(Thread IKs:
fatherboxx)
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I think it would be unwise, but I do find it plausible that Russia is unwilling to give up territory. War is political, after all. Gerasimov: "Hey, Putin, can we build some fortifications?" Putin: "Sure, sure, go ahead" : proceeds to build defensive positions based on Russian doctrine which assumes a defense in depth and loss of territory in order to win. : Gerasimov: "We're going to start moving back to the main defensive line." Putin: "No, you can't do that! We need to retain as much of these oblasts as we can for as long as we can. We only need to outlast the West's support." Xiahou Dun posted:Comedy prediction : they rushed the soldiers’ train too much and they literally can’t defend in depth. No one on the ground really knows how. The photographic evidence suggests that someone on the Russian military leadership side knows what they're doing (it was probably Surovikin). It's possible that their junior field grade officer ranks have been so decimated that they can't conduct a fighting withdrawal, but I'm doubtful of that. I think Russia is very intentionally defending the gray zone.
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# ? Jul 12, 2023 22:17 |
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# ? Jun 8, 2024 06:19 |
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Herstory Begins Now posted:the more orthodox voenkors have been arguing rather desperately that this will be the time where a NATO summit leads to everyone deciding that Ukraine isn't worth supporting [because the offensive wasn't an instant, huge success and that everyone should give up and let Russia win]. there's been a fair amount of Russian messaging around this and I expect it to end up as fruitless as every other instances of 'western support will dry up for Ukraine any day now' I will just say that much like how NATO clearly has a better grasp of the situation than we do, at the same time the Russian government likely has a better understanding of what is and is not likely to come out of this summit than their most delusional supporters. They may be sending out a message for propaganda purposes but I doubt they truly believe that Ukraine will be abandoned by their allies any time soon and I doubt that would much motivate their actions on the battlefield.
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# ? Jul 12, 2023 22:18 |
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Cpt_Obvious posted:Hasn't foreign support for Ukraine effectively dried up tho? There is a severe scarcity of weapons and equipment, not to mention vehicles. Ukraine has no air force to speak of and is down to the last shells that the US has dug out of the basement. Meanwhile, their manpower supply is far, far smaller than Russias to begin with. What is the point at which they negotiate peace? Put this post up on the big board of incredibly wrong takes along with Grover's Iraq predictions and the guy in the previous thread who thought modern amphibious assaults involved a thousand guys piling into hundreds of inflatable zodiacs and driving them up onto the beach.
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# ? Jul 12, 2023 22:18 |
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Well, apparently the Prigozhin trend of recording grievances as voice messages continues and a general that was sacked today decided to blast Gerasimov. Message was posted by Duma deputy Gurulev who commanded the same army as this one some time ago https://twitter.com/nik0p0l5/status/1679229488993796097?t=XAYa0mYkKdiJWWo9MeDLuA&s=19 Fun detail, the general's callsign is Spartacus and he calls his soldiers here "gladiators", cute fatherboxx fucked around with this message at 22:29 on Jul 12, 2023 |
# ? Jul 12, 2023 22:24 |
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Moon Slayer posted:Put this post up on the big board of incredibly wrong takes along with Grover's Iraq predictions and the guy in the previous thread who thought modern amphibious assaults involved a thousand guys piling into hundreds of inflatable zodiacs and driving them up onto the beach. I’m gonna need more info on that last one.
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# ? Jul 12, 2023 22:28 |
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Starsfan posted:^^edit: I don't think it's a great comparison because Kherson had some different factors at play.. there were much fewer Russians in Ukraine at that time (it was pre-mobilization) and the Russians retreated primarily due to logistical concerns rather than being driven out of their defensive positions by the pressure of Ukrainian attacks.. And I'm aware there are arguments out there that Ukraine is striking Russia's logistical capability every day and that things could get dicey on the southern front at some point, but I have a hard time believing that Ukraine could ever put the sort of pressure on Russia's supply lines here that they could exert in Kherson where those lines extended over a huge river. To be clear, my point is that the Kherson offensive was way easier for Ukraine and still took well over a month to show progress, thus the current offensive not showing significant progress within a month is unsurprising.
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# ? Jul 12, 2023 22:31 |
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Chalks posted:To be clear, my point is that the Kherson offensive was way easier for Ukraine and still took well over a month to show progress, thus the current offensive not showing significant progress within a month is unsurprising. yes I agree with that, my post actually did include a line at one point about it being a good message despite the tenuous of the comparison but I lost it at some point in the editing
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# ? Jul 12, 2023 22:36 |
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Starsfan posted:I will just say that much like how NATO clearly has a better grasp of the situation than we do, at the same time the Russian government likely has a better understanding of what is and is not likely to come out of this summit than their most delusional supporters. They may be sending out a message for propaganda purposes but I doubt they truly believe that Ukraine will be abandoned by their allies any time soon and I doubt that would much motivate their actions on the battlefield. Absolutely nothing during this entire war has suggested unclogged sober analysis in the Russian leadership.
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# ? Jul 12, 2023 22:44 |
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Xiahou Dun posted:I’m gonna need more info on that last one. Boris Galerkin posted:Ok so I made a quip about how clothes exists in regards to an amphibious assault because I thought that amphibious assault meant you drive your inflatable boat up onto the beach and then everyone rushes off so you don’t really get wet. Boris Galerkin posted:I’m sorry I don’t jerk off to military porn and war movies and video games.
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# ? Jul 12, 2023 22:52 |
If you don't buy the "western support will dry up and then we will win in Ukraine" line as a Russian, what is your theory of victory? Nothing, that's what. So you'll convince yourself that is possible and can happen at any moment, because the alternative is accepting you can't force a victory.
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# ? Jul 12, 2023 22:53 |
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Starsfan posted:I will just say that much like how NATO clearly has a better grasp of the situation than we do, at the same time the Russian government likely has a better understanding of what is and is not likely to come out of this summit than their most delusional supporters. They may be sending out a message for propaganda purposes but I doubt they truly believe that Ukraine will be abandoned by their allies any time soon and I doubt that would much motivate their actions on the battlefield. As far as anyone can meaningfully discern, the idea of extremely fragile foreign support for Ukraine has been a cornerstone of Russian internal analysis of Ukraine's position going back to well before the war even started. As in the analysis actually driving decisionmaking. There's been a somewhat evolving list of reasons for why support is supposedly so thin and likely to dry up, but that narrative has been omnipresent and always seems to pop back up. It does get messaged on (remember the europe will freeze commercials?), but it's also been the crux of their concrete efforts as well, it just continually fails to pan out. It does make sense as a goal to be worked towards because indeed severing foreign support for Ukraine is basically the one thing that could rapidly improve Russia's position or even give them a victory so it's probably never going away completely. If we could go back 16 months I'd be amazed if even a percent of Russian defense analysts thought that the west was about to commit to Ukraine this hard. Hell, if you go back 9+ months ago they were convinced that republicans would have a wave election victory and would pull all support for Ukraine, this was taken as absolute fact and was boasted about. Nations absolutely do get things wrong and overvalue garbage inputs and the first 12 months of the war was very much a story of repeatedly misjudging that point on a policy level. the bigger question to me at this point is where that notion is even continuing to come from
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# ? Jul 12, 2023 22:56 |
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Nothingtoseehere posted:If you don't buy the "western support will dry up and then we will win in Ukraine" line as a Russian, what is your theory of victory? Okay, but it's *non*-Russians buying into the "Stronk Russia, we will bury you" worldview that's so weird. I guess it's the same for the "USA/NATO/EU/The West Bad" crew - but turning Russia into the protagonist in this story is just weird.
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# ? Jul 12, 2023 23:01 |
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Nothingtoseehere posted:If you don't buy the "western support will dry up and then we will win in Ukraine" line as a Russian, what is your theory of victory? The alternative Russian theory of "victory" would be doubling down on mobilization, importation of arms, and domestic MIC production and achieving something akin to favorable terms through sheer attrition.
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# ? Jul 12, 2023 23:07 |
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Speaking of long-term support for Ukraine, the G7 countries just announced long-term support,quote:“We will stand with Ukraine as it defends itself against Russian aggression, for as long as it takes.” Source, https://www.cnbc.com/2023/07/12/g7-announces-long-term-security-guarantees-for-ukraine.html Tighter integration between NATO and Ukraine was also announced, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_217320.htm quote:10. We reaffirm our unwavering solidarity with the government and people of Ukraine in the heroic defence of their nation, their land, and our shared values. We fully support Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. We remain steadfast in our commitment to further step up political and practical support to Ukraine as it continues to defend its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and will continue our support for as long as it takes. We welcome efforts of all Allies and partners engaged in providing support to Ukraine.
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# ? Jul 12, 2023 23:14 |
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Vox Nihili posted:The alternative Russian theory of "victory" would be doubling down on mobilization, importation of arms, and domestic MIC production and achieving something akin to favorable terms through sheer attrition. To quote a wiser man than I: Russia could, but can't, apparently
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# ? Jul 12, 2023 23:16 |
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Djarum posted:Yes and no. At a certain point you are going to lose out on the folks that have specialized training. For example pilots don't just appear, it is years of training to get a capable pilot. Yeah you can train any goober off the street how to shoot a rifle, load an artillery piece or even drive a tank to a certain extent. As time goes on those that know how to do the harder stuff will dry up. That is not even counting stuff that isn't as sexy like logistics officers but are probably more important than everything else. It is why Ukraine destroying command posts and supply depots are the most important things they can be doing. Taking out the guys that know where poo poo is and how to get it from A to B along with the guys leading means you have a massive degradation in capabilities. While nothing is wrong with what you said, it doesn't account for several things: 1) Western observers have noted that the Russians have taken great pains to protect the remaining core of the Russian army that has professional skills and there is strong evidence that it is primarily mobilized men that are suffering the bulk of casualties. 2) It does not take into consideration that special skills soldiers in the RuAF are being propagated forward to others. 3) There are no signs that the Russians are suffering an increase in losses to skilled personnel which would make their continued occupation untenable. I recently posted a piece on how Ukrainians are openly admitting that RuAF artillery is still plentiful so despite major strikes on supply depots, the guns are still firing Simply put there is no way to tell that they are not covering these losses with newly trained individuals. It's important to note that I am not claiming that they are covering these losses but there is nothing to support the assertion that these specialists are somehow finite in number and the RuAF has *no way* of replenishing their numbers on these key positions and are on some route of inevitable collapse. Chalks posted:It shouldn't amaze anyone that this one hasn't performed better than Kherson. The minefields are far worse than expected, but it'll be a good couple of months before you can start to say "ok, maybe this isn't going anywhere". And yet it is clear that Ukrainian leadership thought that it would do better than it has been now. The initial weeks of the offensive in June were the losses of the mine-clearing Leopards clearly indicated that the Ukrainians thought it was possible to roll through at least the buffer zone and the losses in were significant enough to trigger a pause and a review in tactics. https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1670649154601713664. Since then the operations have shifted more towards the tactics I have reported on - small infantry units moving forward with vehicles held back - and is now supported by the captured Russian document I posted and Ynglaur has reviewed. So we can be reasonably sure that things didn't go close to what the Ukrainians wanted or expected. Full credit though in that they adapted quickly and rather than try waste valuable lives and vehicles in subsequent attempts, they have gone into a more preparatory attrition phase before another attempt is made to break out the tanks. But it is perfectly valid to point out that reality has not met expectations, even for me when I had expected far fewer results than most. Ynglaur posted:I've seen some reports that indicate the Russian brigades in reserve positions are few weeks ago are in direct contact with Ukrainian forces. If true this is very interesting, because it means Russia is willing to expend reserves to save territory, rather than using a flexible defense and let Ukraine attrit itself against better defensive lines. Ynglaur posted:The photographic evidence suggests that someone on the Russian military leadership side knows what they're doing (it was probably Surovikin). It's possible that their junior field grade officer ranks have been so decimated that they can't conduct a fighting withdrawal, but I'm doubtful of that. I think Russia is very intentionally defending the gray zone. Is there the possibility that the Russians are unwilling to unmask their best defenses to what they consider to be half-hearted AFU attempts to move them out of the buffer zone? They have been willing to cede ground where it would appear to make sense. In the region north of Staromlynivka, multiple settlements like Makarivka, Rivnopil, and Blahodatne were given up pretty much without a fight (you will recall in early June a poster talked about a "collapse" of the Russian front in the area). Since the AFU attacks have shrunk back into these infantry probes, the Russians have similarly ceased pullbacks and are defending their strong points within the buffer area. I will add that there is generally no panic or major concern from Ru outlets on this from those who do report bad news.
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# ? Jul 12, 2023 23:34 |
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MikeC posted:Is there the possibility that the Russians are unwilling to unmask their best defenses to what they consider to be half-hearted AFU attempts to move them out of the buffer zone? They have been willing to cede ground where it would appear to make sense. In the region north of Staromlynivka, multiple settlements like Makarivka, Rivnopil, and Blahodatne were given up pretty much without a fight (you will recall in early June a poster talked about a "collapse" of the Russian front in the area). Since the AFU attacks have shrunk back into these infantry probes, the Russians have similarly ceased pullbacks and are defending their strong points within the buffer area. I will add that there is generally no panic or major concern from Ru outlets on this from those who do report bad news. it seems possible.. also on reflection it does occur to me that the main unique features of the more extensive fortifications to the south that were reported on in the media were 1) the so called "dragon's teeth" and 2) anti-tank ditches... along with the minefields, trench networks and bunkers that may be in common with the contact zone defensive area. It could be that given Ukraine has subsequently held back their armor after the first few days of the operation their is no real difference for the Russians in fighting where they are or further back.. they'll fall back as their defensive positions degrade, but the real purpose of the deeper fortifications was to catch the big armor first as it pushed through the front line and that hasn't happened and isn't going to happen any time soon apparently.
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# ? Jul 12, 2023 23:55 |
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https://kyivindependent.com/investigation-eu-inability-to-ramp-up-production-behind-acute-ammunition-shortages-in-ukraine/quote:Key findings: I've seen parts of this report before, but it's a comprehensive review of how European efforts at increasing ammunition production look like so far. Better make sure your blood pressure is low before you read.
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 00:39 |
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fatherboxx posted:Well, apparently the Prigozhin trend of recording grievances as voice messages continues and a general that was sacked today decided to blast Gerasimov. Message was posted by Duma deputy Gurulev who commanded the same army as this one some time ago When I read "gladiator", I don't think "capable professional warrior doing what he does best" so much as "slave soldier conscripted to fight day in, day out for a chance at glory, but not freedom"
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 00:40 |
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MikeC posted:While nothing is wrong with what you said, it doesn't account for several things: can you link me to who/where this is being stated?
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 00:59 |
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Hannibal Rex posted:https://kyivindependent.com/investigation-eu-inability-to-ramp-up-production-behind-acute-ammunition-shortages-in-ukraine/ Yeah, and this is a big part of why I'm not sure the attrition strategy that Russia has adopted (or really been forced into by default) is necessarily a losing one for them. A lot of that old Soviet production capacity for things like tube artillery shells, firearms, and IFVs is still there, whereas EU nations are essentially making arms on a hobby scale by comparison. The fantasy is that most Ukrainian troops at the front now have plentiful, specialized precision NATO weapons, whereas the ugly reality is that they're doing things like shaving fins off of incompatible mortar shells with angle grinders to get them to fire at all, probably compromising the accuracy of the munitions by doing so, while still relying on dwindling supplies of Soviet-era weapons for the most part. The piecemeal allocation of a random collection of arms and armaments in varying but generally minute quantities is just unbelievably far from ideal for peer-level warfare.
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 00:59 |
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https://www.innovationreform.org/2023/07/06/eirp-russia-energy-series-russias-oil-sector/ As a chaser, have an overview of the current status of Russia's oil sector. There's no miracles to expect here that would force Russia to withdraw because they suddenly can't run their oil wells. Productivity will decrease, but they'll shamble along. quote:Existing sanctions have severely limited the Russian oil industry. They have limited its
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 01:10 |
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Vox Nihili posted:Yeah, and this is a big part of why I'm not sure the attrition strategy that Russia has adopted (or really been forced into by default) is necessarily a losing one for them. A lot of that old Soviet production capacity for things like tube artillery shells, firearms, and IFVs is still there, whereas EU nations are essentially making arms on a hobby scale by comparison. Kind of, not really though. Most of that production infrastructure for the Soviet Union was located in the satellite states, not to mention a lot of Soviet era machining equipment that was located in Russia itself has been, up to this point, either been stolen, smuggled, sold to other nation states, or scrapped for equipment build in the west. What factories did survive are currently overwhelmed building parts to maintain the equipment that's currently in service and/or bringing older inventory back to being serviceable, they don't really have the resources to be spooling up new production. That's not even getting into the weeds of them suffering from labor shortages and the value of the ruble is starting to collapse.
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 01:18 |
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Herstory Begins Now posted:can you link me to who/where this is being stated? https://static.rusi.org/403-SR-Russian-Tactics-web-final.pdf RUSI posted:Casualties and the failure of the approach have led the AFRF to revert to relying on four infantry unit types: disposable; line; assault; and specialised. These are used in combination in both attack and defence, in a manner shaped by current operational challenges that is not formally codified in doctrine. Written in May, much of the videos and commentary from less formal sources back this view up. See my previous BBC link on the changing faces of Russian casualties for example. POW videos are almost exclusively of mobilized men in forward trenches.
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 01:30 |
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Back Hack posted:Kind of, not really though. Most of that production infrastructure for the Soviet Union was located in the satellite states, not to mention a lot of Soviet era machining equipment that was located in Russia itself has been, up to this point, either been stolen, smuggled, sold to other nation states, or scrapped for equipment build in the west. What factories did survive are currently overwhelmed building parts to maintain the equipment they currently and/or bring older inventory back to being serviceable, they doesn't really resources to be spooling up new productions. That's not even getting into the weeds of them suffering from labor shortages and the value of the ruble is starting to collapse. A lot of the corruption/shortage/incapacity line feels pretty handwavey in light of how much Russia has actually been manufacturing since 2014. For example, Russia produced something like 3.5 million standard 152 mm artillery shells between 2014 and 2021, and they have ramped up production significantly such that they are now allegedly pumping out over 2 million total shells a year; that's per British estimates. Those shells go on trains that take them straight from the factory to the front line, and they don't have to worry about fitting them into 30 different tubes when they arrive. Meanwhile, the EU and US are talking a lot about how their ramped up production will be online in 2025. Source article: https://archive.is/YgOdn It seems to me that when you look at the hard numbers (such as are actually available), the EU MIC is ephemeral compared to even the shadow of USSR production that remains within the modern borders of Russia, and it consists of a gigantic hodgepodge of incompatible systems. Russia has also mobilized itself in a way that Europe has been very slow to even begin to match.
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 01:46 |
Vox Nihili posted:It seems to me that when you look at the hard numbers (such as are actually available), the EU MIC is ephemeral compared to even the shadow of USSR production that remains within the modern borders of Russia, and it consists of a gigantic hodgepodge of incompatible systems. Russia has also mobilized itself in a way that Europe has been very slow to even begin to match. Why they losing then
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 01:54 |
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MikeC posted:https://static.rusi.org/403-SR-Russian-Tactics-web-final.pdf I'm curious specifically about the claim that it's mobiks that are suffering the majority of the casualties. I'm not aware that they are the majority of the disposable units, or at least have not been for much of this year. Though by sheer number of them and the amount of them that are clearly on the more forward lines, it's very possible that they are the majority of the casualties. Anecdotally it seems like the prisoner units, both under wagner and recently the mod organized storm units have been doing most of the dying, but I don't have anything concrete to point to there, either. Anyways it's a pretty minor distinction that doesn't hugely matter (beyond the larger impact of losing more socially and economically integrated mobiks vs prisoners), I'm just curious because I haven't seen much good data or even many experts weighing in on ru casualty makeup beyond vague statements, eg kofman stating that Ukrainians are concerned that they're trading good units for bad. on a related note, anyone seen any estimates of the number of people conscripted out of DPR and LPR? last estimates I saw on that were from mid 2022 and suggested ~140,000 conscripted by mid-june 2022
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 02:14 |
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Herstory Begins Now posted:I'm curious specifically about the claim that it's mobiks that are suffering the majority of the casualties. I'm not aware that they are the majority of the disposable units, or at least have not been for much of this year. Though by sheer number of them and the amount of them that are clearly on the more forward lines, it's very possible that they are the majority of the casualties. Anecdotally it seems like the prisoner units, both under wagner and recently the mod organized storm units have been doing most of the dying, but I don't have anything concrete to point to there, either. I may have used the term too loosely then. I have always lumped the non-Wagner prison stream with the regular drafted Russians as "mobilized men" to distinguish them from the contract high skilled professionals. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RU5dJjGYBPY&t=511s Do cigarette filters actually do a reasonable job at being ear protection?????? warning combat footage.
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 02:24 |
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Beaucoup Haram posted:Why they losing then Well, ignoring the weird tone here, I would say the invasion failed for the following reasons first and foremost:
The issue today for Ukraine is that it's really difficult to take back territory when your opponent has a huge advantage in artillery and air power, assuming they are at all competent and can dig in on the ground. The substantial gap in artillery shell production is a significant part of this. Vox Nihili fucked around with this message at 02:46 on Jul 13, 2023 |
# ? Jul 13, 2023 02:44 |
Note that Russia isn't exactly advancing. They do seem to be slowly losing ground. My guess is the fighting continues until both sides want it to stop.
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 02:48 |
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Beaucoup Haram posted:Why they losing then Because NATO stockpiles have been enough to keep Ukraine fighting, and NATO has provided a disproportionate amount of precision munitions. Also, an attritional fight means you have to actually attit the enemy, and that takes time. Herstory Begins Now posted:I'm curious specifically about the claim that it's mobiks that are suffering the majority of the casualties. I'm not aware that they are the majority of the disposable units, or at least have not been for much of this year. Though by sheer number of them and the amount of them that are clearly on the more forward lines, it's very possible that they are the majority of the casualties. Anecdotally it seems like the prisoner units, both under wagner and recently the mod organized storm units have been doing most of the dying, but I don't have anything concrete to point to there, either. The article the poster you're replying to provided reasonable evidence to answer that question. Also it absolutely does matter. Russia lost a tremendous number of experienced contract soldiers and experienced officers in 2022. HIMARS did a number not only on ammo depots, but also battalion and brigade headquarters until Russia pulled them back and put them underground under concrete. Russia playing conservative and safe with its remaining officer corps is smart and does matter, because along with certain command and control tactics described in that report is allowing them to manage a competent defense. Ynglaur fucked around with this message at 02:56 on Jul 13, 2023 |
# ? Jul 13, 2023 02:52 |
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Vox Nihili posted:Well, ignoring the weird tone here, I would say the invasion failed for the following reasons first and foremost: you should have at least one bulletpoint in here that starts with 'Ukraine' if you want your opinion taken seriously
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 02:55 |
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Vox Nihili posted:Well, ignoring the weird tone here, I would say the invasion failed for the following reasons first and foremost: Do we expect this advantage to remain? I would expect the introduction of western planes along with manufacturing artillery shells to eventually reach a point where they don't have to conserve ammo?
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 02:59 |
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Vox Nihili posted:A lot of the corruption/shortage/incapacity line feels pretty handwavey in light of how much Russia has actually been manufacturing since 2014. For example, Russia produced something like 3.5 million standard 152 mm artillery shells between 2014 and 2021, and they have ramped up production significantly such that they are now allegedly pumping out over 2 million total shells a year; that's per British estimates. Those shells go on trains that take them straight from the factory to the front line, and they don't have to worry about fitting them into 30 different tubes when they arrive. Meanwhile, the EU and US are talking a lot about how their ramped up production will be online in 2025. I can see where the 3.5 million number is coming from, because I found this pub with a similar number that estimates it based on revenue: https://jamestown.org/program/russia-struggles-to-maintain-munition-stocks-part-two/ But that already includes incredibly optimistic numbers for production growth. But the 2 mil per year number I can incredibly skeptical of. What it seems like is that the Russians started at somewhat similar to current US production totals in 2014 and had a head start in ramping up, but I would not assume that they will continue to have a production edge unless you believe arms manufacturing can grow exponentially forever. Either way, time will tell, and its not like shell production numbers are everything.
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 03:01 |
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Vox Nihili posted:A lot of the corruption/shortage/incapacity line feels pretty handwavey in light of how much Russia has actually been manufacturing since 2014. For example, Russia produced something like 3.5 million standard 152 mm artillery shells between 2014 and 2021, and they have ramped up production significantly such that they are now allegedly pumping out over 2 million total shells a year; that's per British estimates. Those shells go on trains that take them straight from the factory to the front line, and they don't have to worry about fitting them into 30 different tubes when they arrive. Meanwhile, the EU and US are talking a lot about how their ramped up production will be online in 2025. I mean, it's hard to trust Russian numbers (even if filtered through the British) because they've been known to uh, lie. Like, if they were truth-telling then they really would be the second best army in the world, as opposed to the second best in Ukraine on a good day.
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 03:19 |
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Ynglaur posted:Because NATO stockpiles have been enough to keep Ukraine fighting, and NATO has provided a disproportionate amount of precision munitions. Also, an attritional fight means you have to actually attit the enemy, and that takes time. ? I'm not at all disputing that russia is preserving their more experienced people and I take a RUSI report at basically face value as being very diligently put together. That report asserts that the assault units (aka disposable, or storm--though assault also gets used differently both within and outside of wagner) units take very high casualties but provides very little granularity beyond that. Part of my curiosity here is because what has constituted disposable has changed throughout the war and while in may of 2022 it meant lpr/dpr mobilized civilians, by august the flow of prisoners had started and included whatever remaining occupied territory people they could press gang, in december of 2022 it was the fraction of mobiks rushed directly to the front to plug gaps and prisoners. At some point in early 2023 the flow of prisoners dried up (before restarting with mod organized prisoner units) and there was conversely a big push to recruit more and more migrants. Enough mobiks were captured on the front lines in 2023 that clearly they are very close to the front but any particularly clear breakdown is very unclear. the mobilization waves pulled in both very experienced, specialized people and guys who had minimal, 20 year distant experience. by most accounts the former indeed did not end up in the same place as the latter. the thing that I'm saying doesn't matter is me quibbling over what portion of the disposable units is the least trained mobiks vs prisoners vs whoever else. it certainly matters to the people involved, and it matters significantly in terms of social, cultural, economic, individual impact, and ultimately will matter in political impact, but afaik Russia has not been sending their most valuable units in meat assaults with a handful of notable exceptions that became controversies in their own right (eg spetsnaz units being used for assaults around Izyum). notably the RUSI report does point out that losses among highly valued units are often quite severe given that they are regularly given high-stakes assignments with unit destruction not uncommon as a result of failure, but I've also never seen it asserted that that is an especially large share of Russian losses outside of a few specific points in the war (eg the opening phase and the kharkiv front collapse, which both saw significant destruction of top-tier units). but with that said, that's again separate from the question of what part of Russian military and society is paying the majority of the cost. Herstory Begins Now fucked around with this message at 03:36 on Jul 13, 2023 |
# ? Jul 13, 2023 03:33 |
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Crosby B. Alfred posted:Do we expect this advantage to remain? I would expect the introduction of western planes along with manufacturing artillery shells to eventually reach a point where they don't have to conserve ammo? The Russian edge has been shrinking since near the start of the war. They've been reducing their number of average daily fires for many months now. I don't think Ukraine can feasibly surpass Russia in terms of the raw number of artillery fires or plane and helicopter sorties in the next couple years, so the question for me is how much can precision Western munitions and maneuver warfare work around that particular advantage. Ukraine doesn't need parity in fires to win, but the idea of advancing into a fortified opponent with a 3:1, 2:1, or even just 1.5:1 advantage in fires is pretty precarious. You want to be the one with the fires advantage when you're trying to take ground. Of course the Kharkiv offensive last year demonstrated that Ukraine is capable of making significant regional gains where Russia doesn't have its resources concentrated, so that's not to say that Ukraine can't take territory at all. WarpedLichen posted:I can see where the 3.5 million number is coming from, because I found this pub with a similar number that estimates it based on revenue: The 2 million figure is from some British think tank looking at what Russia is doing. I also saw other sources in the one million shell range. Obviously Russia isn't exactly forthcoming about this, so it's all estimates really. None of these sources are based on Russia's public claims. Herstory Begins Now posted:you should have at least one bulletpoint in here that starts with 'Ukraine' if you want your opinion taken seriously I think you're confusing talking about Russia with cheering for Russia.
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 03:50 |
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Vox Nihili posted:I think you're confusing talking about Russia with cheering for Russia. I'm not accusing you of cheering for Russia, I'm pointing out that your listed reasons are entirely american and russian-centric
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 04:10 |
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Herstory Begins Now posted:I'm not accusing you of cheering for Russia, I'm pointing out that your listed reasons are entirely american and russian-centric Yeah it's very weird to have a 'Why Russia isn't winning' bullet point list and none of them be anything Ukraine has done.
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 04:21 |
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# ? Jun 8, 2024 06:19 |
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Kchama posted:Yeah it's very weird to have a 'Why Russia isn't winning' bullet point list and none of them be anything Ukraine has done. With respect to the original invasion (which is what was quoted), the main reason it failed is that it was poorly planned, had impossible objectives, and conducted over multiple axes of advance with woefully insufficient forces. You could also add specific enemy actions, but those are really secondary in that they determine the details of how an already doomed plan came apart.
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# ? Jul 13, 2023 04:41 |