genericnick posted:

Hm. So there are supposedly some internal brigades that aren't in this list. Wouldn't this mean that we really can't draw any kind of conclusions from the lack of Ukranian sourced equipment?

Nuclear War posted:

The amount of times I've had to yell at soldiers for doing this exact thing is astronomical. it happens all the time. Or taking pictures of clearly marked SECRET or TS briefing notes on a screen "because i cant remember all that"

genericnick posted:

Hm. So there are supposedly some internal brigades that aren't in this list. Wouldn't this mean that we really can't draw any kind of conclusions from the lack of Ukranian sourced equipment?

Ardennes posted:

There are obviously other units in the field, someone needs to be holding the line somewhere else. This is particularly illustrating (well supposedly at least) the assault force that will attack in the south (maybe).

The issue is that very little of the equipment for that force is Ukraine, which suggests that most of it has probably been lost (since we know other units on the line have been taking very heavy attrition).

genericnick posted:

I mean I haven’t seen it in that blurry scan, but according to the snek dude three internal brigades should be involed in this clusterfuck, equipped with ??and with total strength of ??? Makes sense that they would concentrate their remaining equipment there. If any of this is true and they exist.

genericnick posted:

I mean I haven’t seen it in that blurry scan, but according to the snek dude three internal brigades should be involed in this clusterfuck, equipped with ??and with total strength of ??? Makes sense that they would concentrate their remaining equipment there. If any of this is true and they exist.

Ardennes posted:

the Bakhmut situation has developed not necessarily to Ukraine's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest

DancingShade posted:

Most pertubatory my dear chap.

Tea and scones?

Regarde Aduck posted:

Cream then jam or jam then cream?

DancingShade posted:

Oh come now, the help can do that for you.

But if you ever find yourself in a pickle because your manservant is out fetching you a gallon of gin from the merchant down yonder then jam blob followed by hearty dollop of cream.

Regarde Aduck posted:

Cream then jam or jam then cream?

Cpt_Obvious posted:

What's wild is that nobody is disputing the mud info which effectively tells the timing for the offensive.

Cpt_Obvious posted:

What's wild is that nobody is disputing the mud info which effectively tells the timing for the offensive.

ТАСС posted:

❗️The Ukrainian pilot who crashed in the Bryansk Region and was detained by FSB and Rosgvardia border guards is charged with illegal border crossing, the Bryansk regional court told us.

Gravid Topiary posted:

lmao where's that picture of osama/gaddafi reaching down from heaven for zelensky because i think it's going to be very applicable real soon

genericnick posted:

I think there's no way you can keep the weather a state secret.

Al-Saqr posted:

The british in their typical understated way have announced that Russia has taken central Bakhmut

lollontee posted:

you wot mate

genericnick posted:

Hm. So there are supposedly some internal brigades that aren't in this list. Wouldn't this mean that we really can't draw any kind of conclusions from the lack of Ukranian sourced equipment?

DancingShade posted:

Me, spinning on the spot with both arms outstretched:

This is just the vanguard recon force, they have a million highly trained battle hardened Ukranians being administered by a completely different floor of that HQ which is why they weren't on that particular collection of documents. Fully armed with the complete contents of the now emptied NATO armories. Victory any day now. Any. Day.

Al-Saqr posted:

yea question in the back how the gently caress do you find time to type all that holy hell

Lord of Pie posted:

Frosted Flake posted:

I would like to now open the floor to questions,

sullat posted:

Means someone is collecting a lot of paychecks.

sullat posted:

Means someone is collecting a lot of paychecks.

Frosted Flake posted:

I would like to now open the floor to questions

supersnowman posted:

Why does it looks like Ukraine not only took at least some of the Nazi party way of doing politics but also the flawed part of the military strategy by engaging in useless high-risk offensive?

Frosted Flake posted:

I would now like to open the floor for questions,

Frosted Flake posted:

StaffGPT

Gentlemen, today I have the pleasure of discussing two distinct Prussian military concepts: toh-dess-fart and letz-ter woor-fel-woorf. These concepts, though developed for continental linear warfare, hold valuable lessons for contemporary military thought and strategy. We will explore the origins, purpose, and the psychological and emotional basis of these command decisions. We will also analyze historical examples, such as oon-ter-neh-men my-kha-el, vahkt am rine, and frooh-lingz-er-vah-khen, to illustrate these concepts in action. Finally, we will relate them to ongoing staff planning for Op UNIFIER, the Canadian Armed Forces' (CAF) military training and capacity building mission in support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Todesfahrt, or "Death Ride," refers to a decisive and aggressive cavalry charge with the objective of breaking through enemy lines or delivering a crushing blow. This tactic emerged during the era of Frederick the Great, who led the Kingdom of Prussia from 1740 to 1786. The Todesfahrt was typically executed by heavy cavalry units, such as cuirassiers and dragoons, and required an exceptional level of discipline, courage, and skill. The psychological basis for the Todesfahrt lies in the emotional impact of a well-executed cavalry charge. The sight and sound of a mass of horsemen charging at full gallop, sabers gleaming, could have a profound effect on the morale of enemy troops, who often broke ranks and fled in the face of such a powerful display. The Todesfahrt also served as a means of inspiring friendly troops, who could witness the bravery and ferocity of their comrades.

Letzter Würfelwurf, or "The Last Throw of the Dice," refers to a desperate, high-risk, all-or-nothing military maneuver, typically undertaken when other avenues of success have been exhausted. This concept is particularly applicable to situations where an army finds itself in dire straits and has little to lose. By gambling everything on a single, decisive action, the Letzter Würfelwurf can potentially turn the tide of battle or even the entire course of a war. The psychological and emotional basis for the Letzter Würfelwurf is rooted in the hope that a bold and unexpected move can catch the enemy off guard and reverse the fortunes of a beleaguered force. This tactic can instill a sense of urgency and determination in an army, rallying the troops to fight with renewed vigor and purpose.

To illustrate these concepts, let us examine the historical examples of Unternehmen Michael, Wacht am Rhein, and Frühlingserwachen.

Unternehmen Michael, or Operation Michael, was the German Spring Offensive of 1918 during World War I. Facing a worsening strategic situation, General Erich Ludendorff launched a series of offensives in a last-ditch effort to break the stalemate on the Western Front. The Germans employed new infiltration tactics and innovative combined arms techniques to achieve initial success. However, the offensive ultimately failed due to logistical issues and mounting Allied resistance. Unternehmen Michael can be seen as an example of a Letzter Würfelwurf, as it represented a high-risk gamble with the objective of achieving a decisive victory.

Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein, or the Ardennes Offensive, was the German counteroffensive launched in December 1944 during World War II. Facing imminent defeat, Adolf Hitler ordered a surprise attack through the densely forested Ardennes region, with the objective of capturing the vital port of Antwerp and splitting the Allied forces. Despite initial success, the offensive ultimately failed due to a combination of logistical challenges, stubborn Allied resistance, and the onset of harsh winter weather. Wacht am Rhein can be considered another example of a Letzter Würfelwurf, as it represented a desperate, all-or-nothing attempt to reverse the course of the war.

Unternehmen Frühlingserwachen, or Operation Spring Awakening, was the final major German offensive of World War II, launched in March 1945. With their situation growing increasingly desperate, the Germans aimed to recapture the Hungarian oil fields and halt the Soviet advance in the east. Despite initial gains, the offensive was ultimately unsuccessful, as the Soviets counterattacked and pushed the Germans back to their starting positions. Frühlingserwachen also exemplifies a Letzter Würfelwurf, with the German High Command gambling on a high-risk offensive in an attempt to secure a decisive victory and change the course of the war.

Though Todesfahrt and Letzter Würfelwurf originated in the Prussian military of the 18th century, these concepts continue to hold relevance for modern military strategists and theatre commanders. The former emphasizes the psychological impact of aggressive, decisive action on both enemy and friendly forces, while the latter demonstrates the importance of bold, high-risk maneuvers in situations where traditional methods have failed. The synergy between the two concepts is that both reflect the importance of bold, decisive action in military strategy and operational planning. Gentlemen, the common theme here is that utilizing audacious tactics can achieve a desired outcome, often against overwhelming odds.

During Op UNIFIER we have learned from our partner nation to place a greater emphasis on the psychological and emotional aspects of warfare. We have in these Prussian concepts, the tools for planning around the element of surprise and the ability to inspire friendly troops and demoralize the enemy. In addition, we know the necessity of bold, decisive action in the face of adversity, as well as the need for military leadership at all levels to be adaptive and innovative in their approach to strategy, particularly where aggressive manoeuvre is concerned.

Before we move on to a study of Op UNIFIER with these in mind, there is one last thing to discuss. We must evaluate when and why commanders turn to these tools as their Selected Approach. How do Prussian theories of manoeuvre fit in with our Canadian concepts of Ends, Ways and Means?



Both Todesfahrt and Letzter Würfelwurf are operational/strategic concepts that involve bearing tremendous casualties due to the audacious and high-risk nature of the tactics involved. These concepts may become more appealing in situations where a long war seems unwinnable, as the prospect of a swift, decisive victory can become more attractive than the slow, grinding attrition of a protracted conflict. In such strategic situations, the allure of death and glory is tied to the belief that a display of sheer will and determination can reverse the military situation and achieve a short-term victory that would be impossible to sustain in the long run. By taking these risks, commanders hope to shock the enemy and change the course of the war in their favor. However, the potential for high casualties and the destruction of committed forces can make these tactics a double-edged sword, as they can also render a long-term war effort impossible.

Military historian Robert Citino has assessed these concepts within the context of German military history, particularly at the operational level. According to Citino, German military thinking has often been characterized by an emphasis on bold, aggressive action and a willingness to accept high casualties in pursuit of a decisive outcome. Citino argues that the German military tradition, which includes the Prussian concepts of Todesfahrt and Letzter Würfelwurf, has been marked by a preference for short, decisive wars, often at the expense of long-term strategic planning. This approach may have been successful in some cases, but it also carried the risk of catastrophic failure when the desired outcome could not be achieved quickly. The high casualties and equipment losses suffered in pursuit of these objectives could leave an army unable to continue fighting a prolonged war.

In terms of Ends, Ways and Means, when faced with the prospect of a prolonged and costly war with an unfavorable outcome, the idea of a decisive, bold action (Ways), with remaining available heavy manoeuvre forces (Means), that could potentially reverse the situation (Ends) can become increasingly attractive.

Consider the decision making criteria:

• Hope for a swift resolution: A long, drawn-out conflict often entails significant casualties, material loss, and a steady erosion of morale among the troops. In such situations, the prospect of a swift, decisive victory through an audacious maneuver can provide a sense of hope and motivation for both commanders and their troops. This hope can become a driving force, encouraging them to take risks that might seem irrational under different circumstances.
  
  
• Desperation: As the prospects of winning a slow, attritional conflict diminish, desperation can set in, pushing commanders to consider high-risk strategies like Todesfahrt and Letzter Würfelwurf. The belief that their long-term defeat is already likely can lead them to gamble everything on a single, decisive action, as they feel there is nothing left to lose.
  
  
• Preservation of Honour: Military commanders often hold a strong sense of duty and honour, which can influence their decision-making in difficult situations. The idea of going down fighting in a blaze of glory, rather than slowly succumbing to defeat, can be emotionally appealing and provide a sense of purpose and meaning in the face of adversity.
  
  
• Faith in the fighting spirit: Commanders may believe that the sheer will and determination of their troops can overcome the odds and achieve victory against all expectations. This faith in the fighting spirit can lead them to commit to a course of action that, if successful, could dramatically alter the course of the conflict.
  
  
• The element of surprise: A bold, unexpected move has the potential to catch the enemy off guard and disrupt their plans. Commanders may hope that the audacity of their tactics will create an opportunity for victory that would not have been possible through more conventional means.
  

Within the context of national grand strategy or political ideology, successful utilization of this Selected Approach may depend on a nation's strategic culture, risk tolerance, and approach to the use of military force:

• Strategic culture: These concepts can reflect a nation's strategic culture, which encompasses the historical experiences, traditions, and values that shape its approach to military strategy. For example, Prussian and later German military history is characterized by a preference for bold, decisive action and a willingness to accept high casualties for the potential of achieving a quick victory. This tradition influenced the development of Todesfahrt and Letzter Würfelwurf, which emphasize audacity and risk-taking.
  
  
• Risk tolerance: The acceptance and implementation of Todesfahrt and Letzter Würfelwurf can indicate a nation's risk tolerance in military matters. By committing to high-risk maneuvers and tactics, a nation demonstrates its willingness to gamble on the battlefield, potentially sacrificing short-term stability or long-term sustainability for the chance at a decisive victory.
  
  
• Political ideology: The adoption of these concepts can also reflect the influence of political ideology on military strategy. A nation's political leaders may view warfare through the lens of their ideological convictions, which can in turn shape the strategic choices they make. For example, the aggressive, expansionist ideologies of certain autocratic leaders such as Vladimir Putin may leave them vulnerable to the unexpected use of audacious military tactics, disrupting their political objectives and direction of the war.
  
  
• Emphasis on psychological warfare: Related to the above, the utilization of these concepts indicates an appreciation for the psychological aspects of warfare, as both Todesfahrt and Letzter Würfelwurf rely on the element of surprise and the psychological impact of audacious action. This understanding of psychological warfare may be integrated into a nation's grand strategy, shaping its approach to military operations and diplomacy. Autocratic regimes are more susceptible to psychological warfare due to their totalitarian nature.
  
  
• Civil-military relations: The prominence of these concepts within a nation's military doctrine can reveal insights into civil-military relations, particularly the level of autonomy granted to military commanders. In some cases, political leaders may encourage or even demand the use of high-risk tactics like Todesfahrt and Letzter Würfelwurf, while in other cases, military commanders may independently adopt these concepts based on their professional judgment and understanding of the strategic situation.
  

Well, ladies and gentlemen, that brings us to the halfway point of today's lecture. We've covered a lot of ground, from the terminology and historical case studies to the decision-making criteria for successful operations. I hope you've found this information useful and relevant to your work.

Now, during this break, I encourage you to stretch your legs, grab a cup of coffee, and recharge your batteries for the second half of the lecture. When we come back, we'll be diving into a real-life operational situation and exploring how the concepts we've covered can be applied in practice.

But before we break, I'll leave you with a quick joke to lighten the mood: Why did the operations officer break up with his calculator? Because it couldn't handle his complex operations! (hold for laughs) Enjoy your break, and I'll see you all in 30 minutes.

(Break 30 min)

Welcome back. I hope you've all recovered from the incomprehensible German terminology in the first half by getting some kah-fay in you, (hold for laughs) because now that we're familiar with these concepts, and have briefly addressed their relevance to Op UNIFIER, let's look at the overall strategic situation where a theatre commander would utilize them in his Selected Approach:

The country is facing dire circumstances: a destroyed industrial base, difficulty in providing military supplies and payroll, massive casualties, and the loss of its entire peacetime army and replacement forces. With the navy unable to put to sea, air force crippled, and looming military defeat and potential state collapse, the decision is made to assemble powerful, yet ad hoc, manoeuvre forces composed of foreign equipment, provide only minimal training, and launch a massive spearhead offensive in Winter-Spring, with the intention of reversing the course of the war while sufficient forces are still available in the short term.

While I'm sure many of you are thinking of Op UNIFIER, this description was a little misleading. You see, it also applies to the case studies we opened with: Michael, Wacht am Rhein and Frühlingserwachen. While Ukraine differs in being a free and open democratic society, supported by the European Community and NATO, the strategic situation the Armed Forces of Ukraine are presently in bears more than a passing resemblance to those where one last throw of the dice was attempted, and heavy forces went out on a death ride that would prove to be the last large scale offensive conducted in that theatre.

Let's recap planning considerations in the generic scenario:

• Desperation: With no other viable options, the leaders may feel that a high-risk, all-or-nothing attack is the only way to salvage their situation and avoid a complete collapse. They may believe that even if the chances of success are slim, the alternative is certain defeat.
  
  
• Psychological impact: Launching a bold, unexpected offensive could have a significant psychological effect on the enemy, potentially causing confusion, disrupting their plans, and lowering their morale. This psychological impact could create opportunities for the country to exploit, perhaps enabling them to regain lost territory or buy time to regroup and rebuild.
  
  
• Rallying support: A daring offensive may inspire and rally the nation's population, boosting morale and generating a sense of unity and purpose in the face of adversity. This renewed sense of determination could help bolster the country's ability to endure the conflict, even if the military operation itself is not successful.
  
  
• International attention: By committing to a high-risk maneuver, the country may attract international attention and potentially garner additional support or aid from allies. If the operation were to succeed, it could also serve as a demonstration of the country's resilience and determination to continue fighting, potentially swaying the opinions of other nations.
  

Op UNIFIER and other efforts by the International Community to support the Rules-Based International Order through military assistance to Ukraine clearly demonstrate the importance of international support to ongoing military operations, and the ability of a free and democratic nation to inspire the world through their continued resistance and fighting spirit. An offensive operation that destabilizes the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will likely pay dividends through the psychological impact on an authoritarian autocratic regime such as Vladimir Putin's. In combination, these factors may cause the Russian Federation to exit the war and restore Ukraine's internationally recognized 1991 borders. Given these are the desired Ends for theatre commanders and national leadership, and NATO and international partners have provided the Means, a bold offensive manoeuvre is a suitable Way to bring these results about.

Let's conclude with a short staff assessment, incorporating the above lessons:

Introduction
The following staff assessment examines NATO's operational planning for an upcoming Ukrainian offensive. The purpose of this assessment is to analyze the strategic implications of the planned offensive, taking into consideration the concepts of Todesfahrt and Letzter Würfelwurf, and to evaluate the potential consequences of such an operation in the context of the ongoing attritional conflict.

Overview of the Current Situation
Ukraine finds itself in a precarious situation, facing a powerful adversary in a long, attritional conflict. The country's industrial base has been destroyed, its military forces have suffered heavy casualties, and it now relies entirely on foreign aid for military equipment, ammunition, and state payroll. In response to these challenges, Ukraine is assembling 9 brigades of donated equipment of various types, providing only 30 days of training, and planning to launch a massive spearhead offensive in April.

Analysis of Todesfahrt and Letzter Würfelwurf Concepts
The case study presents several indicators that the Ukrainian offensive aligns with the concepts of Todesfahrt and Letzter Würfelwurf:

Force composition and equipment: The Ukrainian forces are in the process of assembling a significant offensive force, composed of nine brigades with a diverse range of equipment, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), armored personnel carriers (APCs), and artillery. The mix of equipment suggests that nearly all serviceable and available Ukrainian equipment has been provided by NATO countries, as Ukrainian forces have suffered considerable attrition and depletion of their pre-war stocks. The force composition also indicates a rapid mobilization and training effort, raising questions about the overall combat effectiveness of these newly-formed units.

This is based on reported equipment and manpower changes in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which can be described as having four iterations:

1. First iteration: Destruction of the initial (peacetime) Ukrainian army (until April 2022).
   
2. Second iteration: Destruction of the rebuilt Ukrainian army equipped with Western light equipment (defeated by the end of July 2022).
   
3. Third iteration: Soldiers trained abroad and equipped with weapons from countries with old Soviet stockpiles (attrited through January 2023).
   
4. Fourth iteration: A mix of professional and conscripted personnel, currently being formed with NATO equipment.
   

Operational planning: The planning documents suggest that the Ukrainian forces are preparing for an offensive, with varying levels of training and equipment readiness among the brigades. The strategic objectives of the offensive are not explicitly detailed, but they could include regaining lost territory, disrupting enemy operations, or achieving a more favorable negotiating position. The operational planning also reveals gaps in knowledge about the exact strength and disposition of Ukrainian forces, leading to a wide range of estimates regarding their combat capabilities.

Political context: The conflict has put immense pressure on the Ukrainian leadership, with President Zelensky seemingly needing to maintain the support of NATO and project an image of resolve. This political pressure could be a driving force behind the decision to launch an offensive, even if the military situation is uncertain. Furthermore, reports of tension between the SBU and the Ukrainian General Staff suggests a complex interplay of actors with potentially differing objectives and priorities.

The role of NATO: NATO's support for Ukraine is evident in the provision of equipment and logistical aid, including Op UNIFIER. However, the information provided also highlights a lack of visibility into the internal workings of the partner Ukrainian military and intelligence apparatus, which could hinder NATO's ability to accurately assess the situation on the ground and make informed decisions regarding their support and strategy.

The opposing force: The Russian forces, despite some estimates of their losses, continue to maintain a presence in the conflict. The exact size and capabilities of their forces are not entirely clear, but it is likely that they have also suffered attrition and would need to maintain a steady flow of reinforcements and supplies to continue the fight. The information provided also mentions the use of long-range rockets and guided bombs, indicating a significant level of Russian firepower remains a threat in theatre.

In this situation, a planned offensive by the Ukrainian forces can be seen as both a Todesfahrt (death ride) and a Letzter Würfelwurf (last roll of the dice) due to the circumstances and assumptions we have discussed previously.

Todesfahrt refers to an action undertaken with the awareness that it will likely lead to significant loss and destruction, with little hope for success. The offensive by the fourth iteration of the Ukrainian army, a mix of professional and conscripted soldiers, demonstrates this concept for several reasons:

• Depleted resources: The Ukrainian army has been through several iterations, and its manpower and equipment have been heavily depleted. A new offensive would involve significant risks, as the remaining forces are a mix of incompatible equipment and potentially demoralized conscripts. However, if no action is taken, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be further attrited by Russian firepower, which has negative implications for the long term strategic outlook.
  
  
• High casualty rates: It has been reported that within Ukraine some believe soldiers who are drafted face a high likelihood of death, injury, or capture. Offensive operations would push the remaining soldiers into a battle with a high risk of failure and loss. That may complicate the morale situation within the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Conversely, boldly taking the fight to the enemy may restore their fighting spirit. Weighing the casualties sustained over the short term through offensive operations against those sustained in the long term through attrition from superior Russian fires is at the heart of the present strategic dilemma.
  
  
• Limited strategic gains: Even if the offensive were to achieve some level of success, the overall strategic situation remains dire for Ukraine. Reports suggests that Russia's goal is the full physical annihilation of the Ukrainian army as a coherent fighting force, and it is unlikely that a single offensive by depleted forces would be able to alter this outcome significantly. Aggressive manoeuvre by Ukrainian forces, even if successful, does not satisfactorily resolve the preponderance of firepower possessed by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
  

Letzter Würfelwurf, or the last roll of the dice, refers to a desperate and final attempt to change the course of events when the situation appears bleak. The planned offensive can be seen as such an attempt due to the following factors:

• Last available forces: While reporting is hazy, there is some reason to believe that the fourth iteration of the Ukrainian army represents the last mobilizable pool of manpower available to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The planned offensive could be seen, therefore, as a final desperate attempt to utilize the remaining human resources in an effort to alter the course of the war before the manpower situation becomes critical.
  
  
• The motivation factor: The continued weapon deliveries from the West, even though they may not impact the outcome of the war in the long term, serve as a motivator for the Ukrainian forces to keep fighting. This offensive, while unlikely to succeed, could be seen as a last-ditch effort to capitalize on the remaining morale and desire to recapture the initiative, made possible while Ukrainian manpower and donated equipment levels are near peak.
  
  
• Tactical vs. strategic objectives: The offensive may focus on achieving tactical objectives, such as inflicting damage on Russian forces or delaying their advance, even if the strategic situation remains unfavorable for Ukraine. In this sense, the offensive represents a final, desperate attempt to extract some value from the remaining forces before the inevitable collapse. An unexpected, bold, and decisive short term victory may be enough to avert long term defeat through attrition. This calculation is at the heart of the Prussian school of military operations.
  

Recommendations

In light of the risks and potential consequences associated with the planned Ukrainian offensive, the following recommendations should be considered:

1. Careful evaluation of the offensive's potential outcomes and their impact on the overall strategic situation.
   
   
2. Exploration of alternative strategies that could achieve similar objectives with fewer risks and casualties.
   
   
3. Increased diplomatic efforts to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict, minimizing the loss of life and resources.
   
   
4. Assessment of the long-term sustainability of Ukraine's military capabilities and the potential need for additional support from allies.
   

The handout will have more details on these recommendations, and what we are looking for in your journal submissions evaluating them.

Excellent. Thank you for your time and attention today gentlemen. We went over some difficult concepts and I appreciate your pah-see-ahn-s with mein German ows-prah-kheh (hold for laughs). I want to end on a positive note. The determination of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has inspired the world, and I have no doubt that whatever their approach, they will be victorious. While in English "Death Ride" sounds pessimistic, you would all do well to remember the Scots Greys at Waterloo, the Cavalry Brigade at Moreuil Wood and the Heavy Brigade at Balaclava. (If Mike or Tim are seated in front row, joke: I hope you Light Horse and Hussars aren't still harbouring any hard feelings about that. Next time, don't bring your light sabers to a cannon fight! Hold for laughs).

I would now like to open the floor for questions,

Frosted Flake posted:

StaffGPT
I would now like to open the floor for questions,

Al-Saqr posted:

yea question in the back how the gently caress do you find time to type all that holy hell