|
It should also be pointed out that if we count the osprey as a utility/cargo helicopter it has the lightest armament in the US military. It only has one ramp gun an an option for one turret. The helicopters its replacing could have at least 3 mounted guns. Wanting a little more punch to cover the troops they're dropping off/extracting seems perfectly reasonable. Also, an ACV-22 along the lines of the guns a go-go would be pretty amazing: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WttpWwcSjy4
|
#
?
Jan 22, 2015 17:34
|
|
|
|
| # ? Jun 7, 2024 21:26 |
|
|
hobbesmaster posted:It should also be pointed out that if we count the osprey as a utility/cargo helicopter it has the lightest armament in the US military. It only has one ramp gun an an option for one turret. The helicopters its replacing could have at least 3 mounted guns. Wanting a little more punch to cover the troops they're dropping off/extracting seems perfectly reasonable. Did I hear that right? 75% losses in one year? 
|
|
#
?
Jan 22, 2015 18:02
|
|
|
Well there were 4. One never deployed. One shot itself down after a cannon mount failed, one was destroyed by an enemy mortar on the ground and one was written off in a taxi accident. Vietnam was incredibly dangerous for helicopters.
|
|
#
?
Jan 22, 2015 18:08
|
|
hobbesmaster posted:Well there were 4. One never deployed. One shot itself down after a cannon mount failed, one was destroyed by an enemy mortar on the ground and one was written off in a taxi accident. The reason Russian helicopters are tanks is reports on the Vietnam war that argued American choppers were underpowered and underarmoured.
|
|
|
#
?
Jan 22, 2015 18:18
|
|
|
hobbesmaster posted:Well there were 4. One never deployed. One shot itself down after a cannon mount failed, one was destroyed by an enemy mortar on the ground and one was written off in a taxi accident. Wiki has an unsourced number of roughly 7,000 UH-1s being deployed to Vietnam over the years. The U.S. Army says they lost 3,090 of them in combat and operational losses. Vietnam sucked.
|
|
#
?
Jan 22, 2015 19:11
|
|
|
MrYenko posted:JDAMs are GPS guided, and get their guidance signals from the GPS constellation, and the target coordinates that were input before release. They're also not quite as accurate as a laser guided weapon, and can't really be used effectively against a moving target. Newer JDAM/SDB production is adding laser and radar homing capabilities, to rectify these issues, but at a MUCH higher unit cost. One of JDAMs biggest advantages was hilariously low unit cost, since it was essentially just some flight control fins and a GPS receiver that you bolt to a Mk 82/83/84. That has nothing to do with what I was saying, which is that control surfaces still work during freefall, and could likely keep target in view.
|
|
#
?
Jan 22, 2015 19:36
|
|
|
Jarmak posted:That has nothing to do with what I was saying, which is that control surfaces still work during freefall, and could likely keep target in view. Control surfaces don't necessarily work during free fall though. If the munition in question is designed for free fall use, (i.e., JDAM tail kits) then yes, they obviously do. If the munition is designed to be forward firing (i.e., Hellfire), the control surfaces aren't nearly as big and don't deflect nearly as much, so yes, it's entirely possible that even if you had the right upgrades to allow this to happen the missile would still lose the laser spot when it fell free because Hellfires just aren't physically designed for controllability in free fall...in which case it's going to go corkscrewing off nowhere near the target. What I'm saying is that you're talking something more extensive than just "drop the missile off the rail and it works just fine otherwise." It'd be a major software upgrade (basically rewriting the code for the entire firing and initial guidance sequence) and quite possibly a hardware upgrade as well. If we're going to do this (and I firmly believe we shouldn't), the right way to do it is to modify a Harvest Hawk system for Osprey use, not some Rube Goldberg contraption of drop-free Hellfires. And a reminder that this would all be to give the Navy's Army's Air Force's unarmored troop transport tilt rotor the ability to fire relatively short range anti-armor missiles that require the tilt rotor to remain in LOS of the enemy forces in order to guide the missile, because that's apparently a capability that makes sense. Putting more door gun-esque capability on the Osprey in order to support its troop transport mission makes sense (although not something that is easily technically feasible thanks to the tilt rotor design), turning it into a pseudo-attack helo is retarded. In actual F-35 news the FY14 DOT&E report came out a couple days ago. I'll maybe post some takeaways when I get done reading through it.
|
|
#
?
Jan 23, 2015 11:51
|
|
|
How accurate are this guys' highlights?quote:The real stand out in the 2015 DOT&E report is not so much in what is being reported, but how things are being reported. It would seem as if some numbers were being fudged to make for a more positive image. This was done three ways: quote:
|
|
#
?
Jan 24, 2015 16:06
|
|
|
The "induced" versus "inherent" categorization is discussed in the paper. It mentions that it is subjective whether it is a design flaw or a induced flaw if you are doing normal maintenance on the aircraft and accidentally break something else. The AOLs are lifted, they were in place to make sure planes didn't fall from the sky because they didn't understand how the engine burst into flames in Florida. I wouldn't necessarily be worried about all of the maintenance hours at this point, since they are writing the maintenance manuals. They also count paint curing time as maintenance time, which is technically accurate, however it is a bit different from having a guy actually working on the aircaft. Apparently the RAM on the aircraft cures in 48 hours. The DOT&E report clearly shows they are working very hard to make this plane work, but it kind of makes me wonder what in the gently caress the whole JSF fly off competition between Boeing and Lockheed was even for if the winner of the competition was not even remotely close to what you will need in the end.
|
|
#
?
Jan 24, 2015 16:32
|
|
|
The U.S. fetish for aerial superweapons has always been a thing, but in recent years, it's seemed to dominate the whole public image of the military. When people need a pithy synecdoche for the U.S. going to war, they say we're "bombing" this place or that, not "shelling" or "invading". In the Obama years, it's gone back to the Clinton paradigm of being used as a symbolic military response without needing ground troops. With that in mind, and also keeping in mind the staggeringly huge deterrent effects of a globalized economy (and nukes, and good-old-fashioned military alliances), the need for this high-flying air force that is built for kinetic warfare seems suspect at best. Did things only get to the point that a crushingly expensive monument to overengineering like the F-35 is declared a success around the world because of an irrational deference to American military doctrine? That seems to be pretty widely agreed upon in this thread. What I want to know is, will the backlash against projects like Fs 35 and 22 make a large scale shift in priorities away from airpower possible? Surely countries around the world are getting tired of always buying new generations of air superiority fighters that never do anything except suck up money and get broken up for scrap in 20 years. EVEN IF they find themselves at war, they never get used in combat. We're 15 years into the 21st century. Has there been a single instance of air-to-air combat in that time? For any enemies that the U.S. military is at all likely to face, wouldn't the Army, Marines and Navy have more than enough tools at their disposal to win handily even if every fixed-wing combat aircraft in their inventory suddenly disappeared? Ground based radar and SAMs do the same job as an air superiority fighter for the fraction of the cost. Modern computer-controlled artillery is accurate enough that the benefit you get from dropping a smart bomb by way of a fragile, expensive strike fighter seems questionable. For times when an air-strike is absolutely critically needed, there are cruise missiles - oh, and the new generation of destroyers; just as overpriced and masturbatory as the fighters but genuinely fearsome on their merits. Plus, on a political level, it seems like cutting, say, three-fifths of the aircraft inventory and carrier fleet would result in fewer servicemen losing their jobs, compared to equivalent cuts in the manpower-heavy ground forces. Sure, there are plenty of defense industry workers who would lose their jobs, but they don't draw nearly the public sympathy that "~Our Troops~" do. In recent years, even republicans have been tepid in defending these weapons programs. Wouldn't even some of the hawks be swayed by the argument that if we're going to spend billions equipping our boys to go stomp on a few developing nations, funding ought to be shifted to forces that are actually suited for messy counterinsurgency and police actions?
|
|
#
?
Jan 24, 2015 19:47
|
|
|
Liberal_L33t posted:
Short answer yes. Nothing as big as the gulf war though http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=112431
|
|
#
?
Jan 24, 2015 20:12
|
|
|
lol....really diggin' D&D's take on airpower. I won't respond to that except to say that you're wrong, and you have no idea how wrong you are. Also I'll say that no one in the Army, Navy, or Marines has been attacked from the air for over 60 years...and that's not because we haven't fought anyone capable of doing that over that timeframe. Dominance of the air has become (rightly) seen as a birthright by those in the American military, and I guarantee you that if someone made a push to shitcan the entire tacair fleet the loudest wailing and gnashing of teeth you'd hear wouldn't be coming from the AF, it'd be coming from the Army. As for the DOT&E report, I think that guy hit the major points but I think it lacks context. Here's what stands out to me as I read through it, I'll endeavor to include more commentary to provide some context... quote:- Discoveries of deficiencies continued to occur in later versions of Block 2B software, further slowing progress. For example, completion of weapons delivery accuracy events lagged the plans for CY14 and was put on hold in August when the program discovered a deficiency in the F-35 navigation system. So further issues cropping up with the Block 2B software combined with delays in testing (such as the AOLs) have driven the program into a corner: they can either close out Block 2B in its entirety or they can pursue development and testing of later Blocks as scheduled but they can't do both because the same pool of test assets is available for use with both efforts. If they do the former they will put the larger programmatic schedule at risk and possibly delay declaration of IOC for both the AF and Navy; if they do the latter they have to accept fielding an incomplete Block 2B because they had to close the software prior to incorporating fixes to all the issues they have discovered so far with Block 2B testing, instead pushing those fixes into a later software build (Block 3i or 3F). They're obviously choosing the second option, which is the correct choice...but it means the USMC is going to declare IOC with an OFP that is even less capable and bug-prone than was previously expected. On the plus side... quote:In the FY13 Annual Report, DOT&E estimated that the program would complete Block 2B testing between May and November 2015 (7 to 13 months late), depending on the level of growth experienced, while assuming the program would continue test point productivity equal to that of the preceding 12 months. Since the end of October 2013, the program has made several adjustments to reduce the delay estimated in the FY13 report: The adjustments are basically consolidation of test points across software builds (allowing for fewer test points overall while still meeting the intent), slightly higher overall test productivity, and being able to briefly delay modification of a couple aircraft from Block 2B to later Blocks without incurring overall schedule risk (see above). DOT&E now assesses that Block 2B will be done with testing by Feb 15...but only if the current version of Block 2B is the one that closes out testing (i.e., what I referenced above about not reopening software to fix all the known bugs.) Going along with what I've said so far about Block 2B... quote:In April, the program accepted a DOT&E recommendation that the Block 2B Operational Utility Evaluation (OUE), which was being planned for CY15, should not be conducted and that instead, resources should be focused on conducting limited assessments of Block 2B capability and re-allocated to assist in the completion of development and testing of Block 3i and Block 3F capabilities. So this is interesting for a couple reasons. The reason DOT&E recommended cancelling the Block 2B OUE is because, as I've highlighted above, Block 2B has numerous issues that threaten its ability to be operationally relevant. These issues have no intention of being fixed in Block 2B because reopening the software (which drives retesting) would prohibitively delay the timeline for testing of later Blocks (i.e., Block 3i and 3F, the Blocks that really matter for combat capability for the majority of the fleet.) So DOT&E basically assessed that if they did an OUE on Block 2B it'd be a repeat of the OUE they did a few years back on Block 1. The conclusions from that OUE were basically "it flies....but that's about it, because it has a bunch of restrictions that completely limit its ability to be assessed on combat performance, it breaks all the time, and no one can fix the drat thing." No reason to repeat what we already know, especially when performing an OUE on schedule would suck up test assets that would otherwise need to be used for Block 3 developmental testing....because the operational test assets which are supposed to be the ones performing an OUE are all getting extensive depot mods to be upgraded to the 2B standard (since they were earlier production lot tails) and aren't going to be fully available until the middle of 2016. Every time another major issue pops up in testing that drives a significant modification, the timeline for these depot mods extends out even further. Say it with me one more time...concurrency was the dumbest idea the US military has had in a long time. Almost as dumb as the USMC's insistence on declaring IOC with Block 2B in 2015 is, especially given all the problems/limitations with Block 2B. This next discussion is hilarious to me for personal reasons (I have an unyielding hatred of System Program Offices): quote:DOT&E conditionally approved Revision 4 of the TEMP in March 2013, under the provision that the program revise the master schedule so that there was no overlap of spin-up training for IOT&E and the certification period needed for the Services’ airworthiness authorities to approve a flight clearance with the software to be used for IOT&E. Specifically, this would require the program to adjust the start of the spin-up training from February to July 2017, coinciding with an Operational Test Readiness Review. This adjustment also moved the start of IOT&E to January 2018, vice August 2017, and hence pushed the completion of IOT&E into FY19. In spite of the conditional approval, the program continues to show schedules that plan for the start of spin-up training in February 2017 and the start of IOT&E in August 2017. So I know that was acronym and jargon heavy, I'll attempt to lay it out in plain language. The TEMP is the Test & Evaluation Master Plan...which is exactly what it sounds like: the overarching plan for all T&E on a given program. This is developed by the acquisition program managers in the Program Office (usually called a SPO, the F-35's is called a JPO just to underline how "joint" it is I guess). However, since the F-35 is such an expensive and troubled program, it is on DOT&E (Director, Operational Test & Evaluation...independent office in the Pentagon that oversees DoD OT&E efforts) oversight, which means that any changes the JPO makes to the TEMP have to routed through DOT&E for approval before they become official. In 2013 DOT&E conditionally approved a revision to the TEMP under one big condition: that there be no overlap between spin-up training for IOT&E and the airworthiness certification. IOT&E is Initial Operational Test & Evaluation, it is a formal operational evaluation conducted by independent testers (i.e., DOT&E) and passing it is a legal requirement for a program to proceed to Full Rate Production (as opposed to LRIP, Low-Rate Initial Production, which is where the F-35 currently is). Given the fact that economy of scale is a big part of the F-35's promised affordability, the JPO obviously wants to get into FRP as soon as possible....so conducting and passing IOT&E on schedule is a big deal for them. IOT&E is conducted in an operationally representative environment...so it is conducted using "production" configured aircraft doing operationally representative things (i.e., combat type missions, not just flying around the flagpole), flown by operational (not test) pilots, maintained by uniformed (not contractor) maintainers. In order for this to take place, a big requirement is getting an airworthiness certification...."test" aircraft flown by test pilots operate under different rules than operational aircraft flown by operational pilots. In order for a program to pass from the DT ("test") world into the OT ("operational") world, the airworthiness certification authority for a particular service has to certify that the system is safe to operate and that there aren't any known issues that highly trained and experienced test pilots are working around but that a big dumb operational pilot wouldn't know how to handle. This airworthiness cert is part of the package that gets sent up for the OTTR (Operational Test Readiness Review...exactly what it sounds like). The airworthiness cert is granted against a particular hardware and software configuration...so in order for the cert to be granted on x date, the hardware and software config to be used in IOT&E has to be frozen y months ahead of the cert granting date in order to give the authority time to analyze the data and process the cert. If you go in and reopen the software or start monkeying around with hardware, the process starts all over. Additionally, prior to IOT&E officially beginning there needs to be a period of spin-up training (F-35 is planning on 6 months). This is to give the operational pilots and maintainers time to gain familiarity with the operational configuration of the system so they can give it a true accurate assessment in IOT&E (in other words, you don't want problems in IOT&E due to unfamiliarity with the system, because this muddies the waters as to how effective the system truly is or isn't.) Obviously it is impossible (or at least illegal) to begin the spin-up training before you have an airworthiness cert, since that would cause operational pilots to begin flying a plane that was not certified for their use (huge no-no). To recap: in order for a program to enter FRP it has to pass IOT&E. IOT&E schedule is laid out in the TEMP. DOT&E has final approval authority of the F-35's TEMP. They approved it, on the condition that there be no overlap between the beginning of spin-up training for IOT&E and the receipt of the airworthiness cert. This drove delays in the schedule for IOT&E, because since there are developmental issues with the Block 3F software planned to be used in IOT&E there have been subsequent delays in the expected date of closing the software...which means delays in the airworthiness cert....which means delays in beginning spin-up training...which means delays in starting IOT&E. The JPO has just ignored all that and continued to say that IOT&E will take place on schedule, even though this means either starting IOT&E with severely compressed spin-up training (something DOT&E would not allow) or conducting spin-up training without an airworthiness cert (something the individual Service components would not allow, much less DOT&E). So basically the JPO has completely ignored DOT&E, because following the rules and DOT&E's direction would mean accepting a delay in FRP, which could cause cascading problems with the rest of the program. Of course, it's kind of a moot point, because: - One, DOT&E's power in this area is absolute. They absolutely can (and have in the past) told a program "no, gently caress you, we're not doing IOT&E until we say we're ready, do not pass go, do not collect $200, I don't really care what this does to your precious schedule." - Two, there are so many issues with Block 3's schedule anyway that it likely won't be ready for the notional DOT&E IOT&E schedule laid out above (spin-up July 17, IOT&E kick-off January 18), much less the JPO's impossible schedule (spin-up Feb 17, IOT&E Aug 17). These issues are both with software: quote:- Block 3i flight testing began in late May 2014, five months later than the program’s baseline plan. As well as hardware: quote:Modification plans for the IOT&E aircraft will likely not have aircraft ready to begin the start of spin-up training in February 2017 as planned by the errant schedule submitted in the TEMP. To become Block 3F capable, the operational test aircraft require extensive modifications, including new processors, in addition to those needed for Block 2B capability. Block 3F modification plans are taking into consideration some modifications that already have engineering solutions and approved designs. Other modifications – although known to be required – are still in the formal change approval process leading to parts and modification kits being developed and procured from suppliers. Some of these latter modifications are currently not scheduled to be available until May 2017 for the F-35A and February 2018 for the F-35C, which is later than needed to support spin-up training for IOT&E. (Thanks again concurrency!) Bottom line is that DOT&E thinks the schedule will need to be revised further past their notional July 17/Jan 18 timeline: quote:In order to account for these realities and reduce the overlap of spin-up training for IOT&E with final development activities (such as the activities that provide the certifications for use of the final configuration), the program master schedule should be adjusted to reflect these realities and depict the start of spin-up training for IOT&E no earlier than the Operational Test Readiness Review in November 2017, and the start of IOT&E for Block 3F to occur six months later, in May 2018 and completing in May 2019. If it becomes apparent that spin-up training entry criteria (e.g., providing properly configured production-representative aircraft in sufficient numbers) cannot be met on this timeline, then the schedule will have to be adjusted again I don't think anyone has really picked up on that blurb yet, but like I've laid out above pushing out IOT&E even further (and thus delaying the start of FRP), is actually a pretty big deal. There wasn't anything too noteworthy from flight sciences...testing is proceeding decently (not well but not terrible), and outside of the engine issue there haven't been any show-stopping problems in that department. However, moving on to mission systems, Block 2B has some...challenges: quote:- To date, performance of 2BS5 software, which began flight testing in June, has shown improvement in startup and inflight stability compared to earlier versions. However, fusion of information from own-ship sensors, as well as fusion of information from off-board sensors is still deficient. The Distributed Aperture System continues to exhibit high false-alarm rates and false target tracks, and poor stability performance, even in later versions of software. So on the plus side, it doesn't take forever to boot up and it doesn't constantly crash in-flight. On the downside, it can't really do its job effectively (manage and process information to allow combat performance). Also DAS still doesn't work. quote:- In June, the Program Office and the Services completed a review of nearly 1,500 deficiency reports accumulated since the beginning of testing to adjudicate the status of all capability deficiencies associated with Block 2B fleet release/Marine Corps IOC. The review showed that 1,151 reports were not yet fully resolved, 151 of which were assessed as “mission critical” with no acceptable workaround for Block 2B fleet release. The remaining development and flight test of Block 2B will determine the final status of these 151 mission critical deficiencies, whether they are corrected or will add to the incomplete development work deferred to Block 3F with the less critical flaws. So the overall number of DRs really isn't that high, especially for a program of this magnitude. Even the number of Cat I DR's ("mission critical" with no acceptable workaround) isn't that astronomically high, relatively speaking. But the idea of proceeding to fielding a system with known unfixed Cat I DRs is absolutely ludicrous and just provides another data point for how retarded the USMC is for pressing to declare IOC with Block 2B later this year. Suitability continues to be a challenge. Maintainers are dependent on contractor FSRs as well as going out for engineering action requests to resolve issues. Depot mods continue to be a driver of fleet availability (see above.) Supply chain management has improved, resulting in a decrease to NMC-S time. The program office is playing numbers games with metrics (emphasis mine): quote:▪ Some of this is due to re-categorizing nut-plate failures. Actual reliability growth can also explain some of this, as could poor training leading to bad troubleshooting and maintenance practices. Some of this could also be due to re-categorizing failures previously scored as inherent failures as induced failures. For example, Program Office maintenance data records showed that there were twice as many inherent failures as induced failures in September 2012, and there were many more inherent failures than induced for every subsequent month through May 2013. Then in June 2013, records showed that there were more than twice as many induced failures than inherent failures, and induced failures have always been much greater than inherent failures for each month afterward. This sudden and abrupt reversal of the relationship between induced and inherent failures across the entire F-35A fleet suggests that scoring failures differently (induced vice inherent) may result in an increase in the design‑controllable metric that is not manifested in other reliability metrics. In other words, don't pay any attention to the design-controllable metric because it's not supported in the other reliability metrics because the JPO is gaming the system. Also lol at the idea of nut-plate failures being induced vs inherent. The JPO must think that they have a bunch of mongoloid maintainers just cranking down on these things without any regard for tech data, but speaking from experience on other platforms nut-plate failures are inherent 90%+ of the time. The discussion previously about counting all flight hours while only counting failures of improved components about covers that, I don't have much to add. LO: quote:• Several factors likely contribute to extensive maintenance time, especially long cure times for Low Observable repair materials. The Program Office is addressing this issue with new materials that can cure in 12 hours vice 48 for example, but some of these materials may require freezer storage, making re-supply and shelf life verification in the field or at an austere operating location more difficult. The idea that "cure time" shouldn't count for some reason is completely wrong. It doesn't matter whether or not a maintainer is touching the plane, if the plane isn't capable of flying because it's on cure then it's broken and that data should be included in reliability metrics. Period, no "technically" about it. This is especially true on a system that promised increased reliability and reduced maintainability regarding LO compared to the last LO plane we bought (F-22). If we're talking 48 hr cures that doesn't seem to be too much of an improvement to me. That said, I wouldn't get too worked up about the freezer storage bit...pretty much every plane in the fleet requires some sort of consumable that requires temperature controlled storage. I guess it gives us another cudgel to hit the USMC over the head with to emphasize that there's no way they'll be living out their fantasy of flying -B's from some open field right behind the battlefield...but I feel like the entire F-35B kind of proves that point already. I won't talk about ALIS since no one but me probably cares about that...suffice to say it still sucks and won't be getting demonstrably better anytime in the near future. Same thing about tech data...short version is it's incomplete and updates to it are extremely cumbersome because they have to be pushed out through ALIS. The section about depot mods is basically "concurrency was a pretty big mistake," like I've said previously. However, it did include a nice example of the Marines loving everything up for everyone yet again: quote:The Program Office has prioritized Block 2B associated modification for Marine Corps F-35B IOC aircraft over operational test aircraft. Because manufacturers could not meet the schedule demand for modification kits, not all of the operational test aircraft will be in the Block 2B configuration by early 2015 when the planned start of spin-up training for the OUE would have occurred, as was noted in the FY13 DOT&E Annual Report. I'm a broken record on this, but declaring IOC in 2015 is loving STUPID. (And thus par for the course with USMC Aviation.) Also expect to see the same "shuffling deck chairs on the Titanic" situation regarding aircraft available for T&E vs in depot when it comes to the Block 3 effort, for the same reasons: quote:- Modification planning has also included early plans to ensure operational test aircraft scheduled for IOT&E will be representative of the Block 3F configuration. However, these plans show that the program is likely to face the same scheduling and parts shortage problems encountered in planning for Block 2B modifications of the operational test aircraft. Concurrency...just say no. Finally, the recommendations section basically just recaps what I've already said: - Shift the TEMP timeline regarding spin-up and IOT&E kick-off to reflect reality - Get at least the minimum required testing and analysis done before fielding anything - Improve timeline for developing tech data - Fix ALIS iyaayas01 fucked around with this message at 22:10 on Jan 24, 2015 |
|
#
?
Jan 24, 2015 22:04
|
|
|
Ah, beurocratic shenangians. Awesome. Are there real penalties for those responsible?
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 02:51
|
|
|
Jarmak posted:Also firing guns through a prop is WWI tech mlmp08 posted:Arming utility helicopters is fine. It just so happens that the USA is rich enough to afford dedicated attack gunships in addition to utility choppers. But the marines still arm UH-1s, the SH-60 carries armament, tons of allies roll with armed utility helicopters. Armed utility helicopters are extremely popular these days as sensor packages and guided weapons improve and nations find that expensive attack helicopters that can't do multirole are kind of expensive for what you get.
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 04:38
|
|
Liberal_L33t posted:The U.S. fetish for aerial superweapons has always been a thing, but in recent years, it's seemed to dominate the whole public image of the military. When people need a pithy synecdoche for the U.S. going to war, they say we're "bombing" this place or that, not "shelling" or "invading". In the Obama years, it's gone back to the Clinton paradigm of being used as a symbolic military response without needing ground troops. There hasn't been a single instance of nuclear warfare in the last 69 (heh) years. Guess it's about time we downsized NORAD. There's also no "new generation" of destroyers. There are three Zumwalts that will be built to provide gun support for potential operations near enough to water, but they are too vulnerable to ASBMs to replace the Arleigh Burke.
|
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 04:50
|
|
|
iyaayas01 posted:I'll say that no one in the Army, Navy, or Marines has been attacked from the air for over 60 years... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Liberty_incident This is one time I can think of off of the top of my head.
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 05:30
|
|
|
The US also doesn't have the full assortment of ground to air capabilities that the Eastern bloc fielded, from what I heard the US generally and the allies operated in a situation where they had more or less total air superiority while the Soviets had to deal with German stuka's pretty much all the way until 1945. So the Soviets developed Tunguska's and a huge array of various tracked/wheeled mobile AA expecting to have to fend off NATO air assaults because Russians are eternally pessimistic.  The junior officers who fought in WWII were pretty heavily shaped by their experiences from what I hear, so the allies don't have as much tactical weapons to fend off aircraft. So the US army fighting without any air support at all against an enemy WITH non-trivial aircraft would not end well.
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 05:41
|
|
|
If we're counting accidentially-maybe-on-purpose incidents, there are incidents a lot more recent than that. Also, covert SIGINT collection missions tend not to be counted for defended assets getting hit numbers.
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 05:42
|
|
|
Effectronica posted:69 (heh) years. Goddammit I giggled like a child.
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 06:38
|
|
|
Raenir Salazar posted:The US also doesn't have the full assortment of ground to air capabilities that the Eastern bloc fielded, from what I heard the US generally and the allies operated in a situation where they had more or less total air superiority while the Soviets had to deal with German stuka's pretty much all the way until 1945. So the Soviets developed Tunguska's and a huge array of various tracked/wheeled mobile AA expecting to have to fend off NATO air assaults because Russians are eternally pessimistic. It's basically because the US expected to air superiority, while the soviets knew they would have more numbers on the ground in a all out shooting war. So the Soviets pretty much made a big investment in air defense hardware, while western nations never developed the same variety as the soviets. For examp,e in the US military there's only the patriot missile in terms of long range aircraft killer, while the Russians have piles of different missile and gun platforms by comparison.
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 06:49
|
|
|
/\ The US is investing significantly in TBM defenses as far as air defense systems go, for obvious reasons /\Mightypeon posted:Ah, beurocratic shenangians. Awesome. Short answer, no. Longer answer, DOT&E just executes oversight on T&E, they don't have the power to hold anyone in the JPO accountable. In theory Congress could make the JPO's life rather uncomfortable, but even then we're talking hearings and lots of posturing questions, not actual "accountability" as the rest of the world defines the term. Absolute worst case if things got horrible the leadership in the JPO might be forced to resign, but even then we're talking senior officers so "resignation" really means "retirement and sliding into a sweet well paying gig with a contractor." Now as far as financial penalties on the contractor in theory there could be, but it would have to be written into a contract...and given the open ended ridiculous requirements the government levied on the program (not to mention concurrency), no contractor in their right mind would bid on this with anything other than some form of a cost-plus (definitely not any form of fixed-price). Dead Reckoning posted:If we're counting accidentially-maybe-on-purpose incidents, there are incidents a lot more recent than that. Also, covert SIGINT collection missions tend not to be counted for defended assets getting hit numbers. Yeah if we're counting covert SIGINT collection missions then I can think of a bunch of incidents...but we don't really try to actively defend covert SIGINT assets so that's kind of missing the point. Or you could argue they're the exception that proves the rule.
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 07:02
|
|
|
etalian posted:It's basically because the US expected to air superiority, while the soviets knew they would have more numbers on the ground in a all out shooting war. While this is mostly true, the army and Marines have always kept the idea floating, hence projects like the SLAMRAAM. So we could probably incorporate more robust ADA should that need arise, relatively quickly (in comparison to other things at least). And if you frame it as West vs East, NATO had a few different SAM and gun systems in total, probably about as many as PACT if you bundle things like the a Kub/Buk and Tunguska/Pantsir together.
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 09:41
|
|
|
Dead Reckoning posted:As I noted, I'm not sure how well interrupter gears scale from something the size of a bullet to something the size of a missile. Also worth noting that most designs abandoned firing through the prop real quick as soon as that was an option. I wouldn't want to try getting a missile through a propeller though. Bullets are decelerating when going through the propeller while a missile would still be accelerating at that point.
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 13:11
|
|
|
I might be late to this but put the GAU8 in the nose of the Osprey TIA~ Then the ground troops get their giant gun in the sky, the airforce no longer has to fly the A10, and the Marines get their VTOL CAS.
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 13:54
|
|
|
Throatwarbler posted:I might be late to this but put the GAU8 in the nose of the Osprey TIA~ Your charming red text warning against this aside, let me (literally) illustrate why that wouldn't work:  There's also kind of an important thing when it comes to rotary flight, even more than in fixed-wing flight, and that's a nice and balanced center of gravity. Not to mention the Osprey has relatively short legs as-is, and the big push to ditch the A-10 in favor of the F-35 for CAS is that evidently the solution to 'excellent but too slow' is 'horrible but much faster.' And before you Wiki the GAU-8 and link the Goalkeeper CIWS with its significantly shorter barrel/footprint, keep in mind you're merely seeing the part of the system that sticks out and swivels on the hull, not what's underneath. BIG HEADLINE fucked around with this message at 15:08 on Jan 25, 2015 |
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 14:26
|
|
|
 (Best cutaway diagram I could find was in Spanish. Those in English were either poor scans or far too small to be readable, sorry.) I don't think fitting a gigantic gun like the GAU 8 on an existing airframe design is that easy to do. It would add 300 kg of weight in front of the wings, unbalancing the aircraft. To compensate for the changed balance and the volume lost, you might want to make it longer, but this could also cause issues with fitting them inside cramped hangar decks. Max payload would be decreased unless you also go for stronger engines. Front landing gear would have to be redesigned, and most of the stuff currently in (or on) the nose, like the FLIR pod, radar, etc. would have to be moved or designed to accommodate for the space taken by the Avenger. The cargo hold and cockpit floor might also need to be raised a bit. The aerodynamics would be changed enough that you'd need to re-certify the aircraft. Given all that, you could as well redesign the entire airframe. The A-10 was designed around its gun; an AV-22 variant with a GAU 8 would have to be the same. iyaayas01 posted:Effortpost Really appreciate your insight. 
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 15:00
|
|
|
All is ok though, Boeing has a solution for the Marines if they really want it and it is called the V-44 otherwise known as the Bell Boeing Quad TiltRotor (QTR).
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 15:08
|
|
|
Cat Mattress posted:radar It has a radar?
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 15:12
|
|
|
From searching it seems the Air Force version is equipped with a ground following radar system which I guess makes sense considering they are using them as part of their special operations team.
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 15:21
|
|
|
iyaayas01 posted:Also I'll say that no one in the Army, Navy, or Marines has been attacked from the air for over 60 years... Leave it to the USAF guy to handwave away all the times the USAF has decided to blow up ground units in the US Army, Navy, and Marines.  Other kinda-sorta air threats depending on definition: Iranian surveillance UAV that was shot down over Iraq, various ballistic missiles and cruise missiles that have either been shot down or hit friendly forces over the years. etalian posted:For examp,e in the US military there's only the patriot missile in terms of long range aircraft killer, while the Russians have piles of different missile and gun platforms by comparison. This is true of the Army, but the Navy's long range aircraft killing power from surface platforms is considerable in capabilities and numbers. Then there are special snowflake areas like the national capitol region, which sports NASAMS. Dead Reckoning posted:It's my understanding that most armed utility helicopters included the provision for weapons mounting hardware as part of the design, and in some cases the installations are semi-permanent. I don't think there have been any designs since the Mi-24 with the provision to carry heavy weapons and troops/cargo at the same time. It gets back to my earlier point: the Marine Corps just got a whole bunch of money to buy AH-1Zs, why do they need to gently caress around refitting their tilt-rotors into ghetto gunships, aside from ~*~camouflage flight helmets~*~? I'm not making a specific argument in favor making the Osprey into a weapons platform. I was just saying that arming utility choppers is very common, and becoming ever more common, particularly when you look at nations that don't have the kind of budget that the USA has. mlmp08 fucked around with this message at 16:12 on Jan 25, 2015 |
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 16:09
|
|
|
Throatwarbler posted:It has a radar? Most aircraft larger than a king air have a radar. I don't know if the osprey has a weather radar but it certainly has a radar altimeter.
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 16:17
|
|
|
iyaayas01 posted:Control surfaces don't necessarily work during free fall though. If the munition in question is designed for free fall use, (i.e., JDAM tail kits) then yes, they obviously do. If the munition is designed to be forward firing (i.e., Hellfire), the control surfaces aren't nearly as big and don't deflect nearly as much, so yes, it's entirely possible that even if you had the right upgrades to allow this to happen the missile would still lose the laser spot when it fell free because Hellfires just aren't physically designed for controllability in free fall...in which case it's going to go corkscrewing off nowhere near the target. We're speaking on different levels of technical granularity, yes I realize there is a lot of work involved. I was speaking to the fact the engineering problem is straightforward and easily solvable , not that you just have to adjust a few knobs and its good to go. That said, you're right about the Griffin being the better choice since it was literally designed to work like that, and the lightweight warhead is more appropriate for what these would be most useful for: providing some extra fire support for troops during the insertion period. iyaayas01 posted:lol....really diggin' D&D's take on airpower. I won't respond to that except to say that you're wrong, and you have no idea how wrong you are. Also I'll say that no one in the Army, Navy, or Marines has been attacked from the air for over 60 years...and that's not because we haven't fought anyone capable of doing that over that timeframe. Dominance of the air has become (rightly) seen as a birthright by those in the American military, and I guarantee you that if someone made a push to shitcan the entire tacair fleet the loudest wailing and gnashing of teeth you'd hear wouldn't be coming from the AF, it'd be coming from the Army. I'll second this, the idea of getting attacked from the air is usually what shuts down the semi regular grunt "man I wish we could fight a real war" poo poo. The idea of fighting an enemy that has equal claim to the sky is loving terrifying. Jarmak fucked around with this message at 18:43 on Jan 25, 2015 |
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 18:41
|
|
|
mlmp08 posted:Leave it to the USAF guy to handwave away all the times the USAF has decided to blow up ground units in the US Army, Navy, and Marines. lol, I was actually thinking about going back and editing in a reference to friendly fire as soon as I hit submit on that post. Jarmak posted:We're speaking on different levels of technical granularity, yes I realize there is a lot of work involved. I was speaking to the fact the engineering problem is straightforward and easily solvable , not that you just have to adjust a few knobs and its good to go. Fair enough. Only objection I would raise to the Griffin/Harvest Hawk idea is that now you've basically given up a significant portion of your troop carrying capacity (potentially all of it depending on if you rig up the system to fire out the side doors or off the back ramp). Also remember that Harvest Hawk isn't just strapping a couple missiles on the plane, you're also talking about adding a targeting pod + the equipment to operate it on the interior + the extra dedicated bodies to man the console. Even if you rig up a system to poo poo missiles out the side doors so you'd still have access to the rear ramp you're talking about adding a significant amount of weight on an airframe that doesn't have a lot of excess weight capacity (there's a reason it isn't armored). So it'd be less about being able to do both missions and more about having to dedicate a certain portion of your MV-22 fleet to be AMV-22s, at least from an operational perspective (you can hot swap the kits on board the LHA but launching for a mission you'd have to have dedicated "attack configured" birds and troop carriers.) This is significant because you're talking about an airframe that is significantly larger than the airframe it is replacing, meaning there's fewer of them on board any given LHA. Not a huge deal for the original purpose of this kit (ground based QRF to fly to the rescue when another DoS facility in Africa gets its poo poo kicked in), but something worth considering if we start talking about spreading the capability fleet wide. The discussion is actually pretty interesting because this capability gap has been a known issue for quite some time. As soon as the USMC realized just how much of a capability leap forward the Osprey was compared to their Phrogs as far as effective operational radius was concerned, they quickly realized that their old CONOPS of having Super Hueys and Super Cobras escort their troop carrying helos wouldn't work, because there was no way either of those platforms could keep up with the Osprey. At the time they hand waved away the requirement by saying F-35Bs would fulfill it. I think they did this because after looking at the Osprey they quickly realized how difficult and limiting it would be to arm it up and didn't want to attack the problem at all. Now they're in a different boat.
|
|
#
?
Jan 25, 2015 21:30
|
|
|
iyaayas01 posted:lol....really diggin' D&D's take on airpower. I won't respond to that except to say that you're wrong, and you have no idea how wrong you are. Also I'll say that no one in the Army, Navy, or Marines has been attacked from the air for over 60 years...and that's not because we haven't fought anyone capable of doing that over that timeframe. Dominance of the air has become (rightly) seen as a birthright by those in the American military, and I guarantee you that if someone made a push to shitcan the entire tacair fleet the loudest wailing and gnashing of teeth you'd hear wouldn't be coming from the AF, it'd be coming from the Army. Maybe I am misunderstanding you but if air dominance is so important why get the f-35? It isn't supposed to do that. It has even been described as useless without the f-22. The f-35 just isn't doing anything well, not even cutting down different spare parts. I wouldn't even argue that the jobs it is supposed to do are not worth the cost but that the f-35 isn't worth the cost.
|
|
#
?
Jan 26, 2015 18:47
|
|
|
Torpor posted:Maybe I am misunderstanding you but if air dominance is so important why get the f-35? It isn't supposed to do that. It has even been described as useless without the f-22. The f-35 just isn't doing anything well, not even cutting down different spare parts. I wouldn't even argue that the jobs it is supposed to do are not worth the cost but that the f-35 isn't worth the cost. Because 'Muricans and their erstwhile allies wanna bomb people who are gradually gaining the ability to shoot back.
|
|
#
?
Jan 26, 2015 19:40
|
|
|
It's a lot faster and easier to establish air dominance by blowing up airfields, parked planes, and supplies than it is to dogfight every enemy plane until they have none left.
|
|
#
?
Jan 26, 2015 19:47
|
|
|
mlmp08 posted:It's a lot faster and easier to establish air dominance by blowing up airfields, parked planes, and supplies than it is to dogfight every enemy plane until they have none left. I guess the f35 is supposed to do that but I would imagine that most airfields will be targeted by tomahawks and b2s. Can the f35 even find a lantern pod or is that whole thing obsolete?
|
|
#
?
Jan 26, 2015 20:06
|
|
|
Torpor posted:Maybe I am misunderstanding you but if air dominance is so important why get the f-35? It isn't supposed to do that. It has even been described as useless without the f-22. The f-35 just isn't doing anything well, not even cutting down different spare parts. I wouldn't even argue that the jobs it is supposed to do are not worth the cost but that the f-35 isn't worth the cost. A) Increasingly expensive SLEPs of an obsolete TacAir fleet or B) Nothing Torpor posted:I guess the f35 is supposed to do that but I would imagine that most airfields will be targeted by tomahawks and b2s. Can the f35 even find a lantern pod or is that whole thing obsolete? Dead Reckoning fucked around with this message at 21:56 on Jan 26, 2015 |
|
#
?
Jan 26, 2015 20:21
|
|
|
Cat Mattress posted:
Wouldn't you also run into a problem with the prospect of firing the GAU-8 with the rotors pointing up? My understanding, and this may be completely wrong, is that the a-10 had more than enough power from a single engine, but the act of firing the avenger was such a pile of newton's third law that it necessitated the second engine (In addition to the redundancy-boner that it is). It seems like firing something like that from a hovering platform would scoot you around like an air hockey puck fake edit: wikipedia tells me that the gun put out more force than the engine, but when you're firing in half second increments, it's not really that big of a deal compared to the built up inertia of the a-10. My question still stands about firing it from a hovering osprey
|
|
#
?
Jan 26, 2015 20:56
|
|
|
|
| # ? Jun 7, 2024 21:26 |
|
|
The idea that the reason the warthog has two engines is to handle recoil is the funniest thing.
|
|
#
?
Jan 26, 2015 21:02
|
|