The US will lose WW3

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > C-SPAM > The US will lose WW3

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Hubbert: Mar 25, 2007; At a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act.

Cuttlefush posted:

the polyphemus? pathetic. try plongeur

# ? May 24, 2023 20:48

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# ? May 24, 2024 04:25

KomradeX: Oct 29, 2011

Totally normal

# ? May 24, 2023 21:08

Centrist Committee: Aug 6, 2019

Turtle Sandbox posted:

The rust is visible when most of the rot is not. Normal assed Americans eyes glaze over when you talk about the MIC, but a rusty warship might make them go "that ain't right".

everything in america is falling apart and everything new is designed to fall apart more quickly but im sure the us military is the exception because marvel would never lie to me

# ? May 24, 2023 21:16

lobster shirt: Jun 14, 2021

gotta see apartheid death squad guys making the soy face at 21st century combat footbage

# ? May 24, 2023 21:16

Megamissen: Jul 19, 2022; any post can be a kannapost
if you want it to be

KomradeX posted:

Totally normal

is that about the incident in syria?

# ? May 24, 2023 21:18

KomradeX: Oct 29, 2011

Megamissen posted:

is that about the incident in syria?

I assume so, didn't watch. But poo poo like this keeps getting suggested for me

# ? May 24, 2023 21:54

Cuttlefush: Jan 15, 2014; gotta have my purp

yeah the veterans react genre has been around for a while and there are a bunch of those channels. it's annoying as gently caress.

pretty sure you can use ublock filters to kill some of them

# ? May 24, 2023 21:56

Slavvy: Dec 11, 2012

Cuttlefush posted:

not really. bulbous bows are actually pretty neat. also some of the nimitz class carriers don't have bulbous bows. im not really sure why they added them because I would think fuel efficiency (which bulbous bows improve, mainly) isn't a huge concern for a nuclear powered ship? I guess refueling the reactors a few years earlier is a huge pain in the rear end taht adds up and there probably aren't major drawbacks.

You can use less fuel/power to go a given speed or you can use the same amount of fuel/power to go faster

# ? May 24, 2023 21:57

Frosted Flake: Sep 13, 2011; Semper Shitpost Ubique

I�ve seen several different videos about the Syria thing in the past week so I assumed it was the new NAFO narrative of the week.

# ? May 24, 2023 21:59

Bar Ran Dun: Jan 22, 2006

Slavvy posted:

You can use less fuel/power to go a given speed or you can use the same amount of fuel/power to go faster

carriers are going to be at / near the theoretical maximum speed for a displacement hull. that�s basically just a direct function of lwl, length at waterline.

# ? May 24, 2023 22:11

bedpan: Apr 23, 2008

Cuttlefush posted:

yeah the veterans react genre has been around for a while and there are a bunch of those channels. it's annoying as gently caress.

pretty sure you can use ublock filters to kill some of them

best "veterans react" thing was a post on the SA forums about a war on terror vet breaking down in tears while looking at the different toothpaste choices available at a grocery store once they came back home

# ? May 25, 2023 00:33

Bar Ran Dun: Jan 22, 2006

bedpan posted:

best "veterans react" thing was a post on the SA forums about a war on terror vet breaking down in tears while looking at the different toothpaste choices available at a grocery store once they came back home

it�s legitimately a weird experience to go into a grocery store after a deployment or stint at sea. it all changes in a disconnected way. for me the longest I was out was about nine months. it�s everything your personal relationships, the culture, the music on the radio, but grocery stores are weird.

they introduced those mini coke cans in a widespread way when I was out. �what the gently caress is this � it almost felt like an affront. I mean all the other things are worse especially what it does to relationships. But grocery stock is physical so it makes it more tangible.

it�s alienation and the commodity fetishism in grocery stores makes you really feel it. lasts for a week or two.

# ? May 25, 2023 00:45

Palladium: May 8, 2012; Very Good
✔️✔️✔️✔️

Cuttlefush posted:

yeah the veterans react genre has been around for a while and there are a bunch of those channels. it's annoying as gently caress.

pretty sure you can use ublock filters to kill some of them

Youtube would be 90% smaller and 900% better if they got rid of all the soyface

# ? May 25, 2023 01:37

Hubbert: Mar 25, 2007; At a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act.

We cannot allow for a ~~mine shaft~~ war game gap.

SCMP: Chinese scientists war-game hypersonic strike on US carrier group in South China Sea, Stephen Chen posted:

- Military planners conclude the Gerald R. Ford and its fleet could be destroyed �with certainty� in rare published report
- The researchers said 24 hypersonic anti-ship missiles were used to sink the US Navy�s newest carrier and its group in 20 simulated battles

A simulated war-game has pitted Chinese hypersonic weapons against the US Navy�s newest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford. Photo: AP

Hypersonic weapons could be �catastrophic� for the most potent aircraft carrier group in the US fleet, according to war game simulations run by a team of military planners in China.

Over 20 intense battles, Chinese forces sank the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier fleet with a volley of 24 hypersonic anti-ship missiles, in a simulation run on a mainstream war game software platform used by China�s military.

In the scenario, the US vessels are attacked after continuing to approach a China-claimed island in the South China Sea despite repeated warnings.

A paper detailing the war game was published in May by the Chinese-language Journal of Test and Measurement Technology. It is the first time the results of simulated hypersonic strikes against a US carrier group have been made public.

The researchers, led by Cao Hongsong from the North University of China, said almost every US surface vessel was shattered by the attack and eventually sank in the simulation.

The war games suggested the US carrier group � previously regarded as unsinkable by conventional weapons � could be �destroyed with certainty� by a relatively small number of hypersonic strikes, they said.

In the simulation, Chinese forces launched 24 hypersonic anti-ship missiles from six sites ranging from southern China to the Gobi desert. Illustration: North University of China

The team said two hypersonic anti-ship missile models with vastly different performances were unleashed in the simulation, with some launched from as far away as the Gobi Desert.

The Chinese military displayed �unusual prowess in their sophisticated launch strategy� which consisted of an intentionally complex three-wave attack meant to deceive and overcome the formidable defence systems of the US carrier group, the paper said.

Military planners use sophisticated war game simulations to evaluate various scenarios and develop strategies but they cannot be relied on over real-world testing and evaluation.

Some military experts caution that the real-world performance of these missiles may differ from what is predicted by simulations due to terrain, weather and other unforeseeable factors.

It therefore remained critical for government leaders and the public to approach these simulations with caution and realism, the researchers said.

The US fleet in the war game was made up of six surface ships, chosen for their �unparalleled strength and advanced technology�.

The military planners selected vessels deemed the US Navy�s most superior � the CVN-78 Gerald R. Ford, accompanied by a CG56 Ticonderoga-class cruiser the San Jacinto, and four DDG-103 Arleigh Burke-class Flight IIA guided missile destroyers.

The Ford-class carrier, commissioned in July 2017, boasts exceptional technology and design advancements, according to the researchers. Features include a pioneering electromagnetic launch system and state-of-the-art radar and electronic warfare systems.

These sophisticated technologies detect incoming threats while multiple layers of armour and protective systems are designed to lessen the impact of missile attacks and other enemy firepower.

The strike group�s cruisers and destroyers were also equipped with advanced weapons and defensive measures, including radar systems that could detect incoming threats while simultaneously tracking multiple targets, the researchers said.

The war game�s parameters for the carrier group�s total number of air-defence missiles were set at 264, according to the research paper. These included the RIM-161E SM-3, an advanced missile devised to intercept ballistic missiles either in midcourse or terminal phase.

Notably, the SM-3 uses a kinetic warhead to obliterate a target by colliding with it at immense speed. While there is no record of it shooting down a hypersonic threat, the war game designers assumed its capability and incorporated it into the game.

The carrier group was also equipped with numerous soft defence weapons to combat missile attacks, including decoys, chaff and flare dispensers.

The advanced SM-3 missile has been designed to intercept ballistic missiles either in midcourse or terminal phase. Photo: US Navy

Several constraints were placed on the Chinese military in the simulation, such as a lack of access to spy satellites stationed in space and a limited number of hypersonic missiles.

The underlying principle of the war game was to be �lenient with the enemy and strict with oneself�, Cao said.

The two models of anti-ship missiles used by the Chinese side in the simulation could cruise at high altitudes and reach a top speed of Mach 11, the paper said. According to Cao, both models are capable of sinking a carrier or large warship within two hits.

The research paper outlined the operational range of one model at 2,000km (1,240 miles) with an 80 per cent probability of hitting its intended target. The other Chinese model has double the range and a higher success rate of 90 per cent.Chinese hypersonic weapons test �has all of our attention�, US General Mark Milley says

While the authenticity of the data used in the war games cannot be independently verified, some military experts suggested the information on the weapons� performance appeared to be reliable.

�The accuracy of the data used in war game simulations is critical to their usefulness in evaluating potential scenarios,� said a Beijing-based aerospace defence industry engineer who asked not to be named because of the issue�s sensitivity.

�If the data about Chinese hypersonic missiles used in this war game simulation is far from reality, it could affect the quality of the simulation and lead to inaccurate conclusions.�

The researchers assumed that the cost of a missile is influenced by the materials, as well as the propulsion and guidance systems, used in its construction, suggesting the model with the greater range and accuracy may be relatively more expensive.

Employing lower quality missiles for certain parts of the attack would therefore maximise the Chinese weapons� effectiveness, they said. For instance, the less reliable missiles could be used to lure SM-3s into the air or clear surviving ships after a formal attack.

During the simulation, the PLA used its sea-based surveillance network to detect and identify the US carrier group before firing eight of the less-reliable hypersonic missiles simultaneously from southern and central sites in China, the researchers said.

While some of the missiles were intercepted, the attack depleted the US fleet�s SM-3 munitions.

The PLA then launched eight of its more accurate hypersonic missiles from northern and western China, with four focused on the aircraft carrier while the others targeted the destroyers. Two of the less accurate missiles were fired at the cruiser, according to the paper.

�After the attack, four ships survived from the blue [US] team, with the destroyers having the most remaining, on average. The reason is that destroyers contain the most soft defence weapons, specially designed to defend against missile attacks,� it said.

Among soft defence weapons, electronic warfare systems play a crucial role in jamming enemy radar signals, a tactic that disrupts the missiles� ability to lock onto their intended targets.

Other measures such as chaff and flare dispensers create confusion among incoming missiles, either through metallic or plastic strips or by emitting infrared flares that mimic the ship�s heat signature.

After confirming the status and location of the remaining targets, the PLA launched a �mop-up� operation with six of the relatively less accurate hypersonic missiles from the southern sites, the paper said.

After running the war game simulation 20 times to consider the various uncertainties that can occur in battle, Cao�s team determined the three-wave attack is capable of eliminating an average 5.6 out of six surface vessels � resulting in �total destruction� of the carrier group.

The researchers said the use of lure tactics would be critical to increasing the effectiveness of China�s hypersonic anti-ship missiles while reducing the number of SM-3 defence missiles available to the US fleet.

The team also said the use of patrol missions to identify and prioritise targets ahead of additional waves of missiles would allow the PLA to conserve its ammunition and ensure it only targeted viable threats.

The reasons for China�s release of the war game results remain unknown. Cao, an experienced researcher on virtual simulation technology and intelligent control technology for missiles and rockets, could not be reached for comment.

Her university, in Taiyuan, Shanxi province, has strong ties to the military with a notable number of its graduates working in the aerospace defence industry, according to publicly available information.

The Journal of Test and Measurement Technology, which published the paper, operates jointly with the university and the China Ordnance Society.

The Chinese government has repeatedly accused the US of stoking tensions in the region, especially at China�s doorstep, while Washington has stepped up its military presence in Asia to safeguard �freedom of navigation�.

The Beijing-based researcher said �greater transparency about China�s military capabilities and intentions could help to reduce misunderstandings and miscalculations on both sides, which could in turn help to reduce the risk of conflict�.

�Increasing transparency could also help build trust between China and other countries in the region, which could contribute to greater stability over the long term,� he said.

Hubbert has issued a correction as of 03:02 on May 25, 2023

# ? May 25, 2023 01:58

cat botherer: Jan 6, 2022; I am interested in most phases of data processing.

Hubbert posted:

We cannot allow for a ~~mine shaft~~ war game gap.

Wow, too bad we allowed Russia and China a decade lead on hypersonics because MIC grift was more important!

# ? May 25, 2023 02:04

Frosted Flake: Sep 13, 2011; Semper Shitpost Ubique

cat botherer posted:

Wow, too bad we allowed Russia and China a decade lead on hypersonics because MIC grift was more important!

I would expect the next round of our wargames to be rigged since Ukraine claimed to shoot down a hypersonic missile too.

# ? May 25, 2023 02:08

Slavvy: Dec 11, 2012

quote:

The underlying principle of the war game was to be “lenient with the enemy and strict with oneself”, Cao said.

The opposite of American war game doctrine, let's see how it plays out

# ? May 25, 2023 02:18

Hubbert: Mar 25, 2007; At a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act.

Frosted Flake posted:

I would expect the next round of our wargames to be rigged since Ukraine claimed to shoot down a hypersonic missile too.

Good news, the Chinese also rigged the game that way too!

quote:

The strike group�s cruisers and destroyers were also equipped with advanced weapons and defensive measures, including radar systems that could detect incoming threats while simultaneously tracking multiple targets, the researchers said.

The war game�s parameters for the carrier group�s total number of air-defence missiles were set at 264, according to the research paper. These included the RIM-161E SM-3, an advanced missile devised to intercept ballistic missiles either in midcourse or terminal phase.

Notably, the SM-3 uses a kinetic warhead to obliterate a target by colliding with it at immense speed. While there is no record of it shooting down a hypersonic threat, the war game designers assumed its capability and incorporated it into the game.

# ? May 25, 2023 02:18

stephenthinkpad: Jan 2, 2020

Follow up of a prev post that said US closed too many ship yards.

https://twitter.com/sharp_writing/status/1661297184967634944?t=tzk8wIHocvuHtTgTy7CCpQ&s=19

# ? May 25, 2023 07:39

Frosted Flake: Sep 13, 2011; Semper Shitpost Ubique

It�s funny that the entirety of interstate competition from the 1400s is increasingly large, increasingly centralized, states directing the productive forces within their borders and then people got cocky and think they can go to war with the country that makes almost literally every good in their society, because the profits are deposited to banks on home soil.

# ? May 25, 2023 08:20

LIVE AMMO COSPLAY: Feb 3, 2006

stephenthinkpad posted:

Follow up of a prev post that said US closed too many ship yards.

https://twitter.com/sharp_writing/status/1661297184967634944?t=tzk8wIHocvuHtTgTy7CCpQ&s=19

Sounds like a terrible idea but also the only answer under capitalism

# ? May 25, 2023 08:23

gradenko_2000: Oct 5, 2010; HELL SERPENT; Lipstick Apathy

no, more privatization!

# ? May 25, 2023 08:40

KomradeX: Oct 29, 2011

Sure in retrospect the Navy could have used those ship yards. But have you considered that firing them into condos and retail space made landlords a lot of money. So worth it in the long run

# ? May 25, 2023 08:49

genericnick: Dec 26, 2012

KomradeX posted:

Sure in retrospect the Navy could have used those ship yards. But have you considered that firing them into condos and retail space made landlords a lot of money. So worth it in the long run

You can't let yourself get distracted by silly things like the PLA navy and global hegemony from the fight against the real enemy: Unions

# ? May 25, 2023 08:52

stephenthinkpad: Jan 2, 2020

Do these closed ship yards include Brooklyn Navy yard? Its got a pretty cool micro brew and a hip bagel shop. Worth it IMO.

# ? May 25, 2023 09:01

Ardennes: May 12, 2002

stephenthinkpad posted:

Do these closed ship yards include Brooklyn Navy yard? Its got a pretty cool micro brew and a hip bagel shop. Worth it IMO.

Yeah, although it was an earlier one and the Navy fully moved out in 1993 but it had been winding down for a while.

It is a good question about how much excess capacity that the US is going to find at overseas yards and the complications that are going to come from them.

# ? May 25, 2023 09:08

gradenko_2000: Oct 5, 2010; HELL SERPENT; Lipstick Apathy

quote:

On March 29, 1954, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, then chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepared a memorandum for the President�s Special Committee on Indochina recapitulating his discussions with his French counterpart, General Paul Ely, regarding the situation in Indochina.115 The exchanges between Admiral Radford and General Ely were quite frank. Admiral Radford reported that he �presented to General Ely our views in regard to expanding the MAAG to assist the French in training the Vietnamese, indicating to him the importance which we attach to this action, first, to obtain better results, secondly to release French officers for combat service,� but that �General Ely was most unsympathetic to any encroachment on French responsibilities or significant expansion of the MAAG. The reasons given related to French �prestige,� possible lack of confidence in French leadership by the Vietnamese, �the political situation in France,� etc.�116

Radford concluded that �the French are disposed firmly to resist any delegation of training responsibilities to the U.S. MAAG.�117

For his part, General Ely �made quite a point of explaining with �great frankness� actions on the part of the United States which were causes of friction.�118

According to Admiral Radford, the points mentioned specifically were:

a. Americans acted as if the United States sought to control and operate everything of importance; that this was particularly true at lower levels and in connection with FCA operations.

b. The United States appears to have an invading nature as they undertake everything in such great numbers of people.

c. French think that McCarthyism is prevalent in the U.S. and actually is akin to Hitlerism.

d. Americans do not appreciate the difficulties under which the French must operate as a result of two devastating wars.

e. Many Americans appear to favor Germany over France.

f. U.S. administrative procedures are enormously wasteful, irritating and paper heavy.

g. In Germany the U.S. forces have the benefit of better weapons and most modern techniques, whereas the French forces do not.

h. In connection with offshore procurement, the U.S. appeared to lack confidence in the French in the manufacture of most modern weapons and equipment.119

...

quote:

American analysts at the time and later have also noted defects in the way U.S. aid to the French in Indochina was handled. For example, the editors of The Pentagon Papers in 1971 highlighted six points of criticism of the U.S. policy toward Indochina. They were:

1. The United States mistakenly acted on the belief that U.S. and French goals were similar and that the French would follow U.S. advice and, once the war was over, would allow Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to become free and independent states.

2. The United States failed to recognize the flaws in its policy and failed to seek alternatives that might have produced a more favorable outcome for the United States.

3. The suppression of alternatives led to �a circularity in and reinforcement of existing policies� that constantly �forced choices between �bad� and �worse.��

4. The United States failed to bargain effectively with the French, giving them most of what they asked for without insisting that they live up to the preconditions the United States wished to impose or even permit monitoring of the use and disposition of the aid provided.

5. The United States was easily manipulated by misinformation provided by the French and others, who found that crying �The Reds are coming� was particularly effective for getting the United States to do what they wanted.

6. The United States failed to weigh the costs of the effort against the potential gains, failed to analyze the �domino theory� thoroughly, and failed to ask the key question: �How important is Indochina to the vital interests of the United States?�121

...

quote:

While by 1954 U.S. military aid constituted the major portion of all the resources applied by the French in Indochina and had surely delayed a Viet Minh victory, the overall conclusion reached by the editors of The Pentagon Papers was that �the effectiveness of the United States assistance program as an instrument of United States policy�quite aside from the outcome of the war�was thus quite low.�126 In fact, the United States, desperate to hold the line against the spread of Communism in Asia following the defeat of the Nationalist Chinese by Mao�s Red Army, allowed itself to be manipulated by the French, who received a cornucopia of military equipment with which to pursue their efforts to maintain political, economic, and military control over their Indochinese colonies while constantly assuring the U.S. government of their intentions to grant them full independence at the earliest possible time. The failure of the U.S. government to correct these defects in policy formulation and execution helped to seal the fate of the French in Indochina and led the United States into a conflict that would last for the following quarter century.

# ? May 25, 2023 09:19

Fish of hemp: Apr 1, 2011; A friendly little mouse!

quote:

f. U.S. administrative procedures are enormously wasteful, irritating and paper heavy.

I don't know what to say when even :france:

complain about excessive bureaucracy.

# ? May 25, 2023 11:45

sullat: Jan 9, 2012

gradenko_2000 posted:

...

...

Ah, shifting blame, the most ancient and honorable martial art.

# ? May 25, 2023 15:58

Frosted Flake: Sep 13, 2011; Semper Shitpost Ubique

gradenko_2000 posted:

no, more privatization!

gently caress it, I'm posting it

Weapon of Choice: Small Arms and the Culture of Military Innovation posted:

The changing soldier-engineer relationship and the privatization of Royal Ordnance

As we�ve seen in previous chapters, the process by which users have defined their requirements has been contested and open to interpretation. However, equipment has always undergone a range of tests and evaluations to ensure that it meets the stated requirement. The tests are important because they represent a point at which different technical imperatives are mediated. At the same time, even as engineers and scientists try to skew a test to put their particular technologies in the best possible light, they must work to maintain the idea that the whole exercise is neutral and objective. By doing so, they legitimize the findings from the trials, build confidence in the decision-making process, and underline the suitability of a specific technology. Maintaining the neutrality of those conducting the test is therefore of great importance for everyone involved in technology development, from users to engineers to industry.

In the contemporary British Army, the testing and evaluation of infantry equipment is managed and undertaken by the Infantry Trials and Development Unit (ITDU). Formally named the ITDU in 1968, the unit can trace its origins back to before the First World War when it was part of the Experimental Establishment at the School of Musketry, Hythe. Now based at Warminster, the ITDU is a small organization made up of a select group of officers and men with technical skills�for example, in marksmanship or as armorers�that, until a recent reorganization of the Army in 2010, traditionally reported to the director of infantry. It is this unit that now offers a technical perspective on the worthiness of Nonetheless, it was not until the mid-1990s that infantry officers at the Ministry of Defence began to actively change the balance of small arms in the Infantry Company and started to fight more assertively for resources in comparison to the other branches of the Army. In their efforts, they could rely on the support of what remained of the British government�s civil service engineering and scientific community. However, the ability of these specialists to offer the kind of independent advice that they would have provided to their predecessors was curtailed by the procurement initiatives developed by McKinsey management consultants and introduced into the MOD in 1998.

Smart Procurement, as these initiatives were known, attempted to integrate private industry and public procurement teams into partnerships. As a result, those government engineers and scientists who might previously have taken a more independent perspective on weapon selection, and whose views might have even been decisive in previous years, had to maintain their position in the context of partnership with industry. Independent engineering and scientific experts thus found themselves caught between the demands of the infantry and the ambitions of an industry and consulting market that had access to the sorts of resources and capabilities that no longer existed within government post-privatization. This fundamentally altered the balance of relationships between the user community and industry, forcing experts in the civil service to fight to get heard. By 2012, it was revealed that 60 per cent of all engineering support provided to Britain�s armed forces came from outsourced agencies. Thus the trend was towards greater industry involvement at the expense of providing independent advice to both users and taxpayers. This is set to continue with the government�s ongoing attempt to introduce more privatisation to the MOD�s Defence Equipment and Support organisation.

However, it had not always been the case that users and government would rely on the private provision of industry advice. Traditionally, the RSAF would manufacture the weapons that the War Office chose, but as the manufactory did not have a design department, it was not responsible for weapon design. Instead, during the nineteenth century, the War Office established various Small Arms Committees made up of officers and the RSAF�s superintendent who would evaluate submissions from weapon designers. Nominally given the rank of colonel in the Army, the RSAF superintendent would establish the design implications of a weapon from the perspective of production. It was only following the outbreak of the Second World War that a formal department dedicated to small arms design properly emerged, not within the RSAF itself, but within the Ministry of Supply. After 1958, this design function was severely reduced for weapon evaluation purposes only and relocated from its wartime location in Cheshunt to Enfield. Lacking the depth of design expertise that had been marshalled during the Second World War, it was eventually this group of RSAF engineers�most notably including Ted Hance, a trainee apprentice working with Noel Kent-Lemon during the development of the EM-2�that were responsible for coming up with the Enfield Weapon System (EWS). This prototype system was eventually renamed the Small Arms post-1980 or the SA80, Individual Weapon (IW i.e. the rifle) and Light Support Weapon (LSW)."

In 1984, the Royal Small Arms Factory (RSAF) was made a division of the newly renamed Royal Ordnance Factories (ROF), which had been set up as a new state-owned company. This new company was formally given both the intellectual property rights to the SA80 and a contract to produce the first batch of the weapon before full privatisation. With the government keen to ensure that the spin-off of the ROF was a success, ministers subsequently took the decision to prevent foreign contractors bidding for the second batch production run of the SA80, a competition that would be held before the formal sale of the ROF. This excluded H&K and FN from bidding for the work and allowed the government to claim that it was protecting British manufacturing. This move was, however, clearly also designed to make it impossible for any other British contractor to make a credible bid for the second batch contract for SA80.

What was clear, however, was that the government could not be sure that the taxpayer was getting value for money out of the second batch tender process. Consequently, after the government announced the winner of the competition in February 1987, Treasury civil servants wrote to the MOD complaining that the MOD had not followed the due process for running a public tender. In practice, however, as one senior civil servant observed, �the Minister (of Defence Procurement) [Lord Trefgarne] was not anxious to see RO [Royal Ordnance] undercut by a bid with a substantial foreign content since this would undoubtedly prejudice a successful float ��

The government�s decision to protect British industry thus ensured that a privately owned ROF would have a second batch contract to produce the SA80, significantly increasing the potential value of the business. Indeed, James Edmiston, the former director of Britain�s Sterling Armament Company, was clear in his criticism when he noted that, by excluding foreign competition, the ROF�a company that had already invested �100 million in the SA80�would be left in the prime spot for winning the second batch contract. At the same time, ministers were aware that British Aerospace was interested in purchasing ROF. What ministers could not be sure of, however, was whether BAE wanted to get into the small arms business. Fearful that the RSAF at Enfield was not capable of turning a profit, given the second batch contract that the ROF had signed with the government, BAE subsequently asked for time to review the deal and figure out their business strategy before deciding on whether to honour the tender process. After agreeing to sell the ROF to BAE in April 1987, the government subsequently allowed the company a further two and a half month grace period to decide whether they would take on the SA80 second batch contract. By mid-July, BAE told the government they would honour the second batch contract but that they would close Enfield and move the whole manufactory to a new �state of the art� plant in Nottingham.

During much of the 1980s, Enfield�s workforce had been aware that their jobs were unlikely to survive privatisation. As privatisation approached, however, workers felt increasingly demoralised, leading some to conclude that the government had left Enfield �shattered as a working community�. This sentiment came to a head following the formal sale of ROF and the announced closure of Enfield. The state of the art plant in Nottingham took a new approach to the production of the SA80. This new approach did not, however, demand a particularly large or skilled workforce. Consequently, the RSAF Apprentices Scheme, a scheme that had produced some of Britain�s most highly skilled craftsmen, was abandoned and the number of workers dropped from 1,200 at Enfield to just 475 at Nottingham.

In the late 70s and early 80s, the configuration of the SA80, a British family of 5.56mm small arms, underwent a number of revisions following the 1979�80 NATO Standardisation Trials. The designers had anticipated that the weapon might have to fire 5.56mm ammunition as directed by the General Staff Requirement. However, they did not foresee that the adopted ammunition would not be the existing American M193 standard, but a new Belgian design. Consequently, the SA80 system had to be recalibrated to accommodate this new NATO standard, the Belgian SS109.

Complicating matters, British ammunition was traditionally loaded with a propellant that had a different burn rate to the Belgian design. These changes in ammunition meant the SA80 would need further recalibration, or a decision would be made to ignore NATO standards in favour of British ammunition.
Meanwhile, the British Army was eager to replace the Self-Loading Rifle (SLR), a weapon that had been in service since 1957 and was becoming expensive to maintain. With the SA80 nearing completion, the Army was reluctant to allocate more funds towards refurbishing the aging SLRs. However, changes in ammunition standards delayed the weapon�s 'In Service Date', as engineers worked to adjust various parts.
When the SA80 finally passed the Acceptance Board in 1984, the Army was eager to introduce it into service and award the Tranche 1 production contract to the RSAF, hoping to maintain a longstanding relationship with a community of expert engineers.

However, problems related to the demoralisation of workers at Enfield and the transition to the new Nottingham plant were still present, leading to the SA80's introduction before these issues were resolved. As a result, Tranche 1 weapons produced at Enfield were reportedly less reliable than Tranche 2 weapons produced at Nottingham. Due to lesser contractual liabilities associated with Tranche 1 failure, BAE decided to start delivering weapons against Tranche 2 before finishing the Tranche 1 contract.

With the MOD deciding to undertake an early, phased roll-out of the SA80 system, further design changes were identified once the weapon reached its users. Making these changes while new weapons were still coming off the production line was complicated by BAE's decision to start delivering Tranche 2 and by the fact that the ROF owned the design rights to the weapon. As a result, the Army had to implement special measures to ensure that they had enough of the right iteration of the SA80 ready for the First Gulf War in 1990�1.

The production challenges with the SA80 were gradually being addressed, but the unexpected deployment of the British Army to the Gulf War highlighted several issues related to the use of SS 109 5.56 ammunition manufactured to NATO standards. The Ordnance Board had previously identified numerous reliability issues with the SA80, such as the problem of sand ingress, which was a significant challenge in the desert environment of Kuwait. This issue was further complicated by the Army�s procurement of additional wartime ammunition produced by Belgian and Swiss manufacturers.

The ammunition made to Belgian and NATO standards used ball powders instead of tubular cut powders. The ball powders had a faster burn rate, altering the SA80 system's cyclic rate, which could lead to increased wear and tear on the internal components and potential breakage. While the possibility of modifying the gas port was explored, the MOD was unwilling to recall the SA80 for comprehensive design evaluation, and thus the weapon continued its phased rollout.

The General Staff, however, was not satisfied with this situation. They were already dealing with an ageing SLR and now had to grapple with the new ammunition issues of the SA80. This was further complicated by the government's drive to prove that privatisating the Royal Ordnance Factories (ROFs) was successful. As part of cost-saving measures, the Defence Procurement Agency signed a five-year agreement, known as the Explosives Propellants and Related Products (EPREP) deal, with the ROF. Despite the difficulties in transitioning to a new ammunition standard, the government decided to continue the supply of tubular cut ammunition for the time being.

During the Gulf War, non-British ammunition was used in the SA80, but luckily, the weapon was seldom used in combat, preventing serious issues from arising due to the change in NATO standards. Still, reports of the weapon's poor reliability, such as bayonets breaking and issues with sand ingress, surfaced in the media. As a result, the SA80 and the privatisation of the ROF came under close public scrutiny.

After the Gulf War, the issues with the SA80 continued, notably those concerning the transition from British to NATO ammunition standards. The Defence Select Committee recommended that the government seek compensation from BAE Systems for poor workmanship and late delivery of weapons. This led to a legal battle between the government and BAE, eventually resulting in an out-of-court settlement in 1994.
The Army continued to alter the weapon's gas operating system to manage its cyclic rate, but these modifications were inconclusive. If the issue with the new SS109 ammunition was to be solved, changes to the SA80 would have to be paid for by the government.

In October 1997, a Reliability and Interoperability Programme was established in the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA), commissioning Heckler & Koch (H&K), the Design Authority for the SA80 after being acquired by British Aerospace, to investigate the inconsistent reliability of the SA80. This occurred alongside ongoing concerns within NATO about the impact the SA80 was having on ammunition types being submitted for qualification.

This series of events highlights the complexities and challenges that can arise when introducing new military equipment and adjusting to new standards, particularly in the context of changing political, operational, and industrial circumstances.

The issues with the SA80 led to a proposal to remove the weapon from the NATO Nominated Weapons List in 1997. However, Lieutenant Colonel Tony Thornburn, the UK head of delegation, persuaded the sub-group to only temporarily suspend the SA80 from the list. He asked all members present to keep this decision confidential until the UK could come up with a plan of action. The Ministry of Defence had already commissioned Heckler & Koch (H&K) to investigate the design and reliability of the SA80 and propose improvements.

During the subsequent investigation, H&K fired two million rounds of mostly non-NATO qualified ammunition through a modified weapon to prove its reliability. The Infantry Trials and Development Unit (ITDU) then fired an additional one million rounds to confirm the success of the modifications. The Mid-Life Upgrade program for the SA80, implemented after the election of the Labour government in 1997, became more acceptable within the MOD.

In 2001, the updated SA80A2 was finally rolled out, nearly three decades after the original design specifications had been approved. Both the SA80 Individual Weapon and Light Support Weapon proved successful, demonstrating that the original design might have worked if the issues had been systematically addressed. The �95 million upgrade improved the weapon's reliability in sandy conditions to 95%, making it more reliable than many other service weapons used by major armies worldwide, including the M16A2.

The process of delivering the SA80 to the military inventory was fraught with controversy and unnecessary complexity, reinforcing the need for the infantry to exert more direct control over future weapon acquisitions. This experience resulted in a mistrust of expert advice in the user community following the difficult separation between Enfield and the government. It emphasized the importance of prioritizing military judgment over other expert opinions when discussing small arms acquisition.

tl;dr

As you can see, the program, and the rifle itself, were plagued by problems. I would suggest that they are the direct consequence of neoliberal policies.

Substandard Quality: The SA80 was touted to be a leap forward in small arms technology for the British forces, but it fell short of its promise due to numerous issues related to design and functionality. One notable example was the issue of sand ingress, which significantly affected the reliability of the SA80, especially - and obviously - during the Gulf War operations in Kuwait.

Lower Volumes: According to the excerpt, problems with the SA80 necessitated over 22 Modification Instructions, slowing the production process and leading to limited availability during key periods, such as the Gulf War.

Increased Cost: Despite privatization's promises of cost-effectiveness, the SA80 ended up costing more than its predecessors, both in terms of its initial price and the subsequent costs incurred due to necessary modifications. An example of this is the decision by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to pay a premium demanded by ROF Radway Green for the continued supply of tubular cut ammunition, which contributed to the financial burden of maintaining the SA80 and necessitated Britain use an entirely separate supply chain for ammunition than the rest of NATO, from initial production down to battlefield logistics.

Reliability Issues: There were serious reliability issues with the SA80, especially in environments outside of Europe, which led to soldiers losing faith in the weapon. A telling instance is when troops rarely used the SA80 in anger during the Gulf War due to its problems. It goes almost without saying that infantry grunts not firing their rifle at the first opportunity indicates a severe lack of trust in the weapon's reliability.

My takeaway is that implementation of neoliberal policies, such as the privatisation of the RSAF, significantly hosed up the acquisition process of the SA80 system. The legal tussle between the government and BAE Systems over the responsibility of design flaws in the SA80 resulted in an extended period of inefficient resolution - with troops issued weapons known to be defective all the while. Confidence suffered accordingly, with British infantry reporting extremely low small arms ammunition expenditure during the Gulf War. That is to say, infantry grunts, given the opportunity, chose not to fire their rifles.

It was only after a 'Mid-Life Upgrade', costing an additional �95 million, that the SA80 reached a satisfactory standard - almost three decades after the initial design specifications were approved. Moreover, the necessary modifications were designed, and the rifles refurbished, by German defense contractor HK. Imagine any period of time previously where Britain would have to rely on Germany to have working rifles.

Frosted Flake has issued a correction as of 16:09 on May 25, 2023

# ? May 25, 2023 16:05

skooma512: Feb 8, 2012; You couldn't grok my race car, but you dug the roadside blur.

cat botherer posted:

Wow, too bad we allowed Russia and China a decade lead on hypersonics because MIC grift was more important!

And a missile gap (lol) on SAM snd SHORAD systems.

# ? May 25, 2023 20:14

Turtle Sandbox: Dec 31, 2007; by Fluffdaddy

Centrist Committee posted:

everything in america is falling apart and everything new is designed to fall apart more quickly but im sure the us military is the exception because marvel would never lie to me

I once assumed the ruling class was smart enough to leave the military alone. Turns out the communist were right.

# ? May 25, 2023 20:21

yellowcar: Feb 14, 2010

stephenthinkpad posted:

Follow up of a prev post that said US closed too many ship yards.

https://twitter.com/sharp_writing/status/1661297184967634944?t=tzk8wIHocvuHtTgTy7CCpQ&s=19

congrats to japan for becoming even more of an imperial outpost, enjoy the jet fuel water!

# ? May 25, 2023 20:29

Danann: Aug 4, 2013

https://twitter.com/zhao_dashuai/status/1661739364668551172

The new China tanks look cool ngl. VN20 is unusually chunky at 50 tons though ngl.

# ? May 26, 2023 06:49

GlassEye-Boy: Jul 12, 2001

Danann posted:

https://twitter.com/zhao_dashuai/status/1661739364668551172

The new China tanks look cool ngl. VN20 is unusually chunky at 50 tons though ngl.

VN20 is a tank chassis modified to fit troops, Israel and Russia have similar vehicles just as chunky.

# ? May 26, 2023 07:41

Cerebral Bore: Apr 21, 2010; Fun Shoe

still p chonky though. but i guess they're not going to be driving those around the rainforest or anything so it could still work fine

# ? May 26, 2023 12:20

stephenthinkpad: Jan 2, 2020

Some choice words from a MIC preparedness talk (the rest of the talk is not as interesting TBH with you)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XMctZ6EcWQw&t=288s

"This is not an accident....we planned it, this is deliberately done by the government. We decided we were not going to need the industrial base....ship yard, arsonal....You [MIC] guys figure it out (how to deindustrialize)"

He also reference a nyt article.
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/24/us/politics/military-weapons-ukraine-war.html

nyt posted:

From Rockets to Ball Bearings, Pentagon Struggles to Feed War Machine
The flow of arms to Ukraine has exposed a worrisome lack of production capacity in the United States that has its roots in the end of the Cold War.

WASHINGTON � The Navy admiral had a blunt message for the military contractors building precision-guided missiles for his warships, submarines and planes at a moment when the United States is dispatching arms to Ukraine and preparing for the possibility of conflict with China.

�Look at me. I am not forgiving the fact you�re not delivering the ordnance we need. OK?� Adm. Daryl Caudle, who is in charge of delivering weapons to most of the Navy�s East Coast-based fleet, warned contractors during an industry gathering in January. �We�re talking about war-fighting, national security, and going against a competitor here and a potential adversary that is like nothing we�ve ever seen. And we can�t dillydally around with these deliveries.�

His open frustration reflects a problem that has become worryingly apparent as the Pentagon dispatches its own stocks of weapons to help Ukraine hold off Russia and Washington warily watches for signs that China might provoke a new conflict by invading Taiwan: The United States lacks the capacity to produce the arms that the nation and its allies need at a time of heightened superpower tensions.

Industry consolidation, depleted manufacturing lines and supply chain issues have combined to constrain the production of basic ammunition like artillery shells while also prompting concern about building adequate reserves of more sophisticated weapons including missiles, air defense systems and counter-artillery radar.

The Pentagon, the White House, Congress and military contractors are all taking steps to address the issues.

Procurement budgets are growing. The military is offering suppliers multiyear contracts to encourage companies to invest more in their manufacturing capacity and is dispatching teams to help solve supply bottlenecks. More generally, the Pentagon is abandoning some of the cost-cutting changes embraced after the end of the Cold War, including corporate-style just-in-time delivery systems and a drive to shrink the industry.

�We are buying to the limits of the industrial base even as we are expanding those limits,� Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks said this month at a briefing on the Biden administration�s 2024 budget plan.

But those changes are likely to take time to have an effect, leaving the military watching its stocks of some key weapons dwindle.

In the first 10 months after Russia invaded Ukraine, prompting Washington to approve $33 billion in military aid so far, the United States sent Ukraine so many Stinger missiles from its own stocks that it would take 13 years� worth of production at recent capacity levels to replace them. It has sent so many Javelin missiles that it would take five years at last year�s rates to replace them, according to Raytheon, the company that helps make the missile systems.

If a large-scale war broke out with China, within about one week the United States would run out of so-called long-range anti-ship missiles, a vital weapon in any engagement with China, according to a series of war-game exercises conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank.

The shortcomings in the nation�s defense industrial base are vividly illustrated by the shortage of solid rocket motors needed to power a broad range of precision missile systems, like the ship-launched SM-6 missiles made by Raytheon.

It was the shortage of SM-6 missiles in particular that had Admiral Caudle fuming; they are used to defend ships against enemy aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and cruise missiles.

There are only two contractors today that build large numbers of rocket motors for missile systems used by the Air Force, the Navy, the Army and the Marines, down from six in 1995.

A recent fire disrupted the assembly line at one of the two remaining suppliers, Aerojet Rocketdyne, causing further delays in delivering the SM-6 and other precision missile systems, even as Pentagon orders for thousands of new missiles pile up.

�Rocket motors, a bane of my existence, continued to be a problem,� Gregory Hayes, Raytheon�s chief executive, told Wall Street analysts last month. He said the shortage would affect the company�s ability to deliver new missiles on time and was a problem unlikely to be solved �until probably the middle of �24.�

Aerojet is building motors for older systems such as Javelin anti-armor missiles and Stinger antiaircraft missiles, of which over 10,000 have already been sent to Ukraine. It is also building new rockets needed to power so-called hypersonic missiles that can travel much faster, as well as the rockets for a new generation of nuclear weapons for the United States and even the rocket for a new NASA spaceship soon headed to the moon.

The result is billions of dollars in backlogged orders at the company � and frustration at the Pentagon about the pace of delivery.

�At the end of the day, I want the magazines filled,� Admiral Caudle told contractors and Navy personnel in January, referring to the storage areas on his ships for guided missiles. �OK? I want the ships� tubes filled.�

Other shortages slowing production include simple items such as ball bearings, a key component of certain missile guidance systems, and steel castings, used in making engines.

There is also only one company, Williams International, that builds turbofan engines for most cruise missiles, according to Seth G. Jones, a former Defense Department official now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, weapons that would be vital for any war with China given their long range.

The current problems have their roots in the aftermath of the Cold War�s end, when a drive for the �peace dividend� led to cuts in weapons procurement and consolidation of the industry.

In 1993, Norman Augustine, then the chief executive of Martin Marietta, one of the largest of the military contractors, received an invitation to a dinner with Defense Secretary Les Aspin, who was helping President Bill Clinton figure out how to shrink military spending.

When he arrived, more than a dozen other chief executives from major contractors were there for a gathering that would become known as �The Last Supper.� The message delivered to the industry by Mr. Aspin was that many of the companies needed to disappear, by merging or going out of business.

https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/last-supper-typed-norm-augustine/f9c5cc70afb5a019/full.pdf

�The cost would be enormous of maintaining the half-full factories, factory assembly lines,� Mr. Augustine, now 87, said in an interview at a coffee shop near his Maryland home, recalling the message shared with the executives. �The government was not going to tell us who the survivors would be � we were going to have to figure that out.�

Mr. Augustine still has a copy of a detailed �Last Supper� chart broken down by weapons systems that he typed up after the dinner. The total number of shipyards and tactical missile makers would each be cut to four from eight, while the number of rocket-motor manufacturers would be reduced to two from five.

Soon enough, Martin Marietta acquired GE Aerospace and General Dynamics� Space Systems, and then merged with California-based Lockheed Corporation to form what is now known as Lockheed Martin.

�The conclusion they made � to get rid of most of the headquarters and the C.E.O.s and get the people left in the business operating at 100 percent, I think that was the right conclusion at the time,� Mr. Augustine said. �But it had long-term consequences. The challenge we face today was one of our own creation.�

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States � from the perspective of demands on its industrial base � has faced either short, high-intensity fights, like the first Persian Gulf war in 1990-91 and periods of the Iraq war starting in 2003, or prolonged but lower-intensity conflicts like the decades-long war in Afghanistan, said Michael E. O�Hanlon, a Brookings Institution military scholar.

But even these engagements, far different in scale from potential confrontations with other major powers, exposed the emerging risks: By 2016, the United States ran short of precision missiles after a series of fights in Afghanistan then Iraq, Libya and finally Syria.

The Pentagon briefly ramped up production to rebuild missile supplies, but it was a temporary move, said William A. LaPlante, the under secretary of defense who oversees acquisition. Defense Department leaders, and lawmakers who set the budget, would often turn to missile programs to cut spending totals.

Prodded by military industry lobbyists � and the hundreds of retired high-ranking military officers they have hired to their sales and marketing teams � the government has instead mostly focused on buying new ships, planes and other extremely high-priced pieces of equipment, where the major contractors make most of their money.

Lobbyists have also pushed Congress to hold on to older ships and planes that even the Defense Department says have limited military value but which burn large amounts of money to equip and staff.

But the lower-priced items � like the missiles and other munitions � became an easy way to cut budgets to keep up spending on the big-ticket items.

�It becomes very attractive when our budgets are being balanced, to balance them on the munitions funds, because it�s fungible money,� Mr. LaPlante said. �We really allowed production lines to go cold and watched as parts became obsolete.�

That habit has also extended to European allies such as Poland, which has committed to buying F-35 fighter jets, which cost about $80 million apiece, but not enough missiles to use them for more than about two weeks in a war, said Mr. Hayes, the chief executive of Raytheon, whose Pratt & Whitney division builds engines for the fighter.

�We spend a lot of money on some very exquisite large systems, and we do not spend or focus as much on the munitions necessary to support those,� Mr. Hayes said in December. �Nobody�s buying the weapons systems necessary to engage for anything other than a very, very short-term battle.�

The Pentagon is now working to jettison an approach built around a Walmart-style just-in-time philosophy of keeping inventory low and instead focusing more on production capacity, Mr. LaPlante said in an interview.

The Biden White House this month proposed a 51 percent increase in the budget to buy missiles and munitions compared with 2022, reaching a total of $30.6 billion.

And that is just the start. The White House�s proposed budget just for Air Force missile procurement is set to jump to nearly $13 billion by 2028 from $2.2 billion in 2021. (Congress is just beginning to consider the administration�s proposals and those from both parties on Capitol Hill.)

Major contractors like Lockheed Martin, with the support of the Pentagon, are looking across the United States to bring on new suppliers for missile programs. The Defense Department is also sending in teams to help them eliminate bottlenecks, including turning to allies from around the world to find particular parts in short supply that are holding back assembly lines.

Last year, Lockheed could produce 7,500 of the artillery rockets that Ukrainian troops have fired to great effect from HIMARS launchers. This year, that number will jump to 10,000. But that is still far less than the Pentagon needs, even just to resupply Ukraine, and it is one of more than a dozen rocket and missile systems that contractors are now rushing to expand.

The surge in spending is likely to translate in the long run into increased profits at military contractors. But in the short term several of them, like Lockheed, continue to struggle to hire workers and eliminate shortages of key components needed to meet the Pentagon�s demand.

Lockheed expects its revenues to remain flat this year, even as the federal government pushes up spending.

Building up the additional needed capacity is likely to take several years.

�Any time you see an analysis that says, hey, we might not be prepared to achieve our strategic objectives, that�s concerning,� Frank A. St. John, the chief operating officer at Lockheed Martin, the nation�s largest military contractor, said in an interview. �We are on a path to address that need.�

Congress in December gave the Pentagon new power to award military contractors multiyear contracts to buy missile systems, providing financial commitments that allow them to hire more subcontractors or expand factories so they can build more missiles, knowing that there are profits to be made.

�It will give industry the real confirmation that they�re going to be in it for years to come,� Mr. LaPlante said. �That�s a big, big culture change.�

The Pentagon last year also created a team assigned to work with contractors to identify labor and supply chain shortages � and then gave out more than $2 billion in funding to quickly help resolve them.

That team started with a focus on resupplying weapons sent to Ukraine, Mr. LaPlante said, but it has now been set up as a more permanent unit inside the Pentagon to help the Defense Department make an �overall shift away from the just-in-time mind-set.�

In a reversal of post-Cold War policy, antitrust regulators have also increased scrutiny of continued military industry consolidation, with the Federal Trade Commission for example moving last year to block a $4.4 billion plan by Lockheed Martin to buy Aerojet Rocketdyne.

�We cannot afford to allow further concentration in markets critical to our national security and defense,� Holly Vedova, the director of the trade commission�s Bureau of Competition, said early last year, after the agency sued to block the deal.

Another major defense company, L3 Harris Technologies, which is the nation�s sixth largest, has moved to buy Aerojet, a deal that is still not completed. But contractors are also looking for new options to expand the ability to build rocket engines, with Lockheed asking for bids from a variety of potential new suppliers.

Aerojet has moved recently to expand its own rocket-engine plants in Arkansas and Alabama, where the company makes rocket motors for the SM-6 that the Navy is waiting for, as well as the PAC-3 missile, which Taiwan is waiting for as a defense against any incoming missile threats.

�D.O.D. leaders have signaled a critical need to replenish existing stockpiles,� the company said in a statement, �as well as a need to invest significantly to address overall munitions inventory.�

The Air Force has started to change the way it buys missile systems in part to expand the number of companies that manufacture key items like rocket engines, said Andrew Hunter, an assistant secretary at the Air Force in charge of acquisitions.

�It�s almost inconceivable that a single supplier is going to have the kind of capacity you�re going to need, if that conflict becomes extended,� he said after being asked about the rocket-engine shortage.

President Biden has also turned to the Defense Production Act � used during the pandemic to speed up the manufacturing of respirators and vaccines � to move ahead with new missile programs faster, including a number of hypersonic weapons being developed for the Air Force, the Army and the Navy.

All the moves have been needed because the United States underestimated the threats it now faces � or failed to prepare adequately, Pentagon officials acknowledged.

�No one anticipated the prolonged high-volume conflict we are seeing in Ukraine, or that we might see against a strategic competitor in the future,� Mr. LaPlante said this month, referring to China.

A surge in requests for weapons sales by the United States from allies in Europe and Asia will also help by creating more demand that can support domestic production lines.

For Taiwan alone, there is a $19 billion backlog of orders for American-made weapons � large chunks of it for Stinger missiles with rocket engines built by Aerojet that are already in short supply.

The Pentagon is also working with certain U.S. allies to create more partnerships, like a $1.2 billion contract awarded last year funding a joint project between Raytheon and the Norwegian defense firm Kongsberg to build a surface-to-air missile system called NASAMS that is being sent to Ukraine.

Ms. Hicks, the deputy defense secretary, said the goal is not necessarily to prepare to fight a war with China � it is to deter one from breaking out.

�Still, we must have the combat credibility to win if we must fight,� she said.

stephenthinkpad has issued a correction as of 12:50 on May 26, 2023

# ? May 26, 2023 12:43

Tankbuster: Oct 1, 2021

Cuttlefush posted:

yeah the veterans react genre has been around for a while and there are a bunch of those channels. it's annoying as gently caress.

pretty sure you can use ublock filters to kill some of them

I purged all that veteran talk by obsessively watching korean subtitled simpsons clips for a week. It really elevates the experience.

# ? May 26, 2023 13:59

Cerebral Bore: Apr 21, 2010; Fun Shoe

stephenthinkpad posted:

Some choice words from a MIC preparedness talk (the rest of the talk is not as interesting TBH with you)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XMctZ6EcWQw&t=288s

"This is not an accident....we planned it, this is deliberately done by the government. We decided we were not going to need the industrial base....ship yard, arsonal....You [MIC] guys figure it out (how to deindustrialize)"

He also reference a nyt article.
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/24/us/politics/military-weapons-ukraine-war.html

everything about this is really funny

quote:

�Look at me. I am not forgiving the fact you�re not delivering the ordnance we need. OK?� Adm. Daryl Caudle, who is in charge of delivering weapons to most of the Navy�s East Coast-based fleet, warned contractors during an industry gathering in January. �We�re talking about war-fighting, national security, and going against a competitor here and a potential adversary that is like nothing we�ve ever seen. And we can�t dillydally around with these deliveries.�

like, what the gently caress is this guy gonna do about it lmao, he's talking to the guys who own his boss

# ? May 26, 2023 14:22

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# ? May 24, 2024 04:25

KomradeX: Oct 29, 2011

Cerebral Bore posted:

everything about this is really funny

like, what the gently caress is this guy gonna do about it lmao, he's talking to the guys who own his boss

That guy spent his life upholidng the sysytem that in the end is undermining the ability of the people who protect that sysytem. All of that is completely lost on him

# ? May 27, 2023 03:44

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > C-SPAM > The US will lose WW3

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