fish and chips and dip posted:

Some more info on that Ural A320 https://avherald.com/h?article=50e4701a&opt=0

ZogrimAteMyHamster posted:

Sorry I couldn't help myself.

Tai posted:

Why not offer scholarships like they do here? Get your uni degree in whatever you subject you want paid for and a basic salary while studying and agree to do 4 years once you graduate.

ZogrimAteMyHamster posted:

Sorry I couldn't help myself.

ZogrimAteMyHamster posted:

Sorry I couldn't help myself.

zone posted:

https://twitter.com/Flash_news_ua/status/1701568047926943888#m
Glory to the Heroes!

fish and chips and dip posted:

Some more info on that Ural A320 https://avherald.com/h?article=50e4701a&opt=0

HonorableTB posted:

These things look really cool, like something out of Terminator

https://twitter.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1701260247078236366?t=2cKNcnWDz4QmqftZuSYJjw&s=19

quote:

The same team launched a similar attack again a few weeks later. On October 29, a fleet of guided sea drones packed with explosives did reach Sebastopol harbor, using a different communications system. They did hit their targets. They put one Russian frigate, the Admiral Makarov, out of commission. The team believes that they damaged at least one submarine and at least two other boats as well.

And then? Nuclear war did not follow. Despite Musk’s fears, in other words—fears put into his head by the Russian ambassador, or perhaps by Putin himself—World War III did not erupt as a result of this successful attack on a Crimean port. Instead, the Russian naval commanders were spooked by the attack, so much so that they stuck close to Sebastopol harbor over the following weeks.

For their own security, I am choosing not to publish the names of the engineers. I was introduced to them by a tech executive I met on a previous trip to Ukraine, when I was writing about drone operations more broadly. This team has shown off its unmanned boats before, so I am not revealing secrets when I write that they are small, black, and hard to see on the water, and have a very long range—now more than 650 miles, the engineers told me. The drones are constantly reinvented and redesigned. Some of those I saw were described as the “fifth generation.” I was given remote control of one on a distant body of water; directing it felt remarkably like playing a video game.

Like the more famous air drones, sea drones are a central important part of Ukraine’s idiosyncratic way of waging war. Unable to compete plane for plane or ship for ship against the much larger Russian military, Ukraine is using tiny, high-tech, custom-designed, and relatively cheap devices that can take large, expensive artillery, tanks, and ships out of the game. Many of these devices are built by groups that are not quite part of the military, but not exactly private either. This networked, grassroots, asymmetric response is part of how the Ukrainians hope to win the war. “This is Ukraine. We are hybrid,” one of the engineers told me.

He also told me that although his drones didn’t destroy the whole Black Sea fleet, they have had an impact on the war. Russian military ships became more cautious. Instead of physically blocking Ukrainian grain transports, as some observers expected them to do, they have stayed in port. “We made them scared,” he told me. They were happy to confirm that if a Russian warship does try to block a cargo ship carrying Ukrainian grain, they will hit it.

HonorableTB posted:

https://twitter.com/UKikaski/status/1701340210003329336?t=qrq95y8GMiU1fyDlfe2y7Q&s=19

dondondondondon

HonorableTB posted:

https://twitter.com/UKikaski/status/1701340210003329336?t=qrq95y8GMiU1fyDlfe2y7Q&s=19

dondondondondon

mobby_6kl posted:

]

https://www.businessinsider.com/george-bush-yevgeny-prigozhin-vladimir-putin-dinner-g8-ukraine-war-2023-9

Oscar Wilde Bunch posted:

First reply is pretty good.

https://twitter.com/ukikaski/status/1701523275027792349?s=46

Alan Smithee posted:

https://twitter.com/cossackgundi/status/1701516047830950271

Shaman Tank Spec posted:

I mean, your tank being able to reverse quickly is definitely a great thing.

Oscar Wilde Bunch posted:

First reply is pretty good.

https://twitter.com/ukikaski/status/1701523275027792349?s=46

quote:

A Russian pilot who defected with a Mi-8 helicopter last month has inspired a massive uptick in calls to Ukraine's surrender hotline, an official said on Monday.

Andrii Yusov, of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, told Radio Svoboda that there has been a 70 percent daily uptick of calls to "I Want to Live", a state-run project which allows Russian soldiers to arrange to give themselves up rather than fight in the war.

"There is considerable progress on the hotline of 'I Want to Live' and, separately, on other communication channels," Ysuov said, according to a translation by the Ukrainian Pravda.

"After the successful operation Synytsia with the Mi-8 and the pilot, the number of Russian army servicemen considering such a scenario has increased," he added.

Yusov did not provide an exact number of how many people have called but did say that there "there will be a reward" for anyone thinking of defecting, as per the Ukrainian Pravda.

Maksim Kuzminov, a 28-year-old captain in Russia's 319th separate helicopter regiment, surrendered to Ukraine last month, bringing with him a Mi-8 helicopter and stolen fighter jet parts.

His successful arrival in Ukraine was said to have marked the end of a six-month secret defection plot he had worked out with Ukrainian intelligence that included moving his family out of Russia. Two other crew members, who were on board the helicopter and not aware of the defection, tried to flee but were killed.

Kuzminov was awarded half a million dollars for changing sides and taking Russia's military equipment with him.

In an interview published by Ukraine's defense-intelligence agency last week, Kuzminov said that he chose to defect because he did not want to be involved in war crimes, according to a translation by CNN.

"What is happening now is simply genocide of the Ukrainian people. Both Ukrainian and Russian," the 28-year-old added.

The "I Want to Live" hotline was launched just before Russia announced a mass mobilization of reservists in September last year. It is run both over the phone and on Telegram.

Russia's Prosecutor General's office blocked the site in mid-October last year, by which time it claimed to have received more than 2,000 inquiries.

By March this year, around 10,000 Russian soldiers used the hotline to offer their voluntary surrender, officials said at the time.

quote:

COPENHAGEN, Sept 12 (Reuters) - Denmark will donate a package worth 5.8 billion Danish crowns ($833 million) to Ukraine, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, tank ammunition and anti-aircraft guns, the ministry of defence said in a statement on Tuesday.

The full amount is distributed over three rounds - 4.3 billion this year, 1.4 billion in 2024 and 52 million in 2025, the ministry said.

"After more than a year and a half of war, we have almost exhausted our defence stocks. Therefore, we are now looking into more targeted joint procurement and international cooperation, tailored to Ukraine's needs here and now," foreign minister Lars Lřkke Rasmussen said in a statement.

This is the twelfth and largest donation package Denmark has sent to Ukraine since Russia invaded the country in February 2022, the ministry added.

($1 = 6.9626 Danish crowns)

quote:

The capture of Novodarivka and Rivnopil took two weeks, with the need to secure flank positions being a prerequisite to further advances. Thus, the rate of advance during this period was one tactical advance for three days of fighting, with each advance moving the line of control approximately 700–1,200 metres forwards. The difference in methods for the various advances produced starkly contrasting results in terms of the level of expenditure for the gains made. Whereas the first tactical advance against Novodarivka cost two companies worth of equipment*, losses throughout the attack on Rivnopil were light. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces made adaptations to their methods after these initial exchanges. The emphasis for Ukrainian troops moved to taking ground while conserving equipment and personnel.

quote:

Russian Adaptations

The first adaptation was to increase the depth of minefields. Russian minefields had been doctrinally set down as 120-metres deep prior to the offensive. Following the early clashes, it was noted that this depth of mines was breachable by MICLIC and UR-77 to a sufficient depth to enable infantry to get into Russian defensive positions. The aim, therefore, has been to increase the depth of minefields to up to 500 metres, well beyond any rapid breaching capability. ..... The increased depth of the fields means that Russian forces have had insufficient mines to consistently meet this lay down with a density of mines consistent with doctrine. The result has been improvisation of explosive devices, the diversification of the range of mines ceded, and the decreasing regularity of minefields.

...


Russian forces have also assessed that the practice of setting pre-registered fires to engage their own positions once they are lost is inefficient and dangerous when the enemy has an artillery advantage in terms of counterbattery detection,
range and accuracy. The problems with this method have included the exposure of friendly guns, reduced effectiveness because of the Ukrainian tendency to displace from the fighting positions as soon as possible, and a dependency on
communications. To solve these problems the Russians have resorted to preparing their fighting positions for reserve demolition. This is often done with improvised charges. The template is to detonate the first line once Ukrainian troops enter the fighting positions, while Russian forces withdraw through the rear of the trenches.

....

One of the foremost methods adopted by the AFRF is the emplacement of ATGW teams to the flanks of their positions, prioritising better trained and motivated troops to conduct anti-tank ambushes. Although there are limited personnel capable and willing to fight forward in this way, there appears to be no shortage of Russian ATGWs

....

The use of attack aviation has posed a consistent challenge for Ukrainian forces throughout the counteroffensive. The foremost threat comes from Ka-52 Alligators firing Vikhr and Ataka ATGMs. However, the Russians have also begun mounting Ataka on Mi-35Ms, which also engage in area-effect strikes utilising salvos of lofted S-8 rockets. Aviation strikes are launched from a depth of approximately 8–10 kilometres from the target. Ukrainian forces note that the presence of attack aviation is often heralded by the lifting of GPS jamming among Russian formations, reflecting the need for precise navigation in order to coordinate strikes, given that both armies are using many of the same platforms. Russian helicopter groups are also often flying with an EW-equipped helicopter for defensive purposes, equipped with directional pods aimed at targeting radar. The Russians are having to keep helicopters relatively close to the front, making their forward arming and refuelling points and other infrastructure vulnerable. Nevertheless, shortage of Ukrainian tactical air defence, the low altitude maintained by these assets, and the limited period during which they are in the
hover to deliver effects all make countering attack aviation difficult.

.....

The Russian military has also determined to tactically exploit opportunities when Ukrainian forces have become bogged down by aggressive flanking with armour to knock out Ukrainian systems. It is worth noting that Russia often loses the tanks used for these counterattacks but they inflict disproportionate damage because the mines constrain Ukrainian vehicles in their ability to manoeuvre or respond.

....

First, the Russian forces lack the ammunition to sustain this volume of fire [artillery saturation based on WW2 derived doctrines]. Second, the logistics enabling such a volume of fire is too vulnerable to detection and long-range precision strike. Third, the loss of counterbattery radar and barrel wear have meant that this mass approach to fire suppression is of diminishing effectiveness. ...... The Russian military is, of course, continuing to rely heavily on MLRS, 120-mm mortars and other imprecise systems, while corner-cutting in the production of its munitions is becoming apparent. Nevertheless, the trend appears to be towards maximising accuracy and reducing the number of rounds necessary to achieve the desired outcome rather than resorting to saturation fire.

....

At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russian forces depended heavily on bespoke military radios. In the scramble for equipment late last year, a wide array of civilian systems was employed. Conceptually, however, the Russians now appear to have moved on, increasingly relying on military bearer networks but app-based services for encoding and accessing data.

quote:

Ukrainian Needs
Insofar as Ukrainian forces have been able to make progress during the offensive it has been dependent on fires superiority. Outranging the Russians, combined with having better means for detecting enemy artillery and carrying out
counterbattery fires, is an essential Ukrainian advantage. This advantage is limited in its duration by the serviceability of Ukrainian artillery pieces, the availability of replacement barrels, and the continued supply of 155-mm
ammunition. With 17 artillery systems in operation, it is evident that replacement barrels cannot be produced for all systems, because of the shortage of barrel machines across NATO. It is therefore vital that Ukraine’s international partners
invest to ensure that there is a sustainable supply for a consolidated artillery park, focusing on maintaining a more limited range of guns at greater scale.

.....

But while Western-supplied protected mobility may be doing a good job at enabling their dismounts to survive – as demonstrated by the infantry still making it to Novodarivka despite their vehicles falling victim to mines and enemy fires – there is still a high loss rate of platforms. These platforms are often mobility killed rather than destroyed. But rebuilding them demands a consistent provision of spare parts.

....

Collective training outside Ukraine is hampered by the fact that because of the safety culture in NATO, Ukrainian troops cannot train as they fight. Moreover, many NATO tactics either require a level of training that is not feasible within
the timeframe available, or are not validated in the modern threat environment. A good example here is that Ukrainian training emphasises the threat from artillery even when teaching squad tactics. For Western armies that build skills incrementally, artillery is introduced into training after basic infantry tactics are mastered. More complex training involving artillery cannot be conducted until troops are certified in their basic skills to be able to exercise safely. For Ukraine,
however, troops who are not prepared to deal with artillery are not prepared for the fight. Another example is the shaping effect of UAVs. Most NATO training areas are severely restricted in the types of UAVs that can be flown and how they
can be used. This is because of fears that UAVs will malfunction and fly into controlled airspace, such as the area around civilian airports. The problem is that for collective training above company, Ukrainian troops need to be prepared
for and practise tactics in an environment where there are up to 25 UAVs observing their movements, while UAVs are also critical to their own combat management.

Shaman Tank Spec posted:

ZogrimAteMyHamster posted:

Sorry I couldn't help myself.

bad_fmr posted:

Please post fat Kadyrov with Zelensky selfie and Prigo pointing.

ZogrimAteMyHamster posted:

ZogrimAteMyHamster posted: