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Nenonen
Oct 22, 2009

Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

A_Bluenoser posted:

Victorian Royal Navy was a uniquely incompetent organization, obsessed only with trivialities and appearance

Bad Navy Island??? :haw:

Okay, that was terrible. Instead, tell me what would Japan have done if a war hadn't broken in Europe in 1939.

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Cythereal
Nov 8, 2009

I love the potoo,
and the potoo loves you.

Nenonen posted:

Bad Navy Island??? :haw:

Okay, that was terrible. Instead, tell me what would Japan have done if a war hadn't broken in Europe in 1939.

Exactly what they did irl. Japan's actions had nothing to do with what was happening in Europe until 1943 or so.

Nenonen
Oct 22, 2009

Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

Cythereal posted:

Exactly what they did irl. Japan's actions had nothing to do with what was happening in Europe until 1943 or so.

French Indochina?

A_Bluenoser
Jan 13, 2008
...oh where could that fish be?...
Nap Ghost

Nenonen posted:

Bad Navy Island??? :haw:

Okay, that was terrible. Instead, tell me what would Japan have done if a war hadn't broken in Europe in 1939.

Missed a "not" there ;)

But there are certainly some "Bad Navy Island" times. Much of the middle ages and the 17th century before the English Civil War come to mind - at least for England (Scotland is a bit of a different case). Then again, if you look at any nation-like entity over a period of a millennium or more it will probably have it's military ups and downs...

As Cythereal said, the tensions between Japan and the US had little to do with what was going on in Europe. Exactly what would have unfolded if the European powers had not been busy in Europe and thus had more resources to devote to the defense of their colonial interests is probably difficult to answer (I certainly can't).

Cythereal
Nov 8, 2009

I love the potoo,
and the potoo loves you.

Nenonen posted:

French Indochina?

Invaded in 1940 irl.

By 1939, Japan was pretty well set on the war path against the colonial powers in the Pacific. The war in China started in 1937, French Indochina was invaded in 1940, Malaya was invaded in 1941, etc. There not being a war in Europe at that time would probably just mean more and bigger naval battles in the Pacific, maybe a later start to Japan attacking the USA due to needing to spend more time and effort securing the seas of southeast Asia, but by then we're well into Gay Black Hirohito territory because there's an excellent chance that postponing or not having a WW2 in Europe kicking off would mean the Soviet Union getting involved in China ahead of schedule.


I think it would largely come down to:

* European colonial powers would be able to divert more forces to defend their colonial holdings. Given the mood in Europe at the time, I'm not sure just how hard the European powers would fight for their colonies versus the enormous local superiority of the Japanese (see Indian Ocean Raid and the fate of Task Force Z, and the Battle of Singapore). If Germany is still under Nazi rule and just hasn't started shooting yet, I wouldn't expect Western Europe to be willing to divert too many forces from this boiling pot.

* The independence movement in India would be a bigger deal because of the greater international importance of east and southeast Asia. I'm not too knowledgeable about this topic so I don't know how this might change in this Gay Black Hirohito scenario.

* Earlier Soviet involvement in China. This is probably the big one, absent a hellwar in Europe, Stalin would almost certainly have been much more active in China, and earlier.

* Greater emphasis on China in general from the West as a proxy and check to Japan. More Lend-Lease, military advisors, etc.

* The Japanese-American war would almost certainly still happen. Possibly delayed due to point one, but the USA was too great a long-term threat, and Japan's leadership too aggressive, for this war to not happen sooner or later.

Cythereal fucked around with this message at 22:00 on Apr 14, 2018

Libluini
May 18, 2012

I gravitated towards the Greens, eventually even joining the party itself.

The Linke is a party I grudgingly accept exists, but I've learned enough about DDR-history I can't bring myself to trust a party that was once the SED, a party leading the corrupt state apparatus ...
Grimey Drawer
Nazi Germany successfully send some technological help via submarine, so that help probably wouldn't happen with no war in Europe.

On the other hand, Germany in peace time tended to help China a lot (even Nazi Germany only stopped after protests from their Japanese allies), so that certainly would influence Japanese adventures on the main land. :v:

Clarence
May 3, 2012

13th KRRC War Diary, 14th Apr 1918 posted:

A working party of 6 Officers and 150 men was called for, for work in the PURPLE LINE, which started at 8 a.m. and since a task was allotted they had finished at 1 p.m. The work was considered highly satisfactory and complimentary letters were sent by the Colonel Commanding the 9th Btn. North Staffs. the Pioneer Btn. of the Division for whom the work was done.
Officers from here go down to Transport where baths are prepared by the details there - owing to conditions it is very necessary to take every opportunity of keeping clean.
Rations here come up early which facilitate their distribution.

Shimrra Jamaane
Aug 10, 2007

Obscure to all except those well-versed in Yuuzhan Vong lore.
No war in Europe means that the United States devotes all of its military might against Japan instead of just 25% of it so I don’t see that ending very well for them.

Cythereal
Nov 8, 2009

I love the potoo,
and the potoo loves you.

Shimrra Jamaane posted:

No war in Europe means that the United States devotes all of its military might against Japan instead of just 25% of it so I don’t see that ending very well for them.

Though in the context of 1939, that's still a ways off yet. Given the isolationist mood of the American population at the time, it would almost certainly still take Pearl Harbor for America to enter the war. Although, it does mean that Japan would be that much more hosed when that war did start.

I just can't see Japan's own actions in 1939 being different if there weren't a war in Europe. The real questions given that hypothetical are what Europe does, and that depends enormously on questions like whether the Nazis are still in charge and just haven't attacked anyone yet, and it just gets sillier and more divergent from there.

In any event,

RFC2324 posted:

dazzle camo was awesome.





Cythereal fucked around with this message at 02:37 on Apr 15, 2018

Epicurius
Apr 10, 2010
College Slice
Japan might have been less likely to move into Indochina if France hadn't just been defeated and lost like half its territory.

System Metternich
Feb 28, 2010

But what did he mean by that?

SeanBeansShako posted:

Haha, cute.


Oh well drat :smith:.


:britain: shine on your little drunk monkey bastard son.

Only somewhat related, but there is a gorilla in a zoo in Berlin right now who in 1959 came to Europe after being traded to the barkeep of a Marseille pub by a thirsty sailor in lieu of payment :v:

feedmegin
Jul 30, 2008

Cythereal posted:

* European colonial powers would be able to divert more forces to defend their colonial holdings. Given the mood in Europe at the time, I'm not sure just how hard the European powers would fight for their colonies versus the enormous local superiority of the Japanese (see Indian Ocean Raid and the fate of Task Force Z, and the Battle of Singapore).

You are absolutely high if you think peacetime Britain and France would let their colonies just be invaded without a full scale response. And I doubt the Japanese would be dumb enough to try. They'd take MUCH more of a bloody nose than either would be expecting mind you. Bear in mind at this point everyone in both countries still thinks battleships are king.

Cythereal
Nov 8, 2009

I love the potoo,
and the potoo loves you.

feedmegin posted:

You are absolutely high if you think peacetime Britain and France would let their colonies just be invaded without a full scale response. And I doubt the Japanese would be dumb enough to try. They'd take MUCH more of a bloody nose than either would be expecting mind you. Bear in mind at this point everyone in both countries still thinks battleships are king.

And Japan proved quite handily that no, battleships are not in fact king. Japan was already very much intent on invading the Pacific colonies - they'd been planning the invasion of Malaysia and Singapore for years.

Imperial Japan's leadership was not particularly rational, and the IJN's early war performance - see the Indian Ocean Raid and ABDA - makes me think Japan would probably have had a distinct advantage cutting off any British/French/Dutch relief efforts.

The Soviet Union is the European power to watch out for during this time period, not Britain or France.

chippocrates
Feb 20, 2013

A_Bluenoser posted:

My point is that the Victorian Royal Navy was not some uniquely incompetent organization, obsessed only with trivialities and appearance, as many later authors would have it, and that portrayal is as much a product of the politics of the Fisher reforms as anything to do with reality.

What were the political issues around the Fisher reforms?

feedmegin
Jul 30, 2008

Cythereal posted:

And Japan proved quite handily that no, battleships are not in fact king. Japan was already very much intent on invading the Pacific colonies - they'd been planning the invasion of Malaysia and Singapore for years.

Imperial Japan's leadership was not particularly rational, and the IJN's early war performance - see the Indian Ocean Raid and ABDA - makes me think Japan would probably have had a distinct advantage cutting off any British/French/Dutch relief efforts.

The Soviet Union is the European power to watch out for during this time period, not Britain or France.

My point is Britain and France did not know this at the time, so they would absolutely send a big fleet out for their colonies rather than shrug and let them go. Anything else would be totally out of step with public opinion at the time, especially given they thought the battleship was decisive and also racism leading to underestimation of the Japanese.

That fleet probably takes a pasting. Now Japan faces two leading naval powers, on its own, both of whom will be building carriers as fast as they can, plus a US that may remain neutral but whose interests are in Japan being beaten. There is no chance that the British Empire of all countries, a country whose status is dependent on its navy, loses a naval battle and just shrugs and gives up.

The Soviet Union is the European power to watch within Europe . They have essentially no ability to project force anywhere else though.

Cythereal
Nov 8, 2009

I love the potoo,
and the potoo loves you.

feedmegin posted:

My point is Britain and France did not know this at the time, so they would absolutely send a big fleet out for their colonies rather than shrug and let them go. Anything else would be totally out of step with public opinion at the time, especially given they thought the battleship was decisive and also racism leading to underestimation of the Japanese.

That fleet probably takes a pasting. Now Japan faces two leading naval powers, on its own, both of whom will be building carriers as fast as they can, plus a US that may remain neutral but whose interests are in Japan being beaten.

The Soviet Union is the European power to watch within Europe . They have essentially no ability to project force anywhere else though.

Japan by 1939 is already balls-deep in China, which the Soviet Union had deep interests in. See real history.

I'm not saying this Gay Black Hirohito scenario would end any better for Japan than real history did, but I think Japan would still do as it did historically. They were that confident, and their objectives in SEA were that important to them.

Tomn
Aug 23, 2007

And the angel said unto him
"Stop hitting yourself. Stop hitting yourself."
But lo he could not. For the angel was hitting him with his own hands

RFC2324 posted:

dazzle camo was awesome.






You know, I've seen dazzle camouflage before, and I've seen Chris Foss's spaceships before, but only just now did I put two and two together and realize where Chris Foss got his paint design schemes from.

Cythereal posted:

And Japan proved quite handily that no, battleships are not in fact king. Japan was already very much intent on invading the Pacific colonies - they'd been planning the invasion of Malaysia and Singapore for years.

Imperial Japan's leadership was not particularly rational, and the IJN's early war performance - see the Indian Ocean Raid and ABDA - makes me think Japan would probably have had a distinct advantage cutting off any British/French/Dutch relief efforts.

How much of Japan's willingness to attack was predicated on the assumption that not only were the colonial powers focused on Hitler, Hitler was actively about to defeat them and they had better declare war quick to get a cut of the spoils, though? I'll have to double-check my sources, but I seem to recall that the Axis alliance was at first seen as a guarantor for peace - the idea being that Hitler was strong enough that nobody would dare to attack Japan and risk having to deal with Hitler as well, as well as the diplomat in charge having slightly screwy ideas of Americans "only respecting strength." Later when the Germans had blitzed France, that's when they started viewing the Asian colonies as easy meat.

Also I distinctly recall reading that the Japanese leadership was NOT confident - in fact there was a lot of private hand-wringing about their odds of success, a sense that they had no other choice but to do what they did and that they were being forced into it, and in particular the attack on America had a strong dose of "If we don't attack now we're definitely going to lose later when we run out of oil as we're already doing now, we might have bad odds now but it's better than certain defeat." I do recall that in public meetings neither Army nor Navy ministers were usually willing to admit the possibility of defeat, for fear of losing face before the other branch, but in private meetings each were usually obliquely in support of peace negotiations. Japanese leadership was hosed, but I'm not certain they're as single-minded as you make them out to be, especially when they're worried about taking on the full power of three world class navies.

Cythereal
Nov 8, 2009

I love the potoo,
and the potoo loves you.

Tomn posted:

Also I distinctly recall reading that the Japanese leadership was NOT confident - in fact there was a lot of private hand-wringing about their odds of success, a sense that they had no other choice but to do what they did and that they were being forced into it, and in particular the attack on America had a strong dose of "If we don't attack now we're definitely going to lose later when we run out of oil as we're already doing now, we might have bad odds now but it's better than certain defeat." I do recall that in public meetings neither Army nor Navy ministers were usually willing to admit the possibility of defeat, for fear of losing face before the other branch, but in private meetings each were usually obliquely in support of peace negotiations. Japanese leadership was hosed, but I'm not certain they're as single-minded as you make them out to be, especially when they're worried about taking on the full power of three world class navies.

This was primarily Yamamoto in private. More than one Army and Navy leader seen as overly pessimistic or too fond of peace was assassinated by pro-war factions in the 20s and 30s. Other leaders, it's hard to say - in Japanese culture, there is an enormous gulf between one's private thoughts and what one will ever show in public.

Basically, Japan was expecting their wars in the Pacific to go like the Russo-Japanese War did: one or two big battles fought near Japan where they had local superiority over colonial expeditions far from their home bases that would convince the European powers to surrender their colonies rather than get into prolonged wars they might not be able to win against a power they deemed inferior for racial reasons. This is the practical foundation of the decisive battle doctrine as envisioned by Japan: take advantage of being on the other side of the planet near your own supply lines, and smash the enemy colonies and expeditions who are a long way from home when they have no chance of reinforcement from their homelands.

In real history, this actually more or less happened against the British and Dutch.


Tomn posted:

How much of Japan's willingness to attack was predicated on the assumption that not only were the colonial powers focused on Hitler, Hitler was actively about to defeat them and they had better declare war quick to get a cut of the spoils, though? I'll have to double-check my sources, but I seem to recall that the Axis alliance was at first seen as a guarantor for peace - the idea being that Hitler was strong enough that nobody would dare to attack Japan and risk having to deal with Hitler as well, as well as the diplomat in charge having slightly screwy ideas of Americans "only respecting strength." Later when the Germans had blitzed France, that's when they started viewing the Asian colonies as easy meat.

From what I've read, the Axis alliance in Japan was seen as reassurance for what Japan was planning to do anyway.

Alchenar
Apr 9, 2008

Cythereal posted:

This was primarily Yamamoto in private. More than one Army and Navy leader seen as overly pessimistic or too fond of peace was assassinated by pro-war factions in the 20s and 30s. Other leaders, it's hard to say - in Japanese culture, there is an enormous gulf between one's private thoughts and what one will ever show in public.

I just want to leap in here and say 'true but' in literally every culture there's an enormous gulf between one's private thoughts and what one will show in public, particularly if the thoughts in question are 'oh poo poo, the people in power/I personally are loving things up massively'.

Different cultures just tend to manifest the signs of this happening in different ways.

RocknRollaAyatollah
Nov 26, 2008

Lipstick Apathy
Just to add to Imperial Japan chat, Japan's foreign policy architects had subscribed to a theory that Japan needed living and defensive space in the form of circular zones around Japan. Korea and Taiwan were the first ones and the greater circle would include the South Pacific region and continental Asia. There were designs on the European colonies since before WWI but by the time of WWII, the military had become so delusional to believe they could knock out China, the US, and UK before they ran out of fuel. Japan up until the Second Sino-Japanese War was so schizophrenic and unstable that nobody really expected much due to the general chaos of the 30's and old fashioned racism.

It was sort of a perfect storm of the military establishment seizing control and not causing a civil war and Europe going to poo poo. China getting its act together and being on the verge of rivaling Japan was the catalyst but since they couldn't beat China, they dusted off the old colonial expansion plans to give them the materials they needed to knock out Chiang.

Tomn
Aug 23, 2007

And the angel said unto him
"Stop hitting yourself. Stop hitting yourself."
But lo he could not. For the angel was hitting him with his own hands

Cythereal posted:

This was primarily Yamamoto in private. More than one Army and Navy leader seen as overly pessimistic or too fond of peace was assassinated by pro-war factions in the 20s and 30s. Other leaders, it's hard to say - in Japanese culture, there is an enormous gulf between one's private thoughts and what one will ever show in public.

Basically, Japan was expecting their wars in the Pacific to go like the Russo-Japanese War did: one or two big battles fought near Japan where they had local superiority over colonial expeditions far from their home bases that would convince the European powers to surrender their colonies rather than get into prolonged wars they might not be able to win against a power they deemed inferior for racial reasons. This is the practical foundation of the decisive battle doctrine as envisioned by Japan: take advantage of being on the other side of the planet near your own supply lines, and smash the enemy colonies and expeditions who are a long way from home when they have no chance of reinforcement from their homelands.

In real history, this actually more or less happened against the British and Dutch.


From what I've read, the Axis alliance in Japan was seen as reassurance for what Japan was planning to do anyway.

Well, I mean, from what I recall one of the big reasons why they ended up putting Tojo in charge is specifically because as a clear member of the Army faction it was thought that if they decided to negotiate for peace, he'd be able to keep a handle on the younger hotheads in the Army, whereas if a Navy or civilian man was in charge and tried to push for peace then yes, there was a danger of assassination.

I know that records after the war are likely to have been distorted to a greater or lesser extent by people trying to wash their hands of it, but from what I recall there's quite a lot of information suggesting that outside of the big public meetings most of the upper leadership (with the exception of maybe some Army leaders) were highly pessimistic about their odds. Yes, their doctrine pushed for decisive battle, but they weren't nearly as sure about victory as you make them out to be. A notable incident happened during an Imperial conference - the Emperor complained that while he was informed that the Chinese war would be a quick one, it was dragging on much longer than anticipated. When the Army minister replied that "China had large hinterlands that were difficult to pacify," the Emperor shot back that the hinterlands of the Pacific were much larger - so why were they so confident of a quick victory in the Pacific? There wasn't, as I recall, a coherent or confident response to this, other than a general insistence that they had no choice. There was also a strain of argument where the Army would sometimes snap at the Navy and insist that if they weren't capable of gaining victory, they should say so - which given their animosity was not going to happen in public, but even then the Navy hemmed and hawed about declaring their confidence in victory. There was also this weird thing where top-level military ministers didn't make their own plans or offer direction, the relatively junior leadership drew up plans based on their own ideas and the top level leadership picked the ones they liked best and went with it.

Overall the impression I get is that Imperial Japan's leadership wasn't confident so much as it was organizationally hosed and incapable of open, honest assessments on a policy level. Which, yeah, if things were different that probably meant the Imperial Japanese response might not have been the most coldly calculated, but they weren't entirely blind to the forces arrayed against them. If France and the UK were capable of concentrating their full force on Japan I think it's a bit of a stretch to insist that Japan would absolutely do exactly the same thing, for sure, no dispute, because they were just that confident. They weren't, and there was plenty of internal debate played out over the idea of fighting just America and the distracted Allies. Throw in the undivided attention of the Allies and the peace faction has a lot more cards to play, and the Navy has more space to say "Yes, we're confident we can take on any two nations for sure absolutely, but three is too much so maybe we should ask for peace" without losing as much face.

Cythereal
Nov 8, 2009

I love the potoo,
and the potoo loves you.
Fair, but I'm still not sold that Britain and France would devote all their forces to Japan in the event of this hypothetical because Germany and the Soviet Union are presumably still there and threatening.

Oh well. It's just what-if wanking.

feedmegin
Jul 30, 2008

Cythereal posted:

Fair, but I'm still not sold that Britain and France would devote all their forces to Japan in the event of this hypothetical because Germany and the Soviet Union are presumably still there and threatening.

The Soviet Union isn't threatening either France or Britain in peacetime (assuming no Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact). They'd have to go through Germany to get at either and they have no navy to speak of.

It's not like the entire RN and French navy would be steaming off to the Far East, but most of it would be, because the German navy is not huge and, also, people in 1939 were expecting that a European war would be WW1: The Remix with the Germans battering themselves out on the Maginot line, not blitzkrieg. You do have to bear in mind when inferring people's intentions here that everyone in 1939 was operating with 1939 assumptions and prejudices (like: the British Empire is built on the strongest navy in the world and will last centuries to come; Japanese are incompetent non-white people whose aeroplanes are built out of cardboard; aircraft carriers are a weird novelty that's mainly good for scouting for the battleships that will win the decisive naval actions) - not what we can see in hindsight from the 21st century.

Epicurius
Apr 10, 2010
College Slice

Tomn posted:


Overall the impression I get is that Imperial Japan's leadership wasn't confident so much as it was organizationally hosed and incapable of open, honest assessments on a policy level. Which, yeah, if things were different that probably meant the Imperial Japanese response might not have been the most coldly calculated, but they weren't entirely blind to the forces arrayed against them. If France and the UK were capable of concentrating their full force on Japan I think it's a bit of a stretch to insist that Japan would absolutely do exactly the same thing, for sure, no dispute, because they were just that confident. They weren't, and there was plenty of internal debate played out over the idea of fighting just America and the distracted Allies. Throw in the undivided attention of the Allies and the peace faction has a lot more cards to play, and the Navy has more space to say "Yes, we're confident we can take on any two nations for sure absolutely, but three is too much so maybe we should ask for peace" without losing as much face.

I've recommended it before, but I''ll recommend again Eri Hotta's "Japan, 1941", which is a look at Japanese planning leading up to Pearl Harbor. One of the things that her book focuses on was how most of the Japanese higher ups thought it was a bad idea, but that, first, they didn't see any good alternative, and second, everybody was afraid to speak out against it, because they thought that everyone else supported it, and didn't want to take a political risk by speaking out and being the only one.

Cythereal
Nov 8, 2009

I love the potoo,
and the potoo loves you.

feedmegin posted:

The Soviet Union isn't threatening either France or Britain in peacetime (assuming no Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact). They'd have to go through Germany to get at either and they have no navy to speak of.

It's not like the entire RN and French navy would be steaming off to the Far East, but most of it would be, because the German navy is not huge and, also, people in 1939 were expecting that a European war would be WW1: The Remix with the Germans battering themselves out on the Maginot line, not blitzkrieg. You do have to bear in mind when inferring people's intentions here that everyone in 1939 was operating with 1939 assumptions and prejudices (like: the British Empire is built on the strongest navy in the world and will last centuries to come; Japanese are incompetent non-white people whose aeroplanes are built out of cardboard; aircraft carriers are a weird novelty that's mainly good for scouting for the battleships that will win the decisive naval actions) - not what we can see in hindsight from the 21st century.

Fair enough for the most part, but you're wrong about the aircraft carriers. Japan didn't start invading places other than China until around the start of 1941, and 1941 is when they developed the Kido Butai. 1939 is a weird time to pick for alt-history centering on Imperial Japan, nothing that important happened in Japan's sphere between 1937 and December 1940.

feedmegin
Jul 30, 2008

Cythereal posted:

Fair enough for the most part, but you're wrong about the aircraft carriers. Japan didn't start invading places other than China until around the start of 1941, and 1941 is when they developed the Kido Butai. 1939 is a weird time to pick for alt-history centering on Imperial Japan, nothing that important happened in Japan's sphere between 1937 and December 1940.

The 'they' I'm talking about are the big-gun admirals in the British and French navies. Japan absolutely did get it. I'm saying '1939' really meaning 'immediately before World War 2 kicked off in real life', because absent that, what people believed in peacetime at the end of the 30s is going to keep being believed until it collides with reality, if you see what I mean.

Cyrano4747
Sep 25, 2006

Yes, I know I'm old, get off my fucking lawn so I can yell at these clouds.

Carriers also weren’t as disregarded as that. Pretty much every country that bothered to build any befor the war had an influential contingent of officers who understood the power of naval aviation and who were influential enough to get some built. Even people who didn’t see them as so decisively obsoleeting BBs thought them useful for ducking treaty tonnage limits.

feedmegin
Jul 30, 2008

Cyrano4747 posted:

Carriers also weren’t as disregarded as that. Pretty much every country that bothered to build any befor the war had an influential contingent of officers who understood the power of naval aviation and who were influential enough to get some built. Even people who didn’t see them as so decisively obsoleeting BBs thought them useful for ducking treaty tonnage limits.

Sure. I'm stereotyping the people that those officers were in opposition to, though, and the people who weren't as big on carriers absolutely saw them as auxiliaries to battleships in Jutland 2: Electric Explodaloo, not as capital ships in their own right. Not every military officer was Billy Mitchell.

Cythereal
Nov 8, 2009

I love the potoo,
and the potoo loves you.

feedmegin posted:

The 'they' I'm talking about are the big-gun admirals in the British and French navies. Japan absolutely did get it. I'm saying '1939' really meaning 'immediately before World War 2 kicked off in real life', because absent that, what people believed in peacetime at the end of the 30s is going to keep being believed until it collides with reality, if you see what I mean.

The Americans were also on track to getting it. Not as much as the Japanese, but the "Pearl Harbor forced the US to rely on carriers and abandon the battleship" line is a bit of an exaggeration in that it definitely hastened a strategic evolution that was already happening, but wasn't a revolutionary change.

I'm inclined to think that Japan and the US were the early pioneers of the carrier as a serious weapon of war (yes, I know the British invented the concept and made the first carrier strike during WW1) in large part because they were the primary Pacific powers. The awesome distances involved, scarcity of local airfields, and primitive nature of much of the region lent itself to the aircraft carrier, much more so than the Atlantic or Mediterranean.

Tomn
Aug 23, 2007

And the angel said unto him
"Stop hitting yourself. Stop hitting yourself."
But lo he could not. For the angel was hitting him with his own hands

Epicurius posted:

I've recommended it before, but I''ll recommend again Eri Hotta's "Japan, 1941", which is a look at Japanese planning leading up to Pearl Harbor. One of the things that her book focuses on was how most of the Japanese higher ups thought it was a bad idea, but that, first, they didn't see any good alternative, and second, everybody was afraid to speak out against it, because they thought that everyone else supported it, and didn't want to take a political risk by speaking out and being the only one.

Yeah, I'm drawing heavily on what I remember of Hotta and John Toland's "Rising Sun." One of the striking things Hotta does is open up in 1941 with a description of the material shortages and rationing going on in Japan just because of the war in China alone - Japan was badly stretched materially and everybody knew it.

As I recall one of the big obstacles to peace is that Japanese leadership was terrified and half-convinced that any peace agreement the Western powers would accept would have essentially been surrender without a war - letting the Western powers force Japan down into a subservient, second-rate position vulnerable to foreign meddling. Given that they saw what happened to China in the Victorian period, you can kinda see where that fear is coming from. Thus the argument for war: "If we give in, we'll lose everything anyways. We might as well throw the dice, maybe we'll get lucky as opposed to the certain subjugation if we accept peace on their terms."

ChubbyChecker
Mar 25, 2018

KYOON GRIFFEY JR
Apr 12, 2010



Runner-up, TRP Sack Race 2021/22
It's important to keep in mind that if Japan takes on say, the Dutch, are the British and French going to rush to their aid? Sure, probably - but it's going to be a bit of a different response than the invasion of Poland by the Germans. After all, the DEI are a long way away. Then, the "victory condition" for the Japanese is a lot different than actual WWII - you just have to gently caress up some boats, land the Rikusentai, hold your territory, and wait. The Allies are either going to have to come dig you out (and note this is without US support), in which case you can hopefully bloody their noses a few more times, or they're going to have to accept ceding colonies. Although the various imperialist factions in the Allied countries would raise an almighty stink, this isn't the same thing as an existential threat to your nation - it's traditional Great Power colonial warfare and spoils-divvying. Not to say this is a particularly likely outcome of this alternate history debacle, but it's possible and you can see a path from A to B. You can't really do that with the war Japan got. Once you have the US involved things get really different.

Chillbro Baggins
Oct 8, 2004
Bad Angus! Bad!

Cythereal posted:

And Japan proved quite handily that no, battleships are not in fact king.

Are you referring to Pearl Harbor or Yamato and Musashi? Either way, the other works as the punchline.

Cythereal
Nov 8, 2009

I love the potoo,
and the potoo loves you.

Chillbro Baggins posted:

Are you referring to Pearl Harbor or Yamato and Musashi? Either way, the other works as the punchline.

I was also referring to the Indian Ocean raid, though that admittedly was heavy cruisers rather than battleships.

feedmegin
Jul 30, 2008

KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:

It's important to keep in mind that if Japan takes on say, the Dutch, are the British and French going to rush to their aid? Sure, probably - but it's going to be a bit of a different response than the invasion of Poland by the Germans. After all, the DEI are a long way away. Then, the "victory condition" for the Japanese is a lot different than actual WWII - you just have to gently caress up some boats, land the Rikusentai, hold your territory, and wait. The Allies are either going to have to come dig you out (and note this is without US support), in which case you can hopefully bloody their noses a few more times, or they're going to have to accept ceding colonies. Although the various imperialist factions in the Allied countries would raise an almighty stink, this isn't the same thing as an existential threat to your nation - it's traditional Great Power colonial warfare and spoils-divvying. Not to say this is a particularly likely outcome of this alternate history debacle, but it's possible and you can see a path from A to B. You can't really do that with the war Japan got. Once you have the US involved things get really different.

This is true. Japan can nibble away at some colonies, particularly those of smaller countries, and get away with it. That's a lot different from eg taking Singapore, though. The UK can't let that go if it wants to keep an Empire at all, it would completely expose them as unable to protect their possessions and interests abroad and thus forfeit their status as a Great Power (see: actual history post Suez). It all depends how far Japan feels it needs to go I guess.

Cythereal
Nov 8, 2009

I love the potoo,
and the potoo loves you.

feedmegin posted:

This is true. Japan can nibble away at some colonies, particularly those of smaller countries, and get away with it. That's a lot different from eg taking Singapore, though. The UK can't let that go if it wants to keep an Empire at all, it would completely expose them as unable to protect their possessions and interests abroad and thus forfeit their status as a Great Power (see: actual history post Suez). It all depends how far Japan feels it needs to go I guess.

Singapore is too great a strategic threat for the Japanese to ignore unless relations with Britain warm back up. Same reason they went after the Philippines - even if the colonial power isn't an enemy now, that's an enemy strongpoint close to the heart of the envisioned empire that will probably have to be excised by force.

System Metternich
Feb 28, 2010

But what did he mean by that?

Archaeologists found the early medieval grave of a man in Italy who had at some point lost one of his hands and replaced it with a loving knife prosthesis. There is no :black101: big enough

Epicurius
Apr 10, 2010
College Slice

Ok, that is pretty badass.

Back to Pearl Harbor, though, also, remember that part of the inspiration for the attack was the British raid on Taranto in 1940, where planes off a British carrier used torpedoes against Italian battleships at harbor. Now, the Japanese were already working on the concept of striking at a docked fleet with planes, but the Taranto raid certainly served as proof of concept.

Cythereal
Nov 8, 2009

I love the potoo,
and the potoo loves you.

Epicurius posted:

Ok, that is pretty badass.

Back to Pearl Harbor, though, also, remember that part of the inspiration for the attack was the British raid on Taranto in 1940, where planes off a British carrier used torpedoes against Italian battleships at harbor. Now, the Japanese were already working on the concept of striking at a docked fleet with planes, but the Taranto raid certainly served as proof of concept.

According to the guy who came up with the Kido Butai formation, though, he was inspired much earlier than that - remember that the Indian Ocean Raid was the first major carrier-lead battle after a few paltry efforts during WW1, and it stunned the world when Kido Butai smashed the British fleet.

Pearl Harbor was years later, after the power and capability of the massive carrier strike was already well established.

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Desiderata
May 25, 2005
Go placidly amid the noise and haste...

Cythereal posted:

According to the guy who came up with the Kido Butai formation, though, he was inspired much earlier than that - remember that the Indian Ocean Raid was the first major carrier-lead battle after a few paltry efforts during WW1, and it stunned the world when Kido Butai smashed the British fleet.

Pearl Harbor was years later, after the power and capability of the massive carrier strike was already well established.

What? The Indian Ocean Raid was after Pearl Harbour. Taranto was before both.

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