Mushika posted:

Chicken and egg, I think.

gradenko_2000 posted:

https://twitter.com/revolutionaryem/status/1729976562051682316

kecske posted:

it takes a million billion thumb flicks to scroll past each titanic emptyquote you fuckers

keep punching joe posted:

What leverage do Hamas have once they have released hostages, since presumably Israel are just going to resume carpet bombing refugee camps and hospitals after the pause?

Frosted Flake posted:

I can't find the former name of "John-F.-Kennedy-Platz", but I'm sure it's hilarious.

Frosted Flake posted:

Someone asked about the German government's support for Israel. Tl;dr :

Frosted Flake posted:

But seriously, the German government still owns a lot of poo poo taken from people during the Holocaust.

Also, yeah, Dachau was owned by the West German government and in use until 1960, or 74, depending on the source. The SS barracks at Dachau are still in use by the German government. By what agency, you ask?




"Bereitschaftspolizei (literally 'Readiness Police'/On-Call Police (Reserve); effectively riot police), BePo, are the support and rapid reaction units of Germany's police forces."

I can't find the former name of "John-F.-Kennedy-Platz", but I'm sure it's hilarious.

dieselfruit posted:

https://twitter.com/taraxrh/status/1730016239156597238?t=sBHH_5zhkz5JRYGTzs8Miw&s=19

dudes rock

euphronius posted:

Frosted Flake posted:

I was able to finish a conference paper and submit to a literary journal while I was probed, but the lack of phone posting means my mind has been wandering while I work. My last bit of writing, I experimented with intermezzos, one on Kleist's Der zerbrochne Krug, and one on William G. Niederland's theory of psychogeography. I think they're thematically related to the point I was making about doctrine, but I'll probably be asked to remove them lol.

Anyway, how did Israel's big hospital raid go?

Elden Lord Godfrey posted:

Kissinger finally dead good rid

Weka posted:

This is simply not true, you do not have to let the ideas of burgeristan into your conceptual framework. Terrorism is the seeking of political change through fear, usually induced through violence.

dieselfruit posted:

https://twitter.com/taraxrh/status/1730016239156597238?t=sBHH_5zhkz5JRYGTzs8Miw&s=19

dudes rock

Elden Lord Godfrey posted:

Kissinger finally dead good rid

Elden Lord Godfrey posted:

make ff a mod permaban all dnd mods

Elden Lord Godfrey posted:

Kissinger finally dead good rid

Willa Rogers posted:

the video...

https://twitter.com/GoomiesDii/status/1730027228623204415

Al-Saqr posted:

Bahraini MP Mohammed Al-Balushi: This is an event in solidarity with the Palestinian people, and unfortunately the American, French and British ambassadors are present here, as are those who kill the dead person and walk in his funeral.


https://twitter.com/ajarabic/status/1729950742285328500?s=46&t=kY7HKwmb1RBg9U186lxtbg

FlapYoJacks posted:

The IDF's official position (I listened to an X [formally Twitter] spaces) is that Hamas treats the hostages with dignity and respect and without harm as a form of psychological warfare. No, I am not joking.

Frosted Flake posted:

It's because everybody is taught about that one Luftwaffe interrogator in the Stalag system that was nice to people (and so acquitted of war crimes postwar). It's brought up on a bunch of courses, and I'm sure the psychological operations and HUMINT people have that drummed into them even more.

What I mean is, there's terminology about idk tactical niceness, as a way of achieving (jargon) deliverables, 21st century, (jargon), kinetic solutions.

Frosted Flake posted:

It's because everybody is taught about that one Luftwaffe interrogator in the Stalag system that was nice to people (and so acquitted of war crimes postwar). It's brought up on a bunch of courses, and I'm sure the psychological operations and HUMINT people have that drummed into them even more.

What I mean is, there's terminology about idk tactical niceness, as a way of achieving (jargon) deliverables, 21st century, (jargon), kinetic solutions.

Willa Rogers posted:

the video...

https://twitter.com/GoomiesDii/status/1730027228623204415

Frosted Flake posted:

I've been trying to catch up on the thread, and just wanted to get into something real quick:

First, there are several good books on Glider Infantry and glider operations generally. There's been a renewal of interest and some pretty good scholarship lately.

I would agree that Ében-Émael and the Gran Sasso raid, both German operations, were the pinnacle of the form as far as special operations use goes, probably moreso than Pegasus Bridge. Parenthetically, the PRC, DPRK and others, retained gliders well into the Cold War for this purpose. The ability to silently, and accurately, deliver a complete unit to a target without the scattering of a parachute drop remains useful.

The mass use of gliders was limited to the Western Allies and was remarkably successful. The reason people know so little about it, and the reason glider forces disappeared so quickly after the war is due to something that has been noted ITT over and over again, the cult of airborne forces, who are exceedingly good at playing Pentagon politics. The US Airborne lobbied so that Glider troops would not share their insignia and uniforms (jump boots etc.), fought against them receiving wings, bonus pay etc. and reduced the size of the Glider component of US Airborne Divisions in 1944. Ironically, the Glider troops seem to have done a better job in achieving their objectives in the immediate 101st and 82nd zones of responsibility in Normandy, because, as I said about the special operations role, they all arrived together, and landed with heavy weapons, including AT guns, howitzers, jeeps, and airborne tanks (which the US Airborne left but the British paras put to use). British Glider troops also got a good reputation for their service in Market Garden and the Rhine crossings.

What the Glider troops were not good at, was climbing the ranks quickly enough to secure their place upon demobilization, which is exactly what happened to the Machine Gun Corps after the Great War.

Having an institution matters a lot in the military, and whole weapons systems can rise and fall based on office politics, not the test of battle. By way of example, British glider pilots formed the Glider Pilot Regiment, and in the Regimental system, that was a big deal. Not only did it allow them to stick around until 1957, when helicopters and large transport aircraft were better able to replicate their capabilities, but it improved their morale and performance during the war years too. They trained to a very high standard, were organized for their missions after delivering their cargo to the LZ, and in Arnhem in particular, gave a very good account of themselves. US glider pilots seem to mostly have been pilots that washed out of multiengine flight school at some point, were treated accordingly, and after landing seem to have been told to mill around or work their way back to the Allied beaches. They had no pull at all in the USAAF, or US Army generally, certainly not enough to fight for Airborne divisions to retain their glider component after the budget cuts following the war.

More importantly, throughout the early Cold War, glider operations were the ones being referenced when military helicopters were being developed, particularly when large airmobile formations were envisioned. The experience of intact formations landing together and making use of the capacity of the larger Allied gliders to land heavy weapons that led to demands for heavy lift helicopters. It took a long time for rotary wing aircraft to match the Horsa and Hamilcar too. Remember that the Wessex could only carry about a dozen troops, the early model Hueys even fewer. The independent airmobile formation, "Air Cavalry" or otherwise, could not deliver to an LZ what the glider formations could until the Chinook came around pretty far into the Cold War.

Now, the Soviets went another route and just dropped bigger and bigger things by parachute, so that the VDV, as you all know, has tanks, IFVs, APCs, more support vehicles than you can shake a stick at. It's a bit misleading, because the Soviet Union, and certainly the Russian Federation, never actually had enough large transport aircraft to deliver even one VDV division by parachute in a single day, despite fielding several of them. It's not just their approach that differed though, the Russians have different politics where the Airborne are concerned, since they were able to carve out a place for themselves as an arm of service. This is neither here nor there.

Now, aside about gliders notwithstanding, what is the deal with Israeli paratroopers? Well, you can stop right here and read When Failure Thrives: Institutions and the Evolution of Postwar Airborne Forces, which also recaps the above about the US Army Airborne, British (and CW) Paras, and VDV. Paratroops are very, very good at finding political supporting, and carving out institutional niches for themselves. In the Canadian Army today, you basically need three things to progress past Major in a combat arm: Staff College, fluent French, and parachute wings. The same seems to be true just about everywhere.

The commander of US forces in Vietnam, Westmoreland, was an artillery officer in WW2, who saw the planned size reduction of the US Army after Korea and quickly transferred to the 82nd Airborne Division. General Petraeus, who you all know and love, made his career in the 82nd, and spent a good deal of it protecting it and its parachute status. Look at any photo of US Army top brass, as you will far more likely than not, see them wearing parachute wings and 82nd AB patches.

Before I get into the mechanics of it, I'll say that the Israeli Army is the exact same way. The Israeli Airborne has in actuality been lavishly equipped with APCs since 1982, when the unit was given a more generous allotment of M113s than the regular infantry, many of whom were still on trucks or WW2 era half tracks. They were among the very first provided with Namers, and once again more of them on a per-unit basis, when those rolled around. So, clearly it's not the actual parachute capability that lends the Israeli Army institutional backing, what's going on?

This power stems not from their military capabilities but from their (exaggerated) historical significance, reputation, and the symbolic value they hold in Israeli society and military culture. Their status as an elite unit has been sustained over the decades, largely due to strong institutional backing, which has provided them with significant resources and autonomy. This support has enabled them to adapt to new operational requirements while retaining their elite status and significant role within the IDF. Despite their origins and continued identification as airborne forces, the Israeli Paratroopers have effectively transitioned to a mechanized force. Since the 1956 Suez War, there has been a strategic shift towards increased mechanization within the IDF, with the paratroopers being equipped with APCs. This transition reflects a broader trend in Israeli military strategy, emphasizing the importance of mechanized infantry in modern warfare - first because the Armoured corps held all the leadership positions and literally left the infantry behind in 1956, 67 and 73, then because of squishy casualty aversion.

"Following the 1973 war, there was a significant expansion and reorganization of the ground forces. The establishment of more armored divisions, including a reserve paratroop division, and the equipping of all infantry units with APCs, including paratroopers, further cemented the transition to mechanized warfare."

However, the paratroopers have retained their airborne mystique and identity, demonstrating the enduring power of institutional prestige and tradition in the military, in part because in a conscript military that has effectively been turned into summer camp, as has been pointed out repeatedly ITT, they are the one formation that leans towards regular soldiers. That's because anyone who becomes an IDF regular will gravitate toward units that aren't Mickey Mouse bullshit clown shows, because as in the other countries mentioned up top, jump wings become a promotion requirement, and a career soldier will by definition seek promotion, and also since 1982 the Armoured branch lost a lot of institutional pull because Israel mostly needed dismounted troops to beat up Palestinians.

The Paratroops met that last requirement in particular because, being filled to at least partial strength with regulars, they could be used for these occupation duties without call-ups, which Israel desperately needed. Think of them a bit like an internal French Foreign Legion in that sense. Cross-border raids into Lebanon and "real" fighting during the Intifadas required something like the US all-volunteer force, and the Paratroops fit that need. There's a lot more to get in to here, but the gist of it is, the walls and checkpoints have often been manned by reservists, but the Paratroops were considered the only reliable infantry in the IDF - it had nothing to do with their ability to hit the silk.

Just like all the SOF teams getting wiped out on Zero Hour this go round, using the Paras has a fire brigade had limitations. For instance, the setbacks experienced during the 2006 Lebanon War, where two parachute battalions were almost wiped out - their operational plan presupposed Hezbollah would run away at the sight of them - "highlighted tactical limitations and the need for adjustments in training and strategy". The IDF being the IDF, these fuckups did not significantly diminish the institutional strength or prestige of the paratroopers. Their resilience underscores how institutional power and historical reputation can buffer military units from the immediate impacts of battlefield failures.

So, if someone wants to take a crack at it, the decline of the US and UK Glider forces and the persistence of the IDF paras are two sides of the same coin, where who can best play office politics and who can cultivate a mystique determines what forces, even whole weapons systems and operational concepts, stick around.

I'd go further and add that in colonial conflicts, Marines and Paras are the only ones who maintain consistently high morale. The same thing happened to the French in Vietnam and Algeria, the Paras and Royal Marines from Suez through Falklands the the present day, the ARVN, I would guess the US military as well.