Starsfan posted:

Xiahou Dun posted:

Comedy prediction : they rushed the soldiers’ train too much and they literally can’t defend in depth. No one on the ground really knows how.

Herstory Begins Now posted:

the more orthodox voenkors have been arguing rather desperately that this will be the time where a NATO summit leads to everyone deciding that Ukraine isn't worth supporting [because the offensive wasn't an instant, huge success and that everyone should give up and let Russia win]. there's been a fair amount of Russian messaging around this and I expect it to end up as fruitless as every other instances of 'western support will dry up for Ukraine any day now'

I'd actually love to know where they come to that conclusion each time because it's just profoundly disconnected from reality. idk if they're like actually listening to the Scott Ritters or what, but someone is feeding them a lot of bullshit and enough people apparently want to believe that that it gets repeated around as if it will actually happen

Cpt_Obvious posted:

Hasn't foreign support for Ukraine effectively dried up tho? There is a severe scarcity of weapons and equipment, not to mention vehicles. Ukraine has no air force to speak of and is down to the last shells that the US has dug out of the basement. Meanwhile, their manpower supply is far, far smaller than Russias to begin with. What is the point at which they negotiate peace?

Moon Slayer posted:

Put this post up on the big board of incredibly wrong takes along with Grover's Iraq predictions and the guy in the previous thread who thought modern amphibious assaults involved a thousand guys piling into hundreds of inflatable zodiacs and driving them up onto the beach.

Starsfan posted:

^^edit: I don't think it's a great comparison because Kherson had some different factors at play.. there were much fewer Russians in Ukraine at that time (it was pre-mobilization) and the Russians retreated primarily due to logistical concerns rather than being driven out of their defensive positions by the pressure of Ukrainian attacks.. And I'm aware there are arguments out there that Ukraine is striking Russia's logistical capability every day and that things could get dicey on the southern front at some point, but I have a hard time believing that Ukraine could ever put the sort of pressure on Russia's supply lines here that they could exert in Kherson where those lines extended over a huge river.

Chalks posted:

To be clear, my point is that the Kherson offensive was way easier for Ukraine and still took well over a month to show progress, thus the current offensive not showing significant progress within a month is unsurprising.

Starsfan posted:

I will just say that much like how NATO clearly has a better grasp of the situation than we do, at the same time the Russian government likely has a better understanding of what is and is not likely to come out of this summit than their most delusional supporters. They may be sending out a message for propaganda purposes but I doubt they truly believe that Ukraine will be abandoned by their allies any time soon and I doubt that would much motivate their actions on the battlefield.

Xiahou Dun posted:

I’m gonna need more info on that last one.

Boris Galerkin posted:

Ok so I made a quip about how clothes exists in regards to an amphibious assault because I thought that amphibious assault meant you drive your inflatable boat up onto the beach and then everyone rushes off so you don’t really get wet.

Is that not what they do?

Boris Galerkin posted:

I’m sorry I don’t jerk off to military porn and war movies and video games.

Starsfan posted:

I will just say that much like how NATO clearly has a better grasp of the situation than we do, at the same time the Russian government likely has a better understanding of what is and is not likely to come out of this summit than their most delusional supporters. They may be sending out a message for propaganda purposes but I doubt they truly believe that Ukraine will be abandoned by their allies any time soon and I doubt that would much motivate their actions on the battlefield.

Nothingtoseehere posted:

If you don't buy the "western support will dry up and then we will win in Ukraine" line as a Russian, what is your theory of victory?

Nothing, that's what. So you'll convince yourself that is possible and can happen at any moment, because the alternative is accepting you can't force a victory.

Nothingtoseehere posted:

If you don't buy the "western support will dry up and then we will win in Ukraine" line as a Russian, what is your theory of victory?

Nothing, that's what. So you'll convince yourself that is possible and can happen at any moment, because the alternative is accepting you can't force a victory.

quote:

“We will stand with Ukraine as it defends itself against Russian aggression, for as long as it takes.”

Outlining how the G7 will support Ukraine over the long term, the joint statement said the countries will ensure “a sustainable force capable of defending Ukraine now and deterring Russian aggression in the future” by providing modern military equipment across land, air and sea, training for Ukrainian forces, and intelligence sharing.

The G7 said it would also seek to bolster Ukraine’s economic stability, including through recovery efforts, “to create the conditions conducive to promoting Ukraine’s economic prosperity.”

quote:

10. We reaffirm our unwavering solidarity with the government and people of Ukraine in the heroic defence of their nation, their land, and our shared values. We fully support Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. We remain steadfast in our commitment to further step up political and practical support to Ukraine as it continues to defend its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and will continue our support for as long as it takes. We welcome efforts of all Allies and partners engaged in providing support to Ukraine.

Vox Nihili posted:

The alternative Russian theory of "victory" would be doubling down on mobilization, importation of arms, and domestic MIC production and achieving something akin to favorable terms through sheer attrition.

Djarum posted:

Yes and no. At a certain point you are going to lose out on the folks that have specialized training. For example pilots don't just appear, it is years of training to get a capable pilot. Yeah you can train any goober off the street how to shoot a rifle, load an artillery piece or even drive a tank to a certain extent. As time goes on those that know how to do the harder stuff will dry up. That is not even counting stuff that isn't as sexy like logistics officers but are probably more important than everything else. It is why Ukraine destroying command posts and supply depots are the most important things they can be doing. Taking out the guys that know where poo poo is and how to get it from A to B along with the guys leading means you have a massive degradation in capabilities.

Chalks posted:

It shouldn't amaze anyone that this one hasn't performed better than Kherson. The minefields are far worse than expected, but it'll be a good couple of months before you can start to say "ok, maybe this isn't going anywhere".

Ynglaur posted:

I've seen some reports that indicate the Russian brigades in reserve positions are few weeks ago are in direct contact with Ukrainian forces. If true this is very interesting, because it means Russia is willing to expend reserves to save territory, rather than using a flexible defense and let Ukraine attrit itself against better defensive lines.

Ynglaur posted:

The photographic evidence suggests that someone on the Russian military leadership side knows what they're doing _{(it was probably Surovikin)}. It's possible that their junior field grade officer ranks have been so decimated that they can't conduct a fighting withdrawal, but I'm doubtful of that. I think Russia is very intentionally defending the gray zone.

MikeC posted:

Is there the possibility that the Russians are unwilling to unmask their best defenses to what they consider to be half-hearted AFU attempts to move them out of the buffer zone? They have been willing to cede ground where it would appear to make sense. In the region north of Staromlynivka, multiple settlements like Makarivka, Rivnopil, and Blahodatne were given up pretty much without a fight (you will recall in early June a poster talked about a "collapse" of the Russian front in the area). Since the AFU attacks have shrunk back into these infantry probes, the Russians have similarly ceased pullbacks and are defending their strong points within the buffer area. I will add that there is generally no panic or major concern from Ru outlets on this from those who do report bad news.

quote:

Key findings:

-Over a year into Russia's full-scale war, neither Ukraine nor the EU has implemented any solid plans for ammunition production ramp-up

-EU member states' governments hardly sign any long-term contracts with producers, while the "wait-and-see" arms industry is reluctant to take financial risks

-Ukraine's arms makers also complain about a lack of state support yet scale up production under existing capacities anyway

-Ukraine uses from 3-10 times (depending on the intensity of fighting) less ammunition than Russia does, but its ammunition expenditure is still several times higher than Europe's production rates

-National protectionism of member states and the bureaucracy of the EU prevented rapid decision-making to tackle ammunition shortages

-The lack of unified ammunition types in the EU forces soldiers on the front line to alter their ammunition and adapt weapons, which can delay or jeopardize operations

fatherboxx posted:

Well, apparently the Prigozhin trend of recording grievances as voice messages continues and a general that was sacked today decided to blast Gerasimov. Message was posted by Duma deputy Gurulev who commanded the same army as this one some time ago

https://twitter.com/nik0p0l5/status/1679229488993796097?t=XAYa0mYkKdiJWWo9MeDLuA&s=19

Fun detail, the general's callsign is Spartacus and he calls his soldiers here "gladiators", cute

MikeC posted:

While nothing is wrong with what you said, it doesn't account for several things:
1) Western observers have noted that the Russians have taken great pains to protect the remaining core of the Russian army that has professional skills and there is strong evidence that it is primarily mobilized men that are suffering the bulk of casualties.

Hannibal Rex posted:

https://kyivindependent.com/investigation-eu-inability-to-ramp-up-production-behind-acute-ammunition-shortages-in-ukraine/

I've seen parts of this report before, but it's a comprehensive review of how European efforts at increasing ammunition production look like so far. Better make sure your blood pressure is low before you read.

quote:

Existing sanctions have severely limited the Russian oil industry. They have limited its
access to the key markets for its oil and oil products, cut off access to Western technologies,
severed partnerships with international oil companies, isolated Russia’s government and
companies from Western capital markets, and made it difficult to procure spare parts and
consumables for existing equipment. They have also created uncertainty about the future and
the possibility of further sanctions.

Nevertheless, Russia’s oil exporters have so far been successful in diverting crude oil
exports to China and India and, according to some reports, in sending oil products to North
Africa. For this purpose, Russia has amassed a so-called shadow fleet of tankers while also
making new transportation and payment arrangements that have in some cases allowed its oil
exporters to evade the price cap mechanism imposed by the G7 and the European Union.

Though high oil prices made 2022 a profitable year for Russian oil companies, their capital
available for investment in new production seems set to decrease, due to new taxes, higher
interest rates, and informal official pressure to boost social spending and to fund politically
important projects.

If Russian oil production declines, OPEC will be the only viable alternative in the 2020s, and
policymakers around the world will need to achieve a complex and delicate balance: on the one
hand promoting energy security, which would encourage investment in fossil fuel production,
and on the other seeking to contain climate change, which would deter that investment by
increasing investor concerns about potentially stranded assets in the fossil fuel industry in the
next decade. If policy decisions discourage new Western investment in production while
Russia’s production erodes, Russia’s hand may strengthen, despite the country’s many
challenges.

Vox Nihili posted:

Yeah, and this is a big part of why I'm not sure the attrition strategy that Russia has adopted (or really been forced into by default) is necessarily a losing one for them. A lot of that old Soviet production capacity for things like tube artillery shells, firearms, and IFVs is still there, whereas EU nations are essentially making arms on a hobby scale by comparison.

Herstory Begins Now posted:

can you link me to who/where this is being stated?

RUSI posted:

Casualties and the failure of the approach have led the AFRF to revert to relying on four infantry unit types: disposable; line; assault; and specialised. These are used in combination in both attack and defence, in a manner shaped by current operational challenges that is not formally codified in doctrine.

....

Russia’s disposable infantry should be considered fundamentally different and are drawn from three principal sources: conscripts from the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (heavily attrited from early rounds of fighting); prisoners drafted by the Wagner Group; and undertrained mobilised Russian civilians. These troops were originally formed into companies of approximately 60 people, but have since been broken down into platoons of approximately 15. They are issued with small arms. Ukrainian troops report that they often appear to be under the influence of amphetamines or other narcotic substances, with material recovered from the battlefield indicating that these are commonly taken in liquid form

....

In the attack, disposable infantry are the first to be employed. Disposable platoons are assigned to those avenues of approach to Ukrainian positions that are deemed to offer some cover and thus could prove viable. Although these have been described colloquially as ‘human wave attacks’, they no longer involve a dense concentration of infantry conducting an assault in a single mass. Rather, a disposable fire team of two to five personnel is sent from a forming-up position in the Russian front line and advances to contact.

....

Russian specialised troops are deployed as irregular groupings of snipers, artillery spotters and support weapon operators.15 While Ukrainian forces are suppressing disposable infantry, additional disposable troops are often pushed forwards as working groups to dig fox holes and prepare firing positions closer to Ukrainian defences. These personnel are withdrawn and replaced by specialists who can establish observation and sniping posts or set up heavy weapons. They can then be used to direct accurate fire against Ukrainian firing posts from a range of up to 2 km and inflict attrition.

.....

In the defence, Russian forces largely occupy company fighting positions with platoon-sized elements that utilise minefields and obstacles to slow down and fix attackers before calling for heavy defensive artillery fire.19 If forced from their positions, they will utilise artillery fires to prevent either
breakthroughs or consolidation by the attacker. Although Russian defensive operations have been criticised as being overly positional, they do hold ground combat units in reserve for mobile defence. Although their less capable units have consistently proven sluggish and reactive, on occasion they have launched rapid, aggressive counterattacks to retake lost positions in response to successful Ukrainian assaults.

....

Overall, this force structure is a cynical but coherent solution to the problem facing the Russian Ground Forces; they are able to mobilise large numbers of personnel but most units are poor quality and suffer from a chronic lack of training capacity that might otherwise rectify the problem. The segmented tasking within an unevenly trained force places correspondingly uneven burdens on its different components. The losses among disposable infantry are extremely high. Conversely, because specialised troops are largely held back and often fight from well-prepared positions, the Russians are able to preserve these soldiers thereby steadily increasing the skill of these operators.

Back Hack posted:

Kind of, not really though. Most of that production infrastructure for the Soviet Union was located in the satellite states, not to mention a lot of Soviet era machining equipment that was located in Russia itself has been, up to this point, either been stolen, smuggled, sold to other nation states, or scrapped for equipment build in the west. What factories did survive are currently overwhelmed building parts to maintain the equipment they currently and/or bring older inventory back to being serviceable, they doesn't really resources to be spooling up new productions. That's not even getting into the weeds of them suffering from labor shortages and the value of the ruble is starting to collapse.

Vox Nihili posted:

It seems to me that when you look at the hard numbers (such as are actually available), the EU MIC is ephemeral compared to even the shadow of USSR production that remains within the modern borders of Russia, and it consists of a gigantic hodgepodge of incompatible systems. Russia has also mobilized itself in a way that Europe has been very slow to even begin to match.

MikeC posted:

https://static.rusi.org/403-SR-Russian-Tactics-web-final.pdf

Written in May, much of the videos and commentary from less formal sources back this view up. See my previous BBC link on the changing faces of Russian casualties for example. POW videos are almost exclusively of mobilized men in forward trenches.

Herstory Begins Now posted:

I'm curious specifically about the claim that it's mobiks that are suffering the majority of the casualties. I'm not aware that they are the majority of the disposable units, or at least have not been for much of this year. Though by sheer number of them and the amount of them that are clearly on the more forward lines, it's very possible that they are the majority of the casualties. Anecdotally it seems like the prisoner units, both under wagner and recently the mod organized storm units have been doing most of the dying, but I don't have anything concrete to point to there, either.

Anyways it's a pretty minor distinction that doesn't hugely matter (beyond the larger impact of losing more socially and economically integrated mobiks vs prisoners), I'm just curious because I haven't seen much good data or even many experts weighing in on ru casualty makeup beyond vague statements, eg kofman stating that Ukrainians are concerned that they're trading good units for bad.

on a related note, anyone seen any estimates of the number of people conscripted out of DPR and LPR? last estimates I saw on that were from mid 2022 and suggested ~140,000 conscripted by mid-june 2022

Beaucoup Haram posted:

Why they losing then

Beaucoup Haram posted:

Why they losing then

Herstory Begins Now posted:

I'm curious specifically about the claim that it's mobiks that are suffering the majority of the casualties. I'm not aware that they are the majority of the disposable units, or at least have not been for much of this year. Though by sheer number of them and the amount of them that are clearly on the more forward lines, it's very possible that they are the majority of the casualties. Anecdotally it seems like the prisoner units, both under wagner and recently the mod organized storm units have been doing most of the dying, but I don't have anything concrete to point to there, either.

Anyways it's a pretty minor distinction that doesn't hugely matter (beyond the larger impact of losing more socially and economically integrated mobiks vs prisoners), I'm just curious because I haven't seen much good data or even many experts weighing in on ru casualty makeup beyond vague statements, eg kofman stating that Ukrainians are concerned that they're trading good units for bad.

on a related note, anyone seen any estimates of the number of people conscripted out of DPR and LPR? last estimates I saw on that were from mid 2022 and suggested ~140,000 conscripted by mid-june 2022

Vox Nihili posted:

Well, ignoring the weird tone here, I would say the invasion failed for the following reasons first and foremost:

• Russia committed wholly insufficient manpower for their apparent goal of annexing and occupying a large, populous country, particularly in the opening months of the invasion when they had an edge in initiative. A ton of experts have commented on this.
  
• Russia's officer corps seemingly has issues with incompetence, setting consistent and realistic goals, revolving door leadership positions, etc.
  
• Western nations have supplied Ukraine with effective defensive weapons such as advanced air defense systems, javelins, stingers, advanced anti-vehicle mines, and the like that have made it extremely difficult for Russia to take and hold onto further territory, particularly since Russia lacks a decisive advantage in troop count.

The issue today for Ukraine is that it's really difficult to take back territory when your opponent has a huge advantage in artillery and air power, assuming they are at all competent and can dig in on the ground. The substantial gap in artillery shell production is a significant part of this.

Vox Nihili posted:

Well, ignoring the weird tone here, I would say the invasion failed for the following reasons first and foremost:

• Russia committed wholly insufficient manpower for their apparent goal of annexing and occupying a large, populous country, particularly in the opening months of the invasion when they had an edge in initiative. A ton of experts have commented on this.
  
• Russia's officer corps seemingly has issues with incompetence, setting consistent and realistic goals, revolving door leadership positions, etc.
  
• Western nations have supplied Ukraine with effective defensive weapons such as advanced air defense systems, javelins, stingers, advanced anti-vehicle mines, and the like that have made it extremely difficult for Russia to take and hold onto further territory, particularly since Russia lacks a decisive advantage in troop count.

The issue today for Ukraine is that it's really difficult to take back territory when your opponent has a huge advantage in artillery and air power, assuming they are at all competent and can dig in on the ground. The substantial gap in artillery shell production is a significant part of this.

Vox Nihili posted:

A lot of the corruption/shortage/incapacity line feels pretty handwavey in light of how much Russia has actually been manufacturing since 2014. For example, Russia produced something like 3.5 million standard 152 mm artillery shells between 2014 and 2021, and they have ramped up production significantly such that they are now allegedly pumping out over 2 million total shells a year; that's per British estimates. Those shells go on trains that take them straight from the factory to the front line, and they don't have to worry about fitting them into 30 different tubes when they arrive. Meanwhile, the EU and US are talking a lot about how their ramped up production will be online in 2025.

Source article:

https://archive.is/YgOdn

It seems to me that when you look at the hard numbers (such as are actually available), the EU MIC is ephemeral compared to even the shadow of USSR production that remains within the modern borders of Russia, and it consists of a gigantic hodgepodge of incompatible systems. Russia has also mobilized itself in a way that Europe has been very slow to even begin to match.

Vox Nihili posted:

A lot of the corruption/shortage/incapacity line feels pretty handwavey in light of how much Russia has actually been manufacturing since 2014. For example, Russia produced something like 3.5 million standard 152 mm artillery shells between 2014 and 2021, and they have ramped up production significantly such that they are now allegedly pumping out over 2 million total shells a year; that's per British estimates. Those shells go on trains that take them straight from the factory to the front line, and they don't have to worry about fitting them into 30 different tubes when they arrive. Meanwhile, the EU and US are talking a lot about how their ramped up production will be online in 2025.

Source article:

https://archive.is/YgOdn

It seems to me that when you look at the hard numbers (such as are actually available), the EU MIC is ephemeral compared to even the shadow of USSR production that remains within the modern borders of Russia, and it consists of a gigantic hodgepodge of incompatible systems. Russia has also mobilized itself in a way that Europe has been very slow to even begin to match.

Ynglaur posted:

Because NATO stockpiles have been enough to keep Ukraine fighting, and NATO has provided a disproportionate amount of precision munitions. Also, an attritional fight means you have to actually attit the enemy, and that takes time.

The article the poster you're replying to provided reasonable evidence to answer that question. Also it absolutely does matter. Russia lost a tremendous number of experienced contract soldiers and experienced officers in 2022. HIMARS did a number not only on ammo depots, but also battalion and brigade headquarters until Russia pulled them back and put them underground under concrete. Russia playing conservative and safe with its remaining officer corps is smart and does matter, because along with certain command and control tactics described in that report is allowing them to manage a competent defense.

Crosby B. Alfred posted:

Do we expect this advantage to remain? I would expect the introduction of western planes along with manufacturing artillery shells to eventually reach a point where they don't have to conserve ammo?

WarpedLichen posted:

I can see where the 3.5 million number is coming from, because I found this pub with a similar number that estimates it based on revenue:
https://jamestown.org/program/russia-struggles-to-maintain-munition-stocks-part-two/

But that already includes incredibly optimistic numbers for production growth.

But the 2 mil per year number I can incredibly skeptical of. What it seems like is that the Russians started at somewhat similar to current US production totals in 2014 and had a head start in ramping up, but I would not assume that they will continue to have a production edge unless you believe arms manufacturing can grow exponentially forever.

Either way, time will tell, and its not like shell production numbers are everything.

Herstory Begins Now posted:

you should have at least one bulletpoint in here that starts with 'Ukraine' if you want your opinion taken seriously

Vox Nihili posted:

I think you're confusing talking about Russia with cheering for Russia.

Herstory Begins Now posted:

I'm not accusing you of cheering for Russia, I'm pointing out that your listed reasons are entirely american and russian-centric

Kchama posted:

Yeah it's very weird to have a 'Why Russia isn't winning' bullet point list and none of them be anything Ukraine has done.