|
As we continue to see active shooters make headlines across the United States I thought a thread to deeper dive into the realities of response, preparedness/prevention, and recovery from these events. By way of background, I am a non-law enforcement professional who does a significant amount of operational planning around ASHE prevention/response/recovery. I want to start by looking at a recent publication from the Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center. Their Mass Attacks in Public Spaces 2016-2020 is a good place to start. The USSS identified 173 incidents in the years studied, and their criteria was at least 3 people (not including the attacker) harmed in a public or semi-public space. There are a lot more things in the report which I don’t cover in this post, but I wanted to call out some highlights for discussion. First, some news that will shock no one, this is a by and large solo, young, white, male, problem. 63 of the 180 attackers were 25-34, 44 were 14-24. 105 of the 180 attackers were white. 172 of the 180 were male with 3 more identifying as male at the time of the attacks. Of the 173 attacks, only 5 were perpetrated by more than 1 attacker. I don’t think you have to look very far to find problems with the average 34 year old, alone, white, male. We’ve seen the rise of the incel movement prey on those exact people. Obviously, lowering the amount of ASHEs that occur is the goal, and will take a large patchwork of fixes, but a good way to frame the argument if you want to try and steer away from gun control or politics with friends, family, etc. is to ask “how do we help these loner, young, men?” School shootings tend to get the headlines, and are arguably the most tragic, but only 13 of the attacks happened in education facilities, the large majority (88) happened at businesses such as bars & restaurants (25), retail (21) , or service establishments (20). About a third of attacks (55) were directed against specific targets. In almost all these cases a motivation for the attack was related to a specific issue such as bully at school, grievance with a neighbor, or workplace/domestic issue. Not including minor traffic violations, nearly two-thirds (115) of attackers had prior criminal history, 68 of those for violent offenses. I think we are all familiar with the “he was on our radar” trope, given after a mass attack showing that law enforcement knew about the bad guy before it happened, but “many attackers (77, 43%) exhibited criminal behavior for which they were never charged, arrested, or contacted by law enforcement. This includes attackers who had engaged in acts of domestic violence (41, 23%), other violent crimes (42, 23%), and non-violent crimes (40, 22%). Especially in cases of domestic violence, while law enforcement may not have been aware of the criminal behavior, someone other than the attacker knew. What can be done to increase resources for victims of domestic violence and to put their attackers on the radar of law enforcement? “Nearly a quarter (42, 23%) of attackers were have found to have conveyed concerning communications online, such as threats to harm others and posts referencing suicidal ideations, previous mass shootings, violent content, and hate towards a particular ethnic group” Resolution  I find it a little disturbing that just over 10% of these attacks seemed to have ended because of a failure of the attackers weapon. In only 38 of the attacks did the attacking stop due to the intervention of law enforcement. 18 were stopped by bystander intervention. This isn’t the silver bullet “good guy with a gun saves the day” some folks think it is (in only 3 cases did the bystander kill the attacker), but it’s still a significant statistic. Researchers found a significant relationship between how the attacks ended and who was being targeted: quote:Most attackers who targeted specific individuals ended the attack on their own (78% vs 42% of attackers without named targets). Also the vast majority of attackers who were stopped by law enforcement or bystanders were targeting random individuals (86% vs 60% of attacks ended by other means. Motives The study found that the main motives were related to grievances, ideological/bias/politically related, and psychotic symptoms. Grievances motivated about half the attacks, whether bullying, health or financial stress, feuds, or feeling victimized by a harasser. Ideological, bias-related, or political beliefs played a large role in about a fifth of attacks. Groups biased against include members of a specific race or ethnicity, members of religious or political groups, or police officers. In one case which truly showcases the circular nature of this problem, one attack was motivated to attack a mostly white church in retaliation for an earlier attack which targeted a largely black congregation. In 25 of the attacks, attackers showed signs of psychosis such as delusional or paranoid attacks, even one attacker believing he was possessed by the devil. Weapons Almost 75% of attacks used one or more firearms including handguns (93 of 126 attacks using firearms, of which 10 were revolvers), long guns (40, 8 of which were shotguns). In 29 of the attacks, firearms were acquired illegally, whether the attacker was legally prohibited, the firearm was modified, or the transaction to acquire it was illegal in some way. 12 attackers had previously had a firearm confiscated, license revoked, or had some type of court-order to give us a gun such as due to a protective order related to domestic violence. Of those 12, 9 later on went to use firearms in their attacks. Stressors within five years This is the most enlightening category for me. Nearly all attackers, 167 or 93% experienced at least one significant stressor in their lives within five years of the attack. For 138 or 77%, that stressor was within one year. For 88, 49% it was within the same month, and for some (18%) it was the same day. If people want to look in any one place for a ‘fix’ to the mass shooting problem it’s eliminating these stressors.  To wrap up this study let’s take a look at their key findings one by one: quote:Most of the attackers had exhibited behavior that elicited concern in family members, friends, neighbors, classmates, co-workers, and others, and in many cases, those individuals feared for the safety of themselves or others. “If you see something, say something” is such a joke trope these days but it’s very true in a lot of these cases. How many mass attacks would have been prevented if someone who knew something had spoken up. We have to be careful to keep this mentality from turning into a witch hunt though. quote:Many attackers had a history of physically aggressive or intimidating behaviors, evidenced by prior violent criminal arrests/charges, domestic violence, or other acts of violence toward others. Again “he was on our radar”. We need a criminal justice system where someone can be fairly investigated, with their civil rights intact and without bias to their demographics. I have no idea how to accomplish this. quote:Half of the attackers were motivated by grievances, and were retaliating for perceived wrongs related to personal, domestic, or workplace issues. So, if there were real, meaningful avenues for people to settle grievances we drop half of these attacks off the map instantly. quote:Most of the attackers used firearms, and many of those firearms were possessed illegally at the time of the attack. quote:One-quarter of the attackers subscribed to a belief system involving conspiracies or hateful ideologies, including anti-government, anti-Semitic, and misogynistic views. I honestly have no idea how to curb this when it comes from news media and in some cases former presidents. quote:Many attackers experienced stressful events across various life domains, including family/romantic relationships, personal issues, employment, and legal issues. In some of these cases, attackers experienced a specific triggering event prior to perpetrating the attack. If there’s a golden ticket to be punched to solve the active shooter problem it’s this. Eliminating stressors, and when you can’t do that, giving people mechanisms to cope with them would make a huge dent in things. The guy who shot up his office because they fired him probably doesn’t do that if he slides right onto quality unemployment and gets real help finding a new job. quote:Over half of the attackers experienced mental health symptoms prior to or at the time of their attacks, including depression, psychotic symptoms, and suicidal thoughts. Mental health also isn’t the one-quick-fix some folks think it is, but it is a problem that needs to be addressed. People sometimes ask if I could wave a magic wand and fix something what would I choose? But that question shows ignorance of the real answer. It’s not one problem driving active shooters, it’s a patchwork of issues and it’s going to take a bigger patchwork of fixes before we stop seeing yet-another-school-shooting on TV. I have some other reports and research I can deep dive into in other posts but for right now I just wanted to see if I could spark some meaningful discussion about this thing which looms seemingly so large over this country. Note: I think an outright ban on gun control debates will help keep the thread from spinning off. There should for sure be a debate on gun violence in America, but it will just overwhelm this thread. Google Jeb Bush posted:For the moment let's go with: Elendil004 fucked around with this message at 04:13 on Mar 31, 2023 |
#
?
Mar 30, 2023 21:56
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 4, 2024 10:01 |
|
|
Elendil004 posted:Note: I think an outright ban on gun control debates will help keep the thread from spinning off. There should for sure be a debate on gun violence in America, but it will just overwhelm this thread. Here in the UK recently there were some climate activists jailed for contempt of court because the judge ordered their defence of climate activism not to mention climate change, or civil rights movements at all. I don't know if it's possible to even attempt an objective consideration of a topic if you immediately excise perhaps the most significant factor relating to it.
|
|
#
?
Mar 30, 2023 22:16
|
|
|
kecske posted:Here in the UK recently there were some climate activists jailed for contempt of court because the judge ordered their defence of climate activism not to mention climate change, or civil rights movements at all. I don't know if it's possible to even attempt an objective consideration of a topic if you immediately excise perhaps the most significant factor relating to it. I mean I'm not a mod and I cant force it but I just don't want the whole thread to just be another gun control. I hope I have done a good job showing that there are other factors that contribute to active shootings than just "gun".
|
|
#
?
Mar 30, 2023 23:00
|
|
|
Elendil004 posted:So, if there were real, meaningful avenues for people to settle grievances we drop half of these attacks off the map instantly.
|
|
#
?
Mar 31, 2023 00:01
|
|
|
Baronash posted:This stuck out for me because we just had a somewhat related discussion on shooters' manifestos in USCE. What makes you so sure that the grievances are capable of being settled? What is the proper remedy for "I feel open contempt for the phonies I'm surrounded by and thus they ought to die"? I don't think anyone goes from 0 to open contempt, at some point that could have been short circuited. At some point that was just "my boss is kind of a dick I wish I could find another job" or "My wife is pissing me off right now I wish we could afford a vacation so she'd get off my back." etc. EDIT: Sorry for late edit, but for example the 24 year old man who set fire to the motel because someone stole his laptop and the police wouldn't investigate despite themt racking the laptop there...if the laptop had been found or if the police had even attempted an investigation and the guy thought ok they tried it's truly lost, he likely would not have become a mass attacker. Elendil004 fucked around with this message at 00:23 on Mar 31, 2023 |
|
#
?
Mar 31, 2023 00:12
|
|
|
Elendil004 posted:I mean I'm not a mod and I cant force it but I just don't want the whole thread to just be another gun control. I hope I have done a good job showing that there are other factors that contribute to active shootings than just "gun". I think this is probably wise, actually. For the moment let's go with: Let's take it as consensus that gun control would be a good policy solution and focus on other subtopics.
|
|
#
?
Mar 31, 2023 03:20
|
|
|
I'm not sure the "93% experienced a stressor in last 5 years" percentage is as telling as it seems- how does it compare to either the population at large, or the white young-ish male demographic that dominates the stats? Additionally, many of these stressors may actually be cocausal, with the behavioral or mental elements that presage the attack being the cause of, in particular, the family/relationship prior events. I'd really like it if we could further break down the "triggering event" material on page 42- 49% of attackers had a "stressor event" within 30 days of their attack, and that proximity suggests a strong causal or relational element, but we don't know the breakdown of what stressors occurred for that smaller group. The report states that the triggering event was the primary motive in some cases, versus being an accelerant, but there, too, there's not more detailed information. Discendo Vox fucked around with this message at 03:57 on Mar 31, 2023 |
|
#
?
Mar 31, 2023 03:53
|
|
|
I believe Democrats should push for all medical bills incurred by mass shootings to be covered by the state, funded by a tax on gun ownership.
|
|
#
?
Mar 31, 2023 04:18
|
|
|
Discendo Vox posted:I'm not sure the "93% experienced a stressor in last 5 years" percentage is as telling as it seems- how does it compare to either the population at large, or the white young-ish male demographic that dominates the stats? Additionally, many of these stressors may actually be cocausal, with the behavioral or mental elements that presage the attack being the cause of, in particular, the family/relationship prior events. I agree seeing which particular stressors were the 18% of same day would be interesting. Though I think generally that it takes a village of stressors. It's the institutional stress that tends to flip people. The example on pg 42 is a good example. That's 20 plus years of little bullshit, institutional bureaucracy, that boiled over when the guy read an obituary. Even if he was completely wrong in his vendetta, surely the dept of mental health should have been equipped to deal with someone like that. If they'd done it with compassion instead of what we are told here, good money he doesn't drive into an unrelated funeral years later.
|
|
#
?
Mar 31, 2023 04:35
|
|
|
Elendil004 posted:I agree seeing which particular stressors were the 18% of same day would be interesting. Though I think generally that it takes a village of stressors. It's the institutional stress that tends to flip people. The example on pg 42 is a good example. That's 20 plus years of little bullshit, institutional bureaucracy, that boiled over when the guy read an obituary. Even if he was completely wrong in his vendetta, surely the dept of mental health should have been equipped to deal with someone like that. If they'd done it with compassion instead of what we are told here, good money he doesn't drive into an unrelated funeral years later. Alternatively, a demonstrably unstable and allegedly abusive individual came into contact with an organization, bristled at the guardrails designed to help them operate properly, and held this grudge for decades before finally lashing out. We don't know, because we only have his biased framing to go off, and crucially that's the framing that, regardless of the truth, he operated under. This dovetails nicely with DV's comment whether there's a causal link between their behavior and these triggering stressors, because I would imagine that the type of malevolent personality that commits a major act of violence such as this isn't the most considerate individual in the neighborhood. Baronash fucked around with this message at 05:44 on Mar 31, 2023 |
|
#
?
Mar 31, 2023 05:24
|
|
|
Baronash posted:I would imagine that the type of malevolent personality that commits a major act of violence such as this isn't the most considerate individual in the neighborhood. I just don't think outside a very tiny outlier of truly heinous people that someone just gets to be that malevolent without death of a thousand cuts. If that guy had had a tenth less interactions with the agency he hated he might have just kept being angry at the org but not killed a bunch of people over it. I agree the details we have are presented pretty dryly and I'm only using it as a broad example not trying to re-litigate the case itself. But I just don't see people getting to the point of launching a mass attack without a multitude of layered stressors.
|
|
#
?
Mar 31, 2023 13:33
|
|
|
Baronash posted:Alternatively, a demonstrably unstable and allegedly abusive individual came into contact with an organization, bristled at the guardrails designed to help them operate properly, and held this grudge for decades before finally lashing out. We don't know, because we only have his biased framing to go off, and crucially that's the framing that, regardless of the truth, he operated under. This dovetails nicely with DV's comment whether there's a causal link between their behavior and these triggering stressors, because I would imagine that the type of malevolent personality that commits a major act of violence such as this isn't the most considerate individual in the neighborhood. I kind of agree with your assessment of that person used as an example in the document. That particular individual had interactions with mental health services for a long time and was unwilling to change. It appears he blamed that department at least partially (but it looks like almost completely) for his daughter's condition. Although, reading the story (obviously it's a summary) his daughter's condition was worsened from treatment and while you always hear medication can have extreme negative side effects it must be different to experience it. But also, from the story his daughter was removed from his custody at least once, which indicated to me this guy is or was incapable of caring for a person with his daughters' problems. I am skeptical that anybody, apart from serial killers or sociopaths, has such a malevolent personality that they are willing to commit mass murder against people for no grievance or issue. The point of providing more outreach and aid to people is to try to prevent any mass shootings. You want to reach help people with their issues when there possible to fix because if it can prevent a death, it's worth it. Unfortunately, this example shows pretty clearly that if the person getting help feels they were mistreated than that itself can lead to grievances that lead to mass killing events. I don't know if there are any statistics available, but my instinct is that more tragedies like this are prevented than caused from outreach. If anybody does, I would be very interested in that. Discendo Vox posted:I'm not sure the "93% experienced a stressor in last 5 years" percentage is as telling as it seems- how does it compare to either the population at large, or the white young-ish male demographic that dominates the stats? Additionally, many of these stressors may actually be cocausal, with the behavioral or mental elements that presage the attack being the cause of, in particular, the family/relationship prior events. I would like to see that breakdown too if it was done. The stressors are things that are a part of daily life for most people, and they experience them simply because they exist. It seems like lowering the number of "stressors" (kind of a vague term and they are defined very broadly in the document) in general society would possibly cause a concurrent dropping of mass casualty events. Side note: anybody know a way to get around not being able to copy from documents like this? It's really annoying to not be able to quote it directly without typing it out.
|
|
#
?
Mar 31, 2023 13:50
|
|
|
Great OP! Two quick question I have after reading it: 1) Is there a definition for "stressor" they are using? I'm shocked that less than 100% of them reported they had a "personal issue" or family/relationship issue that was stressing them out in the last 5 years. That seems like it would apply to essentially any random person and isn't really a strong indicator. 2) Do you know if there are gender breakdowns? I know there are very few female mass shooters, but do they tend to operate functionally similar to male mass shooters and can all be rolled up into the "mass shooter" category? Or are there statistically significant differences in motives/suicide/weapons between them?
|
|
#
?
Mar 31, 2023 14:12
|
|
|
Leon Trotsky 2012 posted:Great OP! A stressor is defined in the paper in footnote 12, but i'll type it out because it should be on this discussion page because it's pretty relevant. Stressors are defined as external conditions, factors, or events that placed, or would likely place, negative pressure on an individual and demonstrated, or would likely cause, some level of discomfort or distress. Stressors may be accute (i.e, transient life situations) or chronic (i.e., persistent life situations) and are relative to the person's own background, experiences, and perceptions.
|
|
#
?
Mar 31, 2023 14:17
|
|
|
Leon Trotsky 2012 posted:Great OP! Gurragadon got the stressor definition, thanks! As for gender, 172 of 180 were male, and 3 additional were assigned female at birth but male-identifying at the time of attack.
|
|
#
?
Mar 31, 2023 20:23
|
|
|
Let’s look at another bit of research from the SUNY Rockefeller Institute of Government called Deconstructing Mass Shootings This is one of the few bits of research I’ve read that talks about prevention and why/how mass attacks happen rather than the last one I shared which was much more ‘what’.  quote:researchers have assumed that the decision to become a mass public shooter and the series of decisions leading to the criminal event are the same. Treating these as one has led researchers to overemphasize and, therefore, focus almost exclusively on traditional criminological factors, such as psychological, sociological, and demographic characteristics, to explain how distant causes of crime interact with more immediate influences to produce a mass public shooting (see Figure 1). Focusing exclusively on criminological factors that influence the decision to commit a crime neglects the actual decisions involved in the commission of a crime. This goes to my comments earlier about how it’s a series of events, stressors, etc, that cause someone to end up a mass attacker, even if you can point to the acute failure point.  quote:Most offenders engaged in low (36%) and medium (36%) level of planning. Twenty percent of offenders engaged in a high level of planning. The level of planning seems to have a substantive impact on the lethality of the attack. Figure 7 presents the average number of fatalities and injured victims by planning level. Offenders who have no and low-level of planning, on average, incur two fatalities and two injured victims. These figures increase to three for offenders with a medium level of planning. Offenders with a high level of planning, on average, killed eight and injured 17 victims. Not a big shock here that more planned attacks are more effective. But it helps show how rare (and how ‘low efficiency’) the no planning attacks are when I feel there’s a public perception that this is most of the events. quote:Threats have been considered by the U.S. Secret Service to be reliable and actionable intelligence as they often signal an impending violent act. Approximately 40 percent of mass public shooters make threats prior to the attack. The majority of the threats (52%) were made verbally, followed by written (26%) and other forms (21%). For example, some offenders drew cartoons or made movies depicting mass public shootings. There are also significant differences to whom threats are directed. Forty one percent of threats were directed towards potential victims. Unfortunately, a large portion of threats may have been ignored, as 40 percent of threats were made in front of family members and close friends, and 20 percent were made on social media platforms. Empirical research has consistently shown that an essential determinant of reporting of threats is the bystander’s relationship with the offender. Threats made in the presence of friends and family are far less likely to be reported to the authorities. Our results also show that threats are credible sources of intelligence on the act, target, and method of execution of the impending attack (see Figure 8). Forty-four percent of threateners followed through with every element identified in their threat. Forty-three percent of mass public shooters deviated in some, but not all, elements identified in their threats. Finally, only 13 percent of mass public shooters deviated completely from elements identified in their threats. Emphasis mine, but it shows how taking threats seriously can have a huge impact. I don’t think we have any data on failed mass attacks, e.g. a guy makes a threat, and an intervention leads to no mass attack. If anyone has that kind of data (I don’t know how you’d get it) I’d love to see it. quote:Besides policy actions, law enforcement could play a significant role in reducing an offender’s ability to prepare for a mass public shooting by identifying potential offenders early and taking appropriate actions to disrupt the preparation and neutralize the threat. One promising strategy in this regard is threat assessment. Threat assessment is the process of identifying, assessing, and managing the threat that certain persons may pose. As conceptualized by the Secret Service, threat assessment is predicated on communication from potential offenders that may signal an impending violent act (i.e., leakages and threats). Our results show that 40 percent of mass public shooters make threats prior to the attack. This means that effective threat assessment could potentially prevent 40 percent of mass public shootings. This, however, would require three interrelated undertakings. First, a state-level threat assessment agency needs to be established to help schools, businesses, and other organizations assess the risk posed by threats and threateners. Second, threat assessment must be applied correctly and systematically to ensure it work effectively. Third, threat assessment and related investigations must be conducted by trained professionals. Unspoken here is that while law enforcement would love a much broader hand to deal with potential threats, civil liberties and rights must be protected. quote:A recent media analysis found that 70 percent of the total news stories on mass public shootings printed by The New York Times were driven by only 15 events. These 15 massacres are the most “extreme” and therefore the most atypical. However, due to the disproportionate news coverage, these 15 cases not only distorted the public’s understanding of the causes and possible solutions but also shaped the political discourse and subsequent legislative solutions to mass public shootings. Research suggests such knee-jerk policies are “feel-good legislation” with no measurable effect. The media plays a role, often poorly, in the public discourse and can sometimes shade things to drive up ratings. Are folks interested in a breakdown of an ideal active shooter response?
|
|
#
?
Mar 31, 2023 20:46
|
|
|
Elendil004 posted:Are folks interested in a breakdown of an ideal active shooter response? Yes and I'm specifically interested in a comparison between Uvalde and Nashville. Why was Uvalde such a shitshow, other than the cops involved were just cowards and it was unavoidable? The responders at Nashville seemed ready and willing to run in and face an armed, active shooter and I really wish there was some kind of understandable reason that was the case. But maybe there just isn't.
|
|
#
?
Mar 31, 2023 22:19
|
|
|
Cops exist above the law, they cannot be made to serve it. The few times they actually face repercussions are extremely rare. So there's really no way to force them to play by any sort of rules so they will not follow any guidelines or restrictions placed upon them. As a result, every time they are meant to act they will act however the gently caress they want and you end up with these wildly different reactions. In one shooting they may go in guns blazing and kill bystanders or even the people who stop the shooter. In another, they will cower outside.
|
|
#
?
Apr 1, 2023 05:46
|
|
|
XboxPants posted:Yes and I'm specifically interested in a comparison between Uvalde and Nashville. Why was Uvalde such a shitshow, other than the cops involved were just cowards and it was unavoidable? The responders at Nashville seemed ready and willing to run in and face an armed, active shooter and I really wish there was some kind of understandable reason that was the case. But maybe there just isn't. The cops in Nashville had an organized military response and seemed to have drilled for it exactly/made use of prior combat experience. The cops in Uvalde were extremely disorganized and did effectively nothing, retreating when they were shot at. The Border Patrol was somehow the group that took any real action. Silence and delay vs. communication and drive – a look at the differences between police responses in Uvalde and Nashville https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/29/us/nashville-uvalde-police-body-camera-response/index.html quote:After being shot at through the door at 11:37 a.m., the officers in Uvalde retreated. One began to head back towards the key classrooms – 111 and 112 – but no one followed him. It appears that no one got close to the classroom doors again until 12:50 p.m., when a team led by Border Patrol agents burst in and killed the gunman. There was a forward surge after shots were fired in the classroom at 12:21 p.m., but no one went in.
|
|
#
?
Apr 1, 2023 10:28
|
|
|
Elendil004 posted:Are folks interested in a breakdown of an ideal active shooter response? Definitely interested in a more detailed breakdown though or other considerations. Name Change posted:The cops in Nashville had an organized military response and seemed to have drilled for it exactly/made use of prior combat experience. I watched the bodycam footage, the Nashville cops immediately started clearing rooms and once they knew where the shooter was, went directly there and shot them. Quite a few times.
|
|
#
?
Apr 1, 2023 10:42
|
|
|
putting this here: was a targeted attack
|
|
#
?
Apr 1, 2023 13:23
|
|
|
The uvalde cops looked extremely organized both in rescuing their own children and preventing most other parents from doing the same. They were also well versed in active shooter training having completed some just a few weeks earlier. It may just be hard for some to stomach the idea that police do not exist to protect the public. The times they do are mostly coincidental when protecting themselves and the public are the same thing.
|
|
#
?
Apr 1, 2023 21:46
|
|
|
A platonic ideal active shooter response First let's talk about the ideal active shooter response. This is going to be somewhat generic but this is the widely accepted best practice today. Several sources back this up though I am not sure how publicly available they are (nothing classified, just things like NFPA guides are paywalled). The National Fire Protection Association 3000, Standard for an Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response Program, Texas State University’s Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training Center, or Louisiana State University’s Active Threat Integrated Response Course all are pretty much in alignment on the broad strokes. The first thing to know is that an active shooter response is integrated, it’s law enforcement and EMS (usually by way of fire services). The second thing to know is that an active shooter response doesn’t stop when the bad guy is dead or in custody. But for this demonstration let’s use the platonic ideal of a school shooting. Let’s assume in this case there is no SRO or police officer on site. So, someone opens fire in the cafeteria of a school and police are alerted via a 911 call. Dispatchers send available patrol resources to the school and begin dispatching additional resources. This may include adjoining towns resources, regional SWAT teams, state police assets, etc. Fire and EMS are dispatched as well. It is very likely that one or two patrol officers arrive first. The old tactic was to form a contact team of 4 officers, and travel in a diamond formation down hallways to the active shooter and engage. Modern, current tactics are for the first officer, followed by the next several, to move immediately and directly to the sound of gunfire in order to stop the killing. Life safety is the primary focus, the order of precedence is first, the lives of innocents, second, the lives of the police, and third, the life of the shooter. The term Contact Team is still used to describe the first few officers moving towards gunfire, though it no longer describes that traditional diamond formation. The main reason is that if two officers show up, and wait for two more, people die in the meantime. If for some reason 4 officers all showed up at the same time, you’d likely still see that diamond formation used, as it’s tactically sound. The key here is that you should not wait for backup before going toward the sound of gunfire. Note: In the recent Nashville shooting bodycam footage you hear one officer shouting “give me three, give me three”. He’s trying to assemble that diamond formation contact team. The second, third, and forth officer to show up all enter the building and beeline for the sounds of gunfire. If there’s no gunfire, or no obvious location, then they will hastily begin searching, though will likely seek information from victims, staff, etc to try to zero in on the shooter. The key role of these first four officers is finding the bad guy, and stopping the killing. They may stop long enough to ask someone which way the bad guy went, or hand someone a first aid kit but they can’t get gummed up helping people as more people get injured deeper onward. This can be a challenging lesson for some law enforcement officers to wrap their heads around. When the fifth cop shows up to the scene, they need to take a step back and start setting up incident command. This is crucial because if they rush in as well, then so will the sixth, seventh, eighth cop, and so on, and the next steps will unfold far too slowly. That fifth cop needs to find the senior fire or ems person on scene, and form a unified incident command. They’re essentially joined at the hip now. They will start setting up two types of teams. The first, if the active shooter is still shooting, is more contact teams. These are those traditional 4-man teams, dispatched from unified command with purpose (enter via a specific door, proceed to a specific location, flank/find/fix/etc.). Contact teams will be assembled as needed and as resources arrive. At this point people will be arriving a lot more frequently and it’s important that newly responding officers don’t just run into the building without a sense of order. That’s not to say that the process of assembling contact teams needs to bog things down, but the unified commanders need to be able to say, “ok, you three from out of town link up with our guy at door 4, make entry and proceed towards the library where the shooter was last seen.”. This doesn’t need to be done in person, but the radio channels are likely pretty heavy with comms from the already-deployed contact teams. The second type of team unified command needs to start assembling is rescue task forces. The scene can be described in three zones. -A hot zone, where the shooting is still occuring, where there is a high probability of being engaged by the shooter or the shooter is still ‘loose’. -A warm zone, where the shooting did occur, but which has been swept by contact teams and there is a low likelihood of being engaged. -A cold zone, i.e. a safe zone. Somewhere distant enough where there is no likelihood of being engaged. The incident command post, staging area, etc. need to be set up in the cold zone. The contact teams need to be engaging the shooter in the hot zone. The rescue task forces are the key for the warm zone. We’ve seen that minutes matter when it comes to gunshot wounds, and even something as simple as pressure on a bullet wound can extend someones time to get to trauma care dramatically. But, the warm zone isn’t the cold zone. The shooter may break out of ‘containment’ (or simply not be contained as well as thought) and double back, the shooter may have left booby traps, the shooter may engage at longer range than anticipated. However we’ve seen that the old method of waiting for everything to be the cold zone means more people die. Enter the Rescue Task Force. The concept is incredibly basic. You take 4(ish) fire/ems personnel, with ballistic protection, and 2(ish) law enforcement officers, you marry them together and the police provide armed overwatch directly for the fire/ems folks who can go in and start doing triage. For a small event, RTFs will directly treat and bring out their casualties on the ambulances they ‘rode’ in on. For a complex event with many victims, RTF’s will establish a Casualty collection point and outside ambulances (or armored vehicles) will rotate through, all under the protection of the armed escorting law enforcement officers. RTFs primary goal in triage is stabilization and transport, a role much better suited for Paramedics/EMS/Firefighters. By the time RTFs are established, unified command should have grown to encompass emergency management and critically, someone from the school administration. Having a subject matter expert from the school embedded in unified command means there should be on-hand answers to the types of questions that are going to crop up. Assuming the killing is stopped, and RTFs have swept the school for injuries, the next big step is recovery...reuniting families, sharing information with the public, and cleaning up. That’s probably best saved for another post. To break it down simply. Active shooter reported, first 4 cops immediately and usually independently move to stop the killing, unified command spins up, deploy contact teams and rescue task forces. We saw this with Nashville, we didn’t see this with Uvalde. I grabbed an after action from Uvalde which I’ll do another post about once I’ve read through it.
|
|
#
?
Apr 2, 2023 03:26
|
|
|
Why wouldn't the platonic ideal of shooter response include armed guards prepared to put it down on site?
|
|
#
?
Apr 2, 2023 04:21
|
|
|
Cpt_Obvious posted:Why wouldn't the platonic ideal of shooter response include armed guards prepared to put it down on site? For a last point, the idea of SROs existing is not necessarily anything like a settled argument. As far as I know, SROs are emotional security theatre responses and not a response that has been shown to be particularly effective. Ravenfood fucked around with this message at 20:23 on Apr 2, 2023 |
|
#
?
Apr 2, 2023 20:19
|
|
|
Ravenfood posted:Presumably said officer should act as the "first officer on scene" in the above narrative. For another, not including it both makes the hypothetical more generalizable to any setting doesn't have a SRO. The famous example (other than Uvalde) is the Parkland shooting, where the deputy assigned to the building fled and acted with remarkable similarity to the Uvalde police. Parkland Officer Who Stayed Outside During Shooting Faces Criminal Charges https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/us/parkland-scot-peterson.html What Officials Say Scot Peterson Did Not Do During the Parkland School Shooting https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/us/scot-peterson-video-footage-parkland-shooting.html We are at the stage where armed police are receiving the "ideal" tactical training and then sometimes just not doing it--a complete dice roll for what is only a mitigating response to people being murdered. And it's not seeing the forest for the trees: The policy in action at Parkland was for an old man to do a military sweep of the school at the drop of a hat. Reading between the lines: To provide this response or better means a continuing militarization of police with accompanying overwhelming taxpayer budget. When the police inevitably overreach because they are trained to be a military, or fail because inevitably they are not really a military, the resulting legal settlements are more money. None of it meanwhile could hope to accomplish the fantasy of a preventative security perimeter around every school in America.
|
|
#
?
Apr 2, 2023 22:19
|
|
|
Ravenfood posted:Presumably said officer should act as the "first officer on scene" in the above narrative. For another, not including it both makes the hypothetical more generalizable to any setting doesn't have a SRO. I don't have any on-hand data for it, and if anyone does I'd love to see it, but anecdotally I've seen SRO programs really thrive when the SRO is a lot less cop and a lot more trusted agent who people can come to for stuff. A "good" SRO will know the drama at the school and be able to intervene before the need for traditionally law enforcement action is there. You want kids who see that Billy brought a gun to school to feel comfortable going to their SRO. When the SRO is just there to jam kids up for bullshit that falls apart.
|
|
#
?
Apr 2, 2023 22:48
|
|
|
Uvalde AAR. It’s worth noting that I haven’t seen anything like an after action from the Uvalde Police department. Given their inability to set up competent incident command and their actions during and after the shooting, that’s not surprising. ALERRT however did an AAR. This is part 1, focusing on timeline, tactics, and a deep dive on breaching. I haven’t seen part 2, it might not be released or it might be limited distro. I recommend folks read the AAR for the detailed timeline, which I won’t go into detail on. Instead I want to quote some excerpts that seem relevant to the discussions in the thread so far. They ID’d three key issues that occurred prior to the suspect entering the building. All emphasis mine. quote:First, a teacher propped open the exterior door at 11:27:14. ALERRT staff noted rocks (some of which were painted) were placed at most external doors of the building. Based on this observation, it appears that propping doors open is common practice at this school. While the teacher did kick the rock and close the door prior to the suspect making entry, and the propping open of the door did not affect what happened in this situation, circumventing access control procedures can create a situation that results in danger to students. After the teacher closed the door, she did not check to see if the door was locked. Perhaps this was because the door is usually locked. However, on this day the door was not locked, and because it was not locked, the attacker was able to immediately access the building. This again highlights the importance of not circumventing access control procedures. Even if the teacher had checked to see if the door was locked, it appears that she did not have the proper key or tool to engage the locking mechanism on the door. Finally, we note that the door was a steel frame with a large glass inlay. This glass was not ballistic glass, nor was there film on the glass to maintain the integrity of the door if the suspect shot the glass. This suggests that the suspect would have been able to gain access to the building even if the door was locked. Single points of entry, and those points being mantraps/vestibules are a common best practice and older schools need to be retrofitted. Even if the door was locked and the shooter had to shoot the glass out and reach in and unlock it, that’s critical time for a responding officer to intervene. quote:Second, one of the first responding officers (UCISD PD) drove through the parking lot on the west side of the building at a high rate of speed. The suspect was in the parking lot at this time, but the officer did not see him. If the officer had driven more slowly or had parked his car at the edge of the school property and approached on foot, he might have seen the suspect and been able to engage him before the suspect entered the building (ALERRT & FBI, 2020, p. 3-4.) Situational awareness is key. Roaring into the parking lot and missing such a critical clue (the suspect) is a huge misstep. Like above, if the shooter had been wrestling with a door at this point an officer may have seen it. quote:Third, a Uvalde PD officer reported that he was at the crash site and observed the suspect carrying a rifle prior to the suspect entering the west hall exterior door. The UPD officer was armed with a rifle and sighted in to shoot the attacker; however, he asked his supervisor for permission to shoot. The UPD officer did not hear a response and turned to get confirmation from his supervisor. When he turned back to address the suspect, the suspect had already entered the west hall exterior door at 11:33:00. The officer was justified in using deadly force to stop the attacker. Texas Penal Code § 9.32, DEADLY FORCE IN DEFENSE OF PERSON states, an individual is justified in using deadly force when the individual reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to prevent the commission of murder (amongst other crimes). In this instance, the UPD officer would have heard gunshots and/or reports of gunshots and observed an individual approaching the school building armed with a rifle. A reasonable officer would conclude in this case, based upon the totality of the circumstances, that use of deadly force was warranted. Stuff like this speaks to the culture at the Uvalde PD. That an officer even considered asking for permission in this case is insane. It’s possible the officer didn’t feel comfortable taking a ~150yd shot, but it doesn't seem that way since he asked permission. This feels like the culture at the PD is one of covering your own rear end, making sure someone OK’s anything you do so if it’s wrong it’s not your fault. Three more key issues prior to the shooter entering the school rooms quote:First, Uvalde ISD had protocols in place requiring doors to remain locked at all times, Your security is only as strong as your weakest link and as we’ve seen there have been a couple weak links in the security at Robb elementary. quote:The second issue involves having teams of officers at both ends of the south hallway. ALERRT teaches that a single team should be in a single area of building at a time (ALERRT & FBI, 2020, pp. 2-20 to 2-26 & 7-4). Having multiple teams or splitting an existing team can create a crossfire situation. If the suspect had emerged from the classrooms, officers from both teams presumably would have opened fire resulting in a high likelihood of officers at either end of the hallway shooting officers at the other end. The teams should have quickly communicated, and officers at one end of the hallway should have backed out and redeployed to another position. Additionally, ALERRT teaches that teams consist of up to 4 members (ALERRT and FBI, 2020, pp. 4-1 to 4-27). Teams larger than 4 tend to create congestion and interfere with the ability of the team to operate quickly and effectively. Therefore, once 4 officers were in the south hallway area of the building, no additional officers were needed in that area. Additional officers should have been assigned other tasks. quote:The third issue revolves around losing momentum. The first three responding UPD officers enter the west hall exterior door at 11:35:55 and an additional four officers entered the south hall at 11:36:00. Audio recordings indicate the suspect was actively firing his weapon until 11:36:04. The first responding officers correctly moved toward the active gunfire, which was acting as their driving force (ALERRT & FBI, 2020, pp. 2-15 to 2-16, 2-26, 2-33). The seven officers converged on rooms 111 and 112 at 11:37:00. As the officers approached the doors, the suspect began firing. This gunfire caused both teams of officers to retreat from the doors. We note that the officers did not make contact with the doors (i.e., they never touched any part of the doors). The team approaching from the north fell back to the T-intersection of the west and south hallways. This position is approximately 67 feet from the doors of rooms 111 and 112. The team approaching from the south fell back to the south end of the south hallway. The team in the south hallway were not visible on camera, so their distance from the affected classrooms is unknown. quote:ALERRT teaches that first responders’ main priority in an active shooter situation is to first Stop the Killing and then Stop the Dying (ALERRT & FBI, 2020, pp. 2-9, 2-15 to 2-16). Inherent in both stopping the killing and dying is the priority of life scale (ALERRT & FBI, 2020, pp. 2-6 & 2-34). At the top of this scale, the first priority is to preserve the lives of victims/potential victims. Second, is the safety of the officers, and last is the suspect. This ordering means that we expect officers to assume risk to save innocent lives. Responding to an active shooter is a dangerous task (Blair & Duron, 2022). There is a chance that officers will be shot, injured, or even killed while responding. This is something that every officer should be acutely aware of when they become a law enforcement officer. quote:We commend the officers for quickly entering the building and moving toward the sounds of gunfire. However, when the officers were fired at, momentum was lost. The officers fell back, and it took more than an hour to regain momentum and gain access to critically injured people. Putting aside the layered failures that led up to this point, once the momentum was lost that was it. The cover-my-rear end and ask for permission culture of the Uvalde PD took over and twenty plus people died. Active Shooter vs Barricaded Suspect There has been a lot of talk (at least there was shortly after the shooting) about how it turned into a barricaded suspect and the response had to change. quote:As discussed, the situation became static at 11:38:37. Prior to this, at 11:38:11, the UCISD PD Chief called for additional assistance (tactical teams and equipment). The responding officers began treating the situation as a hostage/barricade rather than an active shooter event. The timeline shows that the shooter was killed at 12:50:03. quote:A reasonable officer would have considered this an active situation and devised a plan to address the suspect. Even if the suspect was no longer firing his weapon, his presence and prior actions were preventing officers from accessing victims in the classroom to render medical aid (ALERRT & FBI, 2020, p. 2-17). If we assume the officers were totally outgunned and the suspect was in a superior position, and waiting for backup was the right call... quote:The UCISD PD Chief did request SWAT/tactical teams. SWAT was called, but it takes time for the operators to arrive on scene. In the meantime, it is imperative that an immediate action plan is created. This plan is used if active violence occurs. It appears that the officers did not create an immediate action plan. The report goes on to further discuss hwo people from ALERRT went to the school and tried a bunch of different breaching tactics, including the Rainbow Six Siege-esque “smash a firing port into a wall” method, all of which worked pretty well and could have been attempted.
|
|
#
?
Apr 3, 2023 02:23
|
|
|
I'm not loving the ALERRT report, purely reacting to how much of it reads like an ad for ALERRT. I wanted to touch on this paragraph from the Rockefeller report earlier, which bugged me. This veers into gun control territory because, well, that's what the paragraph is about. quote:A recent media analysis found that 70 percent of the total news stories on mass public shootings printed by The New York Times were driven by only 15 events.[20] These 15 massacres are the most “extreme” and therefore the most atypical. However, due to the disproportionate news coverage, these 15 cases not only distorted the public’s understanding of the causes and possible solutions but also shaped the political discourse and subsequent legislative solutions to mass public shootings. Research suggests such knee-jerk policies are “feel-good legislation” with no measurable effect.[21] The bracketed numbers are footnote citations. 20 is to this article, available free online here: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323048253_The_Media%27s_Coverage_of_Mass_Public_Shootings_in_America_Fifty_Years_of_Newsworthiness 21 is to the below article, which isn't publicly available for free: Jaclyn Schildkraut and Tiffany Cox Hernandez, “Laws That Bit The Bullet: A Review of Legislative Responses to School Shootings,” American Journal of Criminal Justice 39, 2 (2014): 358-74. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12103-013-9214-6 First, the claim cited to article 20 isn't really tied to or supported in the citation to article 21- the two articles are talking about somewhat different things, with article 21 not really basing its analysis on the concept of media distortion promoted in article 20. That said, there are two additional layers of problem here: 1. The report misrepresents the cited articles. 2. The cited articles are kinda poo poo. I'll go through each article in turn. Article 20:The Media’s Coverage of Mass Public Shootings in America: Fifty Years of Newsworthiness This appears to be part of a doctorate research program, which is interesting context but doesn't impugn it in any way. The other author is an author on the Rockefeller report, which is, well, a bit incestuous, but not necessarily damning either. The article is a quantitative analysis based on a partially qualitative scoring and evaluation of coverage of mass shooting events in the New York Times from 1966 to 2016. At the outset, both the article and the Rockefeller report should really not be presenting any one newspaper as representing all of media- the NYT has a lot of features that make it a weird choice to assume that it would reflect "the media." That a media analysis article is doing this is...concerning. It's all the more concerning because the approach the article is taking, and its broad claims, are very demanding. The authors choose criteria that they weight into a model to identify which shootings the NYT considered "more newsworthy," identify variables that emerge from this model, and argue that these variables reflect what features of the shootings were considered more "newsworthy." In turn, the authors argue that the NYT covering some shootings more than others produces a distortion in public perception of shootings generally (this is referred to as a "media distortion analysis," and is apparently based on work by Jaclyn Schildkraut, the author of the second paper). In terms of the general concept, it's possible to do this sort of analysis, but it requires really careful consideration of the criteria and dataset to ensure that alternate explanations for the selection of articles for newsworthiness- to identify alternate explanations for why some events may get more coverage beyond the stated impact. Absent that consideration, the sources of "newsworthiness" that influence subject focus will also be missed in the resulting claims about how coverage distorts public perception. (there are other more technical issues with the methodology of the paper, like too many hypotheses for the dataset, but I'm focusing on the abstract stuff). In this case, that close analysis isn't performed, with some serious issues. One example that stands out: the authors emphasize that the NYT covered shootings with middle eastern shooters way more than anyone else, based on their criteria. You can come up with some reasonable intuitions about why that might be the case for news coverage from the NYT between 1966 and 2016! However, what the authors don't directly address is that this emphasis is apparently entirely driven by the San Bernadino shooting, which had a whole ton of unusual features compared to any other mass shooting event. The authors also don't really account for or balance against order effects (will it surprise you to learn Columbine got more coverage than later school shootings?) or other conflicting factors that would influence the coverage. Some of these issues are partially raised as research limitations, but the net effect is that the conclusion is falsification-resistant (in a bad sense): any difference between egalitarian coverage of all shootings can be asserted as representing a selective process of "newsworthiness," and the subsequent argument that this distorts public perception along the same lines goes without associated support that matches the same underlying variable structure. The distortion is just asserted, but, well, I don't know that the public thinks most mass shootings are conducted by people of middle eastern descent. So in brief, the article really overstates the generalizability of its findings and doesn't actually prove or support public perception distortion based on coverage generally, or specifically in line with the forms of coverage selection it discusses. This is a problem when the article is cited to prove "These 15 massacres are the most “extreme” and therefore the most atypical. However, due to the disproportionate news coverage, these 15 cases not only distorted the public’s understanding of the causes and possible solutions but also shaped the political discourse and subsequent legislative solutions to mass public shootings." Article 21: Laws That Bit The Bullet: A Review of Legislative Responses to School Shootings This article is in part by Jaclyn Schildkraut, who is also on staff at the Rockefeller institute that wrote the report (though she's not an author on the report itself). Again, not really a good look to be citing your own people, but not terrible. What is terrible is the article itself. Selecting three shootings (Westside Middle School, 1998, Columbine, 1999, and Virginia Tech, 2006), the authors argue that because the killers in these specific shootings were already in violation of laws, the idea that gun control measures proposed afterwards could have prevented the killing is questionable. This is, uh, straight out of the NRA rhetorical playbook- to argue that people will violate laws and, therefore, legislation is useless. This is used to dismiss bills that haven't even been passed. Schildkraut doubles down by arguing that even legislation that has passed and has an effect (such as reporting requirements created by the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007) aren't effective because there are gaps in them, and shootings still occur: quote:The reporting requirements under the NICS Improvement Act address only people who have been diagnosed mentally ill or an imminent danger to themselves or others. It fails, however, to account for those people with illnesses who are never found mentally unfit, those who are never committed to an institution, or those who never receive outpatient treatment. This is coupling both forms of the futility argument the NRA uses to sabotage legislation- that legislation will do nothing, and that even if it does do something, it's "meaningless" because it won't solve everything. In reading the article, it begins the discussion section with a quotation to a source which I at first thought would be a potential better citation, saying that "the specific gun control measures proposed in their aftermath were largely irrelevant and almost certainly could not have prevented the incidents or reduced their death tolls." When I looked into the author, Gary Kleck, I found he's intensely controversial for producing anti-gun-control research and data that other researchers can't replicate. (that article's not great, but it summarizes pretty accurately how bizarre it is to cite Kleck at the outset of your discussion section). Also, uh, not a great sign. It's really difficult to read this article as being argued in good faith- and the report is citing it to argue that legislation pursued after shootings is "knee-jerk feel-good" and does nothing. That's...just not remotely supported, and the cited source is lovely enough that now I have questions about the whole Rockefeller report. Discendo Vox fucked around with this message at 05:51 on Apr 3, 2023 |
|
#
?
Apr 3, 2023 05:35
|
|
|
That's more evidence of normalization than anything. There are so many mass shootings now that the media only reports on the most extreme because nobody pays attention to the smaller ones. They're just a normal part of American life now.
|
|
#
?
Apr 3, 2023 16:52
|
|
|
Just to be clear: when I say "smaller" i mean less valued by the media. For example, if a mass shooting targeted an extremely wealthy and powerful population it would be probably be front page news regardless of number of deaths.
|
|
#
?
Apr 3, 2023 16:57
|
|
|
Discendo Vox posted:I'm not loving the ALERRT report, purely reacting to how much of it reads like an ad for ALERRT. Oh absolutely, it really seems to exist because someone realized the Uvalde police would never put out one of their own. So I am afraid it's the best we have. I'd love to get my hands on part 2 which supposedly talks about the c2 elements (or lack thereof).
|
|
#
?
Apr 3, 2023 18:18
|
|
|
Elendil004 posted:I just don't think outside a very tiny outlier of truly heinous people that someone just gets to be that malevolent without death of a thousand cuts. If that guy had had a tenth less interactions with the agency he hated he might have just kept being angry at the org but not killed a bunch of people over it. I agree the details we have are presented pretty dryly and I'm only using it as a broad example not trying to re-litigate the case itself. But I just don't see people getting to the point of launching a mass attack without a multitude of layered stressors. This is from a few days ago, but I was reading some of the papers referenced upthread, and a passage stuck out to me as being a good example of the type of behavior I was trying to talk about earlier. This is a passage about the Virginia Tech shooter from the Laws that Bite the Bullet article, but it's essentially just a summary of a more detailed report from Virginia Tech (Link, p. 40-52): quote:The fall of 2005, in particular, was a critical time for Cho (VTRP, 2007). Not only did he remain withdrawn from those around him, but his writings also became increasingly hostile and his behavior more threatening. After his classmates in Professor Nikki Giovanni’s class stopped attending out of fear, she had him removed, and department head Lucinda Roy mentored Cho one-on-one (VTRP, 2007). Cho continued to present dark and violent writings to Dr. Roy and his other professors, which sparked enough concern that they began documenting all encounters with him (VTRP, 2007). Dr. Roy offered on a number of occasions to help Cho seek counseling, though he refused her assistance (VTRP, 2007). I agree with you that there are vanishingly few individuals who execute a mass attack based on one bad interaction, and that it's way more likely to be a "death of a thousand cuts" situation. My point earlier was that an individual with a malevolent personality can, as I believe this passage demonstrates, be more or less the instigator of most of their negative interactions. A lot of negative things happened to this guy: people didn't like hanging out with him, he was removed from a class, he had campus police called on him and was told not to interact with certain students, and at one point he was involuntarily committed. However, all of these things happened because he was, by all accounts, a deeply unpleasant person to be around who openly fantasized about death and violence. That's why I took issue with the assertion that half of attacks could be prevented if there were better avenues for addressing grievances, because "they kicked me out of class because I called the other students mass murderers and told them that I hope they burn in hell" is not the type of grievance that is going to have a nic resolution from the point of view of the eventual shooter. Baronash fucked around with this message at 18:40 on Apr 3, 2023 |
|
#
?
Apr 3, 2023 18:33
|
|
|
Pleasant Friend posted:I believe Democrats should push for all medical bills incurred by mass shootings to be covered by the state, funded by a tax on gun ownership. I believe Democrats should push for all medical bills incurred to be covered by the state, funded by a tax. Cpt_Obvious posted:That's more evidence of normalization than anything. There are so many mass shootings now that the media only reports on the most extreme because nobody pays attention to the smaller ones. They're just a normal part of American life now. It's not so much a 'now'. That's how it's always been. Unless the crime is big enough to be outrageous, it rarely got out of local or regional level media. A couple people getting shot in a gas station holdup isn't news past county lines, but if you're looking for a sensational mass shooting number it's getting counted. Some hard data from the closest thing to what I'd consider an unbiased source in a very ideological argument, the Bureau of Justice Statistics and their publication, the National Crime Victimization Survey In particular, reference Trends and Patterns in Firearm Violence, 1993-2018 (or direct link) for a couple relevant facts, namely that both the rate of homicide by firearm dropped 40% across the period tracked, but the overall rate of nonfatal firearm violence also dropped nearly twice as much, down 75%. For comparison: 1993: 18,300 firearm homicides (7 per 100k population), 1,529,700 nonfatal firearm victimizations (7.3 per 1000 population.) 2018: 14,000 firearm homicides (4.3 per 100k population), 470,800 nonfatal firearm victimizations (1.7 per 1000 population.) Rough estimate from OJP files here and the Small Arms Survey here suggests the number of firearms in circulation increased from 192 million in 1993 to 393 million over that time. Despite the proliferation of guns over the 25 years covered, we see a sharp decrease in both absolute number of shootings, and rates per population. That's not to say that we can't be better, but it does suggest that we should be considering what factors drive violence, and especially mass shootings. My personal opinion since Columbine when I was in high school has been that the media circus surrounding shootings has led more disgruntled young men looking to get famous and have their manifesto broadcast far and wide to go after soft targets that will generate enough outrage to whip the media into a feeding frenzy. I consider that whole thing insanely irresponsible on the part of the media, and contrast it to best practices for reporting on suicides to discourage copycats (https://reportingonsuicide.org/). Liquid Communism fucked around with this message at 04:55 on Apr 4, 2023 |
|
#
?
Apr 4, 2023 04:52
|
|
|
Liquid Communism posted:Despite the proliferation of guns over the 25 years covered, we see a sharp decrease in both absolute number of shootings, and rates per population. That's not to say that we can't be better, but it does suggest that we should be considering what factors drive violence, and especially mass shootings. My personal opinion since Columbine when I was in high school has been that the media circus surrounding shootings has led more disgruntled young men looking to get famous and have their manifesto broadcast far and wide to go after soft targets that will generate enough outrage to whip the media into a feeding frenzy. There has in fact been a push within media over the last few years to cover perpetrators and the statements of mass shooters less, for these exact reasons. They get a lot less coverage than they used to.
|
|
#
?
Apr 4, 2023 06:01
|
|
|
Yeah, still bad enough that every shooting leads to false accusations against people as the Internet Detective Squad starts roaring through social media, desperate to be the first one to out the killer. Remember when the Sandy Hook shooter's brother had to go into protective custody because of it, and found out his mom and sibling were dead from people bombarding his social media while he was at work several states away?
|
|
#
?
Apr 4, 2023 06:33
|
|
|
Liquid Communism posted:Yeah, still bad enough that every shooting leads to false accusations against people as the Internet Detective Squad starts roaring through social media, desperate to be the first one to out the killer. Remember when the Sandy Hook shooter's brother had to go into protective custody because of it, and found out his mom and sibling were dead from people bombarding his social media while he was at work several states away? That's not really mass media; that's social media.
|
|
#
?
Apr 4, 2023 07:30
|
|
|
Liquid Communism posted:Despite the proliferation of guns over the 25 years covered, we see a sharp decrease in both absolute number of shootings, and rates per population. That's not to say that we can't be better, but it does suggest that we should be considering what factors drive violence, and especially mass shootings. My personal opinion since Columbine when I was in high school has been that the media circus surrounding shootings has led more disgruntled young men looking to get famous and have their manifesto broadcast far and wide to go after soft targets that will generate enough outrage to whip the media into a feeding frenzy. I remember seeing that actual ownership rates have been going down, and the number per capita is driven by the nuts buying bigger arsenals   That would be pretty consistent with declining murder rates as you really just need one gun to do it. Though as I understand that's entirely based on polling as there's no actual data so who knows 
|
|
#
?
Apr 4, 2023 08:55
|
|
|
Discendo Vox posted:That's not really mass media; that's social media. CNN, Fox, etc all run uncritically with social media leads.
|
|
#
?
Apr 4, 2023 12:38
|
|
|
|
| # ? May 4, 2024 10:01 |
|
|
Discendo Vox posted:There has in fact been a push within media over the last few years to cover perpetrators and the statements of mass shooters less, for these exact reasons. They get a lot less coverage than they used to. Yeah, the problem with that is, as has been said, trying not to disclose information tends to lead to social media making poo poo up, which is much worse than publicizing the shooter, which is why, by the way, you can't keep a lid on these things.
|
|
#
?
Apr 4, 2023 13:11
|
|
