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Kchama posted:This is never how reality works. A dead commander isn't inherently an incompetent commander, and the replacement isn't inherently a more competent commander. Not in absolute "This is always the case" terms, but I think it's fair to suggest that incompetent commanders do in fact tend to be the ones doing stupid things that leave their CPs vulnerable, creating a natural selection process against that kind of incompetence at least and encouraging more careful planning and thinking. As well, it's not I think that the replacements are NECESSARILY more competent, but rather that at that particular level political factors aren't as important and it's more likely that people are tapped on the basis of perceived competence as opposed to "How loyal to Putin they'll be." Especially if whoever's in charge of picking the replacement really, really wants to see results that HE can show to superiors up the line, and is aware he needs competent people to do that. I don't think it's a huge stretch to say that an army in wartime does tend to natural select towards increasingly competent people rising up the ranks, even if they rise slower in some armies than others, and even if political considerations might block the very top spots from getting replaced. It's also not a question of simple talent, either - presumably EVERY surviving Russian commander is getting at least a little bit more competent as they gain direct battlefield experience. Yes, the absolute stupidest might be going full Cadorna but on a practical level lower level officers are getting more and more of a grip of what works, and what doesn't, and what gets everyone killed - and some of those might be tapped to replace their superiors when a vacancy opens up. Point is, I don't think we can assume that the Russian army is completely and permanently pants-on-head idiotic and do have to allow for the fact that, being human and possessing a survival instinct, some of them are in fact capable of learning and becoming more dangerous.
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Nov 10, 2022 19:00
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churning commanders is usually done by firing bad ones and promoting good ones based on battlefiels outcomes, not waiting for them to die and assuming the living survived because they were competent the living may be alive because they in a bunker while their men died, or they were 200 miles from the front line barking poo poo into the radio the dead may be dead because they were good at their jobs so you gave them the toughest missions
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Nov 10, 2022 19:02
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KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:On balance, in combat, churning commanders is going to drive better results. Sure, assuming a frictionless officer pool. There are other factors though that bring this into question though. For one, many of their best units have been thrown in the fire over and over again, presumably causing disproportionate casualties among their best officers. For another, being good at combat isn't the only survival strategy - cowardice is a great one too! For three, the size of the Russian officer pool is being severely strained by both losses and by the mobilization - this inevitably is going to put stress on the amount of training, education, and qualification considered acceptable.
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Nov 10, 2022 19:04
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KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:On balance, in combat, churning commanders is going to drive better results. That is the opposite of reality. Constantly replacing your commanders through casualties or for political reasons is actually an amazing way to screw your military because there won't be any time for the commander and soldiers to gel and become a proper unit. Tomn posted:Not in absolute "This is always the case" terms, but I think it's fair to suggest that incompetent commanders do in fact tend to be the ones doing stupid things that leave their CPs vulnerable, creating a natural selection process against that kind of incompetence at least and encouraging more careful planning and thinking. As well, it's not I think that the replacements are NECESSARILY more competent, but rather that at that particular level political factors aren't as important and it's more likely that people are tapped on the basis of perceived competence as opposed to "How loyal to Putin they'll be." Especially if whoever's in charge of picking the replacement really, really wants to see results that HE can show to superiors up the line, and is aware he needs competent people to do that. I don't think it's a huge stretch to say that an army in wartime does tend to natural select towards increasingly competent people rising up the ranks, even if they rise slower in some armies than others, and even if political considerations might block the very top spots from getting replaced. Not every surviving Russian commander is going to survive because they were in combat. Being shot at doesn't give you experience in battle. It might keep you from freaking out, but it won't make you a better commander. And if your competent one gets a bomb dropped on his head that he had no way of knowing was coming, then you lose a competent commander. His experience isn't doled out to all the other commanders who were nearby but didn't get randomly exploded. It's never actually good to lose men and commanders.
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Nov 10, 2022 19:14
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TheDeadlyShoe posted:Sure, assuming a frictionless officer pool. There are other factors though that bring this into question though. For one, many of their best units have been thrown in the fire over and over again, presumably causing disproportionate casualties among their best officers. For another, being good at combat isn't the only survival strategy - cowardice is a great one too! For three, the size of the Russian officer pool is being severely strained by both losses and by the mobilization - this inevitably is going to put stress on the amount of training, education, and qualification considered acceptable. Kchama posted:That is the opposite of reality. Constantly replacing your commanders through casualties or for political reasons is actually an amazing way to screw your military because there won't be any time for the commander and soldiers to gel and become a proper unit. All of this. Also Russia didn't have a fundamentally good army that just blundered a campaign because of That loving General. They started with pervasive rot at all levels, the kind of poo poo that takes years of good military policy to unfuck. Any theory of a fast Russian military turnaround is just silly. "Just keep warring until all the dickhead majors get sniped to raise the average living Russian officer IQ" ain't it.
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Nov 10, 2022 19:15
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sean10mm posted:. Look, see, my alcoholism is making me smarter because only the best brain cells will survive
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Nov 10, 2022 19:17
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TheDeadlyShoe posted:Sure, assuming a frictionless officer pool. There are other factors though that bring this into question though. For one, many of their best units have been thrown in the fire over and over again, presumably causing disproportionate casualties among their best officers. For another, being good at combat isn't the only survival strategy - cowardice is a great one too! For three, the size of the Russian officer pool is being severely strained by both losses and by the mobilization - this inevitably is going to put stress on the amount of training, education, and qualification considered acceptable. For sure. They just started from such a bad position that I think it's difficult for them to not improve, and it appears that they are in fact learning some organizational lessons. The Ukranians are for instance no longer able to run roughshod in their rear areas and they seem to be employing drones and artillery much more effectively than early in the war. I'm not suggesting a massive turnaround here, it's that if you're at pretty well rock bottom it's hard not to improve and the Russian military is certainly capable of learning things and improving.
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Nov 10, 2022 19:19
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KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:For sure. They just started from such a bad position that I think it's difficult for them to not improve, and it appears that they are in fact learning some organizational lessons. The Ukranians are for instance no longer able to run roughshod in their rear areas and they seem to be employing drones and artillery much more effectively than early in the war. I'm not suggesting a massive turnaround here, it's that if you're at pretty well rock bottom it's hard not to improve and the Russian military is certainly capable of learning things and improving. This is completely different from your previous stance of "Ukraine killing their commanders is a good thing, because all replacements are guaranteed to be more capable". Also what are you talking about? We just had a huge offensive that completely overran an entire front and wiped it out in days. And maybe another one is happening right now.
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Nov 10, 2022 19:26
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Kchama posted:This is completely different from your previous stance of "Ukraine killing their commanders is a good thing, because all replacements are guaranteed to be more capable". A strategic pullback is pretty different, and indicates that a lesson was learned from Kharkiv. The Russians don't have the assets to hold a long front, so they're shortening the front and making parts of it more defensible. My stance is that if incompetent commanders die, on balance they are likely to be replaced by more competent commanders. I did not guarantee that each individual will be more capable, just that over time organizations in the aggregate learn and perform better through stress. I think that's pretty clearly happening with the Russian army today.
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Nov 10, 2022 19:37
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https://mobile.twitter.com/pevchikh/status/1590740802116145154 Summary: his wife got a million+ bucks from Russian oligarchs doing extraction of Syrian phosphates while the military helped protect the business. OddObserver fucked around with this message at 19:44 on Nov 10, 2022 |
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Nov 10, 2022 19:40
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KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:A strategic pullback is pretty different, and indicates that a lesson was learned from Kharkiv. The Russians don't have the assets to hold a long front, so they're shortening the front and making parts of it more defensible. This is a stance that's extremely wrong, which is why everyone is telling you that it is wrong. You have to actually effect change for an organization to improve, not just assume that eventually you'll get someone with better stats in an important position. And again, not every commander who dies is incompetent. It turns out that competent ones are just as likely to get sniped or hit with random bombs. This isn't even their first strategic pullback. The first one happened in Kyiv. Remember that? They ordered a strategic pullback then. It wasn't the proof of Competent Russian Commanders. Even idiots have the ability to recognize that they have completely screwed up and sound a retreat.
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Nov 10, 2022 19:57
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KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:
This would seem fair in the abstract given the principle of regression to the mean but it rests on a few assumptions that probably aren't valid. Primarily, 1) competent and incompetent aren't binary, they're a spectrum. At the top you've got Serpentor or whoever; at the bottom you'd think you'd have like Cadorna but in actuality there are plenty of historical commanders worse than Cadorna they just managed to gently caress up in even more fundamental ways -- Cadorna at least managed to get his troops to the battlefield, for example. 2) It assumes a pool of potential replacement commanders whose talent and skill will regress towards the mean. If that pool doesn't exist -- say, because everyone with military training or experience has been blown up and all that's left are random line cooks and bus drivers or whoever -- then you aren't replacing incompetents with potential competents, you're replacing incompetents with noncompetents. Water is falling out of your bucket and you aren't replacing it with water you're replacing it with gravel. 3) it assumes that "competency" here is determined by individual talent rather than systemic factors. This takes a little explaining, but bear with me. Let's say you're running the mafia. You have a well built organization for doing organized crime. All your people in your hierarchy are great and experienced mafia people and they have great efficient systems set up for doing crimes and organizing crimes efficiently and grifting and so forth. You have good systems in place to ensure continuity, potential trainees are brought in and coached and trained and raised through your organization based on merit, etc. Then you ask that same organization to do some other large scale long term task. Win the world series as a baseball team, perhaps. Invade a neighboring nation. whatever. All your systems designed for task A, including your training and mentoring systems, won't transfer over to task B. You can't just respecialize from being a mafia to being an army on a whim. It doesn't work. If you try it, you'll end up having to fire all your people for incompetence, because you've asked them to do something they weren't trained or equipped to do, and you won't be able to replace them, because you don't have the systems to replace those people with new more effective people in place. So Putin can't ask his mafia army to suddenly become good at actual army poo poo. It's a bigger task than even replacing the whole organization; he has to first redesign the whole organization and then replace people top to bottom according to the new design if the new design is to work.
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Nov 10, 2022 20:05
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https://twitter.com/WarMonitor3/status/1590785887985889280 WarMonitor is pretty good about not jumping the gun on these, as far as I know? That's...right outside Kherson city. Edit: https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1590785896357691392
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Nov 10, 2022 20:20
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Hieronymous Alloy posted:So Putin can't ask his mafia army to suddenly become good at actual army poo poo. It's a bigger task than even replacing the whole organization; he has to first redesign the whole organization and then replace people top to bottom according to the new design if the new design is to work. I'm reading the Twitter thread at the same time as this thread and you could say the same thing about Musk and his company. Much less death of course. Lots of destruction (of his company/army) though.
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Nov 10, 2022 20:20
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Hieronymous Alloy posted:This would seem fair in the abstract given the principle of regression to the mean but it rests on a few assumptions that probably aren't valid. Primarily, All good points. I suppose I am mostly trying to push back on the idea that the Russian army is inherently incompetent and must remain such because I think that leads to people deciding that this will be a cake walk for the AFU and set expectations in a very unrealistic way. I also don't think that being a mafia organization and being a decently effective combat force (or even improving as a combat force) are fully mutually exclusive. That's also a bit of a spectrum and I think the longer the Russian army is actually in combat the less mafia-like it probably becomes since it you know, has to do another task rather than just do mafia things 24/7. Organizations are dynamic and evolve in response to pressure, too. Top down redesign and reorganization is not the only way organizations change. edit: I'll add that I don't think the Russian Army is gonna turn in to a world beater or live up to its prior reputation or even be able to go on the strategic offensive again. I don't think the organization can evolve through pressure sufficiently to do any of those things and they're losing too many men and assets to turn things around. But competence is a continuum and they can get more competent and make liberating occupied territory more painful for the AFU and I think they will certainly do so. Which sucks, this is a bad thing. KYOON GRIFFEY JR fucked around with this message at 20:41 on Nov 10, 2022 |
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Nov 10, 2022 20:35
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sniper4625 posted:https://twitter.com/WarMonitor3/status/1590785887985889280 the popes toes posted:https://twitter.com/visionergeo/status/1590786040356569088?s=20&t=Y3Mmwq5Q25UVxkVc0GDcxQ Encouraging
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Nov 10, 2022 20:43
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14km to the bridge in a straight line going off Google maps. Wait...that's PAST Kherson Airport!?!! Can someone post a map of where this place is? Comstar fucked around with this message at 20:56 on Nov 10, 2022 |
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Nov 10, 2022 20:53
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Sounds like Russia GTFO pretty well?
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Nov 10, 2022 20:56
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KYOON GRIFFEY JR posted:All good points. I suppose I am mostly trying to push back on the idea that the Russian army is inherently incompetent and must remain such because I think that leads to people deciding that this will be a cake walk for the AFU and set expectations in a very unrealistic way. Setting asides the question of leadership progression for the moment, one of the major weaknesses of the Russian offensive has been manpower shortage, and the gap there de facto is getting shrunk, however shoddy do the individual episodes of that look like on the outside. That alone should be a sufficient basis to temper expectations on things suddenly getting much easier for the UAF any time soon. In combination with a significantly contracting, from what we can tell right now, frontline, they’re virtually guaranteed to encounter fiercer local resistance anywhere they try pushing after they reclaim the right bank of Dnipro. Now, I wouldn’t expect them to rush head on into pillboxes and fortified tank positions - they’ve not operated like that before, and probably won’t going forward either, in the presence of better options - but the window of opportunity for Kherson-Kharkiv style pseudo-diversions is only shrinking.
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Nov 10, 2022 20:57
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ZSU already had a propaganda song lined up for Chornobaivka. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cVg8iKwc25I It's catchy! Has English subtitles if anyone's interested in the lyrics.
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Nov 10, 2022 21:05
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Comstar posted:14km to the bridge in a straight line going off Google maps. On this map of progress as of a few hours ago from Def Mon: https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1590755455340810240 Chornobaivka is on the western edge of Kherson city. Looking at the map markers from left to right, it's just east of the second marker, by the M14 motorway label
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Nov 10, 2022 21:06
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cinci zoo sniper posted:Setting asides the question of leadership progression for the moment, one of the major weaknesses of the Russian offensive has been manpower shortage, and the gap there de facto is getting shrunk, however shoddy do the individual episodes of that look like on the outside. That alone should be a sufficient basis to temper expectations on things suddenly getting much easier for the UAF any time soon. So then the Russian strategy appears to be to hold defensive positions that are too costly to attack but less costly from an attrition perspective to defend and hope that western impatience will push for a peace deal where Ukraine cedes the Russian gained territories in exchange for Kherson going back to UA. Can't they use the winter as an opportunity to start standardizing more sophisticated western weaponry like Bradleys or Abrams tanks in coordination with the new Polish run maintenance depots coming online and try for a spring offensive with the better weapons?
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Nov 10, 2022 21:08
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OddObserver posted:Sounds like Russia GTFO pretty well? It seems that there are still defenders and equipment in some locations. https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1590764762962759685 There's also this theory that the Russians are collapsing the defences to focus on Kherson itself https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1590796185819877401 Doesn't seem believable to me, but DefMon is pretty reliable so I guess it's possible
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Nov 10, 2022 21:12
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I don't think the West is going to force Ukraine to the negotiating table. Milley's statement was an assessment that ever-increasing casualties would potentially bring both sides to the negotiating table, and a note that Ukraine's position wrt regime change recently softened, which also indicates some willingness to negotiate. That's pretty different from forcing Ukraine to accept some kind of peace agreement. I don't see any indication from EU or US policy statements that indicates a change from "Ukraine gets to decide how and when it wants to negotiate." I am not sure Brads or Abrams would make as much of a difference as more drones, more ADA, and more artillery would in terms of bang for the buck. That's exactly what AFU is getting.
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Nov 10, 2022 21:14
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There definitely seems to be an IFV shortage. Abrams is only relevant insofar there are only so many T-72s left in Eastern Europe....
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Nov 10, 2022 21:16
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Chalks posted:It seems that there are still defenders and equipment in some locations. Why doesn't it seem believable? The most valuable Russian units are being withdrawn to safety first while the mobilized formations are left to guard a line so the Ukrainians can't collapse the pocket until the most valuable units are safely across. Once your best units are safe, pull out your more expendable formations next. Kraftwerk posted:So then the Russian strategy appears to be to hold defensive positions that are too costly to attack but less costly from an attrition perspective to defend and hope that western impatience will push for a peace deal where Ukraine cedes the Russian gained territories in exchange for Kherson going back to UA. The Russian strategy is just to hold on to as much as possible and hopefully turn it back into something like 2014 onwards and hope the West loses interest. The Kherson retreat wasn't becuase the Ukrainans booted them out. After Kharkiv, it seems like a legitimate effort was made to forcefully eject the Russians from the area but they got stonewalled and took some heavy casualties, and appear to have let up. I wouldn't count on the prospects of a UA offensive for the foreseeable future. The manpower math is still on Russia's side for now. MikeC fucked around with this message at 21:35 on Nov 10, 2022 |
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Nov 10, 2022 21:28
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Maps?? MAP! If this is correct, Chornobaivka would make sense. https://twitter.com/ukraine_map/status/1590759129110282242
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Nov 10, 2022 21:33
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MikeC posted:Why doesn't it seem believable? The most valuable Russian units are being withdrawn to safety first while the mobilized formations are left to guard a line so the Ukrainians can't collapse the pocket until the most valuable units are safely across. Once your best units are safe, pull out your more expendable formations next. So what’s the roadblock to giving Ukraine more force multipliers? Should we not be giving them the kind of weapons specifically geared towards NATO fighting Russia’s manpower advantage? The way I see it Ukraine must now transition to a NATO style fighting force as soon as possible or else it’s going the Russians will overrun them. They still have a material advantage and eventually the extra bodies are going to make up the difference in troops required to man them. Why are we still delaying f-16s and other stuff. If they started training for this sooner they’d have a new airforce by next year. Kraftwerk fucked around with this message at 21:44 on Nov 10, 2022 |
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Nov 10, 2022 21:42
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MikeC posted:Why doesn't it seem believable? The most valuable Russian units are being withdrawn to safety first while the mobilized formations are left to guard a line so the Ukrainians can't collapse the pocket until the most valuable units are safely across. Once your best units are safe, pull out your more expendable formations next. I'm sure delaying operations are happening as part of the withdrawal, but the tweets says they're planning on a major urban defensive "like Grozny". It sounds like more than just trying to slow them down while everyone escapes, it talks about RU expecting UA to have to siege the city as a result.
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Nov 10, 2022 21:47
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Comstar posted:Maps?? As a side note, re: earlier river bank naming discussion: check out the Inhulets near Dar'ivka there and try to figure out which banks are North/South/East/West...
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Nov 10, 2022 21:50
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After the withdrawal, is it likely that the urban core will become a regular target for artillery? I'd hate to see more people's homes get destroyed for ehat boils down to Putin's vanity.
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Nov 10, 2022 22:02
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Kraftwerk posted:So what’s the roadblock to giving Ukraine more force multipliers? Should we not be giving them the kind of weapons specifically geared towards NATO fighting Russia’s manpower advantage? Russia definitely doesn’t have manpower advantage over NATO’s 6 times as large population. The other things you’re asking about will likely remain unknown until well after they actually happen. Except for the material advantage I guess - on the whole, Ukrainians never had it, and still don’t have it. They just have select items of likely higher quality than their Russian equivalents, e.g., HIMARS. Chalks posted:I'm sure delaying operations are happening as part of the withdrawal, but the tweets says they're planning on a major urban defensive "like Grozny". It sounds like more than just trying to slow them down while everyone escapes, it talks about RU expecting UA to have to siege the city as a result. I hope it’s not a Russian that you saw saying “defensive operation like Groznyi”.  RockWhisperer posted:After the withdrawal, is it likely that the urban core will become a regular target for artillery? I'd hate to see more people's homes get destroyed for ehat boils down to Putin's vanity. Probably. Depending on which rumours you want to take at face value, the city may already be a shell of its old self, with possibly 30-40k out of pre-war ~300k.
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Nov 10, 2022 22:12
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Kraftwerk posted:So what’s the roadblock to giving Ukraine more force multipliers? Should we not be giving them the kind of weapons specifically geared towards NATO fighting Russia’s manpower advantage? There are no roadblocks, just the time and cost needed to convert the Ukrainian army into this highly trained NATO force but this is a formidable cost. This isn't like the US military which has decades of institutional knowledge with professional career soldiers at every level. While it may take only 6 months to get a healthy American citizen into uniform and plugged into a combat unit and expect them to perform well, they are doing so with mountains of infrastructure already in place with established leaders guiding them through the entire process. The Ukrainian regular army which numbered around 250k before the war has, from outside observation, performed well compared to its Russian counterparts but the unknown number of reservists and territorial soldiers have largely shown that they are not capable of the same kind of action as the regulars are especially in offensive action. I keep going back to the Kharkiv/Kherson comparison but it is very clear that while the Ukrainians seem to have a hard core of very competent (vis a vis the Russians) units found in the regular army, the units made up of reservists and the territorial soldiers are probably not a lot better in terms of capability than your average Russian mobilized unit even today. Certainly, they cannot be expected to defeat Russian regulars as Kherson has shown. Even at Kharkiv, it was the best Ukrainian formations going up against largely conscripts or low-quality soldiers from Russian-occupied territories during the initial breakthrough. In Kherson, most of the stories coming out of there were of Reservists or Territorial units being sent as the diversionary assault and they took huge losses and obtained very little territory despite months of action. Some of the most successful stories like the near collapse of the Russians near Osokorivka which caused them to fall back to the Dudchanny - Bruskynske line several weeks ago appear to have been orchestrated by Regulars with significant numbers of IFVs and tanks. So if you are hopeful of a renewed Spring/Summer '23 offensive from the UA, between now and then (6 months) there needs to be significant growth in the number of units within the UA to match the capabilities of current UA regular troops and you have to hope the careful use of the Regulars by the UA high command has preserved most of their manpower. I kinda find that unlikely given the helter-skelter nature of the UA right now where we still get stories of UA regulars using a hodgepodge of equipment and having to trade for weapons amongst themselves. It also feels like the UA high command is very risk-averse in terms of using their few high-quality units unless it's a sure thing which is also evidence that they view these units as difficult to replace/rebuild if something goes wrong. On the flip side, I don't see the Russian manpower advantage somehow overwhelming the Ukrainians. Reporting on the mobilized units shows almost universally poor performance. Troops like these are fine for static defense (sitting in a trench) but awful for an offense. When you read stories of Russian troops being told to move forward X hundred meters and dig trenches only to get wiped out by artillery, I don't think they are going to do very much attacking with good results. Basically, attacking is very hard with low-quality troops while defending with those same troops is much easier. Once this Kherson retreat business is over, this war is likely headed back to a stalemate along current lines for a while. The best-case scenario for the Russians is tons of shelling and minor gains like what we got for most of this summer. But without well-trained troops which both sides lack, big-time offensives that end up taking big swathes of land are probably off the table. Chalks posted:I'm sure delaying operations are happening as part of the withdrawal, but the tweets says they're planning on a major urban defensive "like Grozny". It sounds like more than just trying to slow them down while everyone escapes, it talks about RU expecting UA to have to siege the city as a result. Probably just an exaggeration. Like if you intended to hold Kherson city, you don't retreat and bring the Ukrainians closer to your supply crossings. Every km closer to those crossing sites increases the danger of the Ukrainians being able to storm those positions. There is, I guess, the remote possibility that they intend to just toss away whatever units they don't pull back and tell them to fight to the last man with whatever supplies they have left?
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Nov 10, 2022 22:24
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My favourite genre of Ukraine news: happy civilians being liberated https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1590814334178844673 https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1590788670256095232 https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1590782030597464064 cinci zoo sniper posted:I hope it’s not a Russian that you saw saying “defensive operation like Groznyi”. https://twitter.com/LanguageIearner/status/1590794696657637376 ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
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Nov 10, 2022 22:26
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Chalks posted:My favourite genre of Ukraine news: happy civilians being liberated If the mobilniks and national guard is being left to die, UAF will likely make the effort to cut them off and ask them to surrender instead of battling it out street to street. These groups are less likely to die fighting after being abandoned and cut off. Its such a great look to abandon mobilized men like this. Good job Russia.
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Nov 10, 2022 22:42
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Zhanism posted:If the mobilniks and national guard is being left to die, UAF will likely make the effort to cut them off and ask them to surrender instead of battling it out street to street. These groups are less likely to die fighting after being abandoned and cut off. There are a lot of rumours about Russian troops being left behind and the chaos of the evacuation, nothing confirmed so far https://twitter.com/WarMonitor3/status/1590816129794310144 https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1590817086137311239 Chalks fucked around with this message at 22:57 on Nov 10, 2022 |
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Nov 10, 2022 22:54
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Tomn posted:Not in absolute "This is always the case" terms, but I think it's fair to suggest that incompetent commanders do in fact tend to be the ones doing stupid things that leave their CPs vulnerable, creating a natural selection process against that kind of incompetence at least and encouraging more careful planning and thinking. The first commander to locate their command post outside of artillery range is a coward, the second is prudent
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Nov 10, 2022 22:55
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The Russians aren't going to leave some units in Kherson to, ugh, fight until the end or something. Be real, it literally makes no sense militarily to leave some units to pointlessly engage in street battles. They are probably all on the Left Bank already.
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Nov 10, 2022 22:59
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Solovyev is doing it live https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1590827196079550464
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Nov 10, 2022 23:04
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The rumours of chaos and panicked Russians left behind on the wrong side of the river continue https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1590821666518704142 quote:in Kherson, panic broke out among the Russian military. They abandon their equipment and try to get to the left bank. It is not possible to cross safely. A military disaster is brewing. The Dnieper will not become a freeze line. dimitriev https://twitter.com/NLwartracker/status/1590823995188088833 https://twitter.com/IgorKar03352504/status/1590827110759043072 https://twitter.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1590804120146944017 https://twitter.com/WarMonitor3/status/1590819004389949440
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Nov 10, 2022 23:09
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