(Thread IKs:
fatherboxx)
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How practical is trying to support friendly squads 300m away though with the equipment carried by infantrymen? Can people regularly see 300m out much less spot guys moving around trying not to be seen? I have seen a lot of combat footage in Ukraine and it seems they might not see past 150m in many directions from what they show on their cameras.
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May 9, 2023 03:50
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Brain65 posted:Some action going on near Svatove. Maybe bombing Luhansk is not pointless. Anybody got confirmation of this? Defmon says its nothing. https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1657834110075691008
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May 15, 2023 00:11
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fizzy posted:I'm not saying that Ukraine is a fascist country for drafting its citizens into the military. It is at times like these that I really dislike how the modern usage of the word fascist (among other terms) has grown so wide and nebulous that it ceases to have any real meaning and is instead used whenever a person seeks to preemptively take the moral high ground to shut down discussion on their position. In terms of the morality of the situation, I think most people understand there are shades of grey here. The question of whether a citizen is morally obligated to defend their country has ties to the political organization of their country. Most western democracies (as it is understood) offer a wide range of personal freedoms and access to political decision making on some level. I personally think almost without a doubt that citizens of such a country are morally obligated to fight. You can't imo enjoy the freedoms and protections of the state and then abandon the civic responsibility that comes with it. Running away when the country gets invaded definitely counts as avoiding civic responsibility. That same question is different for a person in an authoritarian state (the loose non technical term most people associate with the word fascist these days) who enjoys no civic rights and no political participation. Especially when such a state engages in an offensive war where there is no clear and imminent threat justifying preemptive action. So just because conscription is a tool commonly used by authoritarian regimes, the fact that a state may enact harsh conscription with consequences for dodging, doesn't mean that state is skirting towards fascism. I am not going to just give the Ukrainian government a free pass here because I understand that there is meaningful corruption that occurs and I am not familiar with how robust their democracy and rule of law is but conscription alone doesn't make for fascism. We should take care to use terms in a more precise manner if engaging in good faith discussions.
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May 23, 2023 18:14
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fatherboxx posted:Really, are there stats on income/education of recruits from recent years? Hard to believe that. https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.br...on-problem/amp/
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May 24, 2023 15:10
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fatherboxx posted:Kofman with a surprising take but as always I'd trust him here Not surprising at all. At no point in time was a cross river op an attractive option for the Ukrainians.
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Jun 7, 2023 18:55
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RockWhisperer posted:I'm curious of whether Ukraine might consider a cross-river assault after the water recedes considering the water level is now controlled by nature (not the Russians anymore) and the river bank defenses are damaged. The odds of that are zero unless the Russians themselves evacuate the area and there is no resistance left. Crossing contested rivers is one of the hardest things you can do in war. You have to establish a foot hold on the far bank, and then proceed to be able to move men, vehicles, and supplies across the water obstacle in large quantities. The more units you put on the far side, the bigger the strain on whatever crossing equipment you got whether it be ferries or ad hoc bridging equipment. Existing crossings such as road and rail bridges are limited so the possibility of the foot hold, the bridges, and the area on your side of the bank which will be heavily congested, coming under punishing artillery fire is very high. If you remember the Kherson offensive that lasted 2 months, the Ukrainians tried to force themselves across a much smaller Inhulets river that was fordable in several places and was stone walled by the Russians who were stretched thin with a diminished supply capacity since their own logistics line across the Dnipro was getting hammered by ATACMS. The fighting near the area of Davydiv Brid on the Inuhlets held up the Ukrainians for almost 2 months and by all accounts was a blood bath with the Ukrainians suffering high casualties in men and vehicles. I think you can understand why Kofman is skeptical that this changes anything. The Ukrainian army couldn't take advantage of a depleted Russian force, got held up for 2 months along a much smaller river that didn't even need crossing equipment in places and ultimately the Russians pulled out on their terms. Crossing the Dnipro would be a much bigger ask. Even if you say that the Ukrainians have newer toys and maybe better trained troops after a winter of consolidation, do you really think they would commit them to the most difficult of tasks when they could be unleashed further north where the Ukrainians can attack without having to cross a massive river?
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Jun 7, 2023 23:16
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Phlegmish posted:Zelensky confirming that the counter-offensive has begun: Yep, all signs before and current show that "success" is going to look much like the late summer offensive of 2022 in Kherson. Russians are prepared and willing to fight and the Ukrainians don't appear have clear edge and it is probably going to be a slog with a decent chance they will end up with not a ton to show for it. Goons should temper their expectations now. I know some folks were hoping for Kharkiv round 2 but that is very unlikely to happen.
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Jun 10, 2023 16:11
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Vincent Van Goatse posted:Your evidence, please. 1) Lack of panicked Russian posting on telegram that are located deeper and deeper behind the front lines on an hourly basis like what happened in Kharkiv shortly after that op kicked off. 2) The fact that the Kharkiv offensive was the only case in over a year of fighting that had the Ukrainians actually defeat Russian forces and capture large amounts of territory. Every other instance of major liberation of territory has come from the Russians withdrawing largely on their own terms (Kyiv pocket and other northern Oblasts in April 22, Kherson after 2 months of fighting and Russians withdrawing across the Dnipro with no mass surrender). Both cases had Russians under severe supply constraints on over extended positions. This time around they have had 8 months of preparation in the south. I don't know why anyone who has looked into the conflict with any depth would expect another Kharkiv like success unless you thought Western tanks and vehicles were wonder weapons.
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Jun 10, 2023 16:55
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Xiahou Dun posted:Sure, that's a short but fair summary of some of the difficulties the counter-offensive is and will be facing. Lol, I am glad I live rent free in your head. Going back to the start of the war, I haven't made a ton of predictions, but most them have been accurate. This is a pretty safe one too and in line with what guys like Kofman have been saying. The vitriol on display pretty funny though.
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Jun 10, 2023 18:56
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fatherboxx posted:I'd also like to remind everyone that it is likely you dont have acces to classified/on the ground info and if your main measure is telegram whinage... Lets say you need to improve your methodology. I agree and have said as much in the past (no one has classified knowledge here) but the lack of Russian whinge on telegram is pretty strong circumstantial evidence unless the Russians have fixed their issues on this file. The stuff coming out of the Kharkiv fight and the subsequent Kherson were pretty decent indicators of how bad things were or were not going. Even the Ukrainians were leaking the pace of their advance by social media images. So far, pretty quiet on both ends.
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Jun 10, 2023 20:13
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Xiahou Dun posted:This is called a spurious correlation. And your sample size is 1. Two things happened at the same time, and now you're arguing that because 1 isn't happening the other can't be. Where did I say something "can't be"? It's your obsession with me clouding your reading comprehension again. I said signs point to another Kherson in terms rather than a Kharkiv. And yes the lack of Russian panic / Ukrainian boasting on social media points to this 48 hours into the Kharkiv, everybody knew something big was going down. As is the fact that Kharkiv occurred under extraordinary circumstances where conditions were perfect and will not be the same here. Randarkman posted:IIRC there wasn't really a lot of Russian grumbling or whining on telegram about Kherson just a couple days after that offensive started, which grinded along for a long time before things got bleak for the Russians and they eventually withdrew. Hell, one of the first things I remember hearing coming out of that was that it had been going on for some days or (a week or more) and that the Ukrainians were meeting stiff resistance and taking heavy casualties from Russian artillery and that people here and on twitter were fretting about (or gloating) in the same way as now. Correct. Russian social media was fairly positive on the Kherson front but was overshadowed by the collapse of the Donbas conscripts up north with the Ukrainians boosting how they had fooled the Russians with "the feint". After a month, with the Ukrainians hitting supply sites and crossings the stuff changed to how they had no supplies and complaining about the lack of suppoet whenever local attacks by the Ukrainians made headway. Right now, Russian bloggers like Rybar are only talking about heavy Ukrainian pressure. Somaen posted:Just a sample of the accurate predictions and extremely good grasp of the situation I also corrected advised against over exuberance in expecting the encirclement of Russians north of Kyiv when many goons where expecting a mass surrender, that the Russians would have a summer offensive in '22 when numerous goons thought the Russians were finished. Many goons thought that the collapse of Kherson would follow with cross Dnipro ops and I said that was fantasy and to expect months of attritional do nothing. Which is not really anything other than reading and repeating what credible analysts have said all along. And credible analysts are saying to expect more of a Kherson slog than a Kharkiv blitz.
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Jun 10, 2023 21:16
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Huggybear posted:I know what it means, I just think it would be advantageous to Ukraine with their superior ground based fighting systems, also NATO airspace command would mean eyes-on intelligence for Ukraine. But yeah Russia would likely go all out on SAM offensive to attack NATO aircraft so maybe a dumb idea. The Americans have been supplying them with detailed information on Russian positions and movements since the start of the war. That's how the Ukrainians were popping off so many Russian generals. Not sure the risk-reward ratio comes close to justifying what would effectively be NATO's entry into the war just for better surveillance. Deltasquid posted:Will they face the sme types of fortifications or something more solid? https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1667694535978409984?s=20 An FPRI analyst signals that the main defensive belts are still located south of the area under attack. Rybar is acknowledging forward areas were abandoned without a fight due to threats to their rear.
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Jun 11, 2023 07:05
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Dug up a Twitter thread last month going over what the Ukrainians are looking at in front of them. These defensive lines look to be more than a dozen km deep in places and the Ukrainians are sitting in front of zone 1 right now. Tough sledding ahead. https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1655584386601951238.html
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Jun 12, 2023 18:28
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mrfart posted:The problem might be that the Russians lost old junk and the Ukrainians lost some more valuable stuff, like the demining vehicles? It's like one set of photos. From 3 days ago now.
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Jun 13, 2023 15:49
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Paladinus posted:There is a comprehensive list in my post. Was referring to the demining equipment. The nature of using western gear is that it will feel like they are losing more valuable stuff vis a vis the Russians when the fact is the loss ratios not being lopsided is good news at this early stage. It is encouraging that the Russians don't have a ton of vids being spammed right now. ISW reports that Russians are encountering a lot of night attacks which might account for this.
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Jun 13, 2023 16:02
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-says-russia-loses-tanks-as-ukraine-steps-up-offensive-891507a3 Pay walled but Putin acknowledges 54 tanks lost in the counter offensive among other things.
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Jun 13, 2023 19:05
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khwarezm posted:Ok, so I'm sorry to be a bit of a downer, but it seems like a distinct possibility that the offensive probably won't gain the results that have been hoped. If it does stall out what kind of political effects could have on the war? A loss of interest from western parties in funding it? Putin trying to snatch a win of sorts if the war turns into a stalemate that can't be reasonably broken by either side at this point? Depends on what you were hoping for though right? If you were hoping for Zelensky to announce the offensive and watch Ukrainians sweep the Russians to the sea then your hopes or expectations were unrealistic to begin with. If you understood that while the Ukrainians got a lot of older Western surplus stuff and had a little bit of training with it, and that the Russians aren't totally incompetent and have used the time alloted to them to prepare then there is no reason to be a downer because slow and uneven progress was always expected from the start. I see no reason to be down on the Ukrainians so far. The Ukrainians are currently clearing out the forward areas that lie in front of the main Russian defensive line. The area is in question is located where visible Russian defensive works are the least imposing (Tomak is unlikely to be the immediate target given that 3 separate lines of fortifications protect it). See: https://twitter.com/Nrg8000/status/1668649688176955393?s=20 OSINT has identified elements of several of the new brigades but apparently a lot of the heavy lifting in this preliminary attack are from existing units. The pace is slow but is likely just prepatory work before trying to tackle the main fortification line itself. Ie clearing out Makarivka See https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1668693471194914819?s=20 There are no major claims by the Russians of destroying large Ukrainian formations in battle and Russian propaganda footage of destroyed Ukrainian vehicles remains scant. It is going to be a long summer so you can relax. Plenty worse can go wrong before you need to enter doomer mode.
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Jun 14, 2023 18:44
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MeinPanzer posted:Anyone have any good sources of info on the current offensive? Last year I got all of my updates through this thread, but it seems like it’s mostly just discussions of weapons systems and more tangential stuff these days… I’m learning about the incremental gains mostly through mainstream news sites now. The easiest way to keep up is to just read https://www.understandingwar.org/. They have a daily OSINT update. Usually, a day behind due to them having to aggregate and verify before writing their own report If you want to be on the F5 cutting edge then you have to do the Twitter trawl yourself and decide for yourself what is or is not reliable enough to bother with. I usually follow https://twitter.com/RALee85 and https://twitter.com/DefMon3. They won't post trash. I also read the Rybar english account too for the Russian perspective. Despite being pro-Russian Rybar is usually not too bad and if I see what appears to be big claims by pro-Ukraininan accounts, I see what Rybar is or not saying in the same area. The truth is nothing major is happening. Fighting appears to be going on daily in several areas but the Russian fortifications haven't been tested yet. They are still fighting over the forward areas before the main fortifications begin. The Ukrainians also aren't really attacking in large numbers. The Russians aren't really reporting anything more than company or battalion-sized attacks, a lot of them at night. It seems reasonably clear from social media posting on both sides that the western-trained and equipped brigades have not been seriously committed.
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Jun 18, 2023 17:28
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https://www.ft.com/content/d8fe8941-3703-433d-ac7a-dab9ba500481quote:“I personally saw how, during our assault, the enemy [fighter jet] aircraft immediately fired on our advancing troops using laser guided bombs from a far distance,” said Stas, a soldier with an elite drone surveillance unit helping infantry regain lost territory in the south of the country. It was not an isolated incident, he said. There is a method to the madness with the Russian strikes on Ukranian infrastructure.
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Jun 21, 2023 00:20
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Bel Shazar posted:My guess is a few years, since that can only be answered by understanding how Ukraine expected it to go and then comparing that to actual results. Best answer. Though maybe not years. RUSI had access to high-level officials inside the Ukrainian military and produced a report that revealed a lot about the early days of the war from the Ukrainian perspective and expectations. e: came out about the 6 months after the start of the war.
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Jun 22, 2023 04:48
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Willo567 posted:Have they been wrong before on stuff? They are fall more on the sensational spectrum of twitter accounts that do tracking on events. They are typically faster on reporting at the cost of accuracy in details. They are also unabashedly pro Ukrainian with no attempt at balance so you will typically only get good news from them and they will skip all the bad news. Also lots of memes about how Russian forces are going to get it good or will fall apart any day now type tweets.
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Jun 22, 2023 18:53
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https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/22/politics/ukraine-counteroffensive-western-assessment/index.htmlquote:In its early phases, Ukraine’s counteroffensive is having less success and Russian forces are showing more competence than western assessments expected, two western officials and a senior US military official tell CNN. A rather harsh indictment 2 weeks in
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Jun 22, 2023 22:10
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Ynglaur posted:That has "many people are saying" vibes. Whose assessments, specifically? Which countries? The West is not a monolith, and lots of people with no business assessing anything military cover social media with assessments. I am unsure how far CNN's journalistic practices have fallen but I wouldn't expect "senior US military official" to be a random nobody or that they would quote someone who isn't informed on the file. Nor is CNN to my knowledge in the habit of of spreading doubt on the Ukrainians when in fact I find their coverage to be quite optimistic and pro-Ukraine. I posted this since Milley himself is quoted to as saying 'it will likely take a considerable amount of time' a week earlier, hence my "harsh" qualifier. Seems like some dichotomy in opinion in US circles? VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV Ukraine is not a place to visit if you have any doubts about whether you should go or not. MikeC fucked around with this message at 23:23 on Jun 22, 2023 |
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Jun 22, 2023 23:15
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A quick and dirty overview 3 weeks in. https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1672055675248340992
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Jun 23, 2023 14:57
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FlamingLiberal posted:This account is a pretty good source, right? I haven't been keeping up lately with this conflict too closely though. There is enough traffic on all forms of media for you to assume something significant with Wagner and/or its leader is going down. I was in semi-disbelief most of the afternoon. It's so weird that you can't make it up at this point.
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Jun 23, 2023 23:34
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BigBallChunkyTime posted:I've been trying to understand this, so please be gentle. If I'm wrong, explain it like I'm five and have brain damage. ADHD can be a real bitch sometimes: Wagner is a Russian merc group that operates for the Russian government in the Ukraine, among other places, and basically got used as cannon fodder. There seems to be some sort of internal power struggle between Wagner's leader Prigozhin and the Russian Armed Forces going on for some time now. For whatever reason things seem to have come to a head and it appears increasingly likely Prigozhin has crossed the proverbial Rubicon. His ultimate goal is unclear. Wagner is not switching sides. This is an internal conflict within the Russian military aparatus.
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Jun 24, 2023 00:55
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Diogines posted:Can someone who has a better understanding of the situation than I do, please explain the likelihood of this leading to (1)the Russian state imploding into anarchy or (2)nukes somehow getting lose or flying? Both are pretty unlikely, right? SA seems like the last place to ask for an accurate assessment of internal Russian power dynamics. The fact that Prigozhin has gotten this far and isn't dead in a ditch while Russia is in the middle of war has immense comedic value though.
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Jun 24, 2023 05:50
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GaussianCopula posted:If Prigozhin/Wagner can't decapitate the Russian Security State by capturing the president they have a much more difficult task ahead, because Putin will be able to marshal a lot more forces in the long run. I actually think it's the other way around. The longer it takes to suppress Wagner, the weaker Putin looks and the intimidation aspect of his regime starts to crumble. Authoritarian regimes are built on the idea that you can't resist authority. Prigozhin is actively showing otherwise.
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Jun 24, 2023 15:14
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Arglebargle III posted:So if this is true this is basically Prigozhin committing suicide, right? I don't see how Prigozhin can be allowed to live if true.
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Jun 24, 2023 18:44
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Orthanc6 posted:
I dunno bout that. Momentum is crucial for things like this. You want to keep the train moving at max speed to prevent anyone who hopped on from jumping off. You don't want to give folks who are essentially taking a huge risk time to think about what is actually going on. Most importantly you do not want to give the impression they are on a sinking ship.
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Jun 24, 2023 19:02
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Ra Ra Rasputin posted:Hypothetical, Wagner kept marching on Moscow and Prigozhin kicks his feet up on Putin's desk in the kremlin, what then? Either the army and security forces rally to him and he assumes control or they won't and at some point in time he gets shot in the head.
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Jun 24, 2023 23:03
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Kraftwerk posted:That’s the one I’m referring to. It’s sorta like touching a very hot object that singes your fingers and now you aren’t really doing anything because there’s no way to break the Russian lines without your own air assets and a SEAD capability Ukraine doesn’t have. I don’t see what cards are left to play until the F-16s show up and even then there won’t be enough of them to achieve Ukraine’s goals. Both sides are trading small gains and losses. Rybar reported that the Ukrainians were within 1.5 km of Robotyne, a village that is basically at the end of the buffer zone before the first main fortification line in the Orkhiv sector.
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Jun 24, 2023 23:52
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Even the languaged used by Prigozhin in how he avoided leveling accusations directly at Putin has similarities in medieval rebellions where vassal Barons were rarely out for regicide....only to "save" him from his scheming and evil councilors who had led him astray.
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Jun 25, 2023 02:10
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Didn't see this posted with all the Wagner speculation going on but Vice has a new short on the war. Nothing really to analyze but it puts pictures to words. The short has three vignettes. 1. A Bakhmut piece including footage of a trauma team at work. NWS since it is real damage to human bodies 2. A short interview with a Ukranian IED construction team. 3. A few minutes with a rear area bodies recovery team that is going through old battle sites and areas with mass graves identifying previous KIA both Ukrainian and Russian  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xVh-Cejyxs8
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Jun 27, 2023 01:03
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I have been watching this for about a week now but with mil bloggers on both sides commenting on it, I think it's worth bringing up. Ukrainian SoF units have been operating on the eastern side of what remains of the Antonivka bridge over the past week in the village of Dachi. Posters have shown some sketchy tweets about combat footage in that area, and up till today it was only the unreliable pro-Ukranian accounts tweeting about this, but it is safe to say that the Ukrainian presence is real and it is permanent at this point. The thing that piques my interest is that both sides are now talking about pontoon assets being seen/located in the area and in Nova Khakova and that some may already have been thrown up. Example: https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1673400883894272000?s=20 Rybar's daily update today indicates that Ru aviation and drone operators have tried to hit these positions but the Ukrainians have moved SAM and EW assets close enough to make it difficult for the Russians to work on this problem. Rybar also claims that they have information that the Ukrainian 93rd was being pulled out of Chasiv Yar (Bakhmut sector) and in the process of redeploying in the Kherson region. This all may be just a ploy to keep the Russians honest and not strip the left bank of the Dnipro of all troops and I remain skeptical that the Ukranians would try a cross-river operation of any significance given the risks, but the possibility of that is no longer at zero I think.
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Jun 27, 2023 23:20
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Nix Panicus posted:The GPS breaks due to the force of firing. The shell is more expensive than just saturating the area with conventional shells. The shell has less explosives because it has to carry a GPS. The artillery platform has to have a bunch of dumb bullshit attached to it for positioning, increasing weight, power consumption, and necessitating maintenance. Jamming exists. Precision munitions are a grift for the stupid. All this is worth it when you have to haul around a fraction of the shells and launchers to get the same damage on target as dumb shells.
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Jun 29, 2023 00:50
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Ynglaur posted:At least for ground forces, the value of camoflauge had been re-learned in this war. It's not possible to be invisible or anything like that : something always has a sensor good morning enough to see you. But you can skew the odds a little bit,, or require your enemy to use a more valuable asset woth better sensors, or put enough doubt into what they're seeing to cause them to target a lesser, but more certain target. How much of this is due to the relatively static nature of the war?
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Jun 29, 2023 14:03
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Ynglaur posted:The latest RUSI report actually discussed this very thing! Apparently the answer is to create lots of tracks and hide in the noise. Vehicles with unique tires or track signatures are particularly vulnerable to having their positions hunted down via aerial reconnaissance. That's kinda why I asked. Your initial post seemed to make it out that camo had fallen out of fashion or something. That report emphasized the fact that new surveillance techniques made hiding a lot harder than before especially in rear areas. I was wondering how much of it was because men and equipment was constantly occupying the same areas while within range of these systems.
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Jun 29, 2023 18:02
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Cpt_Obvious posted:So, out of curiosity, how does the thread feel about the progress of the counter offensive? Is it successful? How much progress are they making? Is it relatively good or bad news for the Ukrainian military? My view which is formed by listening and reading serious 3rd party analysts as well averaging my daily Twitter trawling from accounts on both sides. It feels like the "counter offensive" is almost a misnomer and is in fact more of an extension of late May's "shaping operations". In the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia area, major fighting is confined to a few spots on the front line near Tomak, Robotyne, and a bulge in the Russian line near Staromaiorsky. This later area is the region where the Ukrainians have gained the most ground but it is important to note that all gains have been made in the buffer zone established by the Russians before the main network of fortifications on the "Surovkin line" begins. Aside from the early June sightings of the Bradleys' and mine clearing Leopards getting taken out, the presence of Western vehicles on video or still images is sparse which suggests that the number of these western trained brigades involved in the fighting is small or sub units are rotated in and out. Complicating things is that the Ukrainians seem very active at night either pushing back or destroying Russian positions in the buffer zone in the dark and the pulling back the vehicles to cover in the day when the Russians counter attack to regain lost ground. It almost feels like a cat and mouse game where the Russians use low quality mobilized troops to hold strong points to bait the Ukrainians forward and the hit them with artillery and attack helicopters before sending the mobiks back in. The Ukrainians meanwhile are trying to shoot down the helicopters and hit Russian artillery positions as they expose themselves in turn. Who is gaining the upper hand in this is impossible to tell. The only thing that is consistent is that it is the mobilized Russians that are doing the majority of the fighting for the Russians. It also seems clear the Ukrainians are not going to take risky action and expose significant portions of their western vehicles until the artillery duel is won. The Ukrainians are attacking elsewhere too especially in the Bakhmut region where progress is being made on the north and southern edges of the city. The footage coming out of those areas seem to indicate older and more established Ukrainian units leading the fighting there. There are scattered tweets from the Russian side which suggests that they don't view Bakhmut changing hands again as some remote possibility. The Russians aren't totally on the defensive. They are continuing to attack and expand the bulge in there line around the Kreminna area and much fuss has been made about Russian "paratroopers" attacking south towards Siversk by Rybar. To me, from the way the Ukrainians are talking in public, it seems conceivable that if the conditions for breaking the fortified line in the south don't present themselves, a major attack might never come and they will pull their chips back and wait for a better hand to be dealt and what we are left with is a summer of this type of extended skirmishing along the front line. Whether that is considered a success or not I guess will be up to the spin doctors to fight over.
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Jun 30, 2023 19:00
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WarpedLichen posted:Got a source on this? I did not have this impression at all, so curious where that's coming from. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-829ea0ba-5b42-499b-ad40-6990f2c4e5d0 Also. Several of pro Ukrainian propaganda accounts showing captured mobiks. None I have come across show captured professionals.
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Jun 30, 2023 20:11
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