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Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

my dad posted:

Serious question: What's the most effective shield shape?

Samuel L. Jackson

PrinceRandom posted:

War is really depressing. Does it ever get depressing reading about real people killing real people?

Yes. Although as a military historian I like to think that writing about this stuff might make a difference in whether there's more or less of it in the future.

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Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

Rodrigo Diaz posted:

Also, according to Hew Strachan when I spoke to him, any time Keegan talks about Clausewitz or WWI. lmao

This was my Ph.D advisor's take on Keegan too, but especially whenever he talked about naval warfare. Someone else I think described Keegan as a man who had never read a primary source in his life.

As for songs, I think my favorites are two from the Civil War:

The first is a Union "gently caress you" to the Southern song "Bonnie Blue Flag":

quote:

REPLY TO "THE BONNIE BLUE FLAG" [Also known as The Stripes and Stars]
by Colonel J.L. Geddes

We're fighting for our Union,
We're fighting for our trust,
We're fighting for that happy land
Where sleeps our father dust.
It cannot be dissevered,
Though it cost us bloody wars,
We never can give up the land
Where floats the stripes and stars.

Chorus: Hurrah, Hurrah,
For equal rights hurrah,
Hurrah for the good old flag
That bears the stripes and stars.

We trusted you as brothers,
Unitl you drew the sword,
With impious hands at Sumpter
You cut the silver cord.
So now you hear the bugles,
We come the sons of Mars,
To rally round the brave old flag
That bears the stripes and stars.

Chorus

We do not want your cotton,
We do not want your slaves,
But rather than divide the land,
We'll fill your Southern graves.
With Lincoln for our chieftain,
We wear our country's stars,
And rally round the brave old flag
That bears the stripes and stars.

Chorus

We deem our cause most holy,
We know we're in the right,
And twenty million freemen
Stand ready for the fight.
Our pride is fair Columbia,
No stain her beauty mars,
On her we'll raise the brave old flag
That bears the stripes and stars.

Chorus

And when this war is over,
We'll each resume our home,
And treat you still as brothers,
Where ever you may roam.
We'll pledge the hand of friendship,
And think no more of war,
But dwell in peace beneath the flag
That bears the stripes and stars.

Chorus

The second one was popular with German-American immigrants, who were often some of the most patriotic soldiers the North had even if they couldn't speak English all that well.

quote:

I GOES TO FIGHT MIT SIGEL
Words by F. Poole

I've come shust now to tells you how,
I goes mit regimentals,
To schlauch dem voes of Liberty,
Like dem old Continentals,
Vot fights mit England long ago,
To save der Yankee Eagle;
Und now I gets my sojer clothes;
I'm going to fight mit Sigel.

Ven I comes from der Deutsche Countree,
I vorks somedimes at baking;
Den I keeps a lager beer saloon,
Und den I goes shoe-making;
But now I was a sojer been
To save der Yankee Eagle,
To schlauch dem tam secession volks,
I goes to fight mit Sigel.

I gets ein tam big rifle guns,
Und puts him to mine shoulder,
Den march so bold like a big jackhorse,
Und may been someding bolder;
I goes off mit de volunteers
To save der Yankee Eagle;
To give dem Rebel vellers fits.
I goes to fight mit Sigel.

Dem Deutschen mens mit Sigel's band
At fighting have no rival;
Und ven Cheff Davis mens ve meet,
Ve schlauch em like de tuyvil.
Dere's only von ting vot I fear,
Ven pattling for der Eagle,
I vont get not no lager beer,
Ven I goes to fight mit Sigel.

For rations dey gives salty pork,
I dinks dat was a great sell;
I petter likes de saurkraut,
Der Schvitzer-kase und bretzel.
If Fighting Joe will give us dem,
Ve'll save der Yankee Eagle,
Und I'll put mine frau in breech-a-loons,
To go and fight mit Sigel.

Vincent Van Goatse fucked around with this message at 00:20 on Nov 15, 2013

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose
Found a recording of "I Goes to Fight mit Sigel":

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUSJA-vtg_s

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

AATREK CURES KIDS posted:

Is The Mitrokhin Archive, by Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, a reliable book? I'm 100 pages into it and it has parts that are unbelievably farcical, like the English plot to publicly de-pants and humiliate Lenin.

Much of the material is supposedly accurate although there's plenty of reputable scholars who have their doubts such as Amy Knight, although most of their doubts are based on the supposed ironclad security within Soviet intelligence. So really it depends on how much you believe in the KGB etc being hypervigilant in document security measures. Considering things like Bradley Manning walking out with thousands of secret documents on a loving fake burned Lady Gaga CD, I have my doubts the Soviets didn't have equally boneheaded lapses in security.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

a travelling HEGEL posted:

The Italian Wars begin. Gunpowder artillery, mother fuckers :hellyeah:

Constantinople would like a word in your ear. Also Orleans and Calais. And Crecy.

Vincent Van Goatse fucked around with this message at 21:27 on Nov 29, 2013

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

Shimrra Jamaane posted:

What civilization had the world's first standing professional tank destroyer?

Imperial Germany. Because they were the only ones who needed such a thing in 1916. It was a guy with a special bullet for his Mauser. He was replaced by a guy with a big rifle.

Vincent Van Goatse fucked around with this message at 08:38 on Dec 1, 2013

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

tweekinator posted:

I was fairly skeptical of his "And then Roger and 150 dudes beat an army of 35,000!", but thank you for the heads up about his tendency.

When it comes to medieval and classical battles of this sort, I almost always assume the numbers claimed in primary accounts are overstated by anywhere from 2/3s to 9/10s, sometimes even more.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

Hogge Wild posted:

Can a Polish Hussar achieve a take off if you put him on a conveyor belt?

Only if Hitler is gay but not black.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose
I am utterly shocked that a man like this would spend his life writing creepy alternate history books involving horrible rape and genocide.

Only registered members can see post attachments!

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

Godholio posted:

Can't blame a guy for figuring out how to turn history into money.

I can and I will.

Anything Ferguson wrote about British foreign policy and especially Sir Edward Grey being the mastermind of an Anglo-German showdown is complete and utter bullshit, and his reading of the Cabinet meeting in August 1911 is almost certainly ludicrously wrong. I only add the "almost certainly" caveat because I haven't actually read Ferguson's account of that meeting, just heard what was said about it by others.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

gradenko_2000 posted:

Holy poo poo what :aaa:

What I've read of Grey from A World Undone and Guns of August makes him seem like one of the few rational actors in that shitshow, and leagues less warmongering than, I dunno, loving Churchill or Jackie Fisher.

It's not really fair to call Jackie Fisher a warmonger. If anything he understood deterrence theory before the term was coined. Not that I'd want him or anyone from that era in charge of nuclear weapons :ohdear:

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

sullat posted:

They were oral histories, eventually recorded in Greek. The modern names for them are ”the Iliad” and ”The Odyssey”.

This isn't even close to being true.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

Rodrigo Diaz posted:

As an aside, here's an interesting article on Tours. Seems sound to me. http://deremilitari.org/2013/09/the-battle-of-tours-poitiers-revisited/

There's some problems with their description of the Visigothic "kings" that followed Roderic (there's no actual proof Achila II was related to Witiza, much less that he was his son, although there's plenty of reason to think they may have been from the same power bloc, i.e. they were both opposed to Roderic), but that's only a minor issue.

Vincent Van Goatse fucked around with this message at 11:28 on Jan 20, 2014

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

DerLeo posted:

The First World War was traumatic enough to scar the art and literature of Europe right up until a worse war came along and pretty much made pacifism a mainstream political movement, so I'm feeling that there's a bit of nostalgia for the GOOD OLD DAYS OF EMPIRE :britain: here.

At least in England, a lot of that art and literature was written by upper class sons of privilege who'd spent the prewar years listening to nothing more violent than their servants cutting meat in the kitchens of their manor houses. Except when shooting partridges or going on fox hunts, I suppose.

Meanwhile, the "lower classes" who lived four families to a tiny tenement house in the East End with holes the floor and no heating beyond burnt newspapers found trench warfare much less traumatic for some reason.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

Slim Jim Pickens posted:

This is absurd. When it rains in London, it doesn't come with shells

I said less traumatic, not a happy puppy parade.

Also I don't think either of you realize just how lovely housing for the poor and working class was in prewar Britain. Like those stories about holes in the floor are from government reports.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

a travelling HEGEL posted:

Physical privation and facing down the immediate prospect of getting killed aren't the same thing.

It's also possible that the poorer WW1 veterans didn't write about their traumatic experiences because they were less literate, or less used to using writing in an introspective manner. That doesn't have to mean that they didn't suffer, or even didn't suffer as much.

Oh that's certainly possible, and I didn't claim only the rich suffered (which anyone who read All Quiet on the Western Front in high school would know is laughable). Just that, at least in the British case, the war novels and poems that make up "war literature" is almost entirely about officers suffering horrible things while the "lower ranks" are often described as not being nearly as effected by it all.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

There's also the less-remembered Walter "Tich" Cowan, a First World War RN flag officer who joined a Commando unit in World War Two (in his seventies) and was captured by the Italians while trying to fight a tank with his service revolver.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

a travelling HEGEL posted:

Yeah, because that's what makes you win. The flashy poo poo is all on top--beneath it is the Ottoman government itemizing pillowcases and spoons.

There's also multiple ways of doing logistics badly. I'll have to do an effortpost one of these days about how Jackie Fisher saved the Royal millions of pounds by actually paying attention to what kind of pillowcases and spoons were being bought by the Admiralty.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

meatbag posted:

The Royal Navy pre-Fisher is hilarious. "Gunnery training? But that will make our ships dirty! :ohdear:"

Now there's another effortpost right here, debunking the legend that before Fisher came the RN was a bunch of circlejerking clowns.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

meatbag posted:

I'm not saying they were the Keystone Kaptains, but not having to fight an actual war for almost a century sure didn't lend itself to producing an efficient force.

Have you read Dreadnought and Castles of Steel by the way? Great books both on pre-WW1 Europe as well as the RN. And it lists plenty of stupid things they did post-Fisher as well. Though any large organization is bound to have idiots.

Yes, they aren't particularly good if you're a specialist on the period, considering how much important research the author ignored.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

Fangz posted:

Was there any popular military fiction in the pre-modern age?

I suppose Romance of The Three Kingdoms might vaguely qualify. Was there anything elsewhere?

King Arthur.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

brozozo posted:

I'm also curious in hearing about Massie's shortcomings. I've read Dreadnought, and I've been interested in reading Castles of Steel as well.

Actually if you're looking for a general history of the period aimed at non-experts Massie is about the best you'll be able to find. I've just been working on a graduate-level thesis for so long I'm still in "my sources can beat up your sources" mode.

Marder on the other hand is excellent but you have to be careful with some of his claims because he took the griping and complaining of some particularly disaffected officers way too seriously (gently caress Herbert Richmond).

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

Slim Jim Pickens posted:

Yeah, he wrote one.

I like that his main point is that if Britain didn't join in WWI, they would've kept the old empire? That's a solid, bias-free and inoffensive stance.

It's also wrong in every important respect.

:siren: WARNING: BIG WALL OF TEXT :siren:

I can't give a blow by blow Fisking of Ferguson's idiotic swill because my library is currently boxed up in my garage and I haven't actually read The Pity of War, but I'm familiar enough with the main thrust of it all that I can safely describe it as garbage.

OK, first of all he totally ignores the naval rivalry between Britain and Germany before the First World War. If a student turned in a paper to me on the origins of the First World War and omitted this, I would fail them immediately. German sailors drank regular toasts lustily hoping for Der Tag when the High Seas Fleet would sortie and defeat the British battle fleet in a reverse Trafalgar in the North Sea. The Kaiser was obsessed with sea power. Admiral Tirpitz was one of the key men who shaped German history as a whole in the two decades before August 1914. The German Army Command and the other hawks during the July Crisis went through quite a bit of trouble to give crucial mobilizing orders and such like when the Wilhelm and the fleet were on a cruise in Norwegian waters, because they thought Tirpitz and the Kaiser would want to hold off on military action out of fear of the superior strength of the Royal Navy (irony or ironies, the service which had done the most to damage Anglo-German relations had a better understanding of British feelings than anyone else).

Second of all, Ferguson pins the whole of the collapse of Anglo-German relations on Sir Edward Grey, the Liberal Foreign Secretary, claiming he led a cabal to bring Britain around into opposition to Germany because Reasons (and because he was from a political party that Ferguson hates). This is preposterous. When he first took over as Foreign Secretary, he was interested in better relations with Germany, or at least trying to find common ground. Want proof, here's an excerpt from a January 1906 letter from Grey to the Prime Minister, Henry Campbell-Bannerman, discussing British actions during the recent Algeciras Crisis:

Sir Edward Grey to Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 9 January 1906, Add MS 41218, f. 49-50, Campbell-Bannerman MSS, British Library posted:

In more than one part of the world I find ... that Germany is feeling after a coaling station in a port. Everywhere we block this. I am not an expert in naval strategy, but I doubt whether it is vy important ... to prevent Germany getting ports at a distance from her base; and the moment may come when timely admission, that it is not a cardinal object of British policy to prevent her having such a port, may have great pacific effect.

That sure sounds like a man doing all he can to poison the Anglo-German diplomatic well, doesn't it? Never mind that in the fallout from Wilhelm's congratulatory telegram to Paul Kruger after the Boers defeated the Jameson Raid had led to such a crisis between Germany and Britain that a "Flying Squadron" of warships had been assembled in case the balloon went up. Never mind that since at least 1903 the Admiralty had been drawing up potential operational plans for a war with the German Navy. Never mind that Tirpitz mentioned the Royal Navy by name in his own memoranda leading up to the devising of the German Navy Laws in 1898. Never mind all that, Sir Edward Grey is obviously the villain of the story. I mean, he had to be, he was a Liberal.

Third of all, Ferguson (I believe) interprets a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence in August 1911 (amidst another Moroccan Crisis, the Agadir Incident) as being the point where the sinister cabal of evil Liberal politicians decided they would throw in with France in a continental war and destroy the Empire in the process. Bull loving poo poo. I've read the minutes of that conference and nothing of the sort happened. Hell, here's my own description of events taken direct from my own loving Ph.D thesis. Footnotes are missing, sorry.

Me posted:

Agadir

In the spring of 1911, France had begun working to remove the last vestiges of independent Morocco by sending a military column to Fez. Germany, alarmed by this disruption of the status quo began diplomatic counter-manoeuvres but overplayed their hand by demanding excessive compensation for the loss of their (largely theoretical) commercial claims in Morocco in the form of French Congolese holdings and by impetuously sending the gunboat Panther to Agadir in defence of their position. It is worth noting that in both cases the impetus came from the German Foreign Ministry, as Tirpitz for all his faults knew better than to make such an obvious challenge to British maritime pride. Sir Edward Grey and the rest of the Foreign Office understood the German grievances but nonetheless regarded them with the suspicion of a conspiracy theorist. Helping them to this conclusion were the usual diplomatic rumours of the time, especially one of French provenance that the Germans were desirous of a great African territory that would ultimately threaten South Africa and Rhodesia.

The Admiralty, who were not privy to such rumours and in any case understood the reliance on seapower that such a move would entail, took a much more relaxed view of the entire crisis. Much 'to the consternation of Crowe and Nicolson', the Admiralty's initial reply to the Panthersprung was to note the fact that the crisis posed little threat to Britain's maritime interests. This response was, in retrospect, a very good example for those who wish to paint the Navy as a retrograde institution. It was entirely correct but politically naïve—the diplomats and cabinet politicians wanted something more than a blithe assurance of safety, and the Admiralty would not stoop to give it.

Frustration was not limited to the Cabinet. From his flagship, Admiral [Sir Francis] Bridgeman [Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet i.e. the main battle fleet in British waters] complained to [Prince Louis of] Battenberg [Second Sea Lord at the Admiralty] in an unusually forceful manner at the end of September about recent events. Hearing garbled (and, in fact, inaccurate) reports of German warships operating in the Orkneys and Shetlands, Bridgeman sent first 'a Scout & some Destroyers' to the islands and then took his own flagship, the dreadnought Neptune, to Lerwick in response to rumours of German cruisers being seen in nearby waters. 'It's difficult to say what particular cruiser she was,' Bridgeman stated 'but I am led to believe she was one of those in charge of the Submarines & most possibly she was accompanied by them!' These reports convinced Bridgeman that 'Germany has laid her plans for attacking our fleet in these Northern ports with His Submarines, Destroyers and Mines—the instant they declare war!' Germany, he thought, would go to war using their flotillas as the tip of the spear. Their rumoured infiltration of the northern islands was disturbing enough, but 'what is so disconcerting to all of us Sailors in the Home Fleet' was that the Cabinet 'will permit no precautions being taken to prevent a surprise.' Bridgeman complained further that he ‘was forbidden to take the Fleet to Sea, or take the necessary precautions while laying in Harbour, exception having been taken to getting nets out at night!’ What were the point of War Orders providing precautionary measures for 'Strained Relations' when those Orders 'were disregarded just as much as if they had not existed!' The experience had even soured him on the use of Scapa and Cromarty and the Firth as bases. 'Are we never to take precautions for fear of the press? If so, then I am no longer in favour of using these Northern Harbours for our Battleships! For if we are not to go to sea, and not defend ourselves, the fleet will be gone before we can fight an action!'

On August 23rd, 1911, in the context of the crisis a famous meeting occurred in London. Despite recent efforts to downplay its importance, there is still the impression of a bureaucratic coup d'état to the proceedings. The Army could hardly have prayed for better circumstances. The Navy's best advocates were either absent or hors d'combat. Also absent were Lewis Harcourt and Lords Morley and Crewe, who if not sympathetic to the Navy’s cause, were unlikely to favour the Army's 'continental commitment'; in any case they were furious regarding their enforced absence. The Navy’s case was thus left to [Reginald] McKenna [First Lord of the Admiralty (the civil head of the Admiralty)], [Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur] Wilson[, VC] [First Sea Lord (professional head of the Admiralty)], and [Admiral Sir Alexander] Bethell [Director of Naval Intelligence]. It is not an understatement that 'the meeting constituted a gathering of the entente faction'. The stage was set for what amounted to the Navy's Ides of March.

The subject of the meeting was officially described as 'Action to be Taken in the Event of Intervention in a European War'. Zara Steiner observed that this would be the only time that the Committee 'actually reviewed the over-all pattern of British strategy before 1914.' Wilson and McKenna began the meeting by denying that the Admiralty could provide men or ships to transport a major expedition across the Channel:

'The whole force at the disposal of the Admiralty would be absorbed in keeping the enemy within the North Sea. Ordinarily the Navy would furnish transport officers and protecting ships. These could not be furnished in these circumstances.'

Unfortunately, this argument was diluted when General [Sir Henry] Wilson [Director of Military Operations (the man in charge of British Army war planning and a strong advocate of sending the British Expeditionary Force to fight alongside France)] observed that in any case the Channel would likely 'be covered by the main operations' in the North Sea, and resultantly the risk to the troop transports would be 'very slight', especially since in the first few days of mobilization many of the Navy's warships activated from reserve would be 'traversing the Channel on the way to their stations.' When pressed for details on the opinion of Admiral Groome, the Admiralty Director of Transports, McKenna said the Admiralty had not sufficient men to mobilize the fleet and ferry the expeditionary force to France simultaneously. Bethell added that a previous report on transport availability had 'assumed the Fleet had already been mobilized.' [Prime Minister] Asquith grew increasingly impatient over the whole issue and finally ended the discussion, instructing McKenna to look into the matter of transportation because the Army's plan required simultaneous mobilization of the British forces alongside the French Army, making 'the question of time... all important.'

General Wilson was then able to commence his 'masterful, well-planned exposition'. Seven British divisions (six infantry, one cavalry) plus Army-level assets totalling some 160,000 men would cross the Channel and marshal at Maubeuge, where they would be available to assist the French forces defending against the main German thrust, which Wilson said would happen in 'the 90-mile gap between Verdun and Maubeuge.' Limitations of the local road network meant the Germans could employ at most forty divisions against a French defensive force of thirty-seven to thirty-nine. In these circumstances, General Wilson said it 'was quite likely that our six divisions might prove to be the deciding factor.' Doubts over whether Germany would violate Belgian neutrality only south of the Liege fortress were dismissed by Wilson when they were raised by Churchill and, later, General [Sir John] French [present as Inspector-General of the Forces]. When the question of a French defeat along the Meuse was raised, Wilson simply said the British forces would remain alongside the French left flank. This did not satisfy [Home Secretary Winston] Churchill, who 'did not like the idea of the British Army retiring into France away from its home country.' After a discussion of potential Russian contributions to a European war, and a suggestion by Churchill that Russia could be supported by a forcing of the Dardanelles which Grey felt would be 'an insuperable difficulty', the meeting adjourned for lunch.

The Admiralty spoke their case that afternoon. The First Sea Lord began by offering three related objections:

1. The effect on public morale if the entire regular Army went abroad.
2. The effect of such a deployment on the Navy’s defence of the British Isles.
3. The consequential loss of the ability for the Navy to carry out combined operations.

On the second point, Admiral Wilson emphasized that his statements were in no way a capitulation on the unending invasion argument. It was not 'a question of invasion by 70,000 men,' he said. 'The guarantee of the Navy against any number like that was absolute, but small raids might cause serious damage unless very promptly met.' The third objection allowed Admiral Wilson to segue into the Admiralty's own plans of war against Germany.

Wilson's strategy was consistent with his proposals during the previous Moroccan Crisis. Landing operations would be undertaken to seize Heligoland 'as soon as possible after the outbreak of war' using the Royal Marines for the assault, and afterwards other islands and points on the coasts on the German Bight would be taken by Army forces covered by the fleet. Wangeroog, Schillighorn, and Büsüm are named explicitly in the Minutes, the first to prevent its use as an inconvenience for the British destroyer flotillas on observation duties or as a German signal station, the second for its potential as an advanced base, and the last because of the threat it would pose to the Kiel Canal if in British hands. No mention is made of Borkum, presumably because Heligoland was designated as an essential target, making the former's capture redundant. Admiral Wilson's estimate was that these operations would 'probably require one division, perhaps more', especially if at a later phase of the war the British felt 'obliged to try and destroy or drive out the German Fleet at Wilhelmshaven', presumably if they had not previously sortied to attack the earlier British landing forces en masse. Anticipating arguments on the vulnerability of the transports to attack or the landing forces to counterattacks from the German shore, the First Sea Lord claimed that by 'having its transports close at hand' the British amphibious assets 'would be highly mobile, and could be landed and embarked again before superior forces could assembled to destroy [them].'

Summarizing the plan's objectives, Admiral Wilson launched into a barbed attack on his Army counterpart:

'If in this way we could retain the 10 German divisions of which General Wilson had spoken on the North Sea coast, we should make a material contribution to the Allied cause by keeping these men not only from the theatre of war elsewhere, but from normal productive labour, possibly in dockyards or kindred industries. That meant that we should intensify the economic strain upon Germany.'

This excerpt should remove any doubt that Admiral Wilson was supportive of economic warfare or that he was blind to the possibility of these landings being faced by German reserve units or even the Landstrumm, instead of first-line regiments pulled back from the Western Front. After all, why would a redeployment of active duty troops pose a danger to the availability of shipyard labour?

How McKenna took all this in is not recorded, although [naval historian] Nicholas Lambert suggests he 'listened in horror', which may be true as Battenberg would later write that neither McKenna nor [Minister of War R.B.] Haldane knew of this plan before Wilson presented it. In any case, the counterattack came quickly. When Churchill observed that the taking of Wilhelmshaven would involve 'regular siege operations', the First Sea Lord 'assented', and further observed he did not anticipate any difficulty in the Heligoland operation—despite previous N.I.D. [Naval Intelligence Department] studies of such an operation suggesting otherwise—since the Admiralty 'knew what guns were there, and those we could easily fight.' The only intelligence that the First Sea Lord was concerned with involved mortar batteries on Heligoland, presumably due to the danger of plunging fire. As for the other operations 'we could not foresee how much we could do; but the nature of the enemy coast, with its numerous creeks and islands providing shelter for the enemy's torpedo craft, would make its blockade very arduous' without 'regular troops to assist [the Navy] in their operations.' Field Marshal Sir William Nicholson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, noted that Admiral Wilson's comment on keeping transports close to hand was a departure from a statement he had previously written for a book on the invasion/conscription issue. The First Sea Lord retorted that 'the difference was that we should have command of the sea.' Furthermore, the guns of the fleet could protect the landing forces. This provoked Nicholson to sum up the Army's position on the matter:

'The truth was that this class of operation possibly had some value a century ago, when land communications were indifferent, but now, when they were excellent, they were doomed to failure. Wherever we threatened to land the Germans could concentrate superior force.'

Things only got worse for the Navy after this. Churchill's comment that landing operations would tie the fleet to the coast was met by Wilson observing that those ships 'would be tied to the coast by the necessity for blockading it.' Nicholson thought siege operations against Wilhelmshaven were out of the question given the Japanese experience at Port Arthur. When Wilson said a successful fleet battle in the North Sea might open the Prussian and Pomeranian coasts to attack by the Royal Navy, Haldane scoffed it would 'not cause the Germans a moment's anxiety, for they had always ridiculed the idea of fortifying Berlin despite its comparative proximity to the sea.' Churchill, meanwhile, thought entering the Baltic would 'incur great risks' to the fleet.

Churchill would later remark to Asquith that he had lost all confidence in Wilson and '[n]o man of real power cd have answered so foolishly.' The War Minister now had his opportunity and went on the offensive, informing the Prime Minister that 'the Admirals live in a world of their own. The Fisher Method, which Wilson seems to follow, that war plans should be locked up in the brain of the First Sea Lord, is out of date and impractical. Our problems of defence are far too numerous and complex to be treated in that way.' Furthermore, 'I have after mature consideration come to the conclusion that this is... the gravest problem which confronts the Government to-day and that unless it is tackled resolutely I cannot remain in office.'

In addition, Haldane took the opportunity to embarrass the Admiralty further on August 25th. He submitted the details of the latest revision of the Army's transport requirements with a demand for immediate comment, despite knowing he was on leave. After three weeks Haldane complained to the Prime Minister about the (predictable) lack of response, and Asquith swallowed the bait whole, writing to McKenna telling the First Lord to 'Please see to this, for though there is every reason to home that we are well out of the wood, all possible contingencies ought to be studied.' There seems little doubt Haldane had by now fixed his eyes on the First Lordship. He claimed the Board of Admiralty could not be counted upon to move with the times, complaining 'the doors of the Admiralty are closed to all new ideas and new developments.'

In the end, it seems unlikely that the Admiralty could have carried the day, even if Wilson had put forward what Sir William May might have described as a significantly more au fait presentation of his schemes of campaign against the German coast. At this distance, with the horrors of the Somme and Ypres and Passchendaele defining—for better or worse—public conceptions of the Great War, and the many successful amphibious operations seen during the Second World War and subsequent conflicts, it is tempting to see Wilson's proposals as a great 'what if'. This is, however, to put too much stock in hindsight. Whatever their chances of success, they were politically naïve in the face of the Army delegates' emphasis on cooperation in an assumed Anglo-French coalition. An expeditionary force deployed to the Continent, even a body of only two corps, was a direct show of material assistance that a naval blockade could not be, no matter how many German divisions were kept pinned to the Waddenzee by British landings.

OK, so that's how the conference went down. It's important to note that at no point did the C.I.D. make a firm decision on committing the B.E.F. to the continent. In fact Asquith and his Cabinet wouldn't make a final decision until after the First World War had begun. However, the real significance of this conference is that the Admiralty presented what looked like a suicidal proposal (whether it was or not can be argued) while the Army's plan as presented had a professional polish and was expounded on expertly by General Wilson. The Navy in effect ceded their previous primacy in terms of war strategy. From this moment on the British Army had established that they would pursue a strategic policy completely separate from what the Royal Navy had planned. Anyone who says otherwise hasn't actually read the loving conference minutes at the National Archives in Kew. Which is a shame as there's only 14 or 15 pages of them to read.

There's a lot more, including how his fingering Sir Edward Grey as the villain is basically just filing the serial numbers off a similar condemnation of Winston Churchill for not negotiating peace with Hitler in late 1940, which would somehow magically have saved the empire because, essentially, Hitler would've killed off the Soviet Union and then Germany and Britain could've fended off the monster that destroyed the Empire: the United States.

So yeah, Niall Ferguson is a flatulent, pinheaded, morally bankrupt imbecile and HEGEL has a friend's sister who dated him (while he was married!) and ended up throwing his clothes [amongst other things] into the street from her his window.

Vincent Van Goatse fucked around with this message at 05:05 on Jan 31, 2014

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

a travelling HEGEL posted:

That was her sister, but yes.

Edit: And it was all of his things, from his apartment window. She found out he was married.

I want to shake that lady's hand and buy her a drink.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

Shimrra Jamaane posted:

Isn't Dan Carlin citing Neil Ferguson in his podcasts on WWI? That isn't good.

Oh great, now my eyelid is twitching spasmodically.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose
I love how everyone thinks I got shouted out of D&D when I never posted there much in the first place.

Anyway, here's some neat photos of Royal Navy aerial experimentation in 1908. That boxy thing is a manned kite. Click for big.


Vincent Van Goatse fucked around with this message at 08:09 on Feb 16, 2014

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

Raskolnikov38 posted:

I'm no naval expert but the answer is math. Once you have the shell velocity, your speed and heading, estimated path of the target, estimated target speed and distance you can throw that into some equations and get a firing solution. I'd assume gunners would have tables of numbers to consult so as to get the calculations done quickly before the invention of the fire control computer.

Actually they mostly didn't need huge tables of numbers (though such things existed) because by the time fighting ranges became that long there were mechanical computers available to the gunnery officers.

There was a huge amount of mathematics involved in training gunnery officers, however. Something on the order of the prerequisites for astronomy or physics majors in college.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

grover posted:

What was the hit % in WWI at long ranges anyhow, wasn't it something abysmally low, like well less than 1%? The hit %s I've seen that include engagements at more moderate ranges are still all in the low single-digits.

Keep this in mind and imagine how bad their shooting would've been without the fire control equipment.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

brozozo posted:

Can anyone tell me about the development of air warfare before and during World War I?

That's a pretty broad question. Is there anything specific you'd like to know?

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

Koramei posted:

Huh I have mixed feelings about this. One of them would have only been like 18/19 at the time. Should this live with them 70 years later? (maybe it should?)

They were guards at loving Auschwitz, not some twelve year olds tossed a Panzerfaust each and told to march off to the Seelow Heights. Of course it should live with them.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

PittTheElder posted:

I don't know if I buy that, at least without an explanation of the selection process for said guards. If they were just random conscripts that were getting posted to prison camp duty, then I don't see a huge difference between them and some kid at Seelow.

If that's the case they should be able to prove it.

Seriously, it's literally Auschwitz. Why would you possibly expect there to be a statue of limitations on that poo poo?

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose
I will Dreadnought all over you if you try that.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose
Tooze is exceptionally good.

cafel posted:

But really, how would the war have changed if the Americans had upgunned the Sherman with laser cannons?

General Patton would've died of ecstasy before he could command the Third Army. This would've been a huge blow to the Allies.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

Fangz posted:

If your flagship is not up in the front, how would you lead (literally) with it?

Middle of the line, communicating via signal flags.

That way whichever way your fleet deploys you'll be in the same place in the line.

gradenko_2000 posted:

That's pretty much it, yes. One of David Beatty's failings was apparently that he did not meet the Admiral (the name escapes me) of the squadron of Queen Elizabeth-class super-Dreadnoughts when he took command prior to the Battle of Jutland, and that the Admiral's lack of understanding with Beatty's preferred doctrine and manner of fighting contributed to the miscommunications during the actual battle.

The Admiral that Beatty hosed over was Hugh Evan-Thomas of the Fifth Battle Squadron. What's truly sad about the whole situation is that Beatty had been fighting for months to get the Fifth put under his authority, then he couldn't even be bothered to talk to its commander when he got his wish.

Of course the idea that if he had talked to Evan-Thomas before Jutland it might've saved many of Beatty's ships is most likely an exaggeration. The Battlecruiser Fleet's magazine safety practices were so poor that it was likely they would've been lost anyway no matter what Evan-Thomas had done.

Vincent Van Goatse fucked around with this message at 23:21 on Feb 27, 2014

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

AATREK CURES KIDS posted:

How long did ramming remain a viable tactic? War of the Worlds has a chapter where a naval ram destroys three Martian tripods, and I figure it was in popular culture, if not reality, the most powerful weapon on Earth.

Not very long, although it's often forgotten that the technology of the 1860s-70s made it appealing to more than just armchair admirals.

The best way to sink a ship is to let water in, and heavy guns of the era were cumbersome and slow to reload (the self-propelled torpedo wouldn't be a practical weapon until the late 1870s), so ramming had an elegant simplicity to it that overrode the objections.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

Zorak of Michigan posted:

People have already talked about Castles of Steel, which I enjoyed, but Andrew Gordon's The Rules of the Game digs deeper into the culture of the RN and the factors that drove the British into the weird tactical cul-de-sac they were in during WWI. Some it makes one rather less sympathetic to the personalities involved, but it also drives home that it took only a few decades to overturn centuries of tradition. A sailor from 1612 would have felt more at home in the navy of 1812 than a sailor of 1880 in the navy of 1910.

Rules of the Game is fairly unreliable about the personalities involved. The ideal that most naval officers pre-1914 bullheaded reactionaries is one of the most destructive bits of misinformation told about the prewar Royal Navy.

Basically Andrew Gordon constructed an inaccurate strawman version of the prewar RN based on the complaints of some egotistical wannabe reformers who thought they were the smartest people in the room despite never actually holding commands with anything close to the same responsibility as the people they criticized.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

The Merry Marauder posted:

3" was acceptable for the very brief period (certainly over before WWI began) where weak torpedo boats were doctrinally expected to attack separately from the rest of a force. Otherwise, unshielded, unprotected guns would be...difficult to work with the main batteries firing, not to mention hauling shells to the initially absurd (in context) positions of the 12 pounders.

The Royal Navy's anti-torpedo boat armament (secondary armament isn't really the correct term for these guns, for reasons that I can expound on ad nauseum but which would just bloat up this post) choices prior to 1914 were something of a clusterfuck to say the least.

Fisher picked the 12 pounder for the Dreadnought and the Invincibles because that was what the most modern British destroyers were using at the time. Fair enough. Problem was, destroyers were getting bigger and by 1906, when Dreadnought began her trials, the 12 pounder was rather anemic (Also the early Dreadnoughts had their anti-torpedo battery pretty poorly located, mostly on top of the main turrets. Reasonable if you're expecting to beat off an enemy flotilla operating by itself, useless in a fleet action because of what the blast from the main guns would do to the gun crews on the turret roofs). So they upgraded to the 4 incher. Again, fair enough.

Then in 1911 it's decided to upgrade again to the 6 inch gun, which for safety's sake will be put in armored casements to keep the gun crews from getting wiped out in a fleet action (in fact there's an argument that the casemates made things worse by creating a long enclosed gallery that could see all the guns knocked out by one sufficiently damaging hit like the Malaya suffered at Jutland). Problem was that the forward-most casemates ended up getting flooded out in anything other than a glassy sea and the 6 inch shell turned out to be too heavy for easy manual reloading.

After World War One things got even worse because unlike the U.S. Navy the British could never be bothered to come up with a single dual-purpose medium gun like the American 5"/38. The closest they came was the 5.25", but the mounting used for that weapon was hideously complex and hard to get working correctly. British destroyers and other ships of the 1930s and 40s ended up saddled with a bewildering variety of 4", 4.5", 4.7", 5.5", and 5.25" guns that often couldn't share mountings or ammunition with other guns of the same caliber.

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

mllaneza posted:

The Glorious' third escort was the immortal Glowworm. Detached from the carrier she was intercepted by the Admiral Hipper. Caught in gun range by a heavier ship the captain, Commander Roope, did the only thing he could. He attacked with torpedoes and then rammed the cruiser. His Victoria Cross was awarded based on testimony from the captain of the Hipper, passed on through the Red Cross. Here's a copy of his award:
http://dalyhistory.wordpress.com/2009/11/01/victoria-cross-heroes-gerard-roope-vc/



Glowworm wasn't an escort for the Glorious. She was sunk two months earlier during the opening movements of the invasion of Norway after becoming detached from a British task force based around the battlecruiser Renown. She ran into the Hipper and a bunch of other German ships as a result of the bad weather.

Also I'm quite shocked people are repeating the old and inaccurate canard that the battlecruiser's main weakness was inadequate armoring. The British ships at Jutland were lost through completely inadequate magazine safety arrangements which were completely separate issues to the thickness (or lack thereof) of the armor they carried. That's not to mention Beatty's absolutely atrocious handling of his squadrons during Jutland (although thankfully that was actually mentioned).

Vincent Van Goatse fucked around with this message at 04:24 on Mar 28, 2014

Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose

The Merry Marauder posted:

Are you referring to my comment about British BC deck armor? I assure you that that has nothing whatever to do with (the charge ignitions at) Jutland, and simply reflect that such a level of horizontal protection is largely insufficient for the different threats in an environment featuring aircraft bombs and long range plunging fire. Specifically, a long-range duel with the 11"/52 SK C/28 poses a non-trivial threat. Arguably even after the 1930s adjustments to Refit and Repair's deck armor, obviously not a factor at the time the Panzerschiffe armament was selected.

No, I wasn't.

But since you bring it up, the thinness of the deck armor was a design flaw but it was pretty common across the board and not specific to the battlecruisers. At least in the pre-WW1 days plunging fire wasn't treated with the respect it deserved, designwise.

Vincent Van Goatse fucked around with this message at 05:38 on Mar 28, 2014

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Vincent Van Goatse
Nov 8, 2006

Enjoy every sandwich.

Smellrose
The explosions that destroyed the British battlecruisers at Jutland all started after shells penetrated their turrets, which were the most heavily armored parts of the ships. The subsequent explosions of those shells sent flash down into the magazines, setting off the cordite stored within. There were doors between the magazines and the turrets themselves that were meant to be sealed between firing to prevent flash traveling down to the magazines, but these and other precautions weren't in use at Jutland because they slowed down the turrets' rate of fire too much.

The fact that the parts of the battlecruisers with the heaviest armoring were where the fatal hits happened pretty much shows how the idea that weak armor was to blame for their loss isn't terribly convincing. More deck/belt armor wouldn't have saved any of them because that armor wasn't where the fatal hits happened.

Sources are pretty much anything written about Jutland in the last few decades. I can dig up more specific ones later, though.

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