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Vincent Van Goatse posted:And one of their aircraft carriers. And quite a few of their jet transports and bombers. Liaoning was basically the last in a long term planning process to develop the institutional knowhow to build and operate carriers and by all accounts seems to be in vastly better shape than the Kuznetsov class carrier in Russia's service having undergone basically an entire reconstruction before entering PLAN service and entered service redesigned around being a fully fledged aircraft carrier and not partially as a missile boat like Kuznetsov was. It's basically a completely different boat from its Soviet counterpart, especially the Shandong which presumably has undergone further refinement over the design based on operational experience. Similarly a lot of the PRC's aircraft have undergone a lot of variants, due to a combination of creating licensed designs, getting around export restrictions, and of course tinkering/development to suit their own needs and doctrine, and to be able to use parts they are capable of producing. Maybe a large portion of their inventory is older, but I think what we've seen of Russia's airforce is that they lacked the funds to keep theirs maintained and thus need to strip apart airframes for parts etc, while otherwise seem to be working mostly as designed except for the lack of GPS and similar funny things to come out of the war. China likely doesn't have the same constraints regarding training and technology and funds to have the same specific issues that Russia has displayed. So while a lot of aircraft in inventory are closer to their Soviet analogs; their newest stuff is clearly diverging significantly and continues to do so. So aside from the fact that I'm not really sure we can actually say that Russian/Soviet equipment properly maintained and used isn't working as designed vis a vis their NATO counterparts; but the fact is Russia has had basically three decades where they lacked the funds to keep their military capacity and development going at the same pace it was before the collapse; while China's has been accelerating in their pace of development; so I don't think we can reasonably conclude that China would be just as likely to far as badly for the same reasons in a conflict with a similarly Western backed nation.
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Aug 31, 2023 03:01
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The Russian military doesn't really have any aircraft carriers right now. I think the way that Russia kept trying to drop paratroopers on the capital and they kept getting shot down or getting beaten on the ground might be discouraging for any prospects of invading Taiwan, but generally I'd hope that all the aspects of the war would be discouraging for future would-be warmongers.
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Aug 31, 2023 04:37
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SlothfulCobra posted:The Russian military doesn't really have any aircraft carriers right now. We have to remember that the Russian military didn't properly plan for this kind of op, and just assumed they could take the airfield and land their best troops unopposed to quickly arrest the political leadership of Ukraine and secure the capital for long enough to link up with the lead elements of their armoured advance (which they also assumed would be largely unopposed). Airborne ops are some of the most dangerous ops from what I've read, but not gauranteed to result in failure if more variables are accounted for and the op planned by a competent military. The helicoptering in troops via gunships kinda succeeded albeit with losses, it was trying to bring in more reinforcements via transport plane that failed due to a hostile/contested airspace and a contested landing zone. I don't think China would be silly enough to try to directly seize Taipei via airborne landings, they might try to seize specific strategic targets, like bridges/tunnels before they can be blown up by retreating defenders and so on; or infiltration forces to assist in flanking maneuvers. The experiences in Spain in the 1930's, or the Russo-Japanese war, I don't think any war really discourages further consideration of war, it only encourages a more careful study of the lessons that could be applied. For example the recent fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan would imply a military that took full advantage of the latest technological advances might be able to advance essentially unopposed. For example Taiwan probably won't be able to deny their airspace the way Ukraine has succeeded in doing; which has huge ramifications for the defender and attacker, as the attacker can more freely choose when and where the battle takes place while the defender is more limited in their ability to respond.
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Aug 31, 2023 05:03
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Raenir Salazar posted:. I wouldn't be so sure about that. If the US/Japan/Aus throw in with Taiwan, I'm pretty sure the skies over Taiwan will be massively contested. Taiwan also has a growing amount of SAM systems, both Patriots and several indigenously produced systems. They also have plenty of MANPADs for their infantry that will take out seaward helicopters just fine. Even if Taiwan's sorta kinda friends don't directly intervene, you can bet they'll still offer AWACS/ELINT support to the ROCAF which will let them use their air power as effectively as possible until it's wiped out. The story is the same with their anti-ship missiles. They have hundreds of them dispersed through the island, both Harpoons and indigenously designed AShM's.
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Aug 31, 2023 06:26
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Vincent Van Goatse posted:The bulk of their current-gen military equipment is based on Russian/Soviet stuff, although they have quite significant amounts of homegrown kit too. The conflict has also pretty clearly shown that old Soviet and Russian gear are perfectly fine at their job and that fancy modern and expensive equivalents can't keep up unless they are deployed in the necessary high amounts. Which is obviously hard to sustain unless you have really solid stocks and the manufacturing base to support it with the severe supply constraints of war. Basically that redundancy, simplicity and quantity still matters a lot for any hardware in a modern peer conflict.
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Aug 31, 2023 07:33
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Apparently China has set its sights on a little bit of Russian land in a recent map. https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1696624183470408168 Which I guess in the grand scheme of things, that's the grounding China likes to put itself on with all its neighbors. This is just them specifically taking this time to announce that they don't respect Russia.
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Aug 31, 2023 14:13
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^^ I was going to inquire from a China perspective, how significant is this?
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Aug 31, 2023 14:21
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Mederlock posted:I wouldn't be so sure about that. If the US/Japan/Aus throw in with Taiwan, I'm pretty sure the skies over Taiwan will be massively contested. Taiwan also has a growing amount of SAM systems, both Patriots and several indigenously produced systems. They also have plenty of MANPADs for their infantry that will take out seaward helicopters just fine. Even if Taiwan's sorta kinda friends don't directly intervene, you can bet they'll still offer AWACS/ELINT support to the ROCAF which will let them use their air power as effectively as possible until it's wiped out. I think lot of things get gnarly fast the moment we assume the US is involved, I'm more talking about scenarios where similar to Ukraine, they're for whatever reason on their own for whatever amount of time. As that's the supposed upside of the conflict in Ukraine in potentially discouraging China from undergoing an adventure against Taiwan, that even without Allies directly intervening that they would be able to hold them off. And its a sentiment I'm pretty sure I've seen before in the thread or the other one. I'm not really convinced that the same situation really holds, that for whatever reason that the Russians couldn't suppress Ukraine's SAM systems that China wouldn't be able to suppress them, a lot of Russia's issues stemmed from poor intelligence, I think its possible that Chinese intelligence as to where they are or where they might be deployed will be better. No plan survives contact with the enemy and just because someone has a capability means that it will be as effective on paper against a competent adversary who has been training and work shopping means of dealing with it. For example Ukraine's success with anti-ship missiles seemed to have a lot to do with again, a lack of funding for basic maintenance and training for crew readiness on the part of Russian naval assets. Basically I'm bearish here because I think instead of optimistically hoping the conflict in Ukraine will discourage conflict, I think instead it may encourage it, "just don't do what the Russians did." basically can also be the take away because they got really close despite their incompetence.
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Aug 31, 2023 14:29
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Ukraine definitely discourages conflict in the sense that it provides a reality check for any fantasies that Taiwan will roll over, quickly get annexed, and the west won't respond. But without being able to read Xi Jinping's mind no one can really say what the calculus us. It may be that it's an incentive to double and triple check preparations for the invasion, including making sure the Chinese economy can absorb shocks from western sanctions. The discouragement here definitely delays any attack if nothing else. Or it could tilt the risk-benefit analysis firmly into the negative territory by raising the potential costs so high that it's not worth it.
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Aug 31, 2023 14:52
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My understanding is that everyone is actually hard at work analyzing and extracting data from what is happening in Ukraine right now. China included. At the same time, I don't think that the data coming from the Ukrainian war so far is making China "concerned" about the efficacy or relative strength of their own armed forces. It is a given that studying this war is going to inform doctrine, asset and orbat decisions going forward for everyone observing it. It will be interesting to see some of the effects in the future (like, in the way drones or ammunition/missile stocks and production capabilities are handled, for example). The idea that the Ukraine conflict though is actually dissuading China from working on re-unification is a little far fetched imo. Especially since the military status quo is continually and objectively eroding in its favor with each year passing by. Dante80 fucked around with this message at 15:55 on Aug 31, 2023 |
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Aug 31, 2023 15:51
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Zudgemud posted:The conflict has also pretty clearly shown that old Soviet and Russian gear are perfectly fine at their job and that fancy modern and expensive equivalents can't keep up unless they are deployed in the necessary high amounts. Which is obviously hard to sustain unless you have really solid stocks and the manufacturing base to support it with the severe supply constraints of war. Basically that redundancy, simplicity and quantity still matters a lot for any hardware in a modern peer conflict. Yeah, I'm not sure where this idea that modern weapons are chumping Russia (and by extension China in a hypothetical Taiwan conflict). None of the 'modern' deployments have coincided with major breakthroughs or stifling of assaults. Turns out that a missile is a missile so long as its been maintained in the X decades it's been around, vehicles get blown up regardless of age, and planes still have to land & wait to get bombed. It's a moot point in any case; China has clearly & regularly communicated that they desire the long game; to marginalize Taiwan's exports, control their shipping lines, and pressure them into a peaceful merger. There's more esteem in "failed capitalist state Taiwan returns to China of its own volition" than in breaking a major talking point WRT comparing US and Chinese hegemony.
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Aug 31, 2023 16:55
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Zudgemud posted:The conflict has also pretty clearly shown that old Soviet and Russian gear are perfectly fine at their job and that fancy modern and expensive equivalents can't keep up unless they are deployed in the necessary high amounts. Which is obviously hard to sustain unless you have really solid stocks and the manufacturing base to support it with the severe supply constraints of war. Basically that redundancy, simplicity and quantity still matters a lot for any hardware in a modern peer conflict. Neurolimal posted:Yeah, I'm not sure where this idea that modern weapons are chumping Russia (and by extension China in a hypothetical Taiwan conflict). None of the 'modern' deployments have coincided with major breakthroughs or stifling of assaults. Turns out that a missile is a missile so long as its been maintained in the X decades it's been around, vehicles get blown up regardless of age, and planes still have to land & wait to get bombed. You do know that the 'fancy modern and expensive equivalents' are actually just as old as the Soviet gear in question, right? The Bradleys are from 1963, and Leopard-2 is from 1979. And they're only present in small handfuls. A few 'modern' IFVs are not going to turn the tide. Ukraine's been using 99% Soviet stock and 1% 60 year old NATO stock. The 'necessary high amounts' is more than 100 IFVs. But they do seem to be doing a good job, considering Ukraine's AA network seems to be performing a lot better than it had been. It's just funny that 50-60 year old tanks and jets are considered 'fancy, expensive and modern weapons'. The most advanced thing that has been given to Ukraine is probably the HIMARs, which is a 30 year old artillery platform. The most modern thing in the war is Russia's T-14 Armata. Kchama fucked around with this message at 17:52 on Aug 31, 2023 |
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Aug 31, 2023 17:49
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Dante80 posted:The idea that the Ukraine conflict though is actually dissuading China from working on re-unification is a little far fetched imo. Especially since the military status quo is continually and objectively eroding in its favor with each year passing by. Right: Russia stuck out of desperation in an ill-advised attack because their situation in the stalemate was getting worse. So even if the lesson is, “don’t do that”, it doesn’t really apply anyway
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Aug 31, 2023 17:50
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Kchama posted:The most modern thing in the war is Russia's T-14 Armata. Has one of these fought?
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Aug 31, 2023 17:59
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Kchama posted:You do know that the 'fancy modern and expensive equivalents' are actually just as old as the Soviet gear in question, right? The Bradleys are from 1963, and Leopard-2 is from 1979. And they're only present in small handfuls. A few 'modern' IFVs are not going to turn the tide. Ukraine's been using 99% Soviet stock and 1% 60 year old NATO stock. The 'necessary high amounts' is more than 100 IFVs. But they do seem to be doing a good job, considering Ukraine's AA network seems to be performing a lot better than it had been. The point is that an upgrade in technology did not and will not change what they accomplish, and it's probably foolish to assume that another tech leap will be what turns a bomber into a war winner. You can't Innovative Tech Disruption basic facts of peer warfare. When we've reached the point where we have to start disassembling cluster munitions and shipping the bomblets over because we're running out of conventional stock, we should probably accept that one new missile isn't worth 50 old missiles. If that weren't the case, we would have sent Ukraine modern weapons, confident that none of them would end up in an embarassing war museum. To tie this all back to China: in any case, it would be a bad call to assume Russia and China are at tech parity, and there's a number of significant factors that separate Ukraine and Taiwan, chiefly:
That make them poor comparisons. Neurolimal fucked around with this message at 18:21 on Aug 31, 2023 |
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Aug 31, 2023 18:11
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Aren't Type 96 tanks based on the T-72? Did China ditch the turret-tossing autoloader?
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Aug 31, 2023 18:20
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Kchama posted:You do know that the 'fancy modern and expensive equivalents' are actually just as old as the Soviet gear in question, right? The Bradleys are from 1963, and Leopard-2 is from 1979. And they're only present in small handfuls. A few 'modern' IFVs are not going to turn the tide. Ukraine's been using 99% Soviet stock and 1% 60 year old NATO stock. The 'necessary high amounts' is more than 100 IFVs. But they do seem to be doing a good job, considering Ukraine's AA network seems to be performing a lot better than it had been. IIRC its a little misleading to generalize the Western stuff as 50-60 years old, the Bradley of 1963 is NOT the same as a Bradley coming off the assembly line today; the Leo-2's, Bradley's, etc, all have had incremental improvements and upgrade kits to make them essentially as competitive as any of the most modern tanks currently deployed today. Unless we're claiming that the Chinese T-99 or whichever their latest is, is automatically better and more advanced than the latest bloc Abrams because the original chassis is 50 years old vs 20 years old? But anyways the overall point that can be made here is "any tank is better than no tank" and that applies even if its 80 year old T-54's. What we are seeing I think is that the difference in doctrine in how the tanks were designed does favour their Ukrainian crews in that they're more likely to survive a sudden catastrophic appearance of a breach in the hull via a high speed projectile; but any increases in destroyed Russian equipment as a result of their deployment isn't enough alone to turn the tide; but more that their presence allows Ukraine to have more brigades in which to conduct operations.
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Aug 31, 2023 18:25
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Neurolimal posted:The point is that an upgrade in technology did not and will not change what they accomplish, and it's probably foolish to assume that another tech leap will be what turns a bomber into a war winner. You can't Innovative Tech Disruption basic facts of peer warfare. There's no single thing that will be a war-winner, but having better equipment is a force multiplier that helps a lot in the winning. You could actually see it with the HIMARs or Patriots. The HIMARs had superior range and was able to force the Russians to move their supply lines and HQs back and weaken the Russian forces. Patriots have been instrumental in keeping Kyiv safe. The reason why the US is running out of artillery shells to give to Ukraine (note, this differs from 'the US is running out of artillery shells') is because the US doesn't really use artillery all that much. The US focuses very heavily on gaining air supremacy and using it to blow stuff up to support tanks and soldiers. So shock, we don't really have a huge quantity of a weapon we do not focus our doctrine on, like the Soviets did and Russians inherited. China is probably keeping a good eye on Ukraine to see how well old NATO tech stands up to relatively more modern Russian tech, especially since they know if the US decides to protect Taiwan like they claim they will, then they'll probably be facing something more impressive on the whole instead of just a handful of 60 year old IFVs and 50 year old tanks. Gort posted:Has one of these fought? Yes, but how much is unclear. One was destroyed in Ukraine, and then they withdrew the rest back to Russia a few months later. Raenir Salazar posted:IIRC its a little misleading to generalize the Western stuff as 50-60 years old, the Bradley of 1963 is NOT the same as a Bradley coming off the assembly line today; the Leo-2's, Bradley's, etc, all have had incremental improvements and upgrade kits to make them essentially as competitive as any of the most modern tanks currently deployed today. Unless we're claiming that the Chinese T-99 or whichever their latest is, is automatically better and more advanced than the latest bloc Abrams because the original chassis is 50 years old vs 20 years old? Any tank is better than no tank, but it doesn't mean tanks are interchangable. I was just pointing out that they seemed to think that the stuff the US sent Ukraine are the newest and best gizmo-ridden weapons, whereas they're just old stuff. I know the US isn't even giving Ukraine the domestic Abrams with the better armor, but the old stuff. And the Bradleys they got is the M2A2 from 1988. They're far from 'modern, expensive and fancy'. Kchama fucked around with this message at 18:33 on Aug 31, 2023 |
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Aug 31, 2023 18:27
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Kchama posted:The reason why the US is running out of artillery shells to give to Ukraine (note, this differs from 'the US is running out of artillery shells') is because the US doesn't really use artillery all that much. The US focuses very heavily on gaining air supremacy and using it to blow stuff up to support tanks and soldiers. So shock, we don't really have a huge quantity of a weapon we do not focus our doctrine on, like the Soviets did and Russians inherited. So what's the plan when a country has significant air defense?
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Aug 31, 2023 18:31
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Neurolimal posted:So what's the plan when a country has significant air defense? Same thing as Vietnam and Iraq: lots and lots of SEAD sorties
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Aug 31, 2023 18:37
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Neurolimal posted:So what's the plan when a country has significant air defense? If you want to know the plan, just look at how the US defeated Iraq's air defenses, using their airforce and cruise missiles to overwhelm their air defenses and wipe them out quickly. It turns out that the military planned on fighting countries with significant air defenses when they decided to make air supremacy their doctrine. It's not like Iraq was a sitting ducks air-wise, either. They were considered one of the strongest militaries in the world at the time, and had over 500 airframes and 12000 AA guns in a not-so-big country. Kchama fucked around with this message at 18:42 on Aug 31, 2023 |
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Aug 31, 2023 18:38
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Neurolimal posted:So what's the plan when a country has significant air defense? The US has not had to plan fighting against a peer adversary for quite some time. The idea after the dissolution of the USSR (Serbia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya etc etc) was SEAD->Air Supremacy->Bombing the poo poo out of everyone->...PROFIT!
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Aug 31, 2023 18:41
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Neurolimal posted:So what's the plan when a country has significant air defense? Ungodly amounts of SEAD sorties carried out by 4th gen planes sticking just outside of SAM range, using 5th Gen fighters and newer stealth drones closer in to fish for the SAM and CAP radars lighting up. Crazy ELINT/reconnaissance capacity to identify SAM locations and lob tomahawks and other long range guided munitions at them. Also just tons of smaller standoff munitions like the SDB that can be lobbed out and precision guided into targets. Also it seems like the West is scaling up gun artillery production as well as ground launched rocket artillery like HIMAR's, like Poland and Korea are going heaavvyy into those systems. That's definitely a lesson from this war, that you need a diversity of launch systems that can operate in different environments.
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Aug 31, 2023 18:41
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Neurolimal posted:So what's the plan when a country has significant air defense? Believe it or not they do plan for this poo poo and there’s a reason a lost US war still leaves a mountain of bodies compared to the US casualties It’s really pleasing to think the US military is lmao so stupid and bad 500 dollar hammer but they are real good at the blowing people up part of war Edgar Allen Ho fucked around with this message at 18:43 on Aug 31, 2023 |
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Aug 31, 2023 18:41
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Looks like China's main AA system is an s-300 clone?
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Aug 31, 2023 18:44
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It turns out that when you have the ability to use those fancy missiles properly, they get a lot done.
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Aug 31, 2023 18:45
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Kchama posted:If you want to know the plan, just look at how the US defeated Iraq's air defenses Encourage a country to start a second war after recovering from the first, then destroy enough material in that war that you can invoke no-fly zones across half the country unmolested prior to the third war? Seems like a strong ask, but I think Poland/India will be up for the task.
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Aug 31, 2023 18:48
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Neurolimal posted:Encourage a country to start a second war after recovering from the first, then destroy enough material in that war that you can invoke no-fly zones across half the country unmolested prior to the third war? What does that have to do with what I just said? It's not like Iraq had no military or AA at the time of the Gulf War as a result of Saddam's idiotic decision to invade Kuwait. They were considered one of the premier armies at the time for good reason, and the US took Iraq's military seriously. Nenonen posted:Especially given that the DESIGN of Bradley STARTED in 1963, but they entered production in 1981. What they had on paper under Kennedy is not the same thing as what entered service under Reagan. Actually yeah I had misremembered there, so I'm sorry for being wrong.
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Aug 31, 2023 18:57
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Raenir Salazar posted:IIRC its a little misleading to generalize the Western stuff as 50-60 years old, the Bradley of 1963 is NOT the same as a Bradley coming off the assembly line today; Especially given that the DESIGN of Bradley STARTED in 1963, but they entered production in 1981. What they had on paper under Kennedy is not the same thing as what entered service under Reagan. Anyway, modern equipment didn't help the Saudis in Yemen.
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Aug 31, 2023 18:57
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The US isn't all that short on shells, they're short on shells they're willing to part with or else it could be catastrophic if suddenly they're forced to fight and they're out of their own stocks of shells they reserved for their own use. Made worse by Operation Bomb Useless Dirt which had US artillery formations eroded in favour of lingering CAS. Kchama posted:There's no single thing that will be a war-winner, but having better equipment is a force multiplier that helps a lot in the winning. You could actually see it with the HIMARs or Patriots. The HIMARs had superior range and was able to force the Russians to move their supply lines and HQs back and weaken the Russian forces. Patriots have been instrumental in keeping Kyiv safe. The Leo-2's and so on are probably a bit better than most of the stuff actually being fielded though, as the most advanced stuff, like the T-90's and upgrades are such a smaller proportion of Russia's fielded formations. But definitely more fancy than the T-72's and variations (yes I'm aware the T-90 is basically just a T-72, but it is a much more advanced version) or the T-64's and so on and especially the T-54's and T-55's. As an aside, I think Military History Visualized had a video recently about how the Leo-1 might actually be better for Ukraine, under the idea that the Leo-2's are actually too advanced to effectively field. Food for thought. HIMARs is definitely doing its due diligence, and as you say is quite the force multiplier, but this is I think more of the exception than the norm for Western equipment being sent to Ukraine. HIMARs needs to work in conjunction with mechanized combined arms formations in sizeable numbers to apply pressure and exploit created weakpoints and currently Ukraine doesn't have enough of western or soviet adjacent equipment to do that as effectively as they'd like. In a Taiwan is alone scenario, the scenario might play out very different and the western derived equipment not any more effective than western equipment, especially against Chinese equipment which is much more radically diverged from Soviet derived stuff. The reasons why Russia couldn't get air superiority might not apply, and if China managed to wrest control of the skies either overall or in specific areas then stuff like HIMARs which work as multipliers for Ukraine might just get targeted and becoming very expensive juicy targets like the Moskva was. The war demonstrates how important air offence and air defence is to enabling operational freedom for either side, Taiwan's advance is 300 miles of distance from the mainland, an advance that with every carrier and amphib warfare boat China deploys gradually diminishes. Its unclear to me what exactly is preventing Russia from knocking out Ukraine's SAMs, just a matter of intelligence or a lack of SEAD platforms? Or is it a lack of cruise missiles? Depending on the answer China might be in a much better position to suppress Taiwan's defences. Russia did initially succeed in suppressing (but not destroying) Ukraine's for I think it was about a month? China has a much larger and more effective air force than Russia's, with stealthier planes and even just a few days might be enough to do things like also suppress anti-ship missile batteries.
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Aug 31, 2023 19:14
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Hot take: biggest shock for the neoconservative perspective in Beijing (as indicated in, say, People's Daily editorials since the war broke out) is the failure to predict the European inclination to supply Ukraine with weapons; there's a distinct absence of a 2003-style (or even 1999-style) wave of disaffection against America or NATO expansion as the culprit of tensions and as responsible for dialogue breaking down. Even as Macron continues to channel l'autonomie strategique, there is no enthusiasm to autonomously decide to yield to Russian "legitimate security concerns", even in the face of Russian gas ties and possible impacts to European growth; electoral prospects for pro-Russian leaders in Western Europe continue to be slim a year on. 2022 was supposed to feature a coming-out party of Xi's Global Security Initiative pitching "indivisible security" (as a successor to Helsinki-flavoured "indivisibility of security in Europe" without the prickly individual rights stuff), for which European support (and American skepticism) would have been very desirable mood music. The main impact re: Taiwan is a concern over whether the reaction of e.g. Germany or India to increased grey warfare in the Taiwan strait can be accurately predicted. It also speaks to the unpredictability of red lines and international permissibility (if in February 2022 one could have predicted that openly supplying weapons with a blessing to kill Russian soldiers with it in Ukraine, but not (say) in Syria would be considered non-escalatory in most European capitals, Russia might have reconsidered). ronya fucked around with this message at 19:22 on Aug 31, 2023 |
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Aug 31, 2023 19:20
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Raenir Salazar posted:The US isn't all that short on shells, they're short on shells they're willing to part with or else it could be catastrophic if suddenly they're forced to fight and they're out of their own stocks of shells they reserved for their own use. Made worse by Operation Bomb Useless Dirt which had US artillery formations eroded in favour of lingering CAS. I kind of question the idea that they could be 'too advanced', unless you're saying the Ukrainians might not know or be able to repair them with the equipment and technology they have. It seems extremely doubtful though. The issue that Russia has with air supremacy is that their planes suck REALLY bad and do not have the kind of weapons to effectively perform SEAD missions. Ukraine's starting planes aren't really all that much better and so even older AA weapons are pretty effective against them. Ukraine has been getting around this by just not using their planes much outside of missions that absolutely require them, and Russia has decided to use their planes as cruise missile launchers from the safety of Russia. End result is that neither party can effectively gain control of the skies. With regards to China, this might make China very worried about trying to use their air force too much, and prevent them from gaining air superiority. They likely aren't nearly as priceless as a Russian or Ukrainian plane is, but it's still a big blow to lose any air frame.
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Aug 31, 2023 19:24
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Also for consideration: if Europe is willing to accept a long term embargo of Russian oil and gas as the price of supporting Ukraine, what might it be willing to accept vis-a-vis China and for how long? And while Oil and Gas stay where they are in the ground no matter what, manufacturing supply chains can permanently shift if there's a will and a way.
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Aug 31, 2023 19:25
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Kchama posted:I kind of question the idea that they could be 'too advanced', unless you're saying the Ukrainians might not know or be able to repair them with the equipment and technology they have. It seems extremely doubtful though. IIRC it mostly has to do with logistics and maintenance; that there could be a lot more Leo1s that could be effectively fielded and that the added complexities of Leo2s isn't helpful. Maybe I'm misremembering, here's the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VP1NwbbjeU quote:The issue that Russia has with air supremacy is that their planes suck REALLY bad and do not have the kind of weapons to effectively perform SEAD missions. Ukraine's starting planes aren't really all that much better and so even older AA weapons are pretty effective against them. Ukraine has been getting around this by just not using their planes much outside of missions that absolutely require them, and Russia has decided to use their planes as cruise missile launchers from the safety of Russia. End result is that neither party can effectively gain control of the skies. With regards to China, this might make China very worried about trying to use their air force too much, and prevent them from gaining air superiority. They likely aren't nearly as priceless as a Russian or Ukrainian plane is, but it's still a big blow to lose any air frame. First, I'm not convinced that Russian planes "suck" as an inherent aspect of their design and usecase, or if its a matter of a lack of maintenance and training and investment in upgrades. In either case none of this applies to China, which does have the money and has been gradually increasing the amount of flight hours for its airforce. Secondly, China actually does have a SEAD platform and a dedicated EWAR platform, such as the J-16 and J-16D; and unlike Russia which seemingly has a much more limited number of planes they're willing to risk, I don't think this applies to China either; as China seems to have a much larger airforce with a larger number of trained pilots and a greater ability to keep them maintained and supplied with spare parts; and unlike Russia China has a much larger surface navy that could be deployed to work in conjunction with its airforces to conduct such missions. Third and I think its worth emphasizing, Russia had like 3 decades in which it was unable to keep up its investment into its military hardware and airforce, China has been constantly putting every effort into catching up and creating new variants using available airframes to incorporate incremental improvements; we really can't take the conflict in Ukraine and apply it too broadly to China because some of their planes might have been based on the same design of a Soviet plane at one point.
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Aug 31, 2023 19:39
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Raenir Salazar posted:IIRC it mostly has to do with logistics and maintenance; that there could be a lot more Leo1s that could be effectively fielded and that the added complexities of Leo2s isn't helpful. Maybe I'm misremembering, here's the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0VP1NwbbjeU The Leopard-2s in Ukraine are not so advanced that Ukraine will have problems with the logistics and maintenance. The issue most likely to arise is that having both Leopard-1s and -2s might strain their ability to have mechanics and supplies. But the Leopard-2 is apparently very easy to maintain and run, compared to Abrams or Leopard-1 which is why Ukraine wants them badly. So I find the 'too advanced for Ukraine to handle' argument to not really make sense. Their planes suck because they're largely old and maintenance and upgrades have slipped. And even though most of Ukraine's AA equipment isn't particularly good, it means that they're still very dangerous to Russia's planes. Which is why Russia's so drat afraid of getting close enough to find out if a particular AA gun is good enough. It's why their new Su-57s only operate from Russia, since even one being shot down is a massive blow. As for China's own planes, they seem largely untested, but them being more advanced and numerous might mean China could be confident with them, but who knows. I don't think anyone has an idea exactly how they perform in real combat. Everyone has gotten a lesson on how what a country SAYS how their military equipment perform does not necessarily correlate to it being the actual factual case. Kchama fucked around with this message at 20:06 on Aug 31, 2023 |
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Aug 31, 2023 19:55
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Russia doesn't have a dedicated SEAD platform and Russian pilots only fly 100 hrs a year. They're using Flanker-Es as wild weasels which is not a mission they are designed for. US pilots see more than 200 hours a year and have not only dedicated SEAD platforms like the F-18G, they have entire squadrons dedicated to air defense suppression. Everything I've ever read about SEAD is that it is a dangerous, hard mission and so it's not surprising that an airforce that doesn't dedicate training and materiel to it is going to struggle. PLAAF has a J-16 variant that is designed for SEAD so I imagine they train for it as well. All that to say I don't think the AA vs AF fight in Ukraine is terribly instructive for how it would go down in a hypothetical US/Chinese conflict.
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Aug 31, 2023 20:02
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Kchama posted:The Leopard-2s in Ukraine are not so advanced that Ukraine will have problems with the logistics and maintenance. The issue most likely to arise is that having both Leopard-1s and -2s might strain their ability to have mechanics and supplies. But the Leopard-2 is apparently very easy to maintain and run, compared to Abrams or Leopard-2 which is why Ukraine wants them badly. So I find the 'too advanced for Ukraine to handle' argument to not really make sense.
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Aug 31, 2023 20:05
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zoux posted:Russia doesn't have a dedicated SEAD platform and Russian pilots only fly 100 hrs a year. They're using Flanker-Es as wild weasels which is not a mission they are designed for. US pilots see more than 200 hours a year and have not only dedicated SEAD platforms like the F-18G, they have entire squadrons dedicated to air defense suppression. Everything I've ever read about SEAD is that it is a dangerous, hard mission and so it's not surprising that an airforce that doesn't dedicate training and materiel to it is going to struggle. PLAAF has a J-16 variant that is designed for SEAD so I imagine they train for it as well. I think the main thing is that China will actually take the time to make sure their ducks are actually in a row before they commit to anything, as they have a very very good example of what happens if you get overly confidence even against a foe you are certain you can casually crush.
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Aug 31, 2023 20:12
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I am not a War Nerd but I would be interested in any informed opinion on whether anti-missile capabilities deployed in Ukraine have shaped any thinking, esp given Taiwan's preference for advanced technology and survivability, rather than accepting a high loss of lives as given and turning to asymmetric warfare
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Aug 31, 2023 20:13
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Raenir Salazar posted:Its unclear to me what exactly is preventing Russia from knocking out Ukraine's SAMs, just a matter of intelligence or a lack of SEAD platforms? Or is it a lack of cruise missiles? They can't do SEAD because they can't/won't put airframes in harm's way, and the front lines on both sides are bristling with MANPADS, with Patriots and S-300s behind them. If you stay low to avoid Mr. Patriot, you are going to get smoked by Mr. MANPAD, and vice versa. And the Ukrainians have, I presume, perfect visibility of the air thanks to NATO running permanent AWACS-equivalents in orbits over the Black Sea and Baltic.
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Aug 31, 2023 20:15
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