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ronya posted:that NATO is an expansionist threat not through open military confrontation, but instead through sponsoring NGOs and middle-class activists, then inciting mass urban protests and loss of governing credibility through financial or ideological pressure, during which said NGOs and middle-class activists will rise to the forefront as the default credible alternative It is also helpful to remember that Putin's first job was in the KGB in East Germany, helping Russia run its network of fake democracy puppet states across Eastern Europe. A lot of Security Service Russians don't see the 'use NGOs and activists to destabilise regimes and cause colour revolutions' as paranoid conspiracism, to them it is just a successful variation the West has developed of a strategy that Russia has deployed in its neighbourhood for the last hundred years or so. They assume a zero-sum world, and they therefore see the West doing what they would be doing if they had the same power and resources.
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Mar 18, 2023 20:50
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Deteriorata posted:The plan was to conquer Ukraine in a 3-day blitzkrieg and then present the conquest to NATO as a fait accompli with the expectation that they would ultimately do nothing, like with Crimea. And, I mean, it's worked before. Not just in Crimea, but in Prague in 1968, too. Deteriorata posted:
plus, you know, quote:The enemy is both strong and weak. “By a continuous shifting of rhetorical focus, the enemies are at the same time too strong and too weak.” Putin simultaneously believing NATO is so strong they may attack at any moment (even if just via destabilizaton actions rather than overt force) and also so weak they'll fold if Russia just slaps them hard enough, isn't so much a bug in his thinking as it is a feature.
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Mar 18, 2023 21:06
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Hieronymous Alloy posted:And, I mean, it's worked before. Not just in Crimea, but in Prague in 1968, too. This comparison pretty much gets to the crux of the matter. In 1968 it was widely accepted that the Soviet Union got to do whatever the gently caress it wanted in its client states; Russia believes that it inherited this right after the Soviet Union dissolved and the West believes that the right is now lost.
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Mar 18, 2023 21:17
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Alchenar posted:It is also helpful to remember that Putin's first job was in the KGB in East Germany, helping Russia run its network of fake democracy puppet states across Eastern Europe. A lot of Security Service Russians don't see the 'use NGOs and activists to destabilise regimes and cause colour revolutions' as paranoid conspiracism, to them it is just a successful variation the West has developed of a strategy that Russia has deployed in its neighbourhood for the last hundred years or so. They assume a zero-sum world, and they therefore see the West doing what they would be doing if they had the same power and resources. I have a pet theory that 1968 marks the point where the West stops assuming that mass urban protests in the capital, with the loss of control of key state buildings, are necessarily the loss of state continuity (because France) and conversely where the communist bloc stops assuming that communists are necessarily superior at navigating the politics of urban disorder (because Czechoslovakia)
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Mar 18, 2023 21:18
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the holy poopacy posted:This comparison pretty much gets to the crux of the matter. In 1968 it was widely accepted that the Soviet Union got to do whatever the gently caress it wanted in its client states; Russia believes that it inherited this right after the Soviet Union dissolved and the West believes that the right is now lost. And, functionally, Russia believe(d) it still had the military strength to get away with doing what it wants, while Ukraine is busily trying to prove that that evaporated with the fall of the USSR. Hieronymous Alloy fucked around with this message at 21:28 on Mar 18, 2023 |
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Mar 18, 2023 21:23
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WarpedLichen posted:Anybody know how accurate the CIT is?: New round of conscription is inevitable now that they've burned through so much of the first one.
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Mar 18, 2023 23:12
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Lammasu posted:The thing I don't get is how Putin legitimately believes NATO is an expansionist threat to Russia, yet this entire invasion was based on the premise of them doing nothing. Either NATO will invade Russia in the future or NATO will do nothing when Russia engages in an unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. He can't have it both ways. Assuming that Putin's rhetoric about the threat of NATO expansion to Russia is something to be taken seriously as what he actually believes, and that's a big assumption, I suppose the argument would be that he thought that an invasion where he quickly occupied Ukraine's major cities and made it a fools errand for NATO to throw money into a losing war meant that he was able to secure Russia's western frontier before NATO became too entrenched in the country. Of course the crippling issue was that this was based on faulty assumptions that the Ukrainians would fold over quickly and the might of Russia's army would quickly achieve these aims and show it to be pointless for NATO to put much effort into trying to stop them.
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Mar 18, 2023 23:25
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saratoga posted:New round of conscription is inevitable now that they've burned through so much of the first one. I wonder how much Russian opinions on mobilisation have changed since the first wave. Surely they must be aware of how badly it went to some extent.
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Mar 18, 2023 23:39
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The Washington Post has been running articles digging into the support for Ukraine among different American factions on the right. This article is about the Republican presidential candidates. Trump and Desantis are taking stances against war support, while most others you've heard of are strongly supporting Ukraine (including Pence, Pompeo, and Nikki Haley, all of whom were Trump's administration directly involved with foreign affairs). Desantis' himself voted to arm Ukraine in 2014 after Crimea when he was in Congress, so this represents an about face for him (though possibly not a sincere one). This article is about the conflict within the Republican party over Ukraine. The pro-Russia faction is small, but notably contains enough Republican house members to threaten another stalemate in selecting the next speaker; current speaker McCarthy is notably less vocal about Ukraine support than Mitch McConnell in the Senate. Polling of voters, meanwhile, shows Ukraine support among Republicans has fallen off a bit.
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Mar 18, 2023 23:43
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Lammasu posted:The thing I don't get is how Putin legitimately believes NATO is an expansionist threat to Russia, yet this entire invasion was based on the premise of them doing nothing. Either NATO will invade Russia in the future or NATO will do nothing when Russia engages in an unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. He can't have it both ways. So, yes, western expansion gave Putin no choice. Putin is not insane, he's just a very naughty boy.
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Mar 19, 2023 00:37
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With regards to DeSantis swapping support, I’m admittedly wondering how much of that is him just cynically copying Trump until he’s clinched the nomination (and then probably quietly dropping the matter) vs. Russia having something major enough on him that he has to play to their tune because he just doesn’t have the implausible deniability factor with the base that Trump did during 2016 (or at least not to the same extent).
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Mar 19, 2023 00:43
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Are you of the belief any US politician who does anything that could be seen as being in Russia's favor must be because of blackmail? If the Russian intel services are that omnipotent I have to wonder why they seem to be really fumbling around with Ukraine for well over 10 years now.
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Mar 19, 2023 01:02
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Regalingualius posted:With regards to DeSantis swapping support, I’m admittedly wondering how much of that is him just cynically copying Trump until he’s clinched the nomination (and then probably quietly dropping the matter) vs. Russia having something major enough on him that he has to play to their tune because he just doesn’t have the implausible deniability factor with the base that Trump did during 2016 (or at least not to the same extent). DeSantis is an absolute windsock of a politician. He is the living, breathing embodiment of the quote "These are my values. If you don't like them I have others." He doesn't need Russian pressure to do an about face on a topic. Whichever way the wind blows is the way he faces on any and every topic at all times.
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Mar 19, 2023 01:04
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Regalingualius posted:With regards to DeSantis swapping support, I’m admittedly wondering how much of that is him just cynically copying Trump until he’s clinched the nomination (and then probably quietly dropping the matter) vs. Russia having something major enough on him that he has to play to their tune because he just doesn’t have the implausible deniability factor with the base that Trump did during 2016 (or at least not to the same extent). I started to write out a US-politics based reply on this issue, but then cosmically sensed cinci glaring in my direction. So instead I'll just say this is probably drifting too far away from the thread's topic and too far into US GOP politics. And no, I don't believe Putin has dirt on DeSantis.
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Mar 19, 2023 01:11
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BungMonkey posted:Anti-corruption, liberalization, western oil/gas development, and western military interests are all mutually and recursively self-reinforcing forces. Each of them is effectively all of them. Oil and gas was 40-60% of the Russian federal budget and almost all of the shadow kleptocracy budget. Competing western development of trillions of dollars of gas and oil fields in and around eastern and southern Ukraine were, in fact, an existential threat to both the ostensible and shadow governments in Russia. Putin's plan A was to take over the land to develop it themselves, plan B was to wreck the land so hard that it couldn't be developed by the west. Plan B is succeeding. The gas/oil fields of Ukraine theory is wishful thinking that tries to square American oil wars over Putin's megalomaniacal circle. I suggest spending a few minutes of time on figuring out how much stuff is there, and how much of it has Russia, how would the logistics of it all work out when there's no war going on.
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Mar 19, 2023 01:12
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cinci zoo sniper posted:The gas/oil fields of Ukraine theory is wishful thinking that tries to square American oil wars over Putin's megalomaniacal circle. I suggest spending a few minutes of time on figuring out how much stuff is there, and how much of it has Russia, how would the logistics of it all work out when there's no war going on. It is not entirely clear how much America even had control of the situation; Chevron for instance, was poking the bear by developing Olesska in 2013 and wisely decided to get the hell out by the end of 2014.
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Mar 19, 2023 01:24
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Cinci already told you, just googling Russia and Ukraine's estimated natural gas reserves reveals how much nonsense the idea that development of Ukraine's reserves posed any kind of economic challenge to Russia is.
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Mar 19, 2023 01:37
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The bigger risk is/would've been western europe/us deciding for whatever reason to stop buying oil or natural gas from Russia and focusing on other sources which uh, good job encouraging exactly that Putin.
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Mar 19, 2023 01:44
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ChaseSP posted:The bigger risk is/would've been western europe/us deciding for whatever reason to stop buying oil or natural gas from Russia and focusing on other sources which uh, good job encouraging exactly that Putin. I think the calculus was that this was going to happen anyhow and Russia's gas leverage was at a "use it or lose it" point. In 5 years, Europe would have enough renewables that they could tell Russia to get hosed if they pulled something like this; in 10 years, the Russian economy would be in shambles even without sanctions. Carving up Ukraine does not actually fix any of this but if you want military revanchism for its own sake then your window of opportunity was slipping away in a few years.
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Mar 19, 2023 02:10
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Alchenar posted:Cinci already told you, just googling Russia and Ukraine's estimated natural gas reserves reveals how much nonsense the idea that development of Ukraine's reserves posed any kind of economic challenge to Russia is.
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Mar 19, 2023 02:21
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khwarezm posted:Assuming that Putin's rhetoric about the threat of NATO expansion to Russia is something to be taken seriously as what he actually believes, and that's a big assumption, I suppose the argument would be that he thought that an invasion where he quickly occupied Ukraine's major cities and made it a fools errand for NATO to throw money into a losing war meant that he was able to secure Russia's western frontier before NATO became too entrenched in the country. Of course the crippling issue was that this was based on faulty assumptions that the Ukrainians would fold over quickly and the might of Russia's army would quickly achieve these aims and show it to be pointless for NATO to put much effort into trying to stop them. The telling bit is that when the easy quick win failed, rather than back out or withdraw to hold defensible areas they instead skeletonized everything left in Russia and threw it into further attacks. Then kept things that way for a year, leaving basically nothing between the supposed NATO hordes and Moscow/St. Petersburg. Which is to say whoever's calling the shots is very well aware NATO isn't gonna invade. Warbadger fucked around with this message at 02:27 on Mar 19, 2023 |
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Mar 19, 2023 02:22
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BungMonkey posted:Regional exploratory license activity for oil and gas keep getting (by some strange coincidence) cut short, including those of Exxonmobile, Shell, Enwell, Kulzcyk, Chevron, and Eni. The actual reserves are a big unknown. Ukraine's gas and oil reserves are a rounding error compared to Russia's. 400M vs 80T barrels. Ukraine is a poor country and the oil reserves, while comparatively small, are extremely important to them as a source of badly needed income. Russia's only interest in those oil fields is denying them from Ukraine's possession.
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Mar 19, 2023 02:28
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BungMonkey posted:Can you expand on this?  source Basically, what I joked about a year ago: cinci zoo sniper posted:There’s this argument that Russia is actually doing this for economic reasons, to improve its natural gas reserve of 1700 trillion cubic feet by gaining control over a 70 trillion cubic feet gas field under Donbas. I still haven’t figured out who wrote the original piece for this, but that person should consider reducing their budget for candles. And total reserves are not even the extractable gas, or the feasible rate of extraction. Extractable gas from the Donbas field, assuming that the war is over, and it's safe to pump it, doesn't cover even half of Ukraine's domestic consumption lol. While being more difficult to extract than the average, due to tricky soil conditions. While Russia is a de facto monopolist that can easily just give away the net volume Ukraine could export, for free. I also remember doing a post where I did the maths for how long would all known reserves would last if Ukraine stopped consuming gas itself, and began exporting all of it to Europe, and the resulting figure was below 10 years. Unfortunately, I got bored looking for the post in the old thread.
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Mar 19, 2023 02:37
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BungMonkey posted:Regional exploratory license activity for oil and gas keep getting (by some strange coincidence) cut short, including those of Exxonmobile, Shell, Enwell, Kulzcyk, Chevron, and Eni. The actual reserves are a big unknown. What is this post even supposed to say? Why bring oil into this? Who is cancelling them? When? Edit: I guess you're saying that these alleged licences and their withdrawals are a smoking gun that Ukraine is hiding a fossil fuels reserve meaningfully comparable to the Russian. While I think that the argument is flawed intrinsically, even before we get to possible differences between hypothetical total volume and confirmed annual yield, or the physical size/location differences of the two countries, it would be useful to re-centre this conversation by providing some citations, or a matter of overview establishing the timeline and the speculation here. cinci zoo sniper fucked around with this message at 03:02 on Mar 19, 2023 |
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Mar 19, 2023 02:37
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By the way, while I was digging up where to get current numbers, I did end up finding through a RAND piece that the author of this theory is NYT op-ed writer Bret Stephens.
cinci zoo sniper fucked around with this message at 02:53 on Mar 19, 2023 |
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Mar 19, 2023 02:41
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Warbadger posted:The telling bit is that when the easy quick win failed, rather than back out or withdraw to hold defensible areas they instead skeletonized everything left in Russia and threw it into further attacks. Then kept things that way for a year, leaving basically nothing between the supposed NATO hordes and Moscow/St. Petersburg. Like the very prospect of any country invading the most heavily armed nuclear power on earth is completely nuts, its one of the reasons I really hate people trying to appeal to some sort of atavistic Russian fear of attacks from the west to come up with an excuse for all of this, its not 1941, Russia has probably the most effective defensive deterrent in human history. But most of Southern Russia and Ukraine is famously fluid and flat, its a bit hard to determine obvious defensible terrain and they seem to get concentrated on the Dneiper and Don, so I imagine its extremely tempting for the Russians to want to get up to the banks of the Dneiper at least in a paradox game logic 'natural frontiers' kind of way, it certainly helps explain the blood they spent over the last year on places like Kherson. Also, I don't know how much other people rate Russian desire to secure Crimea once and for all as playing a key role in this war getting escalated in 2022, but I've read that since the Ukrainians blocked off the canal coming from the Dneiper its ravaged agriculture in the peninsula since its just naturally very dry and its essentially impossible for the Russians to fix that without a land connection to the rest of their territory. So Putin has ended up betting basically his entire political career on being the guy who 'regained' Crimea from the Ukrainians so he's willing to go to desperate lengths to keep it in Russia.
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Mar 19, 2023 02:47
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cinci zoo sniper posted:By the way, while I was digging up where to get current numbers, I did end up finding through a RAND piece that the author of this theory is NYT op-ed writer Bret Stephens. For others' context, other than notoriously melting down over being compared to a bedbug, Stephens' main qualifications at the Times are for writing contrarian and/or pro-Israel foreign policy pieces and being broadly paleoconservative, with all the unpleasantry that entails. Like a lot of NYT op-ed authors, he's a dumb hot take engine with no redeeming qualities.
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Mar 19, 2023 03:27
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So I listened to a recent Michael Kofman interview by War on the Rocks and he was discussing the tension between people who were in the military at the start of the war (who have been NATO-influenced) and the older soldiers who have been called back and reincorporated (who were definitely products of Soviet military doctrine and beliefs). People might take issue with this characterization, but Kofman was wondering what we'll see with respect to any offensives from Ukraine since you have people who had to fight out the beginning stages of the war and he found them to be more open to tactically flexible command structures (i.e., more "western") while the returning personnel seemed to want to go back to a more top-down leadership style with less on-the-ground flexibility (i.e., more "Russian"). https://warontherocks.com/2023/03/how-to-think-about-bakhmut-and-a-ukrainian-spring-offensive/ I think he walked back a little bit on the idea of Ukraine staying in Bakhmut as an obvious mistake, but he did see it as a situation where you cannot tell how much of it is politics versus a pure military utility judgment. Also, since war is politics by other means, maybe Bakhmut matters because everyone has decided it matters and Ukraine does not even want Russia to have a minor (or even pyrrhic) victory. Anyway, I thought you all might find the podcast interesting and I'd love to know your thoughts.
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Mar 19, 2023 03:49
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I actually keep forgetting to subscribe to Kofman's podcast, this sounds like a good reason to try to not forget to do that this time around. From what I see following Ukrainian domestic presss, there's definitely a category of issues they're working through that reeks of Ukrainian army pre-2014. Transplanting that onto Bakhmut does make sense as well, even though there also are other reasons as to why "NATO-style manoeuvre warfare" isn't happening right now. The weather, for instance, or that their attack ran into strong defensive fortifications (do you call a minefield a fortification?) and coordinated response under Kreminna.
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Mar 19, 2023 03:57
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cinci zoo sniper posted:
This gets into my warehouse. There is a definition for 'reserves' at the SEC that requires 90% certainty of production at certain economic conditions (average of first day oil/gas price each month, assumed development costs). Once it gets international, the numbers get really weird, like a geologist figure the size of a basin, how much gas could be there, and gave a recovery factor. If there is oil and gas and you don't care about it making money, you can produce some amount of either.
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Mar 19, 2023 04:11
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Russian media reporting that Putin helicoptered into Mariupol and drove around for a while, a day after a visit to Sevastopol: https://ria.ru/20230319/mariupol-1858878587.html
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Mar 19, 2023 04:23
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Speaking of podcasts, I just listened to one from mid-January with RUSI's Jack Watling. He's not as prolific as Kofman, but absolutely worth listening to. Two things that stood out for me: -Russia has captured some Star Streaks, and provided them to Iran as part of their deal. It's expected they'll reverse-engineer them in time. -He's now fairly confident that July 2021 was the time when Russia changed from feasibility testing to war preparation.
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Mar 19, 2023 04:38
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Oil! posted:This gets into my warehouse. There is a definition for 'reserves' at the SEC that requires 90% certainty of production at certain economic conditions (average of first day oil/gas price each month, assumed development costs). Once it gets international, the numbers get really weird, like a geologist figure the size of a basin, how much gas could be there, and gave a recovery factor. If there is oil and gas and you don't care about it making money, you can produce some amount of either. Post-av combo  That said, I should've been more precise in the post, in that, as implied in the older quote I brought up, 70 tcf is not really a disputed figure for the Yuzivska gas field. The volume is established as per a standard similar to what you mention, and the questions are 1) how expensive will it be to get it out, and 2) what sort of extraction rate is practical for the field. The point for the argument in question being both the relatively small size, and the latter factor – Ukraine presently is not even self-sufficient with gas, and imports it from the EU.The “proven reserves” debate is more relevant for their Black Sea resources, as those are not yet explored properly.
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Mar 19, 2023 05:14
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I don't think we really know the full extent of Russia's fossil energy reserves, for that matter.
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Mar 19, 2023 10:09
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This discussion about the reasons for Russia's aggression seems to ignore the elephant in the room. It feels like you're all taking whatever Mearsheimer† ist taking. Russia's talk about NATO is reheating Cold War grievances because it plays well and because it's less embarrassing than to talk about the real reason. It's the EU. If Russia sees itself as a superpower, then it follows that the EU, directly on its western flank, is its rival. Russia under Putin has reacted aggressively to countries moving towards the EU and has used military force when political force didn't work (Euromaidan -> Annexation of Crimea). There are constant threats against potential and recent EU members and Russian internal propaganda is super fixated on the "degeneracy" in the EU. Which makes sense when you look at how diametrically opposed Putin's kleptocracy is to the EU's boring technocracy. Any country that moves towards the EU's style of governance is lost to Putin's kleptocracy, because corruption within EU structures works so differently and is more constrained. And I further don't think we can dismiss the extremely loud toxic masculinity permeating absolutely everything Russia is projecting. The image of Putin as a manly man fighting the weakly effeminate homonazis of the EU who are coming to destroy the family†† is popular, sincerely held, and shared with lots of other fascists. PiS, Fidesz, GOP, Putin. There is no doubt in my mind that this war is at least partially a Culture War gone hot. † This is a light joke. I do not want to accuse anyone of being an International Realist. That would be terrible. †† 2.1 and 3.1 paint a pretty clear picture imo: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_BRI(2021)653644
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Mar 19, 2023 10:42
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I guess I'm in the absolute minority in thinking that Putin is just genuinely a nationalist and revanchist, and those ideals are the driving force here. Putin grew up in a large Soviet homeland, saw it fall apart and has dedicated the rest of his career and life to restoring as much of that state's core as possible. He wants to see Russia expand on a map, to territories he considers to be Russia's ancestral lands. He spent the Covid years more isolated than ever and came to believe in his own myths and fantasies more than ever. I know this approach seems nuts from a western perspective and there has to be an economical or some other reason, but I think those are secondary at least.
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Mar 19, 2023 11:22
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Fabulous Knight posted:I guess I'm in the absolute minority in thinking that Putin is just genuinely a nationalist and revanchist, and those ideals are the driving force here. Putin grew up in a large Soviet homeland, saw it fall apart and has dedicated the rest of his career and life to restoring as much of that state's core as possible. He wants to see Russia expand on a map, to territories he considers to be Russia's ancestral lands. He spent the Covid years more isolated than ever and came to believe in his own myths and fantasies more than ever. I know this approach seems nuts from a western perspective and there has to be an economical or some other reason, but I think those are secondary at least.
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Mar 19, 2023 11:34
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Fabulous Knight posted:I guess I'm in the absolute minority in thinking that Putin is just genuinely a nationalist and revanchist, and those ideals are the driving force here. Putin grew up in a large Soviet homeland, saw it fall apart and has dedicated the rest of his career and life to restoring as much of that state's core as possible. He wants to see Russia expand on a map, to territories he considers to be Russia's ancestral lands. He spent the Covid years more isolated than ever and came to believe in his own myths and fantasies more than ever. I know this approach seems nuts from a western perspective and there has to be an economical or some other reason, but I think those are secondary at least. I have come around to this viewpoint, he's just completely lost in his fantasy world.
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Mar 19, 2023 11:37
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Fabulous Knight posted:I guess I'm in the absolute minority in thinking that Putin is just genuinely a nationalist and revanchist, and those ideals are the driving force here. Putin grew up in a large Soviet homeland, saw it fall apart and has dedicated the rest of his career and life to restoring as much of that state's core as possible. He wants to see Russia expand on a map, to territories he considers to be Russia's ancestral lands. He spent the Covid years more isolated than ever and came to believe in his own myths and fantasies more than ever. I know this approach seems nuts from a western perspective and there has to be an economical or some other reason, but I think those are secondary at least. No, you are on the money, the people who think this is about rational war goals like economics or strategic military reasons are deluding themselves, framing the war like that is nothing but wishful thinking rooted in the desire to uphold the even greater illusion of a liberal world order where ideology no longer matters. If we admit Russia doesn't act according to this framework, it becomes untenable and more and more holes start to appear across the board, making the past 30 years of Western foreign policy an obviously wasted period, a giant failure of unprecedented proportions.
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Mar 19, 2023 13:20
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cinci zoo sniper posted:The weather, for instance, or that their attack ran into strong defensive fortifications (do you call a minefield a fortification?) and coordinated response under Kreminna. Minefields are a military obstacle. Generally, obstacles are anything that slows down incoming troops and they may or may not inflict casualties. Minefields and concertina wire are obstacles, but so are rivers and cliffs.
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Mar 19, 2023 13:24
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