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Atreiden
May 4, 2008

A little update from Girkin, he is his usual positive self.
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1619987711934496768

Also thanks Cinci for your service, you kept this thread good. Sad to see you go.

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Grakkus
Sep 4, 2011

cinci zoo sniper posted:

Back on topic, BoJo is saying that Putin threatened him with “I don't want to hurt you, but with a missile, it would only take a minute”. A literal alleway gopnik. :laffo: https://news.sky.com/story/boris-jo...kraine-12798288

This is like the Unstoppable Force vs Immovable Object of pathological liars, but for the first time in my life I actually think the Kremlin's side is more plausible.

alex314
Nov 22, 2007

He 100% won't do that. There's about 48 F-16 in Polish Airforce, and they represent all of full capability airpower. I barely consider early version Mig-29 as capable, and they are A2A only. Unless it's temporary handing over of a couple planes, that will quickly be replaced by US active stock. But in that case it'd have to be already preagreed with US. And Morawiecki would simply play "those crazy Poles, and their ideas" stereotype.

Also reminder to everyone that this year Poland will have an election. It's 50/50 whether PiS stays in power, and they ABSOLUTELY need to keep their power. Or a bunch of people will suddenly get in some serious problems for a lot of shady poo poo they did over last 8 years. Expect more crazy poo poo.

Kikas
Oct 30, 2012
Holy poo poo I forgot that there was a period of anticipation for "Ooooh when will the F16s get delivered".

cinci zoo sniper posted:

Pretty sure Morawiecki has a Scholz dartboard in his office. Scholz last week: “stfu about planes”. Morawiecki today: “Poland is ready to give Ukraine its F-16 fighters, if NATO supports this decision”. https://zn.ua/ukr/WORLD/polshcha-hotova-peredati-ukrajini-f-16-ale-za-odnijeji-umovi-moravetskij.html

That said, this could also be simply callous populism, since it does not put pressure pressure on Poland to follow up, yet anyways.

Actually though, this is odd, I'm struggling to find a Polish source for this that isn't some insane right wing ramblings. And I can't read ukrainian so can't confirm the article.

Saladman
Jan 12, 2010

Albino Squirrel posted:

I mean, if Finland joins NATO it would be impossible to invade Sweden without crossing through a NATO country. Finland joining accomplishes most of Sweden's defense goals regardless of what Erdogan does.

I think there were some theoretical concerns with Russia invading Gotland, but based on the "lol, lmao." state of Russia's navy and their apparent lack of an air force, I agree that it's not really a serious concern for Sweden.

cinci zoo sniper
Mar 15, 2013




Kikas posted:

Holy poo poo I forgot that there was a period of anticipation for "Ooooh when will the F16s get delivered".

Actually though, this is odd, I'm struggling to find a Polish source for this that isn't some insane right wing ramblings. And I can't read ukrainian so can't confirm the article.

As TheRat says, Borrell had quite possibly the gaffe of his whole career in February 27. I seem to recall an even stupider tweet from him about “the planes are being delivered to Ukraine” or “crossing Ukrainian border” or some such, but that’s too much of a chore to look up, and the widely reported February 27 is bad enough on its own.

As for the original source, there’s a Facebook link at the start of the article.

Atreiden posted:

Also thanks Cinci for your service, you kept this thread good. Sad to see you go.

I’m not dying, lol.

Hieronymous Alloy
Jan 30, 2009


Why! Why!! Why must you refuse to accept that Dr. Hieronymous Alloy's Genetically Enhanced Cream Corn Is Superior to the Leading Brand on the Market!?!




Morbid Hound
F (for Cinci)

Hieronymous Alloy
Jan 30, 2009


Why! Why!! Why must you refuse to accept that Dr. Hieronymous Alloy's Genetically Enhanced Cream Corn Is Superior to the Leading Brand on the Market!?!




Morbid Hound
Is there any detailed explanation for why Russia has had some battlefield success lately or is it just the mobilization finally starting to add some mass to their advances?

Kikas
Oct 30, 2012

I cannot believe cinci zoo sniper is loving dead


cinci zoo sniper posted:

As TheRat says, Borrell had quite possibly the gaffe of his whole career in February 27. I seem to recall an even stupider tweet from him about “the planes are being delivered to Ukraine” or “crossing Ukrainian border” or some such, but that’s too much of a chore to look up, and the widely reported February 27 is bad enough on its own.

As for the original source, there’s a Facebook link at the start of the article.

...it's like he's still talking to me.


Ah, this conference has literally just happened. Lol at the poor sods standing in the snow and wind (Poland has gotten a few Amber Alerts of "lol wind good luck fuckers" today), but that would explain why the usual news outlets are still preparing the digest.

alex314
Nov 22, 2007

They've limited the amount of concurrent advances, then unfucked the logistics, and had time to work through issues. Russia still has enough manpower and material to learn a lot of lessons the hard way and keep on fighting. I imagine "mobiks" helped at least in having manpower to free up your valuable combat capable units.

sean10mm
Jun 29, 2005

It's a Mad, Mad, Mad, MAD-2R World

Hieronymous Alloy posted:

Is there any detailed explanation for why Russia has had some battlefield success lately or is it just the mobilization finally starting to add some mass to their advances?

Ukraine holding the line as lightly as practical while assembling the force for the next big offense means Russia can make tiny land gains at huge cost in places.

Just like the weeks/months before the last big Ukrainian offensive.

Kikas
Oct 30, 2012
Also wait, have to go back on that, but giving the F16 from Poland is a loving stupid idea. We have like 40 of those things are they are our entire air power. Giving them out would (:v:) air out our army completely.
So I'd guess despite him saying "if NATO allows us" he must have meant "if NATO orders us" because it makes no sense otherwise.

VorpalFish
Mar 22, 2007
reasonably awesometm

Kikas posted:

Also wait, have to go back on that, but giving the F16 from Poland is a loving stupid idea. We have like 40 of those things are they are our entire air power. Giving them out would (:v:) air out our army completely.
So I'd guess despite him saying "if NATO allows us" he must have meant "if NATO orders us" because it makes no sense otherwise.

It would almost certainly be contingent on the US replacing them. Hypothetically.

cinci zoo sniper
Mar 15, 2013




Hieronymous Alloy posted:

Is there any detailed explanation for why Russia has had some battlefield success lately or is it just the mobilization finally starting to add some mass to their advances?

They’ve got much more higher concentration of people now, due to mobilisation and penal battalions adding up on narrower lines of front, and fresh/de-mothballed gear. Added up, that is allowing them to at the very least to attempt repeating the last summer’s strategy of advancing by pulverising everything with artillery - their advances are still measured in metres per day, and not steady at all. And “attempt” because HIMARS are complicated artillery logistics, and Excalibur rounds et. al. - tank warfare.

alex314 posted:

They've limited the amount of concurrent advances, then unfucked the logistics, and had time to work through issues. Russia still has enough manpower and material to learn a lot of lessons the hard way and keep on fighting. I imagine "mobiks" helped at least in having manpower to free up your valuable combat capable units.

Yeah, this is a big part of it. They can just have mobilised soldiers staff 2nd-3rd line defences on the long rear end front line segment from from Donetsk until Dnipro, which has to be freeing up a measure of experienced units towards the more contested areas.

sean10mm posted:

Ukraine holding the line as lightly as practical while assembling the force for the next big offense means Russia can make tiny land gains at huge cost in places.

Just like the weeks/months before the last big Ukrainian offensive.

Also this, we have no idea about the distribution of military resource to UAF right now, only the pressers from specific units in, e.g., Vuhledar.

Tuna-Fish
Sep 13, 2017

Kikas posted:

Also wait, have to go back on that, but giving the F16 from Poland is a loving stupid idea. We have like 40 of those things are they are our entire air power. Giving them out would (:v:) air out our army completely.
So I'd guess despite him saying "if NATO allows us" he must have meant "if NATO orders us" because it makes no sense otherwise.

Poland has F-35:s on order. I suppose the plan would be: "NATO allies cover our airspace for the few years before F-35 becomes online."

Note that Poland has a good incentive to do this, as the EU has a mechanism where the union compensates states for military hardware donated. F-16s are expensive, and if they could unload, say, half their fleet on Ukraine just before it was removed from service anyway, it would go a long way towards paying for their F-35 acquisition.

alex314
Nov 22, 2007

F-16 block 52 still have a lot of use left in them. It might be better in the long run to have 100 FA-50 and 40 F-35, but completely dismantling the Airforce for a couple years seems very risky. Plus there's a matter of lost skill, and interrupted pilot training pipeline.

Tevery Best
Oct 11, 2013

Hewlo Furriend

Kikas posted:

Holy poo poo I forgot that there was a period of anticipation for "Ooooh when will the F16s get delivered".

That was for MiG-29s. Pity that didn't work out.

Kikas posted:

Lol at the poor sods standing in the snow and wind (Poland has gotten a few Amber Alerts of "lol wind good luck fuckers" today), but that would explain why the usual news outlets are still preparing the digest.

Not discussing the merits, just FYI Amber Alerts are specifically about child abduction.

cinci zoo sniper
Mar 15, 2013




Tevery Best posted:

Not discussing the merits, just FYI Amber Alerts are specifically about child abduction.

Technically the weather alarms in Europe are yellow, orange, and red, yes. https://meteoalarm.org/en/page/help#list

Edit: Novaya Gazeta has an informative piece on the real estate crash in Crimea. https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/01/30/voina-zhilia-ne-daet

cinci zoo sniper fucked around with this message at 17:17 on Jan 30, 2023

Dolash
Oct 23, 2008

aNYWAY,
tHAT'S REALLY ALL THERE IS,
tO REPORT ON THE SUBJECT,
oF ME GETTING HURT,


I'm not sure I fully understand or appreciate the significance of, say, Poland holding on to a couple dozen jets, or any European NATO country holding on to tanks. Isn't the nuclear umbrella the only actual defense they need?

Because if it isn't, I don't see the number of tanks and jets each of these smaller states has as a meaningful defence against Russia in a conventional war, but I also don't see how a conventional war with Russia would even be possible within the next generation.

Ynglaur
Oct 9, 2013

The Malta Conference, anyone?

Hieronymous Alloy posted:

Is there any detailed explanation for why Russia has had some battlefield success lately or is it just the mobilization finally starting to add some mass to their advances?

Don't let the news organizations overplay this. "some battlefield success lately" amounts to losing several thousand--and maybe several tens of thousands--of mobilized recruits to move a notional front line about a kilometer or two to occupy a small town north of a small city (Bakhmut). It's not a breakthrough, in that the Ukrainian lines are not breached, and it's not a sudden or unexpected change.

I'm kind of with Michael Koffman on this: I'd give Russia a 50/50 chance of taking Bakhmut. If they do, then what? It doesn't really get them that much in terms of new options. It doesn't present any kind of operational dilemma for Ukraine.

One of the best outcomes for Russia is if the attrition forces Ukraine to commit new operational formations it's busy training, but so far that doesn't seem to be the case. Ukraine is rotating units, and likely replenishing those units with new recruits, but it's not e.g. taking a new mechanized battalion trained in the UK and committing them to save Bakhmut.

Dolash posted:

...I also don't see how a conventional war with Russia would even be possible within the next generation.

Don't underestimate how quickly military institutions can reform and change. It's not always predictable--and of course some fail to change, and thus keep failing. But history is replete with examples of militaries completely reforming in a matter of a couple years, from ancient times through modern.

wins32767
Mar 16, 2007

Dolash posted:

I'm not sure I fully understand or appreciate the significance of, say, Poland holding on to a couple dozen jets, or any European NATO country holding on to tanks. Isn't the nuclear umbrella the only actual defense they need?

Because if it isn't, I don't see the number of tanks and jets each of these smaller states has as a meaningful defence against Russia in a conventional war, but I also don't see how a conventional war with Russia would even be possible within the next generation.

They are defense against salami slicing. If RU took a Lithuanian border town, Joe Biden isn’t pressing the button and ending the world.

Moon Slayer
Jun 19, 2007

Can't recall if it was already posted, but WaPo has a deep dive into the tank imbroglio:

tl;dr: the big hold up was a result of Scholz's desire to not be the first to send tanks butting up against Secretary of Defense Austin being convinced that M-1s were too complicated for Ukraine to get into the field in a reasonable amount of time. Eventually it was good enough for Germany that the US promised to send a bunch of M-1s in the medium- to long-term and Germany et all would supply Leopards in the short term.

quote:

Short on time, Biden sought new Ukraine tank plan to break stalemate
Amid growing discord, a new proposal and a week of nonstop negotiations finally resolved the dispute, as Germany relented on Leopards and U.S. pledged (eventually) to provide Abrams tanks to Kyiv
By Karen DeYoung, Dan Lamothe and Loveday Morris
January 28, 2023 at 6:51 p.m. EST


After weeks of failing to persuade Chancellor Olaf Scholz to free up Germany’s Leopard 2 tanks for shipment to Ukraine, President Biden was ready to make one more try. Kyiv’s forces were convinced that if Western tanks weren’t on the battlefield by spring, it might be too late for them to thwart a coming Russian offensive and launch a successful one of their own.

In a late morning call with Scholz from the White House on Jan. 17, Biden tried several tacks.

Britain had announced it would send 14 of its Challenger tanks, he reminded Scholz, addressing the chancellor’s concern that Germany not be the first to challenge the Russians by giving Ukraine a major new weapons system. The United States and other NATO partners, following mid-December consultations among the “Quad” of U.S., British, French and German leaders, had tentatively approved the transfer of hundreds of lesser, but effective, armored combat vehicles, he said, including American Bradleys and Strykers.

Scholz did not budge. Berlin and Washington must face down Moscow in lockstep, he told the president. Germany would not send its main battle tanks if the United States continued to decline sending some of its own — the powerful Abrams M1.

“I think the chancellor had the impression … he made a good case,” a German official said. Biden told Scholz he would “get back to you,” the official said.

Two of Biden’s closest foreign policy aides had been listening in, and after he hung up the three men sat alone rehashing the disappointing call. Jake Sullivan, the president’s national security adviser, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken had helped him navigate countless national security crises over the years — Blinken since Biden’s Senate days and Sullivan during his vice presidency.

The longer the increasingly public disagreement over tanks went on, Biden worried, the more damage it was doing to his top priority on Ukraine: maintaining U.S.-led Western unity in the face of Russian aggression. Military leaders from the dozens of countries supporting Ukraine were meeting in three days at the U.S. base in Germany, and everybody wanted an answer to the tank dispute.

“How do we move forward?” Biden asked the two.

It was Blinken who suggested a possible workaround. What if they announced a commitment to supply M1s but at some future point as part of Kyiv’s “long term” needs in a war that might go on for years? It could provide Scholz with the cover he sought to allow the Leopards to move right away. At the same time, it would give the Pentagon — where Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was against supplying Abrams tanks he thought were too complicated for near-term use in Ukraine — time to address concerns about training Ukrainian forces on how to use them and setting up the necessary logistics.

President Biden announced plans to supply Ukraine with M1 Abrams tanks on Jan. 25. (Video: The Washington Post)
Barely a week later, Biden appeared in the White House Roosevelt Room to announce that, on Austin’s recommendation, “the United States will be sending 31 Abrams tanks to Ukraine.” Thanks to Scholz, he said, Germany was providing Leopards from its own arsenal, “and will lead an effort to organize the European contribution” of dozens more.

“We are fully, thoroughly, totally united,” said Biden, with Austin and Blinken standing by his side.

This account of how extended allied discord turned around in the space of barely a week was compiled from conversations with more than a dozen current and former officials and people familiar with events and closed-door consultations on both sides of the Atlantic. Most discussed the still-sensitive issue on the condition of anonymity. The White House, Pentagon and State Department declined to comment.

In the aftermath of the deal, success claimed many fathers. The administration said it demonstrated Biden’s clear commitment to go the distance with Ukraine and keep the support coalition together. Scholz, whose reputation for dithering had been coined as “Scholzing” in Ukrainian memes last summer, said in a Wednesday radio interview that the real meaning of the term was “Germany does the most.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, whose urgent appeals for more and better military equipment over the past year have sometimes sounded like criticism to a frustrated West, told SkyNews on Wednesday that “overall I am grateful to the world for their support. … But if we are talking frankly and honestly … we have approved cases of weapons to be sent to us, but we still haven’t received them.”

The drip-drip to tanks
Since Russia invaded Ukraine nearly a year ago, aid from the United States and its allies has repeatedly “evolved,” in the words of many officials, to respond to battlefield needs, even as its sometimes slow pace has reflected their reluctance to provoke Moscow. It began with short-range defensive weapons that helped repel Moscow’s initial attack on Kyiv. When regrouped Russian forces began to push into Ukraine last spring along a lengthy front line in the east, the United States, Europe and others began sending their toughest artillery.

Washington hesitated when the Ukrainians asked for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, the multiple-launch HIMARS that would allow longer-range, precision strikes behind Russian lines. But by late summer, the United States relented and Kyiv was hammering enemy command centers and ammunition depots — allowing Ukraine’s forces to reclaim significant swaths of Russian-occupied territory.

In early fall, just as a debate revved up over Ukraine’s request for heavy tanks and armored vehicles to push Moscow’s forces even farther back, attention was abruptly diverted to the need for a different kind of weapon. Russian President Vladimir Putin had responded to Ukrainian successes on the ground by ordering massive missile and drone attacks on civilian areas and infrastructure, far from the front lines.

Major cities without electricity and heat, apartment buildings reduced to rubble and massive civilian casualties overwhelmed allied concern that Putin might use the transfer of some of the West’s most advanced weapons as an excuse to attack NATO countries. They quickly agreed to supply sophisticated air defense systems, including Patriot missile batteries.

The air barrage continued into winter, even as ground forces on both sides slowed their efforts to advance through the inhospitable weather and prepared for the second spring of the war. The United States and its partners announced they would use the time to train thousands of Ukrainian soldiers in a smarter way to attack entrenched Russian lines, with infantry protected by armored vehicles.

Armor, they agreed, could carry troops across the broad flat fields of eastern and southern Ukraine, and fire big guns to clear their path. They pledged new systems of fighting vehicles, such as U.S. Bradleys, German Marders, and French AMX 10-RCs.

But the heavy battle tanks that Ukraine wanted were another question. Austin considered the Abrams M1s operationally and logistically too difficult. He thought Kyiv already had enough Soviet-era models — hundreds taken from its own arsenals, captured from retreating Russians, or donated by other NATO members that were once part of the Soviet bloc. As far as he was concerned, the U.S. tanks were out of the question.

A retired Army general who helped lead the 3rd Infantry Division’s invasion of Iraq with M1s in 2003, Austin was convinced, a senior defense official said, that the massive battle tanks would be “impossible” for the Ukrainians to sustain and maintain. At the same time, a second defense official said, the U.S. vehicles were clad with specialized, depleted uranium armor, a classified design that no one wanted Russia to get its hands on.


Ukraine’s appeals made little headway until Zelensky traveled to Washington four days before Christmas to make his case, in private to Biden and in a public address to Congress.

“It is just a matter of time when they will strike against your other allies if we do not stop them now,” he told lawmakers. “We must do it. I believe there should be no taboos between us in our alliance. Ukraine never asked the American soldiers to fight on our land instead of us. I assure you that Ukrainian soldiers can perfectly operate American tanks and planes themselves.”

The answer to his plea was an announcement of the more lightly armored fighting vehicles, and Britain’s pledge to send 14 of its Challenger 2 main battle tanks. But rather than calm the roiling allied waters, discussion about more heavy tanks gained speed in Europe, with pressure on Germany. There are about 2,000 of the German-made Leopards in Berlin’s arsenal and spread across the world, primarily in Europe. But any other country that wanted to transfer them to Ukraine would need a German re-export license.

“It was clear from that moment that the question would be whether Germany would provide the Leopards,” the German official said. From the outside, it seemed a simple question. The German-built vehicles were far more simple to use than M1s, with an abundance of available spare parts, and other nearby countries were willing to send them to the battlefield.

But for Scholz, it was a significant political dilemma. Since the early days of the war, he had tried not to appear ahead of the pack when it came to arming Ukraine, expressing concerns over Moscow’s potential retaliation, or being seen as a direct participant.


Many in his governing coalition were pressing him to move forward, even as some in his own Social Democratic Party were less enthusiastic, and polls indicated a closely divided populace. Dueling images were at play, neither of which looked ideal — Germany as a reluctant partner in the worldwide coalition against Russian efforts to quash Ukrainian democracy, versus the sight of German tanks rolling across Europe for the first time since World War II.

Turning up the heat on Berlin
In Europe, potential Leopard providers focused on ramping up pressure on Berlin through carefully crafted public messages, according to a senior official from Poland, which had its own Leopards.

“The Ukrainians really wanted a country that would openly say they were sending tanks to open the way to others, and they asked Poland to be the first one. … We were sure that Germany sooner or later would succumb. … There’s no way they can say no to so many countries,” the official said.

The method had already proved useful. In November, after Germany offered one of its U.S.-made Patriot systems to Poland when an errant missile landed inside the Polish border, Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak announced he had asked Germany for permission to re-export that battery to Ukraine. In short order, the United States and Germany said they would send Patriots to Kyiv.

“When you start speaking about something, you create a subject,” the Polish official said. “We call it the ‘Blaszczak effect.’” As Germany continued to drag its feet on the Leopards, Poland announced that Warsaw, and probably others, would send some of theirs to Ukraine with or without German authorization.


“We had reached a point, I think, where we were running out of time,” said Jim Townsend, who oversaw NATO and European policy in the Pentagon during the Obama administration.

In the end, Blinken’s proposal offered a way out. “The Americans said, ‘This is a way we can get them tanks on a timely basis,’” Townsend said.

Tasked with figuring out whether and how the idea would work, Sullivan spoke that afternoon with Austin about the proposed Plan B to commit to transferring Abrams tanks. The defense secretary still had concerns, but agreed to task the Pentagon with figuring out how it could be implemented.

Austin, however, was due to travel to Germany that week for a meeting with his German counterpart and a Friday gathering at Ramstein Air Base with the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, the consortium he had organized last spring to coordinate arms donations and shipments to Ukraine. He wanted to give Plan A — at least getting Germany to release other countries to send the “Leos,” as they were known in the Pentagon, even if it wouldn’t send its own — one more chance without promising Abrams tanks.

Meanwhile, Sullivan made multiple calls to his German counterpart, Jens Plötner, to begin sketching out the alternative. People familiar with the calls declined to discuss the extent to which details of Plan B were communicated during the week, or how much the Germans knew of internal White House thinking during the meetings with Austin.


While the contact group meeting reached no successful conclusion, Austin defended Berlin to the media at a news conference that afternoon. Outside, a storm blanketed Ramstein with a deepening coat of snow, stalling his flight home until the following day. Over the weekend, he told Sullivan that Berlin remained adamant: No Leos without Abrams.

On Monday morning, Austin and Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with Biden at the White House. The defense secretary formally recommended proceeding with the “long term” proposal for Abrams tanks.

It was not as much a stretch as it originally appeared. Pentagon policy officials had long been planning for the future needs of a modern Ukrainian military — including tanks, planes and all manner of sophisticated armaments.

The 31 M1A2 main battle tanks that Biden officially authorized on Tuesday would not be taken from U.S. military stockpiles, but would be procured under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. They would be built to task, without the depleted uranium armor, for delivery late this year or next.

It was enough for Berlin, and Sullivan ironed out the details with Plötner. On Wednesday morning, Scholz met with his Cabinet and delivered a speech to the Bundestag, the German parliament, announcing that two battalions of Leopards — roughly 80 — from Germany and others in Europe would go to Ukraine. Biden held a telephone conference with the leaders of Germany, Britain, France and Italy.

At noon, the president entered the Roosevelt Room and faced the cameras. Berlin hadn’t forced him to change his mind, Biden said. “We wanted to make sure we’re all together.”

On Thursday, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry retweeted Zelensky’s notes of thanks to Scholz for sending the Leopards and to Biden for the Abrams.

Two days later, it tweeted a message of its own — the next big ask of Washington: “F-16.”

Tanks for reading.

Irony Be My Shield
Jul 29, 2012

Dolash posted:

I'm not sure I fully understand or appreciate the significance of, say, Poland holding on to a couple dozen jets, or any European NATO country holding on to tanks. Isn't the nuclear umbrella the only actual defense they need?

Because if it isn't, I don't see the number of tanks and jets each of these smaller states has as a meaningful defence against Russia in a conventional war, but I also don't see how a conventional war with Russia would even be possible within the next generation.
If, for example, Russia makes good on its threats to attack equipment destined for Ukraine while it's still in Poland it's better if NATO has military responses available that aren't "end the world". For example you could threaten to take out Russian military assets in Ukraine or the Black Sea proportional to the attack that was made.

TheDeadlyShoe
Feb 14, 2014

Irony Be My Shield posted:

If, for example, Russia makes good on its threats to attack equipment destined for Ukraine while it's still in Poland it's better if NATO has military responses available that aren't "end the world". For example you could threaten to take out Russian military assets in Ukraine or the Black Sea proportional to the attack that was made.

yeah.

the problem is that nuclear deterrents are still fundamentally insane. starting a nuclear exchange is a lose/lose scenario, even if you are being invaded it makes no sense to use a nuke and thus get nuked yourself. Nuclear deterrents only work because of spite; namely, the belief that leaders are indeed spiteful enough to say 'gently caress all y'all, launch the nukes while we still can', even though its loving stupid. Thus, a strong conventional army is still necessary, just in case your enemies get it in their heads that you are too rational to press the big red button.

Blut
Sep 11, 2009

if someone is in the bottom 10%~ of a guillotine
That WaPo article is good. Further proof of Scholz's ridiculous delaying tactics, his government managed to delay Ukraine getting Leopards for months for absolutely no good reason.

TheRat
Aug 30, 2006

Blut posted:

That WaPo article is good. Further proof of Scholz's ridiculous delaying tactics, his government managed to delay Ukraine getting Leopards for months for absolutely no good reason.

Personally I think Germany not wanting to look like a main military force in Europe is a pretty good, historical reason. I don't see any reason to blame Germany more than the US for the delay.

Quixzlizx
Jan 7, 2007

TheRat posted:

Personally I think Germany not wanting to look like a main military force in Europe is a pretty good, historical reason. I don't see any reason to blame Germany more than the US for the delay.

Nobody thinks that sending military equipment to Ukraine (or allowing other countries to send military equipment to Ukraine) means the Nazis are back.

That reason sounds like plausible deniability for idiots to lap up.

Family Values
Jun 26, 2007


Somewhat pissed that the US has to build all new tanks for Ukraine 'later this year'. Where the gently caress are all of the tanks we've been overproducing for years? Even if we don't want those going to Ukraine because they have the ~*~secret~*~ armor, can't we give them to one of our other allies and take their export M1s and give them to Ukraine?

Keisari
May 24, 2011

Family Values posted:

Somewhat pissed that the US has to build all new tanks for Ukraine 'later this year'. Where the gently caress are all of the tanks we've been overproducing for years? Even if we don't want those going to Ukraine because they have the ~*~secret~*~ armor, can't we give them to one of our other allies and take their export M1s and give them to Ukraine?

Or perhaps even "give them the export tanks now, we will backfill them to you later in the next 8 years and gently caress anyone up that would attack you in the meantime

beer_war
Mar 10, 2005

Quixzlizx posted:

Nobody thinks that sending military equipment to Ukraine (or allowing other countries to send military equipment to Ukraine) means the Nazis are back.

That reason sounds like plausible deniability for idiots to lap up.

One of Scholz' advisors made the argument that earlier this year that if Russia captured a tank with German insignia, Russian propaganda could claim they were being attacked by Nato.

And I'm absolutely dumbfounded by this line of reasoning. Russian propaganda is already completely off the rails, who the gently caress cares? The only reason to care about Russian propaganda is to point and laugh at it.

beer_war fucked around with this message at 19:01 on Jan 30, 2023

cinci zoo sniper
Mar 15, 2013




:nm: (struck tank on fire, also don’t scroll anywhere there) https://t.me/csources/183008 - this is from Vuhledar direction, looks like Russians are throwing T-80BVM at it (2022 modernisation with extra ERA). Serves to underscore that it’s a high priority target already.

Probably not entirely coincidentally, there was UAF artillery strike on a railway bridge between Melitopol’ and Crimea.
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1619755420423430144

https://t.me/brussinf/5608 Russians are posting photos from Blahodatne (near Bakhmut, from Soledar direction), which is an incremental progress for the Russian Bakhmut campaign, of a sort - cutting off one of the 3 UAF supply routes there. That said, I feel that Vuhledar is going to be the new serious flashpoint, and Bakhmut will be left for Wagner to break their teeth on if Prigozhin fancies, since neither from Vuhledar nor from Kreminna there’s as little as a word of them.

Also, it seems that Germany is preparing some gear for moving all those tanks, IFVs, and APCs announced around. https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/military-support-ukraine-2054992

quote:

78 truck tractor trains and 86 semi-trailers* (before: 14 truck tractor trains and 14 semi-trailers*

Telsa Cola
Aug 19, 2011

No... this is all wrong... this whole operation has just gone completely sidewaysface

Family Values posted:

Somewhat pissed that the US has to build all new tanks for Ukraine 'later this year'. Where the gently caress are all of the tanks we've been overproducing for years? Even if we don't want those going to Ukraine because they have the ~*~secret~*~ armor, can't we give them to one of our other allies and take their export M1s and give them to Ukraine?

I'm not entirely sure the US gives the super secret tanks to anyone, and our major allies who we might be willing to trust dont really need a whole new tank to manage and fit in to how they do things.

Keisari posted:

Or perhaps even "give them the export tanks now, we will backfill them to you later in the next 8 years and gently caress anyone up that would attack you in the meantime

The two remotely viable options for that currently IMO are Poland and Taiwan since both have orders in the works but our aid to both is strongly implied regardless of whether they accept or not, so why would they? Poland is in NATO and the US is fairly heavily invested in Taiwan remaining independent.

Like I guess you could give Saudi Arabia a gently caress ton of money and give them a guarantee and have them ship that poo poo over, but a guarantee is just words on paper and it's probably nice having actual tanks.

Telsa Cola fucked around with this message at 19:15 on Jan 30, 2023

Charliegrs
Aug 10, 2009

Family Values posted:

Somewhat pissed that the US has to build all new tanks for Ukraine 'later this year'. Where the gently caress are all of the tanks we've been overproducing for years? Even if we don't want those going to Ukraine because they have the ~*~secret~*~ armor, can't we give them to one of our other allies and take their export M1s and give them to Ukraine?

We dont sell DU armored Abrams to any ally as far as I know.

MikeC
Jul 19, 2004
BITCH ASS NARC

Ynglaur posted:

I'm kind of with Michael Koffman on this: I'd give Russia a 50/50 chance of taking Bakhmut. If they do, then what? It doesn't really get them that much in terms of new options. It doesn't present any kind of operational dilemma for Ukraine.

There is the possibility that Bakhmut holds significance for the Russians as a defensive stronghold that they want in their hands rather than allow the Ukrainians to have access to an urban area which is an intersection area for several major routes. T0513 and T0504 intersect in Bakhmut and in late summer were major supply lines for the Ukrainian Army as reported by ISW in late August. Those two roads offer lateral movement for the UA along the front and it the past two months have been all about bringing those routes under Russian control which had already been partially successful with the fall of Soledar on the northern shoulder.

Bakhmut also has E40 running between it and Krasna Hora and that route runs right into the heart of the breakaway republics. T0513 to the south (already under Russian control) leads directly into Horlivka and efforts south of Bakhmut have been centered around ensuring routes into that city under control as well.

It may well be that the Russians view Bakhmut, and other urban crossroads in the area as defensive liabilities if left indefinitely under Ukrainian hands and want control to make Ukrainian redeployment more difficult along that area of the front and having urban and fortified terrain protecting key roads that lead deep into Luhansk and Dontesk territory.

Keisari
May 24, 2011

Telsa Cola posted:

I'm not entirely sure the US gives the super secret tanks to anyone, and our major allies who we might be willing to trust dont really need a whole new tank to manage and fit in to how they do things.

The two remotely viable options for that currently IMO are Poland and Taiwan since both have orders in the works but our aid to both is strongly implied regardless of whether they accept or not, so why would they? Poland is in NATO and the US is fairly heavily invested in Taiwan remaining independent.

Like I guess you could give Saudi Arabia a gently caress ton of money and give them a guarantee and have them ship that poo poo over, but a guarantee is just words on paper and it's probably nice having actual tanks.

Yeah, true. And probably 2016-2020 eroded the value of American guarantees, so there's that as well.

At least some Leos should arrive more quickly, and they will need tanks a year from now on as well

cinci zoo sniper
Mar 15, 2013




https://www.ft.com/content/959c4a23-676e-49d7-b25e-409fa85c397e FT did a bunch of interviews for whether if the tanks are too late. The article in general is quite good, I suggest reading it.

quote:



“The question is whether 100, 150 is enough. Well, it’s enough to make a big difference,” says Andriy Zagorodnyuk, a former Ukrainian defence minister.



One place where Ukraine could try to attack is along the Svatove-Kreminna line, a stretch of the front in the Luhansk province. A major breakthrough there could threaten Russia’s north-south supply routes to its forces trying to seize the rest of Donetsk province — one of Vladimir Putin’s main objectives for the war.

A much bigger prize for Kyiv would be to push southwards into Zaporizhzhia province all the way to the Azov sea, severing Russia’s so-called land bridge to occupied Crimea.

Either of these directions would be through open terrain, where mechanised force would be indispensable, as opposed to the more urbanised Donetsk province.



But the Russian defensive lines along both of these axes are likely to be more formidable than anything that Ukraine has so far overcome. In the meantime, it could be the Russians who attack first. Moscow has been holding back about half of the 300,000 troops that it mobilised in the autumn and, having given them some training, they could be more effective than the first 150,000 thrown into the fight.

“Heading into 2023, Ukraine no longer has a manpower advantage and difficulties lie ahead,” says Michael Kofman, director in the Russian studies programme at CNA, a think-tank. “This will require large numbers of armoured fighting vehicles and to a much lesser extent tanks. Consequently it is a numbers game, where more is more.”

Mykola Bielieskov, an analyst at Ukraine’s National Institute for Strategic Studies, says tanks integrated with artillery and infantry would be vital to any Ukrainian offensive or defensive operation. How many western tanks Ukraine needs depends on the sequence of events on the battlefield, he says. If Russia attacks first and is then weakened, giving Ukraine a counter-attacking opportunity, Kyiv will need fewer. If Ukraine embarks on its own offensive, it would need more because it would first need to break through enemy lines and then conduct a second phase of enveloping and destroying Russian troops.

Seizing a defensive position ultimately involves getting infantry into trenches, says Rob Lee, senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, adding that the key is getting your soldiers across open terrain protected from artillery fire. “It hasn’t really changed that much in warfare since the second world war or before that.”

“In some ways the deliveries of Bradleys, or Marders or Strykers and those types of [infantry fighting] vehicles may be even more significant,” says Lee. The upgrade in Ukrainian capability from a Soviet-era armoured vehicle to a US-supplied Bradley may be greater than that from a shift from T-72 to Leopard tank.

“We shouldn’t jump to conclusions that tanks by themselves will win this war,” he says. “But they are an important contribution, and they’ll give Ukraine a better chance of success in 2023 and in 2024.”

Or was worth a read anyway, I copied like half of it.

Family Values posted:

Somewhat pissed that the US has to build all new tanks for Ukraine 'later this year'. Where the gently caress are all of the tanks we've been overproducing for years? Even if we don't want those going to Ukraine because they have the ~*~secret~*~ armor, can't we give them to one of our other allies and take their export M1s and give them to Ukraine?

Keisari posted:

Or perhaps even "give them the export tanks now, we will backfill them to you later in the next 8 years and gently caress anyone up that would attack you in the meantime

What’s funny is that US can’t even build them fairly right now, since that factory is apparently loaded up for years worth of tank deliveries ordered by Poland and Taiwan. Apparently though there are “options”, so I assume they’ll convince *spins globe* (wait it’s only Poland on this thing) Kuwait or something to give a bit of theirs up.

Tomn
Aug 23, 2007

And the angel said unto him
"Stop hitting yourself. Stop hitting yourself."
But lo he could not. For the angel was hitting him with his own hands

Quixzlizx posted:

Nobody thinks that sending military equipment to Ukraine (or allowing other countries to send military equipment to Ukraine) means the Nazis are back.

That reason sounds like plausible deniability for idiots to lap up.

I feel like this might be slightly unfair given how much of Germany's history education focuses on pummeling through the idea that "We did a VERY VERY VERY BAD THING before, NEVER AGAIN." It's unfortunate but understandable how parts of their internal politics might end up oversensitive about anything that might remotely sound like they're inching back towards the Bad Thing, even if everyone else is actually OK with the action in question.

See also discussions in this thread about how the German ministry of defense is where, traditionally, the gently caress-up political appointees are assigned in the cabinet shuffles to get them out of the way, or how the Bundswehr has been badly underfunded and organized ever since the end of the Cold War if not before. I imagine the average German has, on the whole, a very low tolerance of military adventurism in general, or anything remotely like it.


Moon Slayer posted:

Can't recall if it was already posted, but WaPo has a deep dive into the tank imbroglio:

tl;dr: the big hold up was a result of Scholz's desire to not be the first to send tanks butting up against Secretary of Defense Austin being convinced that M-1s were too complicated for Ukraine to get into the field in a reasonable amount of time. Eventually it was good enough for Germany that the US promised to send a bunch of M-1s in the medium- to long-term and Germany et all would supply Leopards in the short term.

Tanks for reading.

Good article, thanks for bringing it up. A good insight into the internal disagreements that go on between allies.

Yaoi Gagarin
Feb 20, 2014

Family Values posted:

Somewhat pissed that the US has to build all new tanks for Ukraine 'later this year'. Where the gently caress are all of the tanks we've been overproducing for years? Even if we don't want those going to Ukraine because they have the ~*~secret~*~ armor, can't we give them to one of our other allies and take their export M1s and give them to Ukraine?

They're not fully new, they take tanks from our cold war stockpile and upgrade to modern standards (and remove the DU armor)

Quixzlizx
Jan 7, 2007

Tomn posted:

I feel like this might be slightly unfair given how much of Germany's history education focuses on pummeling through the idea that "We did a VERY VERY VERY BAD THING before, NEVER AGAIN." It's unfortunate but understandable how parts of their internal politics might end up oversensitive about anything that might remotely sound like they're inching back towards the Bad Thing, even if everyone else is actually OK with the action in question.

See also discussions in this thread about how the German ministry of defense is where, traditionally, the gently caress-up political appointees are assigned in the cabinet shuffles to get them out of the way, or how the Bundswehr has been badly underfunded and organized ever since the end of the Cold War if not before. I imagine the average German has, on the whole, a very low tolerance of military adventurism in general, or anything remotely like it.

So it's ethically OK for "pacifists" to build up a profitable MIC that exports military equipment throughout Europe, but not OK to donate that same military equipment from that same MIC to a democratic country being invaded and genocided? :rolleyes:

You/they might have had a point if Ukraine was asking for manned German formations to join the war.

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SmokingFrog0641
Oct 29, 2011

TheRat posted:

Personally I think Germany not wanting to look like a main military force in Europe is a pretty good, historical reason. I don't see any reason to blame Germany more than the US for the delay.

I think there is a difference though. In the migrant crisis and the debt crises of Spain and Greece, Germany put itself at the forefront and dictated terms. Germany sees itself at the front of Europe and the continental economic engine. Germany may have historical reasons for not wanting to appear as the military leader, but, in the end, it should play its part in leading in all crises, not just ones it finds convenient for its own purposes, and skulking when it does not.

As has been discussed many times, there are logistics is issues with the American MBTs like Abrams, such as fuel, weight, and technology loss—such as DU, that are not concerns with the Leopards. And if it was equally on the Americans, why are the challenger 2s from Britain not enough to cover Scholz or, while not MBTs, the French foreign legion wheeled recon with tank destroyers being sent (forget the name, apologies). Additionally, the leopards are already en masse in continental Europe in great number as opposed to American stocks.

Yes, America could have done more to accelerate the process but I don’t think that Germany should necessarily be excused in their delays by equating their actions with American actions.

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