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(Thread IKs: dead gay comedy forums)
 
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Lightningproof
Feb 23, 2011

Pener Kropoopkin posted:

I'm starting to think this is actually a child.

yeah the whole 'prospective whatever student' bit in their bio makes me think this is literally a teenager

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Lasting Damage
Feb 26, 2006

Fallen Rib

Pener Kropoopkin posted:

I'm starting to think this is actually a child.

we need to bully the teens more

Comrade Koba
Jul 2, 2007

”wannabe shi’ite”

mawarannahr
May 21, 2019

anyone who says “muh” instead of “my” gets a field trip to the parts of Siberia that are on fire

tokin opposition
Apr 8, 2021

I don't jailbreak the androids, I set them free.

WATCH MARS EXPRESS (2023)
Tomboys are fash bait

indigi
Jul 20, 2004

how can we not talk about family
when family's all that we got?

is this even kind of true? I’ve never heard it before

John Charity Spring
Nov 4, 2009

SCREEEEE
it's not true, their source for it is that the KPD opposed the SPD, and this is interpreted as 'supporting the Nazis'

like this is what they keep linking to back up "the German communists supported Hitler":

https://twitter.com/RealRainbowFire/status/1431739002797834243

they also had this to say on the German Revolution which, lol

https://twitter.com/RealRainbowFire/status/1431774301276053504

Raskolnikov38
Mar 3, 2007

We were somewhere around Manila when the drugs began to take hold

indigi posted:

is this even kind of true? I’ve never heard it before

branches of both parties once worked together on a failed recall election of the SPD controlled prussian legislature after it banned far left and far right parties due to street violence

this is the foundation of the KPD and NSDAP walking hand in hand myth

StashAugustine
Mar 24, 2013

Do not trust in hope- it will betray you! Only faith and hatred sustain.

kpd: socdems and nazis are basically the same thing
socdems: so this means you like nazis right

indigi
Jul 20, 2004

how can we not talk about family
when family's all that we got?
they shouldn’t of worked with the Nazis in any case but it does seem like a complete fiction to say they “supported” then

V. Illych L.
Apr 11, 2008

ASK ME ABOUT LUMBER

a non-trivial amount of the working class was nazi. the KPD tried to mobilise nazi workers to be communist instead; also, zero-tolerance of nazis would've meant constant blood in the streets since these people often lived in the same neighbourhoods

Raskolnikov38
Mar 3, 2007

We were somewhere around Manila when the drugs began to take hold

indigi posted:

they shouldn’t of worked with the Nazis in any case but it does seem like a complete fiction to say they “supported” then

tbh i dont know if they actually worked together or just jointly supported the recall. my suspicion is its the latter and that this is all SPD hysterics mad that the KPD dared to threaten their prussian dictatorship

genericnick
Dec 26, 2012

Not sure this is really the right thread for it, but is there any primer for the Sino-Soviet split? Seems to have screwed over everyone involved quite massively.

Enjoy
Apr 18, 2009

indigi posted:

is this even kind of true? I’ve never heard it before

no.

i recommend richard j evans' "the coming of the third reich", he goes over the street battles between the different paramilitaries and how the judicial system was rigged in favour of the right-wing. as far as i remember the closest the communists and nazis came to collaborating was that they staged a strike in berlin at the same time to try to unseat the governing SPD. but evans gives numerous examples of how they fought each other, and how the KPD and SPD were closer ideologically and socially than others parties, like when the rot frontkampferbund provided bodyguards to the widow of a murdered SPD politician

Enjoy
Apr 18, 2009

V. Illych L. posted:

a non-trivial amount of the working class was nazi. the KPD tried to mobilise nazi workers to be communist instead; also, zero-tolerance of nazis would've meant constant blood in the streets since these people often lived in the same neighbourhoods

the working class were underrepresented in the nazi party. being in a city with a strong history of trade unions and left-wing organisation inoculated workers against fascism
https://www.johndclare.net/Weimar6_Geary.htm

mawarannahr
May 21, 2019

I was moved by Brace Belden’s interview with Brandon Lee to donate to his gofundme. He is a comrade in need rendered quadriplegic by the Philippine state:

https://www.gofundme.com/f/justice-4-brandon-lee-campaign posted:

Our beloved friend, Brandon Lee was shot on August 6th, 2019 at his home in Lagawe, Ifugao. He sustained multiple gunshot wounds. He has undergone operation and is in very critical condition.

Brandon is a staunch advocate for human rights and has been a volunteer paralegal with Cordillera Human Rights Alliance. Prior to moving to the Philippines, he was active with both the Filipino and Chinese community in the San Francisco Bay Area.

We are saddened, angry, outraged, and worried that Brandon has been targeted by what we believe are agents of the Philippine military to silence critics of the current Duterte Administration and people like Brandon who are raising awareness about the human rights abuses in the Philippines. Prior to the incident on August 6, he experienced intense harassment and surveillance.

Friends, please help Brandon and his family (wife and daughter) get through this difficult time. We ask that you please consider donating for long term medical care and other expenses that may accrue.

For updates in the Philippines please follow:

CHRA KARAPATAN on FaceBook. If you don’t have Facebook, feel free to leave your email address and we can include you on our updates.

Let’s do this for Brandon y’all!

Thank you so much for your donation which is critical at this time for the immediate and long term medical costs for Brandon.

For Venmo donations, please put #Justice4Brandon and send your donation to either of the following people:

Aaron @Aaron_Y_Lee
@SFCHRP

We accept checks. Please contact us for payee.

We also encourage you to continue to post poems, songs, personal stories of Brandon on social media and please include #SaveBrandonLee #Justice4BrandonLee #StopTheAttacks #FriendsofBrandon

Post here:
Friends of Brandon Lee Facebook Page

Other ways to get involved:

+ Share this fundraiser

+ Join us in hosting fundraising activities!

+ Legislative advocacy:
We will continue to pressure our legislative representatives to urge House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and congressional representatives to support the Philippines Human Rights Act. The US must suspend military aid to the Philippine government until human rights abuses end and the perpetrators against all victims of Duterte's regime are brought to justice.

For legislative updates, visit San Francisco Committee for Human Rights in the Philippines.

other links provided in show notes:

quote:


Bayan USA - https://bayanusa.org

Philippine Human Rights Act - https://humanrightsph.org

Human Rights Defenders Fund - https://ichrpus.square.site/hr-defenders-fund

Investigate PH - https://www.investigate.ph




I have no idea about these human rights organizations, perhaps gradenko has some knowledge of them. The guy sounds really hosed up and will probably require long term intensive medical care and face lifelong disability in the United States.

idk about writing to Nancy Pelosi.

comedyblissoption
Mar 15, 2006

John Charity Spring posted:

it's not true, their source for it is that the KPD opposed the SPD, and this is interpreted as 'supporting the Nazis'

like this is what they keep linking to back up "the German communists supported Hitler":

https://twitter.com/RealRainbowFire/status/1431739002797834243

they also had this to say on the German Revolution which, lol

https://twitter.com/RealRainbowFire/status/1431774301276053504
furthermore, the senile octogenarian hindenberg was supported by the socdems in his successful presidential re-election against hitler while being denounced by the kpd

hindenberg then worked with hitler and the nazis to make hitler dictator and to murder the communists lol

indigi
Jul 20, 2004

how can we not talk about family
when family's all that we got?

mawarannahr posted:

I was moved by Brace Belden’s interview with Brandon Lee to donate to his gofundme.

drat he’s been up to a lot since The Crow

Tiler Kiwi
Feb 26, 2011
ask the sdp stan about who used the freikorps

V. Illych L.
Apr 11, 2008

ASK ME ABOUT LUMBER

Enjoy posted:

the working class were underrepresented in the nazi party. being in a city with a strong history of trade unions and left-wing organisation inoculated workers against fascism
https://www.johndclare.net/Weimar6_Geary.htm

underrepresented among a third of the population is still into "non-trivial" territory

Southpaugh
May 26, 2007

Smokey Bacon


the working class was only 1/3 of the population?

Raskolnikov38
Mar 3, 2007

We were somewhere around Manila when the drugs began to take hold
okay looking at german wikipedia on the referendum and whoops turns out my guess was right

quote:

Support from the KPD
After the announcement of the referendum by the Stahlhelm in October 1930, the KPD initially declared itself unwilling to support. This was despite the fact that, according to Comintern documents, the option of overthrowing the Social Democratic Cabinet Braun by referendum was discussed long before the summer of 1931, regardless of Moscow's guidelines, and Executive Committee member Hermann Remmele proposed at a KPD leadership meeting in January 1931 that the right-wing parties should now be pre-empted by holding their own referendum to dissolve the state parliament. [1] The reason for the hesitant attitude was the lack of support from the KPD district secretaries, who wanted to show consideration for the social democratic workers. [2] In view of the relatively low turnout in the referendum, the republican forces were able to look forward to the referendum with relative confidence. This changed on July 22, 1931, when the KPD also announced its support. This decision reflects the priority of the communists at the time in the fight against the SPD, which was reviled as " social-fascist ". This was entirely in line with the line that the Executive Committee of the Comintern had set in the spring of 1931. Behind the decision of the KPD stood the then chairman Heinz Neumann , the Comintern and Stalin , who also exerted considerable influence on the decision.

Raskolnikov38
Mar 3, 2007

We were somewhere around Manila when the drugs began to take hold
the SPD is the scum of the loving earth

Mandoric
Mar 15, 2003
Geary's drawing a distinction between the strict definition of the proletariat as specifically industrial monetary-wage-for-labor earners and the loose definition of the working class as a whole including peasantry, pay-in-kind or pay-in-housing rural labor, artisans, and lower management such as foremen.

StashAugustine
Mar 24, 2013

Do not trust in hope- it will betray you! Only faith and hatred sustain.

Raskolnikov38 posted:

the SPD is the scum of the loving earth

voting to support the war in 14 is where everything went wrong

gradenko_2000
Oct 5, 2010

HELL SERPENT
Lipstick Apathy
Reposting these excerpts from Donna Harsch's "German Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism" to provide some perspective on just how loving bad the SPD was.

quote:

Observing the course of the SPD’s demise, some historians have assumed that the party made little effort to stave off the Nazi threat and the republic’s dissolution. During Weimar’s last years, they argue, the party stood immobilized, even paralyzed—a giant with feet of mud. The SPD’s passivity, it has been suggested, demonstrated a deficient sense of urgency about the NSDAP.⁶ From this viewpoint the story of Weimar Social Democracy is part of the chronicle of National Socialism, that is, as Karl Dietrich Bracher put it, the “history of [the NSDAP’s] underestimation.”⁷

As Helga Grebing has argued, however, to judge Social Democracy guilty on this count is unfair. For one thing, the SPD’s intent and motives cannot be faulted.⁸ Social Democrats tried to prevent the triumph of Nazism in order to save the republic and democracy, a claim that cannot be made without qualification for any other party or major political actor in the complex and unsavory maneuvers of the late Weimar years. The SPD had more than good intentions, however. Social Democrats, as a rule, did not underestimate Nazism but misunderstood it. The magnitude of the danger was appreciated; its nature and sources, less so.

After September 1930, cognizance of the Nazi threat was great, and the very passivity of the SPD’s politics corresponded to the party leadership’s understanding of how best to ward off this danger. The genesis and character of this awareness and of its strategic expression need to be examined to discover how and why Social Democracy acted in an ineffectual manner.  The case of Social Democracy is, in fact, even more complicated than this justification suggests. Because Social Democrats took the Nazi threat seriously, they engaged in an intense dialogue about the character, roots, and social basis of National Socialism and subjected their own party to critical analysis. From this discussion arose diverse challenges to official SPD interpretations of Nazism and the SPD’s predicament, and to the strategy and tactics that flowed from them. Weimar Social Democrats offered explanations of the NSDAP’s rise and the SPD’s crisis that foreshadowed those put forward by historians; they suggested reforms of their party and solutions to the Weimar republic’s crises that still fuel debates over how and whether the republic could have been saved.⁹ Understanding this discussion and its feeble results is as important as analyzing the SPD’s actual strategy and tactics, for not only in the rigidities of party practice but in the dialectic between that practice and resistance to it lies the explanation of why no effective strategy emerged.

Authors who emphasize structural causes of the SPD’s immobility have focused on three features of the Weimar party: bureaucratization, aging, and “bourgeoisification.” They point out that the Weimar SPD had lost its “movement” character, had trouble attracting young supporters, and had become diluted by nonproletarian elements.¹¹

The structure of Social Democracy was not only bureaucratic, hierarchical, and rigid, but also protean, multicentered, and evolving. Horizontal fissures ran between the levels of the SPD, and vertical splits developed between the SPD and the other organizations within Social Democracy. These fractures worked against a unified response to the rise of Nazism or to the crises that the NSDAP exploited. Within the SPD, apparently monolithic decision making hid competing priorities among the organization’s different levels and geographic regions. Party bureaucrats tended to deny or ignore organizational dissonances rather than respond to them. Yet some functionaries promoted reforms only to find their efforts blocked from either above or below. Depending on the issue, Social Democrats at all levels both demanded reform and resisted change. Reforms that were enacted at one level often counteracted those implemented at another and so had the effect of further immobilizing the SPD rather than revitalizing it.  Even more than in the party alone, organizational diversity was both boon and bane of the broader Social Democratic movement. Most significant were the divergent priorities of ADGB officials and SPD leaders. Differences also strained relations between the SPD and the Reichsbanner, between the SPD and the cultural organizations, and between these and the ADGB. The resulting tensions, conflicts, and distrust absorbed energy and time needed to solve the external crises that exacerbated internal discord. Beneath the appearance of unified decision making and action, fragmented policymaking and halfhearted implementation increasingly plagued Social Democratic behavior and dulled its impact. Compared with its archrival, the NSDAP, Social Democratic activity suffered from insufficient central coordination. The lack of unity of purpose was a consequence of the different tasks and interests of each pillar of Social Democracy—party, unions, Reichsbanner, and cultural organizations. Because only the core membership of each ancillary organization consisted of organized Social Democrats, their leaders represented overlapping, but not equivalent, constituencies.

___

quote:

Historians who focus on the SPD’s ideology have generally identified the fundamental fault in the Social Democratic worldview as that between its commitment to Marxism and its commitment to parliamentary democracy. Liberal and conservative historians of the SPD have emphasized that this contradiction conditioned the ambivalent attitude toward coalitions with bourgeois parties, reluctance to accept national political responsibility, and Marxist reservations against broadening its social base or adopting pragmatic economic measures.¹³ Critics from the Left, on the other hand, have found the Weimar SPD too willing to compromise with bourgeois forces, overly focused on parliamentary politics, too reluctant to mobilize the masses, unjustifiably hostile to the Communist Party, and not Marxist enough.¹⁴ That the SPD can be criticized from opposite directions indicates its inner contradictions. I do not think, however, that the SPD can be criticized coherently from either perspective because internal dissonance led to inconsistent behavior. While the centrist leaders of the SPD straddled a fault between Marxism and parliamentary liberalism, this was only one version of a more profound contradiction between Social Democratic social understanding, which was based on class, and the Social Democratic political worldview, which was based on the individual.

Weimar Social Democrats identified the basic divisions in society as those between social classes and saw the motivating force behind political action as class interest. Social Democrats expressed many variations of a class-based explanation of social identification—from classic classstruggle ideology, to a commitment to the working-class composition of the SPD, to a pragmatic emphasis on the immediate concerns of organized workers. Diverse formulations of the meaning of class were united by a tendency to underestimate the influence on human behavior of political interest or other kinds of social identification.¹⁸ As will be seen, the reigning class-based worldview faced internal challenges that were central to debates about how to confront the Nazis and the depression.

___

quote:

In 1928 the SPD’s 937,381 members were divided into 33 districts that corresponded to the electoral districts of the Weimar republic. Four hundred subdistricts and, in 1929, 9,544 local clubs (Ortsvereine) formed the base of the organizational pyramid.⁶³ At its apex sat the executive committee, which administered the party between congresses.

As the executive gained new prerogatives over the years, the SPD had become ever more centralized. By the Weimar period, the executive appointed paid secretaries to the districts, owned all SPD property, and had the power to expel anyone who “worked against the party.” It chose 6 to 9 Reichstag candidates for the national election list (elected with the “leftover” ballots that were part of Weimar’s system of proportional representation). One Weimar Social Democrat recalled that the executive committee made all major decisions without consulting the rank and file.⁶⁴ The executive committee was notably stable. About 19 people sat on it at any one time, but between 1918 and 1933 only 31 served altogether. Their average age was 54. Little competition existed for these highest posts in the SPD. Even oppositionists generally voted for the official slate, evidently seeing constancy as a valuable quality of political leadership.

The majority of executive members stemmed from skilled worker backgrounds. Of 27 for whom information exists, only 6 had attended university. Led by Otto Wels and Hermann Müller, the executive constituted a powerful, stable, and predictable force in the SPD. Müller acted as the political-parliamentary leader, while Wels, characterized by the historian Richard Hunt as the “perfect stereotype of a party boss,” managed the organization.⁶⁵ The larger party council convened quarterly to weigh executive decisions and vent the concerns of provincial Social Democrats. Composed of the districts’ appointed secretaries and elected chairmen, it generally deferred to the executive’s expertise on national affairs.⁶⁶ Each subdistrict also had an elected chairman. Altogether 20,000 to 30,000 paid apparatchiks, elected and appointed, worked for the SPD. The party also called on the services of an army of volunteers, including the chairmen and treasurers of local clubs.⁶⁷ These “little people” distributed leaflets and drummed up subscribers for the party press, routine activity that, according to left-wing critics, numbed political thinking and shrank horizons.⁶⁸ These activists chose the delegates to the party congress, where, in theory, they pronounced on the issues of the day, pondered the pros and cons of a new course, and elected the executive. In fact, even before 1914, the congress had become, in Peter Nettl’s words, a “ritual celebration of political ideology” instead of a “supreme legislative assembly.”⁶⁹ In the Weimar era, about 25 percent of the delegates had some organizational claim to a voice and/or vote as members of the executive, party council, or Reichstag delegation. Moreover, not local clubs but district congresses (dominated by functionaries) elected delegates (mainly functionaries).⁷⁰ Chaired by Otto Wels and with an agenda proposed by the executive, a majority nearly always approved the leadership course. Superficially at least, the party functioned like a well-oiled machine. As Theo Haubach, a neorevisionist critic of Verbonzung (bureaucratization or bossism), remarked, “The SPD is excellently administered, but in no way led.”

continuing to lmao at the parallels to the DNC

quote:

Social Democrats also discussed whether, and under what conditions, the SPD should join a coalition. More broadly, debate centered on how the party should exploit its electoral victory to gain maximum influence. Most Socialist newspaper editors agreed with the executive committee that a coalition with bourgeois partners was preferable to opposition or a united front with the KPD.²⁸ Leftist dailies cautioned against joining a coalition but did not dismiss the idea.²⁹ They campaigned for pre-conditions on Social Democratic participation in a coalition, while pointing out that the election results showed the benefits of opposition.³⁰ When it became clear that the Reichstag delegation would not make entry into a cabinet contingent on concessions, leftist districts and journals came out against participation, arguing that the SPD had a better chance of effecting change from the opposition, where the threat of growing Socialist popularity could be used to wrest concessions from a bourgeois executive.³¹ If the party did enter the government, the only way to remain true to its proletarian nature lay in holding to a set of demands to guide its representatives over rough political terrain. Socialist ministers, in the leftists’ view, should speak for the party ranks in a very immediate sense. Such a strategy certainly offered one solution to the difficulties faced by Social Democratic ministers in a regime with parties that objected to their social, political, and cultural aims.

...

In the national coalition, the SPD assumed a defensive posture of protecting existing measures and ensuring the continuity of the republic, not of further democratizing it. According to Hilferding, the party had to join the government to maintain democracy, stabilize the parliamentary system, and exert influence on foreign policy. Statements by the party council and the Reichstag delegation stressed the SPD’s willingness to take responsibility for government affairs.⁴⁰Responsibility played a much bigger role in the Social Democratic vocabulary about government than power.

In a series of frustrating meetings in June, representatives of the SPD, the BVP, the Center Party, the DDP, and the DVP groped for a common ground on which to form a cabinet. When it proved impossible to form a party-based Great Coalition, Müller and Stresemann worked out a “cabinet of personalities” that included ministers from each of the parties as individuals, not as representatives of their party delegations.⁴¹ Writing during this wearying process, Paul Levi criticized the SPD’s method of forming a regime, first for its lack of vision. When the Center Party and the DVP queried, “Where is this government headed?,” the reply, “to the republic,” was less than enlightening. Second, Levi faulted the timidity that kept the SPD from using the authority conferred by its electoral victory. Levi warned, “If [power] is left lying in the street, any Hanswurst can grab it. Let us be warned by Stalin’s example: the road to the dissolution of the state leads not only over barricades; the crippling indifference of those who govern can be just as dangerous.” After two weeks of tedious negotiations, Levi concluded, the public had lost interest in the fate of the government.⁴²

Force the vote!

quote:

The Müller cabinet’s first significant decision unleashed a storm of protest in the SPD more intense than any since the revolution. On August 10, just before adjourning for summer recess, the cabinet decided unanimously to approve funding for the Panzerkreuzer A, the first ship of the pocket battleship program proposed under the [Chancellor Wilhelm] Marx government. General Wilhelm Groener, the minister of defense, pushed hard to have this thorny issue tackled by the shaky cabinet at an early date. Fearful that the coalition would founder on this stumbling block and convinced that the current budget had enough surplus to allow this expenditure, the four Social Democratic ministers succumbed to his pressure. Müller and Severing, the Social Democratic minister of the interior, balked only briefly before approving the funds for the first ship.⁴⁵ Thus, on the eve of Germany’s Constitution Day, which only Social Democrats celebrated with enthusiasm, and while leading Socialists were at- tending a peace conference of the Socialist International in Brussels, the cabinet cleared the way for the production of this controversial cruiser. The timing was not felicitous.

Moderates felt that the decision violated an important Social Democratic principle. Both Paul Levi and Julius Leber remarked that anti- militarism (despite August 1914) was one of the few sacred traditions of the German working class, especially when militarism took the form of “fleet imperialism.”⁵⁶ Of course, the exigencies of realpolitik had caused many principles to be violated over the years without provoking such vehement disgust. In this case, however, antimilitarism had found expression as a specific political slogan in a campaign only lately ended. It had fired up the ranks and helped win the SPD greater electoral support than it had enjoyed since the first years of the republic. It was one thing to compromise, another to break campaign promises.⁵⁷ The outrage indicated a widespread belief in the strict accountability of representatives, indicative of attachment to direct democracy. According to Julius Leber, a “middling functionary” on the party council chided Müller for not heeding the “people’s will.” Müller retorted that he was a minister, not a “mail carrier.” Rank and file Social Democrats en- dorsed the functionary’s argument rather than Müller’s rejoinder.⁵⁸

Even while the Panzerkreuzer controversy raged, various Social Democrats recognized that it could have the salutary effect of democratizing the SPD. While revealing the inadequacy of democratic practice inside the SPD, it had awakened broad critical forces that had slumbered too long, they said. From the crisis could emerge a party that encouraged debate and discussion in its press and meetings.⁷⁴ One right-wing Socialist warned against returning to the “graveyard peace and quiet” that had reigned before May 20. Others saw a chance to break out of the endless cycle of fruitless coalition/anticoalition debates and have discussions about, as Carlo Mierendorff put it, politics and tactics.⁷⁵ For its part, the executive committee announced that the crisis revealed the need to discuss the party’s defense policy and to choose new defense guidelines at the next congress in June 1929.⁷⁶ It did not engage the organization in a debate about the appropriate strategy and tactics in a coalition with bourgeois parties, so the SPD drifted without a conception of its role in the government. Not surprisingly, leftists criticized the leadership’s sudden insistence on the need for a new defense policy as a maneuver to replace a discussion of the coalition’s failures with an exchange about general principles. Less expectedly, young neorevisionists agreed that a rehashed military policy would not solve the problems which led to the Panzerkreuzer mess. Mierendorff found it an “illusion” to think a correct defense program would guard against tactical mistakes or get the party out of the “dead end of August 10.”⁷⁷ Schumacher spoke in the same vein at the Magdeburg party congress in 1929. Also at Magdeburg, Theo Haubach regretted that the same mistake was being made in the defense discussion as in the continuing dialogue about coalition policy: the party disputed the foundations of its policies instead of the policies themselves.⁷⁸

Tedious replays of debates on principles arose from the mutual suspicion with which the leadership and the Left Opposition regarded each other. The Left insisted on raising the coalition issue, but the leadership directed discussion into the well-worn groove of “defense policy in the republic.” Wels, Hilferding, Müller, and other leaders ignored criticisms of how the coalition functioned, fearful that any debate about specific policies would quickly become one about whether the party should participate in a government with bourgeois partners. Insecure themselves about the coalition policy, they assumed a shallow reservoir of support for it in the party’s ranks. They might have been correct in general, but in this debate and during the months to come, many critics were Social Democrats who did not question the policy but its execution.⁷⁹ Rightists such as Leber and Schumacher shared with leftists such as Levi the suspicion that SPD leaders did not know how to wield political power.

___

quote:

The NSDAP was the party most prepared for an election campaign upon the dissolution of the Reichstag in July 1930. On July 25, Goebbels’s Propaganda Department sent out directives on how to conduct the campaign. District propaganda offices distributed detailed reports on the course of the campaign to all local branches. They also received a brochure titled “Modern Political Propaganda.” In Baden the Nazis transferred the groundwork for a state election to the Reichstag campaign, ending up with a mass saturation effort considered very effective by the police. Elsewhere, such as Hanover—South Braunschweig, the NSDAP held 300 to 400 meetings per week in the last month of the campaign. Despite many different (and contradictory) slogans, the Nazi cam- paign revolved around a central, unifying theme: the disintegration of German political life into a “heap of special interests.”⁷⁹ In the 30,000 rallies the NSDAP held in the four weeks preceding September 14, its speakers lambasted the bourgeois parties and the SPD. Significantly, one of its favorite attacks on the bourgeois parties focused on their alleged friendliness to Marxist Social Democracy.⁸⁰

The SPD’s campaign paled by comparison.⁸¹ Certainly, the party possessed an effective electoral machine, its hallmark among German political parties, and had prepared material specifically for this contest. Despite an impressive number of rallies and scores of leaflets and pamphlets, however, at core the party entered the campaign unprepared. For one thing, the SPD failed to adjust its propaganda style and methods to compete more effectively with the Nazis and the KPD. Social Democrats and their supporters remarked that the party had become too “moderate” and “dry,” with little idea of how to draw in the masses so effectively seduced by the Nazis.⁸² The party leadership did not perceive the urgency of rethinking the SPD’s propaganda style, in part because it underestimated its radical rivals and reserved the party’s biggest blasts for the Bürgerblock. More fundamentally, the SPD’s campaign lacked a theme that could draw voters from outside its large, but restricted, electorate. This omission is especially noteworthy because SPD analysts recognized that nonvoters and those who normally voted for the non-Catholic bourgeois parties were the wild cards in the election. In a widely reprinted article, Kurt Heinig estimated that 25 percent of the electorate was composed of nonvoters and newly enfranchised voters. He divided the other 75 percent into three groups: “worldview” voters loyal to the SPD, the Center Party, or the BVP; voters influenced by the economic and political “conjuncture” who were likely to vote Communist, Nazi, or for the Economic Party; and a second unpredictable block of voters in the process of “structural regroupment” who traditionally voted for the DNVP, the DVP, or the DDP. He did not hazard a prediction about how the “20 to 25 million” undecided voters might divide their allegiances but urged the SPD to go after them.⁸³

On the basis of regional returns, commentators realized that the Nazi vote would increase significantly, even dramatically. The SPD, therefore, devoted an appreciable amount of its campaign rhetoric to Hitler and his ideology and organization.⁸⁴ On a national level, this effort included material for SPD public speakers, leaflets, and reports in Vorwärts that focused on SA violence, Hitler’s racism, and Nazi attempts to infiltrate the army.⁸⁵Anti-Faschist, a biweekly supplement to local Social Democratic newspapers, contained cruder, popular attacks on the “Swastika pest,” with jokes and cartoons. Prominent Socialists, such as Arthur Crispien and Philipp Scheidemann as well as Prussian cabinet members, focused campaign speeches on National Socialism.⁸⁶ Nonetheless, provincial Social Democrats still directed more of their energy against the NSDAP than did the organizers of the national campaign. Local agitators were confronted with the brute force of the Nazi onslaught as thugs broke up meetings and beat up Socialists. In Stuttgart, Social Democrats were all the more shocked by this wave of terror because, according to Wilhelm Keil, they had underestimated the NSDAP since 1928.⁸⁷ Editorials and rally descriptions from Frankfurt, Hanover, Düsseldorf, Darmstadt, Hamburg, Leipzig, and Stuttgart present a collage of cross- national concern about the growth and vitality of the NSDAP.⁸⁸ In Darmstadt, Carlo Mierendorff, a first-time candidate for the Reichstag, made the struggle against the NSDAP the heart of his campaign effort.⁸⁹

Social Democratic alarm about the NSDAP was clearly on the rise. However, the quantity of propaganda directed against the Nazis is not as significant as its message or its place within a broader campaign strategy. Socialist propaganda portrayed the Nazis in two principal, and seemingly contradictory, ways. On one hand, Social Democrats branded the NSDAP as the “handmaiden” of capital whose “role [is] the maintenance of capitalist society.”⁹⁰ As Rudolf Breitscheid put it, National Socialism was “at least for a section of the bourgeoisie . . . a battering ram to be used against the SPD and the trade unions.”⁹¹ On the other hand, the SPD castigated the Nazis as radical rabble, street rowdies, and hoodlums who appealed to bourgeois youth and the unemployed.⁹² In this guise, the NSDAP was often lumped with the KPD.⁹³ During the campaign, as during the fight around the Protection of the Republic law, Social Democrats in political office were most likely to see the KPD and the NSDAP as equally deserving targets of punitive legal measures to protect the state. By Prussian decrees passed in January and July 1930, Nazis and Communists elected as mayors in Prussian towns were denied government confirmation. In June, Prussian civil servants were forbidden to hold membership in either party, and Nazi uniforms were banned in public. In Hamburg, using a local police law of 1879, authorities arrested a number of National Socialists and Communists shortly before the Reichstag election. Social Democrats in Hamburg’s senate approved of this procedure, even though, predictably, conservative judges imposed heavier sentences on the Communists.⁹⁴

Most Social Democrats saw no contradiction in portraying the Nazis as radical rowdies and the battering ram of the bourgeoisie. They believed that National Socialism’s true face was currently masked, even to many capitalists. In an in-depth analysis of the NSDAP, Max Westphal, a member of the SPD executive committee, acknowledged that the “well-known capitalist, Herr Klönne” had vilified the NSDAP as “half-Marxist,” but, Westphal assured Herr Klönne, had he heard Hitler’s speech at a recent employers’ meeting, he would modify his view. Westphal admitted that the Nazis “appear very revolutionary, so that [in competition] even the Communists have to remain at the peak of their radicalism.” They wrapped themselves in a socialist mantle to lure bourgeois youth in search of the genuine article. Nazi attacks on the bourgeois parties were an “agitational maneuver” that allowed the NSDAP to depict itself as an absolutely new party, untarnished by association with the old, worn-out organizations, and enabled it to exploit “party weariness” in the bourgeois camp. Consequently, the bourgeois parties were draining into the Nazi swamp. After siphoning these votes, according to Westphal, the Nazis would turn around and safeguard the reactionary interests of the decimated parties. Evidence of the real nature of National Socialism lay in its support of conservative regimes in Mecklenburg and Thuringia. Westphal concluded that the SPD had nothing to fear from this sham movement for a “deeper socialism.”⁹⁵ In its campaign propaganda, meanwhile, the bourgeois DVP insisted that the NSDAP kept its socialist principles and hatred of private property hidden from the middle class and peasants, who should “beware of wolves in sheep’s clothing.”⁹⁶

Local Social Democratic papers often carried a cruder version of Westphal’s view of Nazism, exposing “princes and big agrarians” as members of this self-proclaimed “‘workers’ party’ ” and trumpeting “heavy industry” as the source of Nazi gold. In articles for the popular press, even Carlo Mierendorff described the NSDAP as a “yellow” movement, though he emphasized that it was autonomous rather than the kept creature of capitalists.⁹⁷ Social Democrats believed the identification of National Socialism as a capitalist tool would discredit it with the masses. This explanation also braced Social Democrats’ sense of their own party as the embodiment of the class interests of capitalism’s opponents. Besides discounting Nazism as a genuine social movement, they ridiculed Nazis and their followers as unworthy of serious concern. Wilhelm Sollmann, editor of Cologne’s Rheinische Zeitung, lampooned Communists who took so “seriously and tragically” those “tens of thousands” who heard Hitler speak in Cologne; even a “semi-political person” could only laugh at such “stupid youths and petit bourgeois.” In Braunschweig, the SPD district chairman in- formed an election rally, “You can’t argue seriously with the NSDAP.”⁹⁸

Despite militant evocations of the class-against- class nature of the campaign, the party’s positive slogans were neither radical, concrete, nor very evident. Social Democrats attributed Communist and Nazi growth to the economic crisis, but they of- fered no program to overcome rapidly rising unemployment. In June 1930, 2,638,000 Germans were unemployed, up from 1,360,000 in June 1929. In some branches of the economy, the rate of increase was even more dramatic; over the same year, the building trades went from 55,000 unem- ployed to 219,000; mining, from 11,000 to 67,000. Free Trade unionists, the main reservoir of SPD votes, comprised 900,000 of those without work; 18.8 percent of union membership was on the dole, and another 17.5 percent was on short time.¹¹⁵ The serious nature of the crisis could also be seen in the increase in long-term unemployment, measured by the percentage of unem- ployed receiving municipal welfare support (18 per- cent in 1928, 23.6 percent in 1930). The drag on public funds was especially onerous in the many cities that had financed municipal construction with short-term loans in the 1920s.¹¹⁶ Such devel- opments did not bode well for the SPD because so much of its strength rested on its representation in municipal government.

Social Democrats particularly deplored employers’ attacks on the wages of those still working but, again, proposed no specific measures to counter it. To help the unemployed and to reduce the “reserve army of labor,” they called for public works, especially on a communal level, but rarely provided details.¹¹⁷Vorwärts advocated an “active policy for the economy.” The state, according to this editorial, should intervene to reduce prices, make capital productive, and restrict its flight abroad.¹¹⁸ How these things were to be accomplished was not explained. Indeed, Fritz Naphtali denied that a “general recipe” for overcoming the depression in Germany existed. Those who promised otherwise were engaged in an “election swindle.” He outlined conditions that would decrease unemployment, such as greater “mass buying power,” more ex- ports, lower customs, and fewer hindrances on foreign investment.¹¹⁹ While honest, this prescription was unlikely to fire the imagination of citizens who were out of work or fearful of going bankrupt.

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Nazi electoral successes in the fall fueled the conviction that more activity could make a difference. The leftist Leipziger Volkszeitung chided Baden Socialists for a lackluster campaign, contrasting the exemplary bustle of Leipzig’s forty-five thousand Socialists who had shored up an “island in the midst of the yellow flood of fascist waves.” The SPD, the paper cried, must “increase the number of active fighters!”¹¹⁷ The Munich police noted increased activity by the SPD, which “turned itself almost exclusively toward the struggle against the NSDAP.” Bavarian Social Democrats held meet- ings with antifascist themes not only in cities but in rural areas (although observers described the lat- ter as only “moderately well attended”).¹¹⁸ Across Germany, in towns of all sizes, the number of public meetings, marches, and rallies organized by Social Democrats multiplied dramatically, especially after January 1, when the national executive added its imprimatur to mobilization of the SPD.¹¹⁹

Within this spate of activity, impulses toward cooperation with the KPD surfaced at the local level. Relations between the KPD and the SPD, never warm, had turned frigid in 1929. After several years of a course of realpolitik, the KPD had adopted an ultraleftist stance. Its press spewed insults at “class traitors,” alternating denunciations of all Social Democrats with scathing attacks on the leaders of the SPD and the Free Trade Unions.¹²⁰ The SPD, on its side, did nothing to end the cold war between the working-class parties. The bloody outcome of fights between Berlin police and Communist demonstrators on May 1, 1929, in particular, embittered the KPD. As part of a ban on all demonstrations imposed in December 1928, the Social Democratic chief of police in Berlin had refused a permit to the KPD for the traditional May Day celebration in 1929. When the KPD marched anyway, the police moved forcefully against participants, who responded in kind and constructed barricades. In three days of fighting in Berlin’s working-class neighborhoods, thirty-three people were killed. Rather than chastise the police, the Social Democratic minister of the interior in Prussia, Albert Grzesinski, banned the Roter Frontkämpfer-Bund, the KPD’s defense league.¹²¹

Within the trend toward greater latitude on both sides, however, ran a thread of tension between Reichsbanner regulars and, in particular, special youth formations. In Breslau, Young Socialists formed the Young Proletarian Marshals (Jungordnerdienst), which advocated an independent working-class defense organization. Not only Young Socialists around the country but youth in the SAJ, the Reichsbanner, and the sports organization signed up. In Berlin a brawl broke out between Jungordner and resentful Reichsbanner activists after which the marshals, and later the Young Socialists, were dissolved in the capital.¹³⁷ Differences in the levels of militancy between young and old Socialists did not always place youth in opposition to party policy. In Munich a plan to institute an “alarm organization” (which aimed at amassing fifteen to twenty thousand men within two hours) was opposed by older comrades in the party and the Reichsbanner who did not want to fight armed Nazis and Communists. By December the emergency plan had been implemented in Prussia, where the idea originated, but the Munich leadership had to conduct negotiations with the city’s clubs to convince members of the plan’s safety.¹³⁸ Such incidents provide a corrective to the notion that the base was always more militant than its leadership.

The electoral returns of the fall of 1930 also occasioned a lively debate on issues crucial to the SPD’s success on the electoral stage: the composition and motivation of the Nazi constituency as well as the social provenance of the Social Democratic electorate. This discussion tackled questions that have intrigued scholars ever since. From the 1930s to the 1970s the dominant paradigm in the electoral sociology of the NSDAP assumed it to be a movement that disproportionately attracted the lower middle class.¹⁴³ Over the last decade this interpretation has been effectively challenged. By subjecting electoral data to sophisticated statistical techniques, researchers have shown, first, that the lower middle class did not vote as a block. Although independent shopkeepers and artisans did vote lopsidedly for the NSDAP, white-collar employees did not.¹⁴⁴ Second, new studies indicate that the NSDAP enjoyed wider social support than previously assumed and that, indeed, it emerged as Germany’s first (Protestant) Volkspartei.¹⁴⁵ Within these widely accepted revisions of the lower- middle-class thesis, researchers disagree about which other social groups contributed most to the Nazi rise, and how much. Richard Hamilton, in particular, has found that the upper middle class (higher civil servants and professionals) voted disproportionately for the NSDAP.¹⁴⁶ More controversial is the claim of Jürgen Falter and Dirk Hänisch that the employed working class, although not the unemployed, contributed significantly to the NSDAP’s growth. Against them, Thomas Childers has maintained that workers voted at a relatively low rate for the NSDAP, while admitting that the absolute number was large.¹⁴⁷ Childers and Falter and Hänisch agree, however, that the majority of workers who voted Nazi were not typical industrial or urban proletarians but were those who lived in small towns, worked in handicrafts and small manufacturing shops, and were unorganized. In the university town of Göttingen, for example, the percentage of lower-class voters choosing the SPD declined from almost 70 percent in 1928 to 40 percent in 1930, while the percentage of poorer voters who chose the NSDAP stood almost exactly at its national average (18.6 percent). Rural laborers were the most susceptible of all workers to Nazi appeal.¹⁴⁸ In considering the political background of the Nazi electorate of 1930, Thomas Schnabel has estimated that 23 percent had not voted in 1928, 31 percent came from the bourgeois middle, and 21 percent were from the DNVP. Previous SPD voters comprised 9 percent of the NSDAP vote.¹⁴⁹ Falter and Hänisch and Conan Fischer have argued that especially after September 1930 the SPD lost many votes to the NSDAP.¹⁵⁰

Part 1

gradenko_2000
Oct 5, 2010

HELL SERPENT
Lipstick Apathy
Part 2

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Geiger and others identified nationalism as a major barrier separating their party from the middle classes. Immediately after September 14, public and private intimations that the SPD should become more openly patriotic were voiced by Social Democratic right wingers. Julius Leber reported that at the first delegation meeting after the elections the venerable Eduard David warned against slighting widespread frustration over the Versailles treaty that was swelling the nationalist wave. At Leipzig, Wilhelm Hoegner argued for going beyond routine criticism of the treaty to open attacks on anti-German foreign policy in general. Hermann Heller, a legal theorist who was the beacon of many neorevisionists, attested that the SPD could call itself national without betraying its principles.⁹² Severing, known to favor a more positive attitude toward national defense, nonetheless obliquely criticized such views in an article in Sozialistische Monatshefte, the Francophile voice among party journals. He cautioned against warmed-over National Socialist recipes and said instead the SPD should stress “our love for peace” and cooperation with France. Mierendorff, cau- tioning against bending too far in the nationalist direction, put forward the slogan “Overcome Versailles through Europe.”⁹³ While officially the ADGB toed the party line, Geiger expressed the growing impatience of the Free Trade Union leadership with the SPD’s reluctance to adopt a more national point of view.⁹⁴ In a practical sense, disagreement centered on whether the SPD should call for revision of the Young Plan or even cessation of reparations (discussed in chapter 6).

Social Democrats also blamed the party’s propaganda style and psychological approach for its inability to attract nonproletarian or new working-class supporters. The initial effort to mobilize the SPD had succeeded in activating the party corps; but by late spring 1931 more activity had not enabled the SPD to break into new circles, and the campaign was losing steam. Many fewer notices of rallies appeared in the press, and a sense of frustration became evident.⁹⁵ Neorevisionists began to argue openly that the character and even the aims of SPD activity had to change. Theo Haubach wanted to turn the SPD into a “militant party” to confront the fascist “military party.” The SPD must drop the “language of 1914,” learn the ways of 1931, and carry out a “profound transformation of the workers’ movement.”⁹⁶ Neorevisionists and some lower functionaries also challenged the psychological assumptions behind party propaganda. A Munich Socialist stirred up a wrenching debate in Das Freie Wort by suggesting the SPD cultivate the “emotional side” of politics and whip up passion.⁹⁷ His opponents questioned the legitimacy of emotional agitation and claimed that the slow work of “enlightenment” would eventually pay off.⁹⁸ This division did not neatly straddle the Left/Right di- vide. Both the rightist Ernst Heilmann and left-wing commentators endorsed the “rational” approach. For many Social Democrats, adoption of the emotion-laden language and techniques used to such effect by the Nazis equaled adaptation to Nazi ideas. In their eyes, reason and rationality were as deeply imprinted on the Socialist ideal as its political and social goals.⁹⁹

Bureaucratic torpor contributed to the SPD’s inability to break its routine and enter new territory. Organizational inertia was reinforced by a twofold psychological reaction: paralysis in the face of a multitude of problems and denial of the need for change. The defensiveness with which some bureaucrats responded to demands for change only exacerbated internal tensions, squandering energy and goodwill.¹⁰³ This dynamic characterized discussions of the SPD’s aging, for example. The volume of letters to Das Freie Wort on the need to recruit youth showed that Social Democrats recognized the despair of German youth who suffered disproportionately from unemployment and received less protection from unemployment insurance or welfare measures. Marginalized and alienated, they succumbed to radical blandishments, especially those of the KPD.¹⁰⁴ The SPD’s obvious lack of allure for youth touched a raw nerve among some functionaries, however, who denied the problem or extolled the hard-earned “experience” of older cadres.¹⁰⁵ Even Karl Meitmann, elected in Hamburg as a Young Turk, scolded SAJ members for mocking seasoned functionaries. Older rank and filers, in contrast, defended youth’s need to criticize authority freely.¹⁰⁶ The dissolution of the Young Socialists by the Leipzig congress neither enhanced the SPD’s ability to recruit among young Germans nor engendered better rapport between old and young Social Democrats.

The neorevisionist Julius Leber recalled angrily that September 14 in no way shocked the Reichstag delegation into “leaping over [its own] stagnating bureaucracy.” It reelected its old executive, of which not one member was of the 1914, much less postwar, generation. The leadership ignored the acute “Bonzen fatigue” that beset the ranks, induced by the antiboss harangues of the NSDAP and the KPD. Kurt Laumann, a leftist, remarked on the ever louder clamor against the “apparatus.”¹⁰⁷ In the daily press, in Das Freie Wort, and at meetings, rancor burst forth against well-heeled Social Democrats who seemed insensitive to the misery of working-class members.¹⁰⁸ A functionary in Hamburg noted that factory workers cared less about the riches of Frick or Hugenberg than whether Socialist X or Y had his hand in the till or lived beyond working-class means. Echoing motions to the Leipzig congress from various districts, he called for reducing the salaries and pensions of party leaders.¹⁰⁹ A Berliner was applauded by fellow functionaries when he castigated Social Democratic “high earners” for not lifting a finger for the organization.¹¹⁰ In Munich, a rebellion against the bourgeois style of life of Erhard Auer (editor of the Münchner Post, chairman of the Munich SPD, and member of both the Landtag and the Reichstag) turned into a revolt against all prosperous Socialists. Through mid-1931, inner strife in the city’s clubs often eclipsed the anti-Nazi struggle.¹¹¹ Criticism of high salaries and pensions, including those of Social Democrats, also preoccupied the Hesse state congress in September 1931.¹¹² The desire to purify the association and restore its original egalitarianism was rekindled by the depression and the struggle against radical opponents. Paradoxically, this impulse distracted some Social Democrats from the external troubles that stimulated the concern.

What explains the party leadership’s apparent nonchalance about finding paths to new social strata or strayed members of the working class? Breitscheid provided a hint at Leipzig when he insisted that toleration was bearable so long as it did not weaken the central core of the SPD. A supporter of toleration pointed to the influx of members across the country as proof that the policy had not hurt the SPD. He scorned those who were overly concerned by electoral losses.¹²⁰ Stampfer later confirmed this attitude: the party could deceive itself about its “invincibility” in 1931 because membership remained high. At the end of 1930 there were 1,037,384 Social Democrats; at the end of 1931 there were 1,008,953—an attrition rate of less than 3 percent, despite an inhospitable political climate and an internal split.¹²¹ In part, this achievement can be attributed to a lag that characterized the ratio of voters to members throughout the Weimar years. It also attests, however, to the loyalty of all Social Democrats and, especially, to the determined efforts of concerned activists to fight attrition. Ironically, the dedication and solidarity that enriched and secured the Social Democratic association masked the corrosive effects of practical and theoretical immobilization on the SPD’s vitality. Despite an avalanche of internal pleas for reform of SPD methods and ideas, the leadership could deceive itself that these were not really necessary.

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Party leaders saw the Iron Front mainly as an electoral instrument. As they had hoped, it played a central role in the presidential campaign in February and March. On February 5 the party council pondered the SPD’s stance in the campaign. Gagging at the thought of working for the reelection of the aristocratic hero of the Battle of Tannenberg, a few members wanted to put up Otto Braun in the first round and support Hindenburg in the second. In a tortured discussion, many stressed that the SPD dare not split the republican vote, and in the end, all except Mathilde Wurm (a moderate leftist) endorsed the man whom the SPD had bitterly opposed in 1925.⁶⁷ Far from encouraging sentiment in favor of his own candidacy, Braun was Hindenburg’s strongest advocate in the SPD.⁶⁸ As were Severing and SPD leaders, he was ever more convinced that in Brüning lay the SPD’s only hope of securing the republic, so he wanted the authority behind Brüning to remain in office.⁶⁹ Among Hindenburg’s conservative backers, however, distaste for Social Democrats and other democratic circles ran so deep that the “Weimar parties” were forced to stage separate rallies for the president. Hindenburg, rather than being pleased, was humiliated by the massive Social Democratic contribution to his reelection.⁷⁰ Social Democrats had to overlook such snubs and ingratitude because their Prussian strategy rested on the president. The effort in favor of the old general became more palatable on February 22, when Goebbels announced Hitler’s candidacy. Under the banner of the Iron Front, Social Democrats vigorously threw themselves into the campaign under the slogan “Smash Hitler, vote Hindenburg!”, making clear the real goal.⁷¹ In response to Communist taunts, however, Social Democrats insisted that Hindenburg had not turned out “as we feared” in 1925.⁷²

The KPD ran Ernst Thälmann. The Right divided its vote also. The Stahlhelm and the DNVP backed Theodor Duesterberg, second in command of the Stahlhelm. Duesterberg received a disappointing 6.8 percent in the first round and dropped out. Thälmann’s percentages, 13.2 percent and 10.2 percent, respectively, were also lower than expected. Among Hindenburg’s rivals only Hitler made an impressive showing. Hindenburg garnered 49.5 percent to Hitler’s 30.1 percent in the first balloting on March 13, just shy of the required absolute majority. He won with 53 percent against 36.8 percent for Hitler in the runoff on April 10. Social Democrats heard the results with pride and pleasure.⁷³ Their contribution to Hindenburg’s count was huge. One bourgeois source estimated that the SPD contributed 8.5 million votes to the tally.⁷⁴ In fact, these voters had rallied under the banner of the Iron Front. An Iron Front memorandum reported with satisfaction that the new movement had passed its “test through fire,” reminding organizers that “we can’t overtake years of Nazi demagogy in two weeks.” For the first round, the front had concentrated on the mobilization of urban voters; for the second, it had turned its attention to small villages where, especially in the northeast, the Nazis completely dominated the campaign despite Social Democratic efforts.⁷⁵ Socialists believed the NSDAP had suffered a significant defeat because its supporters had believed so thoroughly in victory. Mierendorff even judged Hindenburg’s election an achievement for the republic because the general “symbolize[d] legality” against Nazi adventurism. Hilferding wrote to Kautsky that the election outcome “would be decisive if the economy weren’t so rotten.”⁷⁶

so the party campaigned against an aging conservative in prior elections, but then decided to back him in later elections because the alternative was literally Hitler

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Despite Hindenburg’s disgust over the SPD’s support, Social Democrats had some reason to feel that their contribution to his reelection enhanced their influence on national policymaking, for on April 13, the Reich finally banned the SA and the SS. The SPD ministers in Prussia wrung this important concession from the Reich government with the cooperation of the interior ministers of other large states. The crackdown on Hitler’s shock troops contradicted even the most recent Reich policy toward the NSDAP. On January 29, Defense Minister Groener had issued a decree that in effect allowed Nazis to enter the Reichswehr. Privately Groener entertained no illusions about the NSDAP’s goals. Especially after Hitler refused to support Hindenburg’s re- election, he wanted to distance the Reich government from the Nazis.¹¹² He believed, however, that Hitler would rely on legal methods to come to power and, thus, long resisted pressure from Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse to outlaw the SA.¹¹³ His January decree reflected notions current in the army that the NSDAP’s nationalistic fighting spirit could be harnessed to the advantage of Germany’s armed forces.¹¹⁴ Even at the time, however, it was known that not Groener but General Schleicher was the main proponent of a “tame the SA” policy.¹¹⁵ Indeed, soon after the decree, Groener displayed a new willingness to listen to the states’ arguments for sup- pressing the SA.¹¹⁶

Meanwhile, Otto Braun still could not convince Brüning of the subversive nature and plans of the NSDAP. The chancellor did not even deign to acknowledge a fat memorandum documenting Nazi illegal activities that Braun sent him in March.¹¹⁷ Unbeknownst to the SPD, Brüning too was pursuing the chimera of a domesticated NSDAP—one that would support a government of the traditional Right in a renascent monarchy.¹¹⁸ Reluctantly, Severing made the move that finally goaded the Reich government into action. On March 17 the Prussian police raided Nazi offices and confiscated yet more incriminating material. When the Reich Interior Ministry distanced itself from this aggressive step, the interior ministers of Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse rose to Severing’s defense by publishing some of the captured material and by putting pressure on Groener. On April 5, at a meeting with Groener, they seconded Severing’s threat to act independently against the NSDAP.¹¹⁹ Afterward they issued a “passionate” call for a ban of the SA and the SS. On April 11, at the SPD’s opening rally for the Prussian campaign, Braun revealed sensational evidence corroborating Hitler’s boast that his “fighters” would not de- fend republican Germany’s eastern borders against attack. Reichswehr generals had previously disregarded this information, yet now even Schleicher was impressed by the fury with which the bourgeois press took up Braun’s revelations.¹²⁰ Pushed into a corner, Groener feared that if he did not outlaw the SA, the Reich would lose “respect at home and abroad” and would be perceived as “weak” by “parties from the German Nationalists to the Social Democrats.” In particular, he did not want to alienate the powerful states of Prussia and Bavaria. He felt, moreover, that the SPD’s intense desire for a ban should not be rebuffed if only because the party “had so overburdened its left wing by [endorsing] Hindenburg’s election.” He pressed Brüning, immobilized by indecision, for a ban.¹²¹ On April 12, at a meeting with Brüning and Groener, Braun and Severing threatened to act without the Reich. Their stubborn stance produced results if only because they had the backing of the conservative regimes in Bavaria and Württemberg. Brüning finally committed himself.¹²²

No sooner was the ban announced than Hindenburg’s camarilla persuaded him of the inequity of a decree that did not also outlaw the Reichsbanner. The Old Gentleman perused reports (planted for his eyes in rightist papers) on “dangerous” activities by the republican defense league. He wrote Groener an indignant letter that the press printed even before the minister received it.¹²³ Despite this flagrant attempt to force his hand, Groener stood firm because he feared pushing the SPD into opposition.¹²⁴ He denied that the evidence on the Reichsbanner proved subversion, although he did instruct a compliant Höltermann to dismantle the Schufo and to call off the “alarm alert” that the league had stood under during the presidential campaign.¹²⁵ Groener’s obstinacy infuriated Hindenburg and his advisors but won him the respect and gratitude of the republican Left.¹²⁶ His admirers, however, could not secure his tenure in office. General Schleicher intrigued against Groener inside the Defense Ministry and with the president. On May 10, unable to parry effectively an attack on the SA ban by Hermann Göring, Groener suffered humiliation in the Reichstag. Three days later he tendered his resignation as defense minister. Although he stayed as interior minister, and the SA decree remained in effect, many Social Democrats realized that not only Groener’s but Brüning’s days were numbered.¹²⁷

Hindenburg met with Brüning on May 29 and demanded a purely conservative government. The next day the chancellor and his entire cabinet resigned. Schleicher’s machinations were decisive in bringing down Brüning. In addition, however, Hindenburg’s Junker cronies urged him to cut loose from the chancellor. They were impressed by neither Brüning’s rightist inclinations nor his closeted efforts to build a coalition extending to the Nazis.¹²⁸ They saw only his “eastern settlement plan” (that would allow farmers to settle on bankrupt estates) and his reliance on SPD support. Big business complaints about the connection with the SPD had also grown ever more clamorous.¹²⁹ On June 2 the reactionary Center Party politician Franz von Papen formed a new cabinet and immediately dissolved the Reichstag, setting new elections for July 31. The SPD vehemently opposed the new government. The NSDAP, on the other hand, initially tolerated it in return for the elections and a promise to lift the SA ban, a pledge fulfilled on June 14.¹³⁰

so the conservative government initially resisted banning the Nazis because they wanted to harness the nationalism and militarism of its supporters and thought that they could tame it into a force for the "traditional Right"

when they finally moved to ban the Nazis, the Center and the bourgeois industrialists attacked the government for the unfairness of only banning the extreme right and not the "extreme left"

the internal sabotage went so far that it caused the cabinet to crumble and the government to fall, and the ban on Nazis was lifted

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Wilhelm Sollmann created the intraparty sensation of the season. In an article widely picked up by the Social Democratic press in December, he charged that from top to bottom the SPD was administered by men and (a few) women so burdened with daily tasks they could not get an overview of the political landscape. The executive committee required “political-intellectual” leaders, not “organization men” wrapped up in a “thousand small matters.” The SPD needed not bureaucrats but leaders with a “will to power.”⁸¹ Sollmann had expressed the same view in Neue Blätter two years earlier to little effect; now his analysis corresponded to that of many activists. For this reason, his article generated heated remarks in the party council. Meitmann seconded his diagnosis of the SPD’s malaise, while the leftist Georg Dietrich agreed that the organization suffered from “rigidity.” Others denied the need for a shakeup. The SPD’s much-maligned inflexibility, they said, had actually helped the organization survive recent traumas.⁸² Wels, no doubt stung by Sollmann’s critique, rejected a division between organizational and political leaders such as that, he pointedly remarked, of the Nazis. “If ever an organization has passed muster, it is the SPD,” he stoutly averred. “To reform it without a clear plan would insult the simple people on whose shoulders the apparatus rests.” Wels also denied the need to bring in younger leaders. Rather than foolishly cast aside experienced functionaries, the party should undertake a campaign to inform youth of their accomplishments. Nonetheless, in acknowledgment of the stir Sollmann had created, if not the validity of his points, the executive committee coopted him in January.⁸³

___

quote:

German Social Democrats tended to believe that the “forces of history” would determine the course of events. They did not by any means sit back and let things take their course and, indeed, were committed social and political reformers; yet a peculiar fatalism-optimism fostered passivity at decisive moments. Wels continued to insist that a ruler such as Hitler could not last long, even after the Nazis smashed the trade unions, the SPD, and the KPD and banned other political parties.³ Social Democrats saw themselves as objects of bourgeois society rather than as subjects who could fundamentally shape events. Again, Wels gave a striking formulation of this attitude in his address to the Socialist International congress in August 1933. “We were,” he averred, “driven by the compulsion of events more than the parties in any other country. We were indeed at the mercy of events.”⁴ In a letter to Stampfer in 1936, Erich Kuttner, like Hans Muhle a Social Democrat in Braun’s administration, criticized such reasoning as applied to the economic crisis: the party lead- ership claimed, “‘That’s something we can’t do any- thing about,’” forgetting that “people prefer an active rescue effort that could fail to being comforted with a mere ‘Wait, children!’ by someone watching the disaster with folded arms.”⁵

finally finished the book on the SPD and it leaves us with one final parallel to the inaction and cooption of the Dems

HiHo ChiRho
Oct 23, 2010

https://twitter.com/ShaneSheehy/status/1432364656685948933

indigi
Jul 20, 2004

how can we not talk about family
when family's all that we got?

gradenko_2000 posted:

awesome posts

while the practice of the SPD and DNC have a lot of parallels I’d hesitate to give Democrats the same benefit of the doubt when it comes to “intentions.” I believe the SPD probably recognized and wanted to effectively combat the fascist threat but didn’t know how/wouldn’t effectively organize, while - although Dems may understand the reality of the extreme right’s rise in America - I honestly don’t believe they care in the way the SPD are supposed to in these passages. they’ll have no problem pivoting even further right and in fact I believe that’s what many of them hope to do. they’ll make money and have influence either way

gradenko_2000
Oct 5, 2010

HELL SERPENT
Lipstick Apathy

indigi posted:

while the practice of the SPD and DNC have a lot of parallels I’d hesitate to give Democrats the same benefit of the doubt when it comes to “intentions.” I believe the SPD probably recognized and wanted to effectively combat the fascist threat but didn’t know how/wouldn’t effectively organize, while - although Dems may understand the reality of the extreme right’s rise in America - I honestly don’t believe they care in the way the SPD are supposed to in these passages. they’ll have no problem pivoting even further right and in fact I believe that’s what many of them hope to do. they’ll make money and have influence either way

yeah I tend to agree - the DNC is definitely more "controlled opposition/actually also just capitalists so of course they're not meaningfully left"

I just retained my old comments from when I was reading that concurrently because it was January 2021 and I was in that particular headspace

MLSM
Apr 3, 2021

by Azathoth
The Democrats/DNC are the social fascist party and the Republicans/RNC are the fascist party

Vote

V. Illych L.
Apr 11, 2008

ASK ME ABOUT LUMBER

the SPD was a legitimately proletarian party, for the most part, just a deeply reactionary one by 1930

Anime Bernie Bro
Feb 4, 2020

FUCK MY ASSHOLE, LOL

tokin opposition posted:

Tomboys are fash bait

i thought it was all about tradwives?

edit: horseshoe theory??

Kaedric
Sep 5, 2000


https://gizmodo.com/regulators-in-china-ban-minors-from-online-gaming-more-1847584932

It begins

Truga
May 4, 2014
Lipstick Apathy

honestly, seeing how "online gaming" is becoming synonymous with "gambling" it just makes sense. 99% of new stuff coming out is just gacha hell lmfao

indigi
Jul 20, 2004

how can we not talk about family
when family's all that we got?
honestly it’s just a good idea to limit (or prohibit) minors’ access to online games. probably all online media, but it’s a start. we don’t let children smoke, we probably shouldn’t let them do 16 hours a week on CoD

Atrocious Joe
Sep 2, 2011

mawarannahr posted:

I was moved by Brace Belden’s interview with Brandon Lee to donate to his gofundme. He is a comrade in need rendered quadriplegic by the Philippine state:

other links provided in show notes:

I have no idea about these human rights organizations, perhaps gradenko has some knowledge of them. The guy sounds really hosed up and will probably require long term intensive medical care and face lifelong disability in the United States.

idk about writing to Nancy Pelosi.

Bayan USA is the main US org associated with the Philippines national democracy movement. They're legit. They also love telling people to write or call their congress people, so that makes sense.

Pener Kropoopkin
Jan 30, 2013

I dunno how I missed out on this after all this time, but I was just clued into the fact that Isaac Asimov wrote a review for 1984 in the New Yorker during 1980.

It rips.

http://www.newworker.org/ncptrory/1984.htm

quote:

That book described society as a vast world-wide extension of Stalinist
Russia in the 1930s, pictured with the venom of a rival left-wing sectarian.
Other forms of totalitarianism play a small role. There are one or two
mentions of the Nazis and of the Inquisition. At the very start, there is a
reference or two to Jews, almost as though they were going to prove the
objects of persecution, but that vanishes almost at once, as though Orwell
didn't want readers to mistake the villains for Nazis.

The picture is of Stalinism, and Stalinism only.

By the time the book came out in 1949, the Cold War was at its height.
The book therefore proved popular. It was almost a matter of patriotism in
the West to buy it and talk about it, and perhaps even to read parts of it,
although it is my opinion that more people bought it and talked about it
than read it, for it is a dreadfully dull book - didactic, repetitious, and
all but motionless.

quote:

The great Orwellian contribution to future technology is that the
television set is two-way, and that the people who are forced to hear and
see the television screen can themselves be heard and seen at all times and
are under constant supervision even while sleeping or in the bathroom.
Hence, the meaning of the phrase 'Big Brother is watching you'.
This is an extraordinarily inefficient system of keeping everyone under
control. To have a person being watched at all times means that some other
person must be doing the watching at all times (at least in the Orwellian
society) and must be doing so very narrowly, for there is a great
development of the art of interpreting gesture and facial expression.

One person cannot watch more than one person in full concentration, and
can only do so for a comparatively short time before attention begins to
wander. I should guess, in short, that there may have to be five watchers
for every person watched. And then, of course, the watchers must themselves
be watched since no one in the Orwellian world is suspicion-free.
Consequently, the system of oppression by two-way television simply will not
work.


Orwell himself realised this by limiting its workings to the Party
members. The 'proles' (proletariat), for whom Orwell cannot hide his British
upper-class contempt, are left largely to themselves as subhuman.
(At one
point in the book, he says that any prole that shows ability is killed - a
leaf taken out of the Spartan treatment of their helots
twenty-five hundred years ago.)

quote:

Then, too, Orwell had the technophobic fixation that every technological
advance is a slide downhill. Thus, when his hero writes, he 'fitted a nib
into the penholder and sucked it to get the grease off. He does so 'because
of a feeling that the beautiful creamy paper deserved to be written on with
a real nib instead of being scratched with an ink-pencil'.

Presumably, the 'ink-pencil' is the ball-point pen that was coming into
use at the time that 1984 was being written. This means that Orwell
describes something as being written' with a real nib but being 'scratched'
with a ball-point. This is, however, precisely the reverse of the truth. If
you are old enough to remember steel pens, you will remember that they
scratched fearsomely, and you know ball-points don't.


This is not science fiction, but a distorted nostalgia for a past that
never was. I am surprised that Orwell stopped with the steel pen and that he
didn't have Winston writing with a neat goose quill.

quote:

In his despair (or anger), Orwell forgets the virtues human beings have.
All his characters are, in one way or another, weak or sadistic, or sleazy,
or stupid, or repellent. This may be how most people are, or how Orwell
wants to indicate they will all be under tyranny, but it seems to me that
under even the worst tyrannies, so far, there have been brave men and women
who have withstood the tyrants to the death and whose personal histories are
luminous flames in the surrounding darkness. If only because there is no
hint of this in 1984, it does not resemble the real world of the 1980s.

Nor did he foresee any difference in the role of women or any weakening
of the feminine stereotype of 1949. There are only two female characters of
importance. One is a strong, brainless 'prole' woman who is an endless
washerwoman, endlessly singing a popular song with words of the type
familiar in the 1930s and 1940s (at which Orwell shudders fastidiously as
'trashy', in blissful non-anticipation of hard rock).

The other is the heroine, Julia, who is sexually promiscuous (but is at
least driven to courage by her interest in sex) and is otherwise brainless.
When the hero, Winston, reads to her the book within a book that explains
the nature of the Orwellian world, she responds by falling asleep - but then
since the treatise Winston reads is stupefyingly soporific, this may be an
indication of Julia's good sense rather than the reverse.

In short, if 1984 must be considered science fiction, then it is very bad
science fiction.

These are all just from the section where Asimov reviews the scifi aspects of 1984.

gradenko_2000
Oct 5, 2010

HELL SERPENT
Lipstick Apathy

Pener Kropoopkin posted:

I dunno how I missed out on this after all this time, but I was just clued into the fact that Isaac Asimov wrote a review for 1984 in the New Yorker during 1980.

It rips.

http://www.newworker.org/ncptrory/1984.htm







These are all just from the section where Asimov reviews the scifi aspects of 1984.

lol holy poo poo this is hilarious

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Pener Kropoopkin
Jan 30, 2013

There's just too much quotable poo poo from the other two sections of the review.

quote:

Eurasia is, of course, the Soviet Union, which Orwell assumes will have
absorbed the whole European continent. Eurasia, therefore, includes all of
Europe, plus Siberia, and its population is 95 per cent European by any
standard. Nevertheless, Orwell describes the Eurasians as 'solid-looking men
with expressionless Asiatic faces'. Since Orwell still lives in a time when
'European' and 'Asiatic' are equivalent to ' 'hero' and 'villain', it is
impossible to inveigh against the Soviet Union with the proper emotion if it
is not thought of as 'Asiatic'. This comes under the heading of what
Orwellian Newspeak calls 'double-think', something that Orwell, like any
human being, is good at.

It may be, of course, that Orwell is thinking not of Eurasia, or the
Soviet Union, but of his great bête noire, Stalin. Stalin is a Georgian, and
Georgia, lying south of the Caucasus mountains, is, by strict geographic
considerations, part of Asia.

lmao

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