Ukraine: The Aristoblyats

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cr0y: Mar 24, 2005

Wait, Lukashenko has been hospitalized? Has that been confirmed? I just got back from a trip and might be way behind on news but I don't think I saw it mentioned here.

# ? May 28, 2023 03:48

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# ? Jun 1, 2024 00:36

Qtotonibudinibudet: Nov 7, 2011; Omich poluyobok, skazhi ty narkoman? ya prosto tozhe gde to tam zhivu, mogli by vmeste uyobyvat' narkotiki

Just rumors so far.

# ? May 28, 2023 03:59

Hyrax Attack!: Jan 13, 2009; We demand to be taken seriously

honda whisperer posted:

In this thread? Most of us. Hell on all of SA more than average. As a country? Not even a little bit. Telling a coworker that we have more carriers than the rest of the world put together gets a "nuh uh".

I think the volunteer only +20 years of Iraq and Afghanistan, we'll take anybody heavy on the contractor history has warped people's brains. Army can't be big if it's desperate for troops and no draft. Also we're bad at big numbers so $850,000,000,000 a year that nobody really argues over sounds like the guy from Idiocracy yelling "SHUT UP".

It�s so dang discouraging reading articles from the 90s about how with the USSR gone why would we need a colossal military, so let�s divert funds to domestic programs. Kinda lives on with Simpsons referencing base closures.

# ? May 28, 2023 04:12

PurpleXVI: Oct 30, 2011; Spewing insults, pissing off all your neighbors, betraying your allies, backing out of treaties and accords, and generally screwing over the global environment?
ALL PART OF MY BRILLIANT STRATEGY!

cr0y posted:

Wait, Lukashenko has been hospitalized? Has that been confirmed? I just got back from a trip and might be way behind on news but I don't think I saw it mentioned here.

Like with Putin, the last year or so has been full of rumours about his ill health which I suspect are wishful thinking. He showed up to a couple of events with a bandaged hand, but otherwise doesn't look on death's door. Then he was out of the public eye for a couple of weeks, which made the usual rumour mongers go berserk, but he popped up again looking as fine as a man of his age can.

# ? May 28, 2023 11:42

Murgos: Oct 21, 2010

Hyrax Attack! posted:

It�s so dang discouraging reading articles from the 90s about how with the USSR gone why would we need a colossal military, so let�s divert funds to domestic programs. Kinda lives on with Simpsons referencing base closures.

If the defense budget was the same portion of GDP as in 1985 it would be 1.7 trillion.

# ? May 29, 2023 00:18

Computer viking: May 30, 2011; Now with less breakage.

Murgos posted:

If the defense budget was the same portion of GDP as in 1985 it would be 1.7 trillion.

For those of us who don't offhand know these things: The 2022 budget was apparently 0.753 trillion.

# ? May 29, 2023 02:28

lightpole: Jun 4, 2004; I think that MBAs are useful, in case you are looking for an answer to the question of "Is lightpole a total fucking idiot".

It went something like defense spending up with Reagan and HW, Clinton cuts, huge increase under W (and a lot of "oh thank God W won Gore would never be able to handle 911), supposed cuts under Obama so the GOP could talk poo poo right?

# ? May 29, 2023 03:43

Jimmy Smuts: Aug 8, 2000

At least those of us stupid enough to still be in are benefiting. Does the budget also include the VA? I'd take a pay cut if it meant that it goes to the VA

# ? May 29, 2023 04:33

Suicide Watch: Sep 8, 2009

interesting piece on Ukrainian military intelligence operations https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/how-ukrainian-military-spies-are-beating-their-russian-rivals-q7n2kqch2

# ? May 29, 2023 06:01

FirstnameLastname: Jul 10, 2022

bulletsponge13 posted:

My 2 Cents- If any state actor attacked mainland America, they would try and do as much damage with that initial uppercut as possible- that means WMD, terrorist type activities, and an attempt at drawn out timeline of operations using Sleeper Cells/SoF/Unconventional sources.

It's totally doable with not much. If someone wanted to, they start by destabilizing the nation by attacking infrastructure- power substations are notoriously vulnerable. You make the highways dangerous enough, you stop US logistics. Even worse would be to release a CBRNE agent. Even something as innocuous in the public mind of Small Pox could wreck havoc before identified. If it were weaponized, genetically modified, or a similar agent was used, it could rack up piles of bodies to rival the early days of COVID. Combine this with a robust CyberPropaganda wing, and you could have America destroying itself. If the enemy were to concentrate on the American people as the target of all operations and not the C2, they could have us do the hard work, then strike. Assuming WMDs are off the table (which, I wouldn't. America would have little qualms using them on an enemy, so that should be an early consideration), there is no way to wage a "conventional war" in US territory.

There is no conventional war any longer. It's all cross spectrum- in a straight fight, I doubt there are many who would give us a real run for our money if we took the gloves off. But that isn't how wars are fought any longer, and I think the tendency to define doctrine based around Conventional/Unconventional is flawed and outdated. The strategies of them are different, but we should be thinking of war in totality, if that makes sense.

gently caress that hire 1000 people give em wranglers and durangos and tell them to gently caress up rushhour traffic every single day in LA, DC, NY, houston seattle cleveland and atlanta by blocking all the lanes, causing crashes and 'breaking down' in the middle of offramps

it would bring this country to its knees

# ? May 29, 2023 06:32

god please help me: Jul 9, 2018; I LOVE GIVING MY TAX MONEY AND MY PERSONAL INCOME TO UKRAINE, SLAVA

Suicide Watch posted:

interesting piece on Ukrainian military intelligence operations https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/how-ukrainian-military-spies-are-beating-their-russian-rivals-q7n2kqch2

It's paywalled.

# ? May 29, 2023 06:53

Infidelicious: Apr 9, 2013

FirstnameLastname posted:

gently caress that hire 1000 people give em wranglers and durangos and tell them to gently caress up rushhour traffic every single day in LA, DC, NY, houston seattle cleveland and atlanta by blocking all the lanes, causing crashes and 'breaking down' in the middle of offramps

it would bring this country to its knees

That's business as usual.

# ? May 29, 2023 08:16

Alan Smithee: Jan 4, 2005; A man becomes preeminent, he's expected to have enthusiasms.

Enthusiasms, enthusiasms...

FirstnameLastname posted:

gently caress that hire 1000 people give em wranglers and durangos and tell them to gently caress up rushhour traffic every single day in LA, DC, NY, houston seattle cleveland and atlanta by blocking all the lanes, causing crashes and 'breaking down' in the middle of offramps

it would bring this country to its knees

Well there�s your problem

Russia has no problem hiring

The paying is where it all breaks down

# ? May 29, 2023 08:46

Godholio: Aug 28, 2002; Does a bear split in the woods near Zheleznogorsk?

Jimmy Smuts posted:

At least those of us stupid enough to still be in are benefiting. Does the budget also include the VA? I'd take a pay cut if it meant that it goes to the VA

VA funding does not fall under defense spending.

# ? May 29, 2023 13:31

Suicide Watch: Sep 8, 2009

god please help me posted:

It's paywalled.

https://archive.ph/D2A8q

# ? May 29, 2023 14:11

Alchenar: Apr 9, 2008

I'm not sure if this was posted last week, RUSI released another bit of excellent research: Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine

Executive Summary posted:

The scale of Russian losses in 2022, combined with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation confronting NATO systems they had not previously contended with, has caused a significant deviation in Russian operations from the country�s doctrine. This report seeks to outline how Russian forces have adapted their tactics in the Ukrainian conflict and the challenges this has created for the Ukrainian military that must be overcome. The report examines Russian military adaptation by combat function.

Russian infantry tactics have shifted from trying to deploy uniform Battalion Tactical Groups as combined arms units of action to a stratified division by function into line, assault, specialised and disposable troops. These are formed into task-organised groupings. Line infantry are largely used for ground holding and defensive operations. Disposable infantry are used for continuous skirmishing to either identify Ukrainian firing positions, which are then targeted by specialised infantry, or to find weak points in Ukrainian defences to be prioritised for assault. Casualties are very unevenly distributed across these functions. The foremost weakness across Russian infantry units is low morale, which leads to poor unit cohesion and inter-unit cooperation.

Russian engineering has proven to be one of the stronger branches of the Russian military. Russian engineers have been constructing complex obstacles and field fortifications across the front. This includes concrete reinforced trenches and command bunkers, wire-entanglements, hedgehogs, anti-tank ditches, and complex minefields. Russian mine laying is extensive and mixes anti-tank and victim-initiated anti-personnel mines, the latter frequently being laid with multiple initiation mechanisms to complicate breaching. These defences pose a major tactical challenge to Ukrainian offensive operations.

Russian armour is rarely used for attempts at breakthrough. Instead, armour is largely employed in a fire support function to deliver accurate fire against Ukrainian positions. Russia has started to employ thermal camouflage on its vehicles and, using a range of other modifications and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), has significantly reduced the detectability of tanks at stand-off ranges. Furthermore, these measures have reduced the probability of kill of a variety of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) at ranges beyond 1,400 m.

Russian artillery has begun to significantly refine the Reconnaissance Strike Complex following the destruction of its ammunition stockpiles and command and control infrastructure by guided multiple-launch rocket systems (GMLRS) in July 2022. This has resulted in much closer integration of multiple UAVs directly supporting commanders authorised to apply fires. Russian artillery has also improved its ability to fire from multiple positions and to fire and move, reducing susceptibility to counterbattery fire. The key system enabling this coordination appears to be the Strelets system. There has been a shift in reliance upon 152-mm howitzers to a much greater emphasis on 120-mm mortars in Russian fires; this reflects munitions and barrel availability. Responsive Russian fires represent the greatest challenge to Ukrainian offensive operations. Russian artillery is also increasingly relying on loitering munitions for counterbattery fires.

Russian electronic warfare (EW) remains potent, with an approximate distribution of at least one major system covering each 10 km of front. These systems are heavily weighted towards the defeat of UAVs and tend not to try and deconflict their effects. Ukrainian UAV losses remain at approximately 10,000 per month. Russian EW is also apparently achieving real time interception and decryption of Ukrainian Motorola 256-bit encrypted tactical communications systems, which are widely employed by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Russian air defences have also seen a significant increase in their effectiveness now that they are set up around known, and fairly static, locations and are properly connected. Although Russia has persistently struggled to respond to emerging threats, over time it has adapted. Russian air defences are now assessed by the Ukrainian military to be intercepting a proportion of GMLRS strikes as Russian point defences are directly connected to superior radar.

Russian aviation remains constrained to delivering stand-off effects, ranging from responsive lofted S-8 salvos against Ukrainian forming-up points, to FAB-500 glide bombs delivered from medium altitude to ranges up to 70 km. The Ukrainian military notes that Russia has a large stockpile of FAB-500s and is systematically upgrading them with glide kits. Although they only have limited accuracy, the size of these munitions poses a serious threat. The Russian Aerospace Forces remain a �force in being� and a major threat to advancing Ukrainian forces, although they currently lack the capabilities to penetrate Ukrainian air defences.

Following the destruction of Russian command and control infrastructure in July 2022, the Russian military withdrew major headquarters out of range of GMLRS and placed them in hardened structures. They also wired them into the Ukrainian civil telecommunications network and used field cables to branch from this to brigade headquarters further forward. Assigned assets tend to connect to these headquarters via microlink, significantly reducing their signature. At the same time, from the battalion down, Russian forces largely rely on unencrypted analogue military radios, reflecting a shortage of trained signallers at the tactical level.

An overview of Russian adaptation reveals a force that is able to improve and evolve its employment of key systems. There is evidence of a centralised process for identifying shortcomings in employment and the development of mitigations. Nevertheless, much of this adaptation is reactive and is aimed at making up for serious deficiencies in Russian units. The result is a structure that becomes better over time at managing the problems it immediately faces, but also one that struggles to anticipate new threats. The conclusion therefore is that the Russian Armed Forces pose a significant challenge for the Ukrainian military on the defence. Nevertheless, if Ukraine can disrupt Russian defences and impose a dynamic situation on them, Russian units are likely to rapidly lose their coordination. Changes in the air combat environment, for example, have led rapidly to incidents of Russian fratricide.

e: sacrificing the mobilised to preserve the professional is very 'an army that has a country'.

Alchenar fucked around with this message at 21:44 on May 29, 2023

# ? May 29, 2023 21:39

PurpleXVI: Oct 30, 2011; Spewing insults, pissing off all your neighbors, betraying your allies, backing out of treaties and accords, and generally screwing over the global environment?
ALL PART OF MY BRILLIANT STRATEGY!

Ten thousand UAV's per month lost? That seems insane and like it's suffering from a misplaced 0 or two.

# ? May 29, 2023 21:47

Subjunctive: Sep 12, 2006; ✨sparkle and shine✨

Real-time decryption of a 256-bit encryption system is a little surprising to me!

# ? May 29, 2023 21:54

Kesper North: Nov 3, 2011; EMERGENCY POWER TO PARTY

Subjunctive posted:

Real-time decryption of a 256-bit encryption system is a little surprising to me!

It's not unprecedented. A few possibilities:

- Keys were obtained by human assets
- Motorola rolled their own crypto and there's a flaw in their implementation
- EM sidechannel attacks (very difficult, but possible)

# ? May 29, 2023 22:03

Hannibal Rex: Feb 13, 2010

PurpleXVI posted:

Ten thousand UAV's per month lost? That seems insane and like it's suffering from a misplaced 0 or two.

There's a bit more context for that.

https://twitter.com/Jack_Watling/status/1659577075366342656?s=20

# ? May 29, 2023 22:06

psydude: Apr 1, 2008

Kesper North posted:

It's not unprecedented. A few possibilities:

- Keys were obtained by human assets
- Motorola rolled their own crypto and there's a flaw in their implementation
- EM sidechannel attacks (very difficult, but possible)

1 and 2 are my bet, with 2 being the most likely contender assuming Ukraine is rotating keys correctly.

# ? May 29, 2023 22:07

Subjunctive: Sep 12, 2006; ✨sparkle and shine✨

Yeah I thought it might have been Super Special Encryption, but don�t they have to interoperate with other makers? Key material getting compromised seems like the most likely thing but then talking about real-time decryption is weird since they�re just listening like all the other participants!

# ? May 29, 2023 22:07

Antigravitas: Dec 8, 2019; Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:

Subjunctive posted:

Real-time decryption of a 256-bit encryption system is a little surprising to me!

But that doesn't actually mean anything. The interesting properties of a crypto system are basically anything but its "bitness".

# ? May 29, 2023 22:15

Subjunctive: Sep 12, 2006; ✨sparkle and shine✨

Antigravitas posted:

But that doesn't actually mean anything. The interesting properties of a crypto system are basically anything but its "bitness".

Yeah I was assuming a modern stream cipher with traditional key sizing. Key width matters for brute forcing (or assisted brute forcing via weakening attacks on the cipher that reduce the effective key size), but that�s not the only way to defeat a crypto system obviously.

# ? May 29, 2023 22:17

The X-man cometh: Nov 1, 2009

How many of those UAVs are suicide drones?

# ? May 29, 2023 22:19

spankmeister: Jun 15, 2008

As you know straight up brute-forcing a 256 bit key is impossible. So there has to be a flaw in the system or the Russians got their hands on some key material

# ? May 29, 2023 22:21

psydude: Apr 1, 2008

Subjunctive posted:

Yeah I thought it might have been Super Special Encryption, but don’t they have to interoperate with other makers? Key material getting compromised seems like the most likely thing but then talking about real-time decryption is weird since they’re just listening like all the other participants!

If what I'm reading on the Motorola website is correct, it's looking like Russia's probably stealing the keys. I think it's unlikely there's a flaw in the AES implementation on the radios, and I think it's also unlikely Russia would allow something like that to be used operationally in this war, since it would be divulging a major vulnerability that NATO users of the radios would make Motorola quickly fix.

# ? May 29, 2023 22:23

Bell_: Sep 3, 2006; Tiny Baltimore
A billion light years away
A goon's posting the same thing
But he's already turned to dust
And the shitpost we read
Is a billion light-years old
A ghost just like the rest of us

Coordinating COMSEC custodians suck for a number of units in the best of times.

They're not experiencing the best of times.

# ? May 29, 2023 22:24

Subjunctive: Sep 12, 2006; ✨sparkle and shine✨

Yeah I was going to ask if anyone had suggestions for an overview of how key management works for these sorts of systems.

# ? May 29, 2023 22:26

spankmeister: Jun 15, 2008

Key management is hard to do well. If the Russians managed to access the place where the radios are provisioned (either though hacking or HUMIT) then all bets are off.

# ? May 29, 2023 22:26

spankmeister: Jun 15, 2008

It's often way simpler than that though. They might have captured a few radios and extract the keys off of it, and the Ukrainians haven't rotated their keys yet. I have no idea how easy or hard it is to change the keys but it'd probably be a nightmare to coordinate a key rollover between all the users. Then again, surely the compromise of a radio is something that has been taken into consideration when designing such a radio for military use? Some more info on the key schedule would be nice to have.

# ? May 29, 2023 22:30

Xakura: Jan 10, 2019; A safety-conscious little mouse!

spankmeister posted:

Some more info on the key schedule would be nice to have.

# ? May 29, 2023 22:32

Comrade Blyatlov: Aug 4, 2007; should have picked four fingers

quote:

Nevertheless, if Ukraine can disrupt Russian defences and impose a dynamic situation on them, Russian units are likely to rapidly lose their coordination. Changes in the air combat environment, for example, have led rapidly to incidents of Russian fratricide.

That sure is a thing

# ? May 29, 2023 22:55

Tuna-Fish: Sep 13, 2017

spankmeister posted:

it'd probably be a nightmare to coordinate a key rollover between all the users.

In normal use, you rotate the keys several times a day. Managing the distribution of keys is something that takes significant work, but it is a solved problem, that all competent militaries do.

# ? May 29, 2023 23:10

bulletsponge13: Apr 28, 2010

Tuna-Fish posted:

In normal use, you rotate the keys several times a day. Managing the distribution of keys is something that takes significant work, but it is a solved problem, that all competent militaries do.

I imagine part of the issue is captured equipment; the US military changed Crypto keys with a regular schedule, unless a piece of equipment was lost, which required all of theater (at the time) to get new keys. With the constant back and forth trench assaults and counter attacks means their is no end to the possible compromises of comms just from casualties and captures.

# ? May 30, 2023 00:05

Gabrielite: Apr 24, 2008

�We have approved the dates for the start of the movement of our troops, the decisions have been made, I thank the brigades that prepared for this,� President Volodymyr #Zelensky said. @KyivPost - Twitter.com

# ? May 30, 2023 01:01

Hyperlynx: Sep 13, 2015

I wonder why they don't use asymmetric encryption for key exchange? I guess that must have its own drawbacks...

# ? May 30, 2023 01:13

bennyfactor: Nov 21, 2008

spankmeister posted:

It's often way simpler than that though. They might have captured a few radios and extract the keys off of it, and the Ukrainians haven't rotated their keys yet. I have no idea how easy or hard it is to change the keys but it'd probably be a nightmare to coordinate a key rollover between all the users. Then again, surely the compromise of a radio is something that has been taken into consideration when designing such a radio for military use? Some more info on the key schedule would be nice to have.

There's a number of apparent open-source shortcomings with the encryption on P25 radios including "switch markings for secure and clear modes difficult to distinguish (∅ vs. o). This is exacerbated by the fact that P25 radios when set to secure mode continue to operate without issuing a warning if another party switches to clear mode. In addition, the report authors said many P25 systems change keys too often, increasing the risk that an individual radio on a net may not be properly keyed, forcing all users on the net to transmit in the clear to maintain communications with that radio" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_25#Security_flaws

# ? May 30, 2023 01:20

cr0y: Mar 24, 2005

Hyperlynx posted:

I wonder why they don't use asymmetric encryption for key exchange? I guess that must have its own drawbacks...

I'm sure they do, in reality I bet it's all just RSA and AES with giant keys as they are tried and true encryption algorithms.

# ? May 30, 2023 01:22

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# ? Jun 1, 2024 00:36

Vincent Van Goatse: Nov 8, 2006; Enjoy every sandwich.; Smellrose

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https://twitter.com/ABC/status/1663137874567413760

# ? May 30, 2023 01:24

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