War in Ukraine CE: The Golf War

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(Thread IKs: fatherboxx)

Mr. Apollo: Nov 8, 2000

Nevermind, I get it now.

# ? Jul 18, 2023 14:05

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# ? Jun 6, 2024 19:14

Vesi: Jan 12, 2005; pikachu looking at?

Fragrag posted:

Exactly how does a TLD administrator receive e-mails? Shouldn't emails bounce if they hit a non-existant domain name? Or did he set up a marines.ml domain and e-mail server?

the domain needs to exist and you need DNS admin rights for it, after that it's trivial to set the MX record to point at your server

code:

$ host -t mx pentagon.ml
pentagon.ml mail is handled by 10 handle.catchemail.ml.

# ? Jul 18, 2023 14:06

Antigravitas: Dec 8, 2019; Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:

If you manage .ml, that means you are in control of the name servers for .ml. So if you want to grab every single mail sent to any unregistered .ml domain, you can just reply to anyone inquiring about the responsible mail server for any domain not in your database with "sure mate, deliver it over here".

# ? Jul 18, 2023 14:12

KillHour: Oct 28, 2007

Fragrag posted:

Exactly how does a TLD administrator receive e-mails? Shouldn't emails bounce if they hit a non-existant domain name? Or did he set up a marines.ml domain and e-mail server?

In the same way that if you send something to hellothere.google.com, it first goes to Google to figure out where it should go, if you own the tld, all traffic hits your servers first and you can just send it all to the same place if you want.

Edit: lol of course I'm one of 100 IT nerds jumping in to answer at once

# ? Jul 18, 2023 14:12

OAquinas: Jan 27, 2008; Biden has sat immobile on the Iron Throne of America. He is the Master of Malarkey by the will of the gods, and master of a million votes by the might of his inexhaustible calamari.

Yup. And depending on the mail system in question you can configure it to just dump all "nondeliverable" mail into one large bin to go through later. .ml probably gets a manageable amount of email where you can do that with the TLD. And of course you could set up mailboxes for the more popular (read: commonly misspelled) domains to shrink the bin even further to refine your data mining.

I don't know much about bridgeology or the carrying capacity of an average soldier of ATGMs, but this is my time to shine!

# ? Jul 18, 2023 14:53

Eric Cantonese: Dec 21, 2004; You should hear my accent.

Some more sobering commentary coming from a guy who accompanied Rob Lee and Michael Kofman to observe the front lines.

https://twitter.com/HoansSolo/status/1681240456754077697

I copied and pasted the thread here for those of you who don't want to start a Twitter account.

quote:

First off, we spoke to NCOs, officers, a number of brigade commanders (national guard & regular army) in the field plus senior intel & defense officials in Kyiv (alongside @DAlperovitch).
Counteroffensive:

1.) By and large this is an infantryman�s fight (squad, platoon & company level) supported by artillery along most of the frontline. This has several implications: 1st: Progress is measured by yards/meters and not km/miles given reduced mobility. 2nd: Mechanized formations are rarely deployed due to lack of enablers for maneuver. This includes insufficient quantities of de-mining equipment, air defenses, ATGMs etc.

2.) Ukrainian forces have still not mastered combined arms operations at scale. Operations are more sequential than synchronized. This creates various problems for the offense & IMO is the main cause for slow progress.

3.) 🇺🇦 forces by default have switched to a strategy of attrition relying on sequential fires rather than maneuver. This is the reason why cluster munitions are critical to extend current fire rates into the fall: weakening Russian defenses to a degree that enables maneuver.

4.) Minefields are a problem as most observers know. They confine maneuver space & slow advances. But much more impactful than the minefields per se on Ukraine�s ability to break through Russian defenses is 🇺🇦s inability to conduct complex combined arms operations at scale.
Lack of a comprehensive combined arms approach at scale makes Ukrainian forces more vulnerable to Russian ATGMs, artillery etc. while advancing. So it's not just about equipment. There�s simply no systematic pulling apart of the Russian defensive system that I could observe.

5.) The character of this offensive will only likely change if there is a more systematic approach to breaking through Russian defenses, perhaps paired with or causing a severe degradation of Russian morale, that will lead to a sudden or gradual collapse of Russian defenses.
Absent a sudden collapse of Russian defenses, I suspect this will remain a bloody attritional fight with reserve units being fed in incrementally in the coming weeks & months.

6.) There is limited evidence of a systematic deep battle that methodically degrades Russian C2/munitions. Despite rationing on the Russian side, ammunition is available and Russians appear to have fairly good battlefield ISR coverage.

Russians also had no need to deploy operational reserves yet to fend off Ukrainian attacks.There is also evidence of reduced impact of HIMARS strikes due to effective Russian countermeasures. (This is important to keep in mind re. any potential tac. impact of delivery of ATACMs.)

Russian forces, even if severely degraded & lacking ammo, are likely capable of delaying, containing or repulsing individual platoon- or company-sized Ukrainian advances unless these attacks are better coordinated & synchronized along the broader frontline.

7.) Quality of Russian forces varies. Attrition is hitting them hard but they are defending their positions well, according to Ukrainians we spoke to. They have been quite adaptable at the tactical level and are broadly defending according to Soviet/Russian doctrine.

8.) Russian artillery rationing is real & happening. Ukraine has established fire superiority in tube artillery while Russia retains superiority in MRLSs in the South. Localized fire superiority in some calibers alone does not suffice, however, to break through Russian defenses.

9.) An additional influx of weapons systems (e.g., ATACMs, air defense systems, MBTs, IFVs etc.) while important to sustain the war effort, will likely not have a decisive tactical impact without adaptation and more effective integration.
Ukraine will have to better synchronize & adapt current tactics, without which western equipment will not prove tac. decisive in the long run. This is happening but it is slow work in progress. (Most NATO-style militaries would struggle with this even more than the 🇺🇦s IMO).

10.) The above is also true for breaching operations. Additional mine clearing equipment is needed & will be helpful (especially man-portable mine-clearing systems) but not decisive without better integration of fire & maneuver at scale. (Again, I cannot emphasize enough how difficult this is to pull off in wartime.)

Monocausal explanations for failure (like lack of de-mining equipment) do not reflect reality. E.g., some Ukrainian assaults were stopped by Russian ATGMs even before reaching the 1st 🇷🇺 minefield.

11.) There is a dearth of artillery barrels that is difficult to address given production rates and delivery timelines.

12.) So far Ukraine�s approach in this counteroffensive has been first and foremost direct assaults on Russian positions supported by a rudimentary deep battle approach. And no, these direct assaults are not mere probing attacks.

13.) There is evidence of tactical cyber operations supporting closing of kinetic kill-chains. That is cyber ISR contributing to identifying & tracking targets on the battlefield. Starlink remains absolutely key for Ukrainian C2.

14.) Quality of Ukrainian officers and NCOs we met appears excellent & morale remains high. However, there are some force quality issues emerging with less able bodied & older men called up for service now.

15.) The narrative that Ukrainian progress thus far is slow just because of a lack of weapons deliveries and support is monocausal & is not shared by those we spoke to actually fighting & exercising command on the frontline.

16.) It goes without saying that in a war of attrition, more artillery ammunition & hardware is always needed and needs to be steadily supplied. (Western support of Ukraine certainly should continue as there is still the prospect that the counteroffensive will make gains.)

But soldiers fighting on the frontline we spoke to are all too aware that lack of progress is often more due to force employment, poor tactics, lack of coordination btw. units, bureaucratic red tape/infighting, Soviet style thinking etc. & ...Russians putting up stiff resistance.

It's not what I want to hear, but it does seem to check out from what we have been able to see.

# ? Jul 18, 2023 14:55

Fragrag: Aug 3, 2007; The Worst Admin Ever bashes You in the head with his banhammer. It is smashed into the body, an unrecognizable mass! You have been struck down.

Antigravitas posted:

If you manage .ml, that means you are in control of the name servers for .ml. So if you want to grab every single mail sent to any unregistered .ml domain, you can just reply to anyone inquiring about the responsible mail server for any domain not in your database with "sure mate, deliver it over here".

Right, so there was no need for any deliberate intent like spoofing a military website to receive those e-mails. Just some ordinary TLD administration practices

# ? Jul 18, 2023 15:03

Antigravitas: Dec 8, 2019; Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:

Yeah, basically super powered typosquatting. It's somewhat unusual that an entire TLD could potentially be used, but the concept is old.

# ? Jul 18, 2023 15:07

Slashrat: Jun 6, 2011; YOSPOS

A more relatable analogy might be literally writing Mali by mistake as the country on the recipient address on a piece of physical mail. You country's post office will happily send it off to Mali, and the post office in Mali then gets to decide themselves what to do with it once they realize that the rest of address is not actually valid for the country. Maybe they'll be nice and send it back with a note that you got the address wrong, or maybe they'll just open and read it out of curiosity.

# ? Jul 18, 2023 15:18

Just Another Lurker: May 1, 2009

Eric Cantonese posted:

I copied and pasted the thread here for those of you who don't want to start a Twitter account.

A good read and i appreciate the copy. :tipshat:

# ? Jul 18, 2023 16:14

The_Franz: Aug 8, 2003

Just Another Lurker posted:

A good read and i appreciate the copy.

Just FYI, Nitter is working again (including search).

https://nitter.net/HoansSolo/status/1681240456754077697#m

# ? Jul 18, 2023 16:18

Just Another Lurker: May 1, 2009

The_Franz posted:

Just FYI, Nitter is working again (including search).

https://nitter.net/HoansSolo/status/1681240456754077697#m

Good to know it's available again... until Musk throws another wobbler. :rolleyes:

# ? Jul 18, 2023 16:20

Bar Ran Dun: Jan 22, 2006

Qtotonibudinibudet posted:

in what realpolitik universe are us nationals going to starve if global wheat prices increase? we are paying pennies more if they do.

Grain prices directly affect international stability especially in Middle East, a price spike was one of the reasons the Arab Spring kicked off. Nobody in the US is ever going to starve though though�.

Qtotonibudinibudet posted:

yes, WW3 over grain prices is clancychat. America don't care about them unless most of the world is already nuclear ash and we're sending our remaining aircraft carriers to annex the surviving green space in new zealand.

Because we structured several international systems so that we would never be dependent on another country for grain. Multiple major systems. Farm policy, international finance, the regulation of the transportation of hazardous materials and grain all were directly affected by our national defense need to protect our grain industry. WTO died basically between the US and Europe�s protectionism /subsidy of grain.

It�s a notable event when grain is imported into the US in bulk by vessel. It�s extremely rare and tends to only happen for speciality products and then they usually give up on it shortly after starting.

Qtotonibudinibudet posted:

outside that, potential problems down the road in locales that are affected by grain prices are but a twinkle in the eye of our foreign policy elite

And no, they care a great deal. A reason Russia is playing these games is because they also sell wheat and raising the price benefits then. The Chinese are also securing farms in places like Africa. One of the reason Bolsenaro came into power in Brazil is commodity grain. It�s a hugely important foreign policy topic.

# ? Jul 18, 2023 17:45

Enjoy: Apr 18, 2009

Eric Cantonese posted:

Some more sobering commentary coming from a guy who accompanied Rob Lee and Michael Kofman to observe the front lines.

https://twitter.com/HoansSolo/status/1681240456754077697

I copied and pasted the thread here for those of you who don't want to start a Twitter account.

It's not what I want to hear, but it does seem to check out from what we have been able to see.

Very interesting. If training and integration are such major factors in the failure of the counter-offensive to make gains, it seems obvious that Ukraine should halt the counter-offensive and spend some months training their forces on the equipment they are being sent. And enough equipment needs to be sent to make these new formations large enough to be decisive.

# ? Jul 18, 2023 18:27

Quixzlizx: Jan 7, 2007

Enjoy posted:

Very interesting. If training and integration are such major factors in the failure of the counter-offensive to make gains, it seems obvious that Ukraine should halt the counter-offensive and spend some months training their forces on the equipment they are being sent. And enough equipment needs to be sent to make these new formations large enough to be decisive.

I'm no expert, but that thread makes it sound like the major issue is their ability to execute their doctrine/operational plans, and not their ability to operate particular pieces of equipment, although they're obviously not completely unrelated.

# ? Jul 18, 2023 19:09

Ynglaur: Oct 9, 2013; The Malta Conference, anyone?

Quixzlizx posted:

I'm no expert, but that thread makes it sound like the major issue is their ability to execute their doctrine/operational plans, and not their ability to operate particular pieces of equipment, although they're obviously not completely unrelated.

Yes. Ukrainian units seem to be pretty solid tactically: call it company-sized actions and smaller (~150 or fewer soldiers). Operations--which is all about sequencing and synchronizing actions by different units with different capabilities--is where they are struggling.

Think about it this way: ideally, a battalion assault would have these events happen at the right time. If they happen too early, or too late, it doesn't work:

Top off on supplies.
Recon teams launch drones.
Ground recon teams step off.
Artillery suppresses likely enemy OP locations.
EW disables enemy drones over a portion of the battlefield.
Support by fire companies move to assembly areas.
Indirect fires engage targets identified by recon.
Support by fire companies move to firing positions.
Recon teams identify breach lanes.
Assault company moves to assembly area.
Support by fire companies initiate suppression.
Smoke assets deployed.
An Su-24 with a Storm Shadow hits an enemy battalion command post.
Assault company leaves assembly area and begins assault.
Exploitation battalion moves into position to exploit a breach.
Counter-battery fire initiated.

This stuff is hard and takes battalion and brigade staffs with people who have literal years of experience learning and practicing. Many Ukrainian brigade and battalion staffs are full of former Soviet-style officers, or people with very little military background.

# ? Jul 18, 2023 19:26

buglord: Jul 31, 2010; Cheating at a raffle? I sentence you to 1 year in jail! No! Two years! Three! Four! Five years! Ah! Ah! Ah! Ah!; Buglord

Perun taught me a lot about artillery yesterday. Prior to it I had always thought artillery in 2023 was for bunker busting. I had no idea artillery was the main cause of causalities. For whatever reason I was convinced that for most causalities you had to personally catch a bullet with your name on it or be in the radius of an IED/landmine.

Thank you first person shooters for creating all this confusion.

# ? Jul 18, 2023 19:45

KYOON GRIFFEY JR: Apr 12, 2010; Runner-up, TRP Sack Race 2021/22

artillery has been the main cause of casualties in battle since 1803

# ? Jul 18, 2023 19:59

Dirt5o8: Nov 6, 2008; EUGENE? Where's my fuckin' money, Eugene?

Ynglaur posted:

Yes. Ukrainian units seem to be pretty solid tactically: call it company-sized actions and smaller (~150 or fewer soldiers). Operations--which is all about sequencing and synchronizing actions by different units with different capabilities--is where they are struggling.

Think about it this way: ideally, a battalion assault would have these events happen at the right time. If they happen too early, or too late, it doesn't work:

Top off on supplies.

Recon teams launch drones.

Ground recon teams step off.

Artillery suppresses likely enemy OP locations.

EW disables enemy drones over a portion of the battlefield.

Support by fire companies move to assembly areas.

Indirect fires engage targets identified by recon.

Support by fire companies move to firing positions.

Recon teams identify breach lanes.

Assault company moves to assembly area.

Support by fire companies initiate suppression.

Smoke assets deployed.

An Su-24 with a Storm Shadow hits an enemy battalion command post.

Assault company leaves assembly area and begins assault.

Exploitation battalion moves into position to exploit a breach.

Counter-battery fire initiated.

This stuff is hard and takes battalion and brigade staffs with people who have literal years of experience learning and practicing. Many Ukrainian brigade and battalion staffs are full of former Soviet-style officers, or people with very little military background.

Additionally, U.S. officers spend a large portion of their formal military education learning to be cogs in a headquarters staff wargaming these steps. And they still gently caress it up badly, quite often. Synchronizing efforts from multiple specialist organizations is hard. Especially when you don't personally have experience with that specific skill or you're dealing with unfamiliar equipment.

# ? Jul 18, 2023 20:29

Ynglaur: Oct 9, 2013; The Malta Conference, anyone?

Dirt5o8 posted:

Additionally, U.S. officers spend a large portion of their formal military education learning to be cogs in a headquarters staff wargaming these steps. And they still gently caress it up badly, quite often. Synchronizing efforts from multiple specialist organizations is hard. Especially when you don't personally have experience with that specific skill or you're dealing with unfamiliar equipment.

Exactly. Fun fact: Second Lieutenants in the US Army are not really there to lead platoons. They're actually there to learn how platoons work, so that when they're a staff officer in some battalion or brigade or division headquarters, they have an idea of how things work on the ground. Good lieutenants understand this and pray for a good platoon sergeant to teach them. (Most platoon sergeants are pretty good.) Bad lieutenants don't understand this.

That model is predicated upon a strong non-commissioned officer corps capable of managing most tactical tasks. This is something Ukraine started, but did not complete prior to 2022. Further, a lot of the Ukrainian soldiers who learned and started practicing this model have become casualties, and have been replaced with Ukrainians who served before 2014.

# ? Jul 18, 2023 20:49

EasilyConfused: Nov 21, 2009; one strong toad

Eric Cantonese posted:

Some more sobering commentary coming from a guy who accompanied Rob Lee and Michael Kofman to observe the front lines.

https://twitter.com/HoansSolo/status/1681240456754077697

I copied and pasted the thread here for those of you who don't want to start a Twitter account.

It's not what I want to hear, but it does seem to check out from what we have been able to see.

Thanks for copying the thread. Grim reading and I agree it does fit.

# ? Jul 18, 2023 22:25

Qtotonibudinibudet: Nov 7, 2011; Omich poluyobok, skazhi ty narkoman? ya prosto tozhe gde to tam zhivu, mogli by vmeste uyobyvat' narkotiki

Antigravitas posted:

If you manage .ml, that means you are in control of the name servers for .ml. So if you want to grab every single mail sent to any unregistered .ml domain, you can just reply to anyone inquiring about the responsible mail server for any domain not in your database with "sure mate, deliver it over here".

at least currently they're only handling known likely misdirected domains

code:

$ dig MX ssjkgsndsngsdgnjn.ml

; <<>> DiG 9.18.15 <<>> MX ssjkgsndsngsdgnjn.ml
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 61995
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1
...

$ dig +short MX pentagon.ml
10 handle.catchemail.ml.

$ dig +short MX marines.ml
0 handle.catchemail.ml.

$ dig MX marnes.ml

; <<>> DiG 9.18.15 <<>> MX marnes.ml
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 24457
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1

you could set up a wildcard fallback MX for the TLD, but most of the stuff of interest is gonna go to the actual equivalent domains anyway, so probably not worth bothering

# ? Jul 18, 2023 23:16

Vox Nihili: May 28, 2008

Eric Cantonese posted:

Some more sobering commentary coming from a guy who accompanied Rob Lee and Michael Kofman to observe the front lines.

https://twitter.com/HoansSolo/status/1681240456754077697

I copied and pasted the thread here for those of you who don't want to start a Twitter account.

It's not what I want to hear, but it does seem to check out from what we have been able to see.

I have to wonder if another Kharkiv direction operation might have had more of an opening for success than advancing directly into the most heavily fortified and prepared Russian positions in occupied Ukraine.

# ? Jul 19, 2023 03:08

OddObserver: Apr 3, 2009

Vox Nihili posted:

I have to wonder if another Kharkiv direction operation might have had more of an opening for success than advancing directly into the most heavily fortified and prepared Russian positions in occupied Ukraine.

The North Luhansk direction has like half the Russian army.

# ? Jul 19, 2023 03:20

Orthanc6: Nov 4, 2009

Vox Nihili posted:

I have to wonder if another Kharkiv direction operation might have had more of an opening for success than advancing directly into the most heavily fortified and prepared Russian positions in occupied Ukraine.

Ukraine stalled after the initial Kharkiv rout for a reason; they ran into better prepared Russian troops. And they can't really cut off Russian supply lines there like they potentially can in Zaporizhzhia. I'm sure they considered it, they still intend to attack there some day to reclaim everything. And they will still do probing attack just in case something breaks, but it's not much surprise that northern Luhansk is not the main focus at this time.

# ? Jul 19, 2023 03:27

Dick Ripple: May 19, 2021

Eric Cantonese posted:

https://twitter.com/HoansSolo/status/1681240456754077697

It's not what I want to hear, but it does seem to check out from what we have been able to see.

I guess the silver lining would be none of these were unforseen problems.

I wonder who was telling them Ukraine is having problems with combined arms/organizing attacks, the NCOs or brigade level commanders? Like others have said, it is a big challenge for any military and in time of war the cost of learning is blood.
I hope this puts more pressure on the West to supply/train Ukraine with more AA, SEAD, and some drat fighter jets as it seems they cannot even gain local air superiority and that is a big reason why your combined arms is not working.

# ? Jul 19, 2023 05:01

mllaneza: Apr 28, 2007; Veteran, Bermuda Triangle Expeditionary Force, 1993-1952

Here's a nice breakdown on how the US Army trains to do breaching operations. You do not achieve a useful level of proficiency in months. The Western equipped brigades that aren't on the front line? They're working on exactly this, and they're expecting to take huge casualties doing it when the time comes. Have all the best weapons won't help.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZZ-sCT_maAQ

What will help get through Russian lines in the short term is what they're doing. Economy of force operations to roll up to the main defense lines as cheaply as possible, disrupting logistics and command as much as possible, and keeping the pressure on every Russian formation to create the possibility of getting a force into and through Russian lines somewhere. Oh, and counterbattery, counterbattery, counterbattery.

# ? Jul 19, 2023 05:39

CeeJee: Dec 4, 2001; Oven Wrangler

mllaneza posted:

Here's a nice breakdown on how the US Army trains to do breaching operations. You do not achieve a useful level of proficiency in months. The Western equipped brigades that aren't on the front line? They're working on exactly this, and they're expecting to take huge casualties doing it when the time comes. Have all the best weapons won't help.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZZ-sCT_maAQ

What will help get through Russian lines in the short term is what they're doing. Economy of force operations to roll up to the main defense lines as cheaply as possible, disrupting logistics and command as much as possible, and keeping the pressure on every Russian formation to create the possibility of getting a force into and through Russian lines somewhere. Oh, and counterbattery, counterbattery, counterbattery.

That's a nice, clear desert to practice a breach on. Now do it over muddy grounds with just a few roads, no air support, no swarm of Apaches and a lot of the enemy artillery still operational due to not having air support.

# ? Jul 19, 2023 06:42

Comstar: Apr 20, 2007; Are you happy now?

CeeJee posted:

That's a nice, clear desert to practice a breach on. Now do it over muddy grounds with just a few roads, no air support, no swarm of Apaches and a lot of the enemy artillery still operational due to not having air support.

I just realised what could do this- Battlemechs. Battlemechs with jump jets. Jump over the mine fields.

# ? Jul 19, 2023 06:48

Dick Ripple: May 19, 2021

I think more apt would be to look at the many WW2 breaching operations, mainly on the Eastern front, but the US had some rough ones in France particulary around Nancy. It is also telling that a good portion of these battles contain 'meatgrinder' in their descriptions.

# ? Jul 19, 2023 06:49

Zedsdeadbaby: Jun 14, 2008; You have been called out, in the ways of old.

Comstar posted:

I just realised what could do this- Battlemechs. Battlemechs with jump jets. Jump over the mine fields.

Square cubed law says no

# ? Jul 19, 2023 07:16

Libluini: May 18, 2012; I gravitated towards the Greens, eventually even joining the party itself.

The Linke is a party I grudgingly accept exists, but I've learned enough about DDR-history I can't bring myself to trust a party that was once the SED, a party leading the corrupt state apparatus ...; Grimey Drawer

Zedsdeadbaby posted:

Square cubed law says no

I hate that I know this but mechs are light bubbles of future tech. They're extremely light for their size

# ? Jul 19, 2023 07:23

mllaneza: Apr 28, 2007; Veteran, Bermuda Triangle Expeditionary Force, 1993-1952

CeeJee posted:

That's a nice, clear desert to practice a breach on. Now do it over muddy grounds with just a few roads, no air support, no swarm of Apaches and a lot of the enemy artillery still operational due to not having air support.

Yup. Ukraine is going to have it way worse than this in practice. We aren't seeing a whole brigade in a breakthrough operation for a long time. When they can create the conditions for maneuver warfare, we'll see the Western AFVs in numbers. Until then those units are training and waiting.

# ? Jul 19, 2023 07:29

OddObserver: Apr 3, 2009

Massive missile strikes on Odesa overnight, partly targeting the grain terminal, with some stuff getting through.

# ? Jul 19, 2023 09:02

fatherboxx: Mar 25, 2013

https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1681427243816615940?t=s1KIll0jCwEI_wmvBYiY5w&s=19

Also uhh some mad science (morons asking for money to burn)
https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1681365386992779264?t=bHdARHFKd-QiamDcfw0Nlg&s=19

# ? Jul 19, 2023 09:20

Icon Of Sin: Dec 26, 2008

fatherboxx posted:

https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1681427243816615940?t=s1KIll0jCwEI_wmvBYiY5w&s=19

Also uhh some mad science (morons asking for money to burn)
https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1681365386992779264?t=bHdARHFKd-QiamDcfw0Nlg&s=19

Are they trying to rediscover ICBMs? :confused:

# ? Jul 19, 2023 09:23

fatherboxx: Mar 25, 2013

Icon Of Sin posted:

Are they trying to rediscover ICBMs?

At least it is not Colony Drops yet

# ? Jul 19, 2023 09:28

Nam Taf: Jun 25, 2005; I am Fat Man, hear me roar!

Good luck hitting anything smaller than Ukraine from orbit, unless you�ve got a guided missile in which case just use ur planes lmao

# ? Jul 19, 2023 09:39

Gort: Aug 18, 2003; Good day what ho cup of tea

Making something that looks and acts exactly like a nuclear-armed ICBM in order to do a job an ordinary cruise missile can do seems like a great idea.

# ? Jul 19, 2023 09:41

Adbot: ADBOT LOVES YOU

# ? Jun 6, 2024 19:14

Rappaport: Oct 2, 2013

Obviously the superior mad :science:

satellite thingy would be like the microwave power plant in Sim City 2000, where the microwave beam from the satellite sometimes misses the power station and sets your entire city on fire.

# ? Jul 19, 2023 09:52

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > Debate & Discussion > War in Ukraine CE: The Golf War

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