’s failures or that seem to disagree with his own policies. Historically, when authoritarian regimes go to war, they almost always use repression to make the country more unified, usually by ruthlessly attacking perceived internal enemies. Typically, such crackdowns are aimed at those who dissent from the leader’s views, as well as elites, to make sure they do not waiver from the official line. Such repression can sometimes be systematic, as for example in Russia itself under Stalin and other leaders. Indeed, Putin seemed to be firmly on this path even before the invasion, sending high-level officials and governors, as well as officers of Russia’s FSB security service, to jail by the dozens.

Yet when the invasion started, and quickly went badly, Putin limited his anger toward the siloviki, the security elite. The FSB’s Fifth Service, the arm of the agency in charge of keeping an eye on Russia’s immediate neighbors, was the first to receive the president’s wrath. It was the Fifth Service that had briefed Putin about the political situation in Ukraine and suggested, incorrectly, that the government in Kyiv would quickly collapse. In March 2022, the head of the service, Sergei Beseda, was secretly placed under house arrest and was soon shuffled off to the Lefortovo Prison—the notorious prison where leading political prisoners and spies have long been sent.

For all the talk, Putin has yet to adopt a Stalinist playbook.

Next, it was the National Guard’s turn: in the same month, the deputy head of the National Guard, Roman Gavrilov, was forced into early retirement: he had been in charge of supplying the National Guard’s special forces, which had been sent to war woefully underequipped. Some units had been given anti-riot gear instead of armor and ammunition, as if they had expected to meet protesters, not Ukrainian troops, on the streets of Kyiv. There were rumors that Gavrilov had been arrested and that various army generals would soon be fired or imprisoned as retribution for the army’s poor performance on the battlefield.

But then, within a few weeks, the repressions suddenly stopped. Some were even undone: Sergei Beseda was released and returned to his office in Lubyanka and then deliberately displayed at several public events. What is more, in February 2023, his son, Alexander Beseda, was given a remarkable promotion to become the head of the government department that oversees all the security agencies.

With Russia facing increasing pressure from the West and humiliation on the battlefield, hard-line parliamentarians, propagandists, and members of the secret services have been evoking Stalinism as an example of a way to run the country properly during wartime. And some observers, noting the extreme measures that have been mooted, have suggested that Putin is already following a Stalinist playbook. But such an approach would require much more dramatic steps than Putin has actually taken. During World War II, the entire Soviet government was militarized; even Stalin and his ministers wore uniforms and assumed the rank of general. The economy and the society at large were completely mobilized and turned into what became known as a “home front,” with parts of the population and entire factories moved to other regions under orders of the Stalin government. For all the talk, the Russian government never adopted a full-scale Stalinist approach to managing the war at home.

Finally there is the issue of nuclear weapons. Since at least the summer of 2022, Putin has put on the table the option of using a tactical nuclear weapon to change the situation in Russia’s favor. (In September, he announced that Russia was prepared to use “all available means” in its war and that “this was not a bluff.”) Even setting aside the Kremlin’s rhetoric, hard-liners close to the regime have suggested that the Russian military and Putin considered using a tactical nuclear weapon—for instance, against the defenders of Mariupol in the spring of 2022. Despite major Russian setbacks, however, Putin did not choose that path. Instead, he has doubled down on a conventional war, which he has amplified via mobilization and massive airstrikes on Ukrainian infrastructure.

SPACE TO ESCALATE

Throughout the past year, then—arguably the most difficult year for Putin in more than two decades in power—the Russian president time and again escalated on many fronts, at home and on the battlefield. And yet he has never quite followed through in bringing Russia into a total war. Why?

Since the early stages of the war, the total-war concept has clearly been in Putin’s thoughts. In April 2022, Putin told the Duma that “all parliamentary parties, despite their competition with each other, invariably come out with a unified position when it comes to basic national interests, to solving issues of defense and security of our Fatherland,” making clear that no debate about the war was to be tolerated. Then, in July, Putin told the leaders of Russia’s political parties that it was the collective West that had started the war in Ukraine, indicating that the war in Ukraine is part of the centuries’ long existential battle between Russia and the West. And he made his New Year address flanked by soldiers.

Yet judging by Russia’s actions, it has in practice sought to do something different from wage total war. Throughout 2022, the Kremlin made a point of showing that more drastic options were available to it: it could always do more. But it also showed that, for the time being, it was content to go only so far. The point here was that by laying out these extreme options—nationalizing industry, mobilizing the economy, pursuing systematic repression, or even using tactical nuclear attacks—the Kremlin has staked out space to escalate. It has already announced, in effect, what more it could do, whether on the battlefield or in conducting repressions at home.

For Putin, this approach serves multiple purposes. The primary target may be Western governments, which are deeply concerned about the possibility of uncontrollable escalation. The Kremlin is adamant about showing them that it has many options but has thus far kept things under control—unlike Kyiv, which in its desperation is, according to Russia, prone to escalation. At home, Moscow’s approach also serves another purpose: to demonstrate that it is capable of calibrating its response to Western sanctions and military failures, and that it does not need to go all the way until it truly must.

WORSE TO COME

Putin’s halfway strategy has scored some notable successes. Throughout 2022, for example, the Russian economy was not hobbled by excessive militarization or government control. To the contrary, Russia’s economic contraction was smaller than most Western analysts predicted. Moreover, the strategy also helped Putin maintain a fine balance between tightening the rules and not alienating Russia’s economically active urban middle class. For their part, many ordinary Russians have been glad to ignore the war as much as possible, and the Kremlin’s strategy has skillfully played on these feelings: it has allowed many Russians to pretend that they will not be affected by the war.

Indeed, the strategy has also been aimed at those who fled into exile. Many Russian men who went abroad to avoid being mobilized have since been signaled that they will not be punished at home if they return. On February 1, for example, Russia’s Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov reported to Putin that 9,000 “illegally mobilized citizens”—people who are supposed to be exempt from mobilization because they perform critical jobs in IT or in the banking and financial system—had already been returned home. The Russian authorities are also seeking ways to lure the country’s exiled IT specialists—which it needs to sustain the war effort—back to Russia. The government has promised workers in this category exemption from the draft and a free plane ticket home. Putin knows his people well: some Russians, desperate to believe there is a way back to prewar reality, are returning to Russia thanks to this strategy.

In some crucial areas, Putin’s incremental approach has backfired. For example, in the months since the war started, many independent journalists, investigators, and bloggers who had originally fled the country have launched their own YouTube channels, taking advantage of the lack of censorship. Now, dozens of political shows, interviews, and uncensored videos offer Russians the opportunity to get the truth about the war every day. Throughout the past year, many people have developed a habit of getting their news from YouTube, and that includes older Russians as well as young people. Indeed, it was through YouTube and Telegram that many Russians learned of the massacre of Ukrainian civilians in Bucha and the humiliation of Russian troops in Kherson.

At the same time, millions of Instagram users have learned to used virtual private network (VPN) services to access the platform. As a result, although many of them were not previously interested in political content, they now have access to alternative news sources about the war from the non-Russian Internet. Thus, by the time of the war’s first anniversary in late February, much of Russia’s urban population was able to circumvent Russia’s Internet censorship. (So far, however, it has not made a big impact on public opinion because many still chose to believe the government’s own propaganda.)

Nevertheless, in the first year of war, Putin’s partial escalation strategy has generally served him well. It has allowed him to maintain political stability through a combination of intimidation and indifference. Internationally and domestically, it has helped him prepare Russia for a very long war without making the kinds of sacrifices that might ultimately cause the population to rebel. And above all, it has given him flexibility. The more radical options—including economic nationalization and full mobilization—are still open, and the country’s bureaucracy is already prepared to set them in motion.  

The question is, how long can this not-quite-total war be sustained? The longer the war goes on, the more Putin will have to take some of the more drastic steps he has threatened. And at some point, he will run out of room to play with.

cinci zoo sniper
Mar 15, 2013




According to the Times, western intelligence agencies have known for months that the pipeline attack was a private Ukrainian venture with no affiliations with Zelenskyy's administration.
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/west-nato-nord-stream-attacks-protect-ukraine-qsrqxvssw

cinci zoo sniper
Mar 15, 2013




Also, I'll need to ask people to stop posting 2814 word walls of text written by someone else to this thread. I'm still working on finalizing some rules changes for the thread, but posts like

Moon Slayer posted:

Foreign Affairs has an interesting article about Russia's half measures despite talking tough.
are getting ridiculous.

Deteriorata
Feb 6, 2005

cinci zoo sniper posted:

Also, I'll need to ask people to stop posting 2814 word walls of text written by someone else to this thread. I'm still working on finalizing some rules changes for the thread, but posts like

are getting ridiculous.

It's because most interesting articles are behind paywalls, and if just a link and description are posted inevitably there are half a dozen posts requesting someone to quote and post the whole thing.

I've just gotten in the habit of posting full articles to avoid the thread clutter. People can scroll past them if they're not interested.

Moon Slayer
Jun 19, 2007

Deteriorata posted:

It's because most interesting articles are behind paywalls, and if just a link and description are posted inevitably there are half a dozen posts requesting someone to quote and post the whole thing.

I've just gotten in the habit of posting full articles to avoid the thread clutter. People can scroll past them if they're not interested.

Same, I do it specifically because I usually can't be bothered to click through when others link articles. Obviously if it becomes a thread rule I'll stop.

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Roller Coast Guard
Aug 27, 2006

With this magnificent aircraft,
and my magnificent facial hair,
the British Empire will never fall!


Kavros posted:


I am starting to think back to the history of areas in modern day france which are still unoccupied due to catastrophic war damage/refuse and thinking about how much of ukraine will be similarly uninhabitable for lifetimes

The no-go zones in France are more due to the risk of disturbing poison gas munitions than the threat from explosives.

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