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INinja132
Aug 7, 2015

simplefish posted:

How were battles coordinated?
Was it all planned in advance and everyone had to stick to it (like making plans with friends before mobile phones) until they went their own way and took initiative in a situation? Or could things be change in the heat of battle with coordination?
I guess runners with messages but were they sent between Duke This and Duke That?
Or between Duke This and Duke That but via General Whatever for approval?
Or did only the general issue runners with messages during battle to avoid confusion?
Did messengers often get lost?

The actual level of command anyone had over a battle at that time is probably extremely debatable. Everything happened so fast during charges and counter-charges, and as BattleMoose said the armies were getting so big, that by the time you have the huge battles like Borodino and Leipzig, it's basically up to initial plans, local initiative and a healthy dose of luck. Of course that can go either way.

Jena-Auerstedt is a great example of the insanity that was Napoleonics. At Jena, Napoleon basically blundered into what he thought was the whole Prussian army, but was in fact only a small part of it. Cue General Ney launching an unordered suicide charge straight at the Prussians, which Napoleon has to then send more guys to rescue. Meanwhile over at Auerstedt an entirely separate battle was going down where the actual majority of the Prussian army was fighting Davout's Corps, and was handily defeated by Davout's brilliant commanding despite their numbers advantage.

And yes, messengers got lost all the time, which led to a huge amount of orders getting confused, missed or being completely outdated by the time they actually arrived. Jena-Auerstedt provides another great example, where one of Napoleon's Corps (under Bernadotte) kept marching back and forth between the battles, not actually committing to either of them because Napoleon hadn't really told him what to do.

Even though it's obviously not a perfect historical source or anything, Tolstoy's War and Peace actually has some great battle sections which get across the chaos and unpredictability of the battles very well. Even if you don't read the whole thing I'd recommend checking out the Borodino stuff, and some of the earlier, smaller battles as well.

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INinja132
Aug 7, 2015

Grey Hunter posted:

I'm thinking of running a game of Black Powder that has all the divisions commanded by Goons (on both sides) - with everything going through emails and messages moving via riders. I want to recreate as much of the fog of war as possible - I'm not sure HOW often to make the messengers get lost, or how fast to make them move yet, but the planning stage is there.

Yeah that sounds totally baller. Make sure you link in here when you do it :D

INinja132
Aug 7, 2015

Fangz posted:

The failings of the box barrage etc are less about coordination (you need coordination for stuff like creeping barrages, not so much for planned barrages to deny particular areas to the enemy) and range, and more about that sort of area target, being maintained over a period of time requiring a huge amount of shells and guns to be effective. Shelling into the enemy back lines can and did cause lots of casualties, but they could only isolate small sections of the front for short periods of time, not enough to make a difference strategically.

Surely though you could argue that by the end of the war, when "bite-and-hold" had become the norm, isolating small sections of front for short periods of time literally was the strategy. The whole idea of the final Allied offensives at an operational level was to completely pin all German reserves so that they couldn't be shuffled around to deal with an offensive elsewhere in the region. Thus they used artillery (amongst other methods) to pin those reserves in place with at the very least the threat of an offensive, allowing the Allies to assault basically as and when they desired.

INinja132
Aug 7, 2015

Fangz posted:

Sure, my point is more that it took a lot of time getting to that point and you can see why earlier attempts didn't work.

Gotcha. Yeah it must've sucked being a WW1 general big time. Trying to figure out whether your limited attack worked (or didn't) because it was a bad tactic, or whether it was just weird circumstances. Only way to know is to try it again :hist101:

INinja132
Aug 7, 2015

Anyone know what the best sources are for the Boshin War by any chance? Was looking to do some research into it and don't really know where to start.

INinja132
Aug 7, 2015

Kanine posted:

any particularly good ww1 films you guys would recommend? im watching paths of glory right now and enjoying it

It's not a film but the BBC mini-series "Our World War" is really good. It's a weird hyper-modern docudrama (dramamentary?) and is really cool. Just ignore the text before the beginning of each episode because it tends to be incorrect.

INinja132
Aug 7, 2015

Tias posted:

One thing that stuck out in Trin's excellent ongoing WW1 wargame, is how absolutely huge a pain in the rear end it is to maneuver within cities.

This had me thinking: Was there much urban fighting in WW1? Considering how brutal the initial maneuvers were, one supposes city fighting would suck just as much as it did in WW2 and since.

I'm not sure how much there actually was, I think it mainly revolved around villages and towns, at least between Britain and Germany which is where my knowledge resides. Doctrine on both sides suggested building trench lines a few hundred metres in front of any form of terrain because it's a less obvious target, and I assume this was true on other fronts too.

From my archival research I did a couple of years ago on the Battle of the Somme, village fighting was definitely a thing and was pretty rough, although as you might imagine it's all WW1 at the end of the day so it's not a lot worse than any other fighting.

From an Infantry Brigade report about a village assault, they went in with 84 Officers and 2,570 men and came out the other side with 23 Officers and 1315 men (and the village). This was considered a successful attack.

From a Tactical Notes document from around the same period, about how villages were defended:

quote:

Defended Village

2. The following notes on a French defended village show what steps can be taken to organize defences in the second line :-

(a) The village was about 700 yards in rear of the front line, and was organized with three keeps; each was completely surrounded by wire entanglements, was independent of the others, and could be held even if the others were taken, although a very elaborate system of communication trenches was in existence between all these. Water and four days rations were kept in each, and wells had been sunk to provide an ample water supply. These keeps could be held by about one company each, although a very much larger garrison could be placed in the whole defended locality if desired - approximately three battalions. Wherever possible, the communication trenches were also arranged as fire trenches, and there were many places where the flanking fire could be delivered by small parties of men…

(b) Excellent shelters were made all over the village, in some cases these consisted of iron arches, with a covering of at least two rows of beams and two different thicknesses of earth, some over 7 feet in all. All shelters were solidly built, and should be proof against 8-inch shells…
Every open space in the village was well protected. For example, in one courtyard two walls of gabions about 20 feet high were built to give protection against stray bullets…

(c) A series of lines existed in rear of the front lines, all intercommunicating, and almost all provided with barbed wire. These were in addition to the keeps already mentioned.

(d) On one part of the front a small wood was defended by a network of low wire entanglement, anda line of high wire netting as well just behind it running through the wood and in rear of the front line. The high wire netting is little affected by shell fire, gives good protection against bombs [i.e. grenades] and is extremely difficult to cut. It was placed a few yards away in front a communication trench…

(e)There is no definite plan in case of hostile attack, as the above arrangements are considered sufficient to enable attacks in any direction to be dealt with adequately.

(f) Machine guns were placed so as to flank salients etc. In addition, a small 65 millimetre field gun was placed in the front line…

(h) Great use was made of brushwood and undergrowth to revet steps, firing platforms, and so on, and gabions were freely used.

(i) The garrison of the village and the front line trenches in its vicinity was about one battalion, but there was sufficient fire trenches for three battalions if necessary.

I have a whole bunch of this stuff if anyone's interested in British tactics on the Somme by the way.

INinja132
Aug 7, 2015

Alchenar posted:

Reading a book on the German Army in 1917 (frontline experiences of the various Allied offensives) and there's quite a few references to 'automatic rifles' in the British and French armies. Any idea what they're referring to?

For Britain it'll be the Lewis Gun most likely - their LMG which was often referred to as an automatic rifle.

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INinja132
Aug 7, 2015

Milo and POTUS posted:

I've heard of the race to the sea but what was the end game equivalent?

The German Spring Offensives in 1918 were semi-mobile, and were followed up by the Hundred Days which was also semi-mobile (i.e. the front moved by about 8 miles each attack instead of 10 yards)

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