War in Ukraine: thread feedback session open unttil Saturday (i'll regret this)

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Kraftwerk: Aug 13, 2011; i do not have 10,000 bircoins, please stop asking

Tomn posted:

Eh, that might be a factor in decision-making but I feel like it'd be a relatively minor factor - issues of national defense, internal politics over sending aid to Ukraine, diplomatic relationships with the players involved, procurement issues on the home front etc. are likely to factor in a lot more. Besides, this assumes that the government (who's the one actually making the decision to send tanks or not, not the manufacturers) is actively nervous that their tanks will come off badly in practice compared to Russian tanks, and if they're worried about THAT it's probably not optics they're primarily concerned with, but whether or not their national defense is sufficient. If, as is entirely possible, they feel confident about their tanks then optics aren't going to stop them - in fact, it'll encourage them to send them in to showcase what they can do and act as a living advertisement.

And honestly, at this point if Western MBTs go into Ukraine and start exploding at a rate similar to Russian tanks, the conclusion people are likely to draw isn't "Lol Western tanks useless and dumb just like Russians, better buy from China or something" but rather "Well, if Russian tanks AND Western tanks are exploding at a high rate in a real shooting war, maybe tanks just have a naturally high attrition rate in modern warfare and we oughta buy more just in case."

There must be another angle to this.
I think the real advantage behind western tanks is the doctrine and tactics that best maximize their capability.

I think Ukraine likes hit and run tactics based on attrition so they want to quickly scoot in shoot up a position and then drive away before artillery and ATGMs get them. Additionally these western tanks have amazing thermals and optics which let them find concealed positions where someone might be waiting with RPGs. The whole thing is probably about seeing the enemy before they see you and driving away before artillery gets you.

If you don�t do that then western tanks are probably as useful as the Russian ones.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 04:50

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# ? May 25, 2024 23:31

Alchenar: Apr 9, 2008

New Geleotti piece on Russia after Putin: https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/is-there-hope-for-russia-after-putin/

quote:

It is perhaps a mark of Vladimir Putin�s apparent endurance � after 22 years directly and indirectly ruling Russia � that there is such an appetite for claims of his imminent departure. He has blood cancer or pancreatic cancer, and will be dead within six months (we�ve been hearing such tales for years now). He will shortly be toppled by a palace coup. He is about to anoint a successor. And yet he remains stubbornly in place.

Nonetheless, he is now 70 years old, is dogged by persistent suggestions of health issues (if not necessarily the fatal ones so often suggested), and perhaps most importantly, has dragged Russia into a disastrous war that will define its relationship with itself and the outside world for at least a generation. While it is impossible meaningfully to predict quite when and how Putin will leave office, the only certainty is that he will, somehow and some day. What then, though? In many ways this has become a political Rorschach ink blot test, a question whose answer is determined by people�s assumptions about Russia.

There are those who believe that authoritarianism is in some ways � or at least for the foreseeable future � part of the country�s destiny, if not DNA, such that Putin will either be succeeded by another Putin, or else that whoever becomes the new master of the Kremlin will inevitably have to become a Putin, shaped and compressed by political culture, the interests of the elite, and the circumstances of the time. After all, Putinism did not spring from nowhere, and his neo-imperialist project does have deep social roots. One of the best ways of answering this is to consider whether Ukraine is Putin�s war or Russia�s? On the one hand, it is undoubtedly Putin�s. He made the decision to invade not only without consulting outside his closest circle, but also freely, under no discernible pressure to take such a step from his public or his elite. The invasion, as well as the disastrous way it was executed, was a product of his unrealistic assumptions about Ukraine and its will and ability to resist. At the same time, one cannot argue that Putin�s attitudes are entirely out of step with those of many of his fellow citizens. They may not have been calling for an invasion, but nonetheless, they have expressed beliefs which � to a vastly less pyrotechnic degree � resonate with Putin�s hawkish messages. While polling demonstrates that apparent enthusiasm for the war is much less firm and unconditional than headline figures may suggest, there is nonetheless a substantial body of supporters.

Beyond the effects of over a decade of increasingly xenophobic propaganda, one can argue this is in part because Russians never really came to terms with the end of empire, and indeed of great power status after 1991, although Russia retained its vast nuclear arsenal. The irony was that the relatively peaceful manner in which the USSR was dissolved allowed many Russians to believe that they were generously granting a boon to the other successor states, not bowing to political necessity. The implicit corollary was that they were due a debt of gratitude. I remember an otherwise-thoughtful Russian diplomat, after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, arguing �we let the Ukrainians run Crimea and they neglected it, they simply didn�t care for the territory and its people, Russian people. So, of course we had to take it back.� The Russians were also able to sidestep dealing properly with their Soviet legacy. To be sure, all the states which emerged from the former Soviet Union were at once its victims and accomplices, beneficiaries and casualties. To call the USSR a �Russian empire� is a crass over-simplification, but it was the Kremlin�s empire, to be sure. Even before Putin began his deliberate and comprehensive rewriting of Russia�s past to suit his vision of its present and future, Russians had at the very least an ambiguous attitude towards the sovereignty of their former Soviet neighbours.

Thus, there is the argument that the end of the Putin era will also be the end of the Russian Federation in its current from. Like the USSR before it, the country will become a failing state, with the centre unable to manage the country properly � ripped apart by power struggles or otherwise debilitated � leaving regions forced to fend for themselves or able to act on long-held dissatisfaction with their status. Again, for some this is a dream of a rightly �decolonised� empire, for others a nightmare of feuding and unstable successor states and proliferating military muscle. In fairness, though, outside the North Caucasus there is little sense of any desire for independence, even within those few regions and constituent republics where the titular local ethnicity is in the majority. To wish �decolonisation� on them willy-nilly is, in its own perverse way, a deeply imperialist act. Still, while there are those who may seize independence, others may have it forced upon them by circumstances. More likely in this scenario would be a renegotiation of power between regions and centres, perhaps even making the Russian Federation a genuine federation in more than just name, which might prove a very positive development, creating a situation in which it might matter rather less who succeeds Putin and what they want and believe.

It is also possible to imagine a more optimistic trajectory. Putin and those generally characterised as his �cronies� or his �inner circle� are strikingly similar: all men, generally aged between 68 and 75, most having had careers in the KGB. Very few came from higher-up nomenklatura families, the established Soviet Communist Party elite. Instead � like Putin himself � they were often arrivistes, men who had finally made it into the power structures, only to see them undermined and then overturned. It is not just that they are true representatives of Homo Sovieticus, �Soviet Man,� it is that they are suffused with a clear sense of resentment with a world � and a West � they feel betrayed them, denying them and their country the status both deserve.

The emotional dimension of politics is too often overlooked or underplayed, yet the roots of the current crisis are found less in the specific wording of NATO communiques or Ukraine�s fateful Association Agreement with the European Union, so much as how they were interpreted by a cabal of leaders already predisposed to see slights, threats, and conspiracies all around them. Likewise, Putin�s notorious pseudo-historical essay �On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,� was not simply a political gambit to prepare the public for future war, it was much more a statement of personal credo. His unhedged claims that Russians and Ukrainians �are one people� reflected a long-standing belief that, as he told George W Bush in 2008, �Ukraine is not even a country,� and an anger that this non-country was, in his eyes, �betraying� Russia.

For Putin and his ilk, there is little hope of epiphany, but while a majority of Russians, especially within the power elite in general and security apparatus in particular, may share certain nationalist assumptions, they do not necessarily hold them in the same way and to the same degree as Putin�s cohort. As the scholar Gulnaz Sharafutdinova argues, today�s Russians � rich and poor, powerful and marginalised � are no longer Homo Sovieticus. On a purely subjective level, my own interactions with officials and officers in their 50s and early-to-mid-60s have not suggested the same emotional baggage as Putin�s people. They consider themselves patriots (even as they embezzle from their nation with abandon and, largely, impunity) and often betray ingrained racism towards the people of Central Asia and the North Caucasus, as well as assumptions of superiority over Ukrainians. However, they also tend to be pragmatic, acquisitive, increasingly nostalgic of the �good old days� of Putin�s early years, when the funds accumulated from stealing at home could freely be banked and spent abroad. The latest iPhone, the Western luxury car (and now the spare parts to repair it), the skiing holidays in Courchevel, the pied a terre in London, and the opportunity to send your children to a British or American university: these were all considered the essential perks of their position.

For them, this is an inconvenient war. It is locking them away from these perks, and raising the spectre of public unrest, even systemic collapse. Already, there has been an upsurge in intra-elite divisions over shrinking resources, especially evident in �raiding,� a very Russian form of theft, using the courts and the state to appropriate assets, as well as the kind of violent struggles over companies reminiscent of the so-called �wild 90s.� As one source reportedly close to Putin�s inner circle put it, �it�s started to dawn on people: we�ve lost the real war. People are starting to think about how to move forward, what position they�d like to take in the future, what bet to make, what hand to play.�

These are in no way natural democrats, but the war is bad for business (theirs, in particular), and so is trying to maintain a heavy-handed police state, which risks further destabilising and debilitating the country they intend to rule. Besides, the longer Russia is isolated from Western technology and investment, the greater the risk that it simply becomes a satellite of China. A widespread view amongst these powerful � but not powerful enough � figures is that things have gone too far and the need is for some kind of return to �normal politics.� After all, Russia�s historical pattern is that particularly authoritarian leaders� successors tend to �compete among themselves to liberalize the regime,� as Andrei Kolesnikov has observed, and in the words of one Moscow-based analyst who still hobnobs with some of these grandees, �they don�t think that Putin is Stalin, but they do want a Thaw,� citing the limited liberalisation that followed his death.

Of course, quite which of these potential trajectories proves closest to reality depends on a host of variables, not least what happens in the war, the means of Putin�s departure, and Western policy before and after the transition. It is hard to see Ukraine not winning, in the end, but what does �victory� mean? Will it mean Russia losing Crimea, a territory most Russians regard as rightly theirs? National humiliation is a powerful catalyst for change, but an unpredictable one. It could lead to a further explosion of nationalism and revanchism, or prove cathartic for the Russian people as a whole, forcing them to begin to question imperial assumptions.

Secondly, how does any transition of power take place? A coup or an assassination can never be ruled out, but would be very difficult to organise, not least given the proliferation of security forces, organised in part precisely to watch and counter each other. In such an environment, it would likely require some catastrophic crisis that made the choice between their survival versus Putin�s. A political coup is perhaps even more implausible. No one can mobilise political support openly, and there are no bodies such as the Soviet Party�s Politburo and Central Committee to articulate elite consensus, as happened in the successful ousting of Nikita Khrushchev in 1964. The constitutional mechanism for removing a president is complex and intentionally difficult, requiring majorities in parliament and the Supreme and Constitutional Courts, all carefully packed with Putin�s people.

So far, at least, there is no sign of mass public unrest, and if it does emerge it will likely, at least at first, be driven by economic rather than political concerns. Thus, it may need to be Putin�s decision, debility or death that, as for so many Soviet leaders, decides the outcome. If he gets to pick a successor, then it will likely be someone he feels he can trust with his life and his legacy. One of his former bodyguards, now governor of Tula region, the 50-year-old Alexei Dyumin, is frequently mooted as a possible heir. So too is the minister for agriculture, the 45-year-old Dmitri Patrushev, son of one of Putin�s oldest, closest (and most hawkish) allies, Security Council secretary Nikolai Patrushev.

Much of Putin�s power is not institutional so much as rooted in his relationships, his longevity, and his personal authority. Whether appointed by an outgoing president or through haggling between powerful interests because of a sudden vacancy, any successor would inevitably be more dependent on the wider elite. In some ways a parallel can be drawn with the so-called Varyagi, �Varangians� � outsider regional governors appointed by Moscow. Their loyalties may well be to the Kremlin but they find themselves relatively isolated, dependant on local elites with their own interests, circles of corrupt self-interest and social connections. The most successful of them � like Dyumin, for that matter � quickly learn to adapt, appreciating that championing regional interests and forging ties with the people who actually run their territory on the ground is essential to achieving anything. The result is a delicate balancing act, meeting enough of the Kremlin�s demands to remain in post, while appeasing local interests enough to be able to accomplish anything.

A new president would be the ultimate Varyag, in charge according to the constitution, but in practice relying on others to turn orders into action. Even a chosen successor will, in due course, emerge from their predecessor�s shadow, especially as the remnants of Putin�s �team� die or retire. (Putin between 1999-2000 was not today�s secular monarch, in power or policy, after all). Even in the best case, the next political leader is unlikely to be a democrat or a reformer: the experience of Gorbachev�s quixotic era, in which he inadvertently reformed the Soviet Union to death, has become a powerful cautionary tale for many. Likewise, they will probably not be a warmongering ultra-nationalist or ideologue. The bulk of the elite � including the siloviki (�men of force�) � are essentially kleptocrats; ruthless pragmatists, interested in preserving the system that enriches them and regaining the old opportunities for fully enjoying those ill-gotten gains.

Of course, while it is ultimately Russians who will shape their country�s post-Putin fate, the West will also play a role. In the 1990s, an historic opportunity to create a true partnership and encourage genuine democracy in Russia was squandered, not least by short-termism, supporting Boris Yeltsin when he essentially stole the 1996 elections, as well as when he shelled his own parliament into submission in 1993, because his Communist and nationalist opponents were so unpleasant. What was understandable in the short-term was disastrous in the long-term, furthering cynicism about a still-emerging democracy and creating conditions propitious for the rise of a revanchist nationalist and statist like Putin. It may be that the Ukrainian disaster will be a second chance for both Russia and the West.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 11:02

Randarkman: Jul 18, 2011

Kraftwerk posted:

I think Ukraine likes hit and run tactics based on attrition so they want to quickly scoot in shoot up a position and then drive away before artillery and ATGMs get them. Additionally these western tanks have amazing thermals and optics which let them find concealed positions where someone might be waiting with RPGs. The whole thing is probably about seeing the enemy before they see you and driving away before artillery gets you.

People often seem to froget the issue of crew ergonomics, and that's really an arena where Western vehicles blow Soviet/Russian ones out of the water. Sure, they're somewhat smaller, but with better ergonomics you will have a crew that doesn't get tired as quickly, will be able to operate in and out of combat more quickly and efficiently, can more easily change positions within the vehicle if that's required, and if the vehicle is knocked out there's a much better chance that the crew walks away from it alive.

It really cannot be overstated IMO, it's one of those soft factors that it seems is often missed. Soviet vehicles often seem to display a conscious disregard for soft factors in their design, and I don't really think it's a valuable tradeoff to have more and somewhat smaller vehicles when you still seem to be losing them at a higher rate, and losing those vehicles also often ends up with the crew trapped and dead.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 11:52

PC LOAD LETTER: May 23, 2005; WTF?!

Randarkman posted:

Soviet vehicles often seem to display a conscious disregard for soft factors in their design, and I don't really think it's a valuable tradeoff to have more and somewhat smaller vehicles when you still seem to be losing them at a higher rate, and losing those vehicles also often ends up with the crew trapped and dead.

A lot of this is because the Russian or Soviet stuff was designed and built within various harsh limitations.

Their tanks for instance tend to be on the small side and less armored than western tanks because they're required to fit within a ~40 ton weight limit. Abrams weight around 70 tons for comparison.

The BMP's infamous fuel tank doors and poor armor are due to severe weight and space limitations, etc as well as a requirement to be amphibious for fording rivers and lakes.

Their designers are anything but stupid. They are however constantly forced to make difficult trade offs and its the crews that pay for it.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 12:42

PederP: Nov 20, 2009

One thing that I find odd about the current 'Russian mobilization scare' is that it really doesn't take into account the actual proportions between the populations of Ukraine and Russia. That's not to say mobilization waves are worthless or do not pose a serious challenge for Ukraine. Of course they do - the manpower-anemic Russian army which invaded was much more vulnerable, inflexible and thinly spread.

But Russia has a population of fighting-age individuals approximately three times that of Ukraine. That's not the horde-like numerical advantage some make it out to be. Especially not given the massive size of Ukraine and the challenges of outfitting/training hundreds of thousands of soldiers.

I find the increased war footing of the Russian economy a much greater threat to Ukraine than mobilization waves. Which is also why Ukraine really needs Western materiel to keep up. Even if Russia turned out not to have the expected massive materiel stockpiles - they do have heavy industry to produce / refit / adapt. Ukraine's rather impressive heavy industry was wrecked very early in the war - and if logistics is the king, production is the queen.

If Ukraine does not win the war in 2023, and the Russian economy does not collapse by then to an extent that their heavy industry suffers greatly - then the supporters of Ukraine could find itself in a position where they can't simply divert production and current stockpiles to Ukraine, but have to actually dedicating a greater portion of their economy to military production. Now that's probably a good idea anyway, given that the current shortfall of equipment and munitions in Europe will take decades to replenish given current military production capacities. It might also be a welcome way to fight unemployment when the inevitable economic recession hits. But while we're caught in a weird limbo of high inflation, labor shortages and low growth, that's much harder to do.

I see the rush to provide Ukraine with any possible edge as much more of a way to avoid the war dragging out long enough to become one of industrial attrition - rather than a way to address manpower asymmetries. Russia will, even with one or more waves of mobilization, still struggle to field enough personnel for the kind of war they're fighting and the opponent they're facing. The Ukrainian army is large. Russian mobilization is something they have to do, to even stay in the fight. But the scales will be tipped by material and munitions, in my opinion, rather than manpower. Both sides are low on materiel to properly outfit mobile formations with strong fire capabilities. They're low on munitions and replacement/repair capacity to take full advantage of what they do have.

Russia has an industrial base - Ukraine has the scattered remnants of one. The US MIC and massive stores of equipment can do a lot to make up for this - but without Ukrainian victory in 2023 I think Europe will have no choice but to also step up and to some degree, gear their economies toward military production.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 14:31

Antigravitas: Dec 8, 2019; Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:

Antigravitas posted:

Anyway, Bloomberg reports something I haven't seen elsewhere and that I'm too tired to source.

And now:

VOA posted:

"Countries that already have Leopard tanks can begin training missions for our tank crews. We will start with that, and we will go from there. I hope, Germany will follow their process, conduct their internal consultations, and will arrive at the decision to transfer tanks. I am optimistic regarding this because the first step has been made. We will start training programs for our tank crews on Leopards 2,� Reznikov said.

edit:
https://www.businessinsider.de/politik/deutschland/lambrecht-verbot-bestandsaufnahme-von-leopard-1-und-2/

Business Insider posted:

Only now, almost a year after Ukraine first asked for battle tanks, are the stocks of Leopard tanks in Germany to be reviewed. Pistorius said on the fringes of the summit that a corresponding order had been issued.

Why is this only being started now? An omission? No - on the contrary: as Business Insider learned from several sources in the Ministry of Defence, former Defence Minister Christine Lambrecht (SPD) is said to have instructed her officials less than a week before her resignation not to carry out an inventory of the Bundeswehr's Leopard 1 and Leopard 2 tanks. This is despite the fact that her office is said to have suggested a count of the vehicles beforehand in order to be able to provide information on the question of possible further deliveries.

The Business Insider speculates that this was done to not pressure Scholz, but I find that a bridge too far in an article that is already reporting on rumours. There's already a factual error in the article � what's taken stock of is materiel in industry stockpiles, not within the army. The army knows its inventory.

Anyway, what's the normal expression to use here? lol, lmao?

Antigravitas fucked around with this message at 15:01 on Jan 21, 2023

# ? Jan 21, 2023 14:50

cinci zoo sniper: Mar 15, 2013

Antigravitas posted:

And now:

Link?

# ? Jan 21, 2023 14:53

Antigravitas: Dec 8, 2019; Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:

cinci zoo sniper posted:

Link?

https://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-defense-minister-troops-will-train-on-german-tanks-in-poland/6927976.html

# ? Jan 21, 2023 15:01

cinci zoo sniper: Mar 15, 2013

Antigravitas posted:

https://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-defense-minister-troops-will-train-on-german-tanks-in-poland/6927976.html

Cheers. Another interesting tidbit from Reznikov there:

quote:

All the previously announced [military aid] packages have been confirmed. In addition, some new packages were discussed behind closed doors, but I am not at liberty to announce them just yet.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 15:05

Libluini: May 18, 2012; I gravitated towards the Greens, eventually even joining the party itself.

The Linke is a party I grudgingly accept exists, but I've learned enough about DDR-history I can't bring myself to trust a party that was once the SED, a party leading the corrupt state apparatus ...; Grimey Drawer

Sometimes I'm baffled how issues that seem pretty clear in German media get so muddled when translated into English. Is it because both languages are so close, it's easy to get confused? Or are journalists in English-speaking countries just really this bad

# ? Jan 21, 2023 15:08

Antigravitas: Dec 8, 2019; Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:

I used the German Business Insider, which the Focus was reporting on, because Focus is absolutely beneath me.

But generally, yes, Anglo journos are impossibly bad. There's a heavy reliance on machine translation, and few publications still have proper, well-connected and educated correspondents. It's also the Twitter-isation of journalism that just tanked reliability.

Antigravitas fucked around with this message at 15:15 on Jan 21, 2023

# ? Jan 21, 2023 15:12

cinci zoo sniper: Mar 15, 2013

Antigravitas posted:

The Business Insider speculates that this was done to not pressure Scholz, but I find that a bridge too far in an article that is already reporting on rumours. There's already a factual error in the article � what's taken stock of is materiel in industry stockpiles, not within the army. The army knows its inventory.

Anyway, what's the normal expression to use here? lol, lmao?

Is it now? Basically everyone is reporting that army stocks are going through this review as well. Here�s FT, for instance, even with reaction quotes from other German politicians: https://www.ft.com/content/e17e1724-3847-4093-bf2a-ac471ed209e7

# ? Jan 21, 2023 15:15

Antigravitas: Dec 8, 2019; Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:

I'm sure Pistorius also asked his ministry to hand him a report on what the Bundeswehr can spare, but the big item here is to get an inventory of what industry has and when it can be made ready. That would include getting some real answers from industry outside of press statements from various manufacturers that they totally have N tanks ready to go if only someone forked over a few hundred million Euros.

The real question for me why the gently caress this wasn't done months ago.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 15:24

Libluini: May 18, 2012; I gravitated towards the Greens, eventually even joining the party itself.

The Linke is a party I grudgingly accept exists, but I've learned enough about DDR-history I can't bring myself to trust a party that was once the SED, a party leading the corrupt state apparatus ...; Grimey Drawer

cinci zoo sniper posted:

Is it now? Basically everyone is reporting that army stocks are going through this review as well. Here�s FT, for instance, even with reaction quotes from other German politicians: https://www.ft.com/content/e17e1724-3847-4093-bf2a-ac471ed209e7

Here's a non-paywalled link about this: It's again a misunderstanding.

To summarize, Pistorius has ordered to check our Leopard-1 and Leopard-2 stocks (both industry and Bundeswehr) to see how compatible they even are to our allies' versions, to make sure there are no problems when in the future, 10 countries all decide to send small amounts of their Leos all at once into Ukraine.

The stocks are well-known, but other issues (how well maintained, compatibility etc.) are huge unknowns, since generally if you put hundreds of Leo-2s into a big hall and have like one guy go look at them once a month, you have a very low ability to know how well they would work when pulled out of storage.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 15:25

cinci zoo sniper: Mar 15, 2013

Very well, I�ll concede that figuring out the number of existing Leopards and the number of working Leopards are different tasks.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 16:18

ZombieLenin: Sep 6, 2009; "Democracy for the insignificant minority, democracy for the rich--that is the democracy of capitalist society." VI Lenin

[/quote]

cinci zoo sniper posted:

Very well, I�ll concede that figuring out the number of existing Leopards and the number of working Leopards are different tasks.

Being a person who works in civil service I consider it to be incredibly dubious that any Western government does not already know exactly both how many MBTs are in the national inventory and exactly how many of those are in an operable state.

My IT department knows exactly how many microfiche machines the state government has, how many still worked at the time they were put into storage, and how many spare parts it has in its inventory for those machines even though we do not even use microfiche anymore.

It's just staggeringly difficult for me to believe that any Western government does not have a pretty gods' damned solid and accurate accounting of how many MBTs it has in active service, how many it has in reserve, and how many of each are in current working condition.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 16:25

Antigravitas: Dec 8, 2019; Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:

A lot of the materiel Ukraine has received from Germany comes from industry stocks, like the Gepards. The army does not keep inventory, because it was made into a ~~lean army~~ that does everything Just In Time.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 16:37

Jasper Tin Neck: Nov 14, 2008; "Scientifically proven, rich and creamy."

ZombieLenin posted:

Being a person who works in civil service I consider it to be incredibly dubious that any Western government does not already know exactly both how many MBTs are in the national inventory and exactly how many of those are in an operable state.

My IT department knows exactly how many microfiche machines the state government has, how many still worked at the time they were put into storage, and how many spare parts it has in its inventory for those machines even though we do not even use microfiche anymore.

It's just staggeringly difficult for me to believe that any Western government does not have a pretty gods' damned solid and accurate accounting of how many MBTs it has in active service, how many it has in reserve, and how many of each are in current working condition.

Anecdotes vs. anecdote, but I have been contracted to patch blank spots in the registers of the railway infrastructure manager because they want to know e.g. when the rails were last changed and the registry just says NULL.

Similarly a friend of mine had a job that essentially amounted to rummaging through storage rooms to track down tens of thousands worth AV equipment that the public broadcasting company lost track of when the government replaced the management.

I don't find it at all hard to believe that they have no idea how many of the tanks work. Many government agencies suck at asset management.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 16:41

Vincent Van Goatse: Nov 8, 2006; Enjoy every sandwich.; Smellrose

ZombieLenin posted:

Being a person who works in civil service I consider it to be incredibly dubious that any Western government does not already know exactly both how many MBTs are in the national inventory and exactly how many of those are in an operable state.

I'm a historian who works with government archives and I wouldn't be at all surprised if they have piss poor records. I know at least one major military branch that doesn't have a complete catalog of their own archival material.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 17:10

PederP: Nov 20, 2009

Antigravitas posted:

A lot of the materiel Ukraine has received from Germany comes from industry stocks, like the Gepards. The army does not keep inventory, because it was made into a ~~lean army~~ that does everything Just In Time.

I don't know if the German military has the same problem as the Danish - but inventory and budget management has been completely annihilated by failed attempts at transitioning to new IT systems. Many of which turned out too expensive or poorly scoped - and thus the result was wasted expenses and a dysfunctional management system that has never been brought back to working order.

So while each individual unit likely knows exactly what they have at their immediate disposal and what the, probably strict, usage limits are - this doesn't translate into a top-down inventory that is functional. The Danish military doesn't even have the ability to determine the expense level of international deployments - the various types of expenditure are so interwoven, that they've lost the ability to properly budget. And as you say it is all just-in-time, so the maintenance staff are not allowed to develop proper routines and an in-depth knowledge of logistics. They're really good at slotting into multi-national forces, but they don't work properly on their own. They don't have the budget, the leadership or the culture.

European militaries are a sham - everything is allocated to making sure international commitments can be honored - there is no flexibility and no real backbone. Many countries have de facto evolved into contributors of auxiliaries for the US, NATO and the UN. There is no real military to keep track of inventories. It's just a shell for using the military as a foreign policy tool.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 17:16

Kraftwerk: Aug 13, 2011; i do not have 10,000 bircoins, please stop asking

It could very well mean then that there is a serious scandal brewing in European governments that could have major fallout if it came out to the public so they�re trying to stall for time until they can figure out how to allocate tanks that may or may not exist.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 17:38

SirTagz: Feb 25, 2014

PederP posted:

They're really good at slotting into multi-national forces, but they don't work properly on their own. They don't have the budget, the leadership or the culture.

European militaries are a sham - everything is allocated to making sure international commitments can be honored - there is no flexibility and no real backbone. Many countries have de facto evolved into contributors of auxiliaries for the US, NATO and the UN. There is no real military to keep track of inventories. It's just a shell for using the military as a foreign policy tool.

I know you meant this as a critique but I must say that from a shared defense perspective, it does not sound terrible. Having a bunch of countries all with independently operating forces, set up to work alone and not co-operating with other neighbors would probably be worse for common defense.

Military IS just a foreign policy tool. If you are most effective executing foreign policy in cooperation with like minded allies, it makes sense to organize the military side of that foreign policy the same way

SirTagz fucked around with this message at 17:42 on Jan 21, 2023

# ? Jan 21, 2023 17:39

Libluini: May 18, 2012; I gravitated towards the Greens, eventually even joining the party itself.

The Linke is a party I grudgingly accept exists, but I've learned enough about DDR-history I can't bring myself to trust a party that was once the SED, a party leading the corrupt state apparatus ...; Grimey Drawer

PederP posted:

I don't know if the German military has the same problem as the Danish - but inventory and budget management has been completely annihilated by failed attempts at transitioning to new IT systems. Many of which turned out too expensive or poorly scoped - and thus the result was wasted expenses and a dysfunctional management system that has never been brought back to working order.

Man, this gives me bad flashbacks to my time in the Bundeswehr. During my time, a lot of old IT was getting thrown out for a general upgrade throughout the battalion. One day, all our computers stopped working and we milled around in confusion and panic for nearly 15 minutes, before we suddenly got a call from our IT that the network will be down for a while. Company command was really miffed about that little kerfluffle.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 17:44

Svaha: Oct 4, 2005

Huh. This whole thing is really messing with my stereotype of Germans. I probably deserve it for having one in the first place.

The thing is, like it or not, the existing stereotype that Germans are always fastidious in nature and precise in communication, means that statements from German leadership that contradict that are going to come off as false to media that buys into the stereotype. Even when it's not accurate.

Basically every Anglo news source I'm subscribed to is now sensationally proclaiming that "Germany blocked the tanks!" in the headline, then takes a more nuanced approach in the body of the article about the new defence minster being more enthusiastic to support Ukraine, (beyond the large amount of support provided already,) and some sort of minor bureaucratic process that has to happen before other countries can send leopards.

On top of this, we have a well documented history of German leadership foot-dragging on this issue, a series of weirdly evasive statements on the same, and a theory that they keep poor records of their stocks of battle tanks (?!?)

Yeah. No idea what to think about this. One thing I can say for certain, is that this mixed messaging is going to be a problem for Germany going forward.

Svaha fucked around with this message at 17:47 on Jan 21, 2023

# ? Jan 21, 2023 17:44

Moon Slayer: Jun 19, 2007

All of this just drives home how convinced Western European governments were that they would basically never need to fight any kind of military conflict (outside peacekeeping missions and token support for US/UK/French neocolonialist adventures) ever again.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 17:46

Nenonen: Oct 22, 2009; Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

Jasper Tin Neck posted:

I don't find it at all hard to believe that they have no idea how many of the tanks work. Many government agencies suck at asset management.

Wouldn't they know which vehicles work, because those are the ones that are in active use and get serviced periodically? I find it more likely that they have a very clear picture of which tanks are ready for service and which are not, but of the latter there is uncertainty of how much overhaul they need to be serviceable, and how long it will take for the maintenance crews to get all of them back to condition.

It's troubling that this need has been on the wall for at least six months, yet it feels like no one has used the time to start at least preparations for getting mothballed inventory to running condition.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 18:05

Zedsdeadbaby: Jun 14, 2008; You have been called out, in the ways of old.

The Germans don't even keep track of their own rifles, at one point they resorted to using broomsticks instead for training. Wouldn't surprise me one bit if they find their tank storage curiously roomy.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 18:10

Nenonen: Oct 22, 2009; Mulla on aina kolkyt donaa taskussa

Moon Slayer posted:

All of this just drives home how convinced Western European governments were that they would basically never need to fight any kind of military conflict (outside peacekeeping missions and token support for US/UK/French neocolonialist adventures) ever again.

That's a wrong take of the situation. They weren't prepared for a scenario where they would be requested to provide hundreds of main battle tanks to an outsider in the middle of a war in which they are not directly involved. If Russia attacked actual NATO members then they would be facing the full might of western air forces.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 18:10

Tomn: Aug 23, 2007; And the angel said unto him
"Stop hitting yourself. Stop hitting yourself."
But lo he could not. For the angel was hitting him with his own hands

PederP posted:

One thing that I find odd about the current 'Russian mobilization scare' is that it really doesn't take into account the actual proportions between the populations of Ukraine and Russia. That's not to say mobilization waves are worthless or do not pose a serious challenge for Ukraine. Of course they do - the manpower-anemic Russian army which invaded was much more vulnerable, inflexible and thinly spread.

But Russia has a population of fighting-age individuals approximately three times that of Ukraine. That's not the horde-like numerical advantage some make it out to be. Especially not given the massive size of Ukraine and the challenges of outfitting/training hundreds of thousands of soldiers.

I broadly agree with the rest of your statements in this post, but I do want to note that as far as I can tell, most sources talking about the dangers of Russian mobilization are less talking about Russia's ability to crush Ukraine with new overwhelming might, and more "Now Russia can actually afford to man their defensive positions properly, closing off easy opportunities for Ukraine to exploit weaknesses." I'd agree with Russia probably can't generate much new offensive power just by mobilization alone, but it takes less in both equipment and training to become a headache on the defense and I get the impression that Russia can at least do that.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 18:17

Svaha: Oct 4, 2005

Moon Slayer posted:

All of this just drives home how convinced Western European governments were that they would basically never need to fight any kind of military conflict (outside peacekeeping missions and token support for US/UK/French neocolonialist adventures) ever again.

Everyone seems to have been overly optimistic about the prospect of peace and trade with Russia until fairly recently, yes. Even after the invasion Georgia and Crimea, which should have been huge flashing warning signs that history was not, in fact, over.

Looking at you, Francis Fukuyama, you moron. You absolute imbecile.

I can't really blame people for being optimistic after the cold war, but ignoring obvious signs that the Russian federation was going badly sideways for the last 15 years is pretty unforgivable.

Nenonen posted:

That's a wrong take of the situation. They weren't prepared for a scenario where they would be requested to provide hundreds of main battle tanks to an outsider in the middle of a war in which they are not directly involved. If Russia attacked actual NATO members then they would be facing the full might of western air forces.

I suppose that's fair. Kind of a huge oversight after 2014 though.

Svaha fucked around with this message at 18:22 on Jan 21, 2023

# ? Jan 21, 2023 18:18

Quixzlizx: Jan 7, 2007

I hope we can agree that "just-in-time" military procurement and logistics are pants-on-head regardless of the geopolitical context.

I don't think that German defense minister quoted a page or two ago understood the definition of "spare," considering he was a proponent of JIT spare parts.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 18:38

OddObserver: Apr 3, 2009

Quixzlizx posted:

I hope we can agree that "just-in-time" military procurement and logistics are pants-on-head regardless of the geopolitical context.

I don't think that German defense minister quoted a page or two ago understood the definition of "spare," considering he was a proponent of JIT spare parts.

I also recall one article discussing how some country had trouble growing shell production because some components were sourced from China

# ? Jan 21, 2023 18:40

Antigravitas: Dec 8, 2019; Die Rettung fuer die Landwirte:

Svaha posted:

Huh. This whole thing is really messing with my stereotype of Germans. I probably deserve it for having one in the first place.

Germany is primarily extremely old and run by boomers. This legislature is the first in almost two decades that a significant number of younger people entered parliament, and you can see that effect in the foreign ministry. The boomer got the chancellery.

Anglo media cannot at all conceive of the political culture of a country where public debate is as extensive as in Germany. Political culture is all about talking things to death until a consensus is reached and executed upon. That's great if you are a foreign news service, because you can write an endless stream of headlines about every single public statement of every single official or not-official in the country opining on things.

Also, the "German efficiency" is a myth (though the German public service is one of the most efficient in the world), Germany is Process Nation. It's all about Process. Everything is Process.

Zedsdeadbaby posted:

The Germans don't even keep track of their own rifles, at one point they resorted to using broomsticks instead for training. Wouldn't surprise me one bit if they find their tank storage curiously roomy.

That's not what happened there. The vehicles were not even supposed to be armed.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 18:41

Jasper Tin Neck: Nov 14, 2008; "Scientifically proven, rich and creamy."

Nenonen posted:

Wouldn't they know which vehicles work, because those are the ones that are in active use and get serviced periodically?

On a unit level probably, but if you don't have good indicators for and reporting of readiness, higher ups may very well have no idea. Just as the contractor knows when they replaced rails or sleepers (and with what), but if the paperwork is incomplete or never punched into the database, none of the civil servants responsible for monitoring network condition will know.

COVID has probably reduced drills substantially though, so even unit level knowledge might be a bit sketchy.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 18:57

Svaha: Oct 4, 2005

Tomn posted:

I broadly agree with the rest of your statements in this post, but I do want to note that as far as I can tell, most sources talking about the dangers of Russian mobilization are less talking about Russia's ability to crush Ukraine with new overwhelming might, and more "Now Russia can actually afford to man their defensive positions properly, closing off easy opportunities for Ukraine to exploit weaknesses." I'd agree with Russia probably can't generate much new offensive power just by mobilization alone, but it takes less in both equipment and training to become a headache on the defense and I get the impression that Russia can at least do that.

From most accounts I've read the Russian lines are far deeper now than they were at the time of the Ukrainian counter offensives over the summer. That means the lightning breakthroughs that enabled the success of those offensives are far less likely now. Unless Ukraine gets more heavy weaponry, the war is going to stall out into a miserable trench and artillery slug-fest for the foreseeable future. Given that situation, Russia has the manpower and industry to overpower Ukraine through sheer attrition eventually.

Weirdly enough, this situation is exactly what most military analysts were predicting before Ukraine surprised everyone by wildly defying everyone's expectations again. I think we have to be careful about that. It's great that Ukraine managed to pull it off twice in a row, but we shouldn't delude ourselves into thinking they can do it every time as a matter of course. In many ways, they are worse off now than they were a few month ago. Their infrastructure is being pummelled, their economy is in the toilet, they are still having ammo shortages, they are still losing hundreds of people and weapons a day, and it seems Russia is pushing them back around Bakhmut. Giving them the minimum assistance and hoping for the best is not gonna cut it like it did at the beginning.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 18:57

Hieronymous Alloy: Jan 30, 2009; Why! Why!! Why must you refuse to accept that Dr. Hieronymous Alloy's Genetically Enhanced Cream Corn Is Superior to the Leading Brand on the Market!?!; Morbid Hound

Svaha posted:

Russia has the manpower and industry to overpower Ukraine through sheer attrition eventually.

This seems like a possibility sure but hardly a certainty as long as Ukraine keeps getting western support and Russian industry remains hampered by western sanctions.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 18:59

Svaha: Oct 4, 2005

Antigravitas posted:

Germany is primarily extremely old and run by boomers. This legislature is the first in almost two decades that a significant number of younger people entered parliament, and you can see that effect in the foreign ministry. The boomer got the chancellery.

Anglo media cannot at all conceive of the political culture of a country where public debate is as extensive as in Germany. Political culture is all about talking things to death until a consensus is reached and executed upon. That's great if you are a foreign news service, because you can write an endless stream of headlines about every single public statement of every single official or not-official in the country opining on things.

Also, the "German efficiency" is a myth (though the German public service is one of the most efficient in the world), Germany is Process Nation. It's all about Process. Everything is Process.

Thanks. I appreciate you disabusing me of some of the dumb stereotypes that I've passively absorbed though my dumb Anglo media. I plan to visit a cousin in Berlin someday to perhaps disabuse the rest of them.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 19:09

Libluini: May 18, 2012; I gravitated towards the Greens, eventually even joining the party itself.

The Linke is a party I grudgingly accept exists, but I've learned enough about DDR-history I can't bring myself to trust a party that was once the SED, a party leading the corrupt state apparatus ...; Grimey Drawer

Svaha posted:

Thanks. I appreciate you disabusing me of some of the dumb stereotypes that I've passively absorbed though my dumb Anglo media. I plan to visit a cousin in Berlin someday to perhaps disabuse the rest of them.

Coincidentally, Berlin is the perfect place to do so!

# ? Jan 21, 2023 19:14

Svaha: Oct 4, 2005

Hieronymous Alloy posted:

This seems like a possibility sure but hardly a certainty as long as Ukraine keeps getting western support and Russian industry remains hampered by western sanctions.

I'm not saying it's a certainty, just a very real possibility.

Russia is also getting support from Iran, North Korea, and to some extent, China for what that's worth. I'm sure they can keep banging out artillery systems and shells for a long time, despite no longer having access to high quality microchips and the like. High quality weapons? Probably not, but good enough to keep the meat-grinder whirring along for years to come? Yeah, probably.

I think their economy and public support will collapse first, but that is by no means a given, and even that might not stop the war machine, considering the authoritarian nature of the Russian Federation.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 19:25

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# ? May 25, 2024 23:31

Libluini: May 18, 2012; I gravitated towards the Greens, eventually even joining the party itself.

The Linke is a party I grudgingly accept exists, but I've learned enough about DDR-history I can't bring myself to trust a party that was once the SED, a party leading the corrupt state apparatus ...; Grimey Drawer

Svaha posted:

I'm not saying it's a certainty, just a very real possibility.

Russia is also getting support from Iran, North Korea, and to some extent, China for what that's worth. I'm sure they can keep banging out artillery systems and shells for a long time, despite no longer having access to high quality microchips and the like. High quality weapons? Probably not, but good enough to keep the meat-grinder whirring along for years to come? Yeah, probably.

I think their economy and public support will collapse first, but that is by no means a given, and even that might not stop the war machine, considering the authoritarian nature of the Russian Federation.

Support from North Korea is pretty much limited, they may have some stockpiles they can sell to Russia, but their production capability as a tiny rear end country crippled by even worse isolation than Russia is probably fairly small.

And Iran's help is pretty much counter-productive: Sure, it makes Russia shoot longer, but it also enrages US-politicians to see Iran high-fiving Putin this way. Basically any Iranian drone showing up on the wrong side in Ukraine causes more help to flow from the US.

China, maybe. But on the other hand, India and China have Russia over an oil barrel and are squeezing so hard, their help also comes with a hefty price. A price that may cause an economical collapse if they force Russia to accept even lower oil prices in the future.

With help like these, it's less that Russia has allies, and more that they have slightly less hostile enemies.

# ? Jan 21, 2023 19:38

The Something Awful Forums > Archives > Comedy Goldmine > The Goodmine > War in Ukraine: thread feedback session open unttil Saturday (i'll regret this)

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