- ronya
- Nov 8, 2010
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I'm the normal one.
You hate ridden fucks will regret your words when you eventually grow up.
Peace.
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Does anyone have any good reading on Universal [thing] as a step away from the musical-chairs world of the jobs market as the only way of surviving?
I'm seeing more liberals cottoning on to the fact that maybe the total amount of work that needs doing doesn't necessarily match up with [40h/week] x [total working age population], and talking about UBI as a result. Pitfalls I can see are:
- Setting the level way too low
- Scrapping all other benefits, including needs-related disability ones
- Unregulated housing market sucking up the UBI, leaving things functionally the same (but with no benefits, see above)
Meanwhile MMT people are keen on the UJG (universal jobs guarantee), which I guess is attractive to the "rah money for nothing" crowd, and there are definitely things the government could be paying people to be doing, but it sounds a bit too much like "work=good" to me. Works well as an automatic stabiliser during the regular downturns of capitalism though - plus in a pandemic the government can say "your job this month is to stay and home and not cough on people".
And we've talked about UB services before too, which I like because the landlords can't take them, and we have accepted precedent in the NHS.
I'd love to learn more about these things from a leftist perspective, if anyone's got any material.
I don't have any handy links to a lit review of the whole thing that I would call good, but on this topic, I feel that for context and sense-motive reasons, it may make it easier to understand where the Randall Wrays of the world are coming from if one also knows that that the sheer fury of the UBI-vs-UJG argument has its roots in 1970s-vintage Keynesian wars over the causes of stagflation (to wit, whether it would have been sufficient to 'cap and trade' inflation, or whether detailed indicative planning was required - hinging on one's embedded understanding of where wage-price spirals and cost-push pressures are really coming from)
In both, regardless, the message is usually not that there is not enough work to go around but that there is enough work to go around and an endemic market failure in not matching people to do said work: that it is a grotesque moral horror that society's collective economic response to a massive unexpected fall in its lifetime income (i.e., in a recession) could ever be to do even less work (by having more people out of the employed labour force, with associated human suffering from privation. That is, having less stuff). UBI studies, especially older ones, usually emphasize how much they don't impact work incentives
conversely, the universal-services moment is a more recent one and rests explicitly on the supposed superiority of the political defensibility of such programmes in the long-term; the zero-marginal-product-worker concern from automation is also the fruit of a somewhat more recent set of concerns (not especially business cycles). because they're different, and because their core impulses pull in opposite directions, there's a lot of churn and inconsistency out there
ronya fucked around with this message at 20:09 on May 16, 2021
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May 16, 2021 19:57
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- ronya
- Nov 8, 2010
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I'm the normal one.
You hate ridden fucks will regret your words when you eventually grow up.
Peace.
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indeed the challenge seems to be proving the institutional "intent to destroy" in the Genocide Convention; paying attention to (a)-(e) in Article 2 misses the difficult part. Here, have a regrettably real example:
quote:101. The Trial Chamber observes, however, that it will be very difficult in practice to provide proof of the genocidal intent of an individual if the crimes committed are not widespread and if the crime charged is not backed by an organisation or a system150.
102. Admittedly, the testimony makes it seem that during this period Goran Jelisic presented himself as the "Serbian Adolf"151 and claimed to have gone to Brcko to kill Muslims. He also presented himself as "Adolf" at his initial hearing before the Trial Chamber on 26 January 1998152. He allegedly said to the detainees at Luka camp that he held their lives in his hands and that only between 5 to 10 % of them would leave there153. According to another witness, Goran Jelisic told the Muslim detainees in Luka camp that 70% of them were to be killed, 30% beaten and that barely 4% of the 30% might not be badly beaten154. Goran Jelisic remarked to one witness that he hated the Muslims and wanted to kill them all, whilst the surviving Muslims could be slaves for cleaning the toilets but never have a professional job. He reportedly added that he wanted "to cleanse" the Muslims and would enjoy doing so, that the "balijas" had proliferated too much and that he had to rid the world of them155. Goran Jelisic also purportedly said that he hated Muslim women, that he found them highly dirty and that he wanted to sterilise them all in order to prevent an increase in the number of Muslims but that before exterminating them he would begin with the men in order prevent any proliferation156.
103. The statements of the witnesses bring to light the fact that, during the initial part of May, Goran Jelisic regularly executed detainees at Luka camp. According to one witness, Goran Jelisic declared that he had to execute twenty to thirty persons before being able to drink his coffee each morning. The testimony heard by the Trial Chamber revealed that Goran Jelisic frequently informed the detainees of the number of Muslims that he had killed. Thus, on 8 May 1992 he reputedly said to one witness that it was his sixty-eighth victim157, on 11 May that he had killed one hundred and fifty persons158 and finally on 15 May to another witness159 following an execution that it was his "eighty-third case".
104. Some witnesses pointed out that Goran Jelisic seemed to take pleasure from his position, one which gave him a feeling of power, of holding the power of life or death over the detainees and that he took a certain pride in the number of victims that he had allegedly executed160. According to another testimony, Goran Jelisic spoke in a bloodthirsty manner, he treated them like animals or beasts and spittle formed on his lips because of his shouts and the hatred he was expressing. He wanted to terrorise them161.
105. The words and attitude of Goran Jelisic as related by the witnesses essentially reveal a disturbed personality162. Goran Jelisic led an ordinary life before the conflict. This personality, which presents borderline, anti-social and narcissistic characteristics and which is marked simultaneously by immaturity, a hunger to fill a "void" and a concern to please superiors, contributed to his finally committing crimes163. Goran Jelisic suddenly found himself in an apparent position of authority for which nothing had prepared him. It matters little whether this authority was real. What does matter is that this authority made it even easier for an opportunistic and inconsistent behaviour to express itself.
106. Goran Jelisic performed the executions randomly. In addition, Witness R, an eminent and well-known figure in the Muslim community was allegedly forced to play Russian roulette with Goran Jelisic before receiving a laissez-passer directly from him164. Moreover, on his own initiative and against all logic, Goran Jelisic issued laissez-passer to several detainees at the camp, as shown inter alia by the case of Witness E165 whom Goran Jelisic released after having beaten.
107. In conclusion, the acts of Goran Jelisic are not the physical expression of an affirmed resolve to destroy in whole or in part a group as such.
108. All things considered, the Prosecutor has not established beyond all reasonable doubt that genocide was committed in Brcko during the period covered by the indictment. Furthermore, the behaviour of the accused appears to indicate that, although he obviously singled out Muslims, he killed arbitrarily rather than with the clear intention to destroy a group. The Trial Chamber therefore concludes that it has not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused was motivated by the dolus specialis of the crime of genocide. The benefit of the doubt must always go to the accused and, consequently, Goran Jelisic must be found not guilty on this count.
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/tjug/en/
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May 31, 2021 09:30
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- ronya
- Nov 8, 2010
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I'm the normal one.
You hate ridden fucks will regret your words when you eventually grow up.
Peace.
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A more direct example, from the 2005 UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur:
quote:513. Was there a genocidal intent? Some elements emerging from the facts including the scale of atrocities and the systematic nature of the attacks, killing, displacement and rape, as well as racially motivated statements by perpetrators that have targeted members of the African tribes only, could be indicative of the genocidal intent. However, there are other more indicative elements that show the lack of genocidal intent. The fact that in a number of villages attacked and burned by both militias and Government forces the attackers refrained from exterminating the whole population that had not fled, but instead selectively killed groups of young men, is an important element. A telling example is the attack of 22 January 2004 on Wadi Saleh, a group of 25 villages inhabited by about 11 000 Fur. According to credible accounts of eye witnesses questioned by the Commission, after occupying the villages the Government Commissioner and the leader of the Arab militias that had participated in the attack and burning, gathered all those who had survived or had not managed to escape into a large area. Using a microphone they selected 15 persons (whose name they read from a written list), as well as 7 omdas, and executed them on the spot. They then sent all elderly men, all boys, many men and all women to a nearby village, where they held them for some time, whereas they executed 205 young villagers, who they asserted were rebels (Torabora). According to male witnesses interviewed by the Commission and who were among the survivors, about 800 persons were not killed (most young men of those spared by the attackers were detained for some time in the Mukjar prison).
514. This case clearly shows that the intent of the attackers was not to destroy an ethnic group as such, or part of the group. Instead, the intention was to murder all those men they considered as rebels, as well as forcibly expel the whole population so as to vacate the villages and prevent rebels from hiding among, or getting support from, the local population.
515. Another element that tends to show the Sudanese Government’s lack of genocidal intent can be seen in the fact that persons forcibly dislodged from their villages are collected in IDP camps. In other words, the populations surviving attacks on villages are not killed outright, so as to eradicate the group; they are rather forced to abandon their homes and live together in areas selected by the Government. While this attitude of the Sudanese Government may be held to be in breach of international legal standards on human rights and international criminal law rules, it is not indicative of any intent to annihilate the group. This is all the more true because the living conditions in those camps, although open to strong criticism on many grounds, do not seem to be calculated to bring about the extinction of the ethnic group to which the IDPs belong. Suffice it to note that the Government of Sudan generally allows humanitarian organizations to help the population in camps by providing food, clean water, medicines and logistical assistance (construction of hospitals, cooking facilities, latrines, etc.)
516. Another element that tends to show the lack of genocidal intent is the fact that in contrast with other instances described above, in a number of instances villages with a mixed composition (African and Arab tribes) have not been attacked. This for instance holds true for the village of Abaata (north-east of Zelingei, in Western Darfur), consisting of Zaghawa and members of Arab tribes.
517. Furthermore, it has been reported by a reliable source that one inhabitant of the Jabir Village (situated about 150 km from Abu Shouk Camp) was among the victims of an attack carried out by Janjaweed on 16 March 2004 on the village. He stated that he did not resist when the attackers took 200 camels from him, although they beat him up with the butt of their guns. Instead, prior to his beating, his young brother, who possessed only one camel, had resisted when the attackers had tried to take his camel, and had been shot dead. Clearly, in this instance the special intent to kill a member of a group to destroy the group as such was lacking, the murder being only motivated by the desire to appropriate cattle belonging to the inhabitants of the village. Irrespective of the motive, had the attackers’ intent been to annihilate the group, they would not have spared one of the brothers.
518. Conclusion. On the basis of the above observations, the Commission concludes that the Government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide. Arguably, two elements of genocide might be deduced from the gross violations of human rights perpetrated by Government forces and the militias under their control. These two elements are: first, the actus reus consisting of killing, or causing serious bodily or mental harm, or deliberately inflicting conditions of life likely to bring about physical destruction; and, second, on the basis of a subjective standard, the existence of a protected group being targeted by the authors of criminal conduct. Recent developments have led to the perception and self-perception of members of African tribes and members of Arab tribes as making up two distinct ethnic groups. However, one crucial element appears to be missing, at least as far as the central Government authorities are concerned: genocidal intent. Generally speaking the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds. Rather, it would seem that those who planned and organized attacks on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.
Genocidal intent rests heavily on how rationally thorough its execution is. Unsystematic or unintentional mass killing or ethnic cleansing may not be genocide, whereas an organized campaign of sterilization or forcible transfer of children would be. This makes sense given the historical context of a special horror attached to industrial annihilation (as opposed to, e.g., mere pogroms).
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May 31, 2021 10:18
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- ronya
- Nov 8, 2010
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I'm the normal one.
You hate ridden fucks will regret your words when you eventually grow up.
Peace.
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What's their current working definition of 'ethnic group'?
quote:494. The definition of protected groups. While they specify the classes of prohibited conduct, international rules on genocide use a broad and loose terminology when indicating the various groups against which one can engage in acts of genocide, including references to notions that may overlap (for instance, “national” and “ethnical”). This terminology is criticised for referring to notions such as ‘race’, which are now universally regarded as outmoded or even fallacious. Nevertheless, the principle of interpretation of international rules whereby one should give such rules their maximum effect (principle of effectiveness, also expressed by the Latin maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat) suggests that the rules on genocide should be construed in such a manner as to give them their maximum legal effects. It follows that by “national groups”, one should mean those sets of individuals which have a distinctive identity in terms of nationality or of national origin. On the other hand, “racial groups” comprise those sets of individuals sharing some hereditary physical traits or characteristics. “Ethnical groups” may be taken to refer to sets of individuals sharing a common language, as well as common traditions or cultural heritage. The expression “religious groups” may be taken to encompass sets of individuals having the same religion, as opposed to other groups adhering to a different religion.
...
498. The question of genocidal acts against groups that do not perfectly match the definitions of the four above mentioned groups. The genocide perpetrated in 1994 in Rwanda vividly showed the limitations of current international rules on genocide and obliged the Judges of the ICTR to place an innovative interpretation on those rules. The fact is that the Tutsi and the Hutu do not constitute at first glance distinct ethnic, racial religious or national groups. They have the same language, culture and religion, as well as basically the same physical traits. In Akayesu the ICTR Trial Chamber emphasized that the two groups were nevertheless distinct because (i) they had been made distinct by the Belgian colonizers when they established a system of identity cards differentiating between the two groups (§ 702), and (ii) the distinction was confirmed by the self-perception of the members of each group. As the Trials Chamber pointed out, “all the Rwandan witnesses who appeared before it invariably answered spontaneously and without hesitation the questions of the Prosecutor regarding their ethnic identity” (ibidem). The Trial Chamber also insisted on the fact that what was required by the international rules on genocide was that the targeted group be “a stable and permanent group”, “constituted in a permanent fashion and membership of which is determined by birth”, and be identifiable as such (§§ 511 and 702). The objective criterion of a “stable and permanent group”, which, if considered per se, could be held to be rather questionable, was supplemented in the ICTR case law (and subsequently in that of the ICTY) by the subjective standard of perception and self-perception as a member of a group. According to this case law, in case of doubt one should also establish whether (i) a set of persons are perceived and in fact treated as belonging to one of the protected groups, and in addition (ii) they consider themselves as belonging to one of such groups.
499. In short, the approach taken to determine whether a group is a (fully) protected one has evolved from an objective to a subjective standard to take into account that “collective identities, and in particular ethnicity, are by their very nature social constructs, “imagined” identities entirely dependent on variable and contingent perceptions, and not social facts, which are verifiable in the same manner as natural phenomena or physical facts”.
500. It would seem that the subjective test may usefully supplement and develop, or at least elaborate upon the standard laid down in the 1948 Convention and the corresponding customary rules on genocide. Indeed, the criteria initially used by courts to interpret and apply those treaty provisions and customary rules have proved either too loose or too rigid; in short, they were unable to take account of situations where manifestly there existed a stark opposition and conflict between two distinct sets of persons, one of which carried out the actus reus typical of genocide with the intent to destroy the other in whole or in part. Moreover, it would be erroneous to underestimate one crucial factor: the process of formation of a perception and self-perception of another group as distinct (on ethnic, or national, or religious or racial ground). While on historical and social grounds this may begin as a subjective view, as a way of regarding the others as making up a different and opposed group, it gradually hardens and crystallizes into a real and factual opposition. It thus leads to an objective contrast. The conflict, thus, from subjective becomes objective. It ultimately brings about the formation of two conflicting groups, one of them intent on destroying the other.
501. What matters from a legal point of view is the fact that the interpretative expansion of one of the elements of the notion of genocide (the concept of protected group) by the two International Criminal Tribunals is in line with the object and scope of the rules on genocide (to protect from deliberate annihilation essentially stable and permanent human groups, which can be differentiated on one of the grounds contemplated by the Convention and the corresponding customary rules). In addition, this expansive interpretation does not substantially depart from the text of the Genocide Convention and the corresponding customary rules, because it too hinges on four categories of groups which, however, are no longer identified only by their objective connotations but also on the basis of the subjective perceptions of members of groups. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, this broad interpretation has not been challenged by States. It may therefore be safely held that that interpretation and expansion has become part and parcel of international customary law.
(501 alludes to the disputes that occurred during the writing of the Convention itself over whether this should include political groups, e.g., social classes)
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May 31, 2021 11:54
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May 16, 2021 19:57
