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I rarely posted in the prior thread, but I have read it nearly constantly. Thanks to posters and moderation for creating the best-maintained stream of quality information on the war I've found. Here's a question: what are some remaining elements of infrastructure that connect Russia and Europe? I am aware of TurkStream, is that the most significant item? I don't mean to ask speculative military questions, more to understand the leverage currently on the table for the various parties.
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Oct 11, 2022 20:52
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spankmeister posted:If you're asking about gas pipelines there's also Yamal through Belarus and Poland, Soyuz through Ukraine. More general than that, but yes thank you. Maybe it is just gas pipelines, if nothing else would have a comparable impact if interrupted or damaged.
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Oct 11, 2022 20:59
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I would not want to rapidly drive a wheeled vehicle across them. Certainly, it would not take long to breach this element of the line, but it seems perfectly reasonable as a slowing effort. That appears to be what we are seeing across the line: slowing efforts.
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Oct 21, 2022 23:50
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Payndz posted:I'm no expert, but it seems to me that unless each one of those little Toblerone chunks has a big-rear end mine underneath it, one shot from an advancing tank's main gun should clear a wide enough path for armour to get through, then the following infantry can just drag the rest out of the way. It is true that there are many ways to move one of these out of the way. I would venture that infantry dragging them through mud is not the most efficient way to do so. You will note the mobile crane emplacing them; that's because they are far too heavy for even several men to move by hand. As has been noted, they are partially buried, rather than dropped on the surface.
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Oct 22, 2022 00:36
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Discussion on this topic appears to assume that the Wagner line's threat model is an armor offensive. Why is this believed to be the case? I was under the impression that Ukraine is more likely to field artillery-backed infantry with armor in a supportive role. Comparisons to WW2-era massed armor offensives, and the defensive preparations against such, do not seem appropriate to me. I agree with the point that these preparations will only be as good as their manning.
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Oct 22, 2022 10:21
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cinci zoo sniper posted:Kharkiv counter-offensive battle group, the force most apparently likely to threaten those fortifications, worked seemingly like this: Thanks, makes a ton of sense. Motorized comes at the very end, after the obstacle is mostly irrelevant.
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Oct 22, 2022 16:57
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Posters interested in naval damage control may wish to read some posts by former USS Fitzgerald DCA The Valley Stared. Here's a good place to start: https://forums.somethingawful.com/showthread.php?threadid=3803602&pagenumber=25&perpage=40&#post473505233
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Oct 31, 2022 03:30
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