Ukraine: The Aristoblyats

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Serjeant Buzfuz: Dec 5, 2009

Well that makes sense, I'd just solve the problem by only throwing the good grenades, not the duds.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 13:58

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# ? Jun 5, 2024 06:14

hypnophant: Oct 19, 2012

A.o.D. posted:

It was based on percentage of throws that made it into the target area. When I went through the course to get expert 100% of your throws had to land in the target area on the first try.

I (army) did what mlmp described - throw from foxhole, throw into mortar pit, throw from prone, cook off two seconds and throw into bunker, etc. Importantly, we used training dummy grenade bodies instead of live grenades for that range. It�s a separate day from live grenades and unlike the live grenades, you don�t actually have to pass it to pass basic.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 14:02

kill me now: Sep 14, 2003; Why's Hank crying?

'CUZ HE JUST GOT DUNKED ON!

Vincent Van Goatse posted:

Be glad the WW2 Army's attempt to develop a grenade that could be thrown like a baseball didn't work out, I guess.

I think my biggest takeaway from this wiki is, there is a secondary collectors market for live 60 year old grenades?!? :wtc:

# ? Apr 4, 2023 14:31

OctaMurk: Jun 21, 2013

kill me now posted:

I think my biggest takeaway from this wiki is, there is a secondary collectors market for live 60 year old grenades?!?

The grenades only blow up in value with age

# ? Apr 4, 2023 14:38

Cimber: Feb 3, 2014

I'm seeing reports that Russians/Wagner are making gains in Bakhmut, taking the central admin building in the past 24-36 hours. How significant is that in reality? Is it a _big_ deal or do the Ukrainian military actually care? It seems to me that the Russians are taking huge losses for gains of minimal value and the UA is bleeding them to death and forcing them to waste lots of resources that might otherwise be better used when the spring offensive starts?

# ? Apr 4, 2023 14:40

CommieGIR: Aug 22, 2006; The blue glow is a feature, not a bug; Pillbug

Cimber posted:

I'm seeing reports that Russians/Wagner are making gains in Bakhmut, taking the central admin building in the past 24-36 hours. How significant is that in reality? Is it a _big_ deal or do the Ukrainian military actually care? It seems to me that the Russians are taking huge losses for gains of minimal value and the UA is bleeding them to death and forcing them to waste lots of resources that might otherwise be better used when the spring offensive starts?

Lmao - "gains" is a strong word. They've been fighting over Bakhmut for months without any major changes in control.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 14:50

Tuna-Fish: Sep 13, 2017

I do think it's fair to say that they have now made some gains, and that the Ukrainian defense lines seem to have retreated from near the river to the vicinity of the railroad.

As to it being significant... That's about the distance of a mile. In months of fighting. And there are new defensive lines behind the current ones. So no.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 15:57

Vengarr: Jun 17, 2010; Smashed before noon

Think of Bahkmut like Verdun. The significance comes from whatever attritional losses have been inflicted, not on how much territory is won or lost. And we can only guesstimate as to how the war of numbers is going.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 16:02

Anonymous Zebra: Oct 21, 2005; Blending in like it ain't no thang

There was a pretty grisly series of videos on /r combatfootage last night showing the aftermath of the Ukrainians dropping explosives off drones into a series of Russian trenches. The final shot was just a drone flying over this long trench that was absolutely filled with dead Russian soldiers. It really does lend credence to the numbers the Ukrainians claim Russia is losing in this push.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 16:12

Godholio: Aug 28, 2002; Does a bear split in the woods near Zheleznogorsk?

Vengarr posted:

Think of Bahkmut like Verdun. The significance comes from whatever attritional losses have been inflicted, not on how much territory is won or lost. And we can only guesstimate as to how the war of numbers is going.

That Ukraine is continuing to attrit the Russians in Bahkmut tells me the Russians are faring far worse than their opponents. Everything I've seen says that UA is smart enough they'd have withdrawn if they weren't making every casualty count.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 17:07

CommieGIR: Aug 22, 2006; The blue glow is a feature, not a bug; Pillbug

Tuna-Fish posted:

I do think it's fair to say that they have now made some gains, and that the Ukrainian defense lines seem to have retreated from near the river to the vicinity of the railroad.

As to it being significant... That's about the distance of a mile. In months of fighting. And there are new defensive lines behind the current ones. So no.

The sheer amount of bodies Russia has thrown into this makes it far from a gain, even if they captured land.

The cost is not aligned with the advances they've made.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 17:22

glynnenstein: Feb 18, 2014

Godholio posted:

That Ukraine is continuing to attrit the Russians in Bahkmut tells me the Russians are faring far worse than their opponents. Everything I've seen says that UA is smart enough they'd have withdrawn if they weren't making every casualty count.

In the latest War on the Rocks podcast yesterday Kofman said he doesn't think the attrition has been especially favorable for Ukraine in Bakhmut for the last several months. Apparently the first couple months in Bakhmut were a good ratio for UA but it got pretty bad after that. Ukraine changed strategies after the huge success at Kherson from a defense in depth to a more static hold-every-inch approach and there's supposedly a lot of debate about if this was a good call or not. Post-mobilization the manpower advantage is in Russia's hands so it's been harder to make the trade count as much as it did early on.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 17:29

DTurtle: Apr 10, 2011

Cimber posted:

I'm seeing reports that Russians/Wagner are making gains in Bakhmut, taking the central admin building in the past 24-36 hours. How significant is that in reality? Is it a _big_ deal or do the Ukrainian military actually care? It seems to me that the Russians are taking huge losses for gains of minimal value and the UA is bleeding them to death and forcing them to waste lots of resources that might otherwise be better used when the spring offensive starts?

All the gains/losses of ground in the last few months have been insignificant. We are talking about 0.1% of Ukraine. The only significance any of the fighting had is with regards to equipment and trained personnel.

https://twitter.com/War_Mapper/status/1641961313793441792

# ? Apr 4, 2023 17:31

bulletsponge13: Apr 28, 2010

CommieGIR posted:

The sheer amount of bodies Russia has thrown into this makes it far from a gain, even if they captured land.

The cost is not aligned with the advances they've made.

These are loss levels unseen in combat since at least Korea.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 17:38

MonkeyLibFront: Feb 26, 2003; Where's the cake?

bulletsponge13 posted:

Traditionally, you always use the most casualty producing weapon first, provided situation dictates. You don't use a pistol when you have a grenade, you don't use a rifle when you have an MG type thing. It's efficient, and it produces a psychological effect.

That's also assuming they kept the Coax- they are often removed and reutilized in better roles. It's common in smaller/poorer militaries.

I didn't realise they would take out the coax, hopefully they don't on CR2 as it's a chain gun and isn't redeployable.

Honestly get it for the most casualty producing weapon but with CR2 as that's my area I wouldn't be engaging that close with HESH, on such a pinpoint target for reason I won't go into it ain't worth it, better to reverse off and engage a few hundred meters back, now the coax with the CR2a increased depression ability could have absolutely raked the poo poo out of them and there are minimum las return drills for those engagements. I just hope they employ the CR2 well, I know they got great instruction while they were with us.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 18:01

Fearless: Sep 3, 2003; DRINK MORE MOXIE

bulletsponge13 posted:

These are loss levels unseen in combat since at least Korea.

Iran-Iraq War? It also had some pretty hellish large-scale infantry focused operations.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 18:05

Quackles: Aug 11, 2018; Pixels of Light.

OctaMurk posted:

The grenades only blow up in value with age

# ? Apr 4, 2023 18:11

pantslesswithwolves: Oct 28, 2008

https://twitter.com/USEmbassyPrague/status/1643166727948075011

Well played.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 18:11

bulletsponge13: Apr 28, 2010

Fearless posted:

Iran-Iraq War? It also had some pretty hellish large-scale infantry focused operations.

That's fair, and slipped my mind. My knowledge on that conflict is fairly limited. I think I was also applying a needless time frame comparison- this war is just over a year- my crap memory of Iraq-Iran was casualties seriously ramped up a few years in.

It just blows my mind seeing the numbers. I was under the false assumption that a near peer conflict wouldn't have casualties like this, because no country would be willing to go back to throwing 2k to gain 2 meters.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 18:12

Pine Cone Jones: Dec 6, 2009; You throw me the acorn, I throw you the whip!

The Battle of Khorramshahr comes to mind from the Iran Iraq war, but Bakhmut might have produced more casualties by now

# ? Apr 4, 2023 18:16

psydude: Apr 1, 2008

Anonymous Zebra posted:

There was a pretty grisly series of videos on /r combatfootage last night showing the aftermath of the Ukrainians dropping explosives off drones into a series of Russian trenches. The final shot was just a drone flying over this long trench that was absolutely filled with dead Russian soldiers. It really does lend credence to the numbers the Ukrainians claim Russia is losing in this push.

Even if you go with the UK MoD estimates, the numbers are staggering. 220k+ casualties would be about 145k wounded and 75k killed.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 19:14

Kaiser Schnitzel: Mar 29, 2006; Schnitzel mit uns

Cimber posted:

I'm seeing reports that Russians/Wagner are making gains in Bakhmut, taking the central admin building in the past 24-36 hours. How significant is that in reality? Is it a _big_ deal or do the Ukrainian military actually care? It seems to me that the Russians are taking huge losses for gains of minimal value and the UA is bleeding them to death and forcing them to waste lots of resources that might otherwise be better used when the spring offensive starts?

Strategically/militarily it�s not especially significant except to the extent that holding it may have caused Ukraine to expend resources (manpower, equipment, especially artillery ammunition) that might have better been saved for their upcoming offensive. On the other hand, Russia is also using up a lot of stuff/people there that it won�t have to defend against that offensive. Nobody is going to know if continuing to fight for the city or withdrawing would have been the smarter move for years to come.

That�s the military side, but military considerations aren�t the only important thing here. Bakhmut has become politically symbolic for both sides and taking/losing it would have significant morale and political implications. Losing Bakhmut would certainly be a blow to Ukrainian morale and likewise give Russian morale a boost. It could change how NATO or China view each side�s prospects for victory; it could make Zhelensky�s government less popular etc etc. Similarly, not giving Russia that victory leaves Russia with having accomplished basically nothing in their very costly winter offensive. That�s a big morale win, even if it�s not a decisive moment in the war militarily. The view from the Ukrainian side is also �any ground we give up is ground we will have to take back later� and generally holding ground is easier than retaking ground. Ukraine traded space for time earlier in the war, but that strategy seems to be shifting the other way towards �fight for every inch.�

Ukraine�s objectives in the battle are more complex than simple �inflicted the most favorable ratio of casualties on Russia�- if that were their only goal, they would probably be better off withdrawing to more favorable defensive ground behind Bakhmut.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 19:23

Tiny Timbs: Sep 6, 2008

Vincent Van Goatse posted:

Be glad the WW2 Army's attempt to develop a grenade that could be thrown like a baseball didn't work out, I guess.

Are there any that resemble a crumpled-up beer can?

# ? Apr 4, 2023 19:41

OctaMurk: Jun 21, 2013

bulletsponge13 posted:

These are loss levels unseen in combat since at least Korea.

the Iran Iraq war was pretty deadly too

Arab israeli wars were short but sharp and killed a lot of people in a short amount of time

And the military casualties in the tigray war are likely underestimated

OctaMurk fucked around with this message at 20:11 on Apr 4, 2023

# ? Apr 4, 2023 20:04

aphid_licker: Jan 7, 2009

Kaiser Schnitzel posted:

Strategically/militarily it�s not especially significant except to the extent that holding it may have caused Ukraine to expend resources (manpower, equipment, especially artillery ammunition) that might have better been saved for their upcoming offensive. On the other hand, Russia is also using up a lot of stuff/people there that it won�t have to defend against that offensive. Nobody is going to know if continuing to fight for the city or withdrawing would have been the smarter move for years to come.

That�s the military side, but military considerations aren�t the only important thing here. Bakhmut has become politically symbolic for both sides and taking/losing it would have significant morale and political implications. Losing Bakhmut would certainly be a blow to Ukrainian morale and likewise give Russian morale a boost. It could change how NATO or China view each side�s prospects for victory; it could make Zhelensky�s government less popular etc etc. Similarly, not giving Russia that victory leaves Russia with having accomplished basically nothing in their very costly winter offensive. That�s a big morale win, even if it�s not a decisive moment in the war militarily. The view from the Ukrainian side is also �any ground we give up is ground we will have to take back later� and generally holding ground is easier than retaking ground. Ukraine traded space for time earlier in the war, but that strategy seems to be shifting the other way towards �fight for every inch.�

Ukraine�s objectives in the battle are more complex than simple �inflicted the most favorable ratio of casualties on Russia�- if that were their only goal, they would probably be better off withdrawing to more favorable defensive ground behind Bakhmut.

Knowing that getting drafted meant being dead in Bakhmut mere weeks later also wasn't great for Ukrainian morale tho.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 21:18

A.o.D.: Jan 15, 2006

hypnophant posted:

I (army) did what mlmp described - throw from foxhole, throw into mortar pit, throw from prone, cook off two seconds and throw into bunker, etc. Importantly, we used training dummy grenade bodies instead of live grenades for that range. It�s a separate day from live grenades and unlike the live grenades, you don�t actually have to pass it to pass basic.

We did all of our throwing in one day. All of the throws except for the last one were with simunition. The last was was the real deal. Sorry to say that we didn't have any exciting fuckups to regale you with. My unit was boringly competent.

# ? Apr 4, 2023 21:26

knox_harrington: Feb 18, 2011; Running no point.

One of my most cherished memories is of a very stupid Lt accidentally setting off a practice grenade in his pocket. He was loving around with it, looked a bit worried, then his pocket exploded.

The same guy complained about having to carry the GPMG in Helmand, saying there was a risk he "would become combat ineffective". My buddy from the patrol says their boss turned around and just said "I'm prepared to take that risk" :iceburn:

# ? Apr 4, 2023 21:37

Jaguars!: Jul 31, 2012

I'm a southpaw and every drat instructor on my basic was right handed. This is not good when training the mechanics of grenades. I even got to try the freaky 'hold grenade upside down' style although I quickly went back to the standard style.

# ? Apr 5, 2023 00:52

Alan Smithee: Jan 4, 2005; A man becomes preeminent, he's expected to have enthusiasms.

Enthusiasms, enthusiasms...

I wish I could throw a grenade

I will never taste the knowledge of such fruits

# ? Apr 5, 2023 00:57

Deteriorata: Feb 6, 2005

My grandfather had a hand-grenade incident while training with the Canadian army for WWI:

quote:

During his basic training at Niagara-On-The-Lake they were taught how to use hand grenades. They were shaped like a small pineapple with a pair of handles that you could squeeze together. The handles were held in place by a pin that penetrated both parts. When the handles came apart, a five-second fuse was activated. In practice you held the handles together with one hand and pulled the pin with the other. When you tossed the grenade, you released the handles and the grenade scattered shrapnel five seconds later.

For the exercise the trainees were led up to a block wall which was a little higher than their head. Behind them was a pile of live grenades. The instructor demonstrated the technique and tossed the grenade over the wall. It detonated five seconds later.

Down the line they went, each man picking up a grenade from the pile and pulling the pin while squeezing the handles. Then he tossed it over the wall and plugged his ears.

One very nervous trainee took a grenade and pulled the pin, but when he drew his arm back the grenade flew backwards into the pile of grenades. In five seconds the whole pile would detonate.

The instructor leaped to the pile of grenades, grabbed one and flung it over the wall. Had he gotten the right one? Yes. The grenade barely cleared the wall when it went off. The instructor�s perception and courage had saved all their lives. The drill was called off for the day.

# ? Apr 5, 2023 00:57

Comrade Blyatlov: Aug 4, 2007; should have picked four fingers

# ? Apr 5, 2023 01:07

Arrath: Apr 14, 2011

Oh gently caress

# ? Apr 5, 2023 01:14

mllaneza: Apr 28, 2007; Veteran, Bermuda Triangle Expeditionary Force, 1993-1952

I have questions about there being a "pile" of live grenades, but they're probably pretty well answered by it being 1915 or so.

# ? Apr 5, 2023 01:25

Deteriorata: Feb 6, 2005

mllaneza posted:

I have questions about there being a "pile" of live grenades, but they're probably pretty well answered by it being 1915 or so.

Yeah, a lot of his training stories were like that. Health and Safety hadn't really been thought through, whatever was fast and convenient was the way to go.

# ? Apr 5, 2023 01:36

Kesper North: Nov 3, 2011; EMERGENCY POWER TO PARTY

mllaneza posted:

I have questions about there being a "pile" of live grenades, but they're probably pretty well answered by it being 1915 or so.

I have a feeling that it's happened in Ukraine in TYOOL 2023, based on the videos of Russian soldiers unloading anti-personnel mines from trucks by shoving them out the back

# ? Apr 5, 2023 01:41

bulletsponge13: Apr 28, 2010

In every trench video there is a cubby stacked with frags.

# ? Apr 5, 2023 01:46

Murgos: Oct 21, 2010

I kept the ring off one CS grenade I threw and still have it and use it as a key ring.

# ? Apr 5, 2023 01:58

mlmp08: Jul 11, 2004; Prepare for my priapic projectile's exalted penetration; Nap Ghost

US Senior Defense Official (SDO) brief re: Ukraine today. Intro then excerpts as I choose.

Press Briefing:
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3351824/senior-defense-official-holds-a-background-briefing-on-ukraine/
Press Release with PDA (fast from US stocks, $500 milion) and USAI (weeks to months/years contracted from industry, $2.1 billion)
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3350958/biden-administration-announces-additional-security-assistance-for-ukraine/

Highlights:
-SDO says lines largely static with significant artillery exchanges, but not much maneuver, and aim is to assist Ukraine go on counteroffensive [My note: just in the lasts 24-48 hours, some reports that Bakhmut lines might be moving in Russia's favor, but it's been months to move a matter of single-digit kilometers, and Bakhmut was originally thought to be potentially falling/evacuated a month ago]
-Four efforts: 1: Improved layered air defenses; 2: deliver steady flow of artillery rounds, other ammunition, spare parts, and maintenance support; 3: Armor (vehicle) donations; 4: train combined arms combat and maneuver
-SDO says US "understands" Ukrainian strategy in holding Bakhmut. Says Ukraine still has forces to pursue next phase of the war.
-When asked about US contracting for 122mm (soviet design) vs 155mm, the answer is kind of wishy-washy. Providing ammo for legacy guns, because Ukraine has them, but also there's a clear hunger for ammo amounts that the US and partners cannot sustain only from 155mm, though efforts are underway to increase 155mm production. [But the US has pretty publicly stated in press briefings and talks outside of this one that 155mm (and some other munitions) are not produced at a sufficient rate to meet demands due to prioritizing efficiency over raw production numbers.] I left all the howitzer discussion in, because there's a fair amount of reading between lines, especially when combined with past US statements over the past 6+ months about ordnance production numbers and drawdown of stocks.
-SDO does not say Wagner will be replaced or leadership in any domestic danger, just points out that there is squabbling, when asked about it
-No firm update on Patriot employment or delivery timeline, Abrams delivery timeline.

quote:

STAFF: Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for joining us today for this background call. Joining us today is (inaudible) will be on background today with attribution to "a senior defense official".

And with that, I will turn it over to (inaudible).

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Great, thank you.

Good afternoon, everyone. I am proud to announce a substantial new package of security assistance for Ukraine. Let me first offer some broader context, and then what I'll do is I'll summarize the capabilities that are included in this package today.

The war is at an important stage. Fighting continues in the east, but there have not been significant recent shifts in territorial control. The front lines are relatively static with significant exchanges of artillery, but without significant maneuver gains by either side.

As we have said previously, our focus is on supporting the Ukrainians to change the dynamic on the ground. We want to help Ukraine advance and hold its positions in what we expect will be a Ukrainian counteroffensive.

We continue to pursue that objective in several ways, including by working with allies and partners to provide new and significant capabilities and training. First, we have focused on enabling a layered and integrated approach to air defense; second, we are delivering a steady flow of artillery rounds and other ammunition, as well as spare parts and maintenance support to help sustain Ukraine's fight; third, we have marshalled commitments of important armor capabilities to enhance Ukraine's ability to conduct complex maneuvers; and fourth, to bring all of these capabilities to bear in a coordinated manner, we have expanded U.S.-led training of Ukraine's forces to focus on combined arms and joint maneuver operations.

We are putting all of these pieces together to provide full, lasting, combat-credible capabilities covering all of the steps from the donation, to the training, to the maintenance and sustainment. The substantial resources the United States has committed to Ukraine reflects the American interests and values that are at stake.

Judging from the significant commitments that our allies and partners have made, the stakes for Europe and the larger world are widely-recognized, as well. Allies stepped up again two weeks ago at the last meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group chaired by Secretary Austin. In fact, when you look at security assistance for Ukraine as a percentage of GDP, among the top 20 donors, the United States is roughly in the middle.

And today, on all days, as we welcome Finland's accession to NATO, I want to point out that Finland is one of the highest contributors to Ukraine both in percentage of GDP terms and in total dollars spent on military assistance. We look forward to an even closer relationship with Finland now that it has officially become the 31st NATO ally.

The package we are announcing today will complement many of the capabilities our allies and partners are providing. So this is a two-part package. It includes $2.1 billion in additional commitments for procurement under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, as well as a drawdown of equipment from U.S. inventories valued at $500 million. As you know, drawdown and USAI authorities operate on different timelines, and our dual approach demonstrates our commitment to Ukraine's near-term needs, as well as its enduring strength over the longer term.

The full list of capabilities in this package was posted on the DOD website as always, so I'm not going to actually run through every single capability, but I want to summarize by describing three main categories of items.

First, the package includes important capabilities for air defense and to counter Russian unmanned aerial systems. This includes additional interceptors for both Patriot and NASAMS air defense systems, and it also includes new counter-UAS capabilities such as the 30-mm gun trucks to detect and intercept drones such as the Iranian-built Shaheds.

Second, in the category of fires, the package includes a range of items to help Ukraine sustain its fight. This includes additional Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, or as we call them, GMLRS, as well as 155-mm artillery rounds, including Excaliber precision-guided rounds. It also includes additional mortar rounds, which continue to help ensure Ukraine has a layered indirect fires capability, including to support the close fight as its forces maneuver to push back Russian lines.

Third, the package includes several capabilities to support U.S.-provided armor. That includes 120-mm ammunition, which will support Ukraine's newly-formed armored tank battalions, as well as Abraham -- Abrams tanks that the United States has committed, 25-mm ammunition, which can be used on the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles that the United States previously committed, and also recovery vehicles and refuelers to keep the armor in the fight.

As I said at the top, we are focused both on the here and now and on the future. This dual package combining drawdown and procurement reflects that approach. The U.S. remains committed to the cause of a free and secure Ukraine.

And now, I look forward to taking your questions.

...

Q: Hi. Thank you. Two things. If you could just update us, for the senior defense official. Can you give us an update on training numbers, the total that have been trained, including on the -- on the Abrams, but as well, on all of the other training that's been going on in Europe?

And secondly, can you give us a better sense of the -- the communications, the satellite communications that's being provided. Is that Starlink, or is that paying for the -- an ongoing capability that the Starlink has provided, or is it a -- a different capability? Can you just help us understand what that is? Thank you.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Sure. I took down three -- three things then. In terms of the -- the training numbers, at this point, I think our numbers stand at more than 4,000 Ukrainian soldiers making up two brigades that were trained recently. Now, one of those brigades was for the Bradleys, and one was equipped with the Strykers. That was the training program in Grafenwoehr. But you know, when you look at the total training numbers since -- since the invasion last year, we -- we're up to more than 7,000 members trained of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Abrams training has not yet begun, so we will -- we will give you a heads-up as we start that training program. We are still working on the equipment procurement, so we haven't -- we have not yet begun the training, but I would expect that that will happen relatively soon.

In terms of satellite communications, in this particular package, we are looking at a number of equipment items, but I can't comment on specific vendors because there is a -- a contracting process that is -- that is underway, so I just -- I can't get into that.

...

Q: Thank you so very much. I actually have a couple of questions.

One is equipment specific. Can you provide more details about what kind of gun trucks -- the 30 millimeter gun trucks, what kind of counter-UAS laser-guided rocket systems and what kind of precision aerial munitions are in this package? That's the first question.

Second question is is there any concern about the equipment that's been provided to Ukraine being used in Bakhmut? And is there any concern about the amount of effort and casualties that Ukraine is taking to defend that city, in terms of a -- a -- whether that affects the counter-offensive that's looming? Thanks.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Thank you. OK, several things.

So on the equipment, the specific equipment items, the gun trucks are a new item from -- from the United States. We're providing nine. They're called counter-UAS 30 millimeter gun trucks, and our expectation is that these will be able to detect and intercept drones, including the Iranian-built Shaheds, and it's -- it's a -- it's literally what it sounds like, a 30 millimeter gun mounted on a truck. Because that's procurement, it's going to take several months to be able to actually provide that to Ukraine.

And then I think you also asked about the 10 -- these are 10 mobile counter-UAS laser-guided rocket systems. These are going to enable -- this is also a new item -- this will enable Ukraine to fire precision rockets from mobile positions and they will use the APKWS, Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, laser-guided munitions, again, to counter the drone threat, and the APKWS is something that was previously provided.

And then let's see here. On the precision -- the precision aerial munitions, that is -- that is a reference to JDAM, the Joint Direct Attack Munitions, and that also is through -- through procurement. So it will take a bit of time.

And in terms of your question more broadly about, you know, equipment being used in -- in Bakhmut, as -- as you know, we are in very close communication with the Ukrainian leadership team, the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Ukrainian political leadership, and, you know, we -- we understand the -- the strategy that they have decided to pursue.

We absolutely are seeing the devastating loss of life that Russia is experiencing, with Wagner forces essentially being, you know, thrown -- thrown into a meat grinder and Russian forces being fixed in position because of the -- the robust Ukrainian defenses.

And so certainly we understand Ukraine's strategy and we are very confident that they do have the equipment that they need and that, as we are -- as we are helping them to field these newly trained forces, they do have the capabilities to be able to pursue whatever this next phase -- next phase looks like on the battlefield.

STAFF: Great, thank you. Our next question, we'll go to Alex Horton, Washington Post.

Q: Hey, thanks for doing this, SDO. I -- I -- I'm glad you brought up Bakhmut and equipment there. I was just outside the city a couple of weeks ago and I spoke to a battery commander who has D-30s. He wants M777s, doesn't have them, and his problem is running out of artillery shells for that. I see USAI is going to provide the 122 millimeter that would be used for this -- for this piece but it's simply becoming a math problem. Your ability to sustain artillery rounds is for the M777, not -- not what they mostly have, which is Soviet caliber.

So I'm -- I'm curious if -- if you are doing anything to combat this math problem? Are there any issues that you could, you know, address, like procuring the Soviet ammunition? And do you think maybe that the drip and drab approach to meter, you know, U.S. and NATO stockpile of howitzers, have -- have you come to see any flaws in that, now that they're running out of ammunition that you can't readily supply?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Great. So yeah, there's a lot of things that we are doing collaboratively with the Ukrainians on this question of both -- both the howitzers and the actual ammunition supplies.

So I'll start with just the fact that we're incredibly transparent with the Ukrainians. So they have a really good understanding of what ammunition we are planning to provide, when we are planning to provide it, you know, what caliber is this for -- you know, for the M777, as -- as you mentioned. Is this for Soviet-type artillery pieces?

So that enables them to be able to plan their operations and understand where they need to flow their -- their equipment. So that's the first thing. And again, we have this continual conversation with them, not just about what they need right now but what � but what are they going to need in the future, and that's where we can plan to be able to time our deliveries to support what they need on the battlefield.

In terms of the -- you know, the challenge of -- of maintaining sufficient supply of ammunition of whatever caliber, I think we're at this really helpful inflection point right now because previously, the U.S. and most of the allies were just drawing down from their own stocks when it came to Western caliber -- you mentioned the, you know, 155 for the -- for the -- say, the M777 howitzer, for instance. And obviously, there's a finite supply in our own stocks.

But now, we're at this point where we are also doing a healthy amount of procurement because of increased production of ammunition. And the U.S. was -- was really at the front end of this wave, increasing production and procurement of 155 ammunition.

So today, when Ukraine gets their deliveries of 155 from the United States, they're getting deliveries that include ammunition we procured from USAI many, many months ago. So that is starting to come online. But other allies are also starting to boost production. You -- I'm sure you heard about the EU announcement to significantly increase ammunition production in Europe.

So all of this is coming online in the next several months to be able to enable -- enable this to be a sustainable support mechanism for Ukraine.

Now, you also mentioned the -- the availability of -- of howitzers, and I want to emphasize that this is another area where we feel like we have provided the right -- the right capability, the right numbers of -- of howitzers, both the M777, as I mentioned, but also we've had a number of allies providing other Western-type howitzers, whether you're talking, you know, the -- the French CAESAR or other capabilities.

We want to make sure that those howitzers can be kept in the fight, and so that's why you see us focusing also on things like barrel replacement. These -- these howitzers are getting a lot of use. So we have redoubled our efforts on -- on -- on making sure that they are capable.

And then on maintenance, we -- we have tele-maintenance that -- that is possible so that, whether it's a howitzer or -- or -- or, you know, an infantry fighting vehicle, Ukrainian Armed Forces, you know, soldiers far -- far into the field can call back and get assistance from U.S. and allied partners to be able to repair and not necessarily have to actually take that capability offline.

But lastly, you can tell this is a topic I like to talk about. Lastly, in terms of the -- the, what we call non-standard caliber, this is basically Soviet-type artillery and ammunition, we have found many sources of this around the world.

So, you'll -- you did notice, I think, in this USAI package we have a number of different caliber of non-standard ammunition, mortars, et cetera. And so, we will continue to procure the use -- the use capabilities for the Ukrainians because we recognize that they still do have a lot of Soviet-type equipment. And if we can keep it in the fight we can enable their effectiveness.

All right, thank you.

Q: Great. What about -- a question to that. I appreciate it. What's the plan when they run out -- the Soviet and Russian-type of ammunition and they don't have enough M777 to replace them?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, I think we're always looking at what their total capability needs are. And we are always able to look at providing them with more, whether it's through procurement or through our own stocks. And that -- and that's not just true of Howitzers, that's -- that's across the board true. So, we're always evaluating those -- those total requirements.

STAFF: Great. Our next question will go to Carla Babb, "VOA."

Q: Hey, thanks for doing this. Appreciate it. I just wanted to follow up some of the news we're hearing about Wagner Group, that there are reports out there from the U.K. Defense Ministry that they're seeing signs that the Russians are looking to replace Wagner Group. What can you tell us about that?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not familiar with the -- the specific report that you mentioned, Carla. But I can say, you know, in general, what we have seen from Wagner on the battlefield is an incredible brutality in their -- in their operations. And on the part of their leadership, a real disregard for the lives of these Russian Wagner fighters.

We also do certainly see, you know, tension and infighting at the leadership levels. This is not just in terms of, you know, Wagner leadership but really across the board within, you know, Russian leadership we certainly are seeing a good deal of squabbling, I would say.

STAFF: Great, thank you. We'll get through a few more here. James Levinson, "Fox."

...

Q: No, that's perfect, ma'am. Thank you.

So as regard to the mobile UAS laser-guided rocket systems, is that part of the January JCO test that was aimed at finding systems like that? And if so, is this the first time the U.S. has sent a new experimental system that was designed explicitly for Ukraine in mind to Ukraine? Or is this part of an ongoing effort? Thank you.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Thanks. I would characterize this as part of an ongoing effort. But I am not familiar with the specifics of that -- that test. So I'd have to -- I'd have to get back to you with -- with that very specific detail.

Q: No worries. And -- and these are for the Shaheds as well, right?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, yes. This is -- this is aimed at countering the Shaheds, among other -- among other drone threats.

# ? Apr 5, 2023 02:06

A.o.D.: Jan 15, 2006

Kesper North posted:

I have a feeling that it's happened in Ukraine in TYOOL 2023, based on the videos of Russian soldiers unloading anti-personnel mines from trucks by shoving them out the back

Weren't those anti-tank mines that didn't have their fuses installed?

# ? Apr 5, 2023 02:22

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# ? Jun 5, 2024 06:14

madeintaipei: Jul 13, 2012

bulletsponge13 posted:

In every trench video there is a cubby stacked with frags.

Familiar with German stick grenades?

The head contains the delay train, with a string running through it attached to a porcelain ball at the bottom of the stick, held in by a screw-off cap.

Expect trouble? Stack grenades with the stick facing you, unscrew cap(s), trail string and ball out, huck them out there while holding the ball (or not). Hope for the best! Hope the counter-attack pushes past you.

# ? Apr 5, 2023 02:51

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Internet VFW > Ukraine: The Aristoblyats

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