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spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






hello friends

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spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






Lain Iwakura posted:

No Defcon for me this year but likely next.

Same

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






I hope this one comes in via email and then spreads internally

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






Wiggly Wayne DDS posted:

i saw talk of email spreading petya earlier before eternalblue got mentioned so i'd expect that amongst other spreading mechanisms

good, gooood


because that was wannacry's greatest flaw imo, it would _only_ spread through eternalblue

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






Shifty Pony posted:

it also would fail to properly execute on XP, causing the computer to blue screen instead of becoming encrypted.

seems like that happens in this one too:

https://twitter.com/PolarToffee/status/879718578798436352

who knows how many people were saved by the accidental triggering of the kill switch in wannacry and thought that they weren't vulnerable as a result.

It wasn't even meant to be a kill switch, we got really lucky with that one

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






Jabor posted:

poorly-conceived anti-analysis tech was the prevailing assumption afaik.

malware sandboxes typically send stock "yes it exists" replies to dns queries for a bunch of reasons. so you make a request to a bogus domain name that's never gonna be registered, and if dns claims it exists then you're probably in a malware sandbox so you should bail out to avoid leaking your secrets.

sounds like a good idea until you notice the kill-switch potential.

This.

What they did was use a single, hard-coded, unregistered domain to check if the sample is running in a sandbox. It was then trivial to register that domain. The guy (MalwareTech) didn't even know the malware would stop working if the domain were registered. He just thought he was sinkholing it.

Now, to do this properly you should use domains that are randomly-generated on the spot and not beforehand, and you query several so you can recover from a false positive if a random domain happens to be registered.

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






Migishu posted:

Looking forward to the Wiggly Wayne DDS overview of Defcon videos

not going this year so :same:

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






Wiggly Wayne DDS posted:

eh i never do defcon (nor ever have), rarely anything of value. based on their speaker page for this year there's only a handful of interesting talks, and even then it's just further details of public research (sha-1 collision)

You don't go to def con for the talks tbqh

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






https://steemit.com/shadowbrokers/@theshadowbrokers/theshadowbrokers-monthly-dump-service-july-2017 posted:

TheShadowBrokers is having special invitation message for “doctor” person theshadowbrokers is meeting on Twitter. “Doctor” person is writing ugly tweets to theshadowbrokers not unusual but “doctor” person is living in Hawaii and is sounding knowledgeable about theequationgroup. Then “doctor” person is deleting ugly tweets, maybe too much drinking and tweeting? Is very strange, so theshadowbrokers is doing some digging. TheShadowBrokers is thinking “doctor” person is former EquationGroup developer who built many tools and hacked organization in China. TheShadowBrokers is thinking “doctor” person is co-founder of new security company and is having much venture capital. TheShadowBrokers is hoping “doctor” person is deciding to subscribe to dump service in July. If theshadowbrokers is not seeing subscription payment with corporate email address of doctor@newsecuritycompany.com then theshadowbrokers might be taking tweets personally and dumping data of “doctor” persons hacks of China with real id and security company name. TheShadowBrokers is thinking this outcome may be having negative financial impact on new security companies international sales, so hoping “doctor” person and security company is making smart choice and subscribe. But is being “doctor” persons choice. Is not being smart choice to be making ugly tweets with enough personal information to DOX self AND being former equation group AND being co-founder of security company.

Straight up blackmail lmao

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






Much is unclear right now, but imo it's clear that it was targeted against Ukraine. Hmm who would want to do such a thing? :thunk:

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






infernal machines posted:

a breathless and poorly written piece on the petya variant that hit recently

tl;dr: it's not really ransomware as it straight up overwrites the boot sector and subsequent blocks, there's no way to decrypt them because they weren't actually encrypted at all, presumably this is by design.

for some reason it ignores the existence of low level file recovery tools like testdisk and photorec, which will likely recover the file data regardless of mbr and mft damage

e: the implication being this is a state-level attack disguised to look like ransomware to generate a different narrative

Malware Tech refutes this:

https://www.malwaretech.com/2017/06/petya-ransomware-attack-whats-known.html


The fact remains that the installation ID is generated randomly though.

https://securelist.com/expetrpetyanotpetya-is-a-wiper-not-ransomware/78902/


I've looked at some samples today and the code does seem to support the theory, too early to tell though.

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






I agree with both of you. To me it's abundantly clear what the purpose of this malware is.

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






cinci zoo sniper posted:

that i kinda assumed it's russians just ukraining it away, i more thought some specific computer level macro objectives petya had that spankmeister may have implied

The initial infection vector is from a Ukranian company that makes tax return software. This company was hacked and made to push a malicious update to its users. A lot of businesses and government in Ukraine and businesses that deal with Ukraine use this software because it's one of the few that's allowed for use by the government.

So that makes it clear that Ukraine was the target.

Now the malware itself looks like a variant of Petya, which is an existing ransomware family. This is a false flag, smoke and mirrors. Why? Because there is no way of getting your files decrypted. This is because it generates a unique "Installation ID" which you're supposed to send along with your bitcoin wallet address that you made the payment from to an email address. They use a single hardcoded bitcoin wallet for every infection. This method requires manual verification and is completely ludicrous for a malware that has such aggressive spreading methods. Modern ransomware uses a more sophisticated backend that generates a unique bitcoin wallet for each infection which allows payments to be automatically verified over a tor backend.

Stupid verification method aside, the installation ID is completely random. There is _no_ way to link this ID to a specific infection. The malware authors cannot determine which key it belongs to. So there is no chance of this ever working as a "legitimate" ransomware.

And like Wiggly Wayne DDS said, Petya was a perfectly functional ransomware, there was no reason to make the changes that they did.

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






Cocoa Crispies posted:

so wait was there a new legit ransomware attack this week or is petya older and just the non-ransomware targeted at ukraine is new?

Petya is an older ransomware. The attack on Ukraine uses malware based heavily on Petya but it's not legit ransomware, it amounts to a wiper.

There was also a campaign with Loki making the rounds this week which caused some confusion but it's unrelated.

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008







wow, someone at fujitsu knows how to use nmap

such cyber

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






fins posted:

https://iss.oy.ne.ro/Shattered

An intersting attck vector, albeit not the stealthiest poc



Is it those Israeli stunt hacking guys?

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






ate all the Oreos posted:

"hospital" and "end of life" in the same sentence :ohdear:

The death panels are real! :freep:

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






Hmm slight chance I might be going to def con after all

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






Subjunctive posted:

I only do palliative software maintenance

As a Mozilla dev I,

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






working in the government space has taught me to just embrace cyber because then people will at least have a vague idea of what you're talking about

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008







Wish your posting rig would self destruct

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






Wiggly Wayne DDS posted:

cyber was definitely used by itself for years before then

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






It's pretty clever imo. I think we're going to see a shadowbrokers / guccifer 2.0 style disinformation campaign...

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






here's a video of the police raid on MEDoc, the company that (likely unwittingly) spread the NotPetya malware

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TY5f2fmwcDE

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






BangersInMyKnickers posted:

I'm going over the OpenSSL docs to review their cipher support (schannel/openssl configbomb incoming) and there are some PSK suites that have name strings that I am having a hard time parsing

code:
PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256               PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256
 PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384               PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384
 DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256           DHE-PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256
 DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384           DHE-PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384
 RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256           RSA-PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256
 RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384           RSA-PSK-AES256-GCM-SHA384
With those first two suites where they don't specify a key exchange mechanism, am I correct in assuming that is does key exchange in the clear? The other 4 specify DHE and RSA for key exchange so the nomenclature would seem to indicate that.

They do it's PSK i.e. a pre-shared key. Meaning you share the AES key offline beforehand.

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






BangersInMyKnickers posted:

So with the RSA/DH PSK variants are you pre-sharing the asymm keys and then letting it negotiating the sym key from there while PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 just pre-shares the symm key? I am concerned that the non-RSA/DH ciphers are doing something similar to these garbage anon suites through maybe that doesn't matter if you are assuming the out of band exchange was secure.

The DHE ones use a pre-shared key to authenticate the DH key exchange. Because as you probably know DH does not offer authentication, only key exchange.

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/TLS-PSK

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






Number19 posted:

any bets on what type of software this one's in?

i'm guessing it's in a popular VPN client since he hasn't really looked at those yet and openvpn has been getting audits lately. if it is it's going to be Real Bad

That's a strange guess, what makes you say that?

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






I don't know if this user1 has any infosec knowledge or anything but it seems to me they dont actually know what an 0day is.

0day is becoming one of those terms that gets thrown around without people knowing what it really means, just yesterday I was talking to some non-techies about wannacry and nyetya and one of them thought and 0day was a backdoor and persistence mechanism.

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u7ERHEJLmWc

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






I use antifa on all my accounts

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






Beverly hills nine zero two one zero

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






By the way the plural is zeroes day

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






I'm not going this year :(

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






lmfao if you use computers at all imo

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






WAR DOGS OF SOCHI posted:

i saw that the petya decryption key was released just the other day

practically speaking, how are they obtaining the keys to these ransomwares? i mean, they must be using a crap algorithm in order for this to be possible, right?

A few things are in play here:

The recent attack on Ukraine was performed using a modified version of Petya, known as NotPetya, ExPetya, Nyetya etc. Modifications included the delivery method (EternalBlue and Powershell/WMI) and a hastily-implemented payment mechanism which didn't work.
These modifications were done without having acces to the original source code. I.e. likely not by the original authors of Petya.

"Janus" the original author of Petya, contacted Hasherezade, a malware researcher, and gave her the master key for the previous versions of Petya. I.e. the OG ransomware version, not the one used in the attacks. This key cannot be used to decrypt NotPetya.

Now, the Petya familiy of ransomware can work in two modes: If it has no administrator privileges it encrypts the files on the machine with the current user credentials using AES. If it _does_ have admin, it will write a new bootloader to the MBR that will encrypt the entire drive using Salsa20.

Most recently it became known that certain errors were made in the implementation of said Salsa20 encryption, possibly allowing for the decryption of files.

You can read about this recent development here: http://blog.ptsecurity.com/2017/07/recovering-data-from-disk-encrypted-by.html

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






BangersInMyKnickers posted:

Yeah, I will look in to it this week

Oh I've been meaning to ask you why you chose the ecc curve order that you did.

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






He registered a company in that name to get the code signing cert lmfao

spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






BangersInMyKnickers posted:

Anything in particular? I lean to the NIST curves over Brainpool because I feel they are more heavily vetted (and I am a CIA plant). 25519 is young but under a lot of review, with a strength roughly equivalent to P256 so it goes in the middle.

Thanks. Nothing in particular, just wanted to know your reasoning.

Some of the curves are unsafe according to djb et al: https://safecurves.cr.yp.to/

But I don't know enough about ecc to really understand the implications of "unsafe" curves.

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spankmeister
Jun 15, 2008






I went to this crypto museum last year and they had a large collection of enigmas and we weren't tuoposed to touch it but I couldn't help myself. It's a very satisfying machine.

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