Dwesa posted:

Russia is now placing pantsirs on towers





also Tony Hawk's Pro Skater: Pantsir Edition

https://twitter.com/clashreport/status/1698597848525271173

Edit: also this calendar with Putin

Dwesa posted:

Russia is now placing pantsirs on towers

McGavin posted:

Surprised that you didn’t get a visit from the corndog company and the ketchup company with a lifetime supply.

Armacham posted:

And a lifetime supply of tapeworm food

Dwesa posted:

Russia is now placing pantsirs on towers





also Tony Hawk's Pro Skater: Pantsir Edition

https://twitter.com/clashreport/status/1698597848525271173

Dwesa posted:

Russia is now placing pantsirs on towers

Dwesa posted:

Alan Smithee posted:

https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1698424047854375347?s=20
https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1698424053554442639?s=20

PC LOAD LETTER posted:

Supposedly there is actually some benefit from putting them in a elevated position inside a city or hilly area.

It lets their radar system 'see' stuff out farther. The hills and buildings would otherwise interfere with or block the radar. Won't be a huge advantage if true but would help somewhat.

Fumble posted:

this is just part of the training, cant send the boys in if they dont know poo poo about looting.

quote:

Much could have been done sooner by the West to increase defense industrial capacity sufficient to sustain Ukraine’s war effort. For example, European countries need not have waited 13 months to begin making serious investments in artillery production. The same could be said of scaling up training programs. Ukraine’s recent experience shows there’s more to creating combat-effective units than Western infantry fighting vehicles and more capable tanks. They have saved many lives, and Ukraine’s motivated soldiers can quickly adopt Western systems, but this can lead to the erroneous assumption that the time necessary to train cohesive units, and their commanders, can too be dramatically shortened. It is unclear why the training for Ukraine’s summer offensive had to be such a compressed effort, rather than something that was begun much earlier in 2022.

Looking at where the offensive stands today, Ukraine’s decision to attrit Russian forces via fires and advance incrementally with small units played to its strengths. This is a grueling fight. The combat power and reserves available to both sides will play a significant role in determining the outcome. Ukraine’s offensive neither is over, nor has it failed. Ukraine’s prospects depend on how well Western countries resource the Ukrainian war effort into the fall, replace lost equipment, and provide the necessary enablers — above all, artillery ammunition. Ultimately, in planning for their support, Western countries must also think beyond the offensive, rather than taking a wait and see approach. This includes learning lessons from this spring and summer to improve Ukraine’s chances in future offensives. Western efforts should be geared to the assumption that the war will continue well into next year, balancing long-term transition programs, such as the transfer of F-16s and scaled up unit training, with managing Ukraine’s more immediate needs.

The West ought to be introspective about missing important decision points, which had a profound impact on the course of the war, constraining everyone’s options later on. Decisions about future support should have been made well before this offensive even began, assuming that it was unlikely to end the war. Instead, another cycle of attritional fighting may ensue after this offensive, followed by yet another surge effort to restore Ukraine’s offensive potential. In short, the West has been unappreciative of the lead times required to reconstitute military potential or provide Ukraine with a decisive advantage.

The recent anonymous criticism by officials spilling select narratives in the press, rather than fostering an open discussion about Ukraine’s challenges and successes, reveals enduring problems in this war effort: The first, is a lack of Western understanding of how Ukrainian forces fight. The second, which is closely related, is an insufficient Western presence on the ground to enable closer coordination or even the invaluable understanding that could be offered by battlefield observers. Western capitals have sought to keep this Ukraine’s war, avoiding an in-country presence that includes contractor support or trainers. To be clear, there are Western contractors and companies operating independently in Ukraine, but this is not the same as a government sanctioned and supported effort. There is much more that could be done without becoming directly involved in fighting or deploying uniformed personnel on the ground. The hitherto cautious approach has clear limits to its efficacy. Western support thus far has been sufficient to avert a Ukrainian defeat, and arguably has imposed a strategic defeat on Russia, but not enough to ensure a Ukrainian victory. Independent of the outcome of this offensive, Western countries need to be clear-eyed about the fact that this will be a long war. Taken together, Western industrial and military potential greatly exceeds Russia’s, but without the political will, potential alone will not translate into results.

McGavin posted:

When you find yourself with the same opinions as the lady who believes in Jewish space lasers, maybe it's time to reevaluate your worldview.

Dwesa posted:

Sedgr posted:

Sure is quiet. Too quiet. Really gotta hand it to the Ukrainians on their information security. So tight lipped even the wins are under fog.

Groda posted:

Man that's a reference.

The X-man cometh posted:

If Russia's propagandists are claiming the Ukrainian offensive is failing, then you know it's succeeding.

Sashimi posted:

Didn't the exact same thing happen last year when Ukraine was smashing Russian lines in Kharkiv?

Tunicate posted:

Apparently zelensky is removing the current minister of defense Reznikov (who is getting blamed for numerous cases of military procurement corruption whjch happneed under his watch, including an egg overpayment scandal, though it seems like nobody can pin a case on him where he was directly involved), and replacing him with Umerov, a muslim crimean tatar who previously did negotiations on the black sea grain deal, and apparently had a good track record on his management of the previously-embezzle-prone state property fund.

Alan Smithee posted:

https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1698424047854375347?s=20
https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1698424053554442639?s=20

weg posted:

The Russian army has come up with a new way to define "untrained" soldiers lol

Warbadger posted:

It's a great example of why you don't always want to stuff a big Winnebago full of every single sensor, person, and weapon in an air defense system. It's a lot easier to elevate a towed, networked radar (or five) while the rest of the system keeps moving around rather than being an easily found and bypassed static emplacement.

FPzero posted:

I've fallen behind reading this thread by about a week or so and can't seem to catch up. Has anything major happened in the last week since the 27th or so? I know Ukraine had taken Robotyne and was pushing further south through defensive lines.