|
Lostconfused posted:Did a bunch of tankies suddenly get mad at materialism because the US air force believed in it? Fog of War should be required viewing itt
|
#
?
Dec 3, 2023 18:54
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 23, 2024 13:17 |
|
|
somewhere andrei martyanov is clutching a military science textbook full of differential equations and shaking his fist at the sky
|
|
#
?
Dec 3, 2023 19:12
|
|
|
Trabisnikof posted:Fog of War should be required viewing itt 
|
|
#
?
Dec 3, 2023 19:45
|
|
|
Also, hitting Italian wartime production wasn't exactly a major feat, Italian tank production was even lower than their airplane production. From 1939 to 1943, they had produced roughly 3,000 tanks of all forms, most of them light tanks useless against contemporary armor, the Soviet Union produced 85,000 excluding self-propelled guns and armored cars.
|
|
#
?
Dec 3, 2023 19:52
|
|
|
https://twitter.com/Ignis_Rex/status/1731171023989661774 china trying to make the ace combat loadouts reality
|
|
#
?
Dec 3, 2023 21:26
|
|
|
missiles are pretty cool im happy for them making manned vehicles look foolish
|
|
#
?
Dec 3, 2023 21:30
|
|
|
b b b but but uhhh those aren’t stealth
|
|
#
?
Dec 3, 2023 21:30
|
|
|
Frosted Flake posted:Aside, my ideal military is the parade ground Late-Victorian/Edwardian Army, with all of the pomp and circumstance, alternating with wholesome foreign service. Only instead of occupying India, doing something genuinely nice and helpful. I understand and I know you do not condone foreign service but one of your main problems is that you are trying to explain A-1 concepts to your fellow posters with a C-3 education. I think it would help if you take a basic building block and foundation regarding the elements of the military like physical education to drive in the point how things are dire involving the state. A good starting point would be from the 19th before the Boer Wars, the early 20th century in relation to Viscount Esher and the territorials along with the Church Brigade, and where modern Western Military are currently at.  Life is Movement by Eugen Sandow is a good start to start off with the poor physiques that were present in the British Empire's militaries during the 19th to pre-WWI. AmyL has issued a correction as of 21:46 on Dec 3, 2023 |
|
#
?
Dec 3, 2023 21:34
|
|
|
Yeah, exactly. The problem with a military not doing anything, particularly if there's not perceived to be any external threat the the country, is that you end up with a rightward creep like in the Latin American militaries, where officers start obsessing about internal enemies, and have the time to get themselves all worked up while close to the capital. You need them to be involved in public works or something useful.
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 00:33
|
|
|
the pla is always doing civilian infrastructure projects, but I can’t really recall the last time the us military contributed to a public works project aside from the corp of engineers loving up in Katrina
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 00:42
|
|
|
FrancisFukyomama posted:the pla is always doing civilian infrastructure projects, but I can’t really recall the last time the us military contributed to a public works project aside from the corp of engineers loving up in Katrina USACE fucks up stuff all over the country tyvm
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 00:54
|
|
|
i really wanted trump's US military parade to happen so bad (if only to see how badly coordinated it would've been)
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 01:02
|
|
|
yellowcar posted:i really wanted trump's US military parade to happen so bad (if only to see how badly coordinated it would've been) we got to see a barrel-less tank sitting on a bed
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 01:06
|
|
|
would’ve collapsed the roads in dc
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 01:07
|
|
|
Ardennes posted:Strategic bombing worked better when you didn't have reliable air defense, but arguably the question of morale is complicated, because the war was "already lost." This is why I keep harping on about strategic bombing being overblown. A weapon that excels at making defeated foes feel more defeated doesn't seem very useful except as a method of terrorism. Terrorism that seems to rarely ever work at disheartening foes in any militarily useful way though I suppose it might improve morale of your own troops to see the enemy civilians massacred and driven to misery. Maybe the Dolittle raid is an example where that might've been somewhat consequential (for US troops and civilians I dunno how it made the Japanese feel though it certainly didn't seem to slow down their war machine or make peace factions any stronger). I feel like the MIC driven strategic bombing advocacy coming out of the US has probably made war even bloodier and worse for civilians than it overwise would've been. Artillery can more thoroughly flatten a city, but the attacking forces have to drag the artillery to where it needs to be used. With strategic bombing a country in a fit of pique can order death and mayhem for a civilian population without air defenses at will. All that mayhem for such vague reasons even to this very moment where the IDF is massacring civilians while doing nothing for their troops getting ambushed by Hamas (dti). I remember Fog of War being good, but it was still probably too charitable to McNamara who was an advocate for all this dumb poo poo even back to WW2.
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 01:14
|
|
|
It is just McNamara talking, and it is where the line "if we had lost the war, we would have been tried as war criminals" comes from. I wouldn't say he fesses up for everything he did (it is called Fog of War after all) but I think there is an acknowledge the damage that was caused in the name of empire. As for strategic bombing, it arguably can make a difference but it arguably won't decrease the ability of an enemy's population will to fight if they have other means to do so. The Blitz nor the Royal Air Force's "dehousing" program stopped the war. Usually, it is most effective when the air defenses of an enemy are already weakened (Italy in 1943 and Germany in 1944) and continued bombing can be conducted. The USAAF eventually did damage to German industry, but arguably it wasn't the mustang that was the key, but the massive air losses the Germans were experiencing in the east. That said looking at Gaza, despite massive damage being done, strategic bombing (even by tactical aircraft) hasn't achieved the result desired because the Palestinian people can still fight.
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 01:47
|
|
|
quote:This is why I keep harping on about strategic bombing being overblown. A weapon that excels at making defeated foes feel more defeated doesn't seem very useful except as a method of terrorism. Terrorism that seems to rarely ever work at disheartening foes in any militarily useful way though I suppose it might improve morale of your own troops to see the enemy civilians massacred and driven to misery. Maybe the Dolittle raid is an example where that might've been somewhat consequential (for US troops and civilians I dunno how it made the Japanese feel though it certainly didn't seem to slow down their war machine or make peace factions any stronger). quote:It is just McNamara talking, and it is where the line "if we had lost the war, we would have been tried as war criminals" comes from. I wouldn't say he fesses up for everything he did (it is called Fog of War after all) but I think there is an acknowledge the damage that was caused in the name of empire. Does the book bring up the Hankow Raid and Operation Mattterhorn in detail?
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 02:00
|
|
|
FrancisFukyomama posted:the pla is always doing civilian infrastructure projects, but I can’t really recall the last time the us military contributed to a public works project aside from the corp of engineers loving up in Katrina in america the usace are very stupid and they're loving up big-time all over. they basically just rubber stamp development plans in the stupidest ways possible that don't accomplish anything but wasting time and money, one of the many failures of federalism. garbage organization
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 02:08
|
|
|
AmyL posted:Does the book bring up the Hankow Raid and Operation Mattterhorn in detail? I don't think directly beyond mentioning McNamara was generally part of planning at the time as a young man. The focus is on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I would say Hankou/Wuhan and Matterhorn in general was simply the United States having zero consideration for the bombing of (even allied ones) populations to achieve their goals. It was also only possible really when the US had bombers in range but also that Japanese air defenses had already become weak.
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 02:08
|
|
|
There’s a book on strategic bombing in the CBI theatre that might help. Title escapes me but I think it was USNI Press?
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 02:18
|
|
|
Lostconfused posted:Did a bunch of tankies suddenly get mad at materialism because the US air force believed in it? it's not "materialism" to reduce warfighting to a production plan while being ignorant of things like ideology and political economy. the US couldn't, and still doesn't, recognize that bombing everything into dust doesn't cause a Douhet-ian impulse to overthrow the current government just to make the bombing stop, and neither does "body count" matter to an enemy that's fighting for national liberation yes, it's nominally good and productive to have a way to mathematically determine how much firepower you'd need to take out any one target, under certain conditions. what isn't being answered is whether why you'd want to target it, and whether it advances your goals to do so. gradenko_2000 has issued a correction as of 02:38 on Dec 4, 2023 |
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 02:35
|
|
|
Ardennes posted:I don't think directly beyond mentioning McNamara was generally part of planning at the time as a young man. The focus is on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I'll bring up the Hankow Raid since it deals with an instance of 20th Air Force deviating from their philosophy of strategic bombing quote:The Hankow Raid by Timothy J Kutta You are not wrong about the US having zero considerations and it doesn't detract about how artillery is "better" but even back then, LeMay was willing to go against doctrine. Frosted Flake posted:There’s a book on strategic bombing in the CBI theatre that might help. Title escapes me but I think it was USNI Press? Flipping through a bunch of back issues of COMMAND: Military History, Strategy & Analysis atm. I'm surprised that the 20th Air Force went with using China to base the B-29s even when they saw the logistical support required in the European air theatre. AmyL has issued a correction as of 02:45 on Dec 4, 2023 |
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 02:39
|
|
|
As I recall McNamara admits some of the things he did was evil but doesn't admit he was also a dumbass who was wrong (not to mention the cause was unjust from the rip). Like all of the fuzzy war math posted above is McNamara's wheelhouse and there's an undercurrent of if only we had run the war more like a business. The documentary trying to pass off how he and his associates were smart kids who meant well with millions dead is too charitable.
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 02:39
|
|
|
FuzzySlippers posted:As I recall McNamara admits some of the things he did was evil but doesn't admit he was also a dumbass who was wrong (not to mention the cause was unjust from the rip). Like all of the fuzzy war math posted above is McNamara's wheelhouse and there's an undercurrent of if only we had run the war more like a business. The documentary trying to pass off how he and his associates were smart kids who meant well with millions dead is too charitable. yeah McNamara became SecDef because he was known for having pioneered the statistical approach to area bombing in Japan
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 02:43
|
|
|
FuzzySlippers posted:As I recall McNamara admits some of the things he did was evil but doesn't admit he was also a dumbass who was wrong (not to mention the cause was unjust from the rip). Like all of the fuzzy war math posted above is McNamara's wheelhouse and there's an undercurrent of if only we had run the war more like a business. The documentary trying to pass off how he and his associates were smart kids who meant well with millions dead is too charitable. even if he doesn't get there himself, it still ends up being an indictment of the methods he used and the "we can fix any problem with numbers" positivist liberalism more broadly. i think the point that he "meant well" but still caused such horrors is an essential part of that critique. because the problem wasn't that McNamara was an evil or dumb dude, but that his worldview and ideology were fundamentally flawed. the best and the brightest with all the resources in the world can't "fix" problems that their ideology is incapable of handling. McNamara believed in the power of quantitative evaluation and decision-making and it failed him. and in doing so, led him to see needlessly evil acts as good.
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 02:56
|
|
|
gradenko_2000 posted:yeah McNamara became SecDef because he was known for having pioneered the statistical approach to area bombing in Japan He was also the first president of Ford Motor Company from outside the Ford family since John S. Gray in 1906 which bolstered his theories being used in business which meant "practical" applications.
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 03:01
|
|
|
AmyL posted:Flipping through a bunch of back issues of COMMAND: Military History, Strategy & Analysis atm. I'm surprised that the 20th Air Force went with using China to base the B-29s even when they saw the logistical support required in the European air theatre. Iirc it was a political/alliance warfare decision because to prop up the KMT and more directly show their commitment to the theatre.
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 03:04
|
|
|
gradenko_2000 posted:it's not "materialism" to reduce warfighting to a production plan while being ignorant of things like ideology and political economy. the US couldn't, and still doesn't, recognize that bombing everything into dust doesn't cause a Douhet-ian impulse to overthrow the current government just to make the bombing stop, and neither does "body count" matter to an enemy that's fighting for national liberation Yeah, a part of war is getting stuff made and sent somewhere, but winning wars is not just about reducing the enemy ability to make stuff and get it places. The US has often been aggressively disinterested in the political dimension which is why it so often gets blindsided by political repercussions. It's like since the US is supporting whatever political objective for dodgy reasons it just assumes all political objectives are dodgy and therefore somewhat irrelevant. The quality of South vs North Vietnamese governments and their popularity with the people doesn't matter we just need to bomb more NVA. This is why I dislike trying to reduce war down into economic causes as the supposed 'real' cause with everything above just window dressing. That eliminates the very real differences between political causes that change how wars are fought. It's why, for example, the South would say gently caress it and give up on a war for a dumb and unjust cause that the population grew weary of while across the globe people have fought to a far more desperate state for theirs. Creating algorithms that suggest a population will revolt or abandon a cause when X% are killed or Y% of industry can't be universally applied (and I believe that is exactly what McNamara tried to do).
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 03:11
|
|
|
gradenko_2000 posted:it's not "materialism" to reduce warfighting to a production plan while being ignorant of things like ideology and political economy. the US couldn't, and still doesn't, recognize that bombing everything into dust doesn't cause a Douhet-ian impulse to overthrow the current government just to make the bombing stop, and neither does "body count" matter to an enemy that's fighting for national liberation If you changed bombing everything from shelling everything, you could argue a better case for "materialism" to reduce warfighting to a production plan.
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 03:18
|
|
|
The America's mathematical approach to war is "number go up". The easiest way to make the number go up is to gently caress with the metrics. What numbers goes up and why? Doesn't matter. The goal is for each level to avoid being yelled at by the level above.
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 03:44
|
|
|
I would disagree about the US not understanding wars in political terms. US use of airpower is the result of political decision making. Because of how the US military works, first the USAAF, then the USAF staked out missions that would allow them to operate as an independent service and part of the nuclear triad. Those missions therefore had to be at the level of grand strategy. If you announced to the Pentagon that you mission was destruction of rail lines, close air support, and tactical/interdiction bombing, you are first not going to be allowed to go from an Army Air Corps to an Army Air Force, then become an independent service, or maintain your importance, independence and budget. Each of those missions, essentially, support the Army in their objectives, therefore the air forces should be, if not subordinate to the Army formally, at least not achieve the same standing. Their missions would be dictated to them by the Army, in any case, which would be dictating the overall direction of the war and theatre. So, the USAF, like the Marine Corps, and USN carrier aviation at various times (and USMC Aviation even moreso) has tried to explain why they must be at the table with the joint chiefs, receiving the resourcing they do, and so on. This means they must, politically at least, fight their own war. It's also why the first thing the USAF cuts after every war is ground attack aircraft. They don't want to be left with just ground attack aircraft during a drawdown, because that would limit their independent status. To tie this all together with 8th AF, it's not as complex as you're making it out, I think. The US had decided on a Germany First policy by the first months of 1942. However, consider: - There was no way for the US Navy to fight the Germans directly, or decisively, and too many assets were needed/already in place to defend the Pacific - Therefore, there was no way for the Marines to fight the Germans directly or decisively, and too many assets were needed/already in place to defend the Pacific - The British were adamant that the US Army was not ready to fight the Wehrmacht in Northwest Europe, which would be the decisive theatre of the war against Germany. The British insisted that the US Army slowly build up troops and introduce them to combat in the MTO. Torch and the Kasserine Pass showed that the Army was not ready to drive to Berlin, and was not estimated to be until 1943-44. - The US public was mostly upset about Pearl Harbour. A Germany First strategy demanded that something be done to fight the Germans, particularly because US forces could not be seen as idle while the Japanese advance continued in the Pacific. This is sort of a mirror of Canadian ground forces being deliberately kept out of combat for as long as possible, to prevent another Conscription Crisis, and is why Canada fielded a huge Air Force and Navy compared to Australia and New Zealand. The combination of the above meant the USAAF was in a uniquely advantageous position to secure their independence. They were the only force that could start fighting Germany straight away, and they promised that their efforts, alone, would achieve strategic objectives. Which isn't to say they didn't believe the strategic bombing campaign would damage Germany. Think if it sort of like Bomber Command. Before Dunkirk, Bomber Command was not a big deal and the RAF was understood to primarily support the Army, and the RN via Coastal Command. Once British forces were ejected from the continent, and there was no way to directly, let alone decisively, fight the Germans, suddenly Bomber Command became a lot more important and the RAF started getting serious resources allocated to it. To the point that British tank production was famously a disaster until the Sherman, and US produced engines for British tanks, came along. The best engines were going to the RAF. It's also why the gunboats and torpedo boats in the channel had difficulty with the E-Boats. Powerful piston engines were dedicated to bombers, there was no way around it, and so was a good deal of metal. Making due with wooden hulls and obsolete engines - again, until US produced engines came around - limited what RN coastal forces could achieve. Even though coastal shipping was tremendously important in Occupied Europe, Bomber Command made the better case for how giving them resources would end the war. Allied coastal forces didn't achieve real superiority until 1944, the same time decent British tanks came online. Frosted Flake has issued a correction as of 03:54 on Dec 4, 2023 |
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 03:46
|
|
|
Frosted Flake posted:I would disagree about the US not understanding wars in political terms. I mean, that's domestic politics. Sure, the USAF knew how to maneuver itself into becoming its own organization unto itself.
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 04:03
|
|
|
Frosted Flake posted:I would disagree about the US not understanding wars in political terms. US use of airpower is the result of political decision making. Because of how the US military works, first the USAAF, then the USAF staked out missions that would allow them to operate as an independent service and part of the nuclear triad. Those missions therefore had to be at the level of grand strategy. If you announced to the Pentagon that you mission was destruction of rail lines, close air support, and tactical/interdiction bombing, you are first not going to be allowed to go from an Army Air Corps to an Army Air Force, then become an independent service, or maintain your importance, independence and budget. Each of those missions, essentially, support the Army in their objectives, therefore the air forces should be, if not subordinate to the Army formally, at least not achieve the same standing. Their missions would be dictated to them by the Army, in any case, which would be dictating the overall direction of the war and theatre. TLDR: The promise of administrators from the USAFF, then the USAF to the executive and legislature branch of the US government that they can be the first to fight and be in the thick of it so give the majority of funding, infrastructure, and industrial capacity to them? I mean... gradenko_2000 posted:I mean, that's domestic politics. Sure, the USAF knew how to maneuver itself into becoming its own organization unto itself. More office politics there tbqh
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 04:06
|
|
|
AmyL posted:TLDR: The promise of administrators from the USAAF, then the USAF to the executive and legislature branch of the US government that they can be the first to fight and be in the thick of it so give the majority of funding, infrastructure, and industrial capacity to them? Yes. A lot of this was worked out in the Johnson-McConnell agreement of 1966 and earlier Key West Agreement.
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 04:09
|
|
|
Frosted Flake posted:Yes. A lot of this was worked out in the Johnson-McConnell agreement of 1966 and earlier Key West Agreement. Good sir, you mean it was the secret backers of the Peace of Westphalia and the Council of Vienna to form the administrative state to make it all possible Fine people like  Fake edit:   TBF, and I should have clarified it, I was talking about the time period before and during the Hankow raids that took place. AmyL has issued a correction as of 04:43 on Dec 4, 2023 |
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 04:13
|
|
|
FuzzySlippers posted:As I recall McNamara admits some of the things he did was evil but doesn't admit he was also a dumbass who was wrong (not to mention the cause was unjust from the rip). Like all of the fuzzy war math posted above is McNamara's wheelhouse and there's an undercurrent of if only we had run the war more like a business. The documentary trying to pass off how he and his associates were smart kids who meant well with millions dead is too charitable. yeah you definitely have to read between the lines with what mcnamara says
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 04:49
|
|
|
I suppose members of the US military do impressive work in the true war of the contemporary Western military professional: maximizing the funding and prestige of their fiefdom within the military. All this poo poo accomplishing geopolitical goals abroad is only significant by how it helps those objectives. This is a field where technocratic Americans have surpassed what anyone else could ever imagine achieving. Fiefdoms within the US military have managed to become independent in ludicrous ways and have funding that increases every year by amounts that cannot be calculated by mortals while actually constantly degrading their ability to fight a war.  hence the optimization McNamara style towardsBar Crow posted:The America's mathematical approach to war is "number go up". The
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 05:19
|
|
|
Absolutely. That's not even getting into all of the politics of keeping the USMC entirely out of the European Theatre of WW2. Not that they would have done much good, mind you, but the USMC's status as an independent force in the modern era had been secured by going to France in the Great War and having the media directly attached. The result was, even though the doughboys of the US Army did most of the fighting in the AEF, the USMC got most of the press. Going from headlines in 1917-18, you would hardly know the Army was in France. As an ultimate consequence, the USMC were guaranteed their position as an independent branch because the public would not tolerate them being demobilized postwar, or even reduced back down to shipboard security and occasional landing parties. This is where the (entirely invented) nickname "Devil Dogs" came from, the carefully cultivated USMC media campaign. Since all US Army generals commanding in WW2 had been in the Great War, they expended a lot of political capital to prevent a single Marine from landing in Europe. Of course, that meant that in the Pacific, where there were dramatically more US Army soldiers than Marines, and the Army fought bigger, more successful operations, almost the entire popular memory of the conflict is of the USMC. Once again, the USMC cultivated a very close relationship with the media to make this happen. So, in each World War, as you said, eyes were set on maximizing the funding and prestige of their fiefdom within the military. All this poo poo accomplishing geopolitical goals abroad is only significant by how it helps those objectives Frosted Flake has issued a correction as of 05:49 on Dec 4, 2023 |
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 05:38
|
|
|
next you’re going to tell me the marines didn’t actually fight lava monsters
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 05:47
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 23, 2024 13:17 |
|
|
Centrist Committee posted:next you’re going to tell me the marines didn’t actually fight lava monsters I was just reading a historian complaining that the USMC promoting the idea that naval infantry are inherently elite (instead of conveniently located on ships and naval bases, which makes them easier to move around) has led to misconceptions about the Italian San Marco Regiment, "Italian marines" and the even more misconstrued German Seebataillon/Marinestosstruppkompanie, "German marines". These were troops who either maintained order on ships, provided security at distant naval stations, or guarded naval bases. They were not elite, or important, and yet, the American public will not stop asking WW2 historians about them. This is even more complicated in the Pacific, where the Japanese did maintain some pretty good Special Naval Landing Forces, but far more Imperial Japanese Naval Landing Forces, who were construction labourers and security. This is because the IJN was practically a feudal state, rather than just a branch of the military, and so had an entire parallel infrastructure to construct and maintain. Anyway, those
|
|
#
?
Dec 4, 2023 05:49
|
|