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Party Plane Jones posted:
When Hugo Chavez died of cancer on March 5, 2013, he had been President of Venezuela for just over fourteen years. At the time of his death, his Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) was firmly entrenched in every branch of government and virtually all institutions, from media to the supreme court. Chavez oversaw what has arguably been the deepest and most radical transformation of Venezuelan politics and society in its history. Shortly before dying, Chavez named Nicolas Maduro Moros as his successor. Before serving as vice-president at the time of Chavez's death, Maduro had been the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the President of the National Assembly. After Chavez died, Maduro faced off against opposition candidate Henrique Capriles in the April 2013 presidential election. Maduro won with 50.6% of the vote versus Capriles' 49.1%. Maduro's Venezuela After a relatively uneventful first few months in power, Maduro faced his biggest challenge starting in the early months of 2014. Beginning around February 5, students from the Universidad Experimental del Tachira began to protest campus insecurity; on February 8, student protests took place in Merida and Caracas. By February 12, the protests had spread beyond the plight of students and had grown to include large sectors of Venezuelan society. The government maintains that the protests were organized by Venezuela's foreign and domestic enemies: the opposition, the old elite, the United States, Spain, paramilitaries, and former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe have all been blamed at one point or another for organizing and/or financing the protests. Critics claim that the protests were a genuine outburst of widespread discontent with a what was perceived to be a rapid deterioration of the situation in the country. The following statistics provide a picture of the situation facing Venezuelans at the time the protests began:
The 2014 protests were also notable for the widespread human rights violations documented by local and foreign observers. These abuses are embodied in several notable cases (i.e, murder of Geraldine Moreno and the assault on Marvinia Jimenez), and were well-documented by human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (see links below). By the time the protests ended in late July 2014, approximately 40 people had been killed, and a number of Venezuelan opposition figures had been arrested, namely Leopoldo Lopez, Daniel Ceballos and Enzo Scarano. Venezuela Today While the national protests have subsided, the situation in the country has deteriorated since this time last year. Crime continues to claim hundreds of lives per month in Caracas alone, while shortages force Venezuelans to line up for hours in the hopes of finding the most basic necessities. The Banco Central de Venezuela has ignored its own mandate of publishing inflation data every three months, and has now gone seven months without providing inflation numbers. Most estimates I have seen put the country's annualized inflation rate in 2015 at 120-140%. The government has also moved to ban several opposition politicians from holding office ahead of December 6 parliamentary elections. Notable figures affected by these disqualification measures are Maria Corina Machado, Enzo Scarano, Daniel Ceballos, and Pablo Perez. The upcoming parliamentary elections are shaping up to be a monumental event in Venezuelan history. The current session of the National Assembly has been sitting since 2010. The chamber is currently controlled by the PSUV. The next presidential election is not scheduled until 2018, making December 6 an extremely important date in Venezuela. Key Players Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV):  Nicolas Maduro: President of the Republic. Number of Television Shows: 1; En Contacto con Maduro.  Diosdado Cabello: Vice-President of the PSUV and President of the National Assembly. Venezuela's second most powerful man. Number of Television Shows: 1; Con El Mazo Dando.  Jorge Arreaza: Vice-President. Number of Television Shows: 0.  Jorge Rodriguez: Mayor of the Libertador municipality in Caracas and head of the PSUV campaign. Number of Television Shows: 0; however, he is often seen on television fulfilling his latter role.  Luisa Ortega Diaz: Attorney General. Number of Television Shows: 0, but makes up for it by having two radio shows (En Sintonia con el Ministerio Publico and Justicia y Valores).  Tareck El Aissami: Governor of Aragua state. Number of Television Shows: 0, but makes up for it by being a striker for Aragua FC.  Tarek William Saab: People's Defender. Number of Television Shows: 0.  Cilia Flores: First Lady. Number of Television Shows: 1; Con Cilia en Familia. Mesa de la Unidad Democratica (MUD):  Jesus "Chuo" Torrealba: Head of the Mesa de la Unidad Democratica, the largest opposition party bloc and de facto official opposition. Status: At large.  Leopoldo Lopez: Head of the Voluntad Popular party. Status: Imprisoned since February 18, 2014.  Henrique Capriles: Governor of Miranda state. Faced off against Maduro in the 2013 presidential election. Status: At large.  Antonio Ledezma: Mayor of Caracas and head of the Alianza Bravo Pueblo party. Status: Imprisoned since February 19, 2015.  Maria Corina Machado: Head of the Vente Venezuela party. Status: At Large; removed from her National Assembly seat last year, banned from holding officer for one year. Further Reading: Amnesty International: "Venezuela: Human Rights At Risk Amid Protest" Summary of the 2014 protests with a focus on the human rights abuses allegedly committed by security forces during anti-protest operations. "Amnesty International Report 2014/2015" Summary of the situation in the county with a focus on alleged human rights violations. Contains lots of links to related readings. Human Rights Watch: "World Report 2014: Venezuela". Summary of the human rights conditions in the country in the years prior to the 2014 unrest, with a focus on freedom of the press and judicial independence. "Punished for Protesting: Rights Violations in Venezuela's Streets, Detention Centers, and Justice System". Excellent overview of the alleged human rights violations that took place in the country regarding the 2014 protests. Contains lengthy testimony from individuals who claim to have been abused in different ways by security forces. General Online Reading English: Venezuelanalysis: Team of writers covering a range of topics involving Venezuela. Leans towards chavismo. Caracas Chronicles: Written by a team of bloggers who write opinion pieces on a range of Venezuela-related topics. Leans towards the opposition. Spanish: El Nacional: Leading national newspaper. Leans towards the opposition. El Universal: Leading national newspaper. Bought last year by mysterious Spanish conglomerate some people suspected of being tied to the government. La Patilla: News website. Leans towards opposition. Dolartoday.com: I don't like this website because the stories tend to be extremely sensationalized, but dolartoday.com is the site to watch for currency exchange rates. Ultimas Noticias: News website. Leans towards chavismo. Aporrea.com: News website. Leans towards chavismo. Book Readin' List: Comandante Hugo Chavez by Rory Carroll: Carroll is a journalist for The Guardian who spent time covering Venezuela. His book provides a portrait of Hugo Chavez. Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chavez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela by Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold (Eds.): This book is a great introduction to the Chavez years. Corrales and Penfold make sense of Chavez's policies mostly from an economic perspective. We Created Chávez: A People's History of the Venezuelan Revolution by George Ciccariello-Maher: Ciccariello-Maher looks at the way Chavez revolutionized Venezuelan society through interviews with his base - the urban poor, government officials, and leftists from all walks of life. Venezuela Before Chávez: Anatomy of an Economic Collapse edited by Ricardo Hausmann and Francisco R. Rodriguez: This book is a collection of essays by a number of academics that attempt to answer the question, "What factors led to the steady collapse of the Venezuelan economy starting in the late 1970s?". The book is primarily an economic one, though it also contains sections covering social factors. Save the date! On December 6, Venezuelans will take to the polls to vote for their National Assembly. The unicameral legislature is currently controlled by the PSUV. Polls: Firm: Hercon Consultores (link to survey) Survey date: September 5 to September 20 Notable results: On the general situation in the country and its causes:
On voting intentions:
Firm: Instituto Venezolano de Analisis deDatos (link to survey) Survey date: November 10 to November 20 Notable results: When asked "Who do you want to vote for on the December 6 parliamentary election?", respondents answered:
Firm: Hercon Consultores (link to survey) Survey date: November 10 to November 25 Notable results: When asked, "Who do you think will win the December 6 parliamentary elections?", respondents answered:
When asked, "If the parliamentary elections were this Sunday, who would you vote for?", respondents answered:
When asked, "Who is responsible for the increasing scarcity, shortages, insecurity, high cost of living, inflation, economic war, and unemployment?", respondents answered:
Thanks to Labradoodle for helping me put this together! Somebody fucked around with this message at 07:47 on Jan 28, 2019 |
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Aug 25, 2015 19:50
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in an effort to get us out of the weeds any post not specifically about Venezuela is going to get probated. you can, for example:
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A Brief History of Venezuela (2016) I've compiled the information below based on my own recollection of these events and from my own daily records of events in Venezuela which I have been maintaining since February 2014. I believe that my description of these events is accurate, and I have provided links to back up my claims as much as possible. The 2015 National Assembly Elections One December 6, 2015, Maduro's PSUV suffered the worst electoral defeat in its history in that day's parliamentary elections. The National Assembly, which had been majority-controlled by chavismo since 1998, flipped to the opposition. 112 of the legislature's 167 seats went to the Mesa de la Unidad Democratica (MUD), with the opposition winning 56% of the vote to the PSUV's 40%. The polls and the pundits had called it: the Venezuelan people, outraged by the economic and social collapse that they had experienced under Maduro, punished the ruling party at the polls. Democracy Is Great Until You Lose: The Regime Reacts Losing the National Assembly put the PSUV in a position it had never been in before. The separation of powers across multiple branches of government meant that if the opposition controlled the legislature, it could really ruin Maduro's day in more ways than one. The legislature is in charge of approving nationals budgets and international financial treaties; of approving laws and constitutional amendments; of auditing institutions and, when needed, removing cabinet ministers from their seats. The Constitution of 1999 (which was brought in by Chavez himself) gave the National Assembly these powers so that it could act on a check against authoritarian presidents. The PSUV had lost a battle, but the war had yet to be fought. The party gave away its strategy for counteracting the opposition controlling the National Assembly even before the new legislature was sworn in. On December 23, 2015, in what would become the latest parliamentary session held by the PSUV-controlled National Assembly, the party appointed 13 new magistrates (and 20 substitute magistrates) to the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ), Venezuela's top court. The magistrates, who would later be known as the "magistrados express", were appointed in a rush without any of the vetting process required by law. The PSUV even threatened and extorted magistrates into resigning early so that it could re-fill their seats before the opposition took control of the legislature. By the time the opposition-controlled National Assembly was sworn in on January 5, 2016, the fighters were in their corners: the opposition at the National Assembly, and the PSUV at the TSJ. As outgoing National Assembly president and PSUV vice president Diosdado Cabello said at the December 23 2015 session, [url=la confrontación es inevitable"the confrontation is inevitable"[/url]. How To Use Supreme Court to Neutralize Your Legislature The PSUV-controlled TSJ got to work on neutralizing the National Assembly before the deputies took their oath on January 5, 2016. Shortly after the election results were announced, the TSJ disqualified the results of the vote in Amazonas state, stripping the opposition of three of its deputies. 112/167 seats, which is what the opposition won on December 6, is a supermajority and gave the MUD the full arsenal of the National Assembly's powers. 109/167 seats is a simple majority, and significantly limited what the MUD could do in the legislature. The first move in the neutralization of the National Assembly had been made. As the National Assembly began to pass laws, the TSJ began to annul them. In all, the TSJ has issued 50 rulings "annulling the majority of the laws approved" by the National Assembly. The TSJ's decisions did everything from annulling entire laws to stripping away the powers given to the National Assembly by the Constitution. In late July, the National Assembly decided that it had taken enough abuse and that it would make a stand. Despite the TSJ's ruling disqualifying the results of the 2015 elections in Amazonas state, the National Assembly decided to swear-in its three deputies from that state on July 28. The MUD's reasoning for this was twofold. First, it argued that the decision to disqualify their victory was bogus, since the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) had examined the results, found that no fraud had been committed, and declared the winners on December 6. For the MUD, this meant that the TSJ's decision was clearly a move at their supermajority. Second, the MUD pointed out that since the December decision, the case had been collecting dust at the TSJ. There had been no progress whatsoever made on the case by the end of July. To the opposition, this was clear evidence that the TSJ was not interested in ever dealing with the case because that was precisely the point: let it languish forever so that the deputies can never join the legislature. In August 20 2016, the TSJ got tired of annulling individual laws as they were being published. On that day, TSJ annulled seven parliamentary sessions held in April in May of that year, erasing two months of legislative work with a single ruling. On September 5, the TSJ stepped up its game: it issued a ruling declaring the National Assembly in contempt for having sworn-in the Amazonas deputies, and declared all of its future actions to be null, void and without any effect. The September 5 ruling essentially killed the National Assembly. The MUD's parliamentary wing was thrown into disarray. On January 9, 2017, the MUD conceded defeat. It formally accepted and processed the resignation of the three Amazonas deputies, formally ending the state of contempt against the TSJ's order. The TSJ refused to accept the deputies' resignation as a condition for declaring the National Assembly to not be in contempt, however. As far as the TSJ was concerned, the National Assembly was in a state of permanent contempt, and all of its actions were mute. The TSJ's coup de grace to the National Assembly came in a pair of decision in late March of 2017. The first, issued on March 28, set limits on parliametnary immunity and appeared to pave the way for the arrest of opposition deputies in legislature, while the second was issued on March 29 and 1) declared the National Assembly to be in permament contempt, and 2) assigned to the Supreme Court of all the powers of the National Assembly until such a time as the Supreme Court decided that the legislature was no longer in contempt. Taken together, the two decisions were widely condemned for spelling the end of the legislative branch in Venezuela. Such as the outcry over the decisions that the Supreme Court took the unprecedented step of rolling back the decisions just a few days later. However, the die had been cast. In response to the decisions, the opposition called for a massive demonstration in Caracas on April 1 in rejection of the Maduro regime's brazen attack on the separation of powers. The April 1 march became the first in what turned out to be a months-long protest campaign that, as of the writing of this post, has lasted over four months and claimed the lives of at least 130 Venezuelans. Elections Are Overrated! Two Votes Cancelled Aside from the neutralization of the National Assembly by the Supreme Court, 2016 was also marked by the cancellation of two electoral processes: the recall referendum against Maduro and the regional elections. Article 72 of the Constitution states that "every elected position may be the subject of a recall", including that of the President of the Republic. While the specifics of recall election conditions are beyond the scope of this post (and it's 1:00 AM!), Venezuela was in the position to initiate a recall vote against Maduro, something that it began in earnest with the MUD spearheading the measure in March of 2016. The institutional foot-dragging that occurerd as soon as the opposition submitted the paperwork requesting that the recall proceedings begin will be the focus of future books. The CNE's list of hoops for Venezuelans to jump just to begin the process of starting the recall was impressive. Before the recall vote could take place, the CNE demanded that the opposition: 1. The opposition had one month to collect signatures from 1% of registered voters in each of the country's 24 estates and the capital district. Collecting signatures from 1% of registered voters in 24 states, but only collecting 0.999% of signatures in the capital district, for example, would have resulted an immidiate end to the refernedum proceedings. In total, the opposition needed 197,000 signatures: when it collected 1.85 million signatures and handed them over for scrutiny to the CNE weeks in advance, the CNE insisted on waiting the entire 30 days before checking them. 2. Once the CNE had verified Step 1 had been completed successfully, it ordered the opposition to collect signatures (yes, again), but this time from 20% of registered voters, and also their fingerprints. In total, the opposition needed to collect 3,914,420 signatures and their corresponding fingerprints. The CNE gave the opposition 30 days to collect 197,000 signatures in the first step, and in the second step it gave the opposition 3 days to collect 20 times as many signatures. 3. Once the CNE had verified that Step 2 had been completed successfully, it would have had to announce the date of the referendum vote, but it didn't because... ... the process was cancelled on October 21, 2016. Lower courts in Apure, Aragua, Bolivar and Carabobo state had all issued simulaneous rulings in favour of the PSUV in each state, which had alleged that the opposition had committed fraud in collecting signatures in those jurisdictions. Rather than waiting for the cases to work their way up to the Supreme Court, the CNE decided to take the lower court's decisions and cancelled the process outright (Note: As of the typing of this update in August 2017, I am not aware of any of those cases every having been resolved). According to Constitutional term limits, Venezuelans should have gone to the polls on December 2016 to elect their mayors, governors and state legislators. Instead, the CNE delayed the elections for 6 months on October 18, 2016 (Note: it ended up being more than six months). The CNE did not provide an explanation for the postponement, but observers were quick to point out that both Maduro and the PSUV continued to suffer from abhorrent polling numbers, making their defeat at the polls in December a certainty. The Constituent Assembly, or: Calvinball, But With a Country On May 1, 2017, after 30 days of consecutive protests the likes of which the country had not seen for years had claimed the lives of approximately 30 people, Maduro made an unexpected announcement at a rally in Caracas: he was convening a Constituent Assembly to draft a new Constitution and defeat the PSUV's enemies once and for all. Long-feared by opposition supporters as the nuclear option, a Constituent Assembly could give Maduro the power to rule unchallenged by decree and re-shape the State in any way the he desired. Weeks later, the CNE announced that the Constituent Assembly election to vote on the body's members would take place on July 30. The Constituent Assembly is designed by the Constitution to be a powerful entity. Found in Article 347 of the document, the Constituent Assembly has the power to "transform the State, create a new judicial order and draft a new Constitution", and its decisions cannot be objected to by any one or any institution. Regime critics were quick to point out that Maduro had already violated the law by simply decreeing that the Constituent Assembly was taking place. While Article 348 of the Constitution gives the President of the Republic the power to suggest for a Constituent Assembly, the power to actually convene one rests squarely within the people of Venezuela, given that alone hold [url="the original power" that gives life to the State. Indeed, the last time that Venezuela had a Constituent Assembly, in 1999, Chavez followed this principle by first putting the matter up for a referendum vote. Only when a majority of voters elected to host a Constituent Assembly did Chavez go ahead with the plan. Maduro's May 1 announcement shook regime critics to the core, and the anti-regime protests that had been taking place since April 1 intensified in rejection of the measure. On July 16, 2017, the opposition held a plebiscite vote in which approximately 7.5 million Venezuelans voted to, among other things, reject the Constituent Assembly. Survey after survey taken between May and July showed that an overwhelming majority of Venezuelan rejected the Constituent Assembly, with a survey released just days prior to the July 30 vote showing that 72.7% of Venezuelans did not want the Constituent Assembly to take place. Such was the level of rejection of the measure that the opposition took a position that would have been unthinkable years earlier: it was arguing in the defence of the Constitution that Chavez had written in 1999! Despite months of protests leading up to the Constitutent Assembly vote, including from inside the government itself, Venezuelans took to the polls on July 30 to vote for the Constituent Assembly members. The CNE, which is responsible for running and holding elections in the country, did away with a number of anti-fraud measures prior to the vote. Unlike in previous elections, the CNE did not use indelible ink to prevent multiple voting, and it allowed people to vote in any centre in their municipality (as opposed to voting in the centre in which they were registered to vote), which gave electors the ability to cast ballots in multiple voting centres if they so wished. July 30 came and went. Pictures and videos taken at voting centres throughout the day showed largely empty voting centres, and opposition observers estimated that only 2.4 million people, approximately 12% of registered voters, had cast ballots in the election. The country reeled in shock when, at approximately midnight, the CNE announced that 8 million votes had been cast in the day's election. The opposition immediately cried foul over the CNE's 8 million vote figure. The CNE itself, via one of its heads, admitted that it was unable to guarantee that no fraud had been committed in the Constituent Assembly election because many of the organization's internal anti-fraud regulations had been "bent" or "eliminated" in order to hold the vote as soon as possible. Just three days after the July 30 vote, the U.K. company that provided the electornic voting machines for all of Venezuela's elections going back to 2004 came out with a stunning press release in which it stated "without a single doubt" that the CNE had lied about the voter turnout, because its own internal figures based on the votes counted by the voting machines showed a discrepancy of "at least one million" votes. The CNE had been caught red-handed in a lie. As of the writing of this update (August 2, 2017), the CNE and the Maduro regime have doubled-down on the assertion that 8 million people voted for the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly is scheduled to convene on August 4, 2017. As Venezuela looks to the days, weeks and months ahead, I am reminded of a line from Edgar Allan Poe's "The Raven": "Deep into that darkness peering, long I stood there, wondering, fearing, doubting..." Chuck Boone fucked around with this message at 06:24 on Aug 3, 2017 |
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Aug 25, 2015 19:50
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Venezuela's primary financial lifeline at the moment in light of the decrease in oil prices appears to be China. Venezuela has access to something called the Fondo Conjunto Chino Venezolano, a fund financed by China that it usually officially taps into for public works spending. Just a few weeks ago, Venezuela got access to $5 billion from the fund, and something like $45 billion have been pumped into the fund over the past seven years. There is a nice summary of the fund here, but I'm afraid that it's in Spanish. Laphroaig posted:What is the over/under on Venezuela just descending into a full-on "Fascism with Chavista Characteristics" scenario as the petro state fails due to the price of oil staying at sub $40 a barrel, while being simultaneously diplomatically isolated due to the US re-establishing normal relations with Cuba? We're already at the "mass deportation of minority group" stage, so I'm afraid to think about where that puts us on the scale. Just a little while ago, Diosdado Cabello said that he was very much open to the idea of extending the state of exception to include other areas of the country: quote:If it becomes necessary to declare a state of exception along all of Venezuela’s borders, we PSUV deputies will raise both our hands in support. If it’s necessary to close borders, wherever it may be necessary, to maintain the peace and security of our people, we will raise both our hands in support. We formally propose [to President Maduro] that this measure of closing borders and declaring states of exception be added to other territories to liberate them for the good of our people.
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Aug 25, 2015 22:41
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PerpetualSelf posted:The closure of the border is extended to Zulia. The suspensions of the Constitution is being spread there as well. If Deportation of Colombians follows it will make the issue in Cucuta look like childsplay. There are only two things on the border of Colombia and Zulia. Mountains and hundreds of miles of deserts. People will die I've been hearing whispers about this all day but I can't find any official word on it. Aside from Diosdado Cabello's strongly-worded suggestion to extend the state of exception from earlier today, and a statement from the governor of Zulia state saying that he would support any decision from Maduro to close the borders there. Like I said in the old thread, the MUD has been up in arms over this because they're certain that Maduro will extend the state of exception to more areas of the country, suspend civil liberties there and either disrupt or call of the December 6 parliamentary elections. It's not out of the realm of possibility. Maduro made a couple of really erratic statements, even for Maduro. He was speaking on his television show En Contacto Con Maduro and said that Bogota was "nervous" about tonight's episode, presumably because of what he was going to say. Then he said: quote:The exodus we have from Colombia to Venezuela is the biggest humanitarian exodus in existence in the world today. The people of Colombia are fleeing war, paramilitaries and misery. They've come by the millions. We have 5.6 million Colombians here. Venezuela has a population of 31 million, of which a full 18% are Colombian immigrants, according to Maduro. Maduro also said: quote:And President Santos has the nerve to ask us to respect Colombians? Who disrespects Colombians? The people who expel them from their country, the ones who don't give them homes, work, education, or us Venezuelans who have 5.6 million here, and they study, work, love and live here among us? Who disrespects the humble people of Colombia, President Santos? Tell me. We respect each other - I'm telling you this with all due respect.
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Aug 26, 2015 04:05
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PerpetualSelf posted:Would protests and unrest like the ones we saw last year stop the deportations? I think that the kind of unrest that we saw last year would only help to seriously disrupt the electoral process and quite possibly cancel the elections altogether. Maduro took a relatively minor criminal event and turned it into an attack on the sovereignty and existence of Venezuela, and has suspended constitutional rights and uprooted over 1,000 people because of it. It's difficult to imagine what he'd do if we saw guarimbas in Chacao again. The PSUV has such an air-tight grip on the country's institutions that there is absolutely no safeguard against Maduro's whim. We might even get there without unrest. I don't have the link handy with me, but Capriles said the other day that he believes people are tired of marches. He pointed out that the MUD called for a demonstration of some kind against the scarcity and everything else wrong with the country a few weeks ago, and not many people showed up. I think he's right on the money with that observation: people have seen that the marches accomplish virtually nothing tangible and are banking on the elections to achieve change. Most polls I've seen put intended voter turnout on December 6 at the +80% mark. Speaking of China, the People's Bank of China injected $23.4 million into the Venezuelan economy yesterday, and $21.8 million today. They're short term, if that means anything to anyone that knows about economics. MothraAttack posted:How good is 'We Created Chavez.' I know the writer is a bit of a polemicist -- right now he's defending the Colombian deportations on Twitter -- but I'm curious how his book holds up. I actually haven't read the book. I think Labradoodle has, though.
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Aug 26, 2015 12:40
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This article from La Patilla has some pictures of people fleeing across a river into Colombia carrying whatever meager possessions they had time to pick up. You're free to believe that the entire nation's import, production and distribution systems are being sabotaged into failure by Colombian paramilitaries. But to suggest that the solution to that problem is to create a humanitarian crisis through mass deportations is asinine. Ask yourself: aren't the National Guard and the Venezuelan army already charged with conduction operations in those regions to prevent the movement of undocumented people across the border? If the National Guard and the army are failing at this job, why not take a less dramatic approach to the problem? Why not allocate more resources (personnel, etc.) to the region? Why not take a more intelligence-based approach? Why is the solution to the problem to suspend constitutional rights in six municipalities and cause so much misery for so many innocent people? If Venezuela is the refuge for Colombians that Maduro says it is, how could he possibly turn around and do this to the very people he claims to be helping? Who supports/doesn't support this mess doesn't matter at all. What matters is, is this the right thing to do given the circumstances? If not, then why is it being done at all? EDIT: 90 police officers have been killed in the Greater Caracas Area so far this year, two of them in the past 24 hours. Where's the state of exception for Caracas? Why isn't Maduro doing in Caracas what he's doing in Tachira to put an end to the paramilitary, parasitic bourgeois mafias that are killing police in Caracas? Chuck Boone fucked around with this message at 14:52 on Aug 26, 2015 |
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Aug 26, 2015 14:40
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M. Discordia posted:I think it's more than that (though this is certainly part of it) and would like Chuck Boone to comment on the following aspects of what seems to be the situation: I think that the crime-government nexus is a really interesting topic and I'll say a couple of things about it. First, I think it's really important to make one point clear right away. I think that as Labradoole pointed out, "crime doesn't care about politics". In other words, I don't believe that Diosdado Cabello is sitting in a big room full of television screens personally directing the activities of gangs around the country. However, I do think that the government does turn a blind eye whenever it finds criminal violence advantageous to its interests. There is plenty of very solid evidence found in the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports I linked in the OP, for example, of armed groups acting violently against protesters during the demonstrations last year, sometimes within sight of authorities who were obviously willing to let the violence take place unhindered. Amnesty International called these groups "pro-government armed groups", but they're known locally as "colectivos armados" or "tupamaros". Again, I'm not sure that the government is directly controlling these groups, but I do believe that they are allowed to operate as long as they're serving some kind of government interest. It might be that one of those interests is, as you say, keeping people afraid, but that's speculation. Another excellent example of the government turning a blind eye to criminal groups is the existence of the "zonas de paz". These are areas that are explicitly marked as no-go zones for police authorities. The theory behind the zones is that by avoiding violent confrontation between police forces and gangs, and allowing individual communities to in effect police themselves, people might willingly turn away from crime. The government has - at least on paper - offered scholarships and certificates for things to people who turn in weapons inside a zona de paz. In practice, what has happened is that the zones have largely become safe-havens for criminals and criminal groups who know that they can operate more or less with impunity in these areas. Ocumare del Tuy and the Cota 905 are famous zonas de paz. It is impossible for the government to not be aware that crime occurs in these areas, and yet they continue to exist. Second, the case of Jose Odreman. Odreman was the head of the Frente 5 de Marzo colectivo. On October 7 of last year, a raid on a colectivo building in Quinta Crespo, Caracas saw Odreman killed by the police along with three other colectivo members. Tensions between the government and the colectivos were high in the aftermath of the raid, because it appeared as if the sanctity of the crime-government nexus had been violated in a novel way. Maduro ended up calling for an investigation into the raid, and three weeks later unexpectedly removed Miguel Rodriguez Torres from his post as Minister of the Interior, Justice and Peace (the Ministry responsible for the police). I don't have the source with me right now, but I know that several members of the police agency in charge of the raid (I believe it was the CICPC) were also removed from their posts after the raid. The moves appeared to be the government's way of making amends for the raid. In conclusion, I think that the government is certainly interested in the right kinds of violence happening, and it is hesitant to act out against groups that have traditionally supported them in the past, as is the case with the colectivos armados and their community organization branches. hypnorotic posted:If oil stays at a low price for 2-3 years is it generally assumed the government will collapse? Other oil reliant nations (Russia/Saudis/GCC) either have significant reserves or other economic sectors which are somewhat viable, but Venezuela has neither afaik. It's hard to say. It is true that the situation in the country has deteriorated dramatically over the pat year as oil prices have plummeted. I often ask myself, "When will the country finally collapse?", but I'm afraid to say that maybe it's been "collapsed" for a while now. Vlex posted:When I return to London I will try to make an effortpost about my experiences in the sticks of Venezuela - news and discussion tends to get rather Caracas-centric (Táchira notwithstanding) Awesome! Looking forward to it. Thanks!
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Aug 27, 2015 00:18
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One aspect of the border issue that hasn't been pointed out (perhaps because it's so obvious) is that Venezuelan authorities themselves are involved in the smuggling taking place there. Deporting those people is a drop in the bucket compared to the much bigger problem that is Venezuelan army and National Guard authorities actively involved in/allowing the smuggling to take place. The tonnes, truckloads of product making it across the border aren't invisible. In March, the Associated Press was in San Antonio del Tachira and talked to the head of a smuggling operation. The man's alias is "Carteludo", and he told AP that "moving a truck of milk makes more money than cocaine". While four liters of gas cost less than a cent in Venezuela, they go for (or at least went for, in March) three dollars in Colombia. AP also pointed out that there is a "gigantic network of corruption", the existence of which makes the smuggling possible. The article says that the National Guard, the National Bolivarian Police, the SEBIN and the Venezuelan army have all been implicated in accepting bribes at checkpoints when these trucks pass by. The article says that a smuggling operation looks like this: a shell company operates out of Caracas, Maracay or Valencia, for example. The company acquires the transit papers necessary to move the trucks across the country to the border. Once the trucks are loaded, they move (to Tachira, for example), along with a lead vehicle called "la mosca" ["the fly", or "the lookout"]. La mosca's job is to bribe authorities at every checkpoint they drive through, which can total 20 different locations between Caracas and Tachira. The bribes paid for a 650 km journey could total Bs. 80,000 in March, which was about $300 at the time. AP says that "Carteludo" showed them a text message in which a truck delivery had been arranged, and that all the "peajes" [tolls] ""estan cuadrados" ["have been arranged"]. The article says that the most dangerous part of the trip is the border crossing at San Antonio into Cucuta, where the smugglers often choose to cross the border with the help of paramilitaries, who operate exclusively along the border. In other words, saying that the scarcity crisis is Colombia's fault, the paramilitary's fault, (or even worse) the fault of the +1,000 Colombians deported completely ignores the rotten elephant in the room: the Venezuelan authorities that actively/passively let the product reach the border and pass in the first place. Declaring states of exception and cracking down on the poorest of the poor is the wrong way to go about fixing this issue. And if all the paramilitaries get locked up tomorrow, what do you think will happen to that "gigantic network of corruption"? Hugoon Chavez posted:Alright I'm going to pop back into yet another Venezuela thread and try to not get frustrated when other goons try to convince me Chavez was a pretty good guy. Welcome, camarada! I think you'll be surprised by how attitudes have changed since Maduro came along.
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Aug 27, 2015 13:00
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Mercury_Storm posted:Why is smuggling products from Columbia so profitable? Are basic items like shampoo really that hard to find, or overpriced? The products are being smuggled to Colombia from Venezuela because they can be purchased really cheaply in Venezuela and sold for a higher price in Colombia. (Another edit: While I'm sure that products are being smuggled into Venezuela because of the scarcity crisis there, the official reason why the border crossings in Tachira were closed was to stop the flow of goods out of Venezuela). Venezuela has strict price controls for basic necessities. There's a list somewhere of what a "basic necessity" is, but it's essentially things like corn flour (the staple of Venezuelan cuisine), toothpaste, toilet paper, sanitary napkins, shampoo, etc. Basic necessities. What the price controls mean is that if I run a supermarket, I must sell the basic necessities at the price mandated by the government. These prices are extremely low. So low, in fact, that some industries complain that they're being forced to operate at a loss because they can't make up for the cost of production through sales. If I live in Venezuela, I can buy a one kilogram of rice for Bs. 8.6. To give you a point of reference for how much Bs. 8.6 is, you can buy a hot dog from a street vendor in Caracas for about Bs. 90. So, I've got my one kilogram of basically-free rice. If I can get it over the border into Colombia, I can sell it at market prices there, which are a hell of a lot more than what I paid for it in Venezuela. Now, imagine that you have access not to one or two kilograms of rice, but tonnes of it. And it's not just rice: it's all basic necessities. Hence why that smuggler in the AP piece pointed out that you can make more money selling milk in Colombia than cocaine. computer parts posted:It really is scarcity. The usual go-to in the previous thread was that you had a certain ration on toilet paper you could buy. Some of the measures taken to help reduce scarcity include establishing limits for how much of a certain product you're allowed to buy at a time. So, as you say, you might not be allowed to buy more than X packs of toilet paper (or whatever other necessity is scarce). Another measure is that you're only allowed to buy scarce necessities on certain days of the week, depending on what the last number of your national ID is. At the beginning of the year, the government began installing fingerprint scanners at cash registers in supermarkets to really make sure that people weren't going over their purchasing limits. The plan at the time was to have the fingerprint scanners installed at all points of sale in the country, but I'm not sure what ended up happening to that. EDIT: I believe that the agency in charge of setting/enforcing the price controls is called the Superintendencia para la Defensa de los Derechos Socioeconómicos (SUNDDE), and I believe that the relevant legislation is called the Ley Organica de Precios Justos. Chuck Boone fucked around with this message at 16:39 on Aug 27, 2015 |
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Aug 27, 2015 16:27
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Hugoon Chavez posted:The prices are ridiculous. As in I was constantly with my mouth hanging after asking for the price of things. A thousand Bolivares for a hamburguer. Two thousand in groceries for my mom and dogs alone. Five years ago we could eat with 120 BsF. The best part is that the highest bill is 100, so you can imagine how fun was to carry around enough cash for lunch. It was basically monopoly money and everytime I had to take out my wallet and count 30 bills to pay for a round of beers for five friends it just got weirder. Another point of reference: the minimum monthly salary in Venezuela is Bs. 7,421.67. Whenever it's increased (and it's increased quite often), Maduro and the PSUV like to go on about how Venezuela has the greatest, most frequent increases to minimum wage because they put the workers first, etc. Inflation is so out of control that the increases aren't even close to keeping up with it. They're meaningless gestures. "A thousand bolivares for a hamburger": let that sink in. Working minimum wage, at 7 hamburgers you've got essentially no money left for anything else that month. Hugoon Chavez posted:Obviously it's just a generalization, from my personal observations. I've heard really bad things about the Venezuelan communities in Panama and Miami. While I admittedly don't keep in close contact with Venezuelans here in Toronto and the surrounding areas, the ones I've met are hard working and really thankful for the opportunity Canada has given them.
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Aug 27, 2015 17:20
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PerpetualSelf posted:I think Santos is not doing anything drastic or say anything publicly because Maduro want's him to do something, and doing something would be playing into his hand. I think that given the circumstances Santos has done what he can reasonably be expected to do in this situation. I don't think he is - nor should he be - worried one bit about what Maduro or Venezuelans think about him. I think that public sentiment in Colombia is fairly clear on the issue, given the way the deportees were treated in Venezuela, and that's the audience Santos is playing to. After the initial meeting between Foreign Ministers on Wednesday, Santos and Maduro both summoned the other country's ambassadors to talk about the issue. Colombian Foreign Affairs Minister Maria Angela Holguin said yesterday that Santos called Maduro over the weekend to discus the issue, but that Maduro hasn't called Santos back. She also said that Colombia has reached out to the Venezuelan People's Defender and the governor of Tachira state, but that neither of them have responded. It's almost as if the Venezuelan government isn't really interested in coming up with a meaningful, lasting solution to the issue! Yesterday, Santos also said that he was calling for a meeting of UNASUR so that Colombia could go on record there about what has happened. Also yesterday, Maduro gave a speech at an event in Caracas (I think it was Caracas) and he made a couple of more-or-less concrete demands he wants Colombia to meet before he reopens the border. The video is here and my translation is below: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g2SaM3m8h9c quote:I hope that the Colombian government comes to its senses and starts to protect the Colombian people along the Venezuelan border. That’s what I’m asking for. For the Colombian government to wake up and instead of protecting paramilitaries and smugglers, protect the people of Norte de Santander and Cucuta. That’s what I’m hoping for here. I want the Colombian government to prohibit the sale Venezuelan products taken out of the country through smuggling and bachaqueo on Colombian territory. Until he does this, I won’t open the border. And the Colombian government must stop the Bolivar from getting attacked in Cucuta and Colombia. Until he does this, I won’t open the border. There was also a really interesting article published in RunRun.es yesterday that talked about how the border in Tachira is still porous, thanks exclusively to the ease with which Venezuelan guards are bribed. The article claims that a guide to lead you to the border costs Bs. 2,000, and that the guides charge Bs. 700 per person to cover the bribes for Venezuelan guards. A guide who works out of San Antonio, Tachira said: quote:If the authorities from here [Venezuela] catch you, they'll take you. On the other hand, the soldiers from the other side of the river will treat you very well. You have to be afraid of the ones here [Venezuela]. Over there, bribing a guard is really complicated. It's not like it is here.
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Aug 28, 2015 14:21
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My Imaginary GF posted:From your perspective, what would be the most sustainable Columbian response to Venezuela's implementation of its cashgrab ethnic cleansing? Like I said, given the circumstances I don't think there's a whole lot more Colombia can do without creating an even greater humanitarian crisis. I'd argue that a "sustainable response" is anything that doesn't make the situation worse. What Maduro has done is inexcusable, but Santos has very limited options. I'm sure the opposition is tearing into him over his government's response, but that's the opposition's job, isn't it? The Colombian government has condemned the deportations in the strongest possible diplomatic terms. Santos visited a deportee camp in Cucuta on Wednesday. He promised the deportees financial help, including access to jobs. As of Wednesday, the Colombian government was trying to arrange for trucks to enter Venezuela and collect whatever belongings the Venezuelan authorities hadn't looted. I'm not sure what the status of that is, but like I said, as of Wednesday that was in the works. Santos has met with the Venezuelan ambassador to Colombia. Santos has personally reached out to Maduro, and the Foreign Ministry has reached out to the Venezuelan People's Defender and the governor of Tachira. All evidence that there is an earnest willingness on the side of Colombia to get as many people talking about this as possible in the hopes of reaching some kind of understanding. Like I said before, I think Venezuela is not interested in seriously talking about this, but that's outside of Colombia's control. Yesterday, Colombian Attorney General Alejandro Ordonez said that what was happening was a "crime against humanity" and that his office was getting paperwork ready to submit a formal complaint at the International Criminal Court. Santos has also called for a UNASUR meeting, although UNASUR has just been shuffling its feet. There are at least hundreds of thousands of Colombian citizens still living in Venezuela. It is obvious that Maduro is not interested in the well-being of anyone but himself and whatever group of elites he's holding onto power for. Whatever Santos does, he needs to do with the knowledge that tomorrow, Venezuela and Colombia will still share a border. Edit: Sorry for not being more direct. I believe the best course of action for Colombia to take is a diplomatic one, including bringing this situation to the attention of as many international organizations as they can. Chuck Boone fucked around with this message at 02:04 on Aug 29, 2015 |
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Aug 29, 2015 01:39
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If there's a silver lining to this it's that in a few weeks Maduro and the PSUV will probably drop this issue and then it'll be like it never happened because they'll seldom mention it again. Barely a month ago everything coming from the government was about the border dispute with Guyana over the Essequibo region. I remember that there was a period of about 2-3 weeks were every single day I spent a good chunk of time reading about what [insert PSUV official's name here] had said about the Essequibo that day. Then, suddenly, no one's talking about it. The Colombian Attorney General's office is launching an investigation into allegations that Venezuelan National Guard soldiers abused Colombian women as they were crossing the border last week. The AG isn't giving a lot of details about the investigation beyond saying that they've received more than one complaint and that they're looking into it. Santos said yesterday that over the past ten days, 1,097 Colombians were deported from the country and another 7,162 returned to Colombia willingly. In more depressing news, a 76 year old woman died in a stampede at a Mercal supermarket in Barinas on Friday. She was waiting outside the supermarket with hundreds of other people when the supermarket opened its doors and the stampede happened. She died on the scene. The picture below is of the crowd outside the Mercal that morning: 
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Aug 31, 2015 00:01
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El Impulso, a newspaper out of Barquisimeto in Lara state, has an interesting article up today describing the apparent lack of impartiality at some of the state's new voting centers. The article points out that 81 of the state's voting centers are located in buildings that are owned and operated by the PSUV. For example, one of the centers in Barquisimeto houses a clinic, a dorm for Cuban doctors working in misiones, and a local headquarters for the People's Guard. Some of the centers are housed in buildings that have names honoring PSUV officials; some of the centers are named after former Lara governor Luis Reyes Reyes, and there's one center called Por Aqui Paso Chavez [Chavez Came Through Here]. The MUD's campaign manager in Lara pointed out that traditionally, voting centers were set up in educational institutions, but that "that has changed". Also, Maduro is in Vietnam and he said a little while ago that he had evidence that the Colombian government is planning to assassinate him. He said that he'd show the evidence later.
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Aug 31, 2015 16:51
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Ghost of Mussolini posted:Purpose-built voting centers seems like a big waste, but sharing them with obviously partisan institutions is even worse. Have they given any reason as to why they are doing this? Is the standard procedure not to just commandeer schools over the weekend (as seems to be the practice in the rest of Latin America)? That same article I linked quotes a lawyer for Voluntad Popular as saying that the relevant legislation (the Ley de Procesos Electorales) does not explicitly prohibit the practice. However, it's understood that things like this fall under the Consejo Nacional Electoral's (CNE) overall role in overseeing free and fair elections. I'd be interested to hear what the Venegoons have to say about their experiences voting (specially what your voting center looked like), but according to that article it was common practice before to just, as you say, commandeer schools, gymnasiums or other non-partisan venues during elections to turn into voting centers. The voting centers here in Canada (in Ontario at least) are often school/church gyms. Unfortunately, if it's the CNE's job to make sure things like this don't happen, I'm afraid they'll do absolutely nothing to stop it, and people will be voting in rooms with Chavez's posters all over the walls on December 6. Mozi posted:They just want to make sure the proper people vote and that they vote properly, and if they don't that the proper result is still achieved - nothing nefarious at all, I'm sure. You wouldn't want to make a mistake voting, would you? Can you imagine how embarrassing that would be?
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Aug 31, 2015 17:58
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Yesterday, Jose Vielma Mora (the governor of Tachira state) talked about the border closure and shot back at reporters who asked him about the deportat-- err, the placing of Colombian citizens into Colombia: quote:That word you keep repeating, repeating and repeating — we’ve placed citizens in Colombia. That word, “deportation”, is contrary to our socialist and humanitarian values. I want to remind you that many people were placed in an air-conditioned area to avoid trauma. This is the same mentality that makes those Venezuelanalysis articles so difficult to read. "We're socialists, we're The Good Guys™, so we can do no wrong; everyone else is The Bad Guys™, so everything they do is wrong". Today, El Nacional is reporting that there are 299 children in Venezuela who have one or both parents in Colombia following the "placements". The figure comes from the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar [Colombian Instituto of Family Well-being]. One of the organization's spokespersons said that they're doing all they can to reunite the families but that it's a difficult task because, "many [families] are afraid because they were threatened with having their children taken away". M. Discordia posted:This is where Chavez's ideologically incoherent alliances with every anti-U.S. dictator on Earth pay off -- the U.N. is just a forum for third-world crackpots to vent conspiracy theories while the U.S. and Israel veto everything. Colombia isn't going to get in the door with either side. This was the vote on U.N. Resolution 68/262 affirming the territorial integrity of Ukraine after Russia annexed Crimea:  We're a Bond-villain country.
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Sep 1, 2015 13:06
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It's looking more and more likely that the state of exception (which, despite what Telesur and Venezuelanalysis keep saying, does in fact suspend constitutional rights) will be extended beyond Tachira state. Right now, it appears as if Zulia and Apure states (the other two states bordering Colombia) will be next, but today Diosdado Cabello said that the state of exception would be extended to "wherever necessary". Cabello said: quote:We are announcing that wherever it is necessary to take the actions that we have to take, the government will do it. Sections of Zulia and Apure, and wherever necessary. Again, the two Telesur article and one Venezuelanalysis article that I've read on this issue like to point out that under a state of exception, constitutional rights are not suspended. This is false. Constitutional rights are most certainly suspended under the state of exception. As I mentioned in an earlier post, Tareck El Aissami himself read the list of suspended rights under the state of exception in Zone 1 (the first six municipalities where the state of exception was declared), which are are found in Articles 47, 48, 50, 53, 68, and 112 of the Constitution. This is huge because the articles in question deal with the right against warrantless searches and wiretapping, and the freedoms of transit, peaceful assembly and protest. Leading up to what is shaping up to be one of the most important elections in the history of the PSUV, you can imagine what the implications of suspending these rights are.
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Sep 2, 2015 20:37
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Ghost of Mussolini posted:What is the official line regarding the status of the Constitution regarding the Estado de Excepción? If there are no rights being suspended, then what is the point of declaring totally-not-martial-law? The entire objective of such a method is to expedite state action by removing people's rights for the duration of whatever is going on. How can anyone keep parroting the opposite when this is what is happening by the very definition of what they themselves are doing. Its not a question of obfuscating facts or drawing up scapegoats, such as in the case of whether or not these Colombians are all in paramilitary organisations and/or drug cartels, but something which is proven false literally by the name that they have given it. The official government line is found in the Decreto 1.950 that announced the state of exception. The rights I listed are suspended. I have no idea why the pro-PSUV crowd doesn't want to admit this. Maybe it's the same reason why Vielma Mora said that people weren't deported, but rather "placed" back into Colombia. We're the good guys, and we don't deport people or suspend rights. We're the good guys; we place people back in their beloved homelands and we give people their rights back. Borneo Jimmy posted:I find it really hard to have any sympathy for the Colombian government in this situation The Colombian government is the last thing you should have sympathy for. The +1,000 people "placed" back into Colombia and the +7,000 who decided to pack up and leave their lives in Venezuela because of a whim from Maduro are the victims here. You don't even need to think about the Colombian government at all. How can the PSUV claim to represent the poor and do this? Does that not seem inconsistent? How does the mass deportation of these families do anything at all to solve anything? Borneo Jimmy posted:No actually the article doesn't say that. Jimmy -- please. I have difficulty believing that you're being serious, but this is a lie that needs to be dispelled for anyone else reading this. What do you think the overall message of that article is? Do you think that the phrase, "but where no human rights are rescinded" (specially when taken in the context of the very next sentence in the section you quoted) is to make it clear to the reader that while constitutional rights have been suspended, whether or not those rights are human rights is up for scholars to decide? Chuck Boone fucked around with this message at 00:28 on Sep 3, 2015 |
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Sep 3, 2015 00:14
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Borneo Jimmy posted:Well it is a matter for the courts to decide and they've determined that the state of exception respects human rights and that it is legal What the Venezuelan courts say about this is wholly besides the point. Yes, the state of exception is 100% legal under Venezuelan law; that's not being discussed. The Jose Vielma Mora quote in that article is an Orwellian attack on words, and I'm arguing that Venezuelanalysis published those words either out of ignorance or out of a desire to mislead readers. Rights are being suspended, just as people are being deported, no matter how Vielma Mora and the PSUV try to spin it. Borneo Jimmy posted:And here's what Telesur has said about the state of exception Thank you. I hadn't seen that article before. I'm happy to see that Telesur's got it straight. Jack of Hearts posted:No sympathy or fondness for the Venezuelan government, but somehow even less for the Colombian political order, which is predicated on murdering those who dissent. Even if you hate the Colombian government with every fiber of your body, what I'm saying is that this really has absolutely nothing to do with the Colombian government, and absolutely everything to do with over one thousand people who are the poorest of the poor and have now become pawns in Maduro's game.
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Sep 3, 2015 01:47
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Leopoldo Lopez's people uploaded a video on YouTube narrated by Lopez himself that provides a really clear summary of some of the irregularities that have marked his trial. Without having to go into my archives, I can say that what's covered in the video is a really good summary of some of the issues with the trial that have been reported in the media over the past year and a half. In particular, the video mentions the conditions in which he is being held, the constant interference with his right to mount a defense, the refusal of the court to allow the press to attend the trial, the wholesale rejection of evidence for the defense, and the state's reliance on a "magic witness" who gave their expert opinion in court that Lopez's speeches contained subliminal messages that called for violence. The video also makes reference to Maduro's bizarre suggestion back in January to swap Lopez for a Puerto Rican national in prison in the United States. I'll be able to dig out news articles covering the issues mentioned in the video if anyone is interested. Anyway, here's the video along with my translation below: quote:Leopoldo Lopez: “Dictator’s Manual: How to Fake a Trial”. If an opposition figure dares to call you corrupt, inefficient and anti-democratic, and calls for protests against you, throw him in jail. This manual will provide a step-by-step explanation on how to fake a trial and break your political prisoner. Lopez faces a maximum sentence of 14 years in prison stemming from charges related to the violence that happened on February 12, 2014. His trial is wrapping up this week and a verdict is expected soon.
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Sep 3, 2015 23:17
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Hugoon Chavez posted:Is the trial going to be televised or something? It's not at all usual but I'd bet they would love to. There's no press allowed in the room. Not just cameras or recording devices; no one representing the media is allowed to attend. The closest the press is allowed to get to the courthouse is a block away, since all the streets in the vicinity are closed.
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Sep 4, 2015 22:36
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I haven't kept up with what happened to end the day off, but I'm guessing given the current time that there was no verdict in the Lopez/students trial, and that it will continue into Monday of next week. Anyway, as I mentioned in an earlier post the Lopez trial has been marred by some very serious irregularities. Here's a quick overview of the case and some of these irregularities:
There are a few other points that I haven't touched upon, but any single item on the list I've written is enough to seriously cast into doubt the fairness of a trial. There's enough about the Lopez trial to write a book. Back in February, a reporter from El Nacional managed to sneak into the trial and recorded some video of Lopez speaking in court. The video also contains interviews with legal experts who discuss the fact that the trial was conducted under an extraordinary amount of secrecy. The video can be seen here, along with my translation below: quote:Leopoldo Lopez: ... this is a political trial. And that is evident through all of its characterizations and through all of the manipulation of the processes that have taken place. It's clear that the decision to sentence [me] has already been made. Regardless of your stance on the political situation in Venezuela, if you believe in the importance of the rule of law and due process you must take issue with this trial. We give serial killers in North America fairer trials than the one Lopez and the students have gotten.
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Sep 5, 2015 05:24
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JohnGalt posted:What are the opinions of Venezuelan's on the oil policies of Maduro? I'm not familiar with this topic so I'm sorry that I won't be able to answer this question properly, but I'll still say a few things. As Adventure Pigeon pointed out, the PDVSA of today is a decidedly chavista organization. The 2002-2003 general strike resulted in about half of the company's staff leaving PDVSA. The politics of the event ensured that it was in Chavez's best interest to get his supporters into the organization. There have been high profile cases (namely the Amuay refinery explosion of 2012) that people have pointed to as evidence that PDVSA has been slipping when it comes to investing in infrastructure and safety, but I don't know enough about that to talk about it. I can say that PDVSA's daily output goal in 2013 was 3.46 million barrels per day, but it looks like it averaged 2.79 million barrels per day between January and November of that year. If those numbers are true, then production was down 1.1% during that same time in 2012. More recently, an article in El Nacional claims that PDVSA is performing below 2008 levels, pumping out about 2.7 million barrels per day so far in 2015. In 2008, PDVSA managed 3.26 million barrels per day. The company's debt has also increased tremendously, from $2.9 billion in 2006 to $48 billion in 2015. I also remember that back in October 2014 PDVSA made headlines because it was importing light crude from Algeria to use in the refining process in Venezuela. It had never done that before, although this BBC article says that PDVSA did buy light crude in the 80s to use in refineries outside of Venezuela. PDVSA argued that the move simply made good business sense, but it still raised some eyebrows. I think the news gave some people the impression that PDVSA wasn't this giant of oil production they thought it was. JohnGalt posted:Also, what are your opinions (as well as the general public) to the relationship between Venezuela and China insofar as oil financing goes. It looks like China is getting hugely favorable terms. Venezuela's relationship with China has been getting some bad PR recently due to how reliant Maduro appears to have become in Chinese money. Maduro scurrying off to China every few months to beg for loans is a reflection of the dire situation the country's finances are in. The drop in oil prices have pushed international reserves to their lowest level in at least twelve years, and the Banco Central de Venezuela has made two withdrawals from its account at the IMF so far this year: one for $380 million, and another for $1.5 billion. I think a common opinion on the subject is that Maduro is mortgaging the future of Venezuela for his short-mid term political goals.
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Sep 7, 2015 19:44
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As PerpetualSelf just said, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has just issued a ruling in the case of the RCTV shut-down in 2007. The court has ruled in favour of RCTV, and has ordered that it be allowed to broadcast again on channel 2. The court found that the Venezuelan government violated the right to free expression by refusing to renew the station's broadcasting license after years of threats in an attempt to force the station to change its editorial line. The ruling can be found here, in Spanish. Part of the ruling reads: quote:197. The court concludes, then, as it has in other cases, that in this case a deviation of power took place, since a faculty of the State was used with the goal of editorially aligning the media with the government (...) I place the chances of the government abiding by this ruling at 0%. The government will probably accuse the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of being an interventionist, imperialist body, and say that it's part of the international/media/psychological war against the country, and say that no one can tell Venezuela what to do because Venezuela se respeta. As Labradoodle mentioned earlier, Chavez began specifically threatening RCTV with not renewing its license in 2006. The station's license expired on May 27, 2007, and since it wasn't renewed, RCTV was forced off the air. I was in Venezuela at the time, and I remember watching the channel when it shut down. There was a "New Year's eve countdown"-esque feel to it. At midnight, I remember my uncle stepping outside and yelling expletives at the top of his lungs. The cacerolazo in Caracas that night was intense. wiregrind posted:I'm surprised that he could accurately pinpoint these things while being currently in isolation; because most of his points seem to be actual standard practices all over. What he describes is similar to what's happening right now in a trial against an Uruguayan ex-guerrilla (who uncovered a bunch of crap surrounding members of the ruling socialist party.) Difference is that here the media isn't entirely blocked; instead of that, the party relies on providing a smokescreen, confusion, ad hominem, and dismissal of the accusations against their politicians. He's a sharp dude. I think he knew back on the day he turned himself in that he was going to be found guilty and sentenced to prison. Adventure Pigeon posted:There's socialism, and then there's the "socialism" as practiced by Maduro and Chavez, where they take advantage of legitimate poverty and class issues to use the poor as a springboard to office, then consolidate power while making token gestures and abusing rhetoric. There doesn't seem to be any endgame beyond power and extracting as much wealth as possible for themselves and their cronies. I think this is exactly on point. I think this is how history will remember what's happening in Venezuela today.
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Sep 8, 2015 01:15
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Nintendo Kid posted:Does that court actually have any ability to enforce that though? The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is part of the Organization of American States, an organization to which Venezuela belongs. Maduro has already snubbed the OAS plenty of times, most recently during the border crisis with Colombia. I don't think Venezuela cares one bit about what the court has to say. However, the ruling does have the effect of adding its voice to an ever-growing list of international human rights organizations calling the Venezuelan government out for the abuses it continues to perpetrate.
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Sep 8, 2015 01:20
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Maduro officially expanded the state of exception to Zulia state last night, and closed the border crossing at Paraguachon. The communities under the state of exception are Guajira, Mara and Altmirante Padilla. I believe they are all located in the northern tip of Zulia. Interestingly, Maduro also said that the native Wayuu population are exempt from the border closure, since they've inhabited the land for thousands of years. There are now thirteen municipalities across two states that are under a state of exception. It seems as if Diosdado Cabello foreshadowed this last week, and my bet is that if Maduro wants to take this further, Apure state (the third state bordering Colombia) will see closures and states of exception next. As to how effective these measures are viewed, a poll released yesterday by the Instituto Venezolano de Analisis de Datos found that 47.8% of Venezuelans blame the national government for the scarcity crisis, 14.3% blame Maduro personally, while only 7.1% blame smugglers and re-sellers (known as bachaqueros in Venezuela). On the central government's ineptitude in dealing with the scarcity, La Patilla is reporting today that the CENCOEX (the body responsible for exchanging foreign currency) has not handed over any foreign currency to the country's private sector in two months. The article claims that the reason for this is that PDVSA, which earns something like 96% of the country's foreign currency, is saving up in order to pay back $4.6 billion it owes creditors by the end of the year. This means no money for importing raw materials needed for domestic production or products to keep shelves stocked. punk rebel ecks posted:Question to Venezuelan goons, has the whole situation in Venezuela made you distasteful toward all forms of socialism and left wing politics in general? No. I think that as others have pointed out in the thread, what we're seeing in Venezuela is socialism in name only, and that what we have instead is a relatively small group of corrupt officials who will seemingly stop at nothing to enrich themselves.
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Sep 8, 2015 15:21
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Leopoldo Lopez's and the students' trial resumed today, and while it's possible that the judge will deliver a verdict before the end of the day, it's unlikely. The big news today is that National Assembly PSUV candidate Jacqueline Faria called for pro-government supporters to head to the Palacio de Justicia (where the trial is being held). There have been peaceful demonstrations there all throughout the trial by opposition supporters. Anyway, a large crowd of pro-government supporters showed up in the afternoon, and beat the opposition supporters away. A member of the Voluntad Popular opposition party, Horacio Blanco, had a heart attack during the confrontation and died. La Patilla's Roman Camacho was on the scene and recorder this video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3H0AEETdgZQ Camacho points out at several times during the video that the National Guard troops stationed in the area appeared to allow the violence to take place for the most part. Note, for example, that at the beginning of the video a line of National Guard soldiers is separating the pro-government and opposition crowds. At around 2:40, the soldiers have disappeared, allowing the two crowds to merge, which results in the violence seen throughout the video. I've highlighted the main events throughout the video below:
I've also translated Guevara's words at the beginning of the video below. He's the national coordinator of the Voluntad Popular party: quote:Reporter: Freddy, is this demonstration called here by the government a provocation over what's going on here today? This isn't the first time that state security forces have allowed pro-government groups to act violently towards opposition supporters. The Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports linked in the OP contain evidence of this tactic being used during last year's protests. EDIT: Come pictures from earlier today:       EDIT: Fixed incorrect link. Chuck Boone fucked around with this message at 12:40 on Sep 11, 2015 |
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Sep 10, 2015 23:18
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I'm always struck by how absurd the rhetoric coming from Maduro and other officials is. Just recently (either this week or last), Maduro was talking about how Santos had forced Colombians out of the country, how he had abused their human rights, taken their possessions, broken up their families, etc. Maduro said this at the same time that his government was doing exactly those very things to Colombian people in Venezuela. In that video, what's most shocking to me is what the man is yelling through the loudspeaker: " "Out with the fascists! Out with the traitors! Out with those who sympathize with imperialism! This is Chavista territory, it is peaceful territory! We will not allow you to try to destabilize [inaudible] with your violent actions!" The pro-government crowd was literally beating people with sticks, and we are peaceful, and this is a peaceful territory, and we will not tolerate your violent actions here. The judge called a one hour recess in the Lopez trial about an hour and a half ago. She is deliberating now, and a verdict is expected soon. There is a live blog here that is covering the case. Lilian Tintori (Leopoldo Lopez's wife) will speak to the media as soon as she can after the verdict is read. Apparently, Lopez told the judge during his closing statements, "If you find me guilty, you will be more afraid to read the sentence than I am to hear it because you know that I am innocent". PerpetualSelf posted:It's clear at this point that another nation; any nation, should intervene. Probably by providing opposition civilians with guns and training and funding a guerrila war against the current leaders. I think if that were to occur the PSUV house of cards would fall quite quickly. Thankfully, as dire as the situation might appear, there are still democratic options to change. I believe that the PSUV knows that they are likely to lose the parliamentary elections in December, and they should be afraid; a National Assembly out of the hands of the PSUV would (on paper, at least) severely curtail Maduro's power. As Pindar said, "War is sweet to those who have not experienced it". An escalation of violence into a full-fledged armed conflict would be the most disastrous possible outcome. Chuck Boone fucked around with this message at 01:40 on Sep 11, 2015 |
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Sep 11, 2015 01:28
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The Syrian refugee comments reminded me of a scholarship program Venezuela offered to Palestinians to cover seven years of room and board to study medicine in Venezuela. 119 Palestinian medical students arrived in Venezuela last year as part of the program, and by July of this year, a third had left. They complained that the first year of the supposed medical program only offered Spanish and political indoctrination courses, and that they were afraid that their credentials would not be recognized abroad. Let's bring these 20,000 refugees over. There's absolutely no way the government could somehow mess that up. The judge has now been deliberating for about an hour and a half. I just saw on Twitter that more National Guard soldiers have been arriving to the Palacio de Justicia.
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Sep 11, 2015 02:10
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It's also really interesting that Leopoldo and the students are probably about to be sentenced to prison for allegedly calling for a demonstration that led to deaths hours after PSUV superstar Jacqueline Faria called for a demonstration that led to a death. The judge called the court to order about 10 minutes ago and is probably reading the verdict as I type this.
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Sep 11, 2015 02:37
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Lopez has been sentenced to 13 years, 9 months, 7 days and 12 hours in the Ramo Verde military prison. Unsure what the verdicts are for the students at this moment. EDIT: Apparently this is unconfirmed at this time, but the Venezuelan media is reporting it. Chuck Boone fucked around with this message at 03:17 on Sep 11, 2015 |
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Sep 11, 2015 03:12
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I saw it pop up on Twitter from @milmanrique who I believe is inside the courtroom (maybe she's not?); I didn't post it here because it was unconfirmed. Then, everyone (El Nacional, NTN24, La Patilla) picked it up, but now I see that they're saying that it's unconfirmed. Ahhh. The tension. EDIT: I'm seeing Voluntad Popular retweeting the same figures, so it looks like it's confirmed. It also appears that the students were found guilty but were sentenced to medida cautelar sustitutiva, which I believe is... probation? With lots of restrictions? Chuck Boone fucked around with this message at 03:25 on Sep 11, 2015 |
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Sep 11, 2015 03:20
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I've been reading some of the reaction to yesterday's sentencing and one point that stands out and I think is worth thinking about is what we saw yesterday in that courtroom was not a verdict but rather the completion of an order from on high. Given the complete lack of evidence against him, it's obvious that Lopez was found guilty even before the start of the trial. This trial was just a cargo cult display to give the verdict the appearance of justice when it is in fact the opposite of that. Erika Guevara-Rosas, the director for the Americas at Amnesty International, has spoken on Lopez's sentence, saying: quote:The charges against Leopoldo Lopez were never adequately substantiated, and the sentence against him has a clear political motivation. His only crime is being the leader of an opposition party in Venezuela. There was a lot of discussion back at the time Lopez handed himself over to the authorities on February 18 of last year about whether or not that had been the right decision to make. When I went to listen to Maria Corina Machado speak here in Toronto last year after Lopez's arrest, I remember someone in the audience told her during the Q&A period, "Maria Corina, do not do what Leopoldo did: do not hand yourself over when they come looking for you. We need free leaders". I can't remember what Machado answered, but the question reflected the very popular sentiment that Leopoldo should not have surrendered to authorities, that he should have fled the country, etc. The question is, "Why do that?". Lilian Tintori told CNN En Español earlier this year that Leopoldo handed himself over to show people what kind of government Venezuela really has; to demonstrate that Venezuela is a democratic country in any meaningful way. Whether or not this was really Leopoldo's goal is almost besides the point, because the world can see now how deep into authoritarianism Venezuela has sunk. Hugoon Chavez posted:
My goodness. Thank you for pointing that out. I had meant to link to the El Nacional article reporting his death. I've now fixed the link. The reason I'd looked up the meaning of the word huevon (or guevon) is because the woman at the end of that La Patilla video I posted called the man recording a huevon. I know that this is a go-to insult, but I realized that I didn't really know what it meant. I was surprised to find that it means "idiot/lazy person". Is that correct? I always thought that it meant something much "worse" than that. I also want to say that I tend to ignore Borneo Jimmy's comments because I find that he interacts with the thread in a very superficial way. I became active in the old thread back in February of last year, and (I think) he was around then and it was the same thing. I've even offered one more than one occasion to speak to him privately if he's really interested in having a meaningful discussion about Venezuela, but he's never taken me up on that. Instead, he pops in every few pages, posts "a really thorough" article from Venezuelanalysis or Telesur about something that we may or may not be discussing in the thread, and then takes off. If he does engage the thread, it tends to be what we saw from him in the last page: "Wow, I'm sad to see the opposition supporters are calling for right wing death squads", etc. I don't have anything against him and I think it's important to have a plurality of views in any discussion, but please consider the fact that you're likely not going to get an engaged response out of him when you think about replying to something he posts. The thread tends to work better when people keep that in mind.
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Sep 11, 2015 13:20
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I think you placed the link around the wrong part, poor guy isn't a guebón just because he died of a heart attack! Or maybe he is, I mean, I wouldn't go to a protest with a weak heart.
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Hugoon Chavez posted:Well, yes and no? If I were to translate it it would be like calling someone a Retard rather than an idiot. It's much more insulting (idiot would be "idiota" or "pendejo") and yet still used in "friendly" banter. I left Venezuela when I had just turned 12, so for all intents and purposes I have the speech pattern of a 12 year old. I like to think that my vocabulary is more developed because I've read extensively in Spanish, but I almost never swear in casual conversation in Spanish. Certainly not like my cousins who've lived there their entire lives and speak, like you say, drunken sailors. Every second word! "Marico que mierda esa guebonada! Que vaina tan arrecha guebon!!"
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Sep 11, 2015 13:36
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I've translated a video of statements made by Lilian Tintori and some political figures after the sentence was read last night. There video is here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tqEabYhqecquote:Man in Blue Shirt: … the unjust 18-month trial that our leader, Leopoldo Lopez, had to face. It ends today with a thirteen year sentence. Pablo Iglesias from Podemos said on the case: quote:We don’t like that someone is being sentenced for doing politics, whoever he may be. We think that in politics, differences have to be settled through the electoral process, and I wish that this man [Lopez] could be a part of the elections so that Venezuelans could be the ones to decide through their vote who should run the country. Finally, a fitting piece from political cartoonist Jorge Cruz. The piece is from March but is relevant today. It makes reference to the Ojos de Chavez:  zocio posted:... another is the proliferation of arepa restaurants, there used to be one or two and now there are dozens (and I love them, drat you for making me an addict). Arepas are amazing. I was an ESL teacher over this past year and had lots of students from around the world, specially Japan and Korea. I often recommended an arepa restaurant here in Toronto to them, and I never had a student tell me they didn't enjoy the arepas there. You can't not love arepas!
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Sep 11, 2015 16:01
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Mr Luxury Yacht posted:Is it Arepa Café on Queen Street? That place is amazing. Yes, that's one place, but I actually prefer GordoEx Ex Cafe just north of Bathurst station. If you like Arepa Cafe I think you'll go nuts at Gordo Ex.
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Sep 11, 2015 21:27
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The people over at www.freeleopoldo.com have put up an English translation of a letter written by Lopez and signed September 11: the day after his sentencing. This is their translation:quote:He who tires, loses and I will never tire of fighting for a free Venezuela! The original letter in Lopez's handwriting can be seen here. The Colombian Ministry of Defense issued a release today saying that the Colombian Air Force tracked two Venezuelan Air Force airplanes violating its airspace along the northern tip of Zulia state yesterday afternoon. The release says that the planes flew 2.9 km into Colombia's airspace, flew over the town of Majayura, then flew over a Colombian military unit in the area, and then flew away towards the town of Castilletes. Peel posted:We also have calls for assassination and armed revolution ITT, it's just how anglophone venezuelachat goes. Look on the bright side: at least we're getting the full spectrum of opinion! While the thread (counting the last one as well) does appear to go through phases, I'd say that overall it's been informative. beer_war posted:This is from a while back, but remember that Foreign Policy hit piece on Leopoldo López Borneo Jimmy liked so much? Ha! Thank you for posting this. And thank goodness for the eagle-eyed hawks at Burelli's PR firm! The Telesur connection is interesting and certainly helps to locate the piece. Labradoodle posted:Oh man, all you need now is to watch a cadena. Diosdado may ramble, but watching Maduro try to maintain a coherent narrative and making bumbling threats is surrealistic. I pride myself in being able to translate videos quickly, but when it comes to Maduro's speeches...
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Sep 13, 2015 20:43
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BeigeJacket posted:Does anyone ever call Maduro out on his poo poo when he makes these 'the US are planning to invade/my assassination/contaminate our precious bodily fluids' statements, and if not, why not? Great question! I think there are a couple of things to consider here. The complete lack of anything resembling the separation of powers in Venezuela means that no public PSUV figure in any of the branches of government will publicly disagree with what Maduro says, no matter how ridiculous. The PSUV officials who appear in the public eye the most (Diosdado Cabello, Jorge Arreaza, Delcy Rodriguez, Jorge Rodriguez, Tareck El Aissami, Tarek William Saab, etc.) will not contradict Maduro on anything that is central to the PSUV line, such as the assertion that there's an economic war happening, etc. The same goes for the government's media branches, including outlets like Telesur and Venezolana de Television, both of which are for all intents and purposes propaganda mouthpieces for the PSUV. The reason why PSUV die-hards and the party's media outlets don't speak out are relatively clear: the Venezuelan government has extremely authoritarian tendencies. Opposition politicians, public figures and media outlets do speak out against Maduro's "conspiracy-of-the-week" speeches. Miranda state governor Henrique Capriles will often call Maduro out for his nonsense, as will Maria Corina Machado, Jesus Torrealba, and Freddy Guevara. Leopoldo Lopez did as well, and now he's paying the price for that. Similarly, opposition-leaning media such as El Nacional will often report on news stories that other newspapers will not pick up. These stories tend to be highly critical of the government. Unfortunately, such is the state of politics in the country that these people and others like them are often branded imperialist, right-wing, terrorist traitors simply for voicing a different opinion. We see a lot of that in this very thread. I'd also like to say that there is probably a fairly significant number of people who do not believe in Maduro's assertions, but are perhaps not in any kind of position of power for us to see their reactions in the media. Just to give you an idea, a poll conducted by the Instituto Venezolano de Analisis de Datos last week found that 69.4% of respondents do not believe that the country's economic situation is the result of an "economic war", as Maduro likes to claim. We don't necessarily hear a lot about these people, the ordinary citizen, because they're not often in the public eye. Note, however, that when discontent with the government does make the international media (as it did during the 2014 protests), the government called them terrorists, murderers, U.S.-backed instigators, etc. Finally, if you're wondering, "Alright, but still, why don't more people speak out against the government?", I think this week's events point to the answer. Maduro has just placed Leopoldo Lopez in prison for almost 14 years simply for speaking out against his government (check my post on page four to see what a travesty his trial was). The refusal to renew RCTV's broadcasting license in 2007, forcing a station with over 50 years of history off the air, serves as a constant reminder to the country's media that if you dare to overstep your boundaries, you will be shut down. In short, people do speak out; some have become so deluded that they'll believe anything Maduro and Telesur says, while others - specially those in the spotlight - have well-founded fears of the repercussions that come to those who speak out against Maduro and the PSUV. Chuck Boone fucked around with this message at 00:00 on Sep 14, 2015 |
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Sep 13, 2015 23:55
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punk rebel ecks posted:Maybe he isn't that pro-PSUV afterall? I don't know enough about Podemos to talk about it too much, but I do know that it's been linked - for better or for worse - with chavismo, as Hugoon Chavez has pointed out. Also, an organization that Pablo Iglesias and other Podemos leaders belonged to received at least 3.7 million Euros from the Venezuelan government between 2002 and 2012. There's an interview with Iglesias on VTV in that link, too. I watched only a minute of it, but I can tell you that Iglesias wasn't there criticizing the PSUV. However many ideological similarities Iglesias might share with the PSUV, they apparently don't extend to throwing people in jail for speaking their minds, which is great.
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Sep 14, 2015 00:38
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Another Venezuelan airplane violated Colombia's airspace. This happened yesterday in the Venturosa and Nueva Antioquia area. The Colombian Air Force says that the airplane entered approximately 10 kilometers into Colombia. Last night, Foreign Affairs Minister Delcy Rodriguez said that there was no evidence for the incursion on Saturday, and that Colombia was "making up" the whole thing in order to throw a wrench into any future meeting between Maduro and Santos. I don't have the link handy, but the Colombian Foreign Affairs Office said earlier today that they obviously had the radar data from the installation(s) that picked up the incursion. Labradoodle posted:Update on the judge who sentenced Lopez: in a completely unrelated turn of events that in no way has anything to do with her giving Lopez the maximum sentence for made up crimes, she's being considered for the position of Chilean Consul. Seriously guys, it's just coincidence. Ha! If that turns out to be true... I don't know what to say. They might as well have handed her a big bag with a dollar sign on it as soon as she finished reading the verdict on Thursday. Also, I just found out that this judge, Susana Barreiros, came to her post as the replacement for another judge who had been removed from her seat. That judge was Maria Lourdes Afiuni.
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Sep 14, 2015 18:04
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