|
Walk softly and carry a big bullet stick. Ukrainian sniper scores kill 2.5 miles away. https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/uk..._mobilewebshare
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 01:09
|
|
|
|
| # ? Jun 6, 2024 19:10 |
|
|
Tuna-Fish posted:
We live in the Ewok Christmas Special of timelines.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 01:24
|
|
|
psydude posted:Walk softly and carry a big bullet stick. That thing looks like a Kurd sniper special firing .22 eargesplittenloudenboomer.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 01:39
|
|
|
BBC published an interview with a Ukrainian soldier who gave an account of being "outnumbered and outgunned", "Ukraine's struggle to cling on to its foothold on the east bank of the vast Dnipro river", and "troop boats blown out of the water, inexperienced reinforcements and a feeling of abandonment by Ukraine's military commanders". Source: British Broadcasting Corporation Link: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67565508 Ukraine war: Soldier tells BBC of front-line 'hell' 2 hours ago By James Waterhouse BBC Ukraine correspondent Outnumbered and outgunned, one front-line soldier has given a sobering account of Ukraine's struggle to cling on to its foothold on the east bank of the vast Dnipro river. Several hundred Ukrainian soldiers have made it there as part of a counter-offensive launched six months ago. Under relentless Russian fire, the soldier spent several weeks on the Russian-occupied side of the river as Ukraine sought to establish a bridgehead around the village of Krynky. The BBC is not naming him to protect his identity. His account, sent via a messaging app, speaks of troop boats blown out of the water, inexperienced reinforcements and a feeling of abandonment by Ukraine's military commanders. It highlights growing tensions as Ukraine's defence against Russia's invasion grinds to the end of another year. Ukraine's military told the BBC they are not commenting on the situation in that area for security reasons. The Ukrainian soldier's quotes are below in bold. __________________________ "The entire river crossing is under constant fire. I've seen boats with my comrades on board just disappear into the water after being hit, lost forever to the Dnipro river. "We must carry everything with us - generators, fuel and food. When you're setting up a bridgehead you need a lot of everything, but supplies weren't planned for this area. "We thought after we made it there the enemy would flee and then we could calmly transport everything we needed, but it didn't turn out that way. "When we arrived on the [eastern] bank, the enemy were waiting. Russians we managed to capture said their forces were tipped off about our landing so when we got there, they knew exactly where to find us. They threw everything at us - artillery, mortars and flame thrower systems. I thought I'd never get out." __________________________ Yet the few hundred marines have been able to dig in, partly helped by Ukrainian artillery fire from the higher, western banks of the Dnipro. The river separates the Russian-occupied and Ukrainian-controlled parts of the southern Kherson region. President Volodymyr Zelensky has been keen to talk up this offensive, framing it as the beginning of something more. Ukraine's General Staff reported in its daily update on Sunday that its forces were maintaining their positions on the eastern bank of the Dnipro, and were inflicting "fire damage on the enemy's rear". This soldier's testimony, however, reveals splits between Ukraine's government and its generals over the state of the war. Ukraine's commander-in-chief Gen Valery Zaluzhny told the Economist magazine in November that, "just like the First World War we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate." President Zelensky's office swiftly rebuked the general for his comments, denying there was a deadlock on the battlefield. __________________________ "Every day we sat in the forest taking incoming fire. We were trapped - the roads and paths are all riddled with mines. The Russians cannot control everything, and we use it. But their drones are constantly buzzing in the air, ready to strike as soon as they see movement. "Supplies were the weakest link. The Russians monitored our supply lines, so it became more difficult - there was a real lack of drinking water, despite our deliveries by boat and drone. "We paid for a lot of our own kit - buying generators, power banks and warm clothes ourselves. Now the frosts are coming, things will only get worse - the real situation is being hushed up, so no-one will change anything. "No-one knows the goals. Many believe that the command simply abandoned us. The guys believe that our presence had more political than military significance. But we just did our job and didn't get into strategy __________________________ There's no doubt this crossing has forced some Russian forces to redeploy from other parts of the front line, such as their heavily defended positions in the Zaporizhzhia region, where Kyiv hoped there would have been a breakthrough sooner. BBC Russian recently spoke to some Russian troops who are defending the riverbank in that area. They said it was "suicide" for their soldiers to move there, saying they had lost many men in the fight and that they cannot dislodge the Ukrainians from their foothold. Ukraine's military meanwhile says it wants to target Russian supply lines and force them back enough from the river to protect civilians from shelling. It means both Russian and Ukrainian soldiers are absorbing a lot of fire. __________________________ "Mostly our losses were mistakes - someone didn't climb in that trench quickly enough; another guy hid badly. If someone isn't switched on, he'll be immediately targeted from everywhere. "But thanks to our doctors, if we can get an injured soldier to the medics - he'll be saved. They're titans, Gods. But we can't get the remains of the fallen out. It's just too dangerous. "At the same time our drones and missiles inflict a lot of losses on the enemy. We took prisoners of war once, but where to put them, if we have no way to cross the river even with our own injured comrades?" __________________________ Like every other part of the front line, this operation has also turned into a battle of attrition. While Russia is filling its ranks with conscripts and pardoned prisoners, Ukraine is struggling to find the manpower it needs. A recent BBC investigation found that nearly 20,000 men have fled Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion to avoid the draft. __________________________ "Several brigades were supposed to be posted here, not individual companies - we just don't have enough men. "There are a lot of young guys among us. We need people, but trained people, not the green ones we have there now. There are guys who had spent just three weeks in training, and only managed to shoot a few times. "It's a total nightmare. A year ago, I wouldn't have said that, but now, sorry, I'm fed up. "Everyone who wanted to volunteer for war came a long time ago - it's too hard now to tempt people with money. Now we're getting those who didn't manage to escape the draft. You'll laugh at this, but some of our marines can't even swim." __________________________ The village of Krynky has been turned to rubble. The scenes of palpable relief when Kherson city and swathes of the Kharkiv region were liberated a year ago have yet to be replicated. Instead, Ukraine's wins are chalked up in small parcels of devastated and abandoned land. That makes President Zelensky's case for long-term Western support harder to sell politically. But regardless, the anonymous soldier's fight will soon continue. __________________________ "I got out after getting concussed from a mine, but one of my colleagues didn't make it - all that was left of him was his helmet. "I feel like I escaped from hell, but the guys who replaced us last time got into even more hell than us. "But the next rotation is due. My time to cross the river again is soon." (USER WAS PUT ON PROBATION FOR THIS POST)
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 01:58
|
|
|
Considering I've seen the same reports from Russians... that they are feeling outnumbered and outgunned in the same region, I wonder which is true.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 02:20
|
|
|
PurpleXVI posted:Considering I've seen the same reports from Russians... that they are feeling outnumbered and outgunned in the same region, I wonder which is true. They both are, in the sense that something being sandblasted and the individual sand particles are both being utterly hosed up but the guy holding the sand blaster is just turning up the power.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 02:36
|
|
|
The "Washington Post Staff" currently has a pessimistic view of Ukraine's prospects for a military victory. Key take-aways "Key elements that shaped the counteroffensive and the initial outcome include: ● Ukrainian, U.S. and British military officers held eight major tabletop war games to build a campaign plan. But Washington miscalculated the extent to which Ukraine’s forces could be transformed into a Western-style fighting force in a short period — especially without giving Kyiv air power integral to modern militaries. ● U.S. and Ukrainian officials sharply disagreed at times over strategy, tactics and timing. The Pentagon wanted the assault to begin in mid-April to prevent Russia from continuing to strengthen its lines. The Ukrainians hesitated, insisting they weren’t ready without additional weapons and training. ● U.S. military officials were confident that a mechanized frontal attack on Russian lines was feasible with the troops and weapons that Ukraine had. The simulations concluded that Kyiv’s forces, in the best case, could reach the Sea of Azov and cut off Russian troops in the south in 60 to 90 days. ● The United States advocated a focused assault along that southern axis, but Ukraine’s leadership believed its forces had to attack at three distinct points along the 600-mile front, southward toward both Melitopol and Berdyansk on the Sea of Azov and east toward the embattled city of Bakhmut. ● The U.S. intelligence community had a more downbeat view than the U.S. military, assessing that the offensive had only a 50-50 chance of success given the stout, multilayered defenses Russia had built up over the winter and spring. ● Many in Ukraine and the West underestimated Russia’s ability to rebound from battlefield disasters and exploit its perennial strengths: manpower, mines and a willingness to sacrifice lives on a scale that few other countries can countenance. ● As the expected launch of the offensive approached, Ukrainian military officials feared they would suffer catastrophic losses — while American officials believed the toll would ultimately be higher without a decisive assault. The year began with Western resolve at its peak, Ukrainian forces highly confident and President Volodymyr Zelensky predicting a decisive victory. But now, there is uncertainty on all fronts. Morale in Ukraine is waning. International attention has been diverted to the Middle East. Even among Ukraine’s supporters, there is growing political reluctance to contribute more to a precarious cause. At almost every point along the front, expectations and results have diverged as Ukraine has shifted to a slow-moving dismounted slog that has retaken only slivers of territory.[/b] “We wanted faster results,” Zelensky said in an interview with the Associated Press last week. “From that perspective, unfortunately, we did not achieve the desired results. And this is a fact.” Together, all these factors make victory for Ukraine far less likely than years of war and destruction."" __________________________________________________ Source: The Washington Post Direct Link: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war/[/b] Miscalculations, divisions marked offensive planning by U.S., Ukraine By Washington Post Staff December 4, 2023 at 6:00 a.m. EST On June 15, in a conference room at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, flanked by top U.S. commanders, sat around a table with his Ukrainian counterpart, who was joined by aides from Kyiv. The room was heavy with an air of frustration. Austin, in his deliberate baritone, asked Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov about Ukraine’s decision-making in the opening days of its long-awaited counteroffensive, pressing him on why his forces weren’t using Western-supplied mine-clearing equipment to enable a larger, mechanized assault, or using smoke to conceal their advances. Despite Russia’s thick defensive lines, Austin said, the Kremlin’s troops weren’t invincible. Reznikov, a bald, bespectacled lawyer, said Ukraine’s military commanders were the ones making those decisions. But he noted that Ukraine’s armored vehicles were being destroyed by Russian helicopters, drones and artillery with every attempt to advance. Without air support, he said, the only option was to use artillery to shell Russian lines, dismount from the targeted vehicles and proceed on foot. “We can’t maneuver because of the land-mine density and tank ambushes,” Reznikov said, according to an official who was present. The meeting in Brussels, less than two weeks into the campaign, illustrates how a counteroffensive born in optimism has failed to deliver its expected punch, generating friction and second-guessing between Washington and Kyiv and raising deeper questions about Ukraine’s ability to retake decisive amounts of territory. As winter approaches, and the front lines freeze into place, Ukraine’s most senior military officials acknowledge that the war has reached a stalemate. This examination of the lead-up to Ukraine’s counteroffensive is based on interviews with more than 30 senior officials from Ukraine, the United States and European nations. It provides new insights and previously unreported details about America’s deep involvement in the military planning behind the counteroffensive and the factors that contributed to its disappointments. The second part of this two-part account examines how the battle unfolded on the ground over the summer and fall, and the widening fissures between Washington and Kyiv. Some of the officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive deliberations. Key elements that shaped the counteroffensive and the initial outcome include: ● Ukrainian, U.S. and British military officers held eight major tabletop war games to build a campaign plan. But Washington miscalculated the extent to which Ukraine’s forces could be transformed into a Western-style fighting force in a short period — especially without giving Kyiv air power integral to modern militaries. ● U.S. and Ukrainian officials sharply disagreed at times over strategy, tactics and timing. The Pentagon wanted the assault to begin in mid-April to prevent Russia from continuing to strengthen its lines. The Ukrainians hesitated, insisting they weren’t ready without additional weapons and training. ● U.S. military officials were confident that a mechanized frontal attack on Russian lines was feasible with the troops and weapons that Ukraine had. The simulations concluded that Kyiv’s forces, in the best case, could reach the Sea of Azov and cut off Russian troops in the south in 60 to 90 days. ● The United States advocated a focused assault along that southern axis, but Ukraine’s leadership believed its forces had to attack at three distinct points along the 600-mile front, southward toward both Melitopol and Berdyansk on the Sea of Azov and east toward the embattled city of Bakhmut. ● The U.S. intelligence community had a more downbeat view than the U.S. military, assessing that the offensive had only a 50-50 chance of success given the stout, multilayered defenses Russia had built up over the winter and spring. ● Many in Ukraine and the West underestimated Russia’s ability to rebound from battlefield disasters and exploit its perennial strengths: manpower, mines and a willingness to sacrifice lives on a scale that few other countries can countenance. ● As the expected launch of the offensive approached, Ukrainian military officials feared they would suffer catastrophic losses — while American officials believed the toll would ultimately be higher without a decisive assault. The year began with Western resolve at its peak, Ukrainian forces highly confident and President Volodymyr Zelensky predicting a decisive victory. But now, there is uncertainty on all fronts. Morale in Ukraine is waning. International attention has been diverted to the Middle East. Even among Ukraine’s supporters, there is growing political reluctance to contribute more to a precarious cause. At almost every point along the front, expectations and results have diverged as Ukraine has shifted to a slow-moving dismounted slog that has retaken only slivers of territory.[/b] “We wanted faster results,” Zelensky said in an interview with the Associated Press last week. “From that perspective, unfortunately, we did not achieve the desired results. And this is a fact.” Together, all these factors make victory for Ukraine far less likely than years of war and destruction. The campaign’s inconclusive and discouraging early months pose sobering questions for Kyiv’s Western backers about the future, as Zelensky — supported by an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians — vows to fight until Ukraine restores the borders established in its 1991 independence from the Soviet Union. “That’s going to take years and a lot of blood,” a British security official said, if it’s even possible. “Is Ukraine up for that? What are the manpower implications? The economic implications? Implications for Western support?” The year now stands to end with Russian President Vladimir Putin more certain than ever that he can wait out a fickle West and fully absorb the Ukrainian territory already seized by his troops. Gaming out the battle plan In a conference call in the late fall of 2022, after Kyiv had won back territory in the north and south, Austin spoke with Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s top military commander, and asked him what he would need for a spring offensive. Zaluzhny responded that he required 1,000 armored vehicles and nine new brigades, trained in Germany and ready for battle. “I took a big gulp,” Austin said later, according to an official with knowledge of the call. “That’s near-impossible,” he told colleagues. In the first months of 2023, military officials from Britain, Ukraine and the United States concluded a series of war games at a U.S. Army base in Wiesbaden, Germany, where Ukrainian officers were embedded with a newly established command responsible for supporting Kyiv’s fight. The sequence of eight high-level tabletop exercises formed the backbone for the U.S.-enabled effort to hone a viable, detailed campaign plan, and to determine what Western nations would need to provide to give it the means to succeed. “We brought all the allies and partners together and really squeezed them hard to get additional mechanized vehicles,” a senior U.S. defense official said. During the simulations, each of which lasted several days, participants were designated to play the part either of Russian forces — whose capabilities and behavior were informed by Ukrainian and allied intelligence — or Ukrainian troops and commanders, whose performance was bound by the reality that they would be facing serious constraints in manpower and ammunition. The planners ran the exercises using specialized war-gaming software and Excel spreadsheets — and, sometimes, simply by moving pieces around on a map. The simulations included smaller component exercises that each focused on a particular element of the fight — offensive operations or logistics. The conclusions were then fed back into the evolving campaign plan. Top officials including Gen. Mark A. Milley, then chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, commander of Ukrainian ground forces, attended several of the simulations and were briefed on the results. During one visit to Wiesbaden, Milley spoke with Ukrainian special operations troops — who were working with American Green Berets — in the hope of inspiring them ahead of operations in enemy-controlled areas. “There should be no Russian who goes to sleep without wondering if they’re going to get their throat slit in the middle of the night,” Milley said, according to an official with knowledge of the event. “You gotta get back there, and create a campaign behind the lines.” Ukrainian officials hoped the offensive could re-create the success of the fall of 2022, when they recovered parts of the Kharkiv region in the northeast and the city of Kherson in the south in a campaign that surprised even Ukraine’s biggest backers. Again, their focus would be in more than one place. But Western officials said the war games affirmed their assessment that Ukraine would be best served by concentrating its forces on a single strategic objective — a massed attack through Russian-held areas to the Sea of Azov, severing the Kremlin’s land route from Russia to Crimea, a critical supply line. The rehearsals gave the United States the opportunity to say at several points to the Ukrainians, “I know you really, really, really want to do this, but it’s not going to work,” one former U.S. official said. At the end of the day, though, it would be Zelensky, Zaluzhny and other Ukrainian leaders who would make the decision, the former official noted. Officials tried to assign probabilities to different scenarios, including a Russian capitulation — deemed a “really low likelihood” — or a major Ukrainian setback that would create an opening for a major Russian counterattack — also a slim probability. “Then what you’ve got is the reality in the middle, with degrees of success,” a British official said. The most optimistic scenario for cutting the land bridge was 60 to 90 days. The exercises also predicted a difficult and bloody fight, with losses of soldiers and equipment as high as 30 to 40 percent, according to U.S. officials. American military officers had seen casualties come in far lower than estimated in the major battles of Iraq and Afghanistan. They considered the estimates a starting point for planning medical care and battlefield evacuation so that losses never reached the projected levels. The numbers “can be sobering,” the senior U.S. defense official said. “But they never are as high as predicted, because we know we have to do things to make sure we don’t.” U.S. officials also believed that more Ukrainian troops would ultimately be killed if Kyiv failed to mount a decisive assault and the conflict became a drawn-out war of attrition. But they acknowledged the delicacy of suggesting a strategy that would entail significant losses, no matter the final figure. “It was easy for us to tell them in a tabletop exercise, ‘Okay, you’ve just got to focus on one place and push really hard,’” a senior U.S. official said. “They were going to lose a lot of people and they were going to lose a lot of the equipment.” Those choices, the senior official said, become “much harder on the battlefield.” On that, a senior Ukrainian military official agreed. War-gaming “doesn’t work,” the official said in retrospect, in part because of the new technology that was transforming the battlefield. Ukrainian soldiers were fighting a war unlike anything NATO forces had experienced: a large conventional conflict, with World World I-style trenches overlaid by omnipresent drones and other futuristic tools — and without the air superiority the U.S. military has had in every modern conflict it has fought. “All these methods … you can take them neatly and throw them away, you know?” the senior Ukrainian said of the war-game scenarios. “And throw them away because it doesn’t work like that now.” Disagreements about deployments The Americans had long questioned the wisdom of Kyiv’s decision to keep forces around the besieged eastern city of Bakhmut. Ukrainians saw it differently. “Bakhmut holds” had become shorthand for pride in their troops’ fierce resistance against a bigger enemy. For months, Russian and Ukrainian artillery had pulverized the city. Soldiers killed and wounded one another by the thousands to make gains measured sometimes by city blocks. The city finally fell to Russia in May. Zelensky, backed by his top commander, stood firm about the need to retain a major presence around Bakhmut and strike Russian forces there as part of the counteroffensive. To that end, Zaluzhny maintained more forces near Bakhmut than he did in the south, including the country’s most experienced units, U.S. officials observed with frustration. Ukrainian officials argued that they needed to sustain a robust fight in the Bakhmut area because otherwise Russia would try to reoccupy parts of the Kharkiv region and advance in Donetsk — a key objective for Putin, who wants to seize that whole region. “We told [the Americans], ‘If you assumed the seats of our generals, you’d see that if we don’t make Bakhmut a point of contention, [the Russians] would,’” one senior Ukrainian official said. “We can’t let that happen.” In addition, Zaluzhny envisioned making the formidable length of the 600-mile front a problem for Russia, according to the senior British official. The Ukrainian general wanted to stretch Russia’s much larger occupying force — unfamiliar with the terrain and already facing challenges with morale and logistics — to dilute its fighting power. Western officials saw problems with that approach, which would also diminish the firepower of Ukraine’s military at any single point of attack. Western military doctrine dictated a concentrated push toward a single objective. The Americans yielded, however. “They know the terrain. They know the Russians,” said a senior U.S. official. “It’s not our war. And we had to kind of sit back into that.” The weapons Kyiv needed On Feb. 3, Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s national security adviser, called together the administration’s top national security officials to review the counteroffensive plan. The White House’s subterranean Situation Room was being renovated, so the top echelons of the State, Defense and Treasury departments, along with the CIA, gathered in a secure conference room in the adjacent Eisenhower Executive Office Building. Most were already familiar with Ukraine’s three-pronged approach. The goal was for Biden’s senior advisers to voice their approval or reservations to one another and try to reach consensus on their joint advice to the president. The questions posed by Sullivan were simple, said a person who attended. First, could Washington and its partners successfully prepare Ukraine to break through Russia’s heavily fortified defenses? And then, even if the Ukrainians were prepared, “could they actually do it?” Milley, with his ever-ready green maps of Ukraine, displayed the potential axes of attack and the deployment of Ukrainian and Russian forces. He and Austin explained their conclusion that “Ukraine, to be successful, needed to fight a different way,” one senior administration official closely involved in the planning recalled. Ukraine’s military, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, had become a defensive force. Since 2014 it had focused on a grinding but low-level fight against Russian-backed forces in the eastern Donbas region. To orchestrate a large-scale advance would require a significant shift in its force structure and tactics. The planning called for wider and better Western training, which up to that point had focused on teaching small groups and individuals to use Western-provided weapons. Thousands of troops would be instructed in Germany in large unit formations and U.S.-style battlefield maneuvers, whose principles dated to World War II. For American troops, training in what was known as “combined arms” operations often lasted more than a year. The Ukraine plan proposed condensing that into a few months. Instead of firing artillery, then “inching forward” and firing some more, the Ukrainians would be “fighting and shooting at the same time,” with newly trained brigades moving forward with armored vehicles and artillery support “in a kind of symphonic way,” the senior administration official said. The Biden administration announced in early January that it would send Bradley Fighting Vehicles; Britain agreed to transfer 14 Challenger tanks. Later that month, after a grudging U.S. announcement that it would provide top-line Abrams M1 tanks by the fall, Germany and other NATO nations pledged hundreds of German-made Leopard tanks in time for the counteroffensive. A far bigger problem was the supply of 155mm shells, which would enable Ukraine to compete with Russia’s vast artillery arsenal. The Pentagon calculated that Kyiv needed 90,000 or more a month. While U.S. production was increasing, it was barely more than a tenth of that. “It was just math,” the former senior official said. “At a certain point, we just wouldn’t be able to provide them.” Sullivan laid out options. South Korea had massive quantities of the U.S.-provided munitions, but its laws prohibited sending weapons to war zones. The Pentagon calculated that about 330,000 155mm shells could be transferred by air and sea within 41 days if Seoul could be persuaded. Senior administration officials had been speaking with counterparts in Seoul, who were receptive as long as the provision was indirect. The shells began to flow at the beginning of the year, eventually making South Korea a larger supplier of artillery ammunition for Ukraine than all European nations combined. The more immediate alternative would entail tapping the U.S. military’s arsenal of 155mm shells that, unlike the South Korean variant, were packed with cluster munitions. The Pentagon had thousands of them, gathering dust for decades. But Secretary of State Antony Blinken balked. Inside the warhead of those cluster weapons, known officially as Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions, or DPICMs, were dozens of bomblets that would scatter across a wide area. Some would inevitably fail to explode, posing a long-term danger to civilians, and 120 countries — including most U.S. allies but not Ukraine or Russia — had signed a treaty banning them. Sending them would cost the United States some capital on the war’s moral high ground. In the face of Blinken’s strong objections, Sullivan tabled consideration of DPICMs. They would not be referred to Biden for approval, at least for now. Can Ukraine win? With the group agreeing that the United States and allies could provide what they believed were the supplies and training Ukraine needed, Sullivan faced the second part of the equation: Could Ukraine do it? Zelensky, on the war’s first anniversary in February, had boasted that 2023 would be a “year of victory.” His intelligence chief had decreed that Ukrainians would soon be vacationing in Crimea, the peninsula that Russia had illegally annexed in 2014. But some in the U.S. government were less than confident. U.S. intelligence officials, skeptical of the Pentagon’s enthusiasm, assessed the likelihood of success at no better than 50-50. The estimate frustrated their Defense Department counterparts, especially those at U.S. European Command, who recalled the spies’ erroneous prediction in the days before the 2022 invasion that Kyiv would fall to the Russians within days. Some defense officials observed caustically that optimism was not in intelligence officials’ DNA — they were the “Eeyores” of government, the former senior official said, and it was always safer to bet on failure. “Part of it was just the fact of the sheer weight of the Russian military,” CIA Director William J. Burns later reflected in an interview. “For all their incompetence in the first year of the war, they had managed to launch a shambolic partial mobilization to fill a lot of the gaps in the front. In Zaporizhzhia” — the key line of the counteroffensive if the land bridge was to be severed — “we could see them building really quite formidable fixed defenses, hard to penetrate, really costly, really bloody for the Ukrainians.” Perhaps more than any other senior official, Burns, a former ambassador to Russia, had traveled multiple times to Kyiv over the previous year, sometimes in secret, to meet with his Ukrainian counterparts, as well as with Zelensky and his senior military officials. He appreciated the Ukrainians’ most potent weapon — their will to fight an existential threat. “Your heart is in it,” Burns said of his hopes for helping Ukraine succeed. “But … our broader intelligence assessment was that this was going to be a really tough slog.” Two weeks after Sullivan and others briefed the president, a top-secret, updated intelligence report assessed that the challenges of massing troops, ammunition and equipment meant that Ukraine would probably fall “well short” of its counteroffensive goals. The West had so far declined to grant Ukraine’s request for fighter jets and the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which could reach targets farther behind Russian lines, and which the Ukrainians felt they needed to strike key Russian command and supply sites. “You are not going to go from an emerging, post-Soviet legacy military to the U.S. Army of 2023 overnight,” a senior Western intelligence official said. “It is foolish for some to expect that you can give them things and it changes the way they fight.” U.S. military officials did not dispute that it would be a bloody struggle. By early 2023, they knew that as many as 130,000 Ukrainian troops had been injured or killed in the war, including many of the country’s best soldiers. Some Ukrainian commanders were already expressing doubts about the coming campaign, citing the numbers of troops who lacked battlefield experience. Yet the Pentagon had also worked closely with Ukrainian forces. Officials had watched them fight courageously and had overseen the effort to provide them with large amounts of sophisticated arms. U.S. military officials argued that the intelligence estimates failed to account for the firepower of the newly arriving weaponry, as well as the Ukrainians’ will to win. “The plan that they executed was entirely feasible with the force that they had, on the timeline that we planned out,” a senior U.S. military official said. Austin knew that additional time for training on new tactics and equipment would be beneficial but that Ukraine didn’t have that luxury. “In a perfect world, you get a choice. You keep saying, ‘I want to take six more months to train up and feel comfortable about this,’” he said in an interview. “My take is that they didn’t have a choice. They were in a fight for their lives.” Russia gets ready By March, Russia was already many months into preparing its defenses, building miles upon miles of barriers, trenches and other obstacles across the front in anticipation of the Ukrainian push. After stinging defeats in the Kharkiv region and Kherson in the fall of 2022, Russia seemed to pivot. Putin appointed Gen. Sergei Surovikin — known as “General Armageddon” for his merciless tactics in Syria — to lead Russia’s fight in Ukraine, focusing on digging in rather than taking more territory. In the months after the 2022 invasion, Russian trenches were basic — flood-prone, straight-line pits nicknamed “corpse lines,” according to Ruslan Leviev, an analyst and co-founder of the Conflict Intelligence Team, which has been tracking Russian military activity in Ukraine since 2014. But Russia adapted as the war wore on, digging drier, zigzagging trenches that better protected soldiers from shelling. As the trenches eventually grew more sophisticated, they opened up into forests to offer better means for defenders to fall back, Leviev said. The Russians built tunnels between positions to counter Ukraine’s extensive use of drones, he added. The trenches were part of multilayered defenses that included dense minefields, concrete pyramids known as dragon’s teeth, and antitank ditches. If minefields were disabled, Russian forces had rocket-borne systems to reseed them. Unlike Russia’s offensive efforts early in the war, these defenses followed textbook Soviet standards. “This is one case where they have implemented their doctrine,” a senior Western intelligence official said. Konstantin Yefremov, a former officer with Russia’s 42nd motorized rifle division who was stationed in Zaporizhzhia in 2022, recalled that Russia had the equipment and grunt power necessary to build a solid wall against attack. “Putin’s army is experiencing shortages of various arms, but can literally swim in mines,” Yefremov said in an interview after fleeing to the West. “They have millions of them, both antitank and antipersonnel mines.” The poverty, desperation and fear of the tens of thousands of conscripted Russian soldiers made them an ideal workforce. “All you need is slave power,” he said. “And even more so, Russian rank-and-file soldiers know they are [building trenches and other defenses] for themselves, to save their skin.” In addition, in a tactic used in both World War I and II, Surovikin would deploy blocking units behind the Russian troops to prevent them from retreating, sometimes under pain of death. Their options were “either to die from our units or from their own,” said Ukrainian police Col. Oleksandr Netrebko, the commander of a newly formed police brigade fighting near Bakhmut. Yet, while Russia had far more troops, a deeper military arsenal and what one U.S. official said was “just a willingness to endure really dramatic losses,” U.S. officials knew it also had serious vulnerabilities. By early 2023, some 200,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or wounded, U.S. intelligence agencies estimated, including scores of highly trained commandos. Replacement troops who were rushed into Ukraine lacked experience. Turnover of field leaders had hurt command and control. Equipment losses were equally staggering: more than 2,000 tanks, some 4,000 armored fighting vehicles and at least 75 aircraft, according to a Pentagon document leaked on the Discord chat platform in the spring. The assessment was that the Russian force was insufficient to protect every line of conflict. But unless Ukraine got underway quickly, the Kremlin could make up its deficits inside of a year, or less if it got more outside help from friendly nations such as Iran and North Korea. It was imperative, U.S. officials argued, for Ukraine to launch. More troops, more weapons In late April, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made an unannounced trip to see Zelensky in Kyiv. Stoltenberg, a former Norwegian prime minister, was in town to discuss preparations for the NATO summit in July, including Kyiv’s push to join the alliance. But over a working lunch with a handful of ministers and aides, talk turned to preparation for the counteroffensive — how things were going and what was left to be done. Stoltenberg — due the next day in Germany for a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, a consortium of roughly 50 countries providing weaponry and other support to Kyiv — asked about efforts to equip and train Ukrainian brigades by the end of April, according to two people familiar with the talks. Zelensky reported that the Ukrainian military expected the brigades to be at 80 or 85 percent by the end of the month, the people said. That seemed at odds with American expectations that Ukraine should already be ready to launch. The Ukrainian leader also stressed that his troops had to hold the east to keep Russia from shifting forces to block Kyiv’s southern counteroffensive. To defend the east while also pushing south, he said, Ukraine needed more brigades, the two people recalled. Ukrainian officials also continued to make the case that an expanded arsenal was central to their ability to succeed. It wasn’t until May, on the eve of the fight, that Britain announced it would provide longer-range Storm Shadow missiles. But another core refrain from Ukraine was that they were being asked to fight in a way no NATO nation would ever contemplate — without effective power in the air. As one former senior Ukrainian official pointed out, his country’s aging MiG-29 fighter jets could detect targets within a 40-mile radius and fire at a range of 20 miles. Russia’s Su-35s, meanwhile, could identify targets more than 90 miles away and shoot them down as far away as 75 miles. “Imagine a MiG and a Su-35 in the sky. We don’t see them while they see us. We can’t reach them while they can reach us,” the official said. “That’s why we fought so hard for F-16s.” American officials pointed out that even a few of the $60 million aircraft would eat up funds that could go much further in buying vehicles, air defenses or ammunition. Moreover, they said, the jets wouldn’t provide the air superiority the Ukrainians craved. “If you could train a bunch of F-16 pilots in three months, they would have got shot down on day one, because the Russian air defenses in Ukraine are very robust and very capable,” a senior defense official said. Biden finally yielded in May and granted the required permission for European nations to donate their U.S.-made F-16s to Ukraine. But pilot training and delivery of the jets would take a year or more, far too long to make a difference in the coming fight. Kyiv hesitates By May, concern was growing within the Biden administration and among allied backers. According to the planning, Ukraine should have already launched its operations. As far as the U.S. military was concerned, the window of opportunity was shrinking fast. Intelligence over the winter had shown that Russian defenses were relatively weak and largely unmanned, and that morale was low among Russian troops after their losses in Kharkiv and Kherson. U.S. intelligence assessed that senior Russian officers felt the prospects were bleak. But that assessment was changing quickly. The goal had been to strike before Moscow was ready, and the U.S. military had been trying since mid-April to get the Ukrainians moving. “We were given dates. We were given many dates,” a senior U.S. government official said. “We had April this, May that, you know, June. It just kept getting delayed.” Meanwhile, enemy defenses were thickening. U.S. military officials were dismayed to see Russian forces use those weeks in April and May to seed significant amounts of additional mines, a development the officials believed ended up making Ukrainian troops’ advance substantially harder. Washington was also getting worried that the Ukrainians were burning up too many artillery shells, primarily around Bakhmut, that were needed for the counteroffensive. As May ground on, it seemed to the Americans that Kyiv, gung-ho during the war games and the training, had abruptly slowed down — that there was “some type of switch in psychology” where they got to the brink “and then all of a sudden they thought, ‘Well, let’s triple-check, make sure we’re comfortable,’” said one administration official who was part of the planning. “But they were telling us for almost a month … ‘We’re about to go. We’re about to go.’” Some senior American officials believed there wasn’t conclusive proof that the delay had altered Ukraine’s chances for success. Others saw clear indications that the Kremlin had successfully exploited the interim along what it believed would be Kyiv’s lines of assault. In Ukraine, a different kind of frustration was building. “When we had a calculated timeline, yes, the plan was to start the operation in May,” said a former senior Ukrainian official who was deeply involved in the effort. “However, many things happened.” Promised equipment was delivered late or arrived unfit for combat, the Ukrainians said. “A lot of weapons that are coming in now, they were relevant last year,” the senior Ukrainian military official said, not for the high-tech battles ahead. Crucially, he said, they had received only 15 percent of items — like the Mine Clearing Line Charge launchers (MCLCs) — needed to execute their plan to remotely cut passages through the minefields. And yet, the senior Ukrainian military official recalled, the Americans were nagging about a delayed start and still complaining about how many troops Ukraine was devoting to Bakhmut. U.S. officials vehemently denied that the Ukrainians did not get all the weaponry they were promised. Ukraine’s wish list may have been far bigger, the Americans acknowledged, but by the time the offensive began, they had received nearly two dozen MCLCs, more than 40 mine rollers and excavators, 1,000 Bangalore torpedoes, and more than 80,000 smoke grenades. Zaluzhny had requested 1,000 armored vehicles; the Pentagon ultimately delivered 1,500. “They got everything they were promised, on time,” one senior U.S. official said. In some cases, the officials said, Ukraine failed to deploy equipment critical to the offensive, holding it in reserve or allocating it to units that weren’t part of the assault. Then there was the weather. The melting snow and heavy rains that turn parts of Ukraine into a soup of heavy mud each spring had come late and lasted longer than usual. In the middle of 2022, when the thinking about a counteroffensive began, “no one knew the weather forecast,” the former senior Ukrainian official said. That meant it was unclear when the flat plains and rich black soil of southeastern Ukraine, which could act as a glue grabbing hold of boots and tires, would dry out for summer. The Ukrainians understood the uncertainty because they, unlike the Americans, lived there. As the preparations accelerated, Ukrainian officials’ concerns grew more acute, erupting at a meeting at Ramstein Air Base in Germany in April when Zaluzhny’s deputy, Mykhailo Zabrodskyi, made an emotional appeal for help. “We’re sorry, but some of the vehicles we received are unfit for combat,” Zabrodskyi told Austin and his aides, according to a former senior Ukrainian official. He said the Bradleys and Leopards had broken or missing tracks. German Marder fighting vehicles lacked radio sets; they were nothing more than iron boxes with tracks — useless if they couldn’t communicate with their units, he said. Ukrainian officials said the units for the counteroffensive lacked sufficient de-mining and evacuation vehicles. Austin looked at Gen. Christopher Cavoli, the top U.S. commander for Europe, and Lt. Gen. Antonio Aguto, head of the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine, both sitting next to him. They said they’d check. The Pentagon concluded that Ukrainian forces were failing to properly handle and maintain all the equipment after it was received. Austin directed Aguto to work more intensively with his Ukrainian counterparts on maintenance. “Even if you deliver 1,300 vehicles that are working fine, there’s going to be some that break between the time that you get them on the ground there and the time they enter combat,” a senior defense official said. By June 1, the top echelons at U.S. European Command and the Pentagon were frustrated and felt like they were getting few answers. Maybe the Ukrainians were daunted by the potential casualties? Perhaps there were political disagreements within the Ukrainian leadership, or problems along the chain of command? The counteroffensive finally lurched into motion in early June. Some Ukrainian units quickly notched small gains, recapturing Zaporizhzhia-region villages south of Velyka Novosilka, 80 miles from the Azov coast. But elsewhere, not even Western arms and training could fully shield Ukrainian forces from the punishing Russian firepower. When troops from the 37th Reconnaissance Brigade attempted an advance, they, like units elsewhere, immediately felt the force of Russia’s tactics. From the first minutes of their assault, they were overwhelmed by mortar fire that pierced their French AMX-10 RC armored vehicles. Their own artillery fire didn’t materialize as expected. Soldiers crawled out of burning vehicles. In one unit, 30 of 50 soldiers were captured, wounded or killed. Ukraine’s equipment losses in the initial days included 20 Bradley Fighting Vehicles and six German-made Leopard tanks. Those early encounters landed like a thunderbolt among the officers in Zaluzhny’s command center, searing a question in their minds: Was the strategy doomed?
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 02:37
|
|
|
The "Washington Post Staff" currently has a pessimistic view of Ukraine's prospects for a military victory - Part 2. Key Takeaways "This second part is based on interviews with more than 30 senior Ukrainian and U.S. military officials, as well as over two dozen officers and troops on the front line. Some officials and soldiers spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe military operations. Key findings from reporting on the campaign include: ● Seventy percent of troops in one of the brigades leading the counteroffensive, and equipped with the newest Western weapons, entered battle with no combat experience. ● Ukraine’s setbacks on the battlefield led to rifts with the United States over how best to cut through deep Russian defenses. ● The commander of U.S. forces in Europe couldn’t get in touch with Ukraine’s top commander for weeks in the early part of the campaign amid tension over the American’s second-guessing of battlefield decisions. ● Each side blamed the other for mistakes or miscalculations. U.S. military officials concluded that Ukraine had fallen short in basic military tactics, including the use of ground reconnaissance to understand the density of minefields. Ukrainian officials said the Americans didn’t seem to comprehend how attack drones and other technology had transformed the battlefield. ● In all, Ukraine has retaken only about 200 square miles of territory, at a cost of thousands of dead and wounded and billions in Western military aid in 2023 alone." _____________________________________________________________ Source: The Washington Post Direct Link: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/04/ukraine-counteroffensive-stalled-russia-war-defenses/ In Ukraine, a war of incremental gains as counteroffensive stalls By Washington Post Staff December 4, 2023 at 6:00 a.m. EST ZAPORIZHZHIA, Ukraine — Soldiers in the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade waited for nightfall before piling — nervous but confident — into their U.S.-provided Bradley Fighting Vehicles. It was June 7 and Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive was about to begin. The goal for the first 24 hours was to advance nearly nine miles, reaching the village of Robotyne — an initial thrust south toward the larger objective of reclaiming Melitopol, a city near the Sea of Azov, and severing Russian supply lines. Nothing went as planned. The Ukrainian troops had expected minefields but were blindsided by the density. The ground was carpeted with explosives, so many that some were buried in stacks. The soldiers had been trained to drive their Bradleys at a facility in Germany, on smooth terrain. But on the mushy soil of the Zaporizhzhia region, in the deafening noise of battle, they struggled to steer through the narrow lanes cleared of mines by advance units. The Russians, positioned on higher ground, immediately started firing antitank missiles. Some vehicles in the convoy were hit, forcing others behind them to veer off the path. Those, in turn, exploded on mines, snarling even more of the convoy. Russian helicopters and drones swooped in and attacked the pileup. Troops, some experiencing the shock of combat for the first time, pulled back to regroup — only to attack and retreat, again and again on successive days, with the same bloody results. “It was hellfire,” said Oleh Sentsov, a platoon commander in the 47th. By day four, Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s top commander, had seen enough. Incinerated Western military hardware — American Bradleys, German Leopard tanks, mine-sweeping vehicles — littered the battlefield. The numbers of dead and wounded sapped morale. Zaluzhny told his troops to pause their assaults before any more of Ukraine’s limited weaponry was obliterated, a senior Ukrainian military official said. Rather than try to breach Russian defenses with a massed, mechanized attack and supporting artillery fire, as his American counterparts had advised, Zaluzhny decided that Ukrainian soldiers would go on foot in small groups of about 10 — a process that would save equipment and lives but would be much slower. Months of planning with the United States was tossed aside on that fourth day, and the already delayed counteroffensive, designed to reach the Sea of Azov within two to three months, ground to a near-halt. Rather than making a nine-mile breakthrough on their first day, the Ukrainians in the nearly six months since June have advanced about 12 miles and liberated a handful of villages. Melitopol is still far out of reach. This account of how the counteroffensive unfolded is the second in a two-part series and illuminates the brutal and often futile attempts to breach Russian lines, as well as the widening rift between Ukrainian and U.S. commanders over tactics and strategy. The first article examined the Ukrainian and U.S. planning that went into the operation. This second part is based on interviews with more than 30 senior Ukrainian and U.S. military officials, as well as over two dozen officers and troops on the front line. Some officials and soldiers spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe military operations. Key findings from reporting on the campaign include: ● Seventy percent of troops in one of the brigades leading the counteroffensive, and equipped with the newest Western weapons, entered battle with no combat experience. ● Ukraine’s setbacks on the battlefield led to rifts with the United States over how best to cut through deep Russian defenses. ● The commander of U.S. forces in Europe couldn’t get in touch with Ukraine’s top commander for weeks in the early part of the campaign amid tension over the American’s second-guessing of battlefield decisions. ● Each side blamed the other for mistakes or miscalculations. U.S. military officials concluded that Ukraine had fallen short in basic military tactics, including the use of ground reconnaissance to understand the density of minefields. Ukrainian officials said the Americans didn’t seem to comprehend how attack drones and other technology had transformed the battlefield. ● In all, Ukraine has retaken only about 200 square miles of territory, at a cost of thousands of dead and wounded and billions in Western military aid in 2023 alone. Nearly six months after the counteroffensive began, the campaign has become a war of incremental gains. Damp World War I-style trenches lace eastern and southern Ukraine as surveillance and attack drones crowd the skies overhead. Moscow launches missile assaults on civilian targets in Ukrainian cities, while Kyiv is using both Western missiles and home-grown technology to strike far behind the front lines — in Moscow, in Crimea and on the Black Sea. But the territorial lines of June 2023 have barely changed. And Russian President Vladimir Putin — in contrast to the silence he often maintained in the first year of the war — trumpets at every opportunity what he calls the counteroffensive’s failure. “As for the counteroffensive, which is allegedly stalling, it has failed completely,” Putin said in October. Training for battle On Jan. 16, five months before the start of Ukraine’s counteroffensive, Gen. Mark A. Milley, then chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited soldiers with the 47th, just days after the unit arrived at the Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany. Milley, trailed by staff and senior military officials based in Europe, zigzagged across a muddy, chilly training range, bantering with Ukrainian soldiers and watching as they fired on stationary targets with rifles and M240B machine guns. The installation had been used to train small groups of Ukrainian soldiers since 2014, when Russia invaded and illegally annexed Ukraine’s Crimea Peninsula. In anticipation of the counteroffensive, the effort was scaled up with one or more battalions of about 600 Ukrainian soldiers cycling through at a time. In a white field tent, Milley gathered with U.S. soldiers overseeing the training, who told him they were trying to replicate Russian tactics and build some of the trenches and other obstacles the Ukrainians would face in battle. “The whole thing … for them to be successful with the Russians is for them to be able to both fire and maneuver,” Milley said, describing in basic terms the essence of the counteroffensive’s “combined arms” strategy, which called for coordinated maneuvers by a massed force of infantry, tanks, armored vehicles, engineers and artillery. If this were the United States or NATO, the operation also would have included devastating air power to weaken the enemy and protect troops on the ground, but the Ukrainians would have to make do with little or none. The 47th had been selected to be a “breach force” at the tip of the counteroffensive and would be equipped with Western arms. But as Milley made his rounds and chatted with Ukrainian soldiers — from young men in their 20s to middle-aged recruits — many they told him that they had only recently left civilian life and had no combat experience. Milley kept silent. But later, in the meeting with U.S. trainers, he seemed to acknowledge the scale of the task ahead. “Give them everything you’ve got here,” he said. The 47th was a newly created unit tabbed for the training in Germany. Ukraine’s military leadership had decided that more-experienced brigades would hold off the Russians during the winter, while fresh soldiers would form new brigades, receive training abroad and then lead the fight in the spring and summer. More than a year of war — with up to 130,000 troops dead or wounded, according to Western estimates — had taken a heavy toll on Ukraine’s armed forces. Even the most battle-hardened brigades were now largely composed of drafted replacements. About 70 percent of the soldiers in the 47th didn’t have any battlefield experience, according to one senior commander in the brigade. The 47th’s leadership was also strikingly young — its commander, though combat-hardened, was just 28 years old and his deputy was 25. Their youth had been billed as an advantage; young officers would absorb NATO tactics unaffected by the Soviet way of war that still infused parts of the Ukrainian military. Some of the Ukrainian soldiers thought the American trainers didn’t grasp the scale of the conflict against a more powerful enemy. “The presence of a huge number of drones, fortifications, minefields and so on were not taken into account,” said a soldier in the 47th with the call sign Joker. Ukrainian soldiers brought their own drones to help hone their skills, he said, but trainers initially rebuffed the request to integrate them because the training programs were predetermined. Drone use was later added following Ukrainian feedback, a U.S. official said. The U.S. program had benefits, Joker said, including advanced cold-weather training and how to adjust artillery fire. But much was discarded once real bullets flew. “We had to improve tactics during the battle itself,” he said. “We couldn’t use it the way we were taught.” U.S. and Ukrainian officials said they never expected that two months of training would transform these troops into a NATO-like force. Instead, the intention was to teach them to properly use their new Western tanks and fighting vehicles and “make them literate in the basics of firing and moving,” a U.S. senior military official said. No order to attack When soldiers from the 47th returned to Ukraine in the spring, they expected the counteroffensive to start almost immediately. In early May, the brigade relocated closer to the front line, hiding their Bradleys and other Western equipment in the tree lines of rural Zaporizhzhia. The 47th’s insignia on vehicles was covered up in case locals sympathetic to Russia might reveal their location. But weeks passed with no order to attack. Many in the unit felt the element of surprise had been lost. The political leadership “shouldn’t have been announcing our counteroffensive for almost a year,” said one unit commander in the 47th. “The enemy knew where we’d be coming from.” Milley and other senior U.S. military officers involved in planning the offensive argued for the Ukrainians to mass forces at one key spot in Zaporizhzhia, to help them overcome stiff Russian defenses and ensure a successful breakthrough in the drive to Melitopol and the Sea of Azov. The Ukrainian plan, however, was to push on three axes — south along two distinct paths to the Sea of Azov, as well as in eastern Ukraine around the besieged city of Bakhmut, which the Russians had seized in the spring after a nearly year-long battle. Ukrainian military leaders decided that committing too many troops to one point in the south would leave forces in the east vulnerable and enable the Russians to take territory there and, potentially, in Kharkiv to the northeast. To split the Russian forces in Zaporizhzhia, Ukrainian marine brigades at the western edge of the neighboring Donetsk region would push south toward the coastal city of Berdyansk. That left the 47th and other brigades, part of what Ukraine referred to as its 9th Corps, to attack along the counteroffensive’s main axis, toward Melitopol. The plan called for the 47th, and the 9th Corps, to breach the first Russian line of defense and take Robotyne. Then the 10th Corps, made up of Ukraine’s paratroopers, would join the fight in a second wave pushing south. “We thought it was going to be a simple two-day task” to take Robotyne, said the commander of a Bradley Fighting Vehicle who goes by the call sign Frenchman. Mining all approaches Days after the counteroffensive launched, Oleksandr Sak, then the 47th’s commander, visited a Russian position his troops had captured. He noted anti-drone guns, thermal imagery scopes and small surveillance drones, among other abandoned materiel. “I realized the enemy had prepared,” he said. “We didn’t catch them off-guard; they knew we were coming.” Also left behind were posters with Russian propaganda. One showed an image of men kissing in public with a red “X” over it, next to an image of a man and woman with two children. “Fighting for traditional families,” the poster said. Sak also found a map that the Russians had used to mark their minefields. For just one part of the front — about four miles long and four miles deep — more than 20,000 mines were listed. “I wouldn’t say it was unexpected, but we underestimated it,” Sak said. “We conducted engineering and aerial reconnaissance, but many mines were masked or buried. In addition to those by the front line, there were mines deeper into enemy positions. We passed enemy positions and encountered more mines where we thought there were none anymore.” A chief drone sergeant in the 47th said that only on foot did they find remote-detonation traps, describing their discovery as a “surprise.” U.S. military officials believed that Ukraine could have made a more significant advance by embracing greater use of ground reconnaissance units and reducing its reliance on imagery from drones, which weren’t able to detect buried mines, tripwires or booby traps. The Zaporizhzhia region is largely composed of flat, open fields, and the Russians had chosen what high ground there was to build key defenses. From there, soldiers and officials said, Russian units armed with antitank missiles waited for convoys of Bradley Fighting Vehicles and German Leopard tanks. A mine-clearing vehicle always led the pack — and was targeted first with the help of reconnaissance drones. “We constantly faced antitank fire and destroyed up to 10 Russian antitank guided missile systems per day,” Sak said. But, he added, “day after day, they pulled in more” of the systems. Some 60 percent of Ukraine’s de-mining equipment was damaged or destroyed in the first days, according to a senior Ukrainian defense official. “Our partners’ reliance on armored maneuver and a breakthrough didn’t work,” the official said. “We had to change tactics.” Within a week of the start of the counteroffensive, teams of sappers would work in twilight hours, when it was light enough for them to de-mine by hand but not so bright that the Russians could spot them. Once they cleared a small pathway, infantry would follow — a slow, grueling advance one wood line at a time. Often, when Ukrainian soldiers reached a Russian outpost, they would find that it too had been booby-trapped with mines. And rather than withdraw, Russian forces held their positions even under heavy artillery bombardment, meaning the Ukrainians would have to engage in close combat with small arms to advance. Throughout the Zaporizhzhia region, the Russians had deployed new units, called “Storm Z,” with fighters recruited from prisons. The former inmates attacked in human waves called “meat assaults” and were used to preserve more-elite forces. Around Robotyne — the village the 47th was supposed to reach on the first day of the counteroffensive — they were mixed in with Russia’s 810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade and other regular army formations. “Robotyne was one of the toughest assignments,” a member of the 810th engineering unit said in an interview with a pro-war Russian blogger. “We had to go all out to prevent the enemy from breaking through. As sappers and engineers, we had to mine all approaches both for infantry and their vehicles. “The famous Leopards are burning, and we tried to make sure they burn bright.” Fleets of drones Early in the assault on Robotyne, a Russian machine-gun nest carved into a building was preventing Ukrainian infantry from advancing. A drone company within the 47th sent up two modified racing drones strapped with explosives. One glided through a window and exploded. Another, guided by a pilot with the call sign Sapsan, spiraled into another room and detonated the ammunition inside, he said, also killing several enemy soldiers. It was an early high point in the use of small drones like pinpoint artillery. Drone operators — wearing a headset that receives a video feed from the drone in real time — hunted for armored vehicles using first-person-view drones, known as FPVs. FPVs are so precise and fast that they can target the weak parts of vehicles, such as engine compartments and tracks, operators say. But Russia is also deploying fleets of the same hand-built attack drones, which cost less than $1000 each and can disable a multimillion-dollar tank. Unlike artillery ammunition, which is a precious resource for both Russia and Ukraine, the low-cost, disposable FPV drones can be used to hit small groups of infantry — navigated directly into trenches or into troops on the move. Evacuating the wounded or bringing fresh supplies to a front-line position also became harrowing and potentially deadly tasks, often saved for nighttime because of the threat of drones. “At first, our problem was mines. Now, it’s FPV drones,” said Sentsov, the platoon commander in the 47th. “They hit the target precisely and deal serious damage. They can disable a Bradley and potentially even blow it up. It’s not a direct explosion, but they can hit it in a way to make it burn — not only stop the vehicle but destroy it.” U.S. military officials, drawing on their own doctrine, called for artillery to be used to suppress the enemy while mechanized ground forces advanced toward their objective. “You’ve got to move while you’re firing the artillery,” a senior U.S. defense official said. “That sounds very fundamental, and it is, but that’s how you’ve got to fight. Otherwise, you can’t sustain the quantity of artillery and munitions that you need.” But Ukrainian officials have said the ubiquity and lethality of different types of drones on both sides of the front line has been the biggest factor preventing the Ukrainians or the Russians from gaining significant ground for months. “Because of the technical development, everything came to a standstill,” a high-ranking Ukrainian military official said. “The equipment that appears on the battlefield lives for a minute at the most.” Chaotic battlefield conditions The 47th claimed the liberation of Robotyne on Aug. 28. Air assault units in Ukraine’s 10th Corps then moved in, but have been unable to liberate any other villages. The front line has also grown static along the parallel drive in the south, where Ukrainian marines led the push toward the Azov Sea city of Berdyansk. After retaking the villages of Staromaiorske and Urozhaine in July and August, there have been no further gains, leaving Ukrainian forces far from both Berdyansk and Melitopol. Throughout the summer, some of the fiercest fighting took place in a few square miles outside the eastern city of Bakhmut, along the third axis of the counteroffensive. Ukrainian war planners saw regaining control of the tiny village of Klishchiivka as key to attaining firing superiority around the southern edges of the city and disrupting Russian supply routes. In July, police officers belonging to the newly formed Lyut, or “Fury,” Brigade — one of the brigades created last winter ahead of the counteroffensive — were deployed to the area. The brigade, made up of a mix of experienced police officers and recruits, was tasked with storming Russian positions in Klishchiivka, largely using gunfire and grenades. Video footage of the Lyut Brigade’s operations, which was provided to The Washington Post, and interviews with officers who participated in the fighting reveal the intense and at times chaotic battlefield conditions. In one bodycam video, from September, soldiers weave in and out of the ruins of homes as heavy shelling booms around them. Moving from one bombed-out house to another, the Ukrainian forces search the wreckage for any remaining Russian troops — screaming out for them to surrender before lobbing grenades into basements. Days later, on Sept. 17, Ukraine announced that it had retaken Klishchiivka. But its recapture has not moved the lines around Bakhmut in any significant way since. “Klishchiivka is actually a cemetery of equipment and Russian troops,” said the Lyut Brigade’s commander, police Col. Oleksandr Netrebko. But he also conceded: “Every square meter of liberated land is covered with the blood of our men.” Frustration builds With no big breakthrough, U.S. officials became increasingly agitated over the summer that Ukraine was not dedicating enough forces to one of the southern axes, given the American view of its strategic value. In the north and the east, Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky controlled half of Ukraine’s brigades, which ran from Kharkiv through Bakhmut down to Donetsk. Meanwhile, Gen. Oleksandr Tarnavsky controlled the other half of active brigades, fighting along the two main axes in the south. U.S. officials viewed the roughly 50-50 split of Ukrainian forces as the wrong mix and wanted more forces shifted to the south. “Of course the enemy is going to try to destroy your mine-clearing vehicles,” the senior U.S. military official said, adding that there were methods to camouflage them, including the use of smoke. But assessing Kyiv’s approach and urging changes was a delicate task. One officer who did so was Gen. Christopher Cavoli, who as head of the U.S. European Command oversaw much of the Pentagon’s effort to train and equip Ukraine’s army. Milley, by contrast, often struck a more optimistic, motivational tone. Cavoli, however, couldn’t reach Zaluzhny during part of the summer, a critical phase of the counteroffensive, three people familiar with the matter said. Cavoli declined to comment on the issue. A senior Ukrainian official noted that Zaluzhny spoke to Milley, his direct counterpart, throughout the campaign. By August, Milley too had begun to air some frustration. He “started saying to Zaluzhny: ‘What are you doing?’” a senior Biden administration official said. The Ukrainians were insistent that the West simply wasn’t giving them the air power and other weapons needed for a combined arms strategy to succeed. “You want us to to proceed with the counteroffensive, you want us to show the brilliant advances on the front line,” said Olha Stefanishyna, deputy prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. “But we do not have the fighter jets, meaning that you want us to throw our soldiers, you know, and accept the very fact that we cannot protect them.” When allies said no, she said, “we heard ... ‘We are fine that your soldiers will be dying without support from the sky.’” In an August video conference, soon followed by an in-person meeting near the Poland-Ukraine border, U.S. military officials pressed their case. They said they understood the logic of preoccupying Russian forces at different points on the front, but argued that deep advances would not come unless the Ukrainians massed more forces at a single point to move quickly and decisively. Zaluzhny, in response, laid out the challenges in stark terms: no air cover, more mines than expected, and a Russian force that was impressively dug in and moving its reserves around effectively to plug gaps. “I would not characterize that meeting as a ‘come to Jesus’ meeting and some massive drama — go left, go right,” Milley said in an interview. “I wouldn’t say that. I would say this is the normal course of business where professional leaders … routinely meet to assess the situation and adjustments going on, on the ground.” In July, as Ukraine ran low on artillery shells and the counteroffensive faltered, the Biden administration shifted position on providing Ukraine with artillery cluster munitions, with the president overruling State Department concerns that the reputational risks were too high given the weapon’s history of killing or wounding civilians. The final key decision on weapons transfers came in September, when the administration agreed to provide a variant of the Army Tactical Missile System, known as ATACMS. The missiles were not the deep-strike variant Kyiv had requested, with the United States instead opting for a shorter-range weapon that drops cluster submunitions. While useful, Ukrainian officials said, neither the ATACMS launchers nor the cluster weapons have broken the battlefield deadlock. Nor have other strategies. Throughout the counteroffensive, Ukraine has continued striking far behind enemy lines in an effort to weaken Russian forces and sow panic within Russian society. Kyiv isn’t permitted to use Western weapons for strikes on Russia, so a fleet of homegrown drones have been used instead. Some have been able to reach targets in Moscow, while others have damaged Russian oil depots along the Black Sea. Naval drones have also successfully hit ships in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine has recently gained ground in the southern Kherson region, establishing troop positions on the eastern bank of the Dneiper River, but it’s unclear how much weaponry — artillery especially — has been moved across the river to threaten Russian supply lines stemming from Crimea. Ukraine has stopped asking for more tanks and fighting vehicles, despite intensely lobbying for them throughout the first year of the war. “A lot of the weapons,” a high-ranking Ukrainian military official said, “they were relevant last year.” Frozen lines In late September, in a meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was asked why his military continued to commit so many forces to the east rather than the south. Zelensky said that if the Russians lost the east, they would lose the war, according to a person familiar with the conversation. Zelensky acknowledged differing views among some of his commanders, the person said. But most senior Ukrainian military officials continued to believe that throwing more troops at one part of the front would not force a breakthrough. Then in mid-October, the Russians tried just that in a fierce assault on the eastern Ukrainian town of Avdiivka, which sits in a geographically strategic pocket close to the Russian-occupied city of Donetsk. Now it was the Russians on the offensive, with four brigades moving in columns of tanks and personnel carriers, and descending on one narrow strip of the front. Engineering vehicles with mine sweepers led the charge. It was exactly how the Ukrainians had started their counteroffensive. And similarly, the Russians suffered severe losses — Ukrainian officials claimed that more than 4,000 Russian troops were killed in the first three weeks of the assault — before switching to a dismounted approach, just as the Ukrainians had done. In early October, the 47th Brigade, after a brief respite from the fighting, was rotated back into the counteroffensive. Zelensky had publicly vowed that Ukraine would continue its push through the winter, when the weather would make any advances even more difficult. By the end of October, however, the troops of the 47th were suddenly moved east, to defend the northern flank of Avdiivka. The brigade’s Western weapons — German Leopard tanks and American Bradley Fighting Vehicles — went with them. The relocation to Avdiivka was a surprise for the brigade, but it was also a signal that the operation in Zaporizhzhia was frozen along largely fixed lines. And behind their lines, the Russians had continued to build defensive fortifications over the summer and fall, according to satellite imagery. Around the village of Romanivske, southeast of Robotyne, antitank ditches and concrete pyramids were installed three-deep to blunt any further Ukrainian attempts to advance. On Nov. 1, in an interview with the Economist, Zaluzhny acknowledged what had been previously unutterable — the war had reached “a stalemate.” “There will most likely, he said, “be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.”
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 02:50
|
|
|
please go back to posting sweet vids of t-72s blowing up
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 03:18
|
|
|
Some DOD comments regarding Ukraine today. Main Point: DOD warning that lack of supplemental funding for Ukraine is already having an impact in two ways: 1. No funding left for USAI or replenishment. 2. Lack of funding to replenish stocks affects decisions on how to utilize PDA. (in essence, no funds to replace items pulled from PDA means the items the US is willing to part with via PDA are different than if they had active contracts to replace PDA items). https://www.defense.gov/News/Transc...era-on-the-rec/ quote:Q: Separate topic -- when the White House says this morning to the Congress that we will not have any more money, does it mean that the department doesn't have any capability to send to -- to Ukraine or we don't have the authority to send any more? Below is the letter referenced in the quote above. https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/brie...raines-defense/ quote:The Honorable Mike Johnson
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 03:30
|
|
|
Bulgarian President Rumen Radev has vetoed the country's plans to send 100 surplus armored personnel carriers (APCs) to Ukraine. Source: Radio Free Europe. Direct Link: https://www.rferl.org/a/bulgaria-apc-ukraine-surplus/32713101.html Bulgarian President Vetoes Donation Of Armored Personnel Carriers To Ukraine December 04, 2023 By RFE/RL's Bulgarian Service Bulgarian President Rumen Radev has vetoed the country's plans to send 100 surplus armored personnel carriers (APCs) to Ukraine, sending the arrangement back to parliament for reconsideration. In explaining the veto, signed off on by parliament last month, Radev said on December 4 that lawmakers needed to assess if the vehicles -- last deployed in the 1980s -- were expendable and not of possible use to Bulgaria in case of emergencies. Under an agreement signed with Kyiv in August, the APCs were to be provided free of charge. The deal will now go back to parliament for a second vote.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 03:35
|
|
|
Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko has launched his most severe criticism against Zelensky to date. Source: The Independent Direct Link: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-war-russia-zelensky-klitschko-b2458171.html Zelensky is turning into an autocrat, says Kyiv mayor Klitschko Tom Watling 7 hours ago Volodymyr Zelensky is becoming increasingly autocratic and is pushing Ukraine to a point at which it will no longer be any different from Russia, Vitali Klitschko has claimed. It is unprecedented critism of the Ukrainian president since Russia’s invasion almost two years ago and comes as Kyiv’s counteroffensive against the forces of Vladimir Putin has . Mr Klitschko, the former heavyweight boxing champion turned mayor of Kyiv, told the Swiss media outlet 20 Minuten: “People [are beginning to] see who’s effective and who’s not. And there were and still are a lot of expectations. Zelensky is paying for mistakes he has made.” Mr Klitschko has been at odds with Mr Zelensky since last winter, when the president accused him of failing to maintain Kyiv’s bomb shelters to the desired level. But the strength of the Kyiv mayor’s words highlights the struggles Mr Zelensky has in keeping the country’s leadership on the same page as the war grinds on. Speaking to German news magazine Der Spiegel, Mr Klitschko said that Mr Zelensky was showing authoritarian tendencies that could be dangerous for Ukraine, although it was unclear what he was referring to. “At some point we will no longer be any different from Russia, where everything depends on the whim of one man,” Mr Klitschko told German magazine Der Spiegel, in another interview. Internal Ukrainian polling cited last month by The Economist said that Mr Zelensky’s trust ratings were at 32 per cent, having trended downwards for months. Despite Mr Klitschko’s comments, he also said that he did not want Mr Zelensky to leave office until the war was over. A presidential election was due in March but elections are barred under the martial law introduced when Russia invaded. The Zelensky administration has argued that the vote would not be fair because so many soldiers are at the front and millions of Ukrainians have been forced to flee the country. Kira Rudik, a Ukrainian opposition leader, told The Independent that she also disagreed with elections despite Mr Zelensky’s waning popularity. “From a geopolitical perspective, it would be super dangerous if we held elections only in territories that we control,” she said. “It would mean that we appear to acknowledge that Ukraine does not include the occupied territories.” She added that the optics of Ukrainian politicians spending money on political campaigns during a time of war would be “crazy”. Mr Klitschko became the second major official to be involved in a spat with the president after the Ukrainian military chief, Valery Zaluzhny, was criticised for saying the frontline had reached a stalemate last month. Mr Zelensky denied that the war was deadlocked but admitted last week that the counteroffensive had failed to achieve “the desired results”.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 03:37
|
|
|
Do you have any analysis, or are you going to blot out discussion in the thread by spamming full text articles? I might suggest using a pastebin to house long blocks of text.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 04:02
|
|
|
Seems to say "Ukraine counteroffensive bad, Zelensky bad, US aid exhausted,  Ukraine"Writing a letter to Moscow Mitch pleading for more money for Ukraine aid is pretty  though I suppose you just have to do it regardless.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 04:06
|
|
|
Ukrainska Pravda is reporting that Zelensky is bypassing Zaluzhny and interfering with Zaluzhnyi's command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Key Takeaways The increase in the level of politicking and political intrigue in Ukraine (Zaluzhny vs Zelensky that was reported previously, the Kyiv Mayor vs Zelensky as posted above, and now Zaluzhny vs Zelensky again) may be a symptom and/or cause of the military situation for Ukraine on the frontlines. _______________________________________________________ Source: Ukrainska Pravda (A Ukrainian online newspaper founded by Georgiy Gongadze on 16 April 2000. Published mainly in Ukrainian with selected articles published in or translated to Russian and English.) Direct Link: https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/12/4/7431535/ Zelenskyy communicates with some commanders directly, bypassing Zaluzhnyi ALONA MAZURENKO, UKRAINSKA PRAVDA — MONDAY, 4 DECEMBER 2023, 10:06 Ukrainska Pravda sources say that Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy communicates with some commanders of the Armed Forces of Ukraine directly, bypassing Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi and interfering with his overall command of the army. Source: War vs politics. What’s really going on between Zelenskyy and Zaluzhnyi?, an article by Ukrainska Pravda Quote from a source in Zaluzhnyi's inner circle: "You see, sometimes it seems that Zelenskyy has two types of Armed Forces: the ‘good’ ones commanded by Syrskyi and other favourites, and the ‘bad’ ones which are subordinate to Zaluzhnyi. This is very demotivating for the Commander-in-Chief and, crucially, it prevents him from commanding the entire army." Details: Zelenskyy is said to have effectively set up parallel communication channels with the commanders of different branches of the army, bypassing Zaluzhnyi – such as with Air Force Commander Mykola Oleshchuk and Ground Force Commander Oleksandr Syrskyi. Direct contact with commanders obviously speeds up the president’s work, but it destabilises the work of the Commander-in-Chief, who learns some information from people who are officially his subordinates only at Staff meetings, if at all. Another example of Zelenskyy behaving like a politician was the high-profile media story about a purge of regional military enlistment officers. Following an investigation by Ukrainska Pravda into the unprecedented wealth amassed by the Odesa Oblast military enlistment chief during the war, the president demanded the dismissal of all the heads of oblast enlistment offices and an investigation into their assets. Quote: "[Oleksii] Sukhachov, Head of the State Bureau of Investigation, came to a meeting of the Staff in the summer and began to report on how good it was that the military enlistment chiefs had been dismissed. Then it was Zaluzhnyi’s turn to speak, and he just trashed him with this exquisite comment: ‘I want to thank law enforcement; corruption is an important topic. But I also want to announce the latest mobilisation data.’ And there was a sharp drop in all oblasts," one person who attended that meeting said on condition of anonymity. In other words, what looked like a swift and decisive response to society's demand for justice from a political point of view actually had complex consequences from a military point of view. Personnel changes such as the dismissals of Viktor Khorenko, Commander of the Special Operations Forces, and Tetiana Ostashchenko, Commander of the Medical Forces, and the potential resignation of Serhii Naiev, Commander of the Joint Forces, have had a similar effect. All of these officers are from Zaluzhnyi’s inner circle, and their dismissal creates instability in the command hierarchy. The criminal case against Naiev for the defence of the south, which Zaluzhnyi sees as an attempt to get close to him, is another chapter in the same story. But the tension between the President and the Commander-in-Chief really spiked after the start of the counteroffensive in the south. Background: Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, said in an interview with The Economist that the situation at the front has reached a stalemate in which neither side can advance because they are technologically equipped at the same level. The general says the situation reminds him of the First World War. Zelenskyy, however, does not consider the situation at the front to be a stalemate and says that Ukraine will not negotiate with Russia. On 21 November, President Zelenskyy told the British tabloid The Sun that military personnel who are going into politics should not "deal with war". On 29 November, The Economist wrote that along with the grim reality of trench warfare, tensions are also growing on the "political battleground" in Kyiv. President Zelenskyy sees Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi as a rival, and political infighting is harming Ukraine.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 04:15
|
|
|
I’m happy for you. Or sorry. Idk, I’m not reading all of that.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 04:20
|
|
|
I'm just gonna put this obvious rereg on ignore until he stops dumping entire news articles wholesale into the thread.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 04:20
|
|
|
I don't think he's reading the feedback And that feedback is to not just dump articles, pastebin them if you must
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 04:23
|
|
|
Dude's a gimmick who's been forumbanned from D&D and banned by El Jefe himself for forum vendetta shenanigans. He thinks he's owning us by posting news articles.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 04:25
|
|
|
November 2023 regdate and almost all of his posts are unfiltered article dumps in C-SPAM war threads (and recently here). He's not going to read the feedback because he's almost certainly some perma'd guy.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 04:26
|
|
|
And it's the opinion of WaPo staff. Like, at least own us with something that isn't just the opinion of a newspaper that has problematic ties to the CCP
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 04:33
|
|
|
The Door Frame posted:And it's the opinion of WaPo staff. Like, at least own us with something that isn't just the opinion of a newspaper that has problematic ties to the CCP how can they when noone takes Mearsheimer seriously anymore 
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 04:46
|
|
|
Ukrainska Pravda is reporting that "US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was informed during a visit to Kyiv that Ukraine needed 17 million rounds of ammunition and that US$350-400 billion worth of assets and personnel would be required to liberate Ukraine", and that "Austin was stunned, to put it mildly, because you wouldn’t be able to collect that many rounds in the whole world". _____________________________________________ Source: Ukrainska Pravda Direct Link: https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/12/4/7431543/ Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhnyi asked Pentagon chief for 17 million rounds of ammunition ALONA MAZURENKO, UKRAINSKA PRAVDA MONDAY, 4 DECEMBER 2023, 10:45 US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was informed during a visit to Kyiv that Ukraine needed 17 million rounds of ammunition and that US$350-400 billion worth of assets and personnel would be required to liberate the country. Source: War vs politics: what’s really going on between Zelenskyy and Zaluzhnyi?, an article by Ukrainska Pravda Quote: "According to Ukrainska Pravda, the General Staff’s calculations show that achieving the president’s objective of liberating the entire territory of Ukraine will require US$350-400 billion worth of assets and personnel." Details: The General Staff shared some planning ideas with Austin during his visit to Kyiv in November. Quote from a senior Defence Forces official: "Austin was told 17 million rounds of ammunition were needed. He was stunned, to put it mildly, because you wouldn’t be able to collect that many rounds in the whole world." In addition, according to a source, Austin also said Zaluzhnyi had complained privately to American generals about interference from the President’s Office (this news was initially worded: "Austin also said Zaluzhnyi had complained to him about interference from the President’s Office"): "Austin told us privately that Zaluzhnyi was always complaining to his generals about the President’s Office and how it obstructed him. Well, obviously the president learned about those conversations too. And that isn’t conducive to trust." However, the President’s Office is inclined to believe that Zaluzhnyi’s dismissal would facilitate his political career. Ukrainska Pravda sources from Zelenskyy’s inner circle say Bankova Street (the President’s Office) is well aware of this, so a significant part of the president’s team is strongly opposed to the current Commander-in-Chief stepping down. Background: Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, said in an interview that the situation at the front has reached a stalemate, where neither side can advance because they are technologically equipped at the same level, and the war is moving to the stage of positional fighting. President Zelenskyy has said he does not think the situation on the front in Ukraine is a stalemate and Ukraine will not negotiate with Russia. Zelenskyy told British tabloid The Sun on 21 November that military personnel who are going to enter politics should not "deal with war". On 29 November, The Economist wrote that parallel to the grim reality of trench warfare, the "political battlefield" in Kyiv is becoming more and more tense. President Zelenskyy sees a competitor in Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi and the political threat is harming Ukraine. The Economist wrote that it had obtained access to an internal poll in Ukraine, and the results suggest that "Zelenskyy risks losing the presidential election if he ever comes face-to-face with his commander-in-chief."
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 04:50
|
|
|
Summary: Kyiv Post is reporting that Russian forces have opened two new fronts in their ongoing assault on Avdiivka. Direct Link: https://www.kyivpost.com/post/25017 Headline: Russia Opening Two New Fronts in Avdiivka, Says Kyiv Source: Kyiv Post Date: 4 December 2023 Key Takeaways “The current third wave of enemy assaults differs from the previous two in that they have conditionally opened two new directions,” the head of the town, Vitaliy Barabash, told state media. “The launching of new directions proves that the enemy has been given a command to capture the city at any cost,” he added. ... The daily average of Russian troops is so high it’s comparable to those suffered by Imperial Russia during World War 1. ... Barabash said the new pushes by Russian forces were an attempt to distract Ukrainian defences and close a gap west of the town that would see it entirely encircled, AFP reports. ... According to the latest from the Institute for the Study of War, Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Avdiivka on December 3 and made confirmed advances west of the railway north of Stepove and southwest of Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka). fizziest fucked around with this message at 05:38 on Dec 5, 2023 |
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 05:31
|
|
|
Summary: Reuters is reporting that Major General Vladimir Zavadsky, deputy commander of Russia's 14th Army Corps, has been killed in Ukraine. Direct Link: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/deputy-russian-army-corps-commander-is-killed-ukraine-2023-12-04/ Headline: Deputy Russian army corps commander is killed in Ukraine Source: Reuters Date: December 4, 2023 Key Takeaways The governor of Russia's Voronezh region, Alexander Gusev, said Zavadsky had died "at a combat post in the special operation zone", without giving further details. ... The investigative news outlet iStories said Zavadsky was the seventh Major General whose death had been confirmed by Russia, and the 12 senior officer overall to be reported dead since the start of the war. Deaths of senior Russian officers, which military analysts have attributed in some cases to Ukrainian success in intercepting lax communications, have become rarer as the war has progressed.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 05:39
|
|
|
Cleanup in thread 3994572!
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 05:44
|
|
|
Mental illness is a hell of a thing.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 05:47
|
|
|
Vincent Van Goatse posted:Cleanup in thread 3994572! [bored cashier on supermarket intercom voice] Can I get a manager to Internet VFW for an alt check? Manager to IVFW for an alt check, thank you.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 05:52
|
|
|
Summary: Ukraine is scheduled to receive tens of thousands of 155mm NATO standard shells from the German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall... in 2025. Direct Link: https://kyivindependent.com/rheinmetall-wins-142-million-euro-contract-to-produce-shells-for-ukraine/ Headline: Rheinmetall wins over $150 million contract to produce shells for Ukraine Source: Kyiv Independent Date: December 4, 2023 Key Takeaways The German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall won a 142 million euro ($153.7 million) contract from an unnamed NATO country to produce artillery shells for Ukraine, the company announced on Dec. 4. The order involves tens of thousands of 155mm NATO standard shells and is expected to be delivered in 2025. It will be produced by Rheinmetall Expal Munitions, a Spanish subsidiary. ... Rheinmetall is planning for a "massive increase" of its production capacity in 2024, for a new overall annual output of around 700,000 rounds. It is the largest producer of ammunition in the world. Both Russia and Ukraine use a considerable amount of artillery shells, and there has been concern that Russia is gaining the upper hand in terms of shell capacity after allegedly receiving over a million shells from North Korea.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 05:52
|
|
|
Is that so?
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 06:02
|
|
|
The Door Frame posted:The state would probably be better off dissolved. East of the Urals has practically been "here there be dragons" on the map for hundreds of years and would be better off managing their own resources instead of having them stolen by Moscow there isn't much reason to expect siberia to promptly develop a separatist movement. sure, it has natural resources, but it's a fairly isolated part of the world without much development beyond extractive industrial enterprises. simple geography aside, it has a significant ethnic russian population that isn't going to up and raise the banner of decolonization. neither are european russians likely to demand divestiture from the regions like they did during the collapse of the USSR
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 06:30
|
|
|
same bro
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 06:44
|
|
|
Summary: Finnish Defense Minister Antti Hakkanen has announced that Finland plans to invest tens of millions of euros to increase its artillery ammunition production in the next few weeks to arm Ukraine. Direct Link: https://kyivindependent.com/rheinmetall-wins-142-million-euro-contract-to-produce-shells-for-ukraine/ Headline: Minister: Finland plans shell production boost to arm Ukraine Source: Kyiv Independent Date: 5 December 2023 Key Takeaways Finland plans to increase its artillery ammunition production in the next few weeks to arm Ukraine, Finnish Defense Minister Antti Hakkanen said in an interview with the Finnish newspaper Iltalehti published on Dec. 5. ... Finland plans to invest tens of millions of euros to hike the production, the minister said. ... The EU's plan to provide the 1 million shells has been plagued by bureaucracy and protectionism of individual countries. As of Nov. 30, 480,000 shells – less than half of the promised amount – have been delivered or are on their way, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said. (USER WAS PUT ON PROBATION FOR THIS POST)
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 10:22
|
|
|
Hmm not sure I like that this thread has now been colonized by a news aggregator bot.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 14:35
|
|
|
Qtotonibudinibudet posted:there isn't much reason to expect siberia to promptly develop a separatist movement. sure, it has natural resources, but it's a fairly isolated part of the world without much development beyond extractive industrial enterprises. simple geography aside, it has a significant ethnic russian population that isn't going to up and raise the banner of decolonization. neither are european russians likely to demand divestiture from the regions like they did during the collapse of the USSR Oh, it's a total pipe dream, but I think that the people living there would be better off self governed, given how they've historically been treated. Realistically, they'd be pounced on by some other global power who cares even less about them, looking to "help" them get all of the oil and minerals to market, but it's nice to dream sometimes
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 15:12
|
|
|
I will reiterate that just dumping an article and loving off into the night is not acceptable.
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 15:46
|
|
|
hosed up crossover world where Batman was a reporter
|
|
#
?
Dec 5, 2023 17:18
|
|
|
How much of the drive by article dumps are Russian information warfare feeding into understaffed, uncritical newsrooms? "Ukraine is in civil war. Ukraine is on the brink of defeat. Ukraine is hopelessly corrupt and getting worse. Ukraine's soldiers hate fighting the West's war. Ukrainians hate the autocrat Zelenskyy and yearn to return to Russia's embrace. The mayor of Kyiv hates Zelenskyy and so should you." articles dropping in a few newspapers in the last few days seems odd, and at odds with what I read elsewhere. Have I put myself in a filter bubble?
|
|
#
?
Dec 6, 2023 08:20
|
|
|
A bunch of them. If you are on Twitter or Fox News, you are less informed than someone who is not following anything. The news from normal outlets (Le Monde, Süddeutsche, etc.) has been fairly accurate and reasonable. Also, obviously Ukraine's internal politics hasn't just stopped.
|
|
#
?
Dec 6, 2023 08:59
|
|
|
|
| # ? Jun 6, 2024 19:10 |
|
|
Sending a bot to the SA forums to repost articles critical of Ukraine really seems like a waste of dacha funds.
|
|
#
?
Dec 6, 2023 09:39
|
|