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There is a possible world where a necessary supernatural being exists. If it is possible that it is necessary for a supernatural being to exist, then it is necessary that this supernatural being exists. It is necessary that this being (God) exists.
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Dec 9, 2014 05:41
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I Am The Scum posted:There is no possible world where an impossible supernatural being exists. This isn't saying anything. Since 'impossible' means the same as 'there is no possible world', your first premise can be restated as: "There is no possible world where there is no possible world where a supernatural being exists." If this seems nonsensical, it's because it is - 'impossible' is not a predicate; it is not a trait that an object can be characterized by. Edit: It would be simpler for you to just say: "There is no possible world where a supernatural being exists". Which begs the question... Ernest Hemingway fucked around with this message at 07:53 on Dec 10, 2014 |
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Dec 10, 2014 07:33
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bitterandtwisted posted:What do you base this on? God is an entirely perfect being. Necessary existence is a trait of an entirely perfect being. Modal logic. It's pretty simple really - when describing something as necessary or possible (i.e. ascribing modal operators of N or P) - any string of Ns and/or Ps that precedes that thing is only equivalent to the last operator in the string, and vice versa. So, saying that (G) is possible implies that (G) is necessarily possible. i.e. P(G)->NP(G). Likewise, if it is possible for something to be necessary, it is necessary. i.e. PN(G)->N(G). Saying that something is possibly possible, or necessarily necessary is just a long winded way of saying something is possible, or necessary: PP(G)->P(G), NN(G)->N(G) ...and just to drive the point home: NPPPNNP(G)-> P(G). If you consider all possible worlds, and submit that God exists in at least one of these worlds PN(G), then it is implied that God must exist, since PN(G)->N(G). If God exists in any possible world, then God must exist in all possible worlds.
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Dec 10, 2014 18:18
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bitterandtwisted posted:That doesn't answer my question at all. Could you clarify as to what exactly what your question is? bitterandtwisted posted:This is a load of waffle that would also prove the existence of magical penis unicorns. Plus, why do the bolded part? The logic is actually quite sound - you can't really reject the argument on the ground of its axioms (I didn't invent modal logic). And no, this argument can't be used to prove the existence of magical penis unicorns. Necessary existence is a trait that can only be possessed by God. As for the bolded part - in order to reject it, you would have to prove that it is impossible for God to exist.... which is much more philosophically dubious than submitting, at least, to the possibility of God's existence.
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Dec 10, 2014 18:50
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CommieGIR posted:Okay, prove it outside of a metaphysical 'What if' argument. Well, if the argument holds, I fail to see how the sort of argument it is (metaphysical, or otherwise) affects the strength of its conclusion. Are you asking for an argument based on empirical evidence? I'm afraid I don't have one (no one does). And so far I'm submitting that we CAN prove God. Which means that if you don't prove me wrong by Sunday you all have to go to church.
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Dec 10, 2014 19:02
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GAINING WEIGHT... posted:The problem is that it begins by assuming the greatest thing must exist. Yes, the greatest thing would have the property of existence, but it's not necessarily true that there IS a "greatest thing". That's where the unicorns come into play: just because we can imagine it or describe it, does not mean it's there, even if the thing we imagine has the property of being there. You're thinking in terms of existence/non-existence and not in terms of necessary existence/contingent existence - your conception of the perfect cookie might include it's existence - but as Kant established, existence is not something that can be predicated onto something- i.e. regardless of what qualities A consists of, it either exists or it doesn't (You can have a real or imaginary A with qualities C,B,D - but you can't have an imaginary A that also exists ) this is why "The perfect (X) argument fails to address a more refined understanding of the ontological argument. When you imagine the perfect cookie existing, you don't imagine it necessarily existing - and you couldn't because cookies can't necessarily exist (i.e. there is at least one possible world where the cookie is not on the table). Now, when we're talking about necessary/contingent existence the picture becomes difference. There is no possible world where 1+1 does not equal 2 and no possible world with a married bachelor in it. Likewise with God.
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Dec 10, 2014 19:14
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CommieGIR posted:This is called a god of the gaps argument, and its a logical fallacy. Sorry, that doesn't cut it. I think you're mistaken here, unless I'm misunderstanding the content in the "God of the gaps" argument - to my understanding it pertains to an argument wherein a supernatural being is necessary, or suitable in order to explain gaps in scientific knowledge. My argument is an ontological one based on modal logic, it does not relate in any way to scientific knowledge so I fail to see how you've connected my argument to this fallacy. (it is also why I won't address counterpoints that bring up notions of 'sufficient evidence' - they simply don't apply to my argument) As for the bolded part - I concede that the bachelor thing is a lovely example (I was running out the door!). I was just trying to exemplify how things like a truth by definition would hold true in any possible world - which is reasonable, but arguably trivial, observation. CommieGIR posted:The perfect cookie doesn't exist till someone actually creates it. It IS imaginary till its actually materialized. Likewise with God. Once again: Nobody is claiming god doesn't exist and they have the proof, they are claiming that there is insufficient evidence to accept that he does, as most of the natural things attributed to him have natural answers instead of supernatural ones. So, in regards to the cookie: a potential thing is not an actual thing until it is actualized. I agree. But I'm specifically claiming that God is not a contingent being, but a necessary being - so your point about the cookie does not apply to my characterization of God. When people bring up "The perfect (x)" argument they're not grasping the semantics of the argument they're opposing. As a result of this, the argument gets characterized as implying that somehow conceiving of a perfect thing performatively establishes that thing's existence. This is silly. It's important to remember that it's not about 'perfection' but 'necessity' - so, since there is a possible world where you don't conceive of the perfect cake, the existence of that cake is contingent on that possible world not be the actual world (and furthermore, the cake wouldn't have come into existence until the point in time when you concieved it) - so the 'perfect cake' has contingent existence, which is fundamentally different from a thing (God) which has a necessary existence. Thus, 'The perfect (x)' argument doesn't refute the ontological argument and people should stop using it.
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Dec 10, 2014 20:48
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GAINING WEIGHT... posted:I think you have to prove that God has necessary existence. So, what you'd be claiming is that although God is an entirely perfect being, necessary existence isn't a trait that an entirely perfect being would possess?
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Dec 10, 2014 20:51
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CommieGIR posted:By using the 'God is a necessary being you are making the watchmaker argument. Far from it, actually. The watchmaker argument speaks to the notion of causality and depends on the notion of necessary causality. My argument is not about causality and when I use the word necessary, I'm using it in a different sense - i.e. it is logically contradictory to deny a necessary something. I haven't used the gaps or watchmaker arguments at all so I don't know why you are attributing them to me. GAINING WEIGHT... posted:No more than the perfect cake necessarily existing. You contend that the difference is, the cake doesn't exist as a concept until we conceive of it, but I submit that the same is true for God. We invented Him as an idea, and ascribed to Him the quality of "perfection", thus the argument came about that since he is perfect, he must exist, QED. Well, now you're characterizing God as a contingent entity as per a psychological approach (yes, we dreamnt God up and anthropomorphized him at some point), but you're not really addressing the issue of God as a necessary being so much as just asserting the opposite without argument. (To be fair I haven't provided an argument for God as a necessary being, it's just something I've stated).... if it helps, I'm trying to characterize the concept of God as a strictly logical concept which possesses 'necessary existence' as an essential property. Dzhay posted:Let me have a go: we have some property, "A". We use it to define a second property "B" as "a thing exhibits property B if it exhibits property A and necessarily exists.". Imagine the most B thing possible, by your argument it would exist, regardless of what A was, right? So we have: Property 1 = (A) = 'beingness' of an orange cube on your desk Property 2 = (B) = another, unspecified property A thing = x = an unspecified thin Is necessary = N Not = ~ and you state: (IF) Nx and x(A) ->(THEN) x(B) ~A Which means merely that isn't an orange cube on your desk, and speaks nothing to the other elements in your formulation. x(B) is still possible, and Nx is undetermined (though impossible to ever satisfy because the notion of a necessary, contingent object contradicts itself - that is, a thing cannot be true in all possible worlds, while simultaneously being true in some worlds and false in others). ...... and that's where I'm drawing the line. I'm done stirring the pot. Well, the weakness of my argument is that the premise of it 'being possible that a necessary supernatural being exists' is very problematic, and while there are plenty of ways to defend it and respond to scrutiny, none are really persuasive enough to force anyone to accept it as true. The popular 'perfect cake, etc.' argument really becomes a crutch for a lot of people once ontological arguments start getting brought up... it's not as decisive as people think it is, and the ontological argument really doesn't commit any obvious fallacies that can't be robustly responded to. While the perfect dick unicorn rebuttal is still very relevant, it applies more to older formulations derived by Anselm, Descartes, etc. - and even in that realm there are good responses. But once you make the logical/modal switch you really do have to drop the high school atheist playbook and engage it with formal logic, which most people (myself included) aren't capable of doing to any meaningful degree. For anyone interest a modern version of the ontological argument, reading about Gödel is a good start: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_ontological_proof and an example of what gets produced by the people who engage his proof: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1308.4526v4.pdf
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Dec 11, 2014 01:38
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Dzhay posted:Actually B was specified, it was "Having property A and necessarily existing". (A&N in your terminology, I guess) Oh, then it's simple - property A, unless it is a property that is an essential property of a necessary being, couldn't be attributed to a necessary being. So property A can't be just anything as "Having property A and necessarily existing" contradicts itself if property A is something that could possibly be otherwise (like an orange on your desk).
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Dec 11, 2014 02:05
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CommieGIR posted:Still missing a key part: The proof that something is necessary implies you proving this 'necessity' You're right, I haven't (and I'm not going to!). The argument, in most cases, would have to proceed from here. The non-controversial claim I am making is that if God were proven to be a necessary being, then the fundamental characteristic of that proof would be showing that it is logically contradictory to deny God's existence. CommieGIR posted:Keep trying. Oh, and you did indeed make a Watchmaker implication. Remember where I said you made a god of the gaps argument? You just did it again. I'm sorry if I'm missing something obvious but I really do need you to explain how I'm doing this. CommieGIR posted:God is not a logical concept. I think you've misunderstood me here. God, like any other concept, can be represented symbolically in logic formulations. I meant that that was how I was characterizing God in my arguments - to lead it into more of a logical analysis direction than a space-monkey-in-the-sky one.
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Dec 11, 2014 02:17
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CommieGIR posted:Congrats. You are making the logic equivalent of putting your fingers in your ears and going 'LALALALALALA I CAN'T HEAR YOU' Again, I think we've misunderstood one another. I never purported to offer logical proof of God's existence (which I think is almost surely impossible), but merely to characterize a more modern take on a very inventive and compelling argument - specifically, how S5 in modal logic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S5_%28modal_logic%29) establishes that if you can convincingly characterize God as necessary being in any possible world, you have proven God's existence. I thought it was a good topic to bring into the finding out if God exists thread. CommieGIR posted:Nope. Either you prove how he is somehow a necessary component to reality, or you stop trying to make claims you can't back. I did. I did drop the necessity claim, because I agree that it's not evidently true or something that is easy (or even possible) to prove. Which is why I'm content to remain an atheist. And I was not necessarily trolling - pushing the envelope on the ontological argument (even if it is in a fair, philosophically accurate way) does seem to piss some people off though. [/quote] CommieGIR posted:You make claims to imply god is a necessity to everyday reality and materialistic objects. I did no such thing! Something necessarily existing doesn't imply that it's responsible for everything (or anything) else.
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Dec 11, 2014 02:54
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CommieGIR posted:No, it doesn't. How so? Have I mischaracterized S5? (This is a very real possibility since I'm by no means an expert in modal logic.) ...or do you reject S5 altogether?
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Dec 11, 2014 03:03
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CommieGIR posted:No, you utilized S5 correctly, but as someone pointed out earlier, you could use this logic to apply to....anything imaginary. Unicorns. Perfect Girlfriends. Anything. I've already spoken to this. The 'that which no greater can be conceived' issue speaks to older formulations (specifically, Anselm's), and while it is by no means a trivial response, it is a basic and obvious one that has been well addressed and which loses relevance once you get into more modern formulations such as the modal approach that I've done my best to describe in this thread. It's why you're more likely to encounter 'the perfect island' response to Anselm in high school or introductory undergraduate courses than in actual philosophy discourse. When it comes to the ontological argument, the conversation really has moved past that point.
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Dec 11, 2014 03:23
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ShadowCatboy posted:Immanuel Kant demonstrated quite handily that existence is a property of concepts, not a property of objects, so this statement is utter bullshit. To be fair, in issuing this statement I was only stating the assumption behind my previous claim that "There is a possible world where a necessary supernatural being exists." (which is arguably also bullshit). And you're exactly right about Kant, who has been the schoolyard bully of the ontological argument for centuries. That said, his argument in The Critique isn't quite the death knell it is often made out to be. While it certainly made people shut up out the ontological argument for awhile, more recent attempts to revive the argument that operate via modal considerations are intriguing and can't be dismissed off-hand. Ultimately, Kant's objection may hold - but it is still important to be able to demonstrate how it holds in the face of more sophisticated formulations of the ontological argument. Modal logic appears to offer, at the very least, some wiggle room for would-be rationalizing theists. e.g. Plantinga's response is well known: http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/02-03/01w/readings/plantinga.html
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Dec 11, 2014 06:28
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Jack Gladney posted:Have you considered the possibility that the existence or nonexistence of gods makes absolutely no difference to your lived experience, as you suffer alone and without purpose in an indifferent universe just as you would if there were no gods? I think that's a little too meta for this thread. But yes, I am a fan of Woody Allen if that's what you're asking.
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Dec 11, 2014 15:57
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Piell posted:There is a possible world where a necessary supernatural being exists. If the aim of the ontological argument is to 'define things into existence', or predicate existence onto a contingent subject, then it surely fails... and so much has been established through Gaunilo and Kant. The response has to be that it aims to do something else - and in the modal case it is trying to establish the possibility of a necessary being. And this being is usually characterized as something like a being "of maximum greatness", which includes an argument for why only this being could be considered a necessary being. To avoid the risk of sounding like a lunatic again, I won't elaborate, and will leave it to you to figure out why this approach wouldn't apply to Dracula or anything else that would be substituted into the 'lost island' rebuttal. GAINING WEIGHT... posted:They kind of can. I have to already accept the existence of this so-described God to prove the existence of Him. It's almost nonsensical: "accepting that of course God exists, we can now use that to prove that God exists. QED." I hate to nitpick, but the argument doesn't depend on the initial assumption of God existing - it depends entirely on establishing that it is possible for God to exist. It is by no means successful in doing this. But it is important to account for this turn if one wishes to respond to it effectively - (i.e. not with the drat island argument). Blurred posted:I'm not sure how the positive attributes -> God -> necessary existence train of logic can ever really be sustained, even according to the hermetic logic of theology. Why should we necessarily accept that existence is an intractably "positive" (or "perfect") quality of a being such as God, when many theological traditions would claim the opposite? We needn't even run as far as Buddhism for an exploration of the idea that the most perfect, insuperable element of the universe might be nothingness. How would those proffering such ontological proofs deal with the traditions of negative or apophatic theology in both Christianity and, more prominently, in Islam? Yeah, I've never really understood how anyone purports to import value statements into what is essentially supposed to be an analytical argument....however once you established the logical 'proof' of God's existence, you could resort back to usual theological channels to account for the 'apparent' negative qualities one might associate with God in any given religious tradition. The argument seeks to prove God's existence, not explain God's behaviour. I think for it the argument to work in the way that theists want it to, you really have to begin with accepting the assumption that there is a moral order to the universe - otherwise you'll never accept the characterization of 'perfection' that religious philosophers start to work with. To be fair to Plantenga, he understands this point and withdraws the 'proof' for a weaker conclusion: Alvin Plantenga posted:But obviously this isn't a proof; no one who didn't already accept the conclusion, would accept the first premise. The ontological argument we've been examining isn't just like this one, of course, but it must be conceded that not everyone who understands and reflects on its central premise -- that the existence of a maximally great being is possible -- will accept it. Still, it is evident, I think, that there is nothing contrary to reason or irrational in accepting this premise. What I claim for this argument, therefore, is that it establishes, not the truth of theism, but its rational acceptability. And hence it accomplishes at least one of the aims of the tradition of natural theology.
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Dec 12, 2014 20:15
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Ytlaya posted:To start with, I feel kind of bad for you because a lot of people were completely misunderstanding your argument. It was pretty clear from early on that 1. you were using "necessary" in a different way than many of the posters replying to you were and 2. that you never claimed that God was, in fact necessary (and that your logic was contigent upon that). In posting in a God thread on the internet I had to be prepared for some unclear semantics... and while for brevity's sake I didn't qualify each statement (i.e. God 'qua necessary being') every step of the way, my phrasing was a little sloppy and muddled at times. And you're right, I don't see why the logic would exclude the possibility of more than one necessary being - but the monotheist would probably respond with something like "A unified perfection is greater than a shared perfection". Ytlaya posted:That is is a completely valid point. The concept of something necessarily existing doesn't really make any sense. Agreed. And while the linked example doesn't speak explicitly to S5 (which I believe is the trick that makes this argument a little more fun), it does employ modal qualifiers to hide the argument's critical assumption. With: PN(G)->N(G) PN(G) ———— N(G) PN(G) cannot really be assumed and it's up to the person presenting the argument to convince us otherwise before we accept N(G). However, including PN(G)->N(G) as the first premise is, I think, a delightfully clever move. EDIT: Grammar Ernest Hemingway fucked around with this message at 22:13 on Dec 12, 2014 |
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Dec 12, 2014 22:08
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Kaal posted:Point 1. If God exists then magic exists. Definitions for 'God', 'magic, and 'the laws of reality' are needed in order to give this fair treatment, but I think I have a few challenges without them: -Point 1 doesn't hold if God is a being that is not 'all powerful', in a reality-breaking sense. i.e., a being that has extraordinary qualities or abilities, but still exists and functions according to 'the rules of reality' - It is impossible, even for an all powerful God, to break 'the rules of reality'. e.g. No being, however powerful, could create a world where a thing exists and simultaneously doesn't exist. -Magic, even if it granted the wielder unimaginable and absurd causal powers (e.g. snapping one's fingers and creating a galaxy), would not contradict or break the rules of reality. It would break (or merely complicate) the 'rules' of science - but science deals with causality and causality is not a law of reality. A magical God then, would simply be an additional causal agent in the universe, albeit an unpredictable one. She could be as active as she wanted, but you could rest assured that 1 and 1 would still equal 2, all bachelors would remain unmarried, and any other formal proof would still hold.
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Dec 16, 2014 21:11
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Kaal posted:Then such a god is not omnipotent by definition, and therefore not the Abrahamic god. Tangentially, we create worlds where things exist and yet simultaneously don't all the time. We call them video games. Please define 'omnipotent'. In the meantime I will claim that broadly speaking, we can say an omnipotent being is "a being that can do anything". I don't find it overly controversial to interpret the phrase to mean "A being that can do anything that can be done", however it is unintelligible to interpret it as meaning "A being that can do anything including those things that can't be done" e.g. Could God trisect an arbitrary angle with a straight edge and a compass? No, because it is impossible to do so, and it is nonsensical to state otherwise. This doesn't serve as a limit on her omnipotence, it only establishes that power functions in the realm of logical possibility. And no, we do not violate the law of non-contradiction in video games. You are interpreting the concept wrong. Kaal posted:Science deals with the laws of reality. No, science deals with the laws of nature. As applied here, 'law' is a misnomer, as natural laws are more accurately described as 'empirically justified generalizations'. Kaal posted:Causality is a fundamental law of our reality. I can assure you that this is wrong. At the risk of sounding patronizing, I have to point out that basic, widely accepted tenants of Hume's Enquiry establish that this is so, and that this is something that all philosophy students become familiar with very early on in their learning. Kaal posted:I think that you again are falling into a trap of your own devising. You are presupposing a deity of your own creation, and your own limitations. A magical deity, whether they are the Abrahamic God or not, would certainly be capable of bringing into question fundamental proofs like 1 + 1 = 2, or that all bachelors are unmarried. In the Bible, Jesus uses five loaves of bread and two fish to feed a multitude - this is a clear violation of mathematical certitude. Also in the Bible, the virgin Mary gives birth to a child, which is a clear violation of a definitional quality. Indeed it is clear that no proof can truly be safe when magic can effect fundamental changes at any time. No. While a magical being would be capable of performing deeds we would consider scientifically impossible, her actions would still be confined to the realm of logical possibility (as I've established above) - this means that she could not destabilize proofs. Furthermore, the examples you've provided do not violate the laws that you allege they do, i.e. Christ's never ending bread basket makes no scientific sense, but is still perfectly logical. Him having one loaf in one moment, then two in the next moment, then five in the next, etc. is fundamentally different from proving that 1+1=5. Proofs are always safe, that 's why they're proofs. Scientific laws are never safe, and that's why they're not actually laws. These statements obtain in a world with or without God. Ernest Hemingway fucked around with this message at 18:47 on Dec 17, 2014 |
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Dec 17, 2014 18:40
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double post
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Dec 17, 2014 18:45
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CommieGIR posted:Woah woah woah, what? My use of the word 'law' there is a little careless, so I will clarify: I'm using 'law' in the sense of 'an unbreakable rule'. VitalSigns posted:If Big Brother or some random Cardassian secret service douche can make 2+2 equal 5, I'm pretty sure that's no big deal for the omnipotent creator of existence itself. I'd prefer if you didn't think I was stupid. We all know that Cardassian did no such thing.
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Dec 17, 2014 19:23
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OwlFancier posted:So God is a black hole then. Yes, with Matthew McConaughey in the middle. Jack Gladney posted:Yeah he did. Captain Picard ends the episode by saying that right before he got taken away, David Warner made him believe he saw five lights. But he was still prepared for the guards to take him away for a lifetime of torture without stating so. I think this is evidence enough to show that he still rationally doubted the fact.
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Dec 17, 2014 19:38
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VitalSigns posted:No he wasn't, he admitted he was about to say it like two seconds before he was ordered to be released. ...b-but he was warned that once the guards got there it would be too late.... and he let the guards walk right up to him without saying anything! What kind of strategy is that?! I mean, I can't really say that you're wrong or anything.... but Picard is just DENSE.
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Dec 17, 2014 19:57
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OwlFancier posted:Yes, but he would Redeem it by the grace of being played by John de Lancie. I think this happens in the first episode.
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Dec 17, 2014 20:04
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Kaal posted:That's all great, but the non-magical, non-omnipotent, logic-abiding, being that you are talking about is not a god. And she certainly is not the Abrahamic God. But the God I'm describing is magical and omnipotent... and yes, logic-abiding, which I've argued is necessarily the case - and this follows for the Kaal posted:I think that your biblical knowledge might be failing you there. In the miracle of the five loaves and fish, Jesus lands his boat at Bethsaida and sees that a crowd of 5,000 men, as well as women and children, have gathered to wait for him. He has only five loaves of bread and two fish, but he looks up to heaven and then breaks apart the loaves and hands the pieces out into the crowd, and when all is said and done everyone is full and there's food leftover. One should remember that the story was created before multiplication, which is why the story is written in such an illogical manner, but it's clearly a case of 5 + 2 = 5,000+. The numbers themselves are irrelevant to the argument I've made.
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Dec 17, 2014 21:36
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VitalSigns posted:It's established canon that Picard is bad at strategy. Like when they get stuck in that time loop where the Enterprise gets destroyed over and over again, and Worf states the obvious and is just like "Why don't we just stop and turn around?", and Riker is like "But turning around could be what gets us destroyed." and Picard is like "Yep, no second guessing, let's stay on course" and they fly right back to the destruction scenario. ....there are so many ways Picard could've have thought through that and realized that Worf was right (which he was). e.g. He should have known that the first time through the loop he wouldn't have listened to Worf because he never listens to Worf. and should probably give it a try.
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Dec 17, 2014 21:48
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TheSpookyDanger posted:Ernest Hemingway , when people talk about how D&D is full of pedantic idiots that ruin everything they mean you. That's very well put. You've hurt my feelings.
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Dec 19, 2014 05:25
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