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May 30, 2024 05:49
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- Tunicate
- May 15, 2012
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Can't post for 5 hours!
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Like the whole culture of loving over business connections for a quick buck instead of trying to build long term relationships.
I assume it's worse in some industries than in others, since I've wired a few thousand to a bunch of different chinese companies when buying stuff for my business, and always got what I ordered without much of an issue (besides covid delays when they were in lockdown).
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Aug 27, 2022 05:13
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- Criss-cross
- Jun 14, 2022
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by Fluffdaddy
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Considering China is a huge high-tech manufacturing hub for the world, it can't be that bad.
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Aug 27, 2022 05:21
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- Zakrello
- Feb 17, 2015
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missile imbound
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I didn't know the Xi/Obama Pooh/Tigger one was from the mainland and had figured it was a hk thing. How about the Xi/Carrie Lam as Pooh and Piglet one?
this one is definitely a HK thing, being born due to the pooh/tiger thing
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Aug 27, 2022 05:33
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- Zakrello
- Feb 17, 2015
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missile imbound
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Considering China is a huge high-tech manufacturing hub for the world, it can't be that bad.
they're just a manufacturer with power shortage, nothing to see here
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Aug 27, 2022 05:34
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- MarcusSA
- Sep 23, 2007
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they're just a manufacturer with power shortage, nothing to see here
Don't forget the water shortage too.
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Aug 27, 2022 05:37
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- ronya
- Nov 8, 2010
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I'm the normal one.
You hate ridden fucks will regret your words when you eventually grow up.
Peace.
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An export-oriented economy exports its economic volatility (remaining relatively easily at full employment by filling in any swings in domestic demand through foreign demand, whilst the importer sees amplified swings in their remaining domestic demand) in exchange for domestic wage repression (which the importer partner gains in the form of cheaper imports).
It's true for every export-oriented economy from the developed ones (Germany, Japan, Korea) to the developing ones (Vietnam, Malaysia).
Michael Pettis (of Trade Wars are Class Wars) tends to emphasize the latter: the need, but also the difficulty, for China to easing off lifting wage repression. But one can likewise point at the former: if China expects its developed regions (the wealthiest currently at a Poland level of gdp/capita) to support its less developed ones in an import substitution way, it has to accept increased domestic volatility in those regions, precisely because it won't be exporting it any more. But does anyone expect the next decade of China moving to diminish the influence that its new middle classes have on its domestic outlook? I don't think so.
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Aug 27, 2022 06:01
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- PITY BONER
- Oct 18, 2021
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Tigger is also yellow. Worldview shattered.
Edit: LOL
https://www.scmp.com/yp/discover/news/asia/article/3065395/chinese-president-xi-jinping-cant-bear-being-compared-winnie
quote:Chinese president Xi Jinping can't bear being compared to Winnie the Pooh anymore, so the cartoon cub is now banned in China
Disney’s Winnie-the-Pooh has been banned on the mainland, seemingly for no reason other than the vanity of Chinese president Xi Jinping.
In 2013, a photograph of Xi walking beside former US President Barack Obama juxtaposed with one of Pooh walking with his friend Tigger went viral. And In 2014, a photo of Xi shaking hands with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, placed side-by-side with a picture of Pooh holding donkey Eeyore’s hoof also enjoyed massive internet fame. The similaries were unmissable.
Xi has clearly grown tired of the comparison, as typing “Little Winnie Bear” into WeChat pulls up the notification: “This content is illegal.” All Pooh stickers have also been removed from the social media and communication’s gallery.
There was a similar case in 2003, when Russian lawyers said they were preparing a suit against Warner Bros, the maker of the Harry Potter franchise, claiming that Dobby the Elf was making fun of Vladimir Putin.
Amazing how authoritarian strongmen are also giant piss babies.
PITY BONER fucked around with this message at 06:25 on Aug 27, 2022
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Aug 27, 2022 06:20
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- Beefeater1980
- Sep 12, 2008
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My God, it's full of Horatios!
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An export-oriented economy exports its economic volatility (remaining relatively easily at full employment by filling in any swings in domestic demand through foreign demand, whilst the importer sees amplified swings in their remaining domestic demand) in exchange for domestic wage repression (which the importer partner gains in the form of cheaper imports).
It's true for every export-oriented economy from the developed ones (Germany, Japan, Korea) to the developing ones (Vietnam, Malaysia).
Michael Pettis (of Trade Wars are Class Wars) tends to emphasize the latter: the need, but also the difficulty, for China to easing off lifting wage repression. But one can likewise point at the former: if China expects its developed regions (the wealthiest currently at a Poland level of gdp/capita) to support its less developed ones in an import substitution way, it has to accept increased domestic volatility in those regions, precisely because it won't be exporting it any more. But does anyone expect the next decade of China moving to diminish the influence that its new middle classes have on its domestic outlook? I don't think so.
I bounced a bit off Trade Wars are Class Wars, because while it’s very good, I don’t fully understand what they are saying the system levers are. Someone is doing something and as a result elites in trade surplus countries make a ton of poo poo they don’t need and sell it to trade deficit countries, beggaring local producers, to everyone’s detriment except the elites in both places. But they talk about it as if it were the trade surplus countries (or their elites) forcing their goods into the markets…are they advocating tariffs? Trade bans? Why *shouldn’t* they make what they want and sell it to foreigners? It feels like they’re implying there’s a natural amount of consumption and production based on population and it’s doing more than that that distorts things, but they don’t come right out and say it.
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Aug 27, 2022 06:36
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- Beartaco
- Apr 10, 2007
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by sebmojo
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Yeah but i am sure it would be easy to find something else racist
With Tigger? I can't even imagine.
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Aug 27, 2022 06:39
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- Ups_rail
- Dec 8, 2006
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by Fluffdaddy
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But does anyone expect the next decade of China moving to diminish the influence that its new middle classes have on its domestic outlook? I don't think so.
I can see the authoritarian government doing alot to screw normal citizens.
I really wonder what happens if another factional war in the CCP ranks heats up.
It reminds me that after stalin died how the USSR de-stalinized, and how after mau died the CCP leadership set up succession rules and term limits. I wonder if after XI they will return to that system.
China being cheap in regards to it poor provinces I could understand, but there have been so much waste with building projects they could ve easily invested in improving those areas.
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Aug 27, 2022 07:20
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- ronya
- Nov 8, 2010
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I'm the normal one.
You hate ridden fucks will regret your words when you eventually grow up.
Peace.
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I bounced a bit off Trade Wars are Class Wars, because while it’s very good, I don’t fully understand what they are saying the system levers are. Someone is doing something and as a result elites in trade surplus countries make a ton of poo poo they don’t need and sell it to trade deficit countries, beggaring local producers, to everyone’s detriment except the elites in both places. But they talk about it as if it were the trade surplus countries (or their elites) forcing their goods into the markets…are they advocating tariffs? Trade bans? Why *shouldn’t* they make what they want and sell it to foreigners? It feels like they’re implying there’s a natural amount of consumption and production based on population and it’s doing more than that that distorts things, but they don’t come right out and say it.
Pettis doesn't really have a political economy of the deficit countries beyond "there are two different kinds of elites", no. For Pettis, "the world's rich are able to benefit at the expense of the world's workers and retirees because the interests of American financiers were complementary to the interests of Chinese and German industrialists" (pp. 224)
I don't entirely buy it as phrased as such - my own take is similar to how I phrased it above, i.e., that some polities have prioritized higher real wages and other politics more macro stability. Both of those are fair things to want, and countries can prioritize either. We can see the mighty German trade unions backing wage restraint across the 2000s, for instance. Are those the 'German industrialists' Pettis has in mind?
ronya fucked around with this message at 07:29 on Aug 27, 2022
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Aug 27, 2022 07:25
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- LordArgh
- Mar 17, 2009
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Nap Ghost
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how does one share someone's body type if that body type is also unique?
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Aug 27, 2022 07:41
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- ninjoatse.cx
- Apr 9, 2005
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Fun Shoe
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It's from whatever thread halfwit seppos congregate in.
picture me quoting your gang tag.
I'd actually do it, but a halfwit seppo probed me for it
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Aug 27, 2022 07:55
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- eSports Chaebol
- Feb 22, 2005
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Yeah, actually, gamers in the house forever,
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If a random tourist accidentally wore a Winnie the Pooh t-shirt through Chinese immigration would they be denied entry into the country?
Serious question.
Peng Shuai shared photos with a Winnie the Pooh plushie in the background while she was supposedly drinking tea. I don’t think it’s actually a thing any more.
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Aug 27, 2022 08:09
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- Ups_rail
- Dec 8, 2006
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by Fluffdaddy
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So here is a page from a book I ve been reading called "the end of the world is just the beginning" The dude who wrote peter zaihen comes off as a profit because he predicted the ukrain war years ago. My loving youtube feed has been filled with his talks, he tend to tailor his talks to the group he s talking to. but he has some interesting ideas.
Here s his take on china's devolvement
quote:Part of the absurdity is simply size. When China started down its development path in 1980, it already had one billion people, more than the combined total of the rest of the East Asian nations, from Japan to Indonesia.
Part was timing. China’s entrance into the global Order did not occur until after the Nixon-Mao summit, the death of Mao, and the initiation of broad-spectrum economic reforms in the late 1970s. By the time the Chinese were ready to get down to the business of business, the gold standard was nearly a decade gone. Modern Communist China has known nothing but the era of fiat currencies and cheap money. It had no good habits to break.
Part was the nature of Beijing’s unification goals. Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia have half their populations on a small footprint (Greater Seoul for the Koreans, the west coast of the middle Malay Peninsula for Malaysia, and the island of Java for Indonesia). Japan was the world’s most ethnically pure state before it industrialized. Singapore is a city. These Asian states began with reasonably unified populations.
Not so with China. China is messy.
Even eliminating the un- and lightly populated portions, China spans more than 1.5 million square miles, about the same size as all of Western Europe. This populated 1.5 million square miles spans climate zones from near desert to near tundra to near tropics.* Even the “simple” part of China, the North China Plain, has witnessed more wars and ethnic cleansings than any other spot on the planet. The Yangtze Valley in China’s center has ranked among the world’s most sophisticated economies for most of recorded history. Southern China’s rugged landscapes have hosted everything from the poorest and most technologically backward of Asia’s many peoples to the hypertechnocracy of Hong Kong.
Every country puts a premium on political unification. Every country has fought internal wars to achieve it. China’s own internal unification effort is one of the world’s most heinous, stretching back across four millennia and dozens of discrete conflicts. The most recent major dustup—Mao’s Cultural Revolution—killed at least 40 million people, twenty-five times the number of Americans killed in all wars. The Chinese belief in the necessity of internal political violence, repression, and propaganda didn’t manifest out of nowhere, but is instead viewed as a necessary reality to avoid nightmarish civil wars. The solution?
Spend!
The Chinese government assigns capital to everything. Infrastructure development. Industrial plant buildout. Transport systems. Educational systems. Health systems. Everything and anything that puts people in jobs. Excruciatingly little of it would qualify as “wise capital allocation.” The goal isn’t efficiency or profitability, but instead achieving the singular political goal of overcoming regional, geographic, climatic, demographic, ethnic, and millennia of historical barriers to unity. No price is too high.
And so a price was indeed paid:
Fresh new lending in calendar year 2020 was about 34.9 trillion yuan (roughly US$5.4 trillion), which, even if you use the statistics for national economic size that even Chinese state economists say are bloated, comes to just shy of 40 percent of GDP. The best guess is that as of calendar year 2022, total outstanding corporate debt in China has reached 350 percent of GDP, or some 385 trillion yuan (US$58 trillion).
The Chinese have embraced the fiat currency era just as warmly as they embraced the Asian financial model. China regularly prints currency at more than double the rate of the United States, sometimes at five times the U.S. rate. And whereas the U.S. dollar is the store of value for the world and the global medium of exchange, the Chinese yuan wasn’t even used in Hong Kong until the 2010s.*
Part and parcel of the Chinese financial model is that there is no top. Because the system throws a bottomless supply of money at issues, it is hongry. Nothing—and I mean nothing—is allowed to stand in the way of development. Price is no issue because the volume of credit is no issue. One result among many is insane bidding wars for any product that exists in limited quantity. If ravenous demand for cement or copper or oil drives product prices up, then the system simply deploys more capital to secure them.
Something similar occurred in Japan in the 1980s with real estate, when for a brief and bizarre moment a square mile of downtown Tokyo was supposedly worth more than the entire U.S. western seaboard. The Japanese immediately recognized that this was not a sign that things had gone radically right, but instead that something had gone radically wrong. The Chinese have yet to register such a dark eureka. In particular the Chinese boom stressed global commodities markets between 2003 and 2007, with oil prices reaching historical, inflation-adjusted highs in 2007 of approximately $150 a barrel.
Another result is massive overproduction. China is worried about idle hands, not bottom lines. China is by far the world’s largest exporter of steel and aluminum and cement because it produces more of all three than even hyper-ravenous China can use. China’s much-discussed One Belt One Road global infrastructure program—which many non-Chinese fear is part influence peddling, part strategic gambit—is in many ways little more than a means of disposing of the surpluses.
Perhaps the most significant result of the Chinese derivation of the Asian financial model is that there is no end. All the other Asian states ultimately came to terms with the massive-debt-eventually-leads-to-dumpster-fires nature of the model. Japan crashed in 1989 and took thirty years to emerge from under the debt. The recovery took so long that Japan lost the entirety of its demographic dividend and is unlikely to ever have meaningful economic growth again. Indonesia crashed in 1998, which destroyed its government. Twice. The country’s political system remains a chaotic mess. Korea and Thailand also crashed in 1998 and used the pain to solidify transition to civilian rule (a process that bore more durable results in Korea than Thailand).
None of these options can be considered in Beijing. The Chinese Communist Party’s only source of legitimacy is economic growth, and China’s only economic growth comes from egregious volumes of financing. Every time the Chinese government attempts to dial back the credit and make the country’s economy more healthy or sustainable, growth crashes, the natives start talking about making lengthy strolls in large groups, and the government turns the credit spigot back to full. In the CCP’s mind, moving away from debt-as-all is synonymous with the end of modern China, unified China, and the CCP. In that, the Party is probably correct. It’s no surprise then that the CCP’s preferred method of storing their wealth is in U.S. currency . . . outside of China.
check out the amount of domestic credit china has verus everyone else
Ups_rail fucked around with this message at 08:27 on Aug 27, 2022
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Aug 27, 2022 08:19
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- The junk collector
- Aug 10, 2005
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Hey do you want that motherboard?
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So here is a page from a book I ve been reading called "the end of the world is just the beginning" The dude who wrote peter zaihen comes off as a profit because he predicted the ukrain war years ago. My loving youtube feed has been filled with his talks, he tend to tailor his talks to the group he s talking to. but he has some interesting ideas.
Here s his take on china's devolvement
check out the amount of domestic credit china has verus everyone else
As much as I love to dunk on China's economic structure, this chart is worthless until that Y-axis gets properly labeled and with detail.
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Aug 27, 2022 16:47
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- hypnophant
- Oct 19, 2012
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As much as I love to dunk on China's economic structure, this chart is worthless until that Y-axis gets properly labeled and with detail.
it’s pretty obviously % of 2000 baseline ??
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Aug 27, 2022 17:06
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- sticksy
- May 26, 2004
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Nap Ghost
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I too am unable to infer something unless an axis is explicitly and clearly labeled
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Aug 27, 2022 17:24
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- Criss-cross
- Jun 14, 2022
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by Fluffdaddy
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Ah yes, the coming China collapse.
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Aug 27, 2022 17:26
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- Ups_rail
- Dec 8, 2006
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by Fluffdaddy
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I ll include his comments around that graph
quote:Add the extravagances and exaggerations of the fiat era to the excesses and eruptions of the demographic moment and we have experienced the largest credit surges in human history. In the United States we know the biggest chunk of those surges as the subprime era. From 2000, when the subprime industry was birthed, to 2007, when it ended, total credit in the United States roughly doubled. The ensuing crash from such irrational exuberance knocked roughly 5 percent off of U.S. GDP in the two years before the economy found its footing.
Doubling of credit. Five percent economic drop. That’s a good baseline.
Now let’s look at everyone else . . .
quote:
Everyone has heard about the mess that is Greece. The Greeks were admitted into the eurozone despite not meeting . . . well . . . any of the requirements in regard to debts and deficits. They then proceeded to act like a college dropout wielding a distant stepparent’s platinum credit card. Total credit expanded by a factor of seven in just seven years. The bill eventually came due, the country crashed, and during the following three years the Greek economy proceeded to implode by twice as much in relative terms as the United States did during the Great Depression. By 2019 things were looking . . . if not better, then at least not quite as bad. Enter COVID. As a tourism-dependent economy, Greece once again dropped into free fall. If the country continues to exist at all, it will be as a ward of someone else.
Germany, unsurprisingly, is the polar opposite. The Germans are remarkably conservative in their financial dealings, both as a people and a government. Qualifying for a mortgage first requires making regular mortgage-like payments into a sequestered bank account for several years to prove attitude and bona fides. As such, the Germans avoided the sort of catastrophic financial collapses that bedeviled much of Europe in the 2007–9 financial crisis. One result among many was that the German economy bounced back first and fastest, leading firms across the Continent to put their eggs in the German basket while the rest of Europe withered. Two cheers for the Germans! But only two. The establishment of all things German at Europe’s center bred resentment throughout Europe.
A far from insignificant amount of that resentment put down roots in the United Kingdom, where the 2007–9 financial crisis emboldened economic and ethnic nationalists to push for separating the kingdom from the European Union. As part of the ensuing struggle, Britain’s political right and left both imploded. Populists ultimately took control of the British political right and led the kingdom through the haphazard process we know today as Brexit, while the left fell under the control of barely whitewashed neofascists for a time.
The credit build in Hungary in the 2000s was among Europe’s biggest, expanding by a factor of eight. Much of that capital flooded into the housing market in a way that would make American subprime financiers blush, putting people with minimal income or credit histories into homes they could not pretend to afford. Making matters worse, most of the loans were in foreign currencies, so when the inevitable currency swings occurred, even Hungarians who were able to afford their homes under normal circumstances suddenly saw their mortgage payments double. The ensuing economic and financial chaos hardened the political landscape against outsiders of all flavors, enabling Prime Minister Viktor Orban to seize control of the country’s entire financial and political space. For all intents and purposes, as of 2022 Hungary is no longer a democracy.
Singapore has a big credit signature, with a fivefold increase in credit since 2000. But Singapore is a financial center and so is constantly investing in places outside of itself. Much of its “private credit” is wrapped up in foreign economies. Additionally, Singapore has a government investment agency—Temasek—that is responsible for funneling a lot of the city-state’s money into projects abroad. Factor those items out and the picture doesn’t look all that bubbly. That said, Singapore sits on the Strait of Malacca—the world’s busiest trade route—and serves as the world’s largest transshipment center, to such a degree that its fuel tanks hold and manage the distribution of so much petroleum that they constitute a global price standard. Should anything happen to the velocity of global trade, Singapore’s trade-centric economy could not help but suffer in the short term regardless of how well managed the city-state’s finances happen to be.
With the combination of a fairly diversified economy, government policies welcoming immigration, and a bevy of mineral reserves big enough to feed insatiable Chinese demand, Australia has avoided recession for a generation. Others noticed, and foreign money has spammed into the country to take advantage of the longest continuous period of economic growth in human history. That has turned the Great Down Under into the most overcredited of the Western countries to not yet experience a credit collapse. Credit has increased sixfold since 2000. Housing and household debt are of course the expected bugaboos, but the credit inflows have pushed the Australian dollar up to uncomfortably unsustainable highs, eroding the competitiveness of every economic sector outside of mining. Any effort the government has taken to decrease demand with regulatory hammers has been overwhelmed by a tax code that not only encourages property ownership, but in fact encourages those already owning residential property to purchase more. This would be a problem anywhere, but in Australia it is particularly acute. Oz might seem like a place with a lot of land, but the Outback is beyond useless to residential real estate. The vast bulk of the Aussie population lives in fewer than ten largely disconnected metro regions, sharply limiting availability and driving up the cost of building new housing inventory. This will blow. The question is when?
In Colombia credit expanded by a factor of five in a single ten-year period beginning in 2003, but everything about Colombia is a special case. Enmeshed in the Western Hemisphere’s worst civil war for the better part of the past century, a particularly violent period pushed the economy (credit availability included) off the cliff in the late 1990s. Much of the 2003–14 credit expansion went hand in hand with progress in the war: as the Colombians reformulated and consolidated their political space and military strategy, the government succeeded in boxing their military opponents into smaller and smaller enclaves, until securing an ultimate peace deal and de facto surrender in 2015. This political and military recovery was mirrored by an economic recovery. Colombia’s credit “binge” was, if anything, about regaining lost ground. The challenge moving forward will be to win the peace by demonstrating to those on both sides of the war that not shooting at one another is good for business. The most likely path? Easy credit for all, to spark infrastructure development and consumer activity. Colombia’s credit binge isn’t in its past. It is in its future.
Indonesia is a country I tend to be bullish about for a mix of reasons: a large, young, upwardly mobile population; a government that by design focuses on the densely (over)populated island of Java, enabling it to concentrate its efforts on a fairly specific and poliunified geography; broad-scale energy security; an excellent location astride the world’s most prolific trade routes; and proximity to the massive mineral and agricultural exporters of Australia and New Zealand on one hand, and to the complementary industrial and financial partners of Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia on the other. To this I add a surprisingly conservative credit profile. Yes, overall credit in the Southeast Asian country has risen by a factor of more than seven, but economic growth has outpaced it. Back in 2000 overall credit was equal to GDP—something that would normally be more than a little worrying for a poor, sprawling country like Indonesia. But despite year-on-year rises in absolute credit for the next seventeen years, the ratio of credit to the overall economy has actually fallen by a third. Indonesia still faces a bevy of significant challenges—insufficient skilled labor, rickety infrastructure, corruption (which sits either near the top or at the top of the list)—but the country’s overcrediting is far less concerning than the headline figure would suggest.
The credit picture of Brazil is a reasonable echo of Greece: a sixfold increase, peaking in 2014. In that year investor sentiment and the Brazilian political system broke at the same time, triggering a political crisis and deep recession that at the time of this writing shows no sign of abating. Making matters worse, Brazil’s constitution and currency only date back to the 1990s. Not only is this modern Brazil’s first true political and economic crisis, but it is a full-blown constitutional crisis that hits at the very bedrock of everything that makes Brazil Brazil. Assuming for the moment that the Brazilian political system regenerates in short order (and there is no sign of that) and that Brazil’s governing institutions suffer no additional damage (and that seems sheer fantasy), Brazil faces years of severe recession simply to recover from their credit overexpansion. Brazil isn’t looking down the maw of a lost decade, but instead at two. At least.
Given that it has been the world’s largest oil exporter for the past fifty straight years, the word “credit” isn’t what normally comes to mind when one thinks of Saudi Arabia. Yet the Saudis have quite successfully leveraged their oil income stream to acquire rafts of credit for all portions of their system, generating a credit boom of 750 percent since 2000. As this credit is backed by unrelenting income, it probably is not as problematic as the situation in Brazil or Australia—and certainly not as bad as Greece. But most of the credit has gone either to vanity projects in the desert, or to subsidies for the population in order to purchase citizen loyalty. When the flow breaks—and it will—that loyalty will crumble. Luckily for the Saudi leadership, the country’s internal security services are among the world’s most effective . . . at quelling dissent.
Credit in India is up by a cool factor of ten since 2000, with barely a dip along the way. The steady drumbeat of economic expansion has made India a far calmer place politically than its constant bouts of famine and religious and racial churn would suggest. When thecorrection inevitably arrives, it will be epic. I’m perfectly capable of being bullish on India for reasons geopolitical and demographic, while simultaneously warning of a helluva financial crisis.
In Turkey the picture is getting complicated. Between 2000 and 2013, total credit increased by more than a factor of twelve—one of the sharpest and most sustained increases in the world. The boom granted Prime Minister (and now President) Recep Tayyip Erdogan the political capital required to consolidate control over an often-fractious system, ending decades of uncomfortable cohabitation between his own Anatolian religious conservatives, the pro-Western modernizers of the Greater Istanbul region, and a secularized military that saw itself as the guardian of the state. Now there is only Erdogan. But in 2013 the credit expansion stopped in its tracks. The loss of economic legitimacy, the pressure of 3 million refugees from the Syrian civil war, and rising geopolitical hostility from and toward Europe, Russia, Iraq, and the United States mean Erdogan’s rule has become brittle, harsh, and increasingly authoritarian. And all that before Turkey suffers the inevitable credit correction.
At the time of this paragraph’s addition on February 28, 2022, Russia is being melon-scooped out of global finance as punishment for the Ukraine War, the Russian Central Bank included. By the time you read this, the world will have a fascinating, horrific case study of true financial disintegration. Nor is Russia done. Beset with a population aging into decrepitude and a system that has given up educating the next generation, Russia’s credit collapse is but one of a phalanx of factors capable of ending the Russian state. The question isn’t will the Russians go out swinging—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is testament to that—but instead, who else will they swing at? Over-credited countries beware. Credit collapses can be caused by any number of actions or inactions. They do not require a war. Or sanctions.
Not to belabor the point, but the absolute financial blowout that is China has generated the largest and most unsustainable credit boom in human history both in absolute and relative measures. The Chinese will exit the modern world just as they entered it: with a big splash. The only question is when. If I had the answer to that you wouldn’t be reading this book, because instead of struggling through edits I’d be idling away my days on the Peter Virgin Islands.
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Aug 27, 2022 18:00
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- Xakura
- Jan 10, 2019
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A safety-conscious little mouse!
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quote:By the time the Chinese were ready to get down to the business of business, the gold standard was nearly a decade gone. Modern Communist China has known nothing but the era of fiat currencies and cheap money. It had no good habits to break.
quote:Add the extravagances and exaggerations of the fiat era
Uhh, is he a goldbug?
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Aug 27, 2022 18:05
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- Ups_rail
- Dec 8, 2006
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by Fluffdaddy
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No, he is the opposite.
In one of his talks he says that any successful currency backed by metal ultimately becomes the victim of its own success. because as the metal leaves the economy of the country thats created it, they then have to basically go on war of conquest to get more of the metal.
He says the advantage of fiat is that the money supply can be expanded to meet the size of the economy.
In some of his online debates its funny because when people bring up tech, and crypto he shits on them by pointing out that tech is at the top of the pyramid, you need high education and skills and if you dont even have food or energy then your not gonna be able to support a tech industry.
On crypto he argues it only works if its allowed to interface with existing finical system.
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Aug 27, 2022 18:25
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- The junk collector
- Aug 10, 2005
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Hey do you want that motherboard?
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Are you being serious? It shows the percentage change from the baseline in 2000. If you wanted to be incredibly clear you could put a '% increase' on it, but it's pretty obvious what it's showing.
So what's the baseline? Total debt in RMB? In US Dollars? As a percent of GDP? Inflation adjusted or absolute? What accounting is made for the fact that we know China cooks it's books? If you go to the data source it states that "Starting dates for the new credit series (in bold) and sources: Credit to nonfinancial corporations and credit to households" for China begins from 2006 so our year 2000 baseline already has problems with incomplete data.
And that is from a group that runs confidence inspiring statistical regressions that look like
China's debt growth and potential implosion are huge and at nearly unprecedented levels but this chart is very much designed by a guy to tell a story and sell books.
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Aug 27, 2022 18:28
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- Kchama
- Jul 25, 2007
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No, it was mainlanders. That's why it became a big deal and got banned. You're remembering the original meme right though, it was Xi and Obama walking next to a Pooh and Tigger pic.
Anyone who is reaching that far to pretend it's racist is just a loving dipshit, ignore 'em.
Sadly the loving dipshit is an admin...
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Aug 27, 2022 18:30
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- Mr. Nice!
- Oct 13, 2005
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bone shaking.
soul baking.
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I caught a ban in dnd for asking seden chair why a white dude would be afraid of racists.
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Aug 27, 2022 19:15
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- Devils Affricate
- Jan 22, 2010
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Not wanting countless tiny bone shards in your chicken is racist
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Aug 27, 2022 19:31
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- PITY BONER
- Oct 18, 2021
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I just think if you're going to have a unique body type, it should be the kind that is most suitable for riding large pigs in the countryside.
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Aug 27, 2022 19:37
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- Adbot
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ADBOT LOVES YOU
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May 30, 2024 05:49
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- Ups_rail
- Dec 8, 2006
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by Fluffdaddy
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Not wanting countless tiny bone shards in your chicken is racist
If a chinese person calls another chinese person pooh bear is that a racism?
are chinese laundry soap commercials racist?
If a goon has sex in china is that rasicm? depends if peanut brittle is involved
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Aug 27, 2022 19:44
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Aug 27, 2022 05:10
