[Ukraine] EU: Nice minister, shame if something were to happen...

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > C-SPAM > [Ukraine] EU: Nice minister, shame if something were to happen...

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AnimeIsTrash: Jun 30, 2018

tazjin posted:

The first five times or so a rabid lib who can't get to nuclear war quickly enough entered the thread were fun, but now I think it's best to just ignore them right away.

theres a guy who posts in cspam who doesnt believe in nuclear war, straight up doesnt believe that countries wouldnt use nukes if threatened

# ? Jul 15, 2023 16:37

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# ? May 25, 2024 04:16

Frosted Flake: Sep 13, 2011; Semper Shitpost Ubique

OctaMurk posted:

every single infantryman on any side of any war ever:

We're outnumbered!! Why wont command support us with all the artillery and poo poo! The enemys weapons are way better than ours and my food sucks!

# ? Jul 15, 2023 16:52

Ardennes: May 12, 2002

OctaMurk posted:

we're still hearing about himars a lot on the internet imo

you go to ukrainian propaganda sources and it is still extremely publicized and they take a lot of video of it shooting and drone video of impacts. it is mostly claimed strikes against russian artillery now.

its just not covered a lot on western media because people get bored of the same story, nor on russian media because its not as devastating after adaptations. but having a big missile hit somethin accurately remains a good weapon even if its not a superweapon.

There are strikes but they are pretty selective and the Ukrainians themselves admit they can�t run strikes continuously. I do think tactics changed from more hardened structures/targets with heavier AD to artillery or supply vehicles since they are relatively soft targets and Russian point defense can�t be everywhere.

That said, if you are launching a entire HIMARS volley to get a single gun or a few trucks, I don�t know if it is exactly the greatest trade considering there is clearly a limited ammo supply. It is better than nothing but at the same time the Ukrainians are utilizing pretty scare resources for each of those �sizzle� videos.

The drones are more acceptable but it is also clear the Russians are getting better at taking them out.

Ardennes has issued a correction as of 17:34 on Jul 15, 2023

# ? Jul 15, 2023 17:06

dead gay comedy forums: Oct 21, 2011

Frosted Flake posted:

*Phone posting

lmao hit me with that advanced industrial grade vyvanse

# ? Jul 15, 2023 17:31

i say swears online: Mar 4, 2005

dead gay comedy forums posted:

lmao hit me with that advanced industrial grade vyvanse

lol

# ? Jul 15, 2023 17:33

Frosted Flake: Sep 13, 2011; Semper Shitpost Ubique

dead gay comedy forums posted:

lmao hit me with that advanced industrial grade vyvanse

I really should time them so it doesn't overlap with mlmp doing his thing and there are 3 pages between when I post them and conversation picking up again.

# ? Jul 15, 2023 17:35

Zeppelin Insanity: Oct 28, 2009; Wahnsinn
Einfach
Wahnsinn

Ardennes posted:

There are strikes but they are pretty selective and the Ukrainians themselves admit they can�t run strikes continuously. I do think tactics changed from more hardened structures/targets with heavier AD to artillery or supply vehicles since they are relatively soft targets and Russian point defense can�t be everywhere.

That said, if you are launching a entire HIMARS volley to get a single gun or a few trucks, I don�t know if it is exactly the greatest trade considering there is clearly a limited ammo supply. It is better than nothing but at the same time the Ukrainians are utilizing pretty scare resources for each of those �sizzle� videos.

The drones are more acceptable but it is also clear the Russians are getting better at taking them out.

They are not launching an entire volley. Both Ukrainian propaganda videos, as well as articles published in American prestige media make it clear that they are so low on ammo, they fire between 1 and 2 missiles per strike, with only a few strikes a week.

This also explains why they still have a few launchers operational. Firing a single rocket and moving immediately is not an easy target, not is it a particularly valuable target outside of the propaganda sphere.

Someone else a little while ago mentioned that the US committed a significant amount of HIMARS. That's not accurate. The package was 12 or 14 launchers. I think there may have been one more supplemental package of a couple more.

There are not a lot of HIMARS around. When Poland bought a few hundred, Lockmart basically said "lol lmao good luck", which led to Poland buying Choonmoos, the benefit of those being that it's really fun to say "Chunmoo".

# ? Jul 15, 2023 17:45

Ardennes: May 12, 2002

There was a recent strike against some tankers that looked like more than a few rockets, the claim it was HIMARS at least, although it may have been just a regular MRLS strike. In the end, they got a tanker or two but one has to wonder if those are the type of �crushing� victories that will win them the war.

Likewise, a lot of videos (both sides do this) are intentionally deceptive through editing or simply re-using old footage. Recently, have seen the same BMP with hatches open taken out in 3-4 different ways with some editing and quick cuts. In addition, if there is a strike on a vehicle and there is a only bunch of smoke but no aftermath footage, I usually ignore it as a near miss doesn�t mean anything. (The tanker video at least showed one of them on fire, at least something happened.)

It is a good reason I have to be skeptical with big claims on these forums about kill videos because they are intentionally deceptive a lot of the time and have been across this war.

Ardennes has issued a correction as of 18:03 on Jul 15, 2023

# ? Jul 15, 2023 17:54

HiroProtagonist: May 7, 2007

lmao oh my goddd they're just bending over backwards for this poo poo now. just noticed the date is june 5th but lol anyway because they just emailed it to me now for some reason
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/05/world/europe/nazi-symbols-ukraine.html
https://web.archive.org/web/20230605090515/https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/05/world/europe/nazi-symbols-ukraine.html

quote:

Nazi Symbols on Ukraine�s Front Lines Highlight Thorny Issues of History
Troops� use of patches bearing Nazi emblems risks fueling Russian propaganda and spreading imagery that the West has spent a half-century trying to eliminate.

By Thomas Gibbons-Neff

KYIV, Ukraine � Since Russia began its invasion of Ukraine last year, the Ukrainian government and NATO allies have posted, then quietly deleted, three seemingly innocuous photographs from their social media feeds: a soldier standing in a group, another resting in a trench and an emergency worker posing in front of a truck.

In each photograph, Ukrainians in uniform wore patches featuring symbols that were made notorious by Nazi Germany and have since become part of the iconography of far-right hate groups.

The photographs, and their deletions, highlight the Ukrainian military�s complicated relationship with Nazi imagery, a relationship forged under both Soviet and German occupation during World War II.

That relationship has become especially delicate because President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has falsely declared Ukraine to be a Nazi state, a claim he has used to justify his illegal invasion.

Ukraine has worked for years through legislation and military restructuring to contain a fringe far-right movement whose members proudly wear symbols steeped in Nazi history and espouse views hostile to leftists, L.G.B.T.Q. movements and ethnic minorities. But some members of these groups have been fighting Russia since the Kremlin illegally annexed part of the Crimea region of Ukraine in 2014 and are now part of the broader military structure. Some are regarded as national heroes, even as the far-right remains marginalized politically.

The iconography of these groups, including a skull-and-crossbones patch worn by concentration camp guards and a symbol known as the Black Sun, now appears with some regularity on the uniforms of soldiers fighting on the front line, including soldiers who say the imagery symbolizes Ukrainian sovereignty and pride, not Nazism.

In the short term, that threatens to reinforce Mr. Putin�s propaganda and giving fuel to his false claims that Ukraine must be �de-Nazified� � a position that ignores the fact that Ukraine�s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is Jewish. More broadly, Ukraine�s ambivalence about these symbols, and sometimes even its acceptance of them, risks giving new, mainstream life to icons that the West has spent more than a half-century trying to eliminate.

�What worries me, in the Ukrainian context, is that people in Ukraine who are in leadership positions, either they don�t or they�re not willing to acknowledge and understand how these symbols are viewed outside of Ukraine,� said Michael Colborne, a researcher at the investigative group Bellingcat who studies the international far right. �I think Ukrainians need to increasingly realize that these images undermine support for the country.�

In a statement, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry said that, as a country that suffered greatly under German occupation, �We emphasize that Ukraine categorically condemns any manifestations of Nazism.�

So far, the imagery has not eroded international support for the war. It has, however, left diplomats, Western journalists and advocacy groups in a difficult position: Calling attention to the iconography risks playing into Russian propaganda. Saying nothing allows it to spread.

Even Jewish groups and anti-hate organizations that have traditionally called out hateful symbols have stayed largely silent. Privately, some leaders have worried about being seen as embracing Russian propaganda talking points.

Questions over how to interpret such symbols are as divisive as they are persistent, and not just in Ukraine. In the American South, some have insisted that today, the Confederate flag symbolizes pride, not its history of racism and secession. The swastika was an important Hindu symbol before it was co-opted by the Nazis.

In April, Ukraine�s Defense Ministry posted a photograph on its Twitter account of a soldier wearing a patch featuring a skull and crossbones known as the Totenkopf, or Death�s Head. The specific symbol in the picture was made notorious by a Nazi unit that committed war crimes and guarded concentration camps during World War II.

The patch in the photograph sets the Totenkopf atop a Ukrainian flag with a small No. 6 below. That patch is the official merchandise of Death in June, a British neo-folk band that the Southern Poverty Law Center has said produces �hate speech� that �exploits themes and images of fascism and Nazism.�

The Anti-Defamation League considers the Totenkopf �a common hate symbol.� But Jake Hyman, a spokesman for the group, said it was impossible to �make an inference about the wearer or the Ukrainian Army� based on the patch.

�The image, while offensive, is that of a musical band,� Mr. Hyman said.

The band now uses the photograph posted by the Ukrainian military to market the Totenkopf patch.

The New York Times asked the Ukrainian Defense Ministry on April 27 about the tweet. Several hours later, the post was deleted. �After studying this case, we came to the conclusion that this logo can be interpreted ambiguously,� the ministry said in a statement.

The soldier in the photograph was part of a volunteer unit called the Da Vinci Wolves, which started as part of the paramilitary wing of Ukraine�s �right sector,� a coalition of right-wing organizations and political parties that militarized after Russia�s illegal annexation of Crimea.

At least five other photographs on the Wolves� Instagram and Facebook pages feature their soldiers wearing Nazi-style patches, including the Totenkopf.

NATO militaries, an alliance that Ukraine hopes to join, do not tolerate such patches. When such symbols have appeared, groups like the Anti-Defamation League have spoken out, and military leaders have reacted swiftly.

Last month, Ukraine�s state emergency services agency posted on Instagram a photograph of an emergency worker wearing a Black Sun symbol, also known as a Sonnenrad, that appeared in the castle of Heinrich Himmler, the Nazi general and SS director. The Black Sun is popular among neo-Nazis and white supremacists.

In March 2022, NATO�s Twitter account posted a photograph of a Ukrainian soldier wearing a similar patch.

[Image] A Ukrainian service member is wearing what appears to be a Black Sun on the chest of her uniform in this photograph published by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on Feb. 14 and on the NATO Twitter account before being deleted. Credit...General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

Both photographs were quickly removed.

In November, during a meeting with Times reporters near the front line, a Ukrainian press officer wore a Totenkopf variation made by a company called R3ICH (pronounced �Reich�). He said he did not believe the patch was affiliated with the Nazis. A second press officer present said other journalists had asked soldiers to remove the patch before taking photographs.

Ihor Kozlovskyi, a Ukrainian historian and religious scholar, said that the symbols had meanings that were unique to Ukraine and should be interpreted by how Ukrainians viewed them, not by how they had been used elsewhere.

�The symbol can live in any community or any history independently of how it is used in other parts of Earth,� Mr. Kozlovskyi said.

Russian soldiers in Ukraine have also been seen wearing Nazi-style patches, underscoring how complicated interpreting these symbols can be in a region steeped in Soviet and German history.

The Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with Germany in 1939, so it was caught by surprise two years later when the Nazis invaded Ukraine, which was then part of the Soviet Union. Ukraine had suffered greatly under a Soviet government that engineered a famine that killed millions. Many Ukrainians initially viewed the Nazis as liberators.

Factions from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and its insurgent army fought alongside the Nazis in what they viewed as a struggle for Ukrainian sovereignty. Members of those groups also took part in atrocities against Jewish and Polish civilians. Later in the war, though, some of the groups fought against the Nazis.

Some Ukrainians joined Nazi military units like the Waffen-SS Galizien. The emblem of the group, which was led by German officers, was a sky-blue patch showing a lion and three crowns. The unit took part in a massacre of hundreds of Polish civilians in 1944. In December, after a yearslong legal battle, Ukraine�s highest court ruled that a government-funded research institute could continue to list the unit�s insignia as excluded from the Nazi symbols banned under a 2015 law.

Today, as a new generation fights against Russian occupation, many Ukrainians see the war as a continuation of the struggle for independence during and immediately after World War II. Symbols like the flag associated with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Galizien patch have become emblems of anti-Russian resistance and national pride.

Image
A Russian volunteer fighter for the Ukrainian Army, center, wearing a Galizien patch and another featuring a Totenkopf in southern Ukraine in 2022.Credit...Ivor Prickett for The New York Times
That makes it difficult to easily separate, on the basis of icons alone, the Ukrainians enraged by the Russian invasion from those who support the country�s far-right groups.

Units like the Da Vinci Wolves, the better-known Azov regiment and others that began with far-right members have been folded into the Ukrainian military, and have been instrumental in defending Ukraine from Russian troops.

The Azov regiment was celebrated after holding out during the siege of the southern city of Mariupol last year. After the commander of the Da Vinci Wolves was killed in March, he received a hero�s funeral, which Mr. Zelensky attended.

�I think some of these far-right units mix a fair bit of their own mythmaking into the public discourse on them,� said Mr. Colborne, the researcher. �But I think the least that can and should be done everywhere, not just Ukraine, is not allowing the far right�s symbols, rhetoric and ideas to seep into public discourse.�

Kitty Bennett and Susan C. Beachy contributed research.

Thomas Gibbons-Neff is a Ukraine correspondent and a former Marine infantryman.

quote:

and a former Marine infantryman.

# ? Jul 15, 2023 17:58

Frosted Flake: Sep 13, 2011; Semper Shitpost Ubique

Is this the one where the academic quoted is a professor of Judeo-Bolshevism?

# ? Jul 15, 2023 18:00

HiroProtagonist: May 7, 2007

Frosted Flake posted:

Is this the one where the academic quoted is a professor of Judeo-Bolshevism?

not sure if you meant this as a joke, but trying to look him up sent me to this actually pretty decent lib blog post on robert scheer's site

https://scheerpost.com/2023/06/13/nyt-on-ukraines-nazi-imagery-its-complicated/

e: bryce greene the author is a journalist for FAIR which is a lib-left org tho i actually dont want to sound like "lib" is a sneer here

HiroProtagonist has issued a correction as of 18:08 on Jul 15, 2023

# ? Jul 15, 2023 18:06

Chillgamesh: Jul 29, 2014

It�s important not to let right-wing symbols *pausing to give a quick heil to Vyacheslav the Jew Slayer�s monument* seep into our discourse

# ? Jul 15, 2023 18:08

stephenthinkpad: Jan 2, 2020

Wait Ukraine didn't get a lot of HYMARS launchers? I read somewhere Ukraine has shot around 10k himars rockets. So that number is false?

# ? Jul 15, 2023 18:18

sum: Nov 15, 2010

Considering this was even published in the first place, it looks like the White House is telling Zelensky to shut up and the lose war quietly.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/07/13/zelensky-ukraine-nato-invitation/

quote:

Zelensky�s angry tweet on NATO membership nearly backfired

The Ukrainian president�s fiery response to NATO�s conditions-based pledge in Vilnius touched off a scramble � and brief consideration of watering down what Kyiv would be offered, officials said

JAKARTA, Indonesia � Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky�s confrontational tweet this week challenging NATO leaders on the glacial pace of his war-torn country�s admission into the alliance so roiled the White House that U.S. officials involved with the process considered scaling back the �invitation� for Kyiv to join, according to six people familiar with the matter.

Ultimately, the United States and its allies agreed they would preserve the declaration�s language as eventually presented Tuesday at the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. The declaration lacks a timeline for Ukraine�s membership into the bloc but was the product of hard-won efforts to move the Biden administration and other European leaders to grant more-specific offers to Kyiv amid Russia�s ongoing invasion.

The incident illustrates the frustration inside NATO with Zelensky�s pressure tactics, where even some of his strongest backers questioned this week whether he was serving Ukraine�s interests with his outburst. At the same time, the backroom scramble it set off shows how little the alliance can do about it: NATO nations are all-in on the war effort, and many member states remain deeply sympathetic to Zelensky�s demands for a deeper level of support. And while many officials expressed annoyance with the tweet, there was an understanding that the leader of an embattled nation must demonstrate he will do anything to extract the maximum on behalf of his people.

Zelensky�s missive, launched as NATO leaders were gathering for the two-day summit, denounced as �unprecedented and absurd� what was then a draft of the membership language.

The Ukrainian leader�s public rebuke of the alliance stunned those assembled in the summit venue, an exposition hall on the outskirts of the Lithuanian capital, leaving the U.S. delegation �furious,� according to one official familiar with the situation. Like others, the person spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive talks.

Ambassadors, ministers and other senior policymakers held informal talks about how the alliance should respond. U.S. officials raised the possibility of revisiting or striking the passage to which Zelensky had so forcefully objected: �We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met,� according to European officials involved in the negotiations.

Although Washington has given Kyiv billions of dollars worth of military aid and other support since the war began early last year, President Biden has favored a cautious approach, fearful that doing too much too quickly could risk escalating the crisis and drawing NATO into direct conflict with Russia. Biden attended the Vilnius summit with his secretary of state, Antony Blinken, who has traveled on to Jakarta, Indonesia, for a meeting of foreign ministers from Southeast Asia.

At a summit in Bucharest, Romania, in 2008, Ukraine and Georgia were offered eventual NATO membership, provided they fulfilled a slew of requirements first. Ukrainians complain that 15 years later, they are still facing a host of reform demands, many of which aren�t specific.

A U.S. official familiar with the conversations acknowledged that revisions to the declaration had been considered, saying the Biden administration was sensitive to Zelensky�s concerns and had hoped they might address them somehow.

Three other senior policymakers, however, two of whom were direct participants in the talks, said their strong perception was that the United States was getting ready to water down the document�s language � to make it less welcoming to a speedy Ukrainian accession to the alliance.

�Some wanted to withdraw the reference to �invitation,�� or find another place to put that word, said one of the senior policymakers, a NATO diplomat who took part in the talks.

Spokespeople for the White House and the Ukrainian presidency did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Another senior NATO diplomat who took part in the frantic negotiations said that, although �several people� supported removing the phrasing that had upset Zelensky, the U.S. delegation �did not specifically want to take that promise� of an invitation out of the declaration. There was a consensus that reworking the document would delay its release and, �in the end, those most concerned about the Ukrainian reaction came to the conclusion that it would be better to stick with the text� as drafted.

�It sends a very clear and strong message,� this person said, �both to Ukraine and Russia.�

French President Emmanuel Macron, backed by the Central European and Baltic nations, pushed to keep the language originally agreed upon. Those leaders saw it as the strongest possible offer to Ukraine given reluctance by the United States, Germany and others to go further for fear that doing so would draw the alliance into a direct confrontation with Russia. NATO leaders also announced wide-ranging packages of military assistance for Kyiv.

�We landed. The outcome was the best possible,� the diplomat said.

By the time NATO ambassadors formally discussed how to respond to Zelensky�s tweet, the United States was back on board with the declaration�s original wording, the policymakers said.

Inside the leaders� room, there was more back and forth with advisers than is typical for these types of highly scripted summits, officials said. At one point, the White House national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, entered the room and pulled Biden away from the table, appearing to be talking the president through something, one official said.

Zelensky later softened his tone, expressing gratitude during the in-person meetings in Vilnius and urging for as speedy a Ukrainian accession to the alliance as possible.

On Wednesday, a day after the tense negotiations, the head of Zelensky�s presidential office, Andriy Yermak, was observed having an intense conversation with Sullivan during the first meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council, a newly established consultative body created for Ukraine to convene NATO ambassadors and discuss its security concerns.

Yermak, said one person who witnessed the conversation, appeared as though he was trying to argue. Sullivan, this person said, �looked determined.� The exchange lasted about 30 minutes.

The tense effort to hold the line on Ukraine�s behalf left some of Kyiv�s strongest advocates exhausted and exasperated.

�It was not fun,� said a senior NATO policymaker familiar with the talks.

# ? Jul 15, 2023 18:25

dead gay comedy forums: Oct 21, 2011

Frosted Flake posted:

I really should time them so it doesn't overlap with mlmp doing his thing and there are 3 pages between when I post them and conversation picking up again.

hahahaha

Seriously though, good take. Sure, we get to understand in abstract, but definite examples and commentary from the respective audience gives it a whole new level. From that angle, coming at it from political economy, I think the neoliberal MIC might very well be the best example of why capitalism is about market expansion and profits first and foremost, about commodification: absurd quantities of money are mobilized in R&D and production for equipment that fails to deliver because the point is not the gear, but the profit.

I don't remember where I read it; it was a commentary on military industrial capability, not only on production and organization, but also quality. It mentioned how the UK went from the Lee-Enfield, a tremendously reliable rifle (please correct me if it is the case because I am a total layman here and I am just going iirc) to their present service rifle which was a whole comedy shitshow.

The gist of the argument was simple: the MIC doesn't win wars. Not having decisive control over the specific means of production causes the society and the state to not have the ability to exercise the political economy of war. This is, imho, the "cognitive/ideological disjunction" that many people (especially the military on the ground) have about why the gently caress they are stuck on a quagmire. It's the same thing on other social spheres under capitalism: that intuitive feel that we do have the resources to solve the problem, why it doesn't happen?

It seems to me that military experience causes that effect in a much higher degree because violence makes alienation much more explicit. Like, there are rivers of money on this, why the gently caress there is lovely, defective gear etc. Without the ability of a political economy of war, there is no way to have a resolutive approach: to organize and direct that money, those resources, into actually fulfilling a war to the best possible (or least worst) outcome.

# ? Jul 15, 2023 18:28

Ardennes: May 12, 2002

stephenthinkpad posted:

Wait Ukraine didn't get a lot of HYMARS launchers? I read somewhere Ukraine has shot around 10k himars rockets. So that number is false?

Supposedly, a lot of that supply was front loaded around the Kherson offensive and mysteriously the number of strikes has rapidly decreased to the point they will only do a few fire missions a day.

# ? Jul 15, 2023 18:29

BearsBearsBears: Aug 4, 2022

stephenthinkpad posted:

Wait Ukraine didn't get a lot of HYMARS launchers? I read somewhere Ukraine has shot around 10k himars rockets. So that number is false?

Ukraine got 20 launchers and thousands(?) of GMLRS guided rockets. Each guided rocket costs a bit over $100,000. I don't know how many normal unguided rockets Ukraine has received or shot for the HIMARS, or if they got any at all.

https://www.defensenews.com/land/2021/03/30/lockheed-scores-12b-contract-to-build-us-armys-guided-rocket-on-heels-of-extended-range-test/
https://www.csis.org/analysis/rebuilding-us-inventories-six-critical-systems

BearsBearsBears has issued a correction as of 18:37 on Jul 15, 2023

# ? Jul 15, 2023 18:33

OctaMurk: Jun 21, 2013

arms procurement is like if gilette made tons of razors but hardly any razor cartridges

# ? Jul 15, 2023 18:36

stephenthinkpad: Jan 2, 2020

You can't smuggle these himars rockets to the ME market right? Ukraine must have shot a few thousands of the rockets.

If the US is only willing to give 20 launchers, how many F16 are they willing to give?

# ? Jul 15, 2023 18:42

Ardennes: May 12, 2002

The US donated 20 HIMARS but 10 other similar launchers (M270s) were donated by other NATO countries along with other Soviet era MRLS systems that have been donated or Ukraine has previously. It gets a bit murky.

So far the US has promised zero f-16s.

# ? Jul 15, 2023 18:44

Third World Reagan: May 19, 2008; Imagine four 'mechs waiting in a queue. Time works the same way.

has ukraine gotten nato rations yet

can we watch someone rate the ukranian rations on youtube

# ? Jul 15, 2023 18:49

genericnick: Dec 26, 2012

stephenthinkpad posted:

You can't smuggle these himars rockets to the ME market right? Ukraine must have shot a few thousands of the rockets.

If the US is only willing to give 20 launchers, how many F16 are they willing to give?

I mean, it seems pretty obvious that the number of launchers is not the limiting factor. There's just nothing to launch.

# ? Jul 15, 2023 18:50

Deadly Ham Sandwich: Aug 19, 2009; Smellrose

Lpzie posted:

i read it all FF, thank you!

If FF posts were a little longer, they would be a novella.

# ? Jul 15, 2023 18:51

Frosted Flake: Sep 13, 2011; Semper Shitpost Ubique

dead gay comedy forums posted:

I don't remember where I read it; it was a commentary on military industrial capability, not only on production and organization, but also quality. It mentioned how the UK went from the Lee-Enfield, a tremendously reliable rifle (please correct me if it is the case because I am a total layman here and I am just going iirc) to their present service rifle which was a whole comedy shitshow.

Weapon of Choice, the book on the MIC and contemporary small arms development.

Weapon of Choice posted:

Into Africa with the FN Minimi LMG

At 07:00 on September 10, 2000, elements of Britain�s 1st Battalion, the Parachute Regiment (1 PARA), began their assault on positions held by a gang known as the West Side Boys in Magbeni, Sierra Leone. Armed with SA80s, several belt-fed 7.62mm GPMGs, and various other combat equipment, the soldiers jumped from the back of hovering Chinooks and landed chest-deep into a swamp. Despite knowing they would land in marshy terrain, the troops of 1 PARA didn't expect to carry their weapons above their heads as they struggled to get to dry ground. Once out of the swamp, the objective was to support the SAS as they rescued members of the Royal Irish Regiment held hostage by the gang. Now carrying link ammunition covered in mud and grime, the GPMGs were susceptible to stoppages at inconvenient moments. Nevertheless, the professional and well-trained soldiers of 1 PARA were up to the task of suppressing opposition from the West Side Boys.

Although the Paras recovered from their initial surprise of landing in a swamp, it begs the question of why they chose to carry heavy and cumbersome equipment like the GPMG into the close and difficult terrain around Magbeni. It's easy to question such a decision as a civilian analyst, but without direct experience or professional military skills, it's hard to judge what might be the most appropriate for any given engagement.
Soldiers have first-hand experience and can understand the situation they faced. Still, the decision to carry the GPMG poses an interesting set of tactical and technical questions about 1 PARA�s preferences. In relation to Sierra Leone, there were several practical considerations that influenced weapon selection. Lighter 5.56mm support weapons like the belt-fed FN Minimi or SA80 LSW may not have been available or deemed insufficiently reliable. The choice of the GPMG, however, not only reveals something about how soldiers interpreted the tactical situation but also how choices had been constructed in the first place.

From a soldier's perspective, the first challenge lies in the professional desire to do the job and do it properly. The soldier's skill in fieldcraft and weapons handling is directly related to this sentiment. The goal is not only to carry out the technical aspects of the job correctly but also to do it with some 'style'. To achieve this in battle, a place of intense chaos and sensory overload, requires immense psychological and physical strength. As Robert Mason suggests, the act of doing something can create a sense of control. Technologies that support this desire to take action provide soldiers with the opportunity to master events rather than be subject to them.

Set in this context, the central challenge of this chapter is to demonstrate how technological choices not only reflect a tactical situation but also reveal the different forces that shape and distort the way users think about weapons. In this regard, the one group we have yet to consider, who still retain the power to influence choice, includes those working in industry. Industry�s ability to shape the rifle choices made by soldiers is based not only on its direct influence but also on how the needs of the infantry are managed and their technological imaginations configured.

Lukes' discussion of power considers how powerful actors guide the choices of free agents by producing a false consciousness. Unlike critical or Marxist scholars, Lukes attempts to maintain the idea that individuals can express their agency and contribute to co-constructing various outcomes. While some scholars argue that Lukes' third dimension of power is 'illiberal and paternalistic', Ian Shapiro suggests that we can only determine if this dimension of power is at work by empirically showing 'when, where, how and why' interests are manipulated. This makes it easier to identify when actors are subject to false consciousness, which might lead Lukes' discussion of power considers the way that powerful actors guide the choices of free agents through the creation of a false consciousness. Unlike critical or Marxist scholars, Lukes strives to uphold the notion that individuals themselves can exhibit their agency and participate in co-constructing various outcomes. While some scholars argue that Luke's third dimension of power is 'illiberal and paternalistic', Ian Shapiro counters that the only way to verify if this dimension of power is active is by delving into an empirical account to demonstrate 'when, where, how, and why' interests are manipulated. This then enables a clearer view of when actors are under the sway of false consciousness, such that they might act against their real interests.  In a complex selection environment such as that associated with small arms, it would be overly simplistic to suggest that soldiers' perspectives were directly manipulated by the industry. Instead, the attention of the infantry can be diverted towards solutions that favor certain regiments or sections of the Army, but these solutions may not benefit the entire force and might not necessarily reflect the broader interests of the armed forces. This mode of analysis acknowledges that the user community is not a monolith but comprises a variety of constituencies. As we'll explore in this chapter, a more nuanced approach to shaping user preferences recognizes this and then capitalizes on it by appealing to a soldier�s professionalism and their desire for status. From a material perspective, this can be observed in the way soldiers increasingly seek to customize their kit and weapons to make them uniquely their own.  While the activity of shaping technological choice might simply be interpreted as industry marketing its wares to potential consumers, industry�s framing of the Army�s weapon choices typically draws upon and reinforces an underlying desire for status among different military communities. In this respect, the industry has long recognized that the key to selling equipment is not merely to demonstrate that it 'does the job,' but also that it 'looks the part.' In many ways, then, arms manufacturers are doing much the same as any other purveyor of technology: trying to create weapons that reinforce the social standing of one group relative to that of another in order to increase the appeal of their brand of design. Professional armies want to appear as though they have professional-level gear. As I will argue in this chapter, the industry�s key recruits in this process are the elite regiments of an army. To demonstrate how this works in practice, the focus is on one case study: the British Army, the SA80, and the adoption of Fabrique Nationale�s Minimi Light Machine Gun.

In an effort to demonstrate how a variety of factors have brought about the conditions in which private industry can exploit the infantry�s desire for control and performing the job properly, this chapter is divided into three parts. The first part describes how the traditional relationship between the British Army and its historic supplier of armaments, the government-owned ordnance factories, unraveled during the rollout of the SA80. With the Army having lost all trust in engineers and the procurement system, the second part shows how the Army asserted itself in the replacement of the Light Support Weapon. This part illustrates how combat experience and unit status have become dominant arbiters in the selection of weapons at the expense of scientists and engineers applying analytical and statistical techniques.

The final part explores the values of the contemporary British infantry to show how arms manufacturers can exploit these preferences. Particularly, by contextualizing how British soldiers define 'Gucci kit' within a broader cultural framework, the way arms manufacturers influence the buying preferences of the infantry is revealed. Thus, in this final part, we will see how Lukes� third dimension of power has relevance for exploring the way the industry has helped to create the needs of the soldier.

The changing soldier-engineer relationship and the privatization of Royal Ordnance

As we�ve seen in previous chapters, the process by which users have defined their requirements has been contested and open to interpretation. However, equipment has always undergone a range of tests and evaluations to ensure that it meets the stated requirement. The tests are important because they represent a point at which different technical imperatives are mediated. At the same time, even as engineers and scientists try to skew a test to put their particular technologies in the best possible light, they must work to maintain the idea that the whole exercise is neutral and objective. By doing so, they legitimize the findings from the trials, build confidence in the decision-making process, and underline the suitability of a specific technology. Maintaining the neutrality of those conducting the test is therefore of great importance for everyone involved in technology development, from users to engineers to industry.

In the contemporary British Army, the testing and evaluation of infantry equipment is managed and undertaken by the Infantry Trials and Development Unit (ITDU). Formally named the ITDU in 1968, the unit can trace its origins back to before the First World War when it was part of the Experimental Establishment at the School of Musketry, Hythe. Now based at Warminster, the ITDU is a small organization made up of a select group of officers and men with technical skills�for example, in marksmanship or as armorers�that, until a recent reorganization of the Army in 2010, traditionally reported to the director of infantry. It is this unit that now offers a technical perspective on the worthiness of Nonetheless, it was not until the mid-1990s that infantry officers at the Ministry of Defence began to actively change the balance of small arms in the Infantry Company and started to fight more assertively for resources in comparison to the other branches of the Army. In their efforts, they could rely on the support of what remained of the British government�s civil service engineering and scientific community. However, the ability of these specialists to offer the kind of independent advice that they would have provided to their predecessors was curtailed by the procurement initiatives developed by McKinsey management consultants and introduced into the MOD in 1998.

Smart Procurement, as these initiatives were known, attempted to integrate private industry and public procurement teams into partnerships. As a result, those government engineers and scientists who might previously have taken a more independent perspective on weapon selection, and whose views might have even been decisive in previous years, had to maintain their position in the context of partnership with industry. Independent engineering and scientific experts thus found themselves caught between the demands of the infantry and the ambitions of an industry and consulting market that had access to the sorts of resources and capabilities that no longer existed within government post-privatization. This fundamentally altered the balance of relationships between the user community and industry, forcing experts in the civil service to fight to get heard. By 2012, it was revealed that 60 per cent of all engineering support provided to Britain�s armed forces came from outsourced agencies. Thus the trend was towards greater industry involvement at the expense of providing independent advice to both users and taxpayers. This is set to continue with the government�s ongoing attempt to introduce more privatisation to the MOD�s Defence Equipment and Support organisation.

However, it had not always been the case that users and government would rely on the private provision of industry advice. Traditionally, the RSAF would manufacture the weapons that the War Office chose, but as the manufactory did not have a design department, it was not responsible for weapon design. Instead, during the nineteenth century, the War Office established various Small Arms Committees made up of officers and the RSAF�s superintendent who would evaluate submissions from weapon designers. Nominally given the rank of colonel in the Army, the RSAF superintendent would establish the design implications of a weapon from the perspective of production. It was only following the outbreak of the Second World War that a formal department dedicated to small arms design properly emerged, not within the RSAF itself, but within the Ministry of Supply. After 1958, this design function was severely reduced for weapon evaluation purposes only and relocated from its wartime location in Cheshunt to Enfield. Lacking the depth of design expertise that had been marshalled during the Second World War, it was eventually this group of RSAF engineers�most notably including Ted Hance, a trainee apprentice working with Noel Kent-Lemon during the development of the EM-2�that were responsible for coming up with the Enfield Weapon System (EWS). This prototype system was eventually renamed the Small Arms post-1980 or the SA80, Individual Weapon (IW i.e. the rifle) and Light Support Weapon (LSW)."

In 1984, the Royal Small Arms Factory (RSAF) was made a division of the newly renamed Royal Ordnance Factories (ROF), which had been set up as a new state-owned company. This new company was formally given both the intellectual property rights to the SA80 and a contract to produce the first batch of the weapon before full privatisation. With the government keen to ensure that the spin-off of the ROF was a success, ministers subsequently took the decision to prevent foreign contractors bidding for the second batch production run of the SA80, a competition that would be held before the formal sale of the ROF. This excluded H&K and FN from bidding for the work and allowed the government to claim that it was protecting British manufacturing. This move was, however, clearly also designed to make it impossible for any other British contractor to make a credible bid for the second batch contract for SA80.

What was clear, however, was that the government could not be sure that the taxpayer was getting value for money out of the second batch tender process. Consequently, after the government announced the winner of the competition in February 1987, Treasury civil servants wrote to the MOD complaining that the MOD had not followed the due process for running a public tender. In practice, however, as one senior civil servant observed, �the Minister (of Defence Procurement) [Lord Trefgarne] was not anxious to see RO [Royal Ordnance] undercut by a bid with a substantial foreign content since this would undoubtedly prejudice a successful float ��

The government�s decision to protect British industry thus ensured that a privately owned ROF would have a second batch contract to produce the SA80, significantly increasing the potential value of the business. Indeed, James Edmiston, the former director of Britain�s Sterling Armament Company, was clear in his criticism when he noted that, by excluding foreign competition, the ROF�a company that had already invested �100 million in the SA80�would be left in the prime spot for winning the second batch contract. At the same time, ministers were aware that British Aerospace was interested in purchasing ROF. What ministers could not be sure of, however, was whether BAE wanted to get into the small arms business. Fearful that the RSAF at Enfield was not capable of turning a profit, given the second batch contract that the ROF had signed with the government, BAE subsequently asked for time to review the deal and figure out their business strategy before deciding on whether to honour the tender process. After agreeing to sell the ROF to BAE in April 1987, the government subsequently allowed the company a further two and a half month grace period to decide whether they would take on the SA80 second batch contract. By mid-July, BAE told the government they would honour the second batch contract but that they would close Enfield and move the whole manufactory to a new �state of the art� plant in Nottingham.

During much of the 1980s, Enfield�s workforce had been aware that their jobs were unlikely to survive privatisation. As privatisation approached, however, workers felt increasingly demoralised, leading some to conclude that the government had left Enfield �shattered as a working community�. This sentiment came to a head following the formal sale of ROF and the announced closure of Enfield. The state of the art plant in Nottingham took a new approach to the production of the SA80. This new approach did not, however, demand a particularly large or skilled workforce. Consequently, the RSAF Apprentices Scheme, a scheme that had produced some of Britain�s most highly skilled craftsmen, was abandoned and the number of workers dropped from 1,200 at Enfield to just 475 at Nottingham.

In the late 70s and early 80s, the configuration of the SA80, a British family of 5.56mm small arms, underwent a number of revisions following the 1979�80 NATO Standardisation Trials. The designers had anticipated that the weapon might have to fire 5.56mm ammunition as directed by the General Staff Requirement. However, they did not foresee that the adopted ammunition would not be the existing American M193 standard, but a new Belgian design. Consequently, the SA80 system had to be recalibrated to accommodate this new NATO standard, the Belgian SS109.

Complicating matters, British ammunition was traditionally loaded with a propellant that had a different burn rate to the Belgian design. These changes in ammunition meant the SA80 would need further recalibration, or a decision would be made to ignore NATO standards in favour of British ammunition.
Meanwhile, the British Army was eager to replace the Self-Loading Rifle (SLR), a weapon that had been in service since 1957 and was becoming expensive to maintain. With the SA80 nearing completion, the Army was reluctant to allocate more funds towards refurbishing the aging SLRs. However, changes in ammunition standards delayed the weapon�s 'In Service Date', as engineers worked to adjust various parts.
When the SA80 finally passed the Acceptance Board in 1984, the Army was eager to introduce it into service and award the Tranche 1 production contract to the RSAF, hoping to maintain a longstanding relationship with a community of expert engineers.

However, problems related to the demoralisation of workers at Enfield and the transition to the new Nottingham plant were still present, leading to the SA80's introduction before these issues were resolved. As a result, Tranche 1 weapons produced at Enfield were reportedly less reliable than Tranche 2 weapons produced at Nottingham. Due to lesser contractual liabilities associated with Tranche 1 failure, BAE decided to start delivering weapons against Tranche 2 before finishing the Tranche 1 contract.

With the MOD deciding to undertake an early, phased roll-out of the SA80 system, further design changes were identified once the weapon reached its users. Making these changes while new weapons were still coming off the production line was complicated by BAE's decision to start delivering Tranche 2 and by the fact that the ROF owned the design rights to the weapon. As a result, the Army had to implement special measures to ensure that they had enough of the right iteration of the SA80 ready for the First Gulf War in 1990�1.

The production challenges with the SA80 were gradually being addressed, but the unexpected deployment of the British Army to the Gulf War highlighted several issues related to the use of SS 109 5.56 ammunition manufactured to NATO standards. The Ordnance Board had previously identified numerous reliability issues with the SA80, such as the problem of sand ingress, which was a significant challenge in the desert environment of Kuwait. This issue was further complicated by the Army�s procurement of additional wartime ammunition produced by Belgian and Swiss manufacturers.

The ammunition made to Belgian and NATO standards used ball powders instead of tubular cut powders. The ball powders had a faster burn rate, altering the SA80 system's cyclic rate, which could lead to increased wear and tear on the internal components and potential breakage. While the possibility of modifying the gas port was explored, the MOD was unwilling to recall the SA80 for comprehensive design evaluation, and thus the weapon continued its phased rollout.

The General Staff, however, was not satisfied with this situation. They were already dealing with an ageing SLR and now had to grapple with the new ammunition issues of the SA80. This was further complicated by the government's drive to prove that privatisating the Royal Ordnance Factories (ROFs) was successful. As part of cost-saving measures, the Defence Procurement Agency signed a five-year agreement, known as the Explosives Propellants and Related Products (EPREP) deal, with the ROF. Despite the difficulties in transitioning to a new ammunition standard, the government decided to continue the supply of tubular cut ammunition for the time being.

During the Gulf War, non-British ammunition was used in the SA80, but luckily, the weapon was seldom used in combat, preventing serious issues from arising due to the change in NATO standards. Still, reports of the weapon's poor reliability, such as bayonets breaking and issues with sand ingress, surfaced in the media. As a result, the SA80 and the privatisation of the ROF came under close public scrutiny.

After the Gulf War, the issues with the SA80 continued, notably those concerning the transition from British to NATO ammunition standards. The Defence Select Committee recommended that the government seek compensation from BAE Systems for poor workmanship and late delivery of weapons. This led to a legal battle between the government and BAE, eventually resulting in an out-of-court settlement in 1994.
The Army continued to alter the weapon's gas operating system to manage its cyclic rate, but these modifications were inconclusive. If the issue with the new SS109 ammunition was to be solved, changes to the SA80 would have to be paid for by the government.

In October 1997, a Reliability and Interoperability Programme was established in the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA), commissioning Heckler & Koch (H&K), the Design Authority for the SA80 after being acquired by British Aerospace, to investigate the inconsistent reliability of the SA80. This occurred alongside ongoing concerns within NATO about the impact the SA80 was having on ammunition types being submitted for qualification.

This series of events highlights the complexities and challenges that can arise when introducing new military equipment and adjusting to new standards, particularly in the context of changing political, operational, and industrial circumstances.

The issues with the SA80 led to a proposal to remove the weapon from the NATO Nominated Weapons List in 1997. However, Lieutenant Colonel Tony Thornburn, the UK head of delegation, persuaded the sub-group to only temporarily suspend the SA80 from the list. He asked all members present to keep this decision confidential until the UK could come up with a plan of action. The Ministry of Defence had already commissioned Heckler & Koch (H&K) to investigate the design and reliability of the SA80 and propose improvements.

During the subsequent investigation, H&K fired two million rounds of mostly non-NATO qualified ammunition through a modified weapon to prove its reliability. The Infantry Trials and Development Unit (ITDU) then fired an additional one million rounds to confirm the success of the modifications. The Mid-Life Upgrade program for the SA80, implemented after the election of the Labour government in 1997, became more acceptable within the MOD.

In 2001, the updated SA80A2 was finally rolled out, nearly three decades after the original design specifications had been approved. Both the SA80 Individual Weapon and Light Support Weapon proved successful, demonstrating that the original design might have worked if the issues had been systematically addressed. The �95 million upgrade improved the weapon's reliability in sandy conditions to 95%, making it more reliable than many other service weapons used by major armies worldwide, including the M16A2.

The process of delivering the SA80 to the military inventory was fraught with controversy and unnecessary complexity, reinforcing the need for the infantry to exert more direct control over future weapon acquisitions. This experience resulted in a mistrust of expert advice in the user community following the difficult separation between Enfield and the government. It emphasized the importance of prioritizing military judgment over other expert opinions when discussing small arms acquisition.

# ? Jul 15, 2023 18:58

Torpor: Oct 20, 2008; .. and now for my next trick, I'll pretend to be a political commentator...

HONK HONK

gradenko_2000 posted:

https://twitter.com/GalenMetzger1/status/1679939044447522818?t=JI5fg2L3VuEK9-EnvWwuVA&s=19

https://twitter.com/GalenMetzger1/status/1679961192788369408?t=_Qt2CjoSpK-eIffHARjIPQ&s=19

https://twitter.com/GalenMetzger1/status/1679939805130690561?t=DkDFjEHvHINSGfdr7ZnWyA&s=19

Lol this is so stupid

battle of moscow is the correct answer anyway.

# ? Jul 15, 2023 19:05

Deadly Ham Sandwich: Aug 19, 2009; Smellrose

Frosted Flake posted:

Anyway, because this post has gone on too long and I have to run errands I'll leave it to someone else to pick up where I left off, but after 1991 the entire history of the air war over Vietnam was rewritten

# ? Jul 15, 2023 19:20

Frosted Flake: Sep 13, 2011; Semper Shitpost Ubique

I present to you: Mullen of Choice: What if a Rifle Was Gay?

# ? Jul 15, 2023 19:23

Ardennes: May 12, 2002

I would argue once the Germans committed to going through Barbarossa, not finishing off the British, it just the Soviet Union was a no win scenario.

All those are joke responses anyway.

# ? Jul 15, 2023 19:29

comedyblissoption: Mar 15, 2006

gradenko_2000 posted:

https://twitter.com/berlin_bridge/status/1679934822305677337?t=1dNqFHG8cO5a8ibxK-h95g&s=19

shes right

# ? Jul 15, 2023 19:30

Isentropy: Dec 12, 2010

sum posted:

Considering this was even published in the first place, it looks like the White House is telling Zelensky to shut up and the lose war quietly.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/07/13/zelensky-ukraine-nato-invitation/

lol about 70 years ago there would be a CIA guy tasked to beat him up until he gave the approved version of the speech � la Lansdale in The Philippines

# ? Jul 15, 2023 19:32

comedyblissoption: Mar 15, 2006

the peace trolls are at it again
https://twitter.com/bennyjohnson/status/1679925565036347397

comedyblissoption has issued a correction as of 19:47 on Jul 15, 2023

# ? Jul 15, 2023 19:36

stephenthinkpad: Jan 2, 2020

Hitler should have allied with Soviet to fight all the Anglo/Oceanic powers. Big mistake.

World Island Supremecy is the only way to go.

# ? Jul 15, 2023 19:37

AnimeIsTrash: Jun 30, 2018

stephenthinkpad posted:

Hitler should have allied with Soviet to fight all the Anglo/Oceanic powers. Big mistake.

World Island Supremecy is the only way to go.

hmm

# ? Jul 15, 2023 19:38

PhilippAchtel: May 31, 2011

gradenko_2000 posted:

https://twitter.com/berlin_bridge/status/1679934822305677337?t=1dNqFHG8cO5a8ibxK-h95g&s=19

lol

https://twitter.com/berlin_bridge/status/1654854016898138118

Apparently posting like this means you sympathize with Ukrainians, but saying maybe Ukraine can't win on its terms and failed offensives are a waste of human life means you're a monster.

PhilippAchtel has issued a correction as of 19:41 on Jul 15, 2023

# ? Jul 15, 2023 19:39

Regarde Aduck: Oct 19, 2012; c l o u d k i t t e n; Grimey Drawer

stephenthinkpad posted:

Hitler should have allied with Soviet to fight all the Anglo/Oceanic powers. Big mistake.

World Island Supremecy is the only way to go.

i.. uhhh hmmmm

edit: thought really hard about this and i don't think that would have been good at all

Regarde Aduck has issued a correction as of 19:46 on Jul 15, 2023

# ? Jul 15, 2023 19:42

Honky Mao: Dec 26, 2012

stephenthinkpad posted:

Hitler should have allied with Soviet to fight all the Anglo/Oceanic powers. Big mistake.

World Island Supremecy is the only way to go.

thats exactly what happened

# ? Jul 15, 2023 19:56

comedyblissoption: Mar 15, 2006

tucker carlson asks if we should be sending cluster bombs to ukraine
https://twitter.com/RealVinnieJames/status/1679893222112493569

# ? Jul 15, 2023 19:57

Marenghi: Oct 16, 2008; Don't trust the liberals,
they will betray you

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/07/13/biden-military-reservists-europe-deployment-00106271

quote:

Biden orders 3,000 reservists to be ready for Europe deployments

Is Biden mobilizing troops to support Ukraine

# ? Jul 15, 2023 20:00

BadOptics: Sep 11, 2012

Marenghi posted:

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/07/13/biden-military-reservists-europe-deployment-00106271

Is Biden mobilizing troops to support Ukraine

Can't get enough kids to join the army anymore, so instead they get to deploy cops that play soldier every few weekends. It'd be fun to compare alcohol-related incidents near where ever these guys are going in a few months.

# ? Jul 15, 2023 20:05

Adbot: ADBOT LOVES YOU

# ? May 25, 2024 04:16

comedyblissoption: Mar 15, 2006

the only candidates or sitting politicians saying ukraine should sue for peace asap like carlson is saying here that im aware of are west and trump
https://twitter.com/KanekoaTheGreat/status/1677368229499645953

# ? Jul 15, 2023 20:05

The Something Awful Forums > Discussion > C-SPAM > [Ukraine] EU: Nice minister, shame if something were to happen...

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